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THE NECESSITY OF AN IDEAL

IN her account of the "new religions" of today's young people, in the *Saturday Review* for last Dec. 19, Marcia Cavell observes:

> Unfortunately, the idea that feeling and fantasy are an undeniable and often enriching part of human experience has been perverted into the idea that whatever someone thinks he feels, he feels. And the Marcusean critique of Western rationality as enshrining an ideal of objectivity appropriate to objects and not to people becomes a contempt for reason per se.
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> For many students, the irrationality of a belief or practice is a measure of its value.

This hardly sums up all the attitudes of the young, yet it does describe the over-correction that is characteristic of human beings generally, and not just young ones, after a long cycle of submisssion to limiting belief or faith in some simplifying doctrine. How could the present excesses have been avoided? Only by giving more attention to other excesses the Western world in general was indulging forty or fifty years ago. Novelists and critics like Aldous Huxley and George Orwell anticipated the present imprisonments of technological rationalization in their bleakly hopeless anti-utopias, and earlier critics had pointed out the follies of a cocksure, mechanistic rationalism and of an externalizing scientific "objectivity" as the measure of all reality. Today, even the language we use is identified with these assumptions and is under attack. As Marcia Cavell says:

> In *1984*, George Orwell envisioned a society that handled protest not by punishing it but by making it nonsensical. And Orwell's "Newspeak," Marcuse writes, is the language of our one-dimensional society, obliterating contradictions, blurring perceptions, and paralyzing feeling (among his examples: "clean bomb," "harmless fallout," "father of the H-bomb").
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> But a warning that can be stated only in words, that rests on the assumption language is the condition of mind in general, and that makes sense granted we are not always the "dupes" of the words we speak has become for some students the cry that we should get rid of language altogether. "Words mean different things to different people," students say. (Of course they do, but the only way we know it is that they also mean the same thing.) "All experiences are subjective." (No, experiences are things that subjects have. So?) "There is no such thing as truth. There is only my truth!" (Then why are you talking to me?) They do not think of language as a rather miraculous means of communication, but as a barrier.

In short, the intellectual habit of insisting that all reality consists in material, objective happenings, of reading the subjective out of the universe, of denying mind any substance of its own, has produced the moral bankruptcy of a value-free pursuit of sensation and personal enjoyment in individual life, of unlimited power and economic supremacy in national life, and uncontrolled manipulative capacity in scientific and technical undertakings, and, ugly and indeed evil as these things are, they cannot be exorcized by embracing the opposite pole of irrationalism. Instead, when this desperate means is used, ends of the same moral—or amoral—level are once again enthroned and their simplicities hailed as bright, new, emancipating discoveries. It is not that the "irrationalists" have no excuse. They have a great many excuses, which are to be found in the systematic misuse of intellect, over a period of a hundred years or more, in shutting out the significance of the mystical, the metaphysical, the ethical, and the transcendent from the awareness of what we term "serious thought" in the Western world. The fact is that we have a civilization which from its very beginnings has crucified its Christs, ridiculed or persecuted its reformers, and forced its philosophers to ask their searching questions in the streets. This being our history, it is too much to expect that a single generation of young people will find ways to change all these

self-defeating tendencies, especially when their resources amount to little more than revulsion and desperate longings. A great debt is owed to them, nonetheless. They have made it plain that a moral crisis is upon the modern world—a demonstration which older generations had neither the awareness nor the courage to undertake.

There may be, as time goes on, some practical failures or even collapses in the essential facilities of the technological society. These could prove the best possible antidote to irrationalism, since when men need to communicate intelligibly to get water, food, and shelter, they soon develop an astonishing capacity to understand each other and to get on with what has to be done. "Irrationalism," after all, is a luxurious self-indulgence—a doctrine for people able to play at life, after their material needs are well taken care of. The disciplined use of the mind, on the other hand, requires mature human beings—people in the habit of accepting and being equal to practical responsibilities.

One of the best defenses of the rational, as both a practical and a theoretical necessity in human life, is found in the writings of Morris Raphael Cohen, an American philosopher who died in 1947. In a brief essay on F. H. Bradley, included at the end of his *Preface to Logic* (Meridian paperback), Cohen wrote:

> Propositions like 2 + 2 = 4 may not carry us very far in the apprehension of the total reality, but they are absolutely different from propositions like 2 + 2 = 5. As creatures of sense and time, the absolute totality of the world is for us necessarily an unattainable limit. But the necessary effort after the unattainable which characterizes thought and all distinctively human effort, is made intelligible if we remember that we must actually have an ideal of the absolute sufficiently definite to recognize that our partial attainments fall short of it. It is the possession of this ideal which enables science to discriminate between the true and the false, and to evaluate the more or less true. In thus recognizing our eternal inability to attain an actual absolute we possess an ideal absolute. Is this distinction too finely drawn? It is at bottom the distinction between all doctrines which regard the human task as infinite, necessary, and intelligible though full of tragedy, and doctrines which flatter our frail vanity by trying to persuade us that some favorite creed, institution or panacea will forever withstand the ravages of time and mortal finitude.

Morris Cohen is not the only one to declare the indispensable role of the transcendent, the aspiring, the ideal, in human life. But men of this persuasion have always been a comparatively small minority. Yet so long as they are permitted to give strength to the dominant currents of human thought, and to infuse an element of awe and wonder into the daily lives of the people, there remains some kind of moral balance in society. The problem, today, is to restore this element, and to do it in a way that goes more deeply into the core of man's nature than the borrowed rituals and chants of Eastern religion can penetrate, sound as may be the instinct of the young to look to the East for inspiration. The fact is, for one thing, that the philosophic literature of both Hinduism and Buddhism involves the profoundest rationalism that the world has ever known. The *Bhagavad-Gita* has been called the study of sages, while the *Dhammapada*, perhaps the simplest of the Buddhist texts, has been widely recognized as a valuable treatise on psychology—*ethical* psychology.

This, indeed, is what is wrong with Western rationalism: it lacks a moral ground. It is this lack which Michael Polanyi, in his *Personal Knowledge*, and Abraham Maslow, in *The Psychology of Science* and other writings, set out to remedy. The lack has pervaded the entirety of modern culture. From science it seeped into and came to dominate education. The absence of a moral foundation in law and politics, today, as John Schaar has pointed out, is behind the failure of the dignity and the legitimacy of present-day political authority. It is the central weakness in economic theory, as both E. F. Schumacher and Walter Weisskopf have shown. It underlies the mania for "more production" in modern technology, as Mumford makes clear in his argument for the principle of "organic plenitude,"

as the means to restore balance and measure to Western industrial society.

But *what* is the moral idea, first principle, foundation verity, that we need? It is curious that, when the question is formulated in this way, we feel an immediate tendency to marshal all our skillful refutations. So it is natural that, thus far, what has been offered by reformers is exceedingly tentative or plainly functional, and not in the form of beliefs. We were surfeited with beliefs long ago. Maslow describes the capacities, the promise, the qualities of self-actualizing man, and he manages to generate feelings of universal awareness—a few here-and-now glimpses of Nirvana, you might call them—with his accounts of the content of peak experiences. Aldo Leopold writes with a sure inspiration of the need to love the earth, to feel one's unity with it, to honor the living rights of all its creatures. But who or what is the man or being cast for those ennobling roles? Is he or it soul or body? Mortal or immortal? Is he a novel emergence from the germ plasm, or something more? Was he "created"? Did he evolve? Has the ego a history which reaches back through numberless past incarnations, as the East Indians and Platonists maintained? Is man an eternal sojourner or a creature made only of earth?

Not unremarkably, with the breakdown of conventional expectations and the crumbling of authoritarian institutions, questions such as these are beginning to be asked openly—not argued very much, but asked. The bars of traditional skepticism are down, or coming down. "Karma" is becoming a popular term, a bit too popular for the taste of those who have used it philosophically for years. Emerson's essay on Compensation would be an excellent text for grasping some of its meanings, but the day of rigor in metaphysical conceptions of this order still seems remote from the popular mind.

And what is the world? A fortuitous concourse of atoms, as Lucretius said? Are worlds reborn, too? Do *they* "evolve"? Will you have an old myth or a modern cosmological theory of origins? One may explain as much as the other, so far as light on universal beginnings is concerned. We are a long way from knowing anything certain about either planetary or human origins. Perhaps there never was an actual beginning, and the advocates of endless cycles are right.

Actually, the value-free science in which we were all drilled from childhood—in its assumptions rather than its exacting disciplines—has left us almost wholly without nourishment as moral intelligences filled with longing for meaning in our lives. When the optimistic view of endless scientific progress wavered and fell in ruins, our sense of participation in the world's work fell with it. It does not matter, now, it seems, *what* we believe. And yet it must. It must matter, because the idea of the self and the idea of the world are not independent conceptions. *We live in the world.* It is a part of us and we are a part of it; yet both, we sense, are more than just that. But what?

Skepticism, doubt, unbelief, collapse of structure, contempt for the world's many failures, bitter loyalty to a monstrous relativism which makes nothing seem true—these seem to be the attitudes which prevail before the rebirth of conviction, before regeneration of human resolve. Yet there is another factor beneath all these negative qualities. What is it? In the examples we can find, it also turns out to be functional. That is, in the case of Ronald Laing, whose theories, as theories, seem devastating, even frightening—you can't tell whether or not modern psychiatry is just another obsessional system, too, a collection of cultural egotisms made to sound learned—he takes away the terror of such doctrines by his simple humanity, his profound concern. This is not doctrine but act, and it fills the vacuum. It is function. The doctrine, if one is needed, will no doubt come later; and meanwhile one wonders if there can ever be a doctrine that has immunity to

formal rigidity, to verbalism and to the eventual substitution of word for deed.

So the young, many of them, have rushed away from home to find salvation before there was any doctrinal Good News. They began to act out what they felt—not all of it good—not all of it saving—announcing the most primitive credos. Their language is a fuzzy sort of "code." Miss Cavell relates in the *Saturday Review:*

> In a recent article in *Ramparts,* Tom Hayden remarked that the language of the Establishment is depleted. "Often the only words with emotional content are those which cannot be spoken or published in the 'legitimate' world. . . . New words are needed to express feelings: . . . cool, outta sight freaky. . . . In order to dream, to invoke anger or love, new language becomes necessary."

Well, the language of Plato survived the power drives of Alexander, the conquests of the Romans, the interminable religious and political wars of Europe, and is still with us today, undergoing revival in some very choice current reading. What we are watching, and sometimes participating in and experiencing, is a vast change in human conceptions of value, accompanied by great outbursts of feeling, wild attacks on everything "past" and present, with a great deal of apocalyptic prophesying. No historical change of these dimensions, it seems, can go on without such phenomena. Yet these phenomena will not endure. They have no staying power. They are transient symptoms of the confusion and desperation that beset people of all classes, not of the gradually strengthening determination, felt by many, nor of the slowly shaping longings of men everywhere for a better life.

But what *is* a better life? To answer this question it is necessary to think, to think in ordered ways. And as Morris Cohen says, it is our ideal conceptions that will enable us to distinguish between the true and the false. It is devotion to an ideal, even though unattainable on earth, which gives order and precedence to what we do on earth. Without ideals, we have no protection against "doctrines which flatter our frail vanity by trying to persuade us that some favorite creed, institution or panacea will forever withstand the ravages of time and moral finitude."

At first, of course, the need for transcendent ideals is not apparent. So much is wrong that needs fixing or changing. Anyone can see that we've got to stop spoiling the earth with industrial pollution and wars. No clairvoyant powers are needed to recognize that the present course leads directly to self-destruction. But at the beginning of this course, it looked sensible enough. Here we were, we Americans, in this new world, a strong and ingenious people. We knew what to do or how to find out what to do. We celebrated what we did for over a hundred years, and converted a lot of other people to the same optimistic doctrines. "Americanization" has spread all around and has become for a great many people about the worst thing you can name a social process. How can we be sure we won't try something like that again?

A stop-the-pain philosophy isn't good enough. When the pain is gone you are without a philosophy. A bread philosophy isn't good enough. When you get the bread, there's nothing to dream about, to aspire to. Overfed and malnourished is the diagnosis of many of the nutritionists who don't work for the Food and Drug Administration.

The materialist philosophers have been left in charge for too long. What they claimed sounded practical, and being practical is the way to persuade Americans, but now not even the progress we have made is enjoyable. Only the empty men in politics still brag about "progress." And the fact is that the materialists are seldom the originators of great discovery and invention. In what amounts to a very interesting book on philosophy, Frederick Lange's *History of Materialism,* after a long summary of the achievements of ancient science, the author says:

> When we behold knowledge thus accumulating from all sides—knowledge which strikes deep into the heart of nature, and already presupposes the

> axiom of the uniformity of events—we must ask the question, How far did ancient Materialism contribute to the attainment of this knowledge and these views?
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> And the answer to this question will at first sight appear very curious. For not only does scarcely a single one of the great discoverers—with the solitary exception of Demokritos—distinctly belong to the Materialistic school, but we find amongst the most honourable names a long series of men belonging to an utterly opposite, idealistic, formalistic, and even enthusiastic tendency.
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> And special notice must here be paid to mathematics. Plato the first father of an enthusiasm which became in the course of history at one time beautiful and profound, at another fanatical and delirious, is at the same time the intellectual progenitor of a line of inquirers who carried the dearest and most consequent of all sciences, mathematics, to the highest point it was to reach in antiquity.

Then, after identifying a number of ancient discoverers, Lange observes:

> We see easily enough . . . [that the] slender participation of Materialism in the achievements of positive inquiry is not casual, . . . but that, in fact, the ideal element with the conquerors of the sciences stands in the closest connection with their inventions and discoveries.

While a similarly clear case for the idealists would be more difficult in relation to modern times, it is well known that many of the distinguished pioneers of today's science were philosophically inclined, as simple mention of Newton and Einstein establishes. In any event, there is no need to fear a stultification of the mind from turning to idealism, and especially to idealistic thinkers who combined their inventiveness with philosophic balance and placed major emphasis on ethical insight and moral responsibility. The world does not lack for the sort of counsel it needs, in the present emergency. It only seems as though we are left without guides, because we have neglected the available wisdom for so long. And there have been those who, even in recent years, have attempted to put old philosophical teachings into an idiom well within the grasp of present-day man.

REVIEW
"THE ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT

MOST of the reviews and discussions of ecology that have appeared in MANAS have emphasized the contentions of writers like Aldo Leopold and Joseph Wood Krutch. Leopold spoke of the inadequacy of economic motives in conservation policy, pointing to the need for a basic "land ethic" growing out of deep regard for the earth and its creatures. It is necessary, he said, to love the land, to feel fellowship with its life. Krutch wrote a minor classic, *Conservation Is Not Enough*, later published as a pamphlet by the University of Utah Press, in which he spoke of the shallowness of many conservation efforts:

> What is commonly called "conservation" will not work in the long run because it is not really conservation at all but rather, disguised by its elaborate scheming, a more knowledgeable variation of the old idea of a world for man's use only. That idea is unrealizable. But how can man be persuaded to cherish any other ideal unless he can learn to take some interest and some delight in the beauty and variety of the world for its own sake, unless he can see a "value" in a flower blooming or an animal at play, unless he can see some "use" in things not useful? . . .
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> We must live for something besides making a living. If we do not permit the earth to produce beauty and joy, it will in the end not produce food either.
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> Here practical considerations and those which are commonly called "moral," "æsthetic" and even "sentimental" join hands.

We have for review a book which, without arguing this case directly, brings to bear a large amount of convincing evidence. The author, John McHale, was for years closely associated with Buckminster Fuller at the University of Southern Illinois, and his present volume, *The Ecological Context* (Braziller, 1970, $7.95), is a revised and expanded version of Document #6 of the series of reports issued by World Resources Inventory at that university. The first chapter, to which we shall give attention, bears the impact of the book. Chapters on food, energy, and materials supply supporting facts, with many graphic illustrations. The last chapter, "Ecological Redesign," of necessity general and very brief, deals with needs and over-all possibilities which can hardly come alive for the reader without those broad changes in attitude and motivation which, as the author has briefly noted, are essential to man's continued life on the planet.

The fundamental demonstration of this book is that the earth is a finite body with limited resources, some of which are irreplaceable, and that man's behavior has in the past fifty years or so become manifestly incompatible with the health, and perhaps the life, of both his habitat and himself. Human beings don't really "consume" anything. They use things, and by using alter them. If they use too much and alter the world too much, and too degradingly, its usefulness to them will rapidly diminish, and that is what is now happening. We don't have just life and health on earth; we have life and health *with* the earth. Mr. McHale has an illuminating passage on this principle:

> Medicine has developed from concern with pathology of dysfunction and disease in individual organisms to larger concerns with preventive medicine and health regulation at the national- and world-health level. So, whatever meta-discipline an "applied ecology" might evolve into, it must also move toward a preventive and regulatory concern with the optimal viability of the planetary ecology.
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> To rephrase such an analogy: Where the medical-health sciences have grown to encompass overall concern with the *internal metabolics* of the human organism, the approach to human affairs through an ecological perspective must now deal with all the *externalized* metabolic systems of humanity—both the naturally occurring cycles with which man interacts, and the psycho-physical and technological systems through which all of his environmental interactions are conducted.
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> We need also to extend the physical and biological concepts of ecology to include the social behaviors of man—as equally critical factors within the ecosystem. The earth has not only been changed by scientific and technological transformations for

particular economic and industrial functions—but these have been spurred by specific value attitudes, by politico-ethical systems, by art, by religion, by the need for social contiguity and communication as expressed in cities, by highway systems, and so forth. Such "cultural" transformations play more directly causative and formative roles than we customarily accord them.

Mr. McHale now launches into an account of the *extreme* interference of man with the life-balances of the earth, giving a number of dramatic and convincing illustrations. His introduction to these examples is also a conclusion:

> The scale and critical magnitude of human activities within the earth system are now such that nothing less than a planetary approach toward "ecological health" may be adequate. The overriding crisis point revolves around the survival of the human and other species of life within the biosphere.
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> The nature of the crisis is such that no *local* measures can now, in themselves, be wholly effective or sufficient unless they are considered within the whole system. No piecemeal acts of emergency-pressured political legislation can, alone do more than postpone catastrophe—perhaps, hopefully, beyond the next election! The socio-political understanding of the larger ecological implications of local actions and decision-making must now be set within a more radically framed series of questions on how they affect, and are affected by other dimensions of the crisis. Their consideration goes, inexorably, from local to regional to national to international and trans-national consequences and implications.

The main point is that the way we are "using" the world is rapidly rendering it unusable in the future, and in some cases the very near future. "At the time," we think we have the best of reasons for what we do. Take the bombardments which went on in the Pacific during World War II. People who claimed they weren't "necessary" were regarded as subversive or out of their minds. But now it is suspected that "the alarming erosion and breakdown of the Great Barrier Reef, and other large coral formations in the Pacific" may have been partly due to these disturbances brought by modern war, since, curiously, they led to abnormal multiplication of a star fish that feeds on live coral. Defoliation and crop destruction are urged as a military necessity, yet deserts, Mr. McHale points out, "are singularly difficult to occupy and costly to reclaim." Further: "The price-tag on coral reefs, lakes, rivers, streams, and the damage to human and animal genes may be forever out of our reach!"

While agriculture has learned some of the secrets of intensive cultivation, the amount of available soil is continually declining:

> As the historical pattern of deforestation, which produced many of the great desert areas, continues, there is added to this the increasing amount of arable land claimed for building dams, roads, industrial installations, mining, and so forth—all of the necessary uses of an increasing technological system. (In the United States alone, urbanization and transportation have been calculated to draw more than a million acres of soil, each year, from cultivation.)

Since 1900 the rate of "harvesting" the earth's resources has increased voraciously. In 1880, the average person in the West consumed so tons of raw materials. We now use over 300 tons. Translated into iron, coal, oil, wood, and other products, this consumption takes on magnitude of ecological significance. Mr. McHale spells this out:

> For example, of all the coal mined by 1960, only 20 per cent was before 1900, and the remaining 80 per cent since that time. The energies used in the extraction, processing, transportation, and use cycles of all the industrial materials are obtained mainly by burning fossil fuels—each ton of which used releases large amounts of carbon dioxide and other gases into the atmosphere.
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> From 1860 to 1960, this has been calculated to have increased the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration by 14 per cent; during the eight years from 1954 to 1962, the average rate of increase was 5 per cent.
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> During the past century of industrialization, more than 400,000 million tons of carbon dioxide have been introduced into the atmosphere. The concentration in the air we breathe has been increased approximately 10 per cent, and if all known reserves of coal and oil were burned, the concentration would be ten times greater.

Meanwhile, "Sulphur oxides, a more immediately harmful aerial pollutant in highly industrialized countries, is expected to show a 75 per cent increase over present critical levels by 1980."

Turning to agriculture and the reliance of most farmers on artificial nitrogen fertilizers, Mr. McHale points out that making a million tons of such nitrogenous fertilizer requires, directly and indirectly, a million tons of steel and five million tons of coal. Considering that the annual requirement of this fertilizer is expected to be about fifty million tons in the year 2000, one sees the vast drains on non-agricultural resources that will then be made. McHale comments:

> The irony, in terms of our present ecological mismanagement, is that in making the chemical fertilizers and other nutrients to render the land more productive, we indirectly destroy the crops through the by-products of similar industrial processes. Each calorie of food produced in highly mechanized agriculture requires roughly another calorie of fuel to power tractors, harvesters, processing, and transportation. Such fuels are usually the fossil fuels used in internal combustion engines and contribute further sources of aerial pollutants to industrial smoke.

So, even if it be argued that we have enough fossil fuels to last another 500 years, it becomes plain that these resources should not be used as we have been using them, if human health is a consideration.

Well, these are only a few of Mr. McHale's examples of things we are doing which, if continued, will put an early end to life on earth. But how shall we stop doing them? The reforms needed are indeed far-reaching:

> Where massive imbalances occur—whether biophysical in terms of earthquakes and other natural catastrophes or socio-physical in terms of hunger, disease, and the catastrophe of war—we need to recall that the resources of the planet can no more belong, by geographical chance, to any individual, corporation, country, or national group than the air we breathe. National ownership of a key watershed, mineral deposit, or scientific discovery is as farcical, and dangerous, a proposition as our supposed national sovereignty of an "air space."

Mr. McHale hopes that science, as an institution, which he thinks of as a "value-affirming" and "goal-setting" agency, can help with the leadership in achieving the necessary changes. Many scientists, however, have no such optimistic notion of science, institutionally considered, and the willingness of talented men to lend the authority of their reputations to conventional political views has been discouraging, especially since 1945.

But it is certainly true that *some* scientists will do a great deal to create the needed public opinion. More than anything else, however, the changes required will become possible through the changed attitudes of ordinary people, in relation to the living earth. The best-intentioned scientists, moreover, will be helpless without this support, which comes from the hearts as well as the minds of human beings.

COMMENTARY
"ETHICAL ACCOUNTABILITY"

IT is easy to see, by turning to one of his earlier papers, why John McHale feels confident that science or scientists will provide the leadership necessary to bring about the vast changes required to assure that the earth will remain a habitable place for human beings (see page 8). In a lecture, "The Transnational World," given at the University of Texas in 1969, he said:

> We may well reflect that, even at this stage, if all access to such internationally sustained services as telephones, airlines, and health information were shut off, no developed nation today could survive for more than a few days. This is amply illustrated by even local power failures airline strikes, etc. This web of international services and interlocked organizations represents a trend and commitment whose real power is as yet unrealized.
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> There is a growing transnational awareness that the path toward more stable global integration lies with the building of world regulatory agencies along functional and associative lines rather than through the presently dysfunctional territorial entities. . . .
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> As science is turned to for public and legislative guidance in both physical and social affairs, its more responsible and eminent practitioners have begun to question the ethical accountability of their professions for the uses to which science may be put. Such uses have, hitherto, been determined almost wholly by the attitudes and circumstances of local national societies.
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> Scientists increasingly recognize that their central allegiance to the larger human system, to the maintenance of the ecological matrix, may take precedence over the more transient, and possibly dangerous, predilections of local national value systems. . . . Within the now closely-knit interdependence of our global community, the continued disparities between nations may be viewed as the gravest threat to overall maintenance of the human community.

At the level of Mr. McHale's analysis, it may indeed seem that scientists are the best available prospects for leadership in achieving reform. Yet until now the most decisive action in response to this "gravest threat" has not come from any professional elite, but from rare individuals whose chief distinction has been a capacity to identify with the miserable, the dispossessed, and the suffering of the earth—who are also by far the most numerous. And the most helpful scientists are those who stop speaking as scientists, and address their fellows simply as men. There are no important technical barriers to a peaceful, healthful world, and the moral realities of the human situation have too long been obscured by the splendor of technical achievement.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
ART AND LIFE

WE have another wonderful book about art by Pearl Greenberg—a book which, if you show it to people who have to do with teaching the arts, makes them want to have one of their own. Just looking through it seems to have this effect. The pictures, which are mostly photographs by Murray Greenberg, the author's husband, are necessary to and practically part of the text. *Art and Ideas* for *Young People* (Van Nostrand Reinhold, $8.95) is exactly what it sets out to be—an "invitation to art" addressed to children from about the fifth grade on, but there is nothing to prevent adults from enjoying it. The chapters cover all forms of visual art expression, from drawing and painting to sculpture. There is material on color and light and many practical suggestions on ways to print on fabrics and other materials. A fascinating section tells what can be done with simple, homemade looms, and illustrates various uses of yarn. We said "sculpture," but this part is about dozens of ways to create three-dimensional forms—making masks, and working in papier-mache, clay, plaster, and sand.

The excellence of this book makes you brood about what a far cry it is from the actual to the ideal. For example, if you have Tolstoyan notions about "art," and if you believe it ought to have a natural or spontaneous development in the home, that its place is everywhere in the community, not just in "institutions" or special places such as schools or even art schools, or community crafts "centers"; if, in short, you regret the isolation of "art" from the rest of life, and recall that the ancient Greeks had no word for "art" as a thing in itself—then, you may have some kind of initial prejudice to overcome in relationship to all specializing books on "art." In the really good society, nobody would need to talk about "art," because everybody would be doing it. Nor would anyone speak heavily of the pursuit of truth, since everyone would be working on this quite naturally, uncovering it in unostentatious ways. All the "specialties" of what we regard as high culture would be back in the lives of the people, and there wouldn't be any cults and coteries, any artificialities or esthetic status, and no learned pretense at "art criticism." There wouldn't be any "fashions," either.

But, alas, we don't have a culture like that. We have something called "art," which sometimes has a greatness achieved against the grain of all these obstacles, but because it is conceived of in isolation and is continually being "defined," brings also its shadows and its imitations, and often much nonsense, too. As a result, the authentic human qualities of artists sometimes drive them to take flight from "art." In a civilization made up of a great many specialties and professions of various sorts, it often seems as though the search for reality most naturally takes the form of rebellion, flight, alienation, and lonely last stands, and this may also have a starkly obscuring effect on the nature of reality itself.

A teacher may feel all this, yet one teacher or even a few of them can't by themselves change the culture, and the enrichments of experience which are possible through the release of what we call "creative expression" need to be made known to the young by *some* means. Maybe another generation will find a way to internalize them in everyday life. So you become grateful to art teachers who are especially adept in translating the creative impulse into craft activities, since these represent a more natural access to the everyday world.

What *does* learning to practice an art or a craft do for a young person, a child, or any human being? This question leads to reflection on the kind of person many accomplished artists are commonly found to be. First of all, they are "whole-makers." They start something and they have to finish it themselves. No excuses. Artists and especially designer-artists get into the habit of thinking in terms of wholes. They can't just nibble at design problems. If they start to make something, they can't stop in the middle and say, "The rest isn't in my department." They can't be only bright critics. So, the artistic intelligence, the designing intelligence, is naturally more constructive than merely critical intelligence. It is a more responsible intelligence.

Then, too, persons with alert visual intelligence seem to think naturally in analogues. Their minds run to parallels spontaneously. And the capacity to use analogy fruitfully, we should note, is the foundation of hypothesis-making in science. It may be the root of all original thinking. Artists are good at it.

Further, artists look into things more intimately than other people. Mrs. Goldberg tells how an artist learns to see:

> When I saw the work of Ernest Lindner, a Canadian painter, I was astounded at the intricate textural quality that he was inspired to draw or paint from nature and especially from tree stumps overgrown with moss, lichens, and weeds. He taught me, through his work, that birch bark rots in a certain way, eventually seeming almost hollow. I had the sense of being closer to nature, through his drawings and paintings, than I had ever been when I was actually in the woods myself. His paintings prompted me to walk in those woods once again, and to look for all the things that he saw and recorded, which I had overlooked!

A craft project is a great way to find out for oneself the importance of "technique" and the need to acquire it. The right sort of technique grows out of the longing to make something and the determination to make it well. Technique for its own sake is a bore and only people submissive to ritual and form will bother with it. But when you want to *do* something, the drive to learn how to do it is a veritable power-house of resolve. You get the technique because you have to have it. It isn't so painful because you see its meaning and importance while you are getting it, and each little addition of skill delights, instead of satisfying a rule set by someone else who requires it of you.

The section on stained glass in *Art and Ideas for Young People* holds special attraction, not only from the illustrations in color, but also because of the simple techniques that are now available. It should be said in general of this book that the materials needed for the extraordinary variety of craft activities described are all easily available in art supply stores and sometimes in hardware stores, and that there is an excellent bibliography of advanced texts for those who wish to go further in any particular direction.

Simple looms can be devised with wire coathangers or corrugated cardboard cartons. Photographs show how these devices look, and the text gives the necessary explanations of what to do.

Mrs. Greenberg's book is spiced throughout with quotations from other artists and teachers. From her husband, whose photographs are so essential, she takes the following:

> Photography has been my way of bringing art into my life. I believe that people engaged in various endeavors in the mundane, work-a-day world may not realize that the arts are important to them, and most will enjoy art and music as spectators. I have been fascinated for years by the magic of photography. I bought my first camera when I was twelve, and made my own enlarger soon afterward. I have spent much time and effort in trying to master some of the technical aspects of photography. But I think my main enjoyment has come from the increased appreciation of the color, lighting, and beauty in many scenes and people, which might otherwise have passed me by.

Actually, some of the photographs are exquisite—one, for example, which captures boys at play, but is, as the caption suggests, a spontaneous dance form the boys created. It should be added that *Art and Ideas for Young People* is also an impressive example of good book design. The layouts are compact, like the content, which is rich. This should be a book of endless usefulness to those who recognize its value, and it will certainly help to bring its readers a bit closer to that ideal time when art is no longer a special subject, but has become a natural way of doing all things.

FRONTIERS

No Longer Hidden Wound

THE genius of A. H. Maslow lay in his capacity to make generalizing statements which amount to keys to understanding the tensions of the age. Take the distinction between deficiency-needs and being-needs, or deficiency-motivations and growth-motivations. All human beings have both. Deficiency-needs are easy to understand, to define, and they afford concrete objectives on which the energies of men can come to a focus. Being-needs are subtler. They generate motives which derive from the nobler qualities of human nature, yet are often displaced by more easily realizeable, finite ends. A man may want recognition as a human being, find it difficult to get, and decide to find a better job at higher pay, which is not really what he wants, although he may come to think that it is. A great many cultural influences in our society conspire to persuade him that conspicuous acquisition is a desirable status symbol, to the point where he may lose the capacity to distinguish between envy and respect.

One could argue, for example, that the "always more" principle of our economy really grows out of the inadequate satisfaction which external wealth and achievement bring to human beings—since being-needs can never be satisfied in this way, we must always have more. So many people are persuaded of this that the hunger for "more" seems to have virtually the constancy of a "law of nature." But now, the ecologists tell us, this law operates to produce destruction. This could be regarded as a large-scale verification of Dr. Maslow's ideas.

Another sort of verification comes from the works of the perceptive writers who look at the lives of individuals. Wendell Berry's latest book, *The Hidden Wound* (Houghton Mifflin), is an excellent illustration. In this book Mr. Berry shows how distorting a life of competitive economic struggle may be in its effect on ordinary people. A farmer, for example, is never free from economic worries. He has a hard time thinking about today, because he is haunted by the demands he will have to meet tomorrow. Of his grandfather, Berry wrote:

> He was always, he *had to* be, deeply concerned with the economic and legal abstractions of landowning, for no matter how well he worked and planned the slant of the market was usually against him. Like many other farmers of his time, he had to contend constantly with a pressure to abuse his land in order to hold on to it.

His black farm hand had a quite different life:

> Nick's economic situation, although much lower in fact and in expectancy than my grandfather's, was more stable. In wages I don't believe he ever received more than a dollar a day, but by the usual terms of employment he would also receive meat hogs, feed for his chickens, a house, wood for fuel, the use of a milk cow, and a garden plot. Except that he did not own the land he worked, he practiced a sort of subsistence farming, like his employers living as much as possible off the land. . . . When my grandfather went to the field his mind was burdened; when Nick went to the field his mind was free. The difference can be illustrated by imagining two figures in a landscape, one of them trying to determine how that landscape can be made to produce the *money* necessary for the next year's interest, and the other conscious of the whereabouts of the dens of foxes, planning a hunt. And the knowledge I received from those two men is divided in exactly the same way—the two halves, you could say, of a whole relationship to the earth. From my grandfather's struggle to hold on to the land, I got a sense of continuity of my own people there, their lives invested in the earth, and also the sense of the land as the preserver of such a continuity and of the hope of it; but this had come at the price of a certain estrangement from the very place to which he had joined himself with such passion. From Nick I got a sense of a free intimacy with the place, the possibility of pleasure in *being* there.

This is one instance of the hidden wound—there are much more fateful and ugly ones given in the book—showing how the possessor class loses touch with the earth, with its wonder and delight, simply because the owning function displaces the *living* function.

Berry's grandfather was himself a representative of a vanishing American—the sturdy, self-reliant man who was once the backbone of the country. C. Wright Mills tells his history in a few words (in *White Collar*)*:*

> What happened to the world of the small entrepreneur is best seen by looking at what happened to its heroes: the independent farmers and the small businessmen. These men, the leading actors of the middle-class economy of the nineteenth century, are no longer at the center of the American scene, they are merely two layers between other more powerful or more populous strata. Above them are the men of large property, who through money and organization wield much power over other men; alongside and below them are the rank and file of propertyless employees and workers, who work for wages and salaries. Many former entrepreneurs and their children have joined these lower ranks, but only a few have become big entrepreneurs and not much like their nineteenth-century prototypes, and must now operate in a world no longer organized in their image.

In *Escape from Freedom,* Erich Fromm shows how this growth to economic bigness has had the effect of wiping out the individuality of the small merchant, who used to have intelligent, rational relationships with his customers, but who has become little more than a clerk, an order-taker, in sales produced by the hypnoidal suggestion of modern advertising. This kind of selling is almost never rational and tends to "smother and kill the critical capacities of the customer." In Fromm's view, "these methods of dulling the capacity for critical thinking are more dangerous to our democracy than many of the open attacks against it, and more immoral—in terms of human integrity."

While being-needs and deficiency-needs are often in close association in daily life, we have no difficulty in seeing how a doctrine and process of progress which builds entirely on deficiency-needs, and then expands them to ridiculous extremes, must inevitably displace the being-needs of people, until, at last, they feel utterly *starved* for authentically human sustenance. The revolts and dissent in the so-called "affluent" societies are not in the least difficult to understand, when these long-term trends are considered.