VOLUME XXII, NO. 40
OCTOBER 1, 1969

THE STRENGTH OF THE GOOD

WHAT keeps the really good men going, in spite of opposition or obstacles that many people wouldn't even think of trying to overcome? Hope of ultimate success doubtless plays a part in the resolve of social or political reformers, but even many of these have been willing to work toward goals which they were sure could not be reached until years, perhaps generations, after their death. They wore out their lives contending against bastions of blind habit and stubborn custom. Others, like Socrates, began still more difficult undertakings. Expressions like "the search for truth" too easily hide the fact that the reconstruction of what we call "human nature" was Socrates' objective. For him, education meant showing that this reconstruction is without rational alternative. Where does the persistence of such men come from? They were not fools, and they knew the odds against them.

Two kinds of explanation may be possible, one having a rational ground, the other deriving from intuitive or existential sources. The rational explanation might be based on the Orphic conception of the Ring of Return, or metempsychosis, according to which an entire life of striving is regarded as only an episode in a far greater scheme. The Orphic idea was taught by Plato and, according to Zeller, was a widely diffused tenet of Greek religion. This Greek (and originally Eastern) doctrine allowed a certain patience toward the vicissitudes and frustrations in human affairs. The timetable of development included both birth and death as finite events in a vast series of growth-cycles, more or less as Empedocles intimated. Earth-life, in Plato's eyes, provided opportunity for purification and discipline of the soul, and while the progress accomplished by the individual in a single existence might seem little enough, he would inevitably return for other and perhaps more fruitful encounters. This is obviously the meaning of the Myth of Er (Book X of the *Republic*) and it helps to make acceptable the symbolism and stages of self-mastery represented in the *Phaedrus* myth. Again, with this view of embodied existence, one can understand why Plato maintained that the wise man will take no part in politics, "except in some providential juncture." He will choose, instead, to act under the guidance of the values belonging to the larger scheme, according to a pattern "laid up in heaven," it being of comparatively little moment whether the ideal society "exists now or ever will come into being." This incredible patience would be, for most modern men, an intolerable extreme of ivory-tower withdrawal, but it was not this for Plato, whose schedules of growth or "progress" were based on the Orphic timetable. Most of the Western condemnations of Eastern "quietism" neglect this profoundly important difference in conceptions of progress, and only since Gandhi have Western thinkers realized that concern for social justice and human freedom can combine naturally with ancestral Indian philosophy. In any event, it is in this way that the idea of immortality may give rational support to the moral or educational reformer, helping him to endure disappointments which otherwise could hardly be borne.

The other explanation, much more easily illustrated in modern times, points to simple, existential determination to follow a high human calling. It is the "Here I stand, I can do no other" explanation. Probably the Stoics are the most familiar historical example of this resolve, although, curiously, its spirit is evident in the inscription on the Great Seal of the United States: *Fiat justitia, ruat cælum* (Let justice be done, though the heavens should fall). Anyone who supposes that this determination has died out since

the days of the Stoics should read the collection of letters and manifestoes put together by Isadore Abramowitz in *The Great Prisoners* (Dutton, 1946). Going through this book from beginning to end—from Socrates to Sacco and Vanzetti—generates the feeling that the high horizons of moral longing possessed by our world have been raised and sustained almost entirely by an unbroken succession of heroes and martyrs. And then, if you ask what kept these men constant in purpose and undying in vision, the answer will have to be simply that they were *men.* One can try to say more, but the result will be that the rest of us are held to be somehow lacking in full humanity. A moral instinct leads us to make the heroic model normative for man.

There is a sense in which the only serious opponent of the heroic conception of man is the science of statistics. Statistics are much more formidable today than they were in Socrates' time, and we lack Socrates' rational resources for standing alone. The argument from mass opinion or the need to conform influenced him not at all. When his adversary in dialogue resorted to the testimony of common public opinion, Socrates accused him of vulgar "oratory" and insisted that only the discipline of reason could get at the truth. But "reason," for Socrates, was not the diminished, almost merely grammatical logic that it is for us. Our idea of reason has been grossly reduced at one end by the limitation of premises to the findings of scientific empiricism, and at the other by the politicalization of morality, which results in ethical justification of the majority opinion—democratic political philosophy tends to insist that "the masses" *must* be right.

When ethical ideals are regarded as realizable only by political means, a philosopher such as Socrates loses rational ground for his dissent from mass opinion. He may still have his existential ground—the intuitive feeling that he must stick to what he believes, no matter what—but now the prevailing conception of "rationality" is at odds with his intuition. This accounts for the dramatic inconsistencies in attempts at *social* application of modern existential values, since the expedients and compromises of politics always violate these values.

So we see that, until the eighteenth century, the patience of moral reformers, of philosophers like Socrates and Plato, could find rational support in transcendental doctrines of human development. The desperations of a brief historical timetable could not drive them to embrace theories of forced and immediate change. The idea of a "saving remnant" made some sense, since the growth of the soul was a long and ancient task. It could not be constrained, but might gradually be undertaken by more and more men if a handful of exemplars showed the way and illustrated its practice in their lives.

But the eighteenth century imposed a terrible dilemma, the full consequences of which we are able to understand only now. By equating the naturally appealing idea of the equal worth of all men with the dream of an earthly material Utopia, it stirred the visionary potentialities of the entire human race, while, at the same time, by jettisoning ancient transcendentalism, it justified the exchange of philosophic equanimity for a terrible moral impatience. There *must* be a way, revolutionists have said ever since, to force the development of men into patterns of ideal behavior. Terrorism and nihilism are the final resort of the inverted existentialism of revolutionists whose programs fail in history.

Books recording other aspects of the dilemma born of eighteenth-century social dreams have been coming out now for about twenty years. One of the first was Roderick Seidenberg's *Post-Historic Man,* and a recent volume is Jacques Ellul's *The Technological Society.* What is the world-view which such books contemplate with so much horror and fascinated loathing?

First we are given a statistical portrait of the socio-economic *status quo,* including the record of human wants and desires. The fulfillment of these ever-increasing wants and desires—which

are usually redefined as *needs*—has become a morally indisputable goal, since, in a free society, the highest good is determined by objective determination of the "will" of the people. And in a progressive, scientific society the will of the people need not remain obscure or be left to antiquated political methods such as presidential and congressional elections. We have elaborate records of consumer behavior and inclinations and susceptibilities to guide us in quantifying the will of the people. So we can plan the future satisfaction of all human needs, just as they are revealed in day-to-day behavior. The equation is shaped by the parameters of the technological imperative, it is ethically sanctioned by Utilitarian principle, and scientifically confirmed by polls revealing even quite subtle and complex motivations.

It is virtually pointless to claim that evil men have designed this program and formulated its imposing rationale. They are not evil men by prevailing standards of good and evil. They commonly regard themselves as the responsible, active producers of the good that is in the world. They are every bit as convinced of their righteousness as that tough and determined administrator who, in Dostoevski's novel, *The Brothers Karamazov,* called Jesus to strict account for supposing that human beings have the potentialities of heroes. The Inquisitor had figures to prove that they were *not* heroes. He knew the facts. He had reports from local priests all over fifteenth-century Spain. He would not allow Jesus to spread his subversive doctrines, endangering a system of control that was doing so much manifest good. The tough old man based his projections on objective evidence of human behavior and was completely *sincere.*

So are the compilers who picture present-day mass human behavior. The data they collect are not likely to reveal much evidence of heroic determination or independent individuality in mass-society populations. If a trace of it should show up here and there, it won't be regarded as statistically significant. Our experts study the way people *act,* what they *vote* for, the things they *buy,* and their hunger for things it is possible to *count.*

You can't call these people "anti-social" because their literature shows that many of them are trying to work for the good of everybody. They sit up nights thinking about how to make the system work better. Rich men set up foundations that hire scholars to help them. They know about the moral verities of the eighteenth century and believe in them. They even quote Plato now and then—parts of what he said are quite profound, they think.

On what grounds, then, will a modern man with deep feelings of disaffiliation explain his rejection of the system? How can a modern man think about human good except in social totalities, as the eighteenth century requires of him? And how can he justify his withdrawal into powerlessness when the good of man demands social participation here and now? How can he make politics without involving himself in the dehumanizing compromises of the politics of power?

Meanwhile, the sense of alienation grows. A speaker at a recent seminar at a Canadian university predicted that, as the reductive effect of this endlessly quantifying system grows more manifest, good men will be increasingly unwilling to staff its administrative posts. They won't be able to stomach the necessities of the system as time goes on. What then will happen? Poorer quality men will take the jobs, he thinks. This seems reasonable, but how long can it go on and what will it lead to?

As the problem has been set up here, some kind of vast Luddite revolt would seem to be in the offing, or an enormously magnified hippie rebellion, with more and more adults quietly taking part. But this assumes that the adult dropouts, the men who cannot believe the statisticians, even though the figures seem indisputable, will remain unoccupied, that they

will not even think. It is at least possible that we shall see a rather sudden return to the root-resources of moral patience in some form of transcendental philosophy—even to open adherence to conceptions of immortality such as Plato relied upon and made the foundation of his thought. Materialism, after all, is in our history little more than a form of intellectual reaction. It began as a methodological device to shield men like Galileo and others from the talons of the Holy Inquisition. Then it became a weapon of aggression. As Bertrand Russell wrote forty-five years ago:

> Historically, we may regard materialism as a system of dogma set up to combat orthodox dogma. As a rule, the materialistic dogma has not been set up by men who loved dogma, but by men who felt that nothing less definite would enable them to fight the dogmas they disliked. They were in the position of men who raise armies to enforce peace. Accordingly we find that, as ancient orthodoxies disintegrate, materialism more and more gives way to scepticism. At the present day, the chief protagonists of materialism are certain men of science in America and certain politicians in Russia. . . .

Early in this century, William McDougall, almost the only psychologist of that day who never adopted the materialistic dogma, proposed that the only way in which modern man could be persuaded of the possibility of immortality was through the discoveries of scientific psychic research. The contributions of subsequent workers in this field have certainly led to some open-mindedness toward transcendental theories, but the *force majeure* for change in the present is surely the terrible vacuum left by the failure of technological utopianism.

Well, if there is any truth in speculations of this sort, how might the practical considerations of making a living, choosing economic arrangements, conceiving social unities, etc., be affected? An optimistic view would suggest that in the ensuing confusion—and surely more confusion is coming, in any case—a readiness for improvisation and a refusal to be desperate or rigid about economic and political matters is the best way to lubricate a desirable transition. Back in 1928 Julien Benda called this century "the age of the organization of political hatreds," and it should not be difficult to show that the intensity of political hatreds springs directly from the moral impatience which this-world utopianism generates. The idea that human beings have only a single chance for achieving the good life creates the impossible requirement of producing it, somehow or other, *right away*. Who, having accepted this assignment, could avoid extreme political fanaticism?

What about the fact that the enormous and complex national economies of today are geared up to and dependent upon maximum consumption? How can we avoid serious collapse unless we keep all those wheels turning? Well, if we can put an end to war we won't have to keep them turning so furiously. And by taking away the provocation of political hatreds we can remove the chief cause of war. Finally, there is no reason to assume that a wider rationality which includes the idea of the immortality of the soul must mean a sudden departure of all our famous ingenuity and capacity to adapt. It might mean only recovery from the manias of nationalist and collectivist identities, and the beginning of the practice of some transcendental common sense.

REVIEW
FROM DOCTOR TO TEACHER

A FEW years ago, in one of California's enormous mental hospitals, a man with degrees in medicine, neuropathology and psychiatry, who uses the psychoanalytical method in his practice, spoke almost explosively to a group of interns, psychiatric nurses and aides. The occasion was an interval between talking to schizophrenic patients before this small audience, and the provocative was a question by one of the interns: "Doctor, how do you get the patient to do what you want him to do?"

"You don't *know enough* to get the patient to do what you want him to do!" was the reply. "You—all of us here—have a medical education. This means that we have been trained to think of the patient as somebody you do something to—like bandaging a wound or setting a broken leg; or you take something away from him, like an appendix; or you give him something, like a pill. That's what we do in medicine, but *not in psychiatry!*

"In psychiatry, you don't nudge the patient on from behind. Nobody is wise enough to do that. All that we can possibly do is try to remove some of the obstacles from in front of him—which bar his way."

It would be hard to improve on this statement for a short course in what has happened in the practice of psychological medicine during the past fifty years. If you *had* to classify the man we have just quoted, you would probably call him a "Freudian," yet the background of theory in his work with patients long ago became a loose, flexible structure with plenty of give in it for adaptation to emerging subjective realities. From this point of view, psychoanalysis has been one of the important theaters where some of the processes of a vast cultural change may be isolated and examined. Involved is the slow but persistent rediscovery of Man.

Interesting evidence of the part played by psychoanalysis in this change is the way in which the innovators among its practitioners continually redefine what they are doing, keeping pace, you could say, with revisions in the conception of the nature of man. For a broad perspective on the history of psychoanalytical theory, there is no better book than Ira Progoff's *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology* (Julian Press, 1956). There are, however, certain epoch-making expressions by leading figures in psychoanalysis and psychology that if read first-hand give a more intimate sense of radical changes in point of view. Charles Jung's book, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1939), was peculiarly liberating in its influence, and his posthumously published *Memories, Dreams, Recollections* (Pantheon, 1963) shows how far this pioneer had moved toward a psychology rooted in philosophical assumptions before he died. For the significance of Jung's work in relation to Freud, and for the moving and shaking effect generally of psychoanalysis upon academic psychology, Henry Murray's paper, "What Should Psychologists Do about Psycho-Analysis?", in the April 1940 *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, is an important and prophetic piece of writing. Then, what amounts to a definitive progress report was made by Erich Fromm in his *Saturday Review* (March 16, 1957) article, "Man Is Not a Thing," the title alone conveying a declaration of independence from mechanistic conceptions of the nature of man. In this article Dr. Fromm wrote:

> . . . complete rational knowledge is possible only of *things.* Things can be dissected without being destroyed; they can be manipulated without damage to their nature, they can be reproduced. *Man is not a thing.* He cannot be dissected without being destroyed. He cannot be manipulated without being harmed. And he cannot be reproduced artificially. Life in its biological aspects is a miracle and a secret, and man in his human aspects is an unfathomable secret. We know our fellow man and ourselves in many ways, yet we do not know him or ourselves fully because we are not things. . . .
>
> Psychology can show us what man is *not.* It cannot tell us what man, each one of us, *is.* The soul of man the unique core of each individual, can never be grasped and described adequately. It can be "known" only inasmuch as it is not misconceived. The legitimate aim of psychology, as far as ultimate knowledge *is* concerned, is the *negative,* the removal of distortions and illusions, *not the positive,* full, and complete knowledge of the human being.

A notable restoration is accomplished in this paper, in which Dr. Fromm suggests that a sort of knowledge inaccessible to the intellect may be gained through love. Just as mysticism becomes the path which reaches to truth beyond the scope of metaphysics, so love transcends the limitations of analytical psychology. The view of life, the world, and man here presented by Dr. Fromm has the classic balance of antique philosophy, and it went a long way toward restoring the initiative of the individual in both the search for truth and the quest for health. It also makes the psychologist much more of a teacher than a doctor. Meanwhile, Dr. Fromm warns against the danger of using psychology as a substitute for facing and entering into life:

> What happens so often in psychoanalytic treatment is that there is a silent agreement between the therapist and patient which consists in the assumption that psychoanalysis is a method by which one can attain happiness and maturity and yet avoid the jump, the act, the pain of separation. To use the analogy of the jump a little further, the psychoanalytic situation looks sometimes like that of a man wanting to learn how to swim and yet intensely afraid of the moment when he has to jump into the water, to have faith in the water's buoyancy. The man stands at the edge of the pool and listens to his teacher explain to him the movements he has to make, that is good and necessary. But if we see him going on talking, talking, talking we become suspicious that the talking and understanding have become a substitute for the real swim. No amount or depth of psychological insight can take the place of the act the commitment, the jump. It can lead to it, prepare for it, make it possible—and this is the legitimate function of psychoanalytic work. But it must not try to be a substitute for the responsible act of commitment, an act without which no real change occurs in a human being.

A similar sort of discovery was put in different language by Carl Rogers, during a 1952 conference on "classroom approaches" in teaching. Here, even the role of "teacher" is critically examined for the tendency to take the initiative away from those who must do the learning:

> It seems to me [Dr. Rogers said] that anything that can be taught to another is relatively inconsequential, and has little or no significance in behavior. . . . I have come to feel that the only learning which significantly influences behavior is self-discovered, self-appropriated learning. Such self-discovered learning, truth that has been personally appropriated and assimilated in experience, cannot be directly communicated to another. . . . I realize I have lost interest in being a teacher. When I try to teach, as I do sometimes, I am appalled by the results, which seem a little more than inconsequential, because sometimes the teaching seems to succeed. When this happens I find that the results are damaging. It seems to cause the individual to distrust his own experience, and to stifle significant learning.

You can't call things like this "psychoanalysis," and it may be confining to speak of them as "psychology," yet it is certainly not inaccurate to say that the various 'fields of professional investigation of the psyche and its ills have been fertile ground for new understanding of the nature of man, and for a spontaneous sort of philosophizing that speaks to his present condition. The vitality of any historical period is always found in areas where incommensurable factors of human reality make themselves felt, and for at least a generation, now, the swellings of unknown psychological potentialities and capacities have been forcing changes of attitude in the psychological disciplines. Today there are at least a dozen new journals devoted to "psychological" varieties of philosophizing, with much cross-fertilization going on between existential thinkers and the new schools of therapists.

This philosophical development was a natural consequence of recognizing therapy as a kind of "teaching." For teaching means arousing or inspiring, and when it is successful the one to be taught must have reason to think of himself as *capable* of learning, of growing, of achieving. Here we have the underlying necessity for the rather dramatic return to the ancient idea of self-knowledge. If man is not a "thing," then what is he?

So, starting with Jung, original and daring minds among the psychologists have often sought instruction from old philosophers and from traditions which teach about the self by means of symbol and myth. Then, some time in the 1940's, or perhaps earlier, a contemporary theoretical psychologist, A. H. Maslow, began direct research into the psychology of healthy individuals and societies. Dr.

Maslow gave all psychology a new direction and new possibilities of symmetrical development by establishing as normative the highest forms of subjective experience.

Shall we say that Psychology has done all this? We could, or we might say that human beings, using psychology as a tool, have done it, and in the process virtually transformed psychology into something else. Only a few years ago books about psychology were either summaries or critical studies of elaborate bodies of theory. The advanced books were critiques of critiques, for which certain forms of aberrant human behavior supplied the initial data. Today, the best books on psychology, while they naturally pay some attention to past theories, are often simply courageous investigations of the nature of man, risking new forms of generalization. More and more openly, the writers are moving from philosophical premises, and showing why they cannot move from anything else.

A rather impressive recent showing of this necessity is provided in Herbert Fingarette's *The Self in Transformation* (Harper Torchbook, 1965), which passes from a careful, appreciative discussion of Freud to much richer investigations in which the metaphysical systems of the East, both Upanishadic and Buddhistic, are extensively mined for philosophic parallels to the insights of psychotherapy. The opening section is titled "The Seminal Ambiguity of Psychoanalysis," and Dr. Fingarette's background as a university professor of philosophy—he is also a practicing therapist—serves him well in placing Freud in perspective. If we understand him correctly, Dr. Fingarette means by the "ambiguity" of psychoanalysis its need to regard the patient—and therefore any human being—as both a subject and an object. Freud is sometimes called a "mechanist," and it is true enough that the science of his day was ruled by Newtonian conceptions, but it is misleading to stop with this judgment. To show Freud's respect for individual freedom Dr. Fingarette quotes two important sentences from the founder of psychoanalysis:

> After all, analysis does not set out to abolish the possibility of morbid reactions, but to give the patient ego freedom to *choose* one way or the other. . . .
>
> However much the analyst may be tempted to act as teacher model and ideal to other people and to make men in his own image, he should not forget that that is not his task in the analytic relationship. . . .

Perhaps the justest criticism to be made of Freud would point to the lack of "dirigibility" in the potentialities of his language—the absence of lifting inspiration. Dr. Fingarette finds riches of this sort in the Eastern teachings which he adopts as paradigms for psychological insight. One easily recognizes the influence of these ideas in an idealizing paragraph on the therapist:

> The therapist sees, ideally, what is at once universal and unique in all men. He sees each person who comes before him as a person struggling to achieve integrity out of the universal materials of man's experience. In this respect he sees all men—himself included—as brothers. And he sees the uniqueness of the particular patterns, the tasks and solutions, the kinds of integrity achieved or aborted. In this he sees the unique dignity of each human soul. The psychoanalyst, grasping the oneness and the separateness of all men, loves others as himself. It is not a question of having a passionate attachment to them; it is, rather, his central love for himself as a person, an integrity; and it is through this specific kind of concern and love, and in terms of it, that he has come to know others. In opening himself to the "I," he has opened himself to the "Thou." In this respect the ideal psychoanalyst is the enlightened-agonist of mythic history.

This is a visionary expression; one hardly expects to encounter such a "therapist"; yet there is something to be said for a professional calling which can picture its objectives in these terms.

COMMENTARY
A RESTORED HERITAGE

THE opening words of the section of Dr. Fingarette's book (see Review) which examines Eastern philosophical doctrines are a revealing indication of the new hospitality of Western thinkers to ancient transcendentalism. While his approach may seem "pragmatic," the usual criticisms of Pragmatism have little application here. He writes:

> The doctrine of Karma, whether we accept it or not, poses profound questions about the structure, transformation, and transcendence of the Self. It raises in new ways general questions of ontology. We may be parochial and dismiss the doctrine, especially its theses on reincarnation, as obvious superstition. Or we may recall that it was not any self-evident spiritual superficiality but the historical accident of official Christian opposition which stamped it out as an important Greek and Roman doctrine, a doctrine profoundly meaningful to Plato as well as to the masses. Perhaps more significant, it has remained, from the first millennium B.C. until the present an almost universal belief in the East, even among the most highly trained and Western-educated contemporary thinkers. As one Western student of the subject quite properly says,
>
> "A theory which has been embraced by so large a part of mankind, of many races and religions, and has recommended itself to some of the most profound thinkers of all time, cannot be lightly dismissed." (G. F. Moore, *Metempsychosis*, Harvard University Press, 1914, p. 67.)
>
> In any case, an investigation of the doctrine will force us to examine from a fresh perspective both the nature of the self and the ontological question, What is Reality?

While the preoccupation of psychoanalysis with Freud's emphasis on sexual symbolism often leads this writer to cite from Tantric sources—a tendency very common today in the undiscriminating enthusiasm for "the East"—he also explores deeper and purer currents of Indian idealism, as found in the Upanishads, showing the unities of philosophic structure common to Upanishadic thought, Buddhism, and Greek Orphism. One general conclusion that might be drawn from such works is that, as even the physical sciences take on psychological dimensions, and as psychology itself is freed from physical models, ancient systems of philosophy possessed of profound psychological insight begin to seem like treasures restored to the cultural heritage after long centuries of neglect. The task of the reader, as Dr. Fingarette says, is to lay aside the conceits and indifference produced by this neglect, and "to see what the evidence and the argument say."

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
WOODSTOCK WEEKEND

THE promoters of the Woodstock Music and Art Fair (Aug. 15-17) expected about fifty thousand young people for audience at the three-day festival of rock bands, held in the natural amphitheater of a large cow pasture on Max Yasgur's dairy farm, near Bethel, N.Y., but about eight times that many turned up. The traffic on approaching highways was so bad that the band scheduled to open the program had to be brought in by helicopter. A reporter for the *National Observer* said in his (Aug. 25) story:

> On the way in, I stopped to talk with officers at a mobile unit from the neighboring Dutchess County sheriff's police. "No problems here," said officer Bill Curtis. "Peace is the theme of the fair and the kids have really been sticking to it. He explained that his detachment was on loan to Sullivan County to reinforce local police should any trouble develop. But none did. . . .
>
> Checking with the state police, I got the same story. "The kids in general have been very polite and well-mannered," one of them told me. "Of course it's a monumental traffic problem that we've managed to handle pretty well using helicopters. But the kids haven't caused us any trouble."

This reporter, Bruce Cook, lists the chief attractions of the program—Jefferson Airplane, Arlo Guthrie, Janis Joplin, Ravi Shankar, Canned Heat, Iron Butterfly, and Blood, Sweat and Tears—in all "twenty-eight top groups for $18.00," as one pilgrim put it—then wonders what accounted for the extraordinary turnout, greater by far than the attendance at any similar festival:

> But was it really the rock music alone that drew this army of young people to the Woodstock festival? Remember, there were 400,000 of them—this made an upstate New York cow pasture the third-largest city (smaller than New York itself and Buffalo, larger than Rochester) in the state for three days. And that was how the kids thought of it too. Their city, "The only free city in the country," they were calling it. The weekend population was also nearly equal to the number of U.S. troops serving in Vietnam. The kids were also aware of that. The affair had been advertised as "three days of peace and music." The accent was on peace.

It rained a lot of the time during the music, which was hard on everybody, since a natural amphitheater is also a natural basin and in some spots people moved around in ankle-deep mud. Then there were youngsters who brought no tents, no sleeping bags, and no food, while prices at the concession stands were high. Mr. Cook relates:

> Those who really saved the day were the residents of Bethel and surrounding Sullivan County. Disgusted by the few who took advantage of the situation and charged exorbitant prices for necessities—$1 a quart was not uncommon for drinking water early in the weekend—citizens donated whole truckloads of food and drink to the stranded rock lovers.

The bands were popular and all enjoyed the program, but this couldn't explain what was happening:

> . . . in a way the music was the least of it. You had the feeling looking around you, as kids wandered in and out of the audience, that for most of them just being there and sharing the same air with so many of their kind was enough.

The best thing about Mr. Cook's article is his effective reporting. The psychological interpretations he quotes from some "youth experts" may have some application, but it seems more important to say simply that the young of the present are able to get out of the vacuum of their ordinary lives on such occasions. There is also the fact that the performing artists who drew them to the Woodstock festival are musicians and entertainers who are *different* from the ones who attracted much smaller crowds of young people twenty and thirty years ago. They have a genuine *troubador* quality, as the chapter headings in Mark Gerzon's book (*The Whole World Is Watching*) make plain, and they have taken the initiative away from commercial interests in the entertainment field. There are curious dimensions of depth and longing in the popular music of today, prophetic, perhaps, of changes in the

springs of mass behavior in future years. To say much more would be only guessing.

However, other reporting of the festival brings to light some encouraging facts about the adults involved. The Los Angeles *Times* (Aug. 22) printed an interview with Joseph Paul Kimble, the chief of police of Beverly Hills, California, who went to the Woodstock Fair as an observer but was drafted to help handle "one of the largest crowds ever assembled for one of the longest periods." Kimble, said to represent a "new breed" of highly educated policemen, gave four reasons for the lack of "incidents" during the festival. First was the attitude of the young people who came. "I've never seen that many people in so small an area who acted so peacefully," he said. The second reason was what he called the "sub-professional" police work of the members of the Hog Farm, "a commune of hippies from Taos, New Mexico."

> "This group more than any other group helped keep things cool," he said. "They worked around the clock with various militant groups or individuals with emotional problems. . . . there were a lot of radical groups there." He said that whenever a radical group attempted some kind of confrontation—tried to storm the stage or "liberate" food from the concessionaires—the police would drop back and let the Hog Farm people cool things down.

The third reason was the contribution of various professional services provided—legal aid, a counseling service, and a number of doctors and nurses who treated 3,000 people. The fourth reason was the sensible use made of the three-hundred off-duty policemen hired by the promoters to maintain order. No weapons of any sort were allowed within the festival area. Only serious drug offenses were reported, leading to some eighty arrests. Since the promoters assumed responsibility for order at the festival, they gave the three hundred police special instructions. In Kimble's words:

> "They were there to keep the peace. We called them peace corpsmen instead of policemen. That sounds kind of hokey I know, but we were trying to semantically drill the idea into them. . . .
>
> "The police wore bright red windbreaker jackets with the word 'peace' silk-screened where the badge is usually worn. On the back of the jackets was the emblem of Woodstock Ventures, the promoters. It consisted of a guitar with a dove sitting on it, which I think is kind of nice."
>
> Kimble said the officers also wore blue jeans, pith helmets and red T-shirts with emblems similar to those on their jackets. . . . "It was something that caught on with the people attending," the chief said. "It didn't take long to learn there was not any fuzz around with guns, Mace or riot sticks."

Chief Kimble believes that what people term the "hippie movement" is not dying out but, if anything, increasing.

> "One thing I learned was that not all hippies can be stereotyped. That's a pretty uncomfortable revelation for most policemen. There were a lot there who didn't drink, didn't smoke pot. A lot got high just from the emotional experience of the festival. . . .
>
> "I've found there's no correlation between a clean-shaven cheek and morality, and conversely, there's no correlation between long hair and immorality."

FRONTIERS

Economics for the Millions

PUBLICATIONS devoted to humanistic ideals usually avoid the subject of economics. There are three reasons. First, economics seems to be largely a science for managers which obtains its guidelines from the statistics of mass behavior. The other two reasons are that it is difficult and dull.

This doesn't mean that there cannot be a genuinely humanistic approach to economic studies, but that material of this sort is scarce and hardly recognizable *as* economics. Erich Fromm, it will be recalled, had a try at humanistic economic theory in *The Sane Society*, but all he could find to illustrate his thinking was the French Communities of Work. In these enterprises the emphasis wasn't on economics at all, but on people and their normal, natural development. Their economics was purely a tool and obtained all its modes and definitions from more important considerations. Economics had no "autonomy" for the Communities of Work—which is doubtless the criterion of *good* economics: a good economics turns bad when it begins to be a determining factor in vital decisions.

In the only good books on socio-economic managemel~t that we think of easily, the natural well-being of the people comes first. We have in mind Lao-tse's *Tao Te King,* Book II of Plato's *Republic,* and A. H. Maslow's *Entsychian Management.* (Maybe we should add Bellamy's *Looking Backward* and the writings of Arthur E. Morgan, to have the beginnings of a respectable reading list!) Of these, only *Eupsychian Management* is recent, and it focuses on human attitudes in the setting of work situations rather than on what we think of as "economic problems." However, there is one contemporary writer who deals directly with economics, yet has no difficulty in showing that a sound economy can result only from prior consideration to the values of a growing human community. This writer is E. F. Schumacher, presently economic adviser to the National Coal Board of Great Britain, but becoming better known for his advocacy of what he calls intermediate technology development. A paper which he and G. McRobie, an associate, contributed to the *Journal of Administration Overseas* (April, 1969), "Intermediate Technology and its Administration Implications," combines criticism of existing practice in foreign economic aid with positive proposals that should win immediate response and support from all humanists. The paper is based on conceptions presented in Dr. Schumacher's paper, "Buddhist Economics," published in MANAS for Aug. 13, yet achieves independent validity on pragmatic grounds.

The authors begin by pointing to the well known fact that, in general, foreign aid programs in behalf of the developing countries are not helping them to develop. Instead, the aid brought to them by the advanced technological countries tends to create "dual" societies. There is "the emergence of a small, very rich, politically powerful and city-centered élite, which draws its values (and not infrequently much of its wealth) from the West and—perhaps most damaging of all—its education, especially as regards economics, from the same source."

Why does this happen? The reasons are various. First, the methods of modern technology originate in countries where capital is plentiful and labor scarce and high-priced. These methods are exported to countries where *precisely opposite* conditions exist—where there is little capital and much unemployed labor. Since much of the triumph of technology has been through the replacement of human hands with automated machines, when its productive facilities are introduced in an undeveloped country the inevitable effect is an increase in unemployment. Further, since machines of this sort cannot be manufactured in the under-developed country, they must be imported. It follows, then, that as unemployment increases, so do debts to the

country giving "aid." What new wealth is earned by the machines must be used to pay these debts. And even if production is increased by these methods, there is a very limited domestic market for what is produced. The people, being poor, cannot buy.

Why do the advanced countries offer this kind of aid? Well, it is what they know how to do. They have advanced technology to sell for the money they give or lend to the countries needing help. Moreover, while the policies, habits, and interests of the advanced industrial societies are geared to high technology, the politicians in the developing countries have both practical and political reasons for finding it acceptable as aid:

> For instance, large, capital-intensive projects generally get their funds at low rates of interest, which do not reflect the real cost of capital: and it is much easier, administratively, to handle a few big projects rather than many small ones. They also seem more glamorous and photogenic and somehow confer "prestige." But—a very big but—what choice does the West offer them? We have tended to say: "Here are loans and grants. buy our equipment; what's good for us must be good for you."

The rationale of such an aid program is loaded with fallacies. It brings the methods of a rich, technically skilled and highly educated civilization to people who have neither money nor skill nor education. Much of the money given is wasted; even if there is some apparent success, mass production of goods in the underdeveloped land depresses the market for traditional, hand-crafted goods and increases unemployment in rural areas, so that people flock to the cities to keep from starving.

Having given this explanation of the failure of conventional "foreign aid," the authors turn to the natural advantages of "intermediate technology"—by which they mean aid which relates directly to the essential economic needs of the developing country. Aid of this sort is designed to fulfill four conditions:

(1) It will stimulate economic progress by making better use of the available natural resources and labor power. (2) It will consciously devise innovations that enable the general mass of the population to participate in the new activities and share in the benefits. (3) It will develop standards of technical improvement that are based upon the existing methods and means of production, and not on the norms of the very different methods and conditions of advanced Western societies. (4) The development will have a timetable scaled to the society's capacity to profit by, and therefore to pay for, the improvements which are adopted. The authors summarize:

> A technology with these characteristics makes possible the creation of jobs where people are living now—in the rural areas and small towns—rather than in the already overcrowded (and high cost) metropolitan centres. It would make maximum use of local materials to meet local needs—for food clothing, shelter and the basic services required by rural populations. The maximum effect is achieved if not only local materials are employed, but the capital equipment used for manufacturing or processing is also locally made: if, say, not only better tools are introduced but the tools themselves are locally made. For then the "circle of income generation" is complete.
>
> A technology of this kind also minimizes the demands it makes on very advanced managerial, technical and financial skills; while it would stretch peoples' abilities it would not be beyond them; it would make them feel more capable, not more helpless (as they feel when confronted with some super-technology from the West). Finally, it would minimize demands on scarce foreign exchange, imports and savings.
>
> The widespread introduction of low cost, "intermediate" technologies is in fact the only feasible way of providing a framework for real development. What do we mean by real development? We mean the creation of a kind of social infrastructure of education, organization and discipline which enables people to work themselves out of poverty.

The rest of this paper is devoted to explanation of what is meant by "social infrastucture." It becomes obvious that natural economic growth through the introduction of intermediate technology cannot be accomplished

simply by large-scale planning. A great many on-the-spot workers are needed to teach and to encourage, to convey hope and practical vision. For those familiar with Gandhi's writings, this is precisely what he meant by "constructive work." Intermediate technology, as conceived by E. F. Schumacher, is simply the practical means for helping to turn slack and stagnant societies into living, growing communities, by fostering competence and self-reliance at levels where the people themselves can recognize and find both pleasure and strength in their development.

Literature concerning these ideas may be obtained by writing to Intermediate Technology Development Group, Ltd., 9 King Street, Covent Garden, London WC2.