

CONSCRIPTION ACCOUNTING

A BOOK like *Conscription—a World Survey*, edited by Devi Prasad and Tony Smythe, published last year by the War Resisters' International (3 Caledonian Road, London, N.1—\$2.25), does not make easy reading. You have to prepare your mind for one more analysis which discloses bleakly discouraging conditions throughout the world. There has of course been some small "progress" in the treatment of conscientious objectors, but the young men who resolve to make a personal contribution to stopping war are still a sizeable element of the prison populations in many "democratic" countries as well as in lands where politics defines all "morality." Years ago, a contributor to the first edition of the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* remarked that the list of conscientious objectors "includes most of the intellectual and moral innovators in history," so that reporting what the nations do to them as a matter of official policy provides data for estimating the difference between ideology and utopia. On this basis, it is easy to demonstrate that modern governments seem mainly occupied in staving off a humane and intelligent future. Yet "governments" ought not to be isolated scapegoats, since it is equally evident that the great majority of people in these countries still believe that their security and well-being depend upon maintaining militarily powerful political authority.

It isn't the rhetorical objective of war resistance—a peaceful world—that anybody quarrels with, but the *unequivocal means* chosen by men who simply won't fight or kill. Refusal to go to war seems a threat to the identity of people who can see no way to separate the values of freedom, stability, and morality from the protective matrix of national armament. It is probably natural that the most recently evolved form of the national state—the socialist kind—

finds exemption from military service practically unthinkable. Two explanations for this uncompromising policy may be applicable. First, socialist governments nearly all date from either the end of World War I or the end of World War II, and still feel an urgent need to consolidate both their power and their legitimacy. Second, any socialism of Marxist origin has a "scientific" justification which establishes moral certainties impossible to eighteenth-century constitutions. Communist revolutions openly plan *to arrange* the happiness of mankind, not merely to provide for its individual pursuit, so that a "communist" conscientious objector tends to earn theological as well as political odium. In some communist countries, however, as in Russia, it was found expedient for a time to show administrative lenience toward religious objectors, to avoid making "martyrs" of them or providing material for anti-Soviet "propaganda." However, the Universal Military Service Law announced in 1939 by K. R. Voroshilov had no section "on exemption from military service for reasons of religious conviction," the explanation given being that *no request* for exemption had been made during the 1937 and 1938 drafts. Quite evidently, recruits from all over Russia had "evolved" to recognition of socialist truth. And the 1951 Soviet Constitution made no exceptions—defending the "fatherland" is now a "sacred duty" for every citizen.

The laws providing for conscientious objection in Great Britain are probably more liberal than those of any other country. The authors of *Conscription* say:

During the Second World War most [British] C.O.'s were able to obey their consciences without breaking the law, but this was not true of all. Up to the end of June, 1945 . . . about 3,500 men and about 80 women are known to have been convicted for

offences committed because of conscientious objection to compulsory military service.

Of all the countries reported on, eighteen have provisions of varying liberality allowing conscientious objection, while forty-nine have none. The text of the book describes attempts to persuade various national governments to recognize conscience and to abolish or abate punishment of men whose only offense is a refusal to kill. Success in these efforts is infrequent and limited, as conditions in that promising socialist nation, Yugoslavia, will indicate. The only conscientious objectors there seem to be Nazarenes who, since 1945, have been given long prison sentences, sometimes for eight or ten years. Being shy and inarticulate is the best defense for a youth brought before a Yugoslav military tribunal: "The more eloquent and convincing the Nazarene is, the more dangerous he is to the State."

According to a 1958 report, at that time there were about 200 young Nazarenes in prison, less than half of them for the first time. Twenty of the 200 were serving their third sentence, and at least one, a "four-time-loser," was well into his second decade behind bars. It seems that in the past Nazarene leaders have made petitions to Marshal Tito for the release of the C.O.'s and for better treatment, but have not succeeded in achieving any concessions.

The prison terms of Yugoslavian objectors are spent on Goli Otok, a devil's island sort of place with a name which translates into "island of nothingness." Efforts of WRI representatives have apparently succeeded in eliminating the cat-and-mouse feature of Yugoslav prosecutions, one eight- or ten-year term now being held adequate punishment. However, the well-behaved Nazarenes are usually released after serving a little more than half their time. So, one youth who was sentenced to ten years in 1964 is probably leaving his "nothingness" environment about now.

As we said, books on conscription are difficult and uninspiring reading. This has to be our excuse for ignoring a book which came in for review twenty years ago, and has since reposed in plain sight on a shelf in the MANAS office as a

fading, greenish reproach to neglected duty. The book is *Conscription Conflict* (London: Sheppard Press, 1949) by Denis Hayes. William James said that people who oppose war "ought to enter more deeply into the ethical point of view of their opponents," and Mr. Hayes' book gives ample opportunity for this. It is a history of "how modern conscription twice came to Britain, with reasons and principles advanced on each side." The job is fairly complete. At the outbreak of World War I some confident and influential souls decided to save Britain from disgrace by presenting irrefutable arguments for military conscription. The traditional reliance on recruiting volunteers was not working well at all. The most articulate of these men, F. S. Oliver (who in 1915 produced a sustained argument for conscription, *Ordeal by Battle*), expressed his opinion without inhibition in a letter to his brother, showing himself to be really a good sort, a tolerant, fair-minded fellow indeed, although infallibly right in his opinions. How could such campaigners for conscription fail in their appeal to a quite similar population? Oliver wrote to his brother:

"I have no doubt whatever that this talk about ending militarism is unutterable bosh. I believe it is quite sincere and that those who talk it are mostly quite genuine. But I see as clear as crystal without any shadow of a doubt that it means universal militarism. Of course the first shout obviously is 'down with German militarism.' Everyone agrees; but when we come to think how we are going to down it and, still more difficult, keep it down, the only earthly answer is—by British militarism; and no doubt every other country has found that answer already—except America—and is making preparations to meet it.

"I really do think that from one point of view (i.e. the citizen's) militarism is a fine thing. Everyone ought to serve their State. There isn't any question about it and if he does he must surely develop a much higher idea of citizenship than if he doesn't, as well as doing his own soul and body a lot of good in the process."

These, at any rate, were some of the feelings that led to passage of Britain's conscription bill, which became law in January, 1916. There was

little response to Arnold Rowntree's argument against it, an impassioned appeal to the House "to leave men still the masters of their own souls, and to do nothing to destroy the fabric of England's appeal to the conscience of the world." Another minority position had been stated earlier (in April, 1913) by the founder of the Independent Labour Party, Keir Hardie:

All forms of militarism belong to the past. It comes down to a relic of the days when kings and nobles ruled as well as reigned, and when the workers were voteless, voiceless serfs. Militarism and democracy cannot be blended. The workers of the world have nothing to fight about; they belong to a Common Caste; they have no country to fight each other about; they have no country. Patriotism is for them a term of no meaning. It connotes nothing to which they can link themselves. If it means defence of home, hearth, and freedom, then Capitalism is the enemy which is menacing these, and Capitalism knows nothing of patriotism or nationality.

South Wales mine owners supply the German Navy with coal to strengthen its power when it begins the invasion of Great Britain, and German manufacturers will supply France with guns wherewith to defeat the German Army. Capitalism be it repeated, knows no country, has no patriotism. Militarism strengthens capitalism by perpetuating the fiction that there must be enmity and animosity—between nations. . . .

Compulsory military service is the negation of democracy. It compels the youth of the country, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, to learn the art of war. That is despotism, not democracy. . . . Conscription is the badge of the slave.

In September, 1914, as editor of *Labour Leader*, the ILP organ, Fenner Brockway printed a denunciation of war by Andrew Salter, accompanying it with an editorial disclaimer. The reason for Brockway's socialist embarrassment is clear enough; also his reason for publishing this article, which began:

There are only two main religions in the world, though each of them has many forms: (1) The religion which trusts in the power and ultimate triumph of material force—faith in materialism. (2) The religion which trusts in the power and ultimate triumph of spiritual forces—faith in God. . . .

My religion is the Christian religion. . . . I must ask myself what is God's command on the subject and what would Christ do in my place. . . .

Look, Christ in khaki, out in France thrusting his bayonet into the body of a German workman. See! The Son of God with a machine gun, ambushing a column of German infantry, catching them unawares in a lane and mowing them down in their helplessness. Hark! The Man of Sorrows in a cavalry charge, cutting, hacking, thrusting, crushing, cheering. No! No! That picture is an impossible one *and we all know it.*

That settles the matter for me.

There is a great place waiting in history for the first nation that will dare to save its life by losing it, that will dare to base its national existence on righteous dealing, and not on force that will found its conduct on the truths of primitive Christianity, and not on the power of its army and navy. And there is a great place waiting in history for the first political party that will dare to take the same stand and will dare to advocate the Christian policy of complete disarmament and non-resistance to alien force. No nation and no political party (and for that matter no church either) is at present prepared to do that, although they all, more or less, profess to be Christian. The inference is irresistible that the nations of Christendom, the orthodox political parties, and the organised churches believe in the religion of materialism, and not in God. . . .

This writer, a Labour MP until he died in 1945, never changed his views. His article was made into a pamphlet, *The Religion of a C.O.*, which achieved distribution of a million and a half copies in Britain and was translated into various European and Asian languages. Eighty people went to prison for distributing it, one man in America for a term of ten years.

None of these arguments has died out, none has been resolved. The arguments go on, just as wars go on, while conscription is now taken almost for granted by all but the very few. The present situation is adequately described by Prasad and Smythe in the Foreword of *Conscription*:

Increasing centralization in political and economic affairs resulting from the industrial revolution and subsequent technological changes, is

tending to reduce the area of individual freedom. Military conscription adds to this effect.

The conscript is cut off from normal family and community life, he is usually prohibited from taking part in political activities and he is compelled to give unquestioning obedience to orders which may conflict with his individual judgment and conscience. The moral and psychological effects of this on the individual and society are devastating and serve only in inducing an attitude of subservience to authority which undermines the very conception of democracy.

There is no question about the fact that people who cannot imagine life without a powerful military shield may also become deeply concerned about the threat and increasing disaster of war. This includes the wealthy who establish foundations, men by no means unintelligent or without moral perception. So, while we are looking at past times and writing on the subject, the work of these foundations, for many years cited with high respect, is appropriate to consider. Several of the best known ones came into being early in this century. The Nobel Committee and Institute were established in Norway in 1900; Edwin Ginn, of Boston, organized the World Peace Foundation in 1910; in the same year Andrew Carnegie set up the Carnegie endowment for International Peace with a gift of eleven million dollars. What did these clearly well-intentioned organizations accomplish? In the March 1923 issue of *North American Review*, an American Army officer, Major Sherman Miles (who had been detailed to the American Peace Commission in Central Europe after World War I), examined the work of various groups funded to research for "peace." One organization, committed to "the thorough and scientific investigation of the causes of war," expended more than half a million dollars in eleven years. According to Major Miles the fruit of this investment totalled ten books and twenty-four pamphlets. The pamphlets were descriptive studies of phases of World War I, without inquiry into causes, and nine of the books dealt "with the general subjects of industry, commerce and finance; with casualties in war and military

pensions; with existing tariff policies and with conscription in Japan; but none of these subjects are studied as possible causes of war." The one exception was an essay on two minor Balkan wars. Major Miles showed admirable restraint in his final comment:

When one considers all the blood that has been shed in war and all that has been written and said about it, it seems strange indeed that the germ-essence of the thing should boil down to that one anonymous volume, recounting the dull stories of two almost forgotten wars. And as for the economic studies the one thing about them that strikes a soldier is that they throw no light on the causes or prevention of war, but that they would be most useful guides to any government *while waging war*.

Equally sketchy has been the work done on the "thorough and scientific investigation and study" of the "practical methods to prevent and avoid" war that was also called for in the basic work programme of this same research department. It is true that the society itself is concerned largely with the possibilities of avoiding war through the growth of willing and unenforced compliance with international law and equity. But one searches the publications of the society in vain for even a survey of the "practical methods to prevent" war.

This general attitude on the question is shared by another great peace society, the oldest one in the world. They have made no study of the causes of war. They firmly believe in the policy of non-committal to any programme of war suppression or even of the elimination of war causes save through the general education of men and of nations towards reason and law rather than towards belligerency.

So it would appear that at least two of the greatest of the peace societies, the two probably best fitted for research and planning, have no definite plans for combating it beyond the teaching of respect for law and justice. Stranger still, these two societies appear to know of no peace organization anywhere that has ever studied the causes of war scientifically. A search in the Library of Congress reveals but one such study by any peace society, and that consists in a compilation of individual theses written by five members of an English Quaker Meeting during the war.

So there we are—or were, back in 1923—reduced by the implications of some very simple

research to the embarrassingly simple conclusion of Thomas à Kempis, that while all men desire peace, few men desire those things that make for peace. Have the foundations done any better since? One may doubt it, even without attempting a Major Miles sort of survey. Where do foundations come from? They come from people with a lot of money—people who, although they know how to make money, know practically nothing about how to help the world, and still less about choosing people to direct foundations who might be expected to make a real contribution toward world peace. Rich men who understand money put administrators who understand its management in charge of foundations—this has happened so noticeably in recent years that it needs no particular illustration. Now the last thing a conservator of foundation resources and prestige and public acceptance—all values important to an activity like saving the world—will do is hire somebody who sounds like Keir Hardie or Andrew Salter. A foundation employee or a recipient of its largesse is in the business of discovering comfortable or palatable truth—certainly not truths concerning the necessity of being "born again," or anything smacking of the *radical*. That would be as bad as an argument for a low gas-consumption, smog-proof carburetor, to use a homely analogy. Years ago Buckminster Fuller, in his own inimitable way, discovered this basic truth about the pillars of society. There just *isn't anybody* with money who will hire you to work for the good of *everybody*—for all the world. Only interest-groups accumulate money, and they are interested only in furthering or protecting their interests.

So the foundations hire no would-be world-savers, but sound and reliable scholars with the proper degrees. There may be a few exceptions—there always are—but scholars are generally quite safe as foundation people. Their scholarly or scientific caution was illustrated effectively by Michael Polanyi in an article in the Autumn 1966 *American Scholar*. First, Polanyi piled up evidence to prove beyond contradiction that the

Hungarian revolt against Stalinist domination in 1956 was a glorious, humanist demand for a politics placing intellectual honesty above ideology. Then he called attention to the fact that it took a Harvard scholar in the social sciences three years of soul-searching to admit just to himself that such activities as those of the Hungarian revolutionaries could be animated by a *devotion to truth!* Finally, after another four years, the scholar came out into the open with an obscure statement of this discovery, braving the grave disapproval of his colleagues, who regarded him as soft-headed or "unscientific." Polanyi remarked:

This analysis shows that a science that claims to explain all human action without making a value judgment discredits not merely the moral motives of those fighting for freedom, but also their aims. That is why the Hungarian revolutionary movement, which revived the ideals of 1848, and which claimed that truth and justice should be granted power over public affairs, has met with such a cold reception by the science of political behavior. Modern academic theories of politics, on the contrary, give support to the doctrine that denies that human ideals can be an independent power in human affairs.

So, the orthodox foundation scholars are really no help even in throwing light on the causes of revolution, to say nothing of a dreamy ideal like peace.

This kind of analytical reduction of the forces for world peace could go on until we reach the level of a fairly rational explanation of the present impotence in peacemaking. Only people without any stake in the status quo will even try to tell the truth about the causes of war; only they are ready to sacrifice their personal future (or the conventional idea of it) in order to work for peace. And this doesn't mean, of course, that they will be right, but only that they will *try*. Long-haired radicals, Christian martyrs, and rebel scholars speak out in varying accents against war, and when they are both wise and candid they generally start out with the existential impasse declared by à Kempis. Facing this truth makes the only realistic beginning of action for peace.

The point is that the men who are the most devoted, honest, and determined workers for peace are almost certain to be the disinherited of the earth. For it is obvious that when people with a stake in the status quo discover what real peacemakers are saying or doing, they disinherit them right away. Meanwhile, it is equally obvious that mankind will have to disinherit the bulk of its present conceits before genuine peace can become possible. So people who want to work for peace now may find their most promising companions in the fraternity of the WRI—a penniless, unendowed band of war-rejectors—represented in the United States by the War Resisters League. Yet no "organization" can bring realization of what people must themselves discover and act upon independently—that the creation of a peaceful world has practically nothing to do with the findings of "experts." It depends first upon individual rejection of war, and then upon the rejection of what makes for war, and this happens only when people begin to rely on their own insight and move on their own initiative in this direction. From one point of view, such a course, when its corollaries are developed, might be seen to include almost the whole of what Gandhi meant by non-violence.

REVIEW

IN APPREHENSION HOW LIKE A

IN a paper contributed to the *Winter American Scholar* for 1966-67, Lewis Mumford dared to reproach certain anthropologists for their extraordinary preoccupation with the "tool-making" skills of ancient man. Probably the professionals in this field paid little attention, since much of their method evolved from the activity of digging up tools and figuring out how they were made and used, and who, after all, is Mumford? Admittedly no scientist, he openly titled his article "Speculations on Prehistory." Yet for members of the untrained masses it is nonetheless of interest that Mumford, after a lifetime of studying man's relation to tools and technology, should simply from *reflection* feel obliged to propose a profound corrective for anthropological science.

Concentrating on a single kind of evidence of human development—the ability to make tools—has led, Mumford said, to neglect of what may be far more important factors in the emergence of true men. He gives as an example the existence of "grammatically complex and highly articulate languages at the onset of civilization five thousand years ago, when tools were still extremely primitive." (This would doubtless win Noam Chomsky's approval!) Mumford asks:

Why is it that the lowest existing peoples, who support a hand-to-mouth existence with a few tools and weapons, nevertheless have elaborate ceremonials, a complicated kinship, and a finely differentiated language, capable of expressing every aspect of their experience?

Why, further, were high cultures like those of the Maya, the Aztecs, the Peruvians, still using only the simplest handicraft equipment a few centuries ago, although their monuments were magnificent and ancient roads like that to Machu Picchu were marvels of engineering? How is it that the Maya who had no machines, were masters of abstruse mathematics and had evolved an extremely intricate method of time reckoning which showed superb powers of abstract thought? Once one dares to ask these questions the whole course of human history, from the earliest times on, appears in a new light, and our present

machine-centered technology no longer seems the sole witness to the far-off divine event toward which all creation has moved.

Well, this paragraph by Mumford affords introduction to some note—certainly not a review—of a large and physically impressive book titled *Man the Hunter* (Aldine, Chicago, 1969, \$6.95), identified on its jacket as "the first intensive survey of a single, crucial stage of human development—man's once universal hunting way of life." The opening words of the contributors of the first paper in the section titled "Hunting and Human Evolution" compelled recollection of Mr. Mumford's somewhat contrasting view. These scientific anthropologists begin (in their second sentence):

Human hunting is made possible by tools, but it is far more than a technique or even a variety of techniques. It is a way of life, and the success of this adaptation (in its total social, technical, and psychological dimensions) has dominated the course of human evolution for hundreds of thousands of years. In a very real sense our intellect, interests, emotions, and basic social life—all are evolutionary products of the success of the hunting adaptation. When anthropologists speak of the unity of mankind, they are stating that the selection pressures of the hunting and gathering way of life were so similar and the result so successful that populations of *Homo sapiens* are still fundamentally the same everywhere.

This seems to say that to be a man is to belong to the fellowship of technologically skilled predators. A careless, unscientific critic might detect a *reductive* tendency here. Yet, oddly enough, these authors have in common with Mr. Mumford a willingness to "speculate," going on to quite carefree generalizations concerning how present human follies and limitations may derive from our predator past.

In other words, when distinguished scholars in different fields radically contradict one another, it seems fair to say that *someone* is speculating. The historian, Lynn White, Jr., for example, in *Machina Ex Deo*, assembles evidence to show that Western man's ruthless exterminating habits in relation to other forms of life derive from a divine

directive to use and exploit all nature—"in absolute contrast," Dr. White says, "to ancient paganism and Asia's religions." There is also, it may be added, considerable evidence to show a distinctive reverence toward plants and animals, even on the part of hunting peoples, among the members of "primitive" societies and some present-day tribal cultures. Yet in this paper on "The Evolution of Hunting" we are told that the primeval peacefulness of man before he learned to hunt was irrevocably lost in the passage from the "herbivore" to the "carnivore" stage of our evolution. One supposes that there is evidence for this predestining transition; at any rate, the authors say:

. . . with the origin of human hunting, the peaceful relationship was destroyed, and for at least half a million years man has been the enemy of even the largest mammals. In this way the whole human view of what is normal and natural in the relation of man to animals is a product of hunting, and the world of flight and fear is the result of the efficiency of the hunters.

After this fiat concerning "the whole human view"—have the writers never heard of the Jains?—other edifying conclusions seem quite inevitable. A nineteenth-century, blood-sports-pursuing Englishman becomes the very type of the species for these writers:

Behind this human view that the flight of animals from man is natural lie some aspects of human psychology. Men enjoy hunting and killing, and these activities are continued as sports even when they are no longer economically necessary. If a behavior is important to the survival of the species (as hunting was for man throughout most of human history); then it must be both easily learned and pleasurable. Part of the motivation for hunting is the immediate pleasure it gives the hunter, and the human killer can no more afford to be sorry for the game than a car for its intended victim. Evolution builds a relation between biology, psychology, and behavior, and, therefore, the evolutionary success of hunting exerted a profound effect on human psychology. . . . Many people dislike the notion that man is naturally aggressive and that he naturally enjoys the destruction of other creatures. Yet we all know people who use the lightest fishing tackle to

prolong the fish's futile struggle, in order to maximize the personal sense of mastery and skill. And until recently war was viewed in much the same way as hunting. Other human beings were simply the most dangerous game.

Animals seem to have some natural sense of proportion about killing, but not man!

The lack of biological controls over killing conspecifics is a character of human killing that separates this behavior sharply from that of other carnivorous mammals. This difference may be interpreted in a variety of ways. It may be that human hunting is so recent from an evolutionary point of view that there was not enough time for controls to evolve. Or it may be that killing other humans was a part of the adaptation from the beginning, and our sharp separation of war from hunting is due to the recent development of these institutions. Or it may be that in most human behavior stimulus and response are not tightly bound. Whatever the origin of this behavior, it has had profound effects on human evolution, and almost every human society has regarded killing members of certain other human societies as desirable. . . .

Well, since we haven't had time to evolve "biological controls," the predisposition to excessive killing seems without remedy, so far as anthropological theory is concerned. That we may be different in behavior from other carnivorous mammals because we're not just carnivorous mammals, but have some obligation to devise self-controls, is probably a speculation far too wild to have a place in scientific anthropology.

Where, one wonders, did Mumford get the nerve to ask his readers to think like human beings about the nature of man? A sentence from Theodore Roszak's review of Mumford's latest book, *The Myth of the Machine*, is probably the best explanation: "This is the mind of an artist, perhaps more so than the mind of a scholar; it loiters over form and symbol and deals in the affairs of man with that sense of the divine which has become an impossible embarrassment for our grimly secularized intelligentsia."

Man the Hunter is probably a fine book to read if you *have* to know what grimly secularized

anthropologists now believe and choose to say on this subject. The editors are Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore. It is a large volume with more than 400 pages, filled with the work of eminent specialists. Sometimes there are several papers on a single subject, with a report of discussion by the contributors. Readers unacquainted with the pecking habits of cultural anthropologists may be bewildered at the way these presumably serious scientists and educators occasionally make rapier thrusts and stiletto jabs at one another when they reach different conclusions on, say, difficult matters relating to the marriage arrangements of the Australian aborigines. These exchanges remind one of the backbiting arguments that used to go on in the correspondence pages of the *Partisan Review* between the brightest radicals of the 1930's. Would "*graffiti* of the learned" serve to classify such contributions?

COMMENTARY

GOOD GROUPS

WE can't undertake to publish an "honor roll" of foundations or endowed institutions which seem plainly differentiated from the conventional ones described in this week's lead. Tolerance for imperfection would bring purist outrage, and criticism beyond taking note of general trends would soon reach unbearable presumption. Yet there seems an obligation to name the Institute for the Study of Nonviolence, started in Carmel a few years ago by Joan Baez, as an effort to pursue precisely the sort of studies Sherman Miles found studiously neglected by the peace organizations of his time. Now located in Palo Alto (P.O. Box 1001, Palo Alto, Calif. 94302), the Institute identifies itself as "a working community that is attempting to explore deeply-rooted social problems and to transform repressive institutions through an open-ended educational process in which human experience is shared and integrated, and by which men are allowed to grow." The long-range goal: "to move closer, through the dynamics of socially organized nonviolence, to the elusive yet imperative brotherhood of man, undivided by nation, race or ideology."

A new, Colorado branch of the Institute for Nonviolence, guided by Anne Guilfoile and Burt Wallrich, will begin sessions in December—at a location a half-hour's drive from Denver—mail address: The Institute/Mountain West, Box 570, Golden, Colo. 80401.

A later issue of *New Schools Exchange Newsletter* (see "Children") announces the availability (to subscribers) of a "20-page continuing directory of new schools and educational reform groups." This issue (Oct. 25) also outlines the contributions to decentralist thinking and action of Ralph Borsodi, and reports the years of fruitful work by his associate, Mildred Loomis, at Lane's End, Brookville, Ohio, in both practice and education in organic gardening,

homesteading, family and community education. The School of Living, founded by Borsodi in the 30's and maintained for practically a generation by Mrs. Loomis, now has a new incarnation in Heathcote Community, Route 1, Box 129, Freeland, Maryland, where "a group of young people tend the land, remodel old buildings into living quarters . . . conduct seminars . . . and publish the monthly *Green Revolution*."

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves SCHOOLS, SCHOOLS, SCHOOLS

[We print here a portion of the Oct. 9 issue of *New Schools Exchange Newsletter*, published at 2840 Hidden Valley Lane, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103—subscription price \$1.00 a month. Every issue reports the birth of new schools, indicating their character, purposes, and needs.]

THE VALLEY COOPERATIVE SCHOOL, ALGONQUIN, ILL.

THE Valley Cooperative School is a new school concept shared by five families. They are looking for others to help make it a reality.

"We hope to combine the advantages of the one-room schoolhouse with the advanced technology now available to educators. We feel that in a warm, relaxed atmosphere, with a minimum of pressure, children will direct their own learning as they need to explore and understand their environment. Our teachers will be people who can sense each child's strengths; they will help the children follow through on finding answers to their own questions.

"We will share the costs of running the school. Each family will contribute as much as they can. The rest of our finances will come from outside contributions or from moneymaking ventures sponsored by the school. We hope to be a group representative of all the different kinds of people who live in this area: black, white, and brown; rich, middle-income, and poor; politically liberal, radical, and conservative; old and young; farmers and townspeople; university educated and self-taught. We have a diverse society to draw from, but our children will tend to know and understand only people like themselves unless we make an effort to broaden their experiences."

If you agree with the Valley Cooperative School that parents are ultimately responsible for educating their children, and if you'd like to join them, contact: Cynthia Costanza, 3 La Crosse Ct., Algonquin, Ill.

CAMBRIDGE FREE SCHOOL
5 Howard St., CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

"Two goals shape the Cambridge Free School. The first is to make available an experience-laden

setting in which children can learn together with skillful and sympathetic teachers. The second goal is to eliminate the economic segregation that must occur in any school charging tuition fees. The elimination of all fees enables us to offer a genuine alternative to the public school.

"We believe that education is most productive when the impetus to learn comes from the child instead of being imposed from without. Children possess and express a boundless natural curiosity until they are trained to restrain it. This inner force is stronger than any that might be induced by reinforcement or imposed discipline." . . .

"Our first year's experience has encouraged us, and beginning in 1969-1970 we plan to expand the equivalent of one grade per year, eventually serving children from three to thirteen years old.

"With a completely volunteer staff, we pay expenses, such as rent and materials, by having cake sales, rummage sales, etc., and raising money as we go along. We hope to become self-sufficient by starting a business, but that, too, takes money, so things are going slowly."

COLORADO SPRINGS COMMUNITY SCHOOL
730 N. Tejon, COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

This new school originally modeled itself after the Santa Fe Community School. The directors are exploring the possibility of sharing the Santa Fe school's program on the culture of the Southwest through a student and teacher exchange.

"The children live and work together, and within the flexible framework, children will be motivated by a wide choice of materials and activities under the direction of the teaching staff and parents. . . . We think that a community is always healthier if a choice in institutions is available. There are so many exciting possibilities in education through the application of television and computers, which have revolutionized the absorption of knowledge during the past few years. There has been a big breakthrough in what is available, and in what you can do with children. And there is a general frustration at all levels, from pre-school to graduate school, that education is failing us. So, given these conditions, it seems a good time to strike out and do something different. . . ."

WESTLEDGE SCHOOL, WEST SIMSBURY, CONNECTICUT

The Exchange feels that administrators and parents involved in small, community schools and free schools could learn a great deal from Westledge School, as to how one successfully raises money and sustains incoming funds for a new school. They have just raised over a million dollars for their "first phase of development."

Westledge School, judging only from their new pamphlet and a newspaper article, could learn a great deal from community schools and free schools, as to how one can humanely, in a more freely structured environment, work with and learn from children.

Nonetheless, from a letter from the school:

"Westledge is a coeducational independent day school just starting its second year with 180 students, 9 buildings and 360 acres of land in the country. The following words, written by a ninth-grader in the Fall of 1968, perhaps best express what is happening here: 'I've never before been to a school where I loved it so much that I didn't want to go home at night. . . . People here realize that no two people are alike; that they have minds and souls that are only their own. In the last school I went to there were thousands of us and it all seemed like a big cattle herd and they were preparing us for some market or something. The only way kids could get anyone to pay attention to them was to do something wrong, and the only reason any of us ever bothered to study was so that our parents wouldn't get mad. But here there is great recognition of the students as intelligent human beings, individuals; and we want to learn and be good at things that interest us, because we're given a chance to study the things that are most important to us and that we're happy and excited about doing.'"

From a reader: Some flashes on the Summerhill Conference, last month in the Santa Cruz Mountains. Several disturbing notes:

"One: Many of the people there seemed more into creating shelters against reality than in encouraging their kids to experience the world outside the cloister.

"Two: A lot of the people there—doing 'free schools'—were themselves very unfree and hung-up about sex, drugs, race and relating in a spontaneous, non-structured way.

"Three: The Summerhill Society (as represented at the conference) seemed to consist of very middle-class people involved in creating more privileges for their kids."

FRONTIERS

What Is the Peace Movement?

A CERTAIN *déjà vu* melancholy overtakes the reader of Warren Wagar's indictment of the anti-war efforts of the past twenty-five years. In *War/Peace Report* for August/September, Prof. Wagar—who teaches history at the University of New Mexico—briefly inspects the labors of "the movements for world peace" during this period, deciding that they come to nothing and that the movements "face complete spiritual and political bankruptcy." Contrasted with "the forces that cause wars, measured against the growing stockpiles of weapons and the global renaissance of nationalism in the 1960's," he says, "what we have achieved makes no difference." He also finds "middle-class liberal American and European attempts to 'work for peace' " no more than "busy-work without effect or world-historical vision; so harmless that national governments let most of it continue unmolested and even unnoticed." ("Harmless" means "innocuous" here, we suppose.)

Well, the only thing you can do with the indisputable facts in this analysis is agree with them. The world is in perilous condition and peacemakers make no noticeable dent in the conduct of national affairs. The situation has hardly changed, except for the worse, in the years since 1938 when Gandhi confessed: "*Satyagraha* has not yet been acknowledged to be of any value in the solution of world problems or rather the one supreme problem of war."

Yet there are two considerations that bear on Prof. Wagar's charges. First, no one really knows to what extent they ought to be applied only to unwarranted expectations on the part of *some* peacemakers. Moreover, judged by the pragmatic sanction alone, a great many rather splendid characters in history will have to be similarly labelled bankrupts, and even fools. If a peacemaker must *win*, common sense may tell him not to try. Meanwhile, his status as a tyro and beginner is seldom changed by events.

This is a way of saying that the multi-faceted, many-levelled enterprise of working for peace is filled with ambiguities that only partisan polemics will neglect. A certain inexperience—for which no one can be blamed—is responsible for the fact that devoted workers for peace sometimes base what they say they *must* accomplish on anguished feelings of emergency rather than on knowledge of what can probably be done. It takes a veteran Sisyphus to keep on pushing the rock up the hill without giving way to despair. Sisyphus is a reformed Epimetheus, only half-way to getting the Promethean status which Prof. Wagar demands. A mere Sisyphus knows that being against war is something like being against sin. Failing to wipe it out, or to make noticeable headway against it in, say, twenty-five years, may indeed be cause for a petition in bankruptcy, but to urge this on rational grounds you have first to isolate the intrinsic difficulties of the undertaking from factors of managerial inefficiency and other indications of the need for receivership. But why bother, since Sisyphus at least knows enough not to make claims about his efforts? Charge him with anything and he'll just bow his head.

That is one consideration. Another is the diffuse identity of the "peace movement." When Prof. Wagar takes the extreme health of warmaking institutions as evidence that all peace efforts amount to feeble gestures, and then infers from these gestures the inexcusable weakness, if not the guilt, of a vague collective called "the peace movements," his purpose is plainly not to comprehend the socially amorphous expressions of present-day revulsion from war, but simply to rally support for a program he first presented a few years ago in his book, *The City of Man*. He is something like Aristotle on his predecessors—they didn't amount to much compared to what was to come.

What *is* the peace movement, anyway? As its several histories make clear, the peace movement of modern times originated in religious groups, the Quakers and others, for whom war is overtly and irredeemably immoral. By the end of the first world war the base of the peace movement had been broadened by the addition of persons who rejected war on social and philosophical grounds. As the

conflicts of the twentieth century revealed war to be the most obsessive evil of the age, the peace movement grew in number of supporters and diversity of viewpoints. Its actual "unity" has never been more than that provided by the loose consensus of opposition to war, although specific activity against war by particular groups has often seemed to give the peace movement identifying characterization, at least for a time. But successive waves of new adherents change this characterization frequently. An internal history of the peace movement since 1918 would have to devote a great deal of attention to how pacifists have responded to certain familiar claims concerning the best way to end war. Men's *hearts* must be changed first, is one major contention. Another is that the forms of social organization need basic revision in order for human decencies to express themselves and so lead to enduring peace. Most people agree that both changes are necessary, but tensions in the peace movement arise from the varying emphasis in attempts to combine them. The problem is of course as old as the social consciousness of man and as far off from solution as ever. Yet peacemakers probably have more patience with one another than most people in exploring these differences of opinion, because of their overt commitment to conflict resolution.

However, the fact remains that the peace movement, considered as some sort of "whole," does not begin to have the sort of coherence that makes orderly self-knowledge a serious possibility, nor has it the kind of moral responsibility which deliberate programmatic integration of its energies would impose. It is a vast psycho-moral *phenomenon*, an emerging tropism of the human spirit in the face of a hideous historical reality. It can hardly be addressed as a conscious social entity and told to "shape up." We might think of it as a resource for whatever authentic vision becomes available in behalf of a peaceful world, but this general possibility does not convert it into a handy whipping boy for the over-all moral breakdowns and failures of twentieth-century mankind.

What then is Prof. Wagar's "vision"? His articulation of it includes both sides of the project—

social reorganization and stirring hearts. He says: "the winning of world peace through world federation requires not only new political strategies, but the emergence of new faiths, ideologies, and social and cultural movements to undergird and sustain the political effort." If all these powerful and transforming factors appear, it just might work, you could say. Named as prophets in whom to find inspiration and guidance are Toynbee, Mumford, Northrop, and Chardin. The object is to "learn how to move men to make a paramount commitment to mankind." The immediate need is for a "movement for world peace and federation" based on "moral commitment to the over-arching idea of a unified world civilization," and for this purpose the protagonists will, Prof. Wagar thinks, "take more pages from the history of the revolutionary parties than from the parties in the modern liberal democratic tradition." Study of the American Federalists, the French Jacobins, the Bolsheviks, and even National Socialists and Fascists—probably he means the latter's tenacity of purpose and intensive organization, rather than the way they dealt with their adversaries—is recommended. There is also this stimulating, persuasive exhortation:

Let us be candid. To unify mankind means to have a revolution. But the professional lovers of peace in the Western world down to the present time lack the stomach for revolution. To unify mankind means to create a new man-centered planetary culture pointed starward. But the peace-lovers are not cut out for Promethean roles. They have not heard the cry of Zarathustra. They are not heroes at all.

This seems about right. We are an ordinary lot. Still in the Sisyphus stage. No stomach for conspiracy or *coups d'état*. And few of us are "professionals," whatever that means. There is little science in what we do. Amateurs all, and uncertain of many things, save the increasingly irresistible truth that war is *wrong*. But that's not enough! Well, we sort of know that, too. Winning friends and influencing people who are not supermen is also part of the task.