VOLUME XXVII, NO. 21
MAY 22, 1974

THE IMAGE OF MAN IN ECONOMICS

II

THE intellectual framework erected by Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), the "father" of economic neoclassicism, and retained by economics up to the present, rested on two pillars: economic rationality on the one hand and a subjective interpretation of human wants on the other hand. Whereas the classicists had founded economic value on objective factors (labor-time, costs of production), the neoclassicists (Marshall, the marginal utility school and their followers up to the present) explain economic value of a good by its utility. In a way, utility is the denatured offspring of Bentham's pleasure principle. According to the Utilitarians, man strives for pleasure (utility) and avoids pain (disutility). Utility was defined as the benefit derived from the satisfaction of *entirely subjective* drives, wants, desires, and tastes, originating with the individual as the last, indivisible entity of the economic system. This subjectivism is, however, thoroughly blended with an attitude already present in classical thought, namely, economic rationality. The turn toward subjective needs—utility, happiness, and individual desires—brought to the fore a hidden problem of our economic civilization: the existence of human inclinations incompatible with the type of conduct which the economic system required such as the disinclination to work, the resistance to activism, the desire for passivity, contemplation, enjoyment of nature, art and the senses, the unwillingness to pursue long-run goals in a systematic, consistent fashion, to act deliberately and calculatedly, to repress capricious, impulsive behavior. If satisfaction of subjective desires is the ultimate goal, much of economic activity is endangered by the fact that the exchange economy permits only the fulfillment of those needs which can be satisfied by the acquisition of money and wealth and through exchange in the market; and only in a way which often conflicts with many "noneconomic" human propensities. Also, no social order is conceivable in which the satisfaction of purely individual aims is the supreme goal; such a system must end in anarchy.

Alfred Marshall provided a counterweight against purely relativistic and anarchic subjectivity through his emphasis on economic rationality. He represents economic rationalism as an ideal and, at the same time, as the ultimate result of the working of economic laws. He shows that the behavior of consumers and producers can be understood with the help of models of rational economic action and that this type of conduct will have long-run beneficial results.

> . . . It is deliberateness not selfishness that is the characteristic of the modern age. . . . Now the side of life with which economics is especially concerned is that in which he most often reckons up the advantages and disadvantages of any particular action before he enters in it.[1]

The value symbol of rational economic man becomes the focal point of economic thought. Through this emphasis on rationality, directed toward the goal of higher activities, the danger was avoided that nonrational, impulsive, emotional elements would enter through the door of subjectivism and destroy not only the regularity of the economic law, but also the discipline required for the working of the economic system. Therefore, it had to be demonstrated that rationality dominates all types of economic activity. The consumer, housewife, entrepreneur, firm, saver, etc., are all represented as people who consciously *balance* opposing forces, values, interests in such a fashion that they *maximize* the total of their advantages, utility, profits, etc. In all cases the existence of inner conflicts between goals, values, and impulses, and between what

man wants to do and what the economic system permits him to do, is ignored. Human action is represented as directed toward a consciously calculable maximization point at which full satisfaction under given conditions can be reached. Conflicting drives and inclinations of a qualitatively different nature are reduced to a common quantitative denominator, so that conscious comparison of relative quantities of gain and loss can show the way to a clear-cut decision maximizing benefits and equilibrating opposing forces. Rational economic conducts, maximization of gains and equilibrium, became essential characteristics of human nature.

This well-known image of rational economic man is derived from the behavior required of a business manager. As David Riesman has formulated it: Man is supposed to act like a firm and like the firm's auditor. Thus, economics, ever since the neoclassicists, developed a rationalistic concept of human nature.

In neoclassical and later economic thought, this maximizing rationality still had a relatively substantial content. Marshall and the Victorians knew how a prudent economic person is supposed to behave. Marshall counsels "wholesome enjoyment," "subordination of the desire for transient luxuries to the attainment of more solid and lasting resources which will assist industry in its future work, and will . . . tend to make life larger."[2] He roundly condemns "superfluous" luxuries, and he advises the worker that only one-fortieth of the expense for green peas in March is productive; the other thirty-nine-fortieths are superfluities.[3]

All this shows that the Victorians filled the rational maximizing framework with the substance of their values. The goals of the individual were not yet considered as purely arbitrary and subjective. The individual was not really supposed to act as he pleases but should conform to the Victorian ideals of what a solid citizen should do and was doing.

In the course of history, economics became more and more value-empty. It abandoned the Victorian ideals of character formation. The rational framework disintegrated from within through the "liberation" of subjective impulses, drives, and desires. This was partly the effect of growing affluence and partly the reflection of the general disintegration of restraints and inner controls in Western civilization. This unchaining of subjective individual impulses and desires took place mainly in the field of consumption. This decontrol fulfilled not only a psychological but an economic need because the affluent growth economy required a continuous spurring of desires for more and new goods and services.

Thus in the twentieth century the prudent Victorian economic man became the "irrational" consumer directed by advertising and salesmanship. Pure subjective experiences, sensations, "kicks" were admitted into the economic image of man. The present-day orgies of spending caused by advertising receive their intellectual justification from this purely subjectivistic interpretation of consumers' desires. By eliminating all restraints from the formation of these desires, even the sale of the most wasteful, senseless, harmful goods and services is economically justified if they satisfy consumers' whims and demands.

The history of economic thought shows how this result was brought gradually about. Economic thought always retained the idea that subjective "utility" should be pursued in a deliberate fashion and the consumer should not give in to "blind forces of external stimuli and uncoordinated impulse at every moment" (Lionel Robbins). But if the consumer is completely free and sovereign to decide about his wishes, why should he not give in to sudden stimuli and impulses? Economic theory (and some moral philosophers) preached rational restraint; but modern advertising, indeed the modern style of art, leisure, and consumption, actually discarded all restraints. The stress on spontaneity,

immediacy, and direct, momentary experience is the consequence of subjectivistic economic utilitarianism.

The image of man implied in advertising and in modern sales methods is one of a passive person, open and vulnerable to external and internal stimuli leading to spending. The unconscious mind becomes a vehicle for directing economic behavior. The prototype is the dissatisfied, restless housewife who, after husband and children have left for the day, visits the department store, lets herself be titillated by the exhibited goods, and spontaneously, without clear-cut wants and purpose, succumbs to the lure of salesmanship and buys something she does not "really" need and will later regret having bought. This is "man" or "woman" completely under the sway of the id in its commercial manifestations. What is bought is not a good but a momentarily pleasant, tickling experience.

The emerging image of human nature is partly derived from Bentham's "pleasure" principle, but its dialectic structure was brought to light by Freud. His image of human nature rests on the antinomic conflict between the id and the ego, between the pleasure and the reality principle. The id pursues libidinal pleasure without restraint. It has to be controlled by the ego (consciousness and conscience), which is ruled by the reality principle and thus preserves the id from pain through collision with the obstacles which the real world puts in the way of the libido. Similarly, economics, ever since its neoclassical formulation, presents the "economic man" whose pursuit of subjective pleasure is restrained by conscious deliberate maximization. In the course of development, the Western mass-consumption society has to a large extent destroyed the shackles of rational restraint and instituted uncontrolled impulsive buying and consumption as the cornerstone of its continuous expansion. Still, rationality is required in production, in technology and organization. The dialectical conflicts of the economic and psychoanalytic images of man reflect Western man's economic contradictions.

In the philosophy of economic liberty the market was supposed to be the beneficial regulator of the economy. If the invisible hand of the free market guides all economic activity in the right direction, no question of morality, no conflict between right and wrong economic action, arises. In the free market the individual person or firm has only one task: to pursue economic self-interest. The invisible hand will transform these egotistic actions into the common good. Thus questions of morality, of conflict between individual and public interests, cannot arise. This is why Milton Friedman and his school reject any demand for the social responsibility of the corporation; concern for the common good is left entirely to the free market. It supposedly performs like a cybernetic self-correcting system. Interfering with it would be like stoking up the furnace in an automatic heating system. This is again a case in which the "scientific" interpretation serves as a legitimizing and justifying device.

This device became obsolete when the belief in the beneficiality of the free market broke down. This happened in a slow process during the first half of the twentieth century. The growth of big business, monopolies, and market power, the countervailing growth of governmental interference and control, the disruption of the Western economies by World War I and the Great Depression of the 1930s, undermined the belief in the self-regenerating powers and beneficiality of the free market. In traditional economic thought, as presented in textbooks, this idea was never explicitly abandoned; but it was modified in the 1930s by admitting degrees and qualifications of market freedom, by distinguishing between perfect, pure, imperfect, monopolistic competition and market power. However, it was recognized that corporations with large shares of the market and governments and their agencies were not any more subject to the steamroller of the competitive market. They exercise power of their own; the

invisible hand of the market was replaced by the visible hand of corporations and governments (Edward Mason). This opened the door for a revival of a normatively oriented political economy.

The recognition of market power led to the admission of choice between various economic goals and policies. Large firms can protect themselves against competition; they do not have to accept the market price but can administer their own prices within certain limits; they can create their own demand through advertising. And last but not least, they can assume the burden of social responsibility by modifying the relentless search for higher profits through welfare measures for their employees, through considering the social effects of their business, etc. Managers are now often considered as quasi-public officials who should try to balance the conflicting interests of stockholders, suppliers, customers, the labor force, and the general public.[4]

All this implies a new image of man. Man in the free market is man without choices—at least man as a producer and seller. He can sell at the market price or go bankrupt. He has to produce as cheaply as the competition. He cannot engage in the luxury of noneconomic motivations (friendship, compassion, social responsibility) if it increases costs and prices him out of the market.

The large corporations with market power- and government agencies *can* exercise choices; and this raises the question of norms, goals, ideals to guide these choices. The normative element was thus resurrected and reinstated. This changed the image of man in the modern economy.

Galbraith's *Affluent Society* is an example and symptom of this change. This book represents a renaissance of moral reasoning in economics. Galbraith subjects the result of the present economic system to a scrutiny from the point of view of moral and political standards. He denies the beneficiality of more and more production and applies standards of right and wrong to the present method of allocation. He raises the question of the individual and social good and condemns the overabundance of private production and the paucity of public services. Economics became again political economy and a branch of moral philosophy.

Thus, the image of man has changed: from an egotistic pursuer of profit and gain (although only through hard work and thrift), to a "rational" maximizing robot serving the competitive market mechanism; to emerge, at least in some economic thought, as a person confronted with moral choices. Only a small minority of economists today would approve of the last image; but under the impact of the ecological dangers and of growing alienation among intellectuals, blue-collar workers, academic youth, and disadvantaged groups, a real critical political economy, concerned with the choices between senseless cancerous growth and a more balanced existence, may emerge. Economists may once again become more interested in wisdom than in quantitative analysis. Their image of man may then change from a mathematical skeleton to a real human person with finite freedom guided by moral sense and the firmament of moral standards.

Chicago

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NOTES

[1] Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1920), pp. 20-21

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[4] Carl Kaysen, "The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation," *American Economic Review*, XLVII (May, 1952).

REVIEW
THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION

THE fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, requiring equal treatment of all persons under the law, is called by Howard N. Meyer a "second Constitution"—a measure which reconstituted and made explicit in law the central principle which had been blurred and mutilated by the self-interest of the slave-owners of the South. Mr. Mejer's book, *The Amendment That Refused To Die* (Chilton Book Company, 1973, $7.95), is the story of the early conception of the Fourteenth Amendment in the vision of James Madison, the delay of its birth until 1868, after the Civil War, of its practical nullification during the post-war period, and its revivification in the 1930s and 1950s.

In the initial bill of rights formulated by Madison in 1789, the Virginian statesman had included a provision that "no State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, freedom of the press or trial by jury in criminal cases." The idea was that the federal government would guarantee the rights of individuals, should they be violated by the states. But the Constitution-makers of that day were not about to embarrass themselves with any such enactment. Commenting on the idea of a national guarantee of the freedom of the individual, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina had said: "Such bills generally begin with declaring that all men are by nature born free. Now, we should make that declaration with a very bad grace, when a large part of our property consists in men who are actually born slaves."

Elimination of the amendment that would enforce equality before the law had consequences far beyond the anticipation of most men of the eighteenth century:

> In order to suppress the very idea that slavery was questionable or that it was immoral to treat blacks differently from whites, it became necessary to treat Americans worse than the British king had treated their parents, the colonists. The freedoms of speech, the press and assembly and the rights of petition and academic pursuit were forgotten when it came to forbidden subjects. Whites found that they had lost most of the liberties that the founding fathers had thought valuable: they had lost them because they permitted the denial of liberty to blacks.

For this summary of the cost to the American people of a Constitution allowing slavery to be wholly accurate, we should have to have a population filled with convictions of the sort declared by Eugene Debs when he said: "while there is a lower Class I am in it; while there is a criminal element, I am of it; while there is a soul in prison, I am not free." On the other hand, there has been at least some realization of the losses sustained by all Americans because of the long toleration of slavery. Mr. Meyer's book is in fact a study of that realization, and an account o£ the often heroic efforts of the champions of human rights to convert their individual moral awareness into forms of social realization.

What is the Fourteenth Amendment? The first section has ninety-five words:

> All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The second section provides for proportional representation in Congress, this representation to be reduced if any (male) persons of age are denied the right to vote. Why was the fourteenth amendment "needed"?

Or why, if it was needed, didn't the Founding Fathers recognize that need more clearly?

Various reasons played a part in obscuring its importance. First, as Mr. Meyer says, the Colonists had made a revolution against the arbitrary rule of a *king*, and they hardly anticipated any invasion of rights by popular governments such as the states were establishing. Second, many of these early statesmen were confident that

with the progress of the new civilization the Revolution had made possible, slavery would be discarded along with other backward institutions. Third, each of the states had adopted its own "bill of rights," so why should similar national guarantees be necessary? Finally, the slave-owning planters of the South regarded any such national guarantee as threatening federal interference with state independence and government.

The Civil War freed the slaves. Lincoln signed the Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery late in 1864. Then Lincoln was assassinated, and Andrew Johnson, who succeeded to the Presidency, began to undermine what the Northern victory had accomplished by returning the power of self-government to the rebel states, often into the hands of leaders determined to restore the conditions which had existed before the war. In allowing the Southern states to form provisional governments, Johnson made no effort to secure "protection of the whites or the blacks who had been loyal to the Union." Mr. Meyer summarizes the effect of Johnson's decree on the Southerners:

> Here was the signal and a great opportunity to rebuild their society on the prewar basis of using the power of the state to force black men, as a group, to work for whites on the employers' terms, with no freedom to rise or to move or leave when they became dissatisfied with conditions. They elected to leadership in their state and county governments the members and allies of the slave-owning class that had been in the forefront of secession and rebellion.
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> Even as the war had ceased, widespread violence had broken out against both black and white loyalists, and especially against the returning Union soldiers, most of whom were ex-slaves. Now there was superimposed on this moral chaos a whole new legal structure designed to ensure that there would be *no* transition from slavery to freedom. Under a variety of laws called the Black Codes, a whole complex of restrictions on freedom of movement and freedom of contract was imposed whose total effect was to make the "freedmen the slaves of society," as Massachusetts' Senator Henry Wilson said, instead of, as before, the slaves of individual owners.

It was the spectacle of this betrayal of the Emancipation Proclamation and the waste of the agony of the war which caused Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the House, to propose a special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House to establish the conditions under which the rebel states might be readmitted to the Union. This Committee created the Fourteenth Amendment, which repudiated the language of the Dred Scott decision—which had said in effect that state laws denying human rights could render federal guarantees without force—and assured equal protection of the rights of all citizens of the United States. Federal laws were now binding on the states, and the Fifteenth Amendment, which provided that the right to vote could not be abridged or denied by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, left no loopholes for violation of the spirit of the Fourteenth. The passage of these amendments was followed by civil rights legislation spelling out the authority of federal power to enforce the implications of the new amendments.

Now ensues a gloomy recital of the defeat of the "Second Constitution," through the resistance of the Southern states, with the collaboration of the presidency under Rutherford B. Hayes and a reactionary Supreme Court. The course of this retreat from the Constitution is involved in legal decisions which reversed the intent of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complex and devious reasoning by which this result was achieved needs close attention in order to be understood, but in every case a blatant disregard of the clear meaning of the federal guarantees of human and civil rights was the common factor. By the 1880s, the substance of the reforms had been made impotent, and the next step was rationalization of the post-war status quo:

> Assured of immunity from federal interference, the dominant whites in the South now wanted to place legal dress on their relationship with the Americans of African ancestry who lived among them. The tyranny of the mob had kept the black man in his place: away from the polls, fearing to

assert his rights as a citizen. There began the passage of laws designed to make mob action less necessary: to write on tablets of stone that one race was, as a group, inferior to the other.

What was desired was a kind of "final solution," something that would put the stamp of law and order on that which had been achieved by lawlessness and disorder. Ideally it was to make every black American conscious of a supposed inferiority, to admit it, to accept it. At the same time, whites had to be made to understand that no spark of conscience was to disturb them, that moral or religious ideas about the "brotherhood of man" were irrelevant to the mistreatment of a different kind of man. They were not to think that it was for economic advantage, for the material convenience of a ruling group, that the former slaves, or free blacks and their descendants, were to be forbidden to rise, or to think themselves citizens, or even to employ skills as workmen that they had acquired before the Civil War. They were to be persuaded that this was not injustice, but the way things ought to be. . . .

It is usually difficult to do evil in a democracy unless it is disguised. Sometimes the deception is achieved by an explanation that makes the evil course seem fair and proper. That was what happened when the introduction of the caste system into America was accompanied by laws to keep colored Americans from voting. The force and threats that had kept blacks from the polls, or the fraud that had kept their ballots from being counted, were replaced by a pretext. The pretense of the laws was that it was not the Negro who was disfranchised but the ignorant. "Literacy" tests became the great barrier to obedience to the Fifteenth Amendment. Yet ways were found to permit ignorant whites to vote.

The disguise with which the evil of segregation was introduced was the use of the word "equal" in the first laws requiring the separation of American citizens regardless of their wishes. Accommodations, schools, all sorts of facilities were required to be equal by the new breed of Jim Crow laws. This fooled no one. If clues were needed to the real intent, they were found in the common provision that separation was not forced when the contact came about with the black man or woman in the role of servant.

Less than half the book is needed to tell the story up to this point. The remaining chapters are concerned with the long, hard battle to restore Constitutional protection of individual rights, a struggle conducted by a handful of men and women who would not give up, even though they often had small chance of success. This part of the story shows how the failures of democracy after the Civil War infected the entire national life, working injustice against businessmen, workers, women, radicals, and minorities other than the blacks. The big victory for the Fourteenth Amendment came with the decision of the Supreme Court in 1954, in *Brown vs. the Board of Education.* This decision, as Mr. Meyer says, affected "ten million children in fifty thousand schools." A few years later, "a tired lady named Rosa Parks . . . refused to go to the back of a Montgomery, Alabama, bus to stand when there were seats in the 'white' section of the bus." From that event grew the Montgomery bus boycott, and the drama of the great struggle led by Dr. Martin Luther King. This was followed by the sit-ins and freedom rides of the 60s, and voter registration. So we come to the present with a strong sense of a vast unfinished business lying before the American people.

In this brief attempt to outline the dramatic story told by Mr. Meyer, we have not named the men whose efforts gave the Fourteenth Amendment what force it has exercised in the lives of the people. They are a special breed of patriot, men with the capacity to think and feel in terms of the moral realities behind legal conventions. It is not easy to write about their achievements for the reason that to understand what they did it becomes necessary to acquire some of their ability to feel the importance of abstract principles. Thus effort is required to read and to understand even a book so simply and clearly written as *The Amendment That Refused To Die.* What emerges, when the effort is made, is a lofty superstructure of human ideals, welded into unity as human feelings of right and justice are conceptualized in law and the law is embodied in the practical ordering of human behavior.

COMMENTARY
QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS

WHY does the whole-hearted application of the Fourteenth Amendment drag so, and why has the attention to Mr. Meyer's book (see Review) been mainly in law and civil liberties journals? Thinking about these questions recalled a passage in John Adams' letter to his friend, Hezekiah Niles, written in 1818:

> But what do we mean by the American Revolution? Do we mean the American war? The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people; a change in the religious sentiments of their duties and obligations. . . . *This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.*

In short, the change in "the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people" came first, before the fighting and before the Constitution and its enabling laws.

The Fourteenth Amendment didn't have this kind of support. Richard Goodwin says in *The American Condition:*

> . . . through the early part of the boom after the Second World War there was a great deal of poverty and racism in America, yet not until the late nineteen-fifties did the public become aware that these conditions existed and that they were inconsistent with our view of the nation. The idea is threatened when we become aware of the contradiction, aware that it is a contradiction, aware that it is remediable, and aware that we are failing to remedy it.

When Mr. Goodwin says that the public became "aware," what does he mean? All the people? Half of them? An ardent few? Listing all the "contradictions" the public manages to live with would be a painful, if engrossing, project. Is it that people are morally sluggish, ethically indifferent? In any event, the Fourteenth Amendment is still a long way from being "in the minds and hearts of the people." Too many of them, apparently, are still in Stage 3 of Lawrence Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale (see Frontiers). Which, doubtless, is why things like Watergate happen to us.

What makes people wake up to honoring the moral commitments laid upon them in constitutions and other forms of suasion and persuasion? Does anybody know? Is there a "normal" rate of progress in such matters? Are people inwardly drawn up to Stages 4, 5, and 6, or can they be *pushed?* Can, that is, Virtue be taught?

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
FOUR WISE MEN

KENNETH WINETROUT'S paper, Toynbee Looks at Education" (in the Fall 1973 issue of *Educational Theory*), has been handily marked for quotation by the reader who sent it in. While Toynbee's reflective comments on education are of interest, the introductory material from Edward Gibbon and Henry Adams has more bite. No one of these three had a high opinion of the education to which he had been exposed. Gibbon (born 1737) found both Oxford and Cambridge tainted by their monkish origins. Mr. Winetrout puts together some comment by Gibbon from his *Autobiography:*

> We may scarcely hope that any reformation will be a voluntary act; and so deeply are they rooted in law and prejudice, that even the omnipotence of parliament would shrink from an inquiry into the state and abuses of the two universities. . . . It is whimsical enough, that as soon as I left Magdalen College my taste for books began to revive. . . . [my tutor] well remembered he had a salary to receive, and only forgot that he had a duty to perform. . . . [The stay at Magdalen] proved the fourteen months the most idle and unprofitable of my whole life.

Henry Adams, who began life a century later, was similarly soured by his experience of formal education. Two quotations sum up his views:

> The chief wonder of education is that it does not ruin everybody concerned in it, teachers and taught. . . . The attempt of the American of 1800 to educate the American of 1900 had not often been surpassed for folly. . . . The attempt of the American of 1900 to educate the American of 2000 must be even blinder.

Adams had no fond recollections of boyhood school days. What he needed, he said, "was not school," and he counted the years spent there, "from ten to sixteen years old, as time thrown away." Harvard lacked inspiration. Young men went there because their friends did, as a matter of "social self-respect." There is this from *The Education of Henry Adams:*

> Harvard College, as far as it educated at all, was a wild and liberal school, which sent young men into the world with all they needed to make respectable citizens, and something of what they wanted to make useful ones. Leaders of men it never tried to make . . . the school created a type not a will. Four years of Harvard College, if successful, resulted in an autobiographical blank, a mind on which only a water-mark had been stamped . . . but disappointment apart, Harvard College was probably less hurtful than any other university then in existence. It taught little, and that little ill, but it left the mind open, free from bias, ignorant of facts, but docile. The graduate had few strong prejudices. He knew little, but his mind remained supple, ready to receive knowledge.

Mr. Winetrout chose Gibbon and Adams as background for discussion of Toynbee's ideas on education for the reason that they, too, were historians, and all three provide autobiographical material. A passage toward the end of this paper gives Toynbee's general conclusions:

> When universal education was first introduced in the West, it was welcomed as the "triumph of justice and enlightenment which might be expected to usher in a new era of happiness and well-being for our Western society, and perhaps for the whole of Mankind." However, as we look backward, these generous expectations failed to take into account "several stumbling-blocks on this broad road toward the Millennium." . .
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> One stumbling-block: "The good intentions of Democracy have no magic power to perform the miracle of the Loaves and the Fishes; and the draught which, in its benevolent ministrations, it may succeed in bringing to the lips of every child in the community will be at best a weak dilution of the elixir of intellectual life."
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> A second stumbling-block: "the utilitarian spirit in which the fruits of Education are apt to be turned to account when they are placed within everybody's reach."
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> A third stumbling-block: "The bread of Universal Education is no sooner cast upon the waters of social life than a shoal of sharks rises from the depths and devours the children's bread under the philanthropists' eyes." Toynbee illustrates his point by showing how universal education and the yellow press more or less arrive at the same time. As a result, children able to read are exploited by cheap journalism. It is the yellow press publisher who profits most by universal education.

According to Toynbee, the eighteenth century regarded as a social law "that learning is apt to be sterilized by diffusion." He agrees, but rejects elitism as the accommodation to this rule:

> In countries where the system of Universal Education has been introduced, the people are in danger of falling under an intellectual tyranny of one kind or the other whether it be exercised by private capitalists or by

> public authorities; and, if they are to be saved from both of these two almost equally lamentable fates, the only third alternative is to raise the standard of mass-cultivation to a degree at which the minds of children who are put through the educational mill are rendered immune against grosser forms of either private or public propaganda. This is no easy task.

Involved is the "problem of giving elementary education an additional impetus of sufficient force to carry the minds of the masses beyond the intellectual danger-zone where they are at the mercy of propaganda of whatever source."

What shall we say about this? One thing is clear: These eminent historians regard both schooling and higher education as deforming or at least valueless processes, over which the individual must triumph if he can. These three, apparently, did. They were, we may say—no matter how many years they "went to school"—autodidacts. They taught themselves. We can also say that such men are worth reading because of the immunity they developed to the trivializing and distorting influences of schooling. Should we then try to model education on what they did? We can't. We don't know how. The process of maturation is too obscure. Further, they belong to a distinguished minority—they are Ortega's *real* students as contrasted with the great mass of supposed-to-be students who go to school because they are sent, or because it is "the thing to do," or because they want to be "successful." Men like Gibbon, Adams, and Toynbee are valuable as critics, but as models they prove an embarrassment. You look at their lives and achievements and quickly put away your system-building plans. There is no correspondence, no one-to-one relation between systems and such individuals.

Well, if the schools are what these exceptional men say, should we abolish them? But how, then, could we take Toynbee's advice and set about raising standards of "mass cultivation" to the point where children "are rendered immune against grosser forms of either private or public propaganda"? Maybe his advice is well-intentioned but unworkable. We might find that "mass" cultivation is not cultivation, or that cultivation cannot be achieved by mass methods.

One remedy may be to learn to think about education in ways that would help to *dissolve* the problem. A passage from Vinoba on Basic Education (taken from an article in the January-February *Resurgence*) gives some clues:

> As soon as the pupil begins to feel: "Now I am learning," something is wrong with the educational machinery. The best form of physical training and development of the body of little children is play. The child himself never feels: "Now I am training my body." While he is playing the outside world does not exist for him. Children at play are absorbed in one undivided experience. They are not aware of comfort or discomfort, they feel neither hunger nor thirst, neither pain nor weariness. For them play is a joy, not duty; it is pleasure, not physical training. This principle has to be applied to all kinds of learning. . . .
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> The teacher should be free from the professional attitude—"Now I am teaching my pupils." Unless the guru himself is single-minded, a natural teacher, the pupils cannot learn naturally. Whenever you find yourself saying that "we are teaching by the Froebel, or Pestalozzi, or Montessori method," you may be sure that this is empty verbiage, the meaningless copy of some method or other, it is a ghost, it has no life. . . . Method, syllabus, timetable—these are all meaningless words. They are nothing but self-deception. Education is to be had only from living deeds. When some separate activity, unconnected with the work of life, is given the name of education, this "education" has a poisonous and unhealthy influence on the mind, just as some foreign substance entering the body usually has evil consequences. Unless we are exercised in work we have no hunger for learning, and when learning is forced artificially upon a man who has no appetite for it, the digestive organs have no power to digest it. . . . Let us therefore define education as "that which, without method, builds itself up into a methodical and ordered whole, that which no guru can give and which nevertheless is given."
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> The true teacher does not teach, yet one may educate oneself at his side. The sun itself gives its light to no one, yet all, in the most natural and easy way, receive its light.

We'll be returning to this material by Vinoba Bhave in later issues.

FRONTIERS

Social Science: A Radical Critique

IN a paper in *Interpersonal Development* (Vol. II, pp. 227-37), C. M. Hampden-Turner makes the Moral Judgment Scale developed by Lawrence Kohlberg the basis for an analysis of the "disguised moralities" of various social sciences. Kohlberg, it may be remembered, did his research at the Berkeley Institute for Human Development, studying the moral attitudes and beliefs of seventy-five boys. At the beginning of this work, the boys ranged in age from ten to sixteen, and the study continued for twelve years, until they were twenty-two to twenty-eight. Kohlberg found that there were three basic levels in the development of moral attitudes, which he called Preconventional, Conventional, and Post-Conventional. Each level has two stages, making six in all. The highest level, as he put it, "is characterized by a major thrust toward autonomous moral principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the group of persons who hold them and apart from the individual's identification with those persons or groups." Examples of persons who lived at this highest level, Kohlberg suggests, would be Socrates, Lincoln, Thoreau, and Martin Luther King.

Hampden-Turner gives brief characterization of the six levels: (1) Avoiding punishment is the chief motivation (2) Morality is achieved by the satisfaction of needs; (3) Stereotyped roles control—the expectation of others defines the "good boy" or "red-blooded" pattern of behavior; (4) Morality is conformity to a system of law-and-order established by accepted authority; (5) It is realized that authority-systems are man-made, and that the individual has entered into agreements and binding commitments; (6) Here comes recognition that a moral principle may underlie commitments, and that discerning the principle and acting upon it constitutes morality. "Now," says Hampden-Turner, the individual "can judge moral decisions made in deference to lower stages, on the grounds of whether the law, the role, or the commitment contains a *viable moral principle."* In short, at Level 6 morality must be independently evident, not a matter of authority or conformity.

Hampden-Turner's analysis gets interesting in the discussion of Level 3. He says:

> In the development of moral judgment, Level 3 constitutes the "guts" of socialization process. Individuals are persuaded to fill various roles and to model their behavior on stereotypical role images, e.g., "Miss Teenage America," "high-powered executive," etc. Such role-playing is a preparation to comprehending how different roles fit together in a system of law-and-order. . . . Just as the normal run of social roles can lead to a comprehension of the social order, so too, does scientific methodology supposedly lead to a discovery of the lawfulness and orderliness of the social universe. But there is a crucial difference. While most social roles are by definition a part of the overall social fabric, the methodological role-playing of the social sciences *is still in the process of searching* for a lawfulness and orderliness assumed to be "out there." Hence the methodologies of the infant sciences are exceedingly presumptuous. . . .
>
> The behaviorist demands that the entire social world be labeled in terms of stimulus, response, and reinforcement with the privilege of stimulating and reinforcing reserved for himself and his colleagues, and the role of responding predictably, reserved for experimental subjects. (Objects would be a better name.) The environment dominates the individual by presupposition. If new recruits to behaviorism protest this paradigm, they are scorned for taking so seriously the conscious events within their own mind and are reminded that their values are not meaningful. Notice how the *real* explanation of the influence of behaviorism lies not in its success as a science but in its powerful techniques of socialization.

At Level 4, the social universe submits entirely to the rule of law-and-order. Here Hampden-Turner finds a heavy conservative bias, a rejection of freedom and the process of human becoming, absence of self-awareness, and "destruction of affection, equality, and fraternity." Level 4 social science has two postulates:

> (1) There exists a "kingdom of order" outside any one individual man—in the sense of being

> outside his will and desire—so that truth means the discovery of *pre-established order*.
>
> (2) Man's cognitive apparatus does not materially affect the observation of this pre-established order.
>
> Hence while those making law-and-order moral judgments feel that the virtuous individual should obey the lawful order, Stage 4 scientists go even further in stating that the individual *must*, by definition, obey them. Whereas the laws of society protect the free exercise of rights within the law, the laws of social science aim to explain the very exercise of these rights, and not in terms of freedom.

Hampden-Turner has some quotations from social scientists that confirm his charges. One is from Edmund Leach, an anthropologist: "The very first basic assumption of any science is that the stuff he is studying is incapable of thinking for itself. It is not open to nature, or any part of it, to change the rules in the middle of the game." And Lévi-Strauss has said that "the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute but to dissolve man." The author comments:

> We have seen that the Law-and-Order social sciences claim to eschew metaphysics while making unverifiable assumptions on a vast scale. They also claim to avoid politics and to achieve value neutrality while in fact valuing conservatively. In this they do not differ much from many conservatives who would like us to believe that they are above political controversy, since they represent the flag, the Bible, the Law and the Nation itself. There is no better character armor, no surer disguise for bad faith, than to regard oneself and one's work as coextensive with law itself.

This summary of Hampden-Turner's paper does not do it justice, since his generalizations need more illustration and rendering into the common tongue. However, enough has been quoted to show the impact on conventional scientific assumptions of the emancipated stance of humanistic psychology and sociology.

What happens to social science at Level 6? Here there is the ability to distinguish between the knower and the known, and to recognize unresolved contradictions without loss of balance or becoming ineffectual:

> What is needed to move from level to level is the capacity for transcendence. . . . The unity of knowledge at Level 6 comes about through man's capacity to hold many paradigms in his mind, choose between them, and know the consequences of his choice. . . .
>
> Just as the Stage 6 person who judges on principle can turn that principle into an agreement, a law, a role, an instrument, so that he commands the entire hierarchy, so should the humanistic social scientist promulgate a principle, see what kinds of agreement it evokes in others, what kinds of "law-and-order" it fosters, what methodologies and roles it gives rise to. He is master of the hierarchy, master of all disciplines, of all ways of observing, of all styles of knowing.