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THE CONTROL OF NATIONAL POLICY

THE mood of the country is fear and hopelessness. We fear the Russians, the Chinese, the Communists at home and abroad, and the atom bombs. We are hopeless about improving our situation, either personally or nationally, and sure that whatever happens will be for the worse.

This is easy to understand in ordinary men and women like us, who seem so distant from the locus of power and decision. What can we do about the defense program, or the negotiations at Geneva? How can we influence the military and policy decisions that will determine whether we live or die? How can we reach out beyond our circles to redirect the engines of destruction to good use?

The attitude is less easy to understand or excuse in the men who hold the power of decision: President Kennedy, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, even physicists and science administrators—these men who have access to the information denied to us; they can call upon the entire intellectual and monetary treasury of the nation. Yet they exude an aura of helpless desperation.

Our situation is not hopeless—it could be full of hope, excitement, and expectation. Our present course is leading toward nuclear catastrophe, but the course need not be pursued. The instruments that power the holocaust could drive the engines of production. Our failures are not failures of will, of courage, or determination; they are failures of purpose and imagination. If we are frightened of the direction we are going, then we ought to go another way.

First, it is necessary to understand where we are. The East and the West, the two great power systems comprising the communist and non-communist sections of the world, are each composed of several nations with varying degrees of freedom of action in respect to their own power systems. The United States and Russia can almost, but not quite, act without reference to the other members of their alliances, while Hungary and Venezuela, to name a couple of satellites, are limited in action on their own.

Each of the power blocs contains its ferment and instability: Albania and China, for example, are arguing with Russia about how to bring us "capitalist imperialists" into line with the rules of history. We operate in a more open climate, and in consequence our alliances are looser; but we have similar troubles—the Europeans are fixing up a common market that is threatening our prosperity; France insists on its own atom bomb and declines to join our negotiations; West Germany acts like a nation that won the last war and seeks to dictate terms; and so forth. Neither power bloc is unified, either by ideology or coercion, although the communist power system appears to be—and probably is—under more effective central control.

Outside the two power blocs are other nations, mainly preoccupied with their own affairs, who try to turn a neutral face toward the main exchanges between East and West. Some, like India, tend toward the Western bloc but seem to us to threaten allegiance to the Communists. Others, like Egypt, seem to the Communists to renege on firm commitments. Others, like the Congo, are the ground of active contests between East and West; while others still, like Portugal and the Union of South Africa, seem to have withdrawn from contact with the real world.

Toward this conglomerate of uncertainty and change the United States tries to maintain a single-minded policy: anti-communism. The USSR takes as narrow and distorted a view of the non-communist world. So both anti-communism

and anti-capitalism raise their armies and expend their substance on the technology of war, and even their programs of assistance to the sick and needy have harsh military overtones.

The power blocs thus facing each other with symmetrical misconceptions adopt identical means to protect themselves. Though both talk ultimate conquest, both have come to realize that they cannot afford conquest and wish to settle for the status quo. Each has accumulated a powerful nuclear arsenal, the equivalent of seven tons of TNT for each inhabitant of the planet. The power of these vast explosives is intended to keep them from going off. Russia threatens us with retaliation plus a credible first strike to keep us from using our weapons; and we threaten Russia with "massive retaliation" and a credible first strike to keep her from using hers. Except for a few skirmishes around the periphery of the power blocs, we have so far got away with this scheme of psychological warfare.

It is important to recognize that the security of both power blocs is not a military system but a psychological one. The leaders and most of the peoples on both sides agree that an actual exchange of nuclear weapons, even what is called a modest exchange—say a few thousand megatons, no more than one-tenth of the stockpile of either side would be useless for achieving their desired goals. We could not change Russians into capitalists by launching a dozen ICBM's; and they could not change us into Communists. We agree that even a modest exchange could convert large parts of both countries into rubble, and exterminate millions of citizens on both sides; and we agree that a full-scale nuclear war would devastate if not annihilate both sides.

So our weapons get us nothing but the non-use of the weapons of our opponents; and their weapons get them nothing but the non-use of ours. This is the *best* we hope for. Neither side has entered any negotiation for disarmament believing disarmament would be good for itself. We want Russian disarmament and would disarm if the Russians would disarm first; and they would be happy to have us disarm and say they would follow suit.

Neither will move without the other's first move. The arms race, although initially a *product* of the suspicion and fear these nations bear one another, has now become a principal *cause* of suspicion and fear.

The psychological warfare entered a new phase last fall, when the Russians apparently hoped their super weapon tests would terrify us into making a test-ban agreement on their terms; instead, we have now begun a round, having resumed testing when the Russians failed to agree to a test-ban on our terms. The Russians, as all Americans know, are poor psychologists about Americans—Khrushchev's bluster and his big bangs made us less, not more willing to negotiate. We felt betrayed and tricked. But neither are we good psychologists on Russians: in Mr. Kennedy's speech announcing our new test plans, he charged the Russians with preparing their tests while negotiating for a test-ban treaty and then announced a few sentences later that we were preparing our tests and wanted to negotiate while doing so.

The fact that we were preparing openly and therefore openly threatening is presumed to make a difference; it probably does. It also probably makes it impossible for the Russians to agree with us, just as it would have been impossible for us to agree with the Russians if they had said they were going to test if we didn't agree with them last October. Editorials in this country would have cried, "Atomic blackmail!" exactly as Russian editorials did; and we would have declared, as Russia has, that we would never surrender to the threat and bombast of our opponent.

And so it goes: inept psychological warriors proposing military psychological solutions. One reason for the low quality of our strategy, I would guess, is that we have been consulting the wrong kind of expert. We assume, because we are using weapons of great physical and military

sophistication, that we ought to ask physicists and military strategists how to make the best psychological use of them. But great physicists need not be great psychologists, and apparently they are not, if the results are any indication. Such military psychological techniques are not well suited to the subtle work of persuading a suspicious and recalcitrant Russia to disarm.

For that should be our aim. What we want, what would truly give us security, would be to rid the world of the means of making war. The aim is stated admirably in the joint Russian-American declaration of principle signed last September: to achieve general and complete disarmament, with inspection and control, and with adequate peace-keeping and border-guarding machinery in the hands of the United Nations. If we could put that treaty into instant effect, if we could move overnight from our present balance of terror to the weaponless world envisaged in the joint declaration, we would at last be free to pursue the good life without violence or distraction.

Suppose, then, that we take this joint declaration as the statement of American aims. How can we make the Russians disarm?

The answer is, change the situation of the Russians. If their present situation does not encourage them to disarm, what kind of situation would encourage them? Put this way, the question makes obvious the first rule that ought to guide American strategy: we must not let the Russians control our actions.

Our present policies put us entirely under Russian control, as Russian policies put them under our control.

How can we extricate ourselves from Russian control, to take non-military policy initiatives of our own design, aimed at bringing about the warless world?

There is a problem with the American people. Mr. Kennedy has a simple solution to this problem. He could tell us the truth about our situation. If Americans were told, not that we are so far ahead of the Russians in the arms race that our security is assured—Mr. Kennedy's latest word on the subject—but that the arms race itself is the principal cause of insecurity, then Mr. Kennedy would have some room to move. We ought to know how doubtful are the weapons, how little we know about guidance systems, how risky are the safeguards, how wrong the scientists have been in their predictions, how dynamic and stable the Russian government is, how undiabolical and complex the Russian people are, how little our economy has to do with capitalism, and how little the Russian economy resembles communism—and a few hundred other facts that would explode the myths on which the policy of security through arms superiority is based. Mr. Kennedy ought to trust us with the truth, and his gain would be immediate. People wouldn't like the truth, but they would be forced to think what to do about it. They would then welcome his leadership toward American initiatives, instead of scaring him into a standstill.

Suppose that we were ready to back Kennedy in a series of tests—not tests of weapons, but tests of ways to get the Russians to disarm. What then ought we to try?

The answer would be multiple. No one single scheme—even general and complete disarmament—will do the job. We should not try one experiment, but many. We should look at recent events to see what happened about the time the Russians acted as we didn't want them to and see if we could reverse those happenings to discover whether the Russians would then act as we do want them to. We ought to be moving on all sectors, delivering our action messages through as many channels as possible.

Here are some proposals to help stop the arms race. They might be called *Reducing Death and Taxes.*

(1) The most obvious interaction between the Russian and American systems is fiscal. We raise our arms budget; they raise theirs. So we could cut our arms budget 10%, pass out half the saving

in taxes and subsidies to ease the lot of disemployed arms producers, and use the other half for a greatly expanded program of developmental aid to undercapitalized countries.

(2) We could stop the arms race by stopping our part in it completely. We could announce that we had enough weapons and vehicles to carry them, that we did not intend to make any more, and that we were ready to open our weapons manufacturing plants to international inspection—to prove we weren't making more.

(3) We could divide the country into ten regions, open for inspection any one of the regions the Russians choose, and disarm that tenth of our country as we cut our arms budget 10%.

Here are some proposals for peace-keeping arrangements. They might be called *Turns Toward Peace.*

The fundamental risk at the moment, according to the experts, is the danger of surprise attack or accident—and these dangers go hand in hand, for the readiness to respond to surprise attack is what makes the war system accident prone.

(1) The weapons are now under unilateral control. (I hear complaints about proposals for unilateral disarmament. I want to complain about unilateral armament and unilateral arms control.) We could put our weapons, as rapidly as possible, under multilateral control. Since the deterrent weapons are useful only to deter, they could be every bit as useful in the hands of an international peace keeping agency, under UN jurisdiction, staffed entirely by nationals of countries without major military power. Such a peacekeeping force could be empowered to retaliate against any nuclear attack as soon as it was certain which nation had fired off the weapons. If the threat of deterrence does work, it would work better under such an arrangement. In addition, a neutrally operated retaliatory force would gain nothing by striking anybody first. We would gain by reducing the danger of a pre-emptive strike launched by the Russians because they thought we were about to strike them.

(2) We could begin such a transfer of weapons by handing over the arms now located in the first disarmed zone under the 10% plan. The international inspectors could inventory the weapons in the zone the Russians chose, take those weapons under their command, and move them to sites belonging to the UN as soon as feasible.

(3) We would retain no American veto over any action of the peace-keeping agency. (We have already once proposed a variant of this idea in our Baruch Plan in the UN.)

(4) We could begin at once surveillance of every movement of dangerous machines. We could use our radar and U-2 reconnaissance gadgets, and spy satellites if we have them, to provide the data for such surveillance, and we could make public, through a suitable international agency, everything we know. We could keep *our* submarines on the surface, for example, except within our own territorial waters, and report the presence of every submerged submarine we could detect to the international anti-surprise agency. We could report all flights of aircraft and missiles, giving advanced warning of our own. Every uncertainty the surveillance survey eliminated would reduce the danger of accident or surprise.

(6) We should turn toward peace by removing tension-producing points of contact. For example, we could offer a series of initiatives on Berlin. If Berlin is an important symbol of freedom and democracy, we could set it free—free of Germany and everybody else—make it an international and open city under UN protection. The Russians have already indicated they would be open to this proposal. Then the East Germans and the Russians would have to face UN troops on the west side of the wall. Or, we could buy land from East Germany—since they are in financial trouble—and connect West Germany with West Berlin. We could remove every last soldier from Berlin, recruit an army of freedom

riders pledged to nonviolence, equip them with bulldozers, and tell them to knock down the wall. We could, if we put our minds to it, think of a dozen other solutions—like moving West Berlin brick by brick into the Western zone. But whatever we did should be non-military, carefully thought through for its psychological consequences, and designed to reduce or eliminate a potential source of conflict that our present policies nurse and foster. Similar proposals could be applied in Laos, Viet-Nam, Korea, Formosa—to the borders on which we are now embattled.

(7) We ought to begin, at once, a massive program of exchanging persons with the Soviet Union. When the Russians restrict the movement of our visitors to Russia, we respond by restricting the movement of their visitors here. But we say they have the closed society, and we have the open society.

So we might begin by removing all travel restrictions on persons from the communist bloc countries, set up a favorable rate of tourist exchange, and invite them to come visiting. We could exchange 10,000 students among our colleges and universities.

We could get the American Field Service family living exchanges going for high school students on the basis of 50,000 instead of 500 young people. We could send our jazz bands and our singers and our Mort Sahls, for the Russians are having their own problems with beats. There must be sick jokes for the sicknesses of the Soviet world; if our entertainers could discover them, we could exchange our troubles as well as our enjoyments.

The main job of Turns Toward Peace would be more serious. The peace is kept by law. The world now operates under a growing but still limited body of international or supernational law; it needs the sorts of agencies for law enforcement on which we depend for our domestic order.

(8) The first step would be to repeal the Connally Resolution; this action would give the World Court final jurisdiction over any quarrels to which we were party.

(9) But the great impetus for world law will come when we begin to act as if world law exists. Suppose we simply started acting as if the world were a lawful place. Suppose we referred every international dispute to the World Court, or to whatever tribunal was appropriate. Suppose, if no tribunal were in existence, we offered the UN financing for such a tribunal, declined to serve upon it, refrained from suggesting how it should be constituted, and laid our complaints before it. If we then every time, whether or not we liked the judgment, accepted its decisions and carried out its sentences upon ourselves, we would be making a case for world law that could not be refuted. Our language of action would be credible, and our message would be clear.

A third category of proposals has to do with removing the causes of war. Reducing Death and Taxes and Turning Toward Peace would help. All these suggestions interact with each other and reinforce each other. But in the end it is the disparities in health and wealth that will continue to afflict us with conflict, unless the experience and example of cooperation can free men for the pursuit of their common good.

Let us call this category *Turns Toward Life.*

(1) We need, if we are serious about peace, to take the elimination of the causes of war as seriously as we take the job of fighting wars. In time of war, we unite and work and sacrifice for the safety of our nation and the glory of our cause. In the program to make peace is the hope of real safety and a cause whose glory is untarnished by the stain of blood and violence.

(2) We ought to put into the capitalization of the less developed countries the same amount of money we have been willing to spend to arm them. The arms and military assistance programs we have financed so far have done little for the people of those countries. But wars are made, as we sometimes forget, by people. They have

usually been made by people who felt threatened. But they have also been made by people who believed they were being treated unjustly. It is no longer possible to excuse the difference between our riches and the poverty of most of the people of the world by claiming we are wealthy because we are good. We are wealthy because we have been lucky, because we have worked hard, and because we have developed techniques of production. Many generations of suffering and saving were needed to accumulate the capital—the tools and factories—that create our affluence.

The peoples of Asia and Africa and South America need not suffer, as did the peoples of England and the Continent and Russia. We have the surplus capital, and we will need a place to use it as soon as we stop putting billions into the arms race every year.

(3) So we can begin the Turn Toward Life by giving away, if need be, the tools and factories and machines that will convert underdeveloped countries into affluent consumer countries like ourselves. It would cost no more than we would save by reducing our arms budget 10% each year, even if we spend half the saving ourselves in reduced taxes. We could transfer sizable amounts of nuclear fissionable materials to the atom bank at Geneva, and to other parts of the world where energy resources are low. We could offer our surplus agricultural products, now in storehouses, to the hungry of the world and turn our farmers loose to grow as much food as they could. It would cost us no more to buy the food than it now costs us to keep farmers from growing it; and some starving people would be saved from starving. While this is aimed primarily at China, it would also free areas like Egypt, Syria, India, and Indonesia to proceed more rapidly with non-agricultural development.

(4) We could set up additional great trading regions, like Europe's common market, in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. These developmental programs are immediately within our power. They would promote life, and they would cost us less than a few days of nuclear war. Those who argue that nuclear war is thinkable claim we could lose half our population and two-thirds of our buildings, factories, and capital goods in a nuclear attack and still recover our present level of life. If so, it is certainly thinkable to postpone a few of our comforts and pleasures to help rid the world of war.

In all these moves, undertaken independently as part of a coherent plan to free ourselves from the Cold War, we could watch the effect on the Russians. If their system, as we are so often told, gets its present character from the suspicious nature of totalitarian government and the needs of that government to keep its people frightened, these moves of ours would throw the Russian system off balance. Which way would it tilt? I don't know, but if we were keeping track of developments with an open mind, we could observe the relationship between what we did and how the Russians responded. Our purpose would be to get the Russians moving toward disarmament, and if we found some of our actions had the wrong effect, we could stop these and try others.

The essence of this scheme lies in its determination to connect the purposes of policy with the way policy works out in practice. We now seem incapable of making this connection. We say we are for peace; we arm ourselves, make threats of war, and wonder why peace does not come. But if we are convinced that the weapons systems are useless for anything except keeping the Russians from using theirs, then we could aim, first, to stop the arms race which lies within our power and does not depend on Russian agreement. Second, we can turn toward peace by guiding the Russians, through non-military pressures, toward the behavior we want them to adopt. Third, we can turn toward life by helping to supply the world with the arms needed in the fight against hunger, disease, poverty, and ignorance.

Such projects would infect us and all the peoples of the world with hope. That is what we need. Hope comes from the expectation that things will be better in the future. Things can be better. We can build the world, instead of threatening to destroy it.

The power to turn toward peace is in our own hands. It does not depend on prior agreement. It does depend on a hard, imaginative, and bold venture: American initiatives—independent acts that change the causes of Russian conduct and build the world we seek.

HALLOCK HOFFMAN

Santa Barbara, California

REVIEW
ANOTHER "BOOK FOR OUR TIME"

A PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGICAL anthology titled *Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society,* will constitute an excellent source book for many MANAS readers. (Dell, 1962, 95 cents.) The authors, Professor Eric Josephson and his wife Mary Josephson, collaborate in production of a most important volume and we say this not alone because the contemporary authors they quote most frequently in a 44-page Introduction are writers often quoted in MANAS.

This Introduction to *Man Alone* is by itself worth the price of the book. It is a philosophical synthesis of essential elements in the thought of such modern thinkers as Erich Fromm, David Riesman, Karen Horney, Clark Moustakas, Karl Jaspers, Hannah Arendt, C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, Bruno Bettelheim, Joseph Campbell, and Albert Camus. Quotations from these writers elaborate the many varieties of "alienation" which are characteristic of mid-twentieth century society; and the Josephsons suggest that overcoming the "alienation predicament" must involve some transcendental or even metaphysical thinking. As Joseph Campbell puts it: "The problem of mankind today is . . . the opposite to that of men in the comparatively stable periods of those great co-ordinating mythologies. Then all meaning was in the group, in the great anonymous forms, none in the self-expressive individual; today no meaning is in the group—none in the world: all is in the individual. But . . . one does not know toward what one moves. One does not know by what one is propelled. . . . Not the animal world, not the plant world, not the miracle of the spheres, but man himself is now the crucial mystery. Man is that alien presence with whom the forces of egoism must come to terms, through whom the ego is to be crucified and resurrected, and in whose image society is to be reformed."

Among the underlying perspectives of *Man Alone* is the view that the pessimism, despair, and uncertainty of our time have not suddenly sprung into being. Atomic weapons are not the cause but the effect of characteristic attitudes and motivations, each of which has a traceable lineage. The society which prepares to use atomic weapons is itself split and "atomized" in many ways, and the process has been going on for a long time. It is this process which the Josephsons feel must first be understood, since a spurious sense of "togetherness" which depends upon the enforced closing of ranks in fear of war will ultimately only magnify the alienation problem—a problem to be solved by individuals and small groups, rather than by ideologies and institutions. Second, the most penetrating thinkers are aware of the problem, and the best of their writing should provide a springboard for that kind of regenerative thought upon which any hope for an enlightened future depends. The Josephsons summarize:

> The theme of the alienation of modern man runs through the literature and drama of two continents; it can be traced in the content as well as the form of modern art, it preoccupies theologians and philosophers, and to many psychologists and sociologists, it is the central problem of our time. In various ways they tell us that ties have snapped that formerly bound Western man to himself and to the world about him. In diverse language they say that man in modern industrial societies is rapidly becoming detached from nature, from his old gods, from the technology that has transformed his environment and now threatens to destroy it, from his work and its products and from his leisure; from the complex social institutions that presumably serve but are more likely to manipulate him; from the community in which he lives, and above all from himself—from his body and his sex, from his feelings of love and tenderness, and from his art—his creative and productive potential.
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> The alienated man is everyman and no man, drifting in a world that has little meaning for him and over which he exercises no power, a stranger to himself and to others. As Erich Fromm writes, "Alienation as we find it in modern society is almost total; it pervades the relationship of man to his work, to the things he consumes, to his fellows, and to himself." Or as Charles Taylor expresses it, in a mechanical and depersonalized world man has "an indefinable sense of loss; a sense that life . . . has become impoverished, that men are somehow 'deracinate and disinherited,' that society and human nature alike have been atomized, and hence mutilated, above all that men have been separated

from whatever might give meaning to their work and their lives."

This is the dilemma, and after a search for its basic components the Josephsons find grounds for optimism, chiefly in the hope that the present psychological malaise is transitional. But to make the transition meaningful instead of fatally destructive, our motives, our psychology, and even our metaphysics require fundamental revaluation. The Josephsons conclude their Introduction with these paragraphs:

> Ours is a soft and wasteful society. If it ever needed a sense of "national purpose' now is the time. But that purpose cannot be achieved or imposed by appointing committees to select goals for us—although this reflects, at least dimly, an awareness that collective purpose is missing from our lives. Can we arrive at that sense of purpose and retain the freedom we value so highly and use so poorly? Or will we drift into a garrison state that will give us our marching orders?
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> Which shall we choose? The rest of the world may not wait long for us to decide. Indeed, underdeveloped countries—at the outer edge of the explosion of population and expectations—may learn from our experiences and, if they are wise, skip the difficult and painful periods of technological adjustment which we experienced. Perhaps they will reject a system like ours in which men take from one another more than they share and thereby lose an irretrievable part of themselves.

In other words, we have reached a time when the alienation of man from his creations and from himself is nearly complete. This sad conclusion is reflected by sociologists and psychologists, it appears in literature, and is expressed dramatically in the arts. It is possible that the processes which make for alienation have had to run their course before fundamental regeneration can begin, but where is the inspiration for this radical change to come from?

The Josephsons do not offer directives. Their implicit assumption is that the man who is helped to explore the reasons why every dead end is a dead end is bound to reorient his journey. The basic theory of psychoanalysis, applied to the neuroses of nations and cultures, implies that a conscious awareness of the nature of a predicament constitutes therapy. Perhaps this is true, and perhaps thousands of young men and women who refuse to be "squares" will at least manage to do something besides grow up "absurd." On the other hand, the Josephsons draw from their many sources indications that it is only through seeking or establishing a small, meaningful community that the individual is likely to escape pessimism and despair—or blind conformity. The Chinese Communists seem to have achieved a "group therapy" corrective for "alienation" in the villages, but their ends and means militate against the emergence of any truly "autonomous" individuals. The Hutterite communities have for many centuries demonstrated that meaningful life can be achieved by those whose faith in the metaphysical beliefs of the community is absolute. However, it seems to us that Viktor Frankl comes closest to formulating a sound theoretical solution for the alienation complex, by a blending of psychoanalysis and transcendental philosophy. In the final analysis, it is those men who follow their "will to meaning"—beyond the meaning for which any institution or group is designed—who can do the group, and themselves, the most good. The Josephsons conclude a section entitled "Self-Analysis: Dynamics and Therapy" by suggesting that new "group cultures" must be built with the autonomy of the individual as the final goal:

> In all communities where solidarity is achieved men may escape from alienation, only to lose themselves in conformity to the group. Is there any way out of this dilemma? While it is important to recognize that belongingness and togetherness represent a new form of tyranny, it will not do to urge upon an alienated population a meaningless freedom. The task before us is to build group cultures that will satisfy man s yearning to reach his fellows without destroying him in the process. Who is to say that it cannot be done?

COMMENTARY
A REFRESHING BREEZE OF SANITY

THIS week's lead article, "The Control of National Policy," by Hallock Hoffman, first took shape in two broadcasts earlier this year over the Los Angeles Pacifica radio station, KPFK. The material of these talks was then edited and published by the Council for Correspondence in the form of a pamphlet. Copies are available from the Council (Cooper Station Box 536, New York 3, N.Y.) at 20 cents each. The author, Mr. Hoffman, is Director of Study of the Political Process at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Our title tells why we have reprinted this material in MANAS. Here is a well-thought-out program of national action which would put into practice a sane foreign policy. It seems to us impossible to quarrel with any of Mr. Hoffman's uncommon sense. The need, of course, is to turn it into *common* sense—to win wider support for sanity in foreign relations. While MANAS has discussed at length the issues of war and peace, we have never published a series of balanced proposals for serious peace-making at the level of national policy. Mr. Hoffman's essay fills this need far better than anything we might have attempted.

Now, as for spreading this kind of sense and making it more effectively known, we should like to speak of the work of the Council for Correspondence. This is a group of loosely allied individuals—allied by common interests and ideals—who combined in 1960 "in the tradition of the American Revolutionary Committees of Correspondence" to exchange ideas on the issues and problems of the United States and, eventually, to publish a Newsletter. Members of the Council for Correspondence whose names are likely to be familiar to MANAS readers include Jerome Frank, Erich Fromm, Robert Pickus, David Riesman, and Mulford Sibley.

The *Newsletter,* which has become the Council's main activity, now appears monthly ($6.00 a year, address above). Its primary concern is "a basic critique of U.S. foreign policy." As an editorial statement says, the "content is divided about equally between articles and letters, giving the qualities of give-and-take, of declaration and reconsideration, and of the uncertain balancing of moral conviction and reasoned study, which in some degree characterize the experience of many American intellectuals in arriving at a critical position." Something of the mood of its contributors is conveyed by the comment of a Japanese nuclear physicist who wrote to the editors: "I believe that the only action we can take right now in order to overcome the fearful situation is to recover the human bond among peoples and to awaken our rational thinking. In this sense the role of the *Newsletter* is invaluable."

The *Newsletter* needs money in order to continue. It is possible that many MANAS readers will want to support this extraordinary achievement in balanced appraisal of national affairs after they have seen copies of the paper.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

NEW SCHOOLING OPPORTUNITIES

IT seems that whenever MANAS notes the establishment of a new experimental or independent school, we immediately hear of or from other kindred efforts. A natural community of interest develops among the pioneers in this field, if for no other reason than that subsidies are difficult to obtain and are apt to be confining to the school if obtained.

The Friends Educational Association (Quaker) is busy with its own kind of proliferation. Just this fall, the John Woolman School was established in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada. This school provides boarding facilities for from thirty to fifty students in the tenth to the twelfth grades. While the project may be termed one of "religious education," the Woolman School brochure explains precisely what "religion" means in this context:

> Friends schools are religious schools, but students of many religious backgrounds—or none—find themselves comfortable and able to worship in their own way in the unprogrammed Friends silent Meeting. Friends are concerned that religion find expression in life, that our students learn, not to live with the world we have but to work for the world we want. Friends education tries to make real and applicable Friends testimonies of equality, simplicity, peace, and a just social order—testimonies that we believe have the most direct bearing on the public and national welfare.
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> Friends believe that private schools offer opportunities for experimentation and exploration in education that are not possible for the public schools. At the same time, they help provide that bulwark of academic freedom which is of vital import to *all* education.

Further information on the John Woolman School may be obtained from College Park Friends Educational Association, Inc., 2151 Vine Street, Berkeley.

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Pacific High School at Palo Alto, California, is supported by some long-term friends of MANAS. This is a cooperative venture, as self-sufficient as possible, operating on a minimum budget. To provide the "setting for learning" sought by the founders of Pacific High School, the following conditions are maintained:

> Classes will be small so that each person can be known for himself, can speak and be heard as an individual.
>
> Programs will be responsive to the special needs and interests of individual students—time will become the variable accomplishment or mastery of each task the constant.
>
> The traditional boxes in which various areas of Man's curiosity are confined (algebra, geometry, history, geography etc.) will be opened out so the reality of their interrelationships may become apparent.
>
> Teachers and special resource people of the highest character, both in scholarship and quality of life from the rich area in which the school is located will have close personal contact with the students.
>
> Ordinarily, students will be concerned with fewer subjects at any one time of year in order to foster learning which is *intensive* as well as *extensive.*
>
> Plans and decisions relating to program will be in the hands of teachers and students together, acting against a background of the continuing advice and concern of all who are committed to this learning community.

In the Pacific High School brochure, a parent contributes an interpretation of the school's philosophy and psychology:

> Pacific High School is a cooperative, family style, of people who understand that education is opportunity. These are people who have recognized that children have quite as much to teach their elders as the other way around. These are people who are fairly sure that intellectual development happens when the moment arrives, and that personal friendships and good discourses are just as much required by the growing mind, as books and technical gear. The thing is difficult indeed, and somewhat paradoxical, we are well aware: those who hope to learn in this high school must know, at least implicitly, that their learning will be up to them—there can be no compulsions, and yet, to know fully what this means would be to make Pacific—or any

> other school—unnecessary to them. The difficulty, and the paradox, can be faced, of course, only because those elders who operate in the school are not merely exceptionally competent in their fields of knowledge, but are people who do not have it in their nature to be pedantic. Investigation and discussion, in all directions is what happens—a good deal of it utterly playful, all of it spontaneous. It follows, as the seasons change, that systems of interpretation grow up naturally, out of this rough exchange, as they are sought. Most of us know, in some measure, that only so will the mature person have wisdom, tolerance, and character. On the other hand, we also know, to our despair, how strong are the pressures upon us to crowd the process. It can not be altogether easy to keep faith with our better knowledge in these matters.

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An apparently similar effort toward synthesized pre-college learning is represented by the Olivewood School in Riverside, California. Olivewood presently includes the founders and teachers of the Riverside Academy, and its philosophy is represented by an extract from an earlier Riverside bulletin:

> It is felt that the years before college are often wasted under the prevailing systems of education, and that as a result the intelligent student becomes bored, restless, even demoralized and frequently incapacitated for serious learning subsequently. The demands of exact and detailed learning are too often postponed to the college level, and the earlier learning years are spent in trivial and mediocre exercises. The result is that when the student has reached the age of eighteen or so, by which time the critical and speculative faculties should be in the full course of development, he is often reduced to the necessity of memorizing the elements of grammar, for instance, and the facts of history—matters which he might easily have mastered by the age of fifteen or sixteen. Under the present systems an unnecessary hardship is imposed upon both colleges and students. The proposed school is intended as a step toward correcting this problem through an emphasis on reading and memory. But in addition, and in a larger sense, its vocation will lie in cultivating the imagination and the spirit.

Olivewood makes an emphasis on "classical learning" on the ground that an adequate preparation for upper division university studies must begin early. A paper by William P. Chapman, one of the Riverside founders, discusses the common predicament of the high school student when he approaches "the higher learning," which is that he finds himself woefully unprepared for the disciplines of serious education in the Humanities. In the university he encounters for the first time in his life the standards of professional scholarship, and this is a problem in which, Mr. Chapman notes, the "professional 'education educators' have no interest." Olivewood is setting out to correct this flaw in secondary school education.

FRONTIERS

The Egocentric Predicament

ONE of the fundamental errors of most contemporary philosophic and scientific thought is the inability or, perhaps, unwillingness of man to realize that he is an evolving being and that his present apparatus for sensation, perception, and reasoning is quite unexplored, temporary and limited. How, therefore, is it possible for him to assume that he is capable of presenting a world-picture that is "objective and true"?

> We assume that logic is one, that our logic is something absolute, existing outside and independent of us, while as a matter of fact, logic but formulates the laws of the relations of our psyche to the outside world, or the law which our psyche discovers in the outside world. Another psyche will discover other laws.[1]

It is possible within our present approach to the world only to understand the relationships that exist therein. For given a certain level of consciousness, it is impossible to be aware of that which may exist outside of that consciousness. A dog cannot conceive of a man's world. It is unable to reason, unable to correct certain mistakes which must necessarily exist as a result of the manner in which it perceives. A very young child will look at the moon and believe that it is quite close. He has not yet corrected this impression by the use of experience combined with the ability to conceptualize. But is a dog able to correct this error? Or rather, will it see the moon as very close and menacing? Likewise, it is quite probable that the dog when moving toward objects feels that the objects themselves are actually in motion. For we have had this illusion many times, yet through the use of reason we are able to come to a different understanding of this phenomenon.

But can we be so impetuous as to assume that our present level of consciousness is total and able to give us ultimate insight into ourselves and the world?

When Heisenberg says—

> "In the beginning was the word"—the logos. To know this logos in all particulars and with a complete clarity with respect to the fundamental structure of matter is the task of present-day atomic physics and its unfortunately often complicated apparatus. It seems to me fascinating to think that there is today a struggle in the most diverse countries of the world and with the most powerful means at the disposal of modern technology to solve together problems posed two and a half millennia ago by the Greek philosophers and that we shall perhaps know the answer in a few years or at the latest in a decade or two.[2]

—it is obvious that underlying this prediction is the belief that man, his faculties for sensation, perception, and thought are complete both qualitatively and quantitatively. But is this the case? Is there any reason to suppose that man will not continue to evolve? The increasing interest among scientists, psychologists and philosophers in the field of extra-sensory perception should indicate that already man is confronted with a phenomenon which, though seeming strange or alien, may reveal new possibilities of approach to understanding of the world.

> . . . man as ego does not see nature at all. For man as ego is man identifying himself or his mind, his total awareness, with the narrowed and exclusive style of attention which we call consciousness.[3]

Thus it is apparent that man, in defining himself, assumes that within his consciousness, as he is presently aware of it, exist the only possibilities for knowing. Yet is not this assumption quite absurd?

Man cuts up his world into easily digested pieces, orders them according to a very specific logic, and then becomes so fascinated with both the pieces and the ordering that he assumes these constructs must exist "objectively" in nature. But

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[1] Ouspensky, *Tertium Organum.*

[2] Werner Heisenberg, *On Modern Physics* (pp. 27, 28)

[3] Alan Watts, *Nature, Man and Woman.*

the world is not made up of pieces, though man makes it appear that way.

We never fully realize the implications involved in the knowledge that other beings (animals, etc.) view the world quite differently from our mode of seeing. We seem to regard this difference as a necessary consequence of their "inferiority." But is it not quite possible that we too are inferior beings; that we too have only a fragmentary notion of the world . . . and of ourselves? We know so much concerning certain mathematical relationships that we are able to build bombs that are supposedly capable of "total destruction." But do we have any meaningful idea of what these bombs destroy?

Until we realize that our scientific and "common-sense" methods, and our logics are all valuable and necessary . . . but that they are entirely out of their own relative perspectives, we will be lost in a vast chimera of revolving circles, around a center of which we know nothing. We have assembled a fantastic amount of so called "facts and relationships" involving all sorts of things; but as to what these things are, as to what man himself is, we can learn nothing until we understand the obviously fractured manner in which we view ourselves and the universe. Then, perhaps, an effective and "objective" quest for knowledge can begin.

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