

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT PLANNING

PLANNERS can usually be thought of as model-makers. They try to decide what sort of arrangements will best serve large numbers of human beings and then work out ways to create those arrangements. Political planners think in terms of arrangements which establish political or legal relationships which, they hope, will combine certain time-honored principles (freedom, justice) with the realities of human nature. Robert Dahl must have had some sort of socio-political model in mind when he wrote in *After the Revolution*:

It has sometimes seemed to me that there is an inverse relationship between the rate at which the word [Revolution] is used in a given country and the rate of change in the distribution of power and privilege. Some of the most profound changes in the world take place in a quiet country like Denmark, where hardly anyone raises his voice and the rhetoric of revolution has few admirers.

This may not amount to a thorough-going endorsement by Dahl of what Denmark has achieved, but it implies the realization of *some* political model which is held in high regard by some planners. Denmark, in fact, is often declared to be an exemplary "welfare state."

More than eleven years ago—in the issue for Feb. 10, 1960—MANAS had an article, "Denmark Through Bifocals," by a Danish-born woman who had lived in the United States for thirty years, and returned to Denmark for a long visit. Her description of the social organization of the country, one could say, completely supports what is implied by Dahl's brief observation. There are no slums in Denmark. There is no want in Denmark. And despite the fact that Denmark has few natural resources for manufacturing and industry, the skills of the Danes are so well developed that they are able to import raw materials and compete in various areas on the international market. "Denmark," the MANAS contributor wrote, "has the highest standard of

living I have ever experienced—higher than ours, I feel, because it is *uniformly high*." America may do better in terms of "extremes," but the Danes do well enough for everyone! Then there is the following, in striking contrast to the trouble we are having with Medicare and Medicaid:

Hospitalization is the best in the world and costs almost nothing—for anybody—in the state-owned hospitals. And almost all Danish hospitals are run by the state. You pay 40 cents per day for everything: doctors, surgery, laboratory tests, etc. If you need a mental hospital, it will cost a little more—\$1.20 per day. All patients get the same high-grade treatment—no "class" distinction. If you are a man of sixty-seven or a woman of sixty-two you can apply for the *Folke Pension*, which means that you will receive a monthly check in the mail which is almost enough to live on. And you can still earn something besides, without penalty. If you have no earning power, no property or resources, you can move into the Old People's City or into one of the very large but adequate and modern apartment houses for older people, with elevators, cafeterias, etc. In this case the state keeps most of the Folke Pension, but supplies you with a bit of spending money.

The article goes on, reciting the splendors of educational policy, the public radio and television programs, efficient public transport, and the arts of home-making as practiced for centuries by the Danish people.

It was all quite wonderful, yet the MANAS writer, who had scores of relatives and visited some thirty homes, began to have doubts. She wearied of all this "perfection," which sometimes seemed like a drug to the mind. She asked herself—

Are the people actually any happier for instance? Whereas diphtheria, TB, and venereal disease are practically wiped out, mental illness, multiple sclerosis, insomnia, headaches, ulcers, cancer and suicide are very much on the increase. There seems to be almost no awareness among

ordinary people that some "physical" illnesses may have an emotional base. . . .

Why should so many want to commit suicide in this land of plenty and social security? The Danes are aware of this anomaly, but no one wants to discuss it. As a matter of fact nowhere did I meet with any kind of discussion or meeting of minds over ideas or living issues. I began to realize that the suicide rate might have something to do with the almost complete impossibility of friendly understanding of extreme emotional unbalance—such as would be under the skin of a person near suicide—in such an atmosphere. In other words, people who have deep emotional problems have no form, no opportunity, for the expression of their less rational feelings and ideas. It is my feeling that in this "cosy," secure atmosphere with nothing to get hold of to rebel against, irrational feelings must turn inward, where they ferment and pile up and up until the pressure is so high that suicide seems the only way out.

All this is the opinion of only one observer, yet it seems sufficient to show that there may be profoundly important factors of human welfare which the socio-political model of ideal arrangements commonly leaves out of account.

Probably no particular model is adequate, and the hazard of using models is that they become persuasive and engrossing to their sponsors, tending to make people blind to what the models neglect. This is a major defect of behavioristic approaches to both individual and social ills, since the behaviorist technique of positive (and negative) reinforcement, or rewards and punishments, really requires models for it to be applied. But the deepest human problems go beyond any conceivable model. Only elementary difficulties can be met by the use of models. Yet models continue to be popular, because they seem, and no doubt in major respects are, so very "practical."

It is obvious, for example, that a decentralized society—decentralized with respect to power as well as the distribution of population—would make it possible for many excellences to emerge in the lives of people—qualities which now tend to be suppressed. Yet as Jayaprakash Narayan has pointed out, even this

model is no guarantee of an ideal society. He said in a recent article:

I think that some of us are inclined to make the mistake of thinking that by merely setting up decentralized industries, we have made full preparations for nonviolence. We think this work in itself prepares us for nonviolence, moulds our minds, and the minds of spinners and weavers engaged in village industries. But this is not an automatic process.

If the economy is decentralized, there is less violence, there is less concentration of wealth and less scope for exploitation of man by man. But please remember that for ages and ages the economy of society used to be decentralized. And yet there was terrible violence in society. All the princes, kings, nawabs and sultans of those days went on fighting all the time.

Nonviolence did not automatically come into being because the economy was decentralized.

The Greek city states were the ideal examples of decentralized political organizations. Yet they were perpetually at war among themselves. You know the history of Greece.

We uphold the concept today of "Community ownership," as in Gramdan, and consider such ownership as conducive to nonviolent relationships. We say Gramdan points the way to world peace. Again we take too much for granted.

What I am driving at is that for nonviolence decentralization is not enough, common ownership is not enough. They are necessary, but not enough. The roots of violence are in the minds of men and it is there that the radical remedy has to be applied.

The more one thinks about the preoccupation with ideal models, the more evident becomes the truth of what Narayan says, which, freely rendered, is that while good models are necessary, they are not enough! Both the wide diversity in the forms of social activity which men have been able to make work well, and the extraordinary adaptability of human beings, suggest that an excess of modelmaking will only bring an excess of rigidities and future disillusionments.

A great deal of evidence points to the wisdom in a brief chapter in A. H. Maslow's *Eupsychian Management*, titled "The Theory of Social

Improvement; The Theory of the Slow Revolution," in which he insists that "no single change . . . will automatically transform the whole society," but that "society changes as a whole or as a unity, and that everything in the society is related and tied to everything else in the society." Maslow then proceeds to list ten points or "articles" concerned with the processes of social improvement. The first is that "societal change comes about by attacking along the total front, by efforts to change simultaneously every single institution and substitution within the entire society." The second proposition is that essential change is always slow, and that care must be taken that it does not proceed too rapidly and thus abort. The third involves planning, design, and conscious control, with this qualification:

The very fact that social change must be holistic, practically guarantees that it is not going to be easily understood by an uneducated man, and that it certainly cannot even be quickly understood by *any* man, however intelligent, and however learned. Perhaps it can *never* be totally understood by any one human being; perhaps it has to be a colleague-hood or a joint effort with division of labor among a fairly large group of specialists each of whom can understand well his own sector of society. This means as one of the underlying necessities of social betterment or of slow revolution, science, research, education, learning, teaching, etc., etc. This is a shiftover from the traditional revolutionary requirement of people who are ready to fight and kill.

Another article defines the conditions under which there is *hope* for change:

If only we accept the necessity for slowness of change and are quite content with this (or if we get wise enough and insightful enough to *prefer* slowness of change for good technical reasons), then we will not be disillusioned and disheartened and lose self-esteem and feel hopeless and powerless when we realize that we can make only a small change in the society as a single person. If we understand the situation well enough, we can feel quite proud of the amount of change which a single person can make, because if everything above is true, then a single person is the best there is. That is, one cannot do more than a single person can do. Or better say it this way: A single person can do no more than a single person can do. This can make the single

person feel as powerful as (and no more powerful than) he should feel, rather than weak and helpless, rather than a puppet totally weak and useless and helpless before overwhelming and powerful social forces which he can do nothing about.

As one reads these "articles," one after the other, it becomes evident that they are not concerned with models but with attitudes—the attitudes on which even the best models are dependent if they are ever to work well. A few years ago we would have called some of these attitudes ethical qualities; the tenth point, for example, shows the necessity for faith in one another's good intentions and abilities. Another (the twelfth) article deserves repetition because of its bearing on Dr. Maslow's conception of self-actualization. Here, he speaks of "the necessity for self-development, for discipline and hard work in the fullest development of one's own talents or capacities, one's own genius." He continues:

This is crucially necessary today because so many young people are making a distorted interpretation of the pervasive psychology of growth and self-actualization. More dependent, more indulged, more oral, more passive people are interpreting this philosophy of self-actualization to mean "waiting for inspiration," waiting for something to happen, waiting for something to grab them, waiting for some peak experience which will tell them automatically and without effort what their destiny is and what they should do. Part of this feeling of self-indulgence is that anything which is self-actualizing should be enjoyable.

Now, while this is in principle ultimately true, it is not always immediately true.

These reflections by Dr. Maslow recall the similar feelings expressed by C. Wright Mills and quoted in the MANAS editorial of three weeks ago:

We live in times and in a nation demanding—according to our vision of man—structural modifications of a revolutionary character, but also in a time when we do not in fact see an adequate way of making these modifications. We do not want to compromise our larger visions nor deceive ourselves about the true limits of our possible action. But what we *have* to do, if we would act at all, is to act *as if*

what we *can* do is important, even if we are not always certain that it is.

Also to be considered are the enormously different starting-places of people for whom "betterment" is envisioned. Some weeks ago there was comment in MANAS on an ecological "Vision of Environment," which proposed the division of the country into large ecological units determined by major watersheds, with provision made for public transit systems which would bring people from country living to urban employment. The model was well-developed, but manifestly designed for a society which still has plenty of space to grow in. It is interesting to contrast with this ideal solution for urban crowding the very different solution which the Japanese have worked out, not as a theory, but in practice, in a country where "most of 100 million people live on an island the size of Oregon and one tenth of that population lives in one city." The accommodation of the Japanese to what would be intolerable crowding for Americans is described in a long article by Richard Alan Smith in *Landscape* for the Winter of 1970. We have space for only a little description of how the Japanese get the most from their very limited space:

. . . one is always made aware that the Japanese city *is* a place for all kinds of people and activities. The American is constantly caught up in the act of trying to resolve situations which in America would be in conflict but in Japan are a way of life. There are advantages in having factories located next to houses that we may be unable to appreciate. Factories (and houses) have changed since the time we condemned their association in cities. And previous concerns which shaped policies forbidding the intermingling of uses may have been superseded by more urgent city functions. . . .

There is one kind of building in Japan for which there may not be an equivalent in the United States. This building is not unifunctional. It contains what is essentially a diversified city street which goes up stairs and forms corridors. Inside are shops of all kinds—like those of the neighborhood center—plus movie theatres, restaurants, business and professional offices, day nurseries, and perhaps a bus depot. The spaces between the shops, offices, etc., seem to have more in common with streets than with corridors of

conventional-use buildings. Containing the variety of facilities that it does, this type of building is apt to be as heavily used at night as it is during the day.

This article is a long study of the deliberate and ingenious mastery of extreme limitations of space by the Japanese, and no one, surely, who has failed to absorb all the implications of this achievement should consider himself competent to offer "models" for use by these people in respect to the problems of crowding. Yet it should be noted that the imaginative application of the multi-use principle, and the careful conservation of space in all activities—even to the design of toys for children, whose insect "kites" are tethered to a ten-foot thread—is only a part of the story, historically speaking. Japanese expansionism, in quest of more places "in the sun," was responsible for some of the bloodiest wars of the twentieth century, which can be understood or "rationalized" only by comparison with the long centuries of European colonizing. A long war with China preceded World War II, and the Japanese conquest and subjection of Korea, early in the twentieth century, was almost as cruel as the policies of the United States in the subjection of the Indians of North America, in order to obtain their lands.

On the other side of the ledger is the story of the Japanese people who came to this country as agricultural laborers to work the fertile valleys of California. During the 1890's Japanese farm workers began gradually to gain a monopoly over farm labor in California. They were not "troublemakers," they were highly skillful, they had no families, and they were hired through their own employment clubs. But they lived on practically nothing, saved their money, bought marginal and waste land no one else wanted, and by 1918 Japanese land-owners were growing some 25,000 acres of rice in California! Other arid stretches were turned into fruitful berry country by the Japanese, who understood irrigation and applied traditional skills with great imagination. Now, of course, they began to be regarded as "dangerous Asiatics" who must be

subjected to restrictive legislation obliging most of them to sell their holdings. During World War II, of course, they lost much more. Yet by extraordinary industry and skill in gardening, Japanese Americans now are recognized as among the world's best agriculturalists, and their nurseries are found in many parts of California.

It is an irony not easily understood—and certainly not something that can be adapted to model-making—that the finest qualities of human beings often show themselves most clearly under conditions of privation and even extreme injustice. Here mystery is piled upon mystery, and there may be a "fools-rush-in" clause that ought to be inserted in the preamble of all well-considered planning of models for general human benefit. The patterns of existence are not, after all, the *life* that is lived. There is no one-to-one relationship between what men need and what men want, or think they want, and the wiser the teacher or the "planner," the less will he prejudice the situation in any direction with respect to priorities in human needs, except, of course, for certain basic minimums, and no experts are needed to establish these. Perhaps we should say that the models can never do anything more than "represent" or "symbolize" the excellences men long for, and that the core problems of today, as always, are in the human attitudes for which no models can be made.

REVIEW

THE SINGING SEALS

ONE of the comforting things about writing about books and literature is that the writer need not be afraid of saying something that has been said before. In literature, nearly everything has been said before, but not in exactly the same way. This is one of the major differences between the practice of the arts and the practice of science. In the arts, if you say a thing exactly as it was said before, you are "hackneyed," or express yourself in clichés. But in science, there is just *one* right way, and you'd better say it that way, or nobody will listen to you! As Bachelard proposed, in poetry, only the first time counts, but in physics only the second time counts, when you verify or confirm the accuracy—the *precise* accuracy—of what was said before.

This cannot be applied, of course, to the growing edge of science, where theory is in flux. But the conventions of scientific paper-writing tend to confine the investigator to following the path of the familiar, the established, the tried and true. If he does not, then his colleagues begin to think that he is practicing a deuce-is-wild sort of science, and have no patience with him. A handful of rather creative men in the sciences resist these conventions, but since they appear as security-threateners to the rank and file, they cannot be popular.

We should not imply that literature is entirely free of such weaknesses. A man who writes, if he knows what he is doing, has similar choices. Is he going to give the reader a "good time," or burden him with opportunities to participate in the creative enterprise? Let us mention some famous names. Tolkien, for example, is an enormously popular story-teller. He understands the mythopoeic craft. He knows the laws of the moral universe and when he can be playful and when he must not be. His chief offense, a natural one, perhaps, in a popular writer, is that he does too much for the reader. He gives his mythic

meanings in all the splendor of their completion. "Frodo lives" came easily to a great many eager souls who would now never feel the need to make a myth of their own. Tolkien had done it all for them. A starveling audience was fed for the first time in many years. A delighting plaything faith had been born, complete with honest dogmas and a glorious innocence that could be borrowed for hours at a time. Tolkien created a phenomenon rather than literature, but we may be grateful to him for all that. He loosened things up for a lot of people.

But on brave days filled with similar longing we should choose to go back to *The Last Unicorn* (Viking and Ballantine) by Peter S. Beagle. There is a book which doesn't do all the work for the reader. A precious ambiguity persists on every page. Should he complete its meaning this way or *that*? One hardly knows, and times come when you want Mr. Beagle to say what he thinks about the matter. What dare I believe is a question that keeps coming up. Beware of books which answer that question. For a man can justly dare to believe only the truths he creates for himself, and any book which tells him something different is a perverting work of pseudo-science which should be deposited at the next city dump you come to. MANAS reviewed *The Last Unicorn* in the issue of Sept. 2, 1970, and it doesn't seem right to attempt it again. This is a book which rings in the memory, and fit to send to one's children off in a commune, or wherever.

We go from Beagle to a much more famous writer, yet with a similar appreciation. We do not begrudge Elizabeth Goudge her extraordinary popularity. She comes by it with all honor. The first book of hers we read was *The Castle on the Hill*, and we have been faithful to her ever since. Why is she so good? Questions of craftsmanship apart, it seems clear that she is a lover of life in all its forms; that while she knows something of evil, she recognizes it as an inversion of something good. She knows the importance of mystery, of man's need for wonder, and hesitates not at all to

put these qualities in wherever they *ought* to be. So there are "heroes" of one or another sort in all her stories. The matter is exactly as Thoreau put it, in an essay on Thomas Carlyle, many years ago:

Exaggeration! was ever any virtue attributed to a man without exaggeration? was ever any vice, without infinite exaggeration? Do we not exaggerate ourselves to ourselves, or do we recognize ourselves for the actual men we are? Are we not all great men? Yet what are we actually to speak of? We live by exaggeration. What else is it to anticipate more than we enjoy? The lightning is an exaggeration of the light. Exaggerated history is poetry, and truth referred to a new standard. He who cannot exaggerate is not qualified to utter truth. No truth, we think, was ever expressed but with this sort of emphasis, so that for the time there seemed to be no other. Moreover, you must speak loud to those who are hard of hearing, and so you acquire a habit of shouting to those who are not. By an immense exaggeration we appreciate our Greek poetry and philosophy, and Egyptian ruins; our Shakespeares and Miltons, our Liberty and Christianity. We give importance to this hour over all other hours. We do not live by justice, but by grace. As the sort of justice which concerns us in our daily intercourse is not that administered by the judge, so the historical justice which we prize is not arrived at by nicely balancing the evidence. In order to appreciate any, even the humblest man, you must first, by some good fortune, have acquired a sentiment of admiration, even of reverence, for him, and there never were such exaggerators as these.

(We have quoted here from a treasure of a book, *Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers*, published in paperback by Harvest House, Montreal, Canada, in 1963. It contains the essay on civil disobedience, the material on John Brown, Thoreau's only "literary" contribution, a study of Carlyle, the important "Life without Principle," and several other essays.)

Elizabeth Goudge's latest book, *The Child from the Sea* (Pyramid paperback), is the story of the girl-wife of Charles II of England—apparently based on a note in Pepys' Diary to the effect that the issue of that marriage identified as the Duke of Monmouth, was causing a stir at Court. Little is known of Lucy Walter, the mother of the Duke,

who was married to the young prince, according to the story, during the war which ended, finally, with the execution of Charles I. Miss Goudge takes full advantage of this obscurity, and her reader will almost certainly agree that the development of the romance between the startlingly beautiful Welsh girl (of noble origin) and the handsome prince was as it ought to have been. In the passage we have selected for quotation, the prince plays the flute to the seals which live along the coast near Roch Castle where his bride-to-be was born. That seals can sing is something new to your reviewer, since California seals have only an unmelodious bark; but we are willing to believe that the seals native to Wales are of another sort. And people do play the flute to them, as Miss Goudge testifies in a foreword.

The last lights were fading from the western sky but as they came out beyond the headland and saw the faint shine of the coastline, and the islands rising silvery out of pools of diaphanous mist, they knew that the moon was rising and would soon flood the sky with light. "I think we should go now," whispered Lucy.

Charles brought them round to the bay and then shipped his oars while Lucy cast out the floats. They could see the morlos, lulled by the same gentle breathing of the sea that peacefully rocked their boat, and they sat for a long time without movement or speech, anxious to become so much a part of the beauty around them that they would not disturb the morlos. This, they felt, was important. Creatures are not afraid of something that has for long shared their rhythm and their peace. "Now," whispered Lucy at last. "You play the flute better than I do."

He began to play, hardly knowing when he started what he would play, but the right tune came. It was a Hebridean lament and he wondered for the moment what he was lamenting about on this night of joy. Then he remembered that the morlos had been banished from the warm life of men. It must always be the cold sea now that they must fight for life, their only hiding places the lonely caves that thrust in like fingers under the earth. Here they must lie in darkness and when they cried out to the men above them be heard only with fear. He would laugh at himself afterwards but while he played Charles almost believed the old story, and yearned after those seals as though they were his kith and kin.

He ceased playing and listened, and from over the water was answered by a low fluting cry. It was so mysterious, so beautiful and yet so eerie that when Charles took Lucy's hand he found it cold and trembling. He laid Lucy's hand gently down and took up his flute again. He played a few notes like a call and was answered. He did it again and again and each time like an echo his music came back to him, now here, now there, now near, now far. . . .

"Play something merry," she whispered to Charles. "Play a dance tune, but very softly so as not to frighten them."

He played the air of a country dance, one of the lilting tunes to which Lucy and William had danced on May morning. There was no reply to this but the moonlight was brighter and they could see that the morlos were on the move. It seemed to Lucy that in their own manner they moved in the slow mazes of a dance.

'Look at those two!" gasped Charles. "They are flying to us.

Lucy had heard of this marvel but never seen it before. The heads of the two seals were reared high up out of the water and they were moving so fast toward the boat that in the uncertain light they seemed flying. Then they disappeared and left Charles and Lucy wondering if they had really seen what they had seen, or merely dreamed it. They waited a little longer, but there was no movement, no more music, and the moon grew bright and hard above the cliffs. It seemed all over and they turned the boat and rowed slowly away.

They were just rounding the headland when it happened. A great head streaming with water came out of the sea beside the boat, and a face looked at them, old and furrowed and wise, with great eyes of love and sorrow and wet whiskers silvered by the moon. Then another head arose behind the boat and cried aloud to them. Then suddenly both were gone. They waited a long time but they did not come back.

"They were saying goodbye to us," Lucy said at last, and began to cry.

"Do not weep, little love," said Charles. "It was great, it was beauty, and it was true. And now it is over. Let us row home."

Morlos are young seals.

COMMENTARY

REPORT ON THE CITIES

ACCORDING to the Commission on the Cities, set up to find out what has been happening in American cities since the disturbing report, three years ago, of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, most of the changes which have occurred are for the worse. Members of the new commission visited Atlanta, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Phoenix, and sent investigators to Newark and El Paso. Their report was made public last month.

The Kerner Report (by the National Advisory Commission) had said that racism and the harshness of slum life were tearing the nation apart. The new commission declared that—

Housing is still the national scandal it was then.

Schools are more tedious and turbulent.

The rates of crime and unemployment and disease and heroin addiction are higher.

Welfare rolls are longer.

A Los Angeles *Times* (Sept. 24) summary of the Commission's findings says that "with few exceptions, the relations between minority communities and the police are just as hostile." The report concludes:

In short, the expressions of sympathy and concern that the Kerner Report elicited from a large number of those who, privately or publicly, wield the power that governs America, did not signify that they were willing to take the drastic action necessary to make American cities livable again. . . .

To an ever increasing extent, American institutions, public and private, are losing the confidence of the American people.

One could say that if the politically pretentious plans to remedy these conditions, made by the wealthiest country in the world, are such a miserable failure, then there must be something wrong with the entire planning approach. Almost certainly, the main difficulty lies in the conception of "power." The Commission on the Cities attributes the failure to

the inaction of those who "wield the power that governs America," but the fact is that this sort of power is largely impotent in relation to what is wrong. Powerless people don't need just "jobs"; they need situations in which they are able to accept and grow into responsibility, and these situations must be natural and real. The basic tendency of the managed, technological civilization has been in the opposite direction. Reversing this tendency is the first step toward change, and will require the "holistic" approach spoken of by A. H. Maslow (see page 2).

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves FREE LEARNING

TWO root flaws in our educational system account for much that is wrong with our schools and colleges. We have neglected, on the one hand, the role of the entire culture in the learning process. And we have lost sight of the individualism of learning.

Education must be a function of the entire society. Each of the major institutions which constitute the society exerts a powerful educative impact; together their effect is decisive. The way that work and family life are organized, the design of our cities, our popular arts and mass media, the professions which see to our health, security, and salvation—each of these, and all of them together, shape what we become.

This was, of course, the classical idea of education in the West. In Plato the society is a school without walls, and all man's enterprises have no other end than helping him shape himself to his fullest human potential.

This conception of the entire human enterprise as education did not die with the Greeks. It informs every serious work in the field. As Charles Silberman has summarized this tradition:

From Plato to Rousseau to Jefferson to the early John Dewey . . . almost everybody who wrote about education took it for granted that it is the community and the culture—what the ancient Greeks called *paideia*—that educates. The contemporary American is educated by his *paideia* no less than the Athenian was by his. The weakness of American education is not that the *paideia* does not educate, but that it educates to the wrong ends.

Rather than recognize this classical social truth, we have compressed the educational function into one ill-equipped institution: schooling. By this specialization of labor, this intensification of effort, we hoped to assure that the job was done most efficiently.

At the same time, this delegation of responsibility excused our neglect of the mis-educative impact of our other institutions.

The American people have loaded an absurd weight of responsibility on their schools. I recall a recent cartoon in the *Saturday Review*: it showed two Romans, racing down an alley, togas flapping in the breeze. Behind them you could see the barbarian hordes putting the city to the torch, raping and pillaging. As they fled, one Roman was saying to the other: "Education is the only answer."

We are learning at last that education is not the only answer. As Robert Hutchins points out in his latest book, *The Learning Society*:

One who proclaims salvation through education evades the necessity of doing something about the slums. One who sees education as the prime requirement of the poverty-stricken nations does not have to try to keep them from starving. Those who talk of education as the sole means of solving the race problem, or of obtaining lasting peace, or of curing juvenile delinquency, often seem to mean that they have not much interest in these subjects, certainly not much interest in inconveniencing themselves about them.

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At the same time that we have neglected the *social* dimension of education, we have also misunderstood the basic *individualism* of learning. We have assumed that education can be organized as a group activity, and having organized it on that principle we have devoted decades to attempting to "individualize" instruction. But we have forgotten that each person can, does, and must learn by and for himself.

Life *is* learning, but learning dies when it is constrained in a certain place, provided only for a select group, conveyed only through certain people and media, confined to outmoded categories of thought, chopped up in courses, periods, units, lessons, lectures, measured by invidious certificates and credentials.

A widespread recognition of this fact could be the basis for the third great revolution in the history of human learning. The first took us from tribalism and an oral culture, to a written one which transmitted its wisdom through books. The second was the Progressive approach, a Copernican revolution which tried to put the student rather than the teacher at the center of the educational process.

The third revolution could go the whole hog, by liberating the learner from the institutionalized context altogether. At the same time, learning would become lateral rather than horizontal (the older teaching the younger), with everyone learning from everyone else—and from the information-glutted environment.

Most of us learned the important, useful, and engaging things we know, outside of school. An hour's reminiscence reveals this: life, lovers, libraries, and labor are potent teachers that leave school and college far behind. Even more dramatic is the experience of the auto-didacts: men and women who have attained awesome—or merely intriguing—levels of knowledge and wisdom without the beneficence of high school and college.

Today the most important learning already can, does, and should go on *outside* of schools and colleges. The resources available for learning—money, tools, media, people—should be wrested from the institutions which currently "provide" education, and put in the hands of the consumers. The millions of young people and adults who are beginning to demand access to skills, knowledge, and ways of growth—without having to submit to the regimen of a school or college—need emboldening, and practical help.

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Our problems go far deeper than improving teaching, or motivating students, or even to creating better environments for learning. We must strive to make the world learnable. We must refashion our institutions and our ways of life so

that they are communicative, accessible to inquiry, liberating for learners. We must give young people and *all* people the means and the motivation for continual learning. This is Ivan Illich's theme in *Deschooling Society*.

Today we are seeing a renewal, revival and reaffirmation of the classical conception of education and of the individual. Having come through a period of innovation in which we tried to patch up our schools, followed by a period of radical reform in which we tried to restructure them, we are now entering a period of developing of alternatives to schooling as the primary means of education.

Today, it is happening—but the prime movers are not educators, they are students. Literally millions of students at the high school and college level are turning away from the schools as their source of learning and growth, and creating their own institutions. The recent book by Florence Howe and Paul Lauter, *The Conspiracy of the Young*, documents this shift in detail, while Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* suggests its philosophical implications. Young people are building their own institutions, their own communities, their own culture and art, their own language. They sense, inchoately but strongly, that only through such a counter-culture can they affirm their own values and educate themselves as they see fit.

A myriad of other initiatives, inside and outside the formal educative system, are enabling what I call "Free Learning" to commence. Many educators seem reconciled to the fact that the present generation of 10- to 20-year-olds is just about the last one that will voluntarily trudge through the lockstep from kindergarten to college.

Because our thinking about learning has been dominated for so long by the image of the school, we know virtually nothing about the potentialities for truly individual learning, or about how the other institutions of a society become adjuncts and resources for the learning process. We do not know why some people continue to learn and

grow, while others do not. We do not know, except in the still-rare cases of auto-didacts, the potentialities for self-education.

Even worse than these lacunae in knowledge, is the atrophy of our collective imagination. We can only dimly envisage how to seize back for the individual the power over the growth of his own mind, or what to do with that power once we have gained it.

But we do know that the problems of education today cannot be solved by schools and colleges. There is too much to know and understand—not just from books but from conditions, from life, from love and struggle. Like birth and death, the true act of learning is ultimately individual. But without the conditions provided by other people and by humane institutions, it will not occur.

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Gandhian Bibliography

WHAT happens to the work and the vision of a great man, after he dies? A vastly complicated process of assimilation of the body of his thought begins, which may be said to have two effects. If there is an ardent reaching up to what he stood for, an entire age may be elevated by this striving. But at the same time the great man suffers a kind of conventionalization, and his thought is ritualized. Simply by the efforts of lesser men to "understand" him, he is subjected to this reduction.

A great man always rejects the easy way out of difficulties, since he knows that there is no easy way out. Mass human behavior, on the other hand, can be relied upon to do just the opposite. In large societies which depend upon "organization" to solve human problems, there is an unvarying tendency to bureaucratize all issues—to make their solutions matters of technique. So, in time, law is found to have little to do with justice, and medicine little to do with health, and religion little to do with freedom of the human spirit. Ordinary men are relieved of all these problems by the expertise of specialists.

The great man, one way or another, takes all those problems back, and the courage and integrity of this resumption of responsibility make a deep appeal to the better side of other human beings. That is how they know he is great. But greatness eludes definition. By an effort to say *why* a great man is great, we make his secret impenetrable. If he wrote what he meant, it is not read, or it is edited to a more palatable form. If he did not write, then, often, the writings of others gradually give form to what memory we have of him. There is, apparently, no sure escape for human greatness from the denaturing process which sets in with his death, or, perhaps, a little before his death.

Even so, there are gains. Even a vulgarized image of greatness is better than no image at all.

And there will be those who know that such a man is best appreciated by not trying to explain everything about him. It does him no dishonor to leave some blanks in the history of his life. He ought not to be remodelled from epoch to epoch, to suit changing popular conceptions of human excellence. We are under no necessity to make greatness conform to a fad. For example, it was pretty silly of the admirers of Isaac Newton to do everything they could to suppress the fact that Newton was intensely interested in such subjects as alchemy, and that he performed experiments in the transmuting art, although with no success. It seemed to these admirers almost indecent that Newton, the inventor of the World Machine, was quite open to certain occult ideas that he gained great inspiration, if not the very idea of gravitation, from Jakob Boehme, and that science was for him really a branch of religion. Yet the true history of his interests shows that Newton, according to his lights, was a more open-minded, cosmopolitan man than his fanatical admirers, who would make of him a pure Cartesian mechanist. They did not want it widely known that Newton thought of the universe as a Divine Sensorium, much as the Platonic poet, Henry More, conceived it.

There is a lesson in this, as we grow more tolerant of the heterodoxy of human distinction. It is never necessary to give our best men a Procrustean treatment, to make them more acceptable to coming generations. It would be far better to recognize that authentic greatness, when it comes along, is always something that cannot be made to fit the prejudices of any age, and every age has them. On the other hand, it is always well to use a great man's ideas as a means of stretching and even bursting the comfortable categories of the times. If the thought of the age is to be lifted up, connections have to be established and specific contrasts drawn. In this way, greatness ceases to be an abstraction arousing only dumb wonder, and begins to take on visible dimensions having application to immediate human problems.

The Gandhian Institute of Studies, Rajghat, Varanasi, India, headed by Jayaprakash Narayan and Sugata Dasgupta, has for one of its purposes to show the revolutionary importance of Gandhi's thinking for the social sciences. This can be regarded as an attempt to perform constructive assimilation of Gandhi's thinking, so that, little by little his vision may begin to inform both the teaching and the practice of social science. To this end, Navachetna Prakashan, of Varanasi, has published for the Gandhian Institute of Studies an extensive bibliography on Nonviolence and Satyagraha, edited by Hira Rai. (The price is ten rupees.) The bibliography lists books and articles printed in English and has a total of 859 entries, which fall into forty-seven subject categories. In a useful introduction, Dr. Dasgupta describes the general purpose of the bibliography. It is to make known to academic social scientists the rich resources of Gandhian thought, with the hope that when the existence of this material is recognized, it will begin to leaven the rather sterile field of social science with Gandhian inspiration. Dr. Dasgupta points to the need for this vision in speaking of theories of social change:

There are indeed two types of the changes: one that makes the society more stable and prevents fundamental changes in the style of the system, and the other brings change in the system itself and radically reconstructs the society. Social scientists, apologists more or less as they are of the modern society and its creator in a way—have been concerned only with the first typology. They have functioned in a narrow groove within the terms of reference of the modern society. Consequently there has been no effort to develop alternatives of models and concepts or of values and norms which might provide new directions to the system of analysis itself and add fresh chapters to the book of social science.

Gandhi, Dr. Dasgupta points out, was not simply an opponent of war and violence as conventionally identified in their overt forms. He recognized violence as "the central ethos of the global society and was afraid that its pace would increase *ad infinitum*." More and more, this inner fabric of violence is becoming manifest in the domestic problems of the so-called "advanced"

societies. It is the hope of the publishers of the bibliography on nonviolence and Satyagraha that the thoroughness with which the Gandhian tools of social analysis can be applied to contemporary issues will become clear to students of social problems, through reference to the many texts and papers listed. These tools, developed and used by Gandhi, are the ideas of Truth, Swaraj, and Nonviolence. Truth means admission of social reality. Swaraj is self-reliance and self-rule, while nonviolence is action without harm to others.

A minor irony seems involved in this effort, since Dr. Dasgupta hopes that if Western scholars make use of the bibliography, Indian scientists, who are quick to adopt the lead of the West, may follow their example. Yet Western science, especially conventional social science, is under fire today, and being subjected to grave questioning, as indeed, all higher education is being questioned. A reading of C. Wright Mills' *The Sociological Imagination* would give some indication of the changes that are now being demanded of conventional social science in the West.