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FACT AND VALUE

INTERESTING evidence of the psycho-physical transition now going on is found in an article in the Winter 1982 *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* by David Bakan, who teaches psychology at York University, Toronto. He contends that while the prevailing scientific philosophy, known as Positivism, may have value as a guide to the physical sciences, it is useless for understanding human beings. Positivism declares that there is no real knowledge save knowledge of *facts*, and facts are known only through the senses. Since such facts are claimed to be beyond dispute, they are the only knowledge worth having. Bakan's article is titled "War," an undertaking which he connects with the positivistic outlook:

> I would like to dwell a bit on the notion of force. As I have already suggested, force is a principal concept associated with the military. We speak of the armed forces. It is also the principal concept associated with the history of modern science. The giant step in the history of science was made by Isaac Newton in his explication of force, especially in the laws of motion. The convergence is considerably deeper than mere linguistic coincidence, for it is largely on the ground of Newton's explication of force that all of the subsequent development of the physical sciences took place. With it, historically inordinate physical forces, to be exerted at will, to be used to destroy structures and kill people, were placed in the hands of fighting men.
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> Now for positivism the only valid knowledge is that which is given by science, with physical science standing as its chief model. Physicalistic facts are the only valid objects of knowledge. The positivistic position denies the existence or intelligibility of any other forces but physicalistic ones. Anything else exceeds the boundary of fact and scientific law. Any form of thought or procedure of investigation that is not reducible to the scientific method thus conceived is illegitimate. In the social sciences, positivism expresses itself as behaviorism in psychology. It has also led to the redesignation of the social sciences as "behavioral" sciences. It leads to the denial of mind, the failure to study it, and ultimately to mindlessness in practical action, by denying the effectiveness of mind in the world.

Now some history and the connection of positivism with war:

> Positivism came into existence in the early nineteenth century when the industrial revolution was well under way. It came in the wake of the great optimism, which was associated with various developments in technology, a technology that also had dramatic consequences for the conduct of war. Science was raised up in prestige, and positivistic writers proclaimed its significance for all realms of human existence, including politics, ethics, and even religion. . . .
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> Great reinforcement of this positivistic vision came with and especially after, World War II, in which science contributed variously to the war effort. The most notable and ultimate contribution of science was the atom bomb, giving more destructive force than had ever been dreamed of. Following the war there was a massive program of support of the sciences, including a major support program of basic research that was almost completely dominated by this positivistic vision.

In other words, Positivism *works*, and the proof of its effectiveness lies in that ultimate test of the modern age—success in war. There are of course other criticisms of Positivism. It has no comprehension of literature, art, or philosophy, although positivists may play around in these areas. It rules out all forms of the transcendental and has no vocabulary for human qualities such as creativity, nobility, aspiration, and vision.

Actually, these criticisms are quite familiar, having been repeated for at least a century, although without much effect on the general population. Moreover, it is likely that not one in a thousand among ordinary people knows what "Positivism" means, so that debates about its merit or demerit have little meaning except for academics. One could say, then, that arguments

against Positivism have little importance, since they afford weight only with a very small proportion of mankind, but this overlooks the far-reaching effect of the scientific outlook on Western culture as a whole. The "trickle down" theory has more application in the world of ideas than in economics. Bertrand Russell's assertion that "what science cannot tell us, mankind cannot know" has been for close to a century the tacit assumption of the active and productive members of society. Human ideals may not have "disappeared," but they have lost their roots. When ordinary people, respecting learning, turn to scholars and scientists for serious counsel and help in understanding the meaning of life, they find that science has precisely nothing to say on the subject. They are told that eventually, when "all the facts are in," the scientific picture of the world may all come together, disclosing such meanings as may exist, but that in the present we are still busy accumulating facts. There is, in short, no moral culture that supports our civilization, no living tradition of the sort that gave purpose and distinction to the great societies of the past.

But this is not the criticism brought forward by David Bakan. He shows, at some length, that even ordinary human pursuits cannot be carried on with only the rules of positivism for guide. Facts may be certain and unambiguous, but their use and interpretation take place in another universe of discourse. Central to the work of the detective, for example, is an exercise of intelligence concerning what is "intrinsically unavailable to direct observation."

> The detective's technique is to gather data, imagine possibilities, choose among them, and construct a coherent historical scenario. Perception, imagination, and ability to comprehend the logic of events, both forward and backward in time, are his or her major resources. The detective assumes that within physical actuality there is never any contradiction while within human minds and tales contradictions—and therefore conflicts as well—may prevail. One of the detective's major techniques is to imagine contradictory possibilities and to bring actual data to bear in choosing among them. It was in my consideration of the detective that I became even more sharply aware of a limitation of the positivist view of science than I was before this exercise. It is possible to gain knowledge of that which is unique, not directly observable, and not replicable. The everyday assumption of the detective is that it is possible for the mind to apprehend that which is not apprehensible by the senses, if we may go back to that old platonic distinction.

Bakan carries the distinction further—to brilliant warriors—showing that great military leaders make practical use of the technology supplied to them by science, but put aside the rules of science when it comes to strategy. Napoleon, Lawrence of Arabia, Rommel, and General Giap against the Americans in Vietnam, are his illustrations. They work as detectives do, supposing, imagining, and anticipating. Free-ranging non-positivist intelligence is essential to victory. This is the common sense, the "everyday asumption" of practical men, by whom the intellectualist world of positivist thinking is ignored and left behind.

Meanwhile, the men of learning (many of them) ignore the realities of mind, of human intelligence, which is indeed a major "force" in human affairs, and teach in the universities according to the positivist model of the physical sciences. As Bakan says:

> Positivistically influenced social science literature characteristically disallows the existence of other minds. In the seemingly more sophisticated presentations, the existence of other minds is said to be simply an inference on unreliable extrapolation from a single case; mind cannot be an object of scientific investigation because it is not publicly observable; observations of mind are not subject to replication, and the social sciences can only be pursued by the collection of facts of overt behavior. Not only is the mind not recognized as a force in events; its very existence is denied as a proper object of study.

This makes for virtual intellectual paralysis in social studies. How can social investigations lead to first principles for social science without primary attention to human beings *as they are,* not

as they are reduced by positivist assumption? As Bakan says:

> If the social sciences are to advance so that they might be of use to people—in the odd undesirable instance of military efforts, but, more important, for the general solution of political, social, and economic problems—anthropogenesis itself must become a major topic of investigation. Only through the proper understanding of human anthropogenesis will we be able to bring even our own anthropogenesis fully to bear to serve our ends. As long as the social sciences take the physical sciences as their model, the most critical thing associated with human beings, anthropogenesis, is systematically excluded.

Anthropogenesis is the study of the origin and development of man. Since mind—active, artificing, imaginative, and reflective mind—is what differentiates humans from the rest of nature, anthropogenesis means above all the study of the mind, not as a derivative phenomenon, but as a thing in itself. David Bakan's conclusion seems a useful sort of special pleading:

> Historically, science served the military by helping improve the technology of warfare, and mostly by increasing the available physical force of arms. Its role in such technology has characteristically been one of the main reasons for the support of science by governments, at least since the time of Napoleon; and it continues to be one of the main factors in the current support of science. A fashioning of the ideology of science around this function has taken place, expressed largely in that which I am calling positivism taking physical force as the nucleus of all knowledge. One of the main consequences of this has been a great dampening of the advance of the social sciences through the systematic ignoring of human anthropogenesis as a major force in all events. We are left with a great understanding of ways of physical destruction by people, but precious little of the people who may exert the power of such destruction—and the people who could eliminate it.

What David Bakan is calling for here—it really goes far beyond the world of the academy and the "social sciences"—is a fundamental change in the idea of knowledge and how it is obtained. He wants knowledge to be founded on *meaning,* for the very good reason that humans are meaning-seeking beings. He wants education to become once more a cultivation and refinement of common sense, instead of its enemy. He wants learning to be again a source of true civilization, to give potential coherence and unity to the struggle of human beings to understand themselves and the world around them, and to work together for the common good. This is nothing less than a revolutionary goal.

There have been such high civilizations in the past—in India, China, and perhaps Egypt—but we cannot borrow as hearsay from these ancient cultures their primary assumptions and social systems because they were all *theocracies,* and we have been through the fires of an intense historical struggle for independence of mind which we cannot, must not, give up. Yet we can nonetheless learn from the teachers and makers of those civilizations. The problem is to restore the basic assumptions concerning the dignity and promise of human beings, but without using the familiar instruments of "mind-control" that made dogmatic religion a hateful and anti-human thing.

This means a program of education which is deliberate, yet becomes "traditional" in the sense that it is seated beside the cradle and presides at hearth and home. Plato (as shown by Herbert Read in *The Redemption of the Robot*), Froebel, and Montessori understood this need well, and there have been others. We need diverse imagery of a mythic sort for childhood learning, yet used in a way that can be outgrown or deepened without being abandoned in the progress toward maturity. It means saturating the materials which feed the human psyche with the imageries of aspiration, of altruistic responsibility and fellow feeling. The gradual rendition of these colorful ideas into abstract principles *is* the process of growing up, and the community where this is recognized will be more than a practical arrangement for sharing in the public good; it will also be the educational institution of the whole, as with the ancient Greeks.

Accepting this as a good idea is one thing; deciding how to do it responsibly, and even *scientifically,* is quite another. We can't "make up" a suitable metaphysics—guesswork is not the answer. But the beginning of a psychophilosophical program of self-education has been formulated by a man of our time, based on the scientific investigation of the peak experience. In *Farther Reaches of Haman Nature* (Viking, 1971), in the chapter, "Fusions of Facts and Values," A. H. Maslow proposed that we take the reports of these sublime subjective experiences as "facts about the world."

> They are descriptions of what the world appears to be, what it looks like, even, they claim, of what it is. They were in the same category as the descriptions that a newspaper reporter or a scientific observer would use after witnessing some event. They are not "ought" or "should" statements, nor are they merely projections of the investigator's wishes. They are not hallucinations; they are not merely emotional states, lacking cognitive reference. They are reported as illuminations, as true and veridical characteristics of reality which previous blindness has hidden. . . .
>
> These are the most inspiring values of life; these are the ones that people are willing to die for; these are the ones they are willing to pay for with effort, pain, and torture. These are also the "highest" values in the sense that they come most often to the best people, in their best moments under the best conditions. These are the definitions of the higher life, of the good life, of the spiritual life, and, I may also add, these are the far goals of psychotherapy, and the far goals of education in the broadest sense. These are qualities for which we admire the great men of human history, that characterize our heroes, our saints, even our Gods.

Maslow held that a scientific sort of knowledge of these values is both possible and necessary:

> The questions that people ask in the search for identity, real self, etc., are very largely "ought" questions: What ought I to do? What ought I to be? How should I solve this conflict situation? . . . . Most untutored people are quite willing to answer these questions directly. "If I were you . . ." they say, and then proceed with suggestions and advice. But technically trained people have learned that this doesn't work or is even harmful. We don't say what we think another ought to do.

There is no "thought-control" in this proposal or program. It is a return to investigation of the realities in our lives which are not apprehended by the senses, which are in fact the essential core of our being. This is the twentieth-century version of "Every man his own priest." Maslow says:

> What we have learned is that ultimately, the best way for a person to discover what he ought to do is to find out who and what he is, because the path to ethical and value decisions, to wiser choices, to oughtness, is via "isness," via the discovery of facts, truths, reality, the nature of the particular person. The more he knows about his own nature, his deep wishes, his temperament, his constitution, what he seeks and yearns for and what really satisfies him, the more effortless, automatic, and epiphenomenal become his value choices. (This is one of the great Freudian discoveries, and one which is often overlooked.) Many problems simply disappear; many others are easily solved by knowing what is in conformity with one's own nature, what is suitable and right. (And we must remember that knowledge of one's *own* deep nature is also simultaneously knowledge of human nature in general.)
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> Discovering one's real nature is simultaneously an *ought* quest and an *is* quest. This kind of value quest, since it is a quest for knowledge, facts, and information, that is, for truth, is squarely within the jurisdiction of a sensibly defined science. . . .
>
> Here "value," in the sense of *telos*, of the end toward which you are striving, the terminus, the Heaven, exists right now. The self, toward which one is struggling, exists right now in a very real sense, just as real education, rather than being the diploma that one gets at the end of a four-year road, is the moment to moment to moment process of learning, perceiving, thinking. Religion's Heaven, which one is supposed to enter after life is over—life itself being meaningless—is actually available in principle all through life. It is available to us now, and is all around us.

There are moments, as above, when Maslow sounds like Meister Eckhart, yet he is still a tough-minded scientist who applies intellectual rigor in his inquiries. Through him, and others like him—if any turn up—we may gain insight

into the quality of "an inspiration of one's own." in unity with the scientific spirit.

We should remember that the isolation of fact from value was really a protective device of the early scientists who wanted to preserve the impartiality of their researches from priestly or ideological interference. Value is the very stuff of human existence, and ultimately all "facts" gain their coloring and significance from the context of values in which they are identified. Maslow worked to restore this original unity of fact and value, while pointing out that each must make his own fusions of the two.

This is a time of beginnings. Quite evidently, one necessary beginning, if there is to be any future for the human race, is the restoration in culture of the idea that human life is the pursuit of value, meaning, and transcendence. The fabric of family and community life is woven of these ideas. Maslow was one—and there are others—who worked toward this realization in ways that can be incorporated into the patterns of everyday life.

REVIEW
PANTHEIST PHILOSOPHER

IN his twenty-fourth year Baruch Spinoza was excommunicated by the Jewish Synagogue of the Netherlands (where his family had taken refuge from the Inquisition) by reason of his unorthodox and heretical ideas. This was in the year 1656. The Jewish leaders recognized his scholarly brilliance and offered him a pension if he would outwardly conform and appear now and then at the synagogue, but this hypocrisy was abhorrent to Spinoza's nature. Thereafter he went by the name of Benedict. Friends and admirers tried to convert him to Catholicism, but with no success. Only two of his books were published during his lifetime, his major work, the *Ethics*, appearing a year after his death in 1677.

There is now available a new edition of the *Ethics*, edited by S. P. R. Charter, and published by Joseph Simon, Box 4071, Malibu, Calif. 90265, in a beautifully designed book with slip cover, at $40, plus $1 for shipping. The translation used is the one done by R. H. M. Elwes in 1883.

Spinoza, Charter says in his introduction, considered himself "to be beyond all structured religions." He kept up through correspondence with the philosophical development of his time and exchanged letters with members of the Royal Society in London, who informed him of the progress of scientific discoveries. For a living he ground lenses, and in consequence exchanged ideas on optics with Gottfried Leibniz. While life was never easy, Spinoza remained a serene man. Charter puts it well:

> To be a Jew was always difficult. To be a convert to another religion, especially a prevailing one such as Roman Catholicism, made the convert somewhat acceptable to his new-found co-religionists. But to be a Jew uncommitted to any organized religion—and to be Godly in his uncommitment as Spinoza certainly was—made him unacceptable to all, except those of like-minded spirit.
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> While Spinoza tried to live as modestly and quietly as he could and with as few possible external complications, his work widened his reputation and involvement to the point where he was, upon occasion, actually threatened. Spinoza's circle of acquaintances, correspondents, and prestige grew ever wider over the years to include atronomers, mathematicians, physicians, philosophers and pursuers of scientific inquiry, Christian theologians, defrocked priests, and so on. There is reason to believe that Rembrandt (1606-1669) taught him drawing, and may have used him as a model in some of his paintings.
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> Spinoza was a modest man in terms of his person; he lived among strangers, with no family of his own. But he was an aroused Lion—not of Judah, but of all life—when it came to his thoughts and his work. He was a man not only of his age, but for all ages, in the everlasting quest of the nature of the interrelationship of the individual and the cosmos. While the quest may be unanswerable by the finite brain seeking to think infinite thoughts, the processes of inquiry of themselves bring the seeker nearer to God than the angels.

To Spinoza, Charter says, "Nature and everything it contained was God. . . . throughout [the text] the capitalized word Nature is synonymous with the word God, for so it was to Spinoza." There is this further comment on the shaping of Spinoza's thought:

> The mystery of the mind is an abiding one. While the biological intricacies of the brain become increasingly more defined through research into its material matter and physiological function, the mind remains elusive; but its "products" are the most enriching of human endeavors. Since the beginnings of Man the inquiring mind, however primitive, sought to grasp, and indeed to embrace, a largeness beyond self and beyond immediacy. Incapable of conceiving of "nothingness," except as an absence of "somethingness," the human mind created a miraculous *somethingness* in its own magnified human image and gave to it the divine title of Deity. Deity therefore existed through human necessity and acceptance. By extension, however inarticulate, without Man there is no God.
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> To Spinoza this was untenable for many reasons. It reduced God and all of Nature to Man's dependency, and made Man superior to every thing and being that existed or could exist. To him Man

was not made in the image of God, for God has no image. Man therefore made God in his, man's limited image; and when he prays to God and sings to him his harmonious hymns it is not because God wants or needs them but because man does.

Man and everything else on Earth and in the cosmos are distinct entities to Spinoza—*and Nature encompasses all within Nature's own logicality and inevitability.* This is the heartbeat of Spinoza's pantheism, so different from the pantheism of the ancient Greeks with their multitudes of gods and goddesses.

Spinoza, as Charter says, is difficult—difficult to read and difficult to understand. He adopted the mathematical or geometrical style of exposition, not alone for its precision and clarity, it has been said, but also for its absolute impersonality and passionlessness. He begins, as a mathematician should, with his Definitions, proceeds to his Axioms, and then to the Propositions. We take for example Proposition IV, in the first of the five books of the *Ethics*, which is titled "Concerning God."

Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof: Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else—that is, nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words, their attributes and modifications. Q. *E. D.*

The reader realizes that it will take some time, not only to follow the line of Spinoza's reasoning, but to persuade himself that it is worth doing. Abstract metaphysical analysis is not something that we are used to. Yet the metaphysics of the first Book, concerning God, establishes the principle that the processes of nature have their origin in and are expressions of the mind of God, in which all that is participates, so that there is in man as his essential being a divine and eternal reality as well as a mortal aspect. The later books develop the consequences of this principle in thought and behavior in terms of a psychology well within our grasp. Our mind, Spinoza says, "in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God." (V, XL, Note.) The Note which concludes the *Ethics* is this:

I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were, unwitting of himself, and of God, and of thing, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain external necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.

This closing passage may be taken as an explanation of why Spinoza has been an undying influence on so many distinguished minds in the West. He speaks to the quality of heroic aspiration in human beings. And when this appeal is joined with extraordinary insight into the foibles self-deceptions, and possibilities of human nature, as it is in Spinoza, he becomes guide, philosopher, and friend to the noblest minds and liberated spirits of the age.

We give a passage in Book V to illustrate the persuasive sagacity of Spinoza's moral psychology:

Prop. LVII. *The proud man delights in the company of falterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.*

Proof: Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over-estimation of himself; this estimation the proud man will endeavor to foster by all the means in his power; he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is too well known to need definition here) and will avoid the company of high-minded men, who value him according to his deserts. *Q. E. D.*

He adds this Note:

It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are prey to all the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation of other people, and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite quality to this sort of pride may be defined as pain arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. Such being the case, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily envious, and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.

Spinoza is persuaded that there is a calculus of moral excellence as precise as Euclid's demonstrations, and his *Ethics* is a treatise on the use of this discipline. He is, one could say, a pioneering scientist of the balance, meaning, and decisions of the inner or subjective life. In these days of a return to ideas of responsibility and underlying human obligation, based on admission of nature's higher laws, Spinoza is increasingly recognized as one who gave rational ground to such convictions. We are indebted to Mr. Charter and Mr. Simon for restoring his historic work to exquisite print.

COMMENTARY
THE COUNTERPOINT OF ARTISTS

THE protest, criticism, and affirmation by humanistic psychologists recorded in this week's lead article have strong and articulate accompaniment from artists. The changes we seek will become easier—even natural—when such expressions are heard, and honored. Here is one of them, by Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, in *Matrix of Man* (Praeger, 1968), a book on the meaning of cities—what is and what ought to be:

> Twentieth century man is drunk with achievements in one single field of human endeavor: science. Full of self-adoration because he has created a technological-industrial discipline without precedent, he thinks he has severed his ties with historical continuity. . . . . The technocratic illusion that man-made environment can ever be the image of a permanent scientific order is blind to the historical evidence that cities are governed by a tacit agreement on multiplicity, contradiction, tenacious tradition, reckless progress, and a limitless tolerance for individual values. Science must be specalized isolating, value-indifferent, and purely quantitative. With our capacity for incongruous comparisons, we try to solve qualitative problems of racial and social relationships with quantitative statistics; we attach significance to the ratio of old slum units to new slum units because the scientific determination of the last century postulated that man is a product of his physical environment. The qualitative aspect of the city is the content of this environment, which is nonscientific, because its single definable denominator is social and spiritual self-preservation at maximum well-being. No other epoch has received more persuasive proof of the split between human content and ahuman objectivity than ours. The blind logic of science takes its course regardless of the effects of air, water and food pollution, drugs, chemical and nuclear weapons, speed and the combustion engine. But in architecture and planning, only that is good which serves the human condition at a particular stage of existence.

Then, in *The Man-Made Object* (Kepes, ea., Braziller, 1966), Michael Thee, an English architect, says:

> For the primitive his wooden bowl is valued, fingered, felt, and known; a true man-made extension, his spoon a prehensile projection of his own anatomy. Each of his few possessions has a similar intense reality, each is necessary and life-enhancing. It is surely experientially relevant to ask to what extent such identity can be offered by or demanded of the trivia of materialistic society, the paper plate, the plastic spoon.

The objects named may be trivial; the questions raised are not.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
CHILD PHILOSOPHERS

A PAPER in the *Harvard Educational Review* for August 1981 should not pass without notice, since it combines importance with a great deal of charm. The writer, Matthew Lipman (who teaches philosophy at Montclair State College), gives admiring attention to a book published in 1980 by Harvard University Press—*Philosophy and the Young Child*, by Gareth B. Matthews. (Ordinarily we don't review other "reviews," but obtain the text; in this case, however, the justification is strong.) The reviewer begins:

> Here is a book that says not a word about education and yet should be studied carefully by every student teacher; a book that alludes only occasionally to significant ideas in the history of philosophy, yet introduces college students to the pulsing life of philosophic thought. After all, those who study philosophy had best begin, not with the refined end-products of earlier philosophic inquiries, but with the gross subject matter of philosophic thought in all its crude puzzlement and fresh wonder. Proceeding then to reflect upon the experience, one processes and refines it, simultaneously re-enacting to some extent the history of the philosophic discipline in the spirit of that discipline, until one discovers ideas that others have discovered or devises some that are new and excitingly one's own. The roots of our philosophic experience reach down into the rich loam of childhood. To examine these roots, without romanticizing them or treating them condescendingly, is to provide a new perspective on childhood and on the nature of philosophy as well.

Suggesting that Mr. Matthews has done this is high praise of his book. The author, the reviewer says, reproaches Bruno Bettelheim for assuming that children are mainly emotional beings who do not "think." Matthews writes: "A child whose literary diet includes tales of great emotional significance but no tales of intellectual adventure is disadvantaged and deprived in a way that Bettelheim has failed to appreciate."

> What Matthews shows us, with skill, charm, and apparent ease, is how children raise the same kinds of questions that philosophers raise and demand the meanings of terms that the rest of us take for granted. The result is to make clear that philosophers have certain skills which are indispensable to teachers and parents who want their conversations with children to make sense and to have integrity. Adults must be prepared to respond to the philosophical dimensions of the child's discourse, or else they may fail to hear what the child is trying to say, or what the child actually says.

Will philosophic inquiry dull the fantasy so natural in children? Replying, the reviewer says:

> To those who hold such a romantic view of childhood one might respond by arguing that the idyllic childhood without crises or conflicts is a myth, that children are reasonable creatures whose great vulnerability comes far more from inexperience than from inability to reason, and that children would likely welcome with exuberance an educational program that would help them think more effectively about matters of importance to them.

Piaget comes in for a share of criticism. According to Matthew:

> Mature and responsible adults, Piaget appears to believe, do not engage in whimsical speculations or find themselves puzzled about how things stand in the world—they know how things stand. But Matthews sees himself as typical of most philosophers who are just as puzzled as a child when confronted with such questions as, "Were you in the dream or was the dream in you?" For Matthews, one cannot truly understand the mind of the child if one is insensitive to the fact that the child's puzzlement is shared by the adult philosopher. . . . So often we accuse the child of being illogical, as if weak reasoning powers, rather than a lack of experience, were the cause of the incorrect judgment. But, as Joseph Jastrow has noted, we have only to turn to the adult world to see the impropriety of our appraisal. Many distinguished scholars, capable of reasoning quite ably in matters about which they are knowledgeable, reason abominably in matters about which they are poorly informed. We ourselves commit the same error when out of ignorance of the nature of children's thinking, we blame their faulty judgments on their inability to reason rather than on their inexperience.

Matthews relates a conversation with a nine-year-old epistemologist:

"Take the word 'center'," said John, finally. "What does it mean?"

"Well, I could give you another word for it," I said "maybe 'middle'."

"Yeah," said John, "but what does 'middle' mean?"

"Suppose I give you a word for *it*?"

"Okay," said John, "but if all you can do is give more words, how do you know what any words mean?"

There are other examples of juvenile profundity:

Matthews reports a conversation in which children are ridiculing the notion that we need two names, inasmuch as one of them might be lost. Everyone says one can't lose one's name—everyone, that is, except Adam, who asks

"What if you forgot it?" Jennifer replies, "You could ask your brother." But Adam isn't satisfied, and mischievously persists by asking, "But what if he forgets it?" . . .

Nor can we ignore the resemblance of the succinct remarks of the child to the brevity of pre-Socratic philosophical utterance, or to the parables and myths of Platonic and Eastern philosophy. Matthews reports his seven-year-old son remarking, "I wish everything was on a film and you could rewind it and do everything over. . . . Of course then it would just happen again, 'cause there's only one film."

Educators, the reviewer concludes, can disregard Matthews only at their peril.

This seems an appropriate place to note publication last year (by Schocken, at $24.95) of *Tales of King Arthur*, edited from the text of Thomas Malory and other sources by Michael Senior, a scholar and farmer of North Wales. The book is lavishly illustrated in full color from originals decorating medieval manuscripts of Arthurian stories. While this work will not replace the familiar children's versions of the stories about King Arthur and his Knights adults will appreciate having a text that is carefully compiled not only from Malory, but also from his sources, among them Nennius's *History*, the poems of Chretien de Troyes, and *The Mabinogion*. Various errors by copyists have been eliminated. Malory, we learn from Senior's introduction, was a knight who wrote in the time of Edward IV, and composed some of his work while in prison for siding with the Lancastrians in the War of the Roses in the fifteenth century. Malory locates Camelot at Winchester, the ancient seat of the kings of Wessex, which remained a royal headquarters even after the Norman invasion. The editor says:

The question of whether Arthur ever existed, in the sense of someone of that name and answering that description, is not really relevant. The existence of Arthur lies in the stories and ideas associated with him, and there is no doubt that these became attached at a very early date to the character of a British military leader of the period of late Celtic independence and early Anglo-Saxon invasion.

Arthur is said to have died in the year 539. He is called by scholars a "Dark Age leader," yet, in consideration of his character, and of the nobility of his knights and the spirit of their undertakings, one is obliged to wonder if our own age is not still darker, for we have no such transcendental conception of human life, no tale of a Grail to be seen faintly between the trees, and no ideal of heroism' sacrifice, and altruism such as the Arthurian legends convey. Both children and ourselves read the Arthurian stories for light of a sort our own time does not supply.

FRONTIERS

A Brief Comparison

THE dependence of our country's largest educational institutions on government grants and subsidies is often pointed out. Annual "contracts" range in the tens of millions of dollars with some state universities receiving as much as 70 or 80 million a year. Commenting in his latest book, Vine Deloria said that accepting these funds requires "the surrender of a great portion of the private identity of the recipient," which becomes "responsible for assisting in transmitting and promoting the government's image of American society." He adds:

> Defining major areas of income as privileges and demanding loyalty as the condition of receiving income meant a fundamental reversal of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The state, in granting privileges in return for loyalty, was in fact purchasing individual freedoms because dissent from government policies, for whatever reasons, was regarded not as the exercise of freedom of speech but disloyalty.

A further loss of the independence of the universities is described by David F. Noble in the *Nation* for Feb. 6. Writing under the title, "The Selling of the University," he begins:

> It used to be that big news from university science departments consisted of announcements of discoveries in the laboratory. In recent years, however, innovative arrangements for collaboration between universities and business have been making the headlines. Centers, programs and institutes for joint research in microelectronics, computer-based automation, telecommunications and biotechnology are proliferating on campuses across the land.
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> Thus, we hear that Carnegie Mellon University is cooperating with Westinghouse in robotics research, that Honeywell, Sperry Univac, General Electric (G.E.) and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing are partners with the University of Minnesota in its new Microelectronics and Information Center; that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is engaged in joint research with International Telephone and Telegraph, General Motors and ten other firms at M.I.T.'s Polymer Processing Laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and with Exxon in a landmark "combustion" project. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute is working with l.B.M., G.E., Grumman, Lockheed, Prime Computer, Bethlehem Steel and other corporations on computer-interactive graphics. In the "hot" field of genetic research, Harvard is paired with Monsanto, Washington University with Mallinckrodt, Massachusetts General Hospital with Hoechst A. G., a German chemical firm, Harvard Medical School with DuPont, and Cornell with several agribusiness firms.

There have been other such unions, the most notable being the affiliation of M. I. T. with the new Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, which allows to this privately controlled entity "an unheard-of degree of access to and control over university-based research." Patents growing out of this collaboration will belong to the Whitehead Institute instead of M.I.T. Opposing this arrangement were thirty-three full professors who declared that "such a close tie, with all its implications for our educational programs and academic independence, would be contrary to the best interests and academic integrity of M.I.T."

A *Nation* editorial pointed out that the taxpayers have contributed largely to the resource of universities, but have no assurance that they will "share in the prosperity that university-based research creates for the corporations." Again the question is asked:

> Who should control scientific knowledge? How can the public's interest in it be asserted? As a first step, the public should be made aware that scientific knowledge is not a university's to give away—or sell—to private interests.

Well, you can see it coming. We must now, it will be said, have a watchdog regulatory agency to make the institutions of higher learning do right by the taxpayers! We were once able to assume that universities are animated by wholehearted commitment to the public good, but now, since they largely constitute the "knowledge industry," they have something to sell instead of wisdom to impart, and on grounds of both academic freedom and free enterprise principles, they claim the right to do as they please. The *Nation* comments:

> These arrangements—most recently at the Whitehead Institute at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—do not take the public interest into account. As a high-level administrator at M.I.T. said recently, "M.I.T. is a privately controlled, privately owned, privately managed institution operating in the public interest." The assumption is that what is good for the university and what is good for business will be good for America.

That is one account of what is wrong with the universities. Another would be that the institutions of our society—the businesses, and now the universities—are behaving exactly as the American tradition of the acquisitive society instructs. This is how businessmen and administrators have been taught to think. Attention to the public good is a political afterthought, "sincere" enough, but hardly effective in action. One has only to read the books on the regulatory agencies—say, James Turner's *The Chemical Feast*, and similar studies—to recognize that the public good is part of the "also ran" category in our society.

There is only one way to create a society genuinely committed to the public good, and that is to *start* with this idea, and make it the shaping force in the evolution of culture.

This was what Gandhi set out to do. As Detlef Kantowsky says in the October 1981 *Gandhi Marg:*

> The term "Sarvodaya" was coined by Gandhi when he presented to his compatriots in South Africa in 1908 a free translation of selections from John Ruskin's *Unto this Last.* In his autobiography, he describes the decisive influence this anthology of four essays, first published in the *Cornhill Magazine* in 1860, on the "First Principles of Political Economy" had on his life from the day when he read them on a train journey in 1903: "The book was impossible to lay aside. It gripped me. Johannesburg to Durban was a twenty-four hours' journey. The train reached there in the evening. I could not get any sleep that night. I determined to change my life in accordance with the ideals of the book. I translated it later into Gujarati, entitling it *Sarvodaya* (the welfare of all).

Kantowsky gives ten principles outlining the character of the Sarvodaya Social Order, to be achieved by nonviolent revolution:

> (1) Striving for self-knowledge, self-reliance. (2) Motivation based on spiritual values rooted in national culture. (3) Respect for virtue, wisdom, moral capability. Truth, Non-Violence and Self-Denial dominate. (4) Organizations based on sharing and cooperation become powerful. Social-trusteeship economy, people's participation in administration and partyless people's politics become social realities. (5) Good in man is harnessed. Society integrated as one human family. (6) Economic resources properly combined. Production increases; employment. (7) Self-sufficient economy based on the primary needs of the people. National solvency, national self-respect and economic freedom. (8) Dependency on small-scale organizations. Labor-intensive utilization of human labor. Corruption decreases. Protection of environment both physical and psychological. (10) Laws of righteousness, strength of Dhamma and power of the people prevail. No ruling class. People are powerful. Sarvodaya realized.

Gandhi's Constructive Program was his way of beginning to work toward these goals. It starts in the villages, where most of the people live.