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THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAME OF MIND

FOR the most part, modern movements of reform see by a reflected light. That is, they obtain their energy from a reaction to bad situations, and their intellectual and moral justification from arguments against manifest wrong. Searching analysis of evil, you could say, is the characteristic of the age. Not all human enterprises, of course, have this quality. Technology and industry are manifestly affirmative undertakings, and technically quite "constructive." But the achievements of science and technology are today of foremost interest only in the slogans of politicians and the apologetics of ideological leaders. The thoughtful members of our society are mainly concerned with criticism.

This, it may be said, is inevitable in a civilization which is filled with philosophical doubts and uncertainties, yet is also a civilization where technical questions are easily settled by skillful use of a slide rule.

There is an obvious comment, often made, to the effect that it is not enough to be "negative." The comment is not only familiar but true. Being negative or critical is not enough to bring about constructive change. The fact is, however, that the capacity to be positive, these days, manifests most obviously in people who are either ingenuous or sectarian, or over-simplifying demagogues. Most of the intelligent, honest critics or reformers are negative all the way. We don't mean that they don't try to be positive, but that they are strong in criticism but weak in affirmative propositions. What is weakness in affirmative propositions?

The weakness is of three sorts. First, a proposal about what "ought to be done" may ignore what are called the "practical considerations." David Mitrany took cognizance of these considerations when he began his discussion of how to lead the modern world toward a more rational order of international relationships: "For us the question is how far the peoples are ripe for consent, and the answer must determine our line of action."

The second kind of weakness in affirmative proposals is evident in plans and programs which are so general in their positive content that no one grasps what is to be done as a beginning step; often this second weakness is combined with the first, which comes into evidence when reaching a goal depends upon persuading large numbers of other people to agree that the goal is desirable. The problem, here, is to make a great many others *feel* the evil which prompted the desire for reform in its chief protagonists. Reformers sometimes grow fanatical or turn into angry fascists or some other breed of totalitarian when their patience in waiting for the agreement of others runs out.

The third weakness appears in proposals which have little hope, actually, of doing much more than shifting around the factors which produce the evil men want to escape. These ideas represent the vain expectation of accomplishing basic changes by tinkering with the machine of modern society. You could go pretty far in analysis of this weakness. For example, one kind of profitless tinkering occurs when old-fashioned moralists insist that the best way to reduce juvenile delinquency is to make the home and the church more central in the lives of young people. It occurs, also, in Soviet Russia, where the commissars are posting in Moscow big signs which say "Parasites, Get Out," addressed to a lost generation of young people who, in Harrison Salisbury's New York *Times* series of articles about them (Feb. 5-9, 1962), sound a little like the opposite numbers of America's hipsters and the beat generation. Or, to move to another level, it is tinkering with the machine to try to change people's attitudes by transferring title to the

instruments of production from a number of large corporations to one big corporation—the State. The fallacy in this sort of "positive proposal" is that it represents an attempt to change men by manipulating the institutions which surround them. Reconstructing the institutions of society would naturally produce effects, but nothing more than some other kind of paternalistic rearrangement might accomplish. The old-style revolutionist who wants to collectivize society is a man who says to the people: Give me political power and I will change the pattern of your lives in a way that will make you happy and good. It won't work; not really. It may seem to work for a while, so long as people are actually engaged in the struggle for what they conceive to be an ideal, since this kind of activity has always made people happy and good, but at the heart of any of the modern industrial societies is an emptiness which people are bound to reach, sooner or later, and then the trouble comes.

We said that there are three sorts of weakness in the positive proposals of the time, but, looking back, the division now seems somewhat artificial. The simple fact is that we know more or less what we are against, but not what we are *for*. We may think we know how to explain what we are for, but seldom is there evidence of knowledge of the substance and implications of what we are for. We know or think we know, how we would like to *feel*, and we have some speculations concerning the circumstances or environment suited to having such feelings, but we don't really have solid understanding of where we want to go or how to get there.

That sets the problem, but it is too big a problem for useful discussion, here. We can narrow it down by taking a single facet of the struggle for constructive change. A little over two months ago, on March 3, an *ad hoc* committee of peace leaders in New York put on a demonstration in Times Square to protest the resumption of nuclear testing by the United States. According to the report in the *CNVA Bulletin* for March 16:

> Nearly 5,000 persons jammed the Times Square area at 4 p.m. in response to the call issued a week earlier "to support the President if he refuses to test and to protest if he decides to go ahead with the testing."
>
> The demonstrators formed a slow-moving picket-line three abreast, around the Square from 45th Street to 48th Street on Broadway and Seventh Avenue. Leaflets distributed at the scene announced that "everyone will gather on the traffic island in the middle of Duffy Square (the north end of Times Square)" at five p.m. where absolute silence was to be maintained for one-half hour.
>
> The crowd, forming the largest peace demonstration in New York City in many years, was composed mainly of younger people. Many mothers brought their children. Home-made signs were in evidence.
>
> The mood was somber though singing broke out during the march around the Square, with such songs as "We Shall Overcome" and "Study War No More" being the favorites.
>
> The demonstrators began walking to the Duffy Square island shortly before 5 p.m. Police blocked traffic on Seventh Avenue, adjoining the Square, to accommodate the crowd, when it became evident that the Square could not contain them. Many persons were unable to reach the island in time and remained on the sidewalks of Broadway and Seventh Avenue.
>
> The multitude on Duffy Square observed silence until 5:10, when the scene was turned into total chaos within a matter of seconds.
>
> The confusion was brought about when one demonstrator, Richard Bell, apparently fainted as he crossed Broadway to join the crowd. Two policemen stood over Bell, according to the closest eye-witness, and prodded him with their feet.
>
> This indelicate handling appeared to be police brutality to a group of persons behind police barricades nearest the scene. "They're kicking him . . . they're beating him," was the general vocal interpretation.
>
> "We felt moved by our friend's plight to commit civil disobedience rather than ignore cruel police tactics," said one of the sitdowners later in describing why a small group decided to join Bell in the street.

> About a dozen persons left the island and sat down in the middle of Broadway, forcing traffic to a halt. Scores of policemen, mounted and on foot, arrived immediately and began swinging their clubs.
>
> If police handling of Bell was not brutal, their treatment of the group sitting down certainly was. Most were clubbed; some punched. Arms were twisted—all were manhandled and cursed. Demonstrators were dragged to a waiting van and literally thrown in. . . .

A girl who was carried off in the police van said that three men in the van were unconscious from blows. One man was hospitalized with a broken rib and a punctured lung. While the New York Police Commissioner claimed to have evidence that "deliberate violations of the law were planned," and a Deputy Commissioner said that the police had been obliged to meet force with force, the demonstrators said that the sit-down had not been planned, but was a wholly spontaneous reaction to the apparent mistreatment of Richard Bell, and as for the claim of "force" on the part of the demonstrators, none of those arrested was charged with assaulting a police officer.

This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, when ardent reformers have come into conflict with the police, but what is some kind of a "first," in connection with this incident, is the discussion which followed in the pacifist press. In the same (March 16) issue of the *CNVA Bulletin* is an article by Bradford Lyttle, CNVA National Secretary, which is strongly critical of the Times Square demonstration. Under the title, "Why Scapegoat the Police?", Lyttle suggested that the leadership of the rally must accept some of the responsibility for the behavior of the police in Times Square. Arguing that the demonstration was planned without realistic anticipation of violence-tending tensions and without sufficient information being supplied to the participants, he said:

> . . . is it profitable for the peace movement to fix its attention on police brutality, to point at the police and say, "they are the villains"? I do not think so. The police may have been the "first to pull the trigger," but they had been placed in a situation where a violent reaction from them could be expected. Violence in the demonstration was the result of many factors, several of them serious errors in planning the rally. . . . The composition of the crowd made unpredictable behavior likely. When I first read the leaflet distributed to promote the demonstration (HISTORIC DECISION . . . MASS RALLY), I said it was the ultimate in political opportunism in the peace movement. Every factor had been manipulated to maximize the size of the rally and assure it publicity. Consider: The occasion for the rally was the resumption of atmospheric testing. No government policy related to peace has greater emotional power than this. It conjures a host of terrible visions: Hiroshima Maidens, the "Lucky Dragon," Strontium 90, still births, monstrous mutations, sterility, and nuclear war.
>
> Apart from atmospheric testing, the rally had no content. The issues that could have kept people home had been omitted. No mention was made of pacifism, nonviolence or world government. The topic of disarmament, with all its divisive concepts such as arms control, unilateral initiatives, and unilateral disarmament, was omitted. . . .
>
> If civil disobedience is planned or a tense situation with the authorities anticipated, all demonstrators should be instructed and trained as thoroughly as possible in nonviolence. Police should not be shouted or sworn at. Crowds should not close in on them. Every attempt should be made to establish human, sensitive communication with them.
>
> The police incline to be rough. Are you surprised? I'm not. The question is, how should we deal with this reality?
>
> I think we should do everything in our power to encourage them to be gentle. It is unintelligent to startle and frighten them, to exacerbate their hostile feelings, and to make them—in part—scapegoats for our mistakes.

Another writer in the *Bulletin* raised a question about the chanting of "shame" and "we want peace" by the demonstrators when the sit-downers were mishandled by the police. He remarked that from a distance chanting has an ominous sound, adding: "In a large demonstration especially, where police do not really know what to expect but are aware of the history of crowd brutality against them, it is unlikely they will be

able to differentiate between those who are and those who are not shouting at them."

You could call this radical or Gandhian self-criticism, but it needs further identification than this. Basically, it represents a deep awareness of the ends-means equation and, as this sort of thinking spreads, a wide abyss will open up between radical action flowing from such inspiration and the old sort of political demonstration which seeks only to "win" and to prove the total righteousness of its partisans.

For contrast there is a report of the same incident in the *National Guardian* (March 12), which said in one place:

> At 5:15 there was a slight break in the crowd and a group of young people sat down in the Broadway roadway at the 46th Street intersection. A murmur of excitement broke the silence. A police wagon drew up, and from all corners the cops descended on the sitters, who went limp. The murmur became a roar of protest.
>
> The cops tore and tugged at the sitters, prodded them with their clubs, gave them the knee, lifted girls off the ground by their hair till they screamed in agony. Four and five cops lifted each person and flung him head first into the wagons. When the sitters saw what was happening they stiffened to protect themselves. The cops bent them double and smashed them into the wagon. Often the bodies were in piles. Some heads struck benches in the wagon.
>
> The police were like savages. Moans came up from the island. Cries of "Shame, shame" sounded. This was a signal for the police to charge the crowds wedged in the island. They smashed into people with arms flailing and clubs flying. A few people raising their arms in self-defense were beaten brutally. . . .

Well, we weren't there and are not in a position to declare this report either inaccurate or even exaggerated, but the writer has certainly managed to create a fine Buchenwald-Auschwitz atmosphere with his emotion-charged words. There is no mention of Bell's collapse on the street (of which, it must be said, the *Guardian's* reporter may not have known), just a lip-licking account of a vicious cossack charge with not even an imagined provocation.

To keep the record straight, it should be added that the next (April 5) issue of the *CNVA Bulletin* contained some vigorous comment in behalf of the March 3 rally, including a well-reasoned defense of its leadership by David McReynolds and several letters from readers pursuing pros and cons. We shall not quote these communications since it seems far more important to call attention to the basic sense of responsibility which characterizes all the serious pacifists and nonviolent activists than to try to decide, three thousand miles away, who is "right" in this instance.

What we are talking about is a concept of man and what is good for man which is beginning to emerge on the modern scene from the turmoil of such situations. There is one central conviction in the ideas and methods of the nonviolent leaders and activists—the idea that while strivers for the good society in the Gandhian tradition may have opponents, or even "enemies," there can never be justification for devious or unjust action against them. Opinions may differ as to what is devious, unjust, or even "non-violent," but the principle stands and has the primary allegiance of these people.

What is this principle? It is an attitude of mind toward oneself and toward other human beings, which grows into a rule of ethical behavior and can be expanded into a functional definition of the good society. And at this point the non-violent movement transcends the diagnostic frame of mind and becomes fundamentally affirmative in its aims. Out of this affirmation come its growing moral strength and resources.

The liberal press now is filled with material which attempts to second-guess the next turn of world history. There are sagacious articles of what the spreading "polycentrism" of the Communist countries may mean for the future of the "free world." Other writers, looking down from heights of political sophistication, counsel the pacifists to learn more about the ways of the world and the techniques of affecting public

opinion. The old argument about whether to be pure or successful goes on continually. Now that pacifism is beginning to be recognized as an idea whose "time has come," the wheel-horses of liberal political action are showing a willingness to make *their* contribution, which in many cases means a somewhat impatient criticism of political naiveté among pacifists. Constructive help may come from some of these people, but the heart of the peace movement will always be its affirmative doctrine about the nature of man and the rules of behavior in interhuman relations which develop from this doctrine.

Actually, this key-idea is prior even to the Gandhian teaching of non-violence, since it is the *reason* for non-violence in behavior toward others.

We have one more approach to this general question—the limitations of "the diagnostic frame of mind"—to explore. You see a lot of books and articles, these days, which pay casual tribute to the simple life, admitting that "we'd all like it that way," but quickly going on to point out that advanced technology and the welfare state are upon us, so that, as practical men, we must figure how to make these mechanisms more subservient to the good of man. This gets the writers back into the blue-print room, where they and many of their readers feel more at home.

Some of these books are good. That is, they contain what seem sound counsels to the boards of directors of large corporations and other policy-makers in both industry and government. They say that the managers of our society must learn to think more deeply and behave more responsibly. The corporation executive will have to recognize the public-trust aspect of his company's activities. The real power in our society has shifted from the polls to the board room. Instead of feeling contempt for politics, a company president must recognize that he is practicing it every time he makes a decision that reaches out and influences or otherwise affects millions of people through the economic arteries he happens to control. Marketing experts must consult their consciences as well as last year's profit-and-loss statement when planning a sales campaign. And so on. The businessman is told, in effect, to sacrifice some of his efficiency for the sake of humanity—to split his drive and qualify his objectives.

Well, probably this will work for some people and to a certain degree. We have no doubt but that a conscientious researcher could spend a couple of years studying, say, twenty of the most forward-looking corporations of the United States and write a heartening report of some unsung heroes in business. But what we are after is an affirmative feeling about human beings which will in time entirely replace the notion that all those people out there are no more than "consumers." You don't attenuate a bad idea or try to control its more maniacal forms—you get rid of it. People consume, but they are not "consumers." People buy, but they are not just "customers." Modern acquisitive society is drunk on these abstractions, and catering to them is largely responsible for the enormous and debilitating complications of the productive and distributive scheme. The peonage of the people to the psychological dynamics of the acquisitive society and to the practices which implement those dynamics is not something that you change by institutional manipulation. What we endure results from the dialogue people hold with themselves about who they are and what they want. But the fact that our trouble comes, basically, from the flow of our common psychological life is not sufficient excuse to give up and run for the blue-print room for another cycle of tinkering with the machine. There is no affirmation in tinkering with the machine. The tinkering that we need can be better done and to better effect after we get a new spirit going in our lives. There is no harm in saying this, since the people with a yen and a talent for tinkering will do it anyway, and we are not really against tinkering, but only against the belief that it can lift us out of the ugly present without any fundamental changes in human attitude.

There are a few evidences that a fundamental change of this sort is not wholly impossible. The pacifists we have described are one instance of a change. The rather remarkable upsurge of interest in the arts and in creative activity of every sort is another. The rich fruit of current psychotherapeutic practice especially in the form of by-products appearing in poetry and literature generally—is another. The periodic revolts of the young represent an emancipation from old patterns of behavior that may find affirmative channels of expression in time. Many people—more, perhaps, than we realize—would be glad to undertake adventurous alternatives to their present way of life, if they could see what to do. The simple life is not a lost cause. The simple life is created by people who insist upon living simple lives. When enough of them do it, the institutions of society will conform soon enough, for that is how institutions keep on existing. They are no more than the shadow of the way people determine to live.

REVIEW
"THE MASKS OF GOD"—VOLUME II

THE work which Joseph Campbell began as a colleague of Heinrich Zimmer, and which flowered in one of the most remarkable works of our time *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*—receives detailed extension in his two volumes titled *The Masks of God.* The first of these, *Primitive Mythology* (MANAS, March 23, 1960), traced all mythology and religious symbolism to a prehistoric common cipher, and indicated that the essence of religion springs, not from revelation nor the presumed production of miracles as historical events, but from the essential structure of the human psyche. The current volume (Viking), dealing with oriental mythology, addresses itself to a comparison of the differing emphases which developed in the Occident and Orient as the universal language of mythology became diffused. Of particular interest to many MANAS readers should be Dr. Campbell's illustrations of the depths of insight to be found in many of the Eastern traditions. The opening paragraph of *The Masks of God: Oriental Mythology* illustrates the "timeless" mood which is typical of pre-Christian religious philosophy. Dr. Campbell writes:

> The myth of eternal return, which is still basic to Oriental life, displays an order of fixed forms that appear and reappear through all time. The daily round of the sun, the waning and waxing moon, the cycle of the year, and the rhythm of organic birth, death, and new birth, represent a miracle of continuous arising that is fundamental to the nature of the universe. We all know the archaic myth of the four ages of gold, silver, bronze, and iron, where the world is shown declining, growing ever worse. It will disintegrate presently in chaos, only to burst forth again, fresh as a flower, to recommence spontaneously the inevitable course. There never was a time when time was not. Nor will there be a time when this kaleidoscopic play of eternity in time will have ceased.

Historical Christianity found focus in an interpretation of deity which separates God from man—presumably establishing a mandatory pilgrimage through the trials of life until, after death, the Divine Life would finally be realized. Based upon a concept of a single unique historical event—the life of Jesus as the *only* begotten Son of God—this viewpoint is all but incomprehensible in the Orient. Dr. Campbell explains why. In the Christian tradition, "God is beheld only by the dead. The goal of knowledge has to be, rather, to know the *relationship* of God to his creation, or, more specifically, to man, and through such knowledge, by God's grace, to link one's own will back to that of the Creator." He continues:

> Moreover, according to the biblical version of this myth, it was only after creation that man fell, whereas in the Indian example creation itself was a fall—the fragmentation of a god. And the god is not condemned. Rather, his creation, his "pouring forth" is described as an act of voluntary, dynamic will-to-be-more, which anteceded creation and has, therefore a metaphysical, symbolical, not literal, historical meaning. The fall of Adam and Eve was an event within the already created frame of time and space, an accident that should not have taken place. The myth of the Self in the form of a man on the other hand, who looked around and saw nothing but himself, said "I," felt fear, and then desired to be two, tells of an intrinsic, not errant, factor in the manifold of being the correction or undoing of which would not improve, but disable, creation. The Indian point of view is metaphysical, poetical; the biblical, ethical and historical.

The difference between Eastern and Western religions, then, is the difference between assumptions and a protean metaphysics always capable of expansion and refinement. In the religion of India, for example, there is no separation of divinity from human life—or, for that matter, from any form of life at all. Dr. Campbell offers what seems a perceptive justification of the doctrine of "Maya":

> In the Indian view, what is divine here is divine there also; nor has anyone to wait—or even to hope—for a "day of the Lord." For what has been lost is in each his very self (*atman*), here and now, requiring only to be sought.
>
> The question arises (again historical) in the world dominated by the Bible, as to the identity of the

> favored community and three are well known to have developed claims, the Jewish, the Christian, and the Moslem, each supposing itself to have been authorized by a particular revelation. God, that is to say, though conceived as outside of history and not himself in its substance (transcendent: not immanent), is supposed to have engaged himself miraculously in the enterprise of restoring fallen man through a covenant, sacrament, or revealed book with a view to a general, communal experience of fulfillment yet to come. The world is corrupt and man a sinner; the individual, however, through engagement along with God in the destiny of the only authorized community, participates in the coming glory of the kingdom of righteousness.
>
> In the experience and vision of India, although the holy mystery and power have been understood to be indeed transcendent ("other than the known; moreover, above the unknown"), they are also, at the same time, immanent ("like a razor in a razorcase, like fire in tinder"). It is not that the divine is every*where*: it is that the divine is every*thing*. So that one does not require any outside reference, revelation, sacrament, or authorized community to return to it. One has but to alter one's psychological orientation and recognize (recognize) what is within. Deprived of this recognition, we are removed from our own reality by a cerebral shortsightedness which is called in Sanskrit *maya*, "delusion."

Another way of pointing up the East-West contrast is suggested by Campbell's examination of the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine concerning the Bodhisattvas. The Bodhisattva is one who, having as a Buddha passed beyond the delusions of *maya*, is able to incarnate deliberately without confusion in earthly experience. Instead of one historical Christ, then, we are presented with a "Christ of a thousand faces," a thousand Christs who have not so much passed beyond the domain of earthly experience as entered into it more completely, more knowingly, fully "autonomous," yet fully in harmony with the natural laws of soul evolution, so that they are incapable of inharmonious action. Here is an excellent example of how a religion may through its symbols be essentially philosophical—in which even the priests play a symbolic rather than an authoritarian role. From a chapter on Buddhist India:

> In the Mahayana, in spite of the fact that a reverence for the monk, the arhat, and the Buddha remains characteristic to the end, a powerful, ever growing theme developed of world wonder and affirmation, symbolized by the image of the Bodhisattva. For whereas the Hinayana represents the mystery of nirvana from the point of view of the normal dualistic thought of the world, where it is supposed that there is a difference between the vicissitudes of the cycle and the peace of eternal liberation, the Mahayana sees the world from the point of view of the realized void, eternity itself, and knows that to experience a distinction between the peace of that void and the tumult of this world, non-being and being, is to remain deluded by the dualistic categories of sense.

This is a book for the cultural anthropologists, as was Campbell's *Primitive Mythology*. Both volumes of *The Masks of God* amount to important appendices to themes which received clear psychological and philosophical expression in *The Hero with a Thousand Faces.*

COMMENTARY
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

WE have received a small piece of paper on which the following short message appears:

> The one contribution I can make to help spread the interest in peace efforts is this:
>
> I have professional 16-mm movie equipment and can shoot excellent footage for any group desiring to promote peace in that manner.
>
> If you will furnish film and gas for my small car, I'll take care of the rest.
>
> If interested—write; maybe we can get together.
>
> LOWELL NAEVE
> South Woodstock, Vermont
>
> P.S. I recently finished shooting the Student Turn-Toward-Peace demonstration in Washington, D.C. This footage will be used in two films—one soon to be available.

TOWARD CHRISTMAS ISLAND

CNVA (Committee for Non-Violent Action) has opened a northern California office at 2120 Market Street, San Francisco 14. Members of the Committee there are working on completion of a trimaran (a three-hulled catamaran) which, after trial runs, may be used to sail into the Christmas Island nuclear testing area in a protest similar to that of the *Golden Rule* and the *Phoenix.* The trimaran is being built by Robert Swann, under the general supervision of Albert Bigelow, who captained the *Golden Rule.* Ed Lazar, recently in the Los Angeles area, has joined this project. The crew for the trans-Pacific voyage—of from three to five men—is not yet selected and may include persons from other countries to give the protest an international character. Trimarans are low-cost, hardy craft which have recently been successful in ocean-going passages under severe weather conditions. They are extremely fast, remarkably stable, and easy to build. In appearance they resemble the double outrigger vessels used in the South Seas for centuries. (In New Guinea catamarans of three or more logs lashed together with rattan are the commonest vessel, and similar forms appear on the Madras Coast and throughout the Asiatic islands. "Catamaran" is made of two Tamil words: *kattu*, to tie, and *maram*, tree.) Financial support is needed for this project.

STAR ISLAND CONFERENCE

Some interesting papers may be expected to result from the ninth annual summer conference of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, scheduled to be held from July 21 to July 28 on Star Island, off Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The subject chosen for the conference is "The Purpose of Life: its nature and validity as seen from the viewpoints of science and religion." Speakers will include some eminent scientists and religionists. Inquiries concerning attendance may be addressed to the Institute at 280 Newton Street, Brookline 46, Mass. Our difficulty with symposia of this sort is that they are usually conducted and participated in by members of the Establishment, which results in far too cautious and polite goings-on. But it seems likely that some worth-while things will be said at this gathering.

LATIN-AMERICAN "REALITY"

A reader has sent us a paper by Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero, M.D., a practicing psychiatrist of Mexico City, which we missed reading in *Etc.* for the Winter of 1959. It concerns the differences in attitudes of mind and ideas of "reality" between cultural groups and is worth reading. Dr. Diaz begins:

> It is amazing how often psychotherapists will say to their patients, "The main problem is that you do not face reality." This statement of the patient's problem would seem simple and self-evident. The unspoken assumption, however, is that there is a "reality" which everyone can get to know, and that the task of psychotherapy is to help the patient first to see, then to face, this "reality."

Dr. Diaz's point is that peoples differ in their feelings about "reality." The Westerner has an objective, "out there" notion of reality—external and physical. The Mexican, however, is less concerned with what is "out there" than he is with the "interpersonal reality" of human relations.

Unlike *Norteamericanos,* who undertake to *change* the outside reality by conquest and skill, Latin Americans, he says, "take a more fatalistic attitude towards nature and feel subjugated by it." The Mexicans, he notes, "have done little to put external reality under their control."

On the other hand, they believe that people *create* the salient qualities of interpersonal reality:

> Ask a Mexican for street directions. He will often go into a complex series of explanations and gestures, frequently grinning; he will make you *feel* good. But you may get nowhere with his directions! Simply because he cannot answer your question, the Mexican would never let the *real thing,* the pleasant interpersonal encounter, go to waste. A definition of such a concept of interpersonal reality as found among Mexicans might go like this: "The degree of reality of an interpersonal situation lies in the frequency, quality, and warmth of interpersonal relations that can be achieved in a given period of time." Such reactions are spontaneous and are more like choices than conventional responses. . . .
>
> This concept of interpersonal reality is extremely suggestive for marital relations. Here the degree of "truth" in statements made between man and wife should not be measured in terms of their correspondence to external reality, but in terms of how well they help the couple to get along. The verbal interchanges in marriage are not to be evaluated in terms of map-territory relationships, as if they were statements made at a conference of physicists, but rather in terms of their utility in creating and re-creating the on-going relationship. This is not to advocate a complete break with external reality, but to say that there is something more important than being objectively "right" in domestic controversies.

This is a good illustration of the values in understanding other cultures than our own. Related material by Dr. Diaz appears in *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* for July, 1961, under the heading of Culture and Child Development.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

EDUCATION TRANSCENDING SAVAGERY

A READER who was particularly appreciative of our discussion of Howard Fast's *The Edge of Tomorrow,* has strongly recommended a pocket book, *Born Free,* by Joy Adamson. The Fast story attempted to establish the fact that but a small part of human potentiality is encouraged in the present cultural milieu—that unnecessary limitations of "personality" have been hardened. *Born Free* is the story of an African lioness, raised, free of captivity, by Mrs. Adamson and her African gamekeeper husband. The book has become a sort of documentary in the comparatively new science of animal behavior called "ethology." What the Adamsons established—though they were not seeking to prove anything in their care and raising of the young lioness—is that even this feared and savage beast could respond to humans with consistent understanding and affection.

A preface to *Born Free,* by William Percy, explains why this book is much more than the usual animal story, why issues of psychology and philosophy are involved. Mr. Percy writes:

> The history of the lioness Elsa, reared from earliest infancy to three years old and finally returned to a wild life, forms a unique and illuminating study in animal psychology—a subject to which the last half-century has seen a wholly new approach. Partly, no doubt, in revolt against the tendency of nineteenth-century writers to attribute to animals anthropomorphic qualities of intelligence, sentiment, and emotion, the twentieth century has seen the development of a school of thought according to which the springs of animal behavior are to be sought in terms of "conditioned reflexes," "release mechanisms," and the rest of a wholly new vocabulary which is regarded as the gateway to a clearer understanding of animal psychology. To another way of thinking, which cannot reconcile that mechanical conception with the diverse character intelligence, and capabilities exhibited by different individuals of the same species, that gateway to understanding seems as far removed from truth as the anthropomorphism of a previous generation, and more apt to raise a further barrier to a sympathetic understanding of animal behavior than a revelation of it.
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> To whatever way of thinking the reader of Elsa's history may lean, it provides a record of absorbing interest depicting the gradual development of a controlled character which few would have credited as possible in the case of an animal potentially as dangerous as any in the world. That such a creature when in a highly excited state, with her blood up after a long struggle with a bull buffalo, and while still on top of it, should have permitted a man to walk up to her and cut the dying beast's throat to satisfy his religious scruples, and then lend her assistance in pulling the carcass out of a river, is an astonishing tribute no less to her intelligence than to her self-control.
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> If the most fanciful author of animal stories of the nineteenth century had drawn the imaginary character of a lioness acting in that manner it would assuredly have been ridiculed as altogether "out of character" and too improbable to carry conviction—and yet Elsa's record shows that it is no more than sober fact.
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> If in her development Elsa has made her own commentary both on the "anthropomorphism" of the nineteenth century and on the "science" of the twentieth, she has not lived in vain.

A sequel to *Born Free* by Mrs. Adamson, called *Living Free* (Harcourt, Brace & World), contains an introduction by one of the world's most noted biologists, Sir Julian Huxley. Dr. Huxley speaks of "the wealth of potentialities in higher mammals, waiting to be drawn out and elicited into actuality," and indicates how, if "intelligent involvement" can achieve such a remarkable alteration in response among animals, we may also believe that even the most confirmed savagery in human beings can be radically transformed. The Adamson story, in other words, demonstrates that what Sir Julian calls "understanding love" can bridge even the gap between species. Dr. Huxley continues:

> This, I think, is important. It is important for the progress of science. It means that in the young science of animal behavior (or ethology, as it is now called), the investigator will only obtain his most

> valuable results by supplementing his scientific objectivity with an understanding and even affectionate approach to the animals with which he is working. This applies with special force to any attempts to discover the extent of unrealized possibilities latent in his animal subjects. It is important for animal trainers and zoo keepers and officials: the porpoises at Marineland will not stand for a cross word, let alone punishment: the great apes have a deep need for some sort of personal relationship with their keepers, and even such an apparently lethargic character as the giant panda responds to an intimate approach. It is important for human education, as progressive educationalists have long discovered; and for all attempts at contact between hostile or mutually suspicious groups of people, as the modern world is beginning to find out. Patience and understanding, backed by friendliness and a spirit of love, could be as effective here as they were with Elsa.

Born Free is available for 75 cents (Hillman/Macfadden) and suggests itself as an unforgettable tale for children. Elsa, the lioness, was encouraged to live in both her natural habitat and with the Adamsons, and gradually, for herself, worked out the means by which she could do both without sacrificing either the values of free life in the jungle or the values she seemed to sense in her contact with human beings. Elsa learned to make her own kills, took a mate and bore cubs, but preserved without break her relationship with the Adamsons. A paragraph from one of the early chapters of *Born Free* suggests an intriguing parallel between the psychological ingredients of good animal education and good human education. Mrs. Adamson writes:

> To feel that we were responsible for such a proud, intelligent animal, who had no other living creature to satisfy her strongly developed need for affection and her gregarious instincts, attached us all the more deeply to her. Sometimes, it is true, she was unwittingly a nuisance; for instance, because we could not leave her in care of anyone else, we became to some extent her prisoners, but she gave us so much in return for these small sacrifices. The difference between her actions and ours came only from her natural characteristics intended to be developed and used in the normal life of a wild lion. It was very touching to watch her trying to control the strong forces within her and to adapt herself to our way of life to please us. Her good-natured temperament was certainly due in part to her character, but part too may have come from the fact that neither force nor frustration was ever used to adapt her to our way of life. For we tried by kindness alone to help her to overcome the differences that lie between our two worlds.

FRONTIERS

The Rebirth of Ancient Science

LOGIC (systematic induction and deduction), and controlled experimentation mathematically implemented, and all of observation, as in astronomy, which can be brought within and extended by mathematical formulae, are methods of science and parts of the genius of science. The reach of these methods and this particular genius is wide indeed, but not as wide as existence—not as wide as the intended reach of science. Biology is commencing to know the restrictedness of these concepts and methods and this particular genius; psychology fully knows the restrictedness. What follows will try to make specific this extremely generalized statement. But first, a different proposition is offered. It is that science is more ancient by vast aeons than the world-view and the methods which date from Bacon, Galileo, Newton, Descartes, Einstein: not the mere groping or dreaming of the human mind toward science, but the effective possession and utilization of science, almost or actually back to the human dawn.

Consider but one of the world-wide examples—the boat-building and navigation of the Polynesians. Robert G. Suggs says in *The Island Civilizations of Polynesia:* "The migrations of the Polynesians [were] among the greatest achievements of the human species. The technical problems that had to be surmounted . . . were of an appalling magnitude. . . . The actors in this drama were possessed of amazing maritime ability. . . . [They navigated thousands of miles to colonize unpopulated islands, and with them journeyed their domestic animals and the plants they had domesticated] across open water in mat-sailed wooden canoes held together by pegs and cord, and without benefit of any navigational aids beside the naked eye and their own empirically derived knowledge." Their technology was extraordinary and was wedded with beauty and borne upon ritual magic. They possessed no mathematics and apparently had no written language; their technologies (from canoe-building to oceanography and astronomy) and their mystical powers inseparable from the technologies were transmitted across millennia by face-to-face instruction alone.

Polynesian science was one complex among thousands of such developments. Consider the creation of maize[1] by ancient Indians; the technological and ecological achievements, unapproached to our own day, of the pre-Columbian Andes[2]; the ecological perfection of Hopi Indian farming in the present; or the science of the hunt and the techniques of the shaping of the hunting bow, as revealed by Ishi, "the last wild Indian," as told by Theodora Kroeber in her priceless current book, *Ishi in Two Worlds.*

Not only technological science, but social science and psychological science are very ancient among humankind. Here can be made only brief reference to the institutional elaborations of mutual aid; to the profoundly effective systems of education among all the pre-literate ancients; to the psychotherapy, as yet unapproached in our modern world, of the Navajo healing sing—its healing of the individual through his help in healing the community, within a mytho-symbolic wealth which our modern Western life cannot have.

There used to be discussion: Was "primitive" magic the beginning of science or the beginning of religion? Functional anthropology answers out of nearly every continent and island: Magic *was* science—mature science; and it was mature religion.

The epoch of Descartes, reducing life and mind to physical automation, banished from acknowledgment any region of experience which the knowing of physical cause and effect or of their sequences, and mathematical quantification, could not cope with; whence, the lateness of the emergence of modern biology, and the more delayed lateness of psychology; thus was felt the Cartesian neglect of the unconscious or subliminal mind and of the facts of what is now called

parapsychology, and of human culture conceived as field or organism. The huge and world-imperilling capacities of physical science are now seen (with the Cartesian epoch behind us) as only one among science's capacities—capacities a half-million or a million years old.

With the Cartesian dogma outlived, purposiveness and directiveness in organic existence, and even directiveness in the cosmos (as urged by A. N. Whitehead) can be recognized as problems of science and not solely those of philosophy. Thus the circle is rounded, and ancient science has come again into its own. Science is multidimensional once more, and permanently so, and the horizon of intellect joined with intuition is pushed back toward infinitude; man is made anew his own brother and brother to the world.

Taos, New Mexico

JOHN COLLIER

[1] *Maize. "*Of all grains, is the most completely domesticated, being the only one that cannot sow itself or take care of itself. It must be husked shelled, planted, cultivated, usually fertilized, sometimes irrigated, and finally harvested. . . . Maize, which antedated the oldest of the civilizations that grew up in Mexico, Central America and South America, was the most difficult and one of the most fundamental agricultural creations. Without it, these cultures and civilizations could not have come into existence. . . . If one stops to consider what all of these crops (numbering about fifty species), and the development of maize especially, testifies to of discriminative perception, of experimentation, of continuity of applications through seasons, through generations and ages," then one starts to realize how much older by æons is science than the Greek epoch or the Cartesian epoch. (The quotation is from my *Indians of the Americas.)*

[2] The ancient Andean Indians possessed no written language (only the *quipu,* an aid to memory and to communication and to statistical recording). They possessed no mathematics beyond simple arithmetic. Yet they built the vast irrigation systems of coastal Peru, the agricultural terraces reaching to the snow-lines, systems of roads and of communication along thousands of miles of roads, systems of the intensive use of soils which did not exhaust but continually enriched the soils; arts and crafts exceeded in beauty by none others in history or the present, and in the Incaic, terminal period, they achieved a socialistic governance which in its humaneness, considerateness of each human being, and productivity with the minimum of demands on each individual, has not yet been approached again in the world. "The Inca system was not directed toward exploiting tribute from conquered peoples, but rather was an attempt" (a successful attempt) "to build up a well-integrated economic organization." (Wendell Bennett, in Vol. II, *Handbook of South American Indians.*) In the present, to quote John Howland Rowe in the *Handbook of South American Indians,* "The Inca are a 'nation' in the sense of being a group (the six million speakers of *Quechqua* and *Aymara* in the modern republics of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) which shares a feeling of solidarity and a belief in a common culture, and which regards its language as the symbol of its separate existence. No political organization (in the present) of any kind is implied, for the Inca nation exists without any national movement, without parties and without a separate voice in any government. The feeling of solidarity . . . is a direct result of the unifying policies of Pachacuti Topa Inca, and its existence in the modern world is their justification, their glory and their fitting monument." See also "The Realm of the Incas" in my *Indians of the Americas.*