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CONCERNING DIALOGU ES

LAST year, in a lecture given for the Earl Warren Institute of Ethics and Human Relations, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas spoke at length of the withdrawal of the American people from anything like responsible participation in a public dialogue concerning national policy. "Why," he asked, "has silence overtaken us?"

His questions continued:

> Is foreign policy—the key to life and death for all forms of life in this nuclear age—beyond the bounds of debate? If so, how can we, the people, ever free ourselves from military domination and assert our sovereign civilian prerogative over all affairs of state—over war as well as over peace?

Mr. Douglas made some answers. They draw attention to industry's fear of controversy, to the careful conformity of organization men, to the unwillingness of money-makers to be distracted from their acquisitive devotions, and to the eager compliance of manufacturers whose prosperity depends upon government contracts. These, you might say, amount to a circumstantial account of the failure of Americans to debate the issues of the day. Here, we should like to add some further explanation. One obvious point is that the people do not *feel* the import of these issues. Except for the moment of crisis over the Soviet missiles in Cuba—which brought the paralysis of fearful horror rather than stirring debate—the effects of national policy reach the general public only in the form of increased taxation. Life is getting difficult. The small businessman can no longer get capital for expansion out of earnings. Manipulators of the law rather than producers of goods earn the big rewards. The common citizen has a hard time relating his various discomforts to the Berlin wall or the puzzling events in South Vietnam. And we have, as Justice Douglas says, "a press which with few exceptions gives no true account of forces at work in the world."

This is a way of concluding that, for the average man, there are really no issues he can have a dialogue about. All the big problems are in the hands of specialists. The average man, after all, has competence only to discuss moral problems, and the important moral issues, it seems to him, were either settled long ago or are completely beyond his control.

The big moral issue of the relation of the individual to society was settled by revolutionary action a couple of hundred years ago. The common man accepts and approves this settlement every time he uses or assents to the current expression; "Free World." These words indicate that the essential structure of the good society exists and that it should be preserved. Doubtless there are ways of improving it, but the basic achievement took place in the past. If someone asserts that the world needs a further revolution, this "average man" is likely to wonder what for. He may feel apprehensions about present international disorders, and wish "things were different," but he has no measured judgment about steps that might be taken to make them different. He believes that the elected and appointed officials in Washington are doing the best they can in a difficult situation, and he has a tired disgust for the people in other countries who don't seem able to settle down and work for what they want without giving us so much trouble.

Of the larger world objectives on which all agree as a matter of course, such as getting rid of poverty, disease, and war, he has more expectation of ultimate success in erasing the first two ills. Science, he thinks, through progress in technology and medicine, can probably make everybody well-fed and healthy, but putting an end to war is different. A certain hardheadedness, based on experience, here enters his thinking. "Some day, maybe," he will say, with a faraway

look in his eye, but he is reluctant to discuss the end of war as a practical possibility.

A further explanation of the absence of a dialogue about national affairs arises from the fact that we live in an age of experts. An expert is a man who has acquainted himself in some detail with a particular area of the finite universe. He has made it his business to know as much as he can about the behavior and dynamics of some limited and controllable reality. To clarify what he is doing and to give his judgments certainty, he eliminates all incommensurables from his calculations. Like some lawyers, he will make grudging acknowledgement of "moral" considerations, but he hastens to add that such factors cannot be related to his field of operations; or, if they are to appear, he will insist that they be fed into the picture in fixed and finite segments which he is able to control. You can't exactly blame the expert for this attitude. When he went to school, he didn't take his courses in engineering, economics, or management as subdivisions in philosophy. And he wasn't hired for his moral sensibility, but for his specialized knowledge of the mechanisms over whose operation he now presides.

Actually, an expert who lets "morals" enter into his calculations—or, what is worse, his public declarations—is regarded by most of his colleagues as having broken the union rules. He commits the unpardonable offense of thinking and talking like a human being. This was the crime of Robert Oppenheimer, who had the bad taste to allow his conscience as a man to affect his counsels as a technician. He was severely punished by public censure, and unfrocked as a patriot scientist, although he never lost the respect of those who live in the shadowland of whole human beings—that universe of moral discourse which a substantial number of people carry about in their heads. Linus Pauling is another expert who stepped out of line and has lately found refuge in Robin Hutchins' Sherwood Forest at Santa Barbara, where study of the public applications of morality need not be a clandestine enterprise.

Is there, then, no dialogue at all? There is speech, and a species of communication, but it takes place almost entirely among the experts themselves. The common citizen may occasionally get a letter published in the newspapers, or he may, in the role of a "fanatic," harangue some outré group, but such debate as there is about arms and men, today, is conducted according to ground rules made by experts who insist that the discussion proceed without any intrusions of moral emotion. The experts are not against manageable morality, but they refuse to tolerate uncalibrated bursts which play havoc with their theories of calculated risk.

How did the argument about national policy get restricted in this way? The answer seems fairly simple. In our time, diplomacy, which is the operative end of policy, has become virtually a paramilitary function. Military force has always been a background reality in diplomacy, but until recently its use has been a fairly simple matter. If you wanted to add gravity to a diplomatic warning, you sent a battleship on maneuvers in a certain sea, or increased the garrison on a strategic frontier. But now that nuclear science has raised the military capacity to destroy almost to infinity, a new vocabulary of threatening gestures is required, and the guardians of national security feel the need of psychologists as well as atomic scientists. The atomic scientists are building the weapons, but there remains the problem of how to rattle them to the best effect. You could say that the national defense now necessitates motivation analysis, not of men, but of *States*. You could say that the problem is now one of deciding how to point the nuclear guns to get the desired result without pulling any triggers. To argue such questions, you need a lot of brainy men. We have them, of course, and these are the men who now monopolize the dialogue about policy in the United States. It seems only a slight exaggeration to say that in this dialogue the "last

resort" of arms has become the only resort of thinking about policy. Even arguments for disarmament are still arguments about arms, in anticipation of the effect of having less of them, or none at all. If you want to talk about policy, you have to talk about arms. If you talk about anything else, no one, or almost no one, will hear what you say.

This point needs further discussion, and explanation or qualification; but first, to give the discussion more substance, let us look at a recent book, *The Arms Debate*, by Robert A. Levine, published this year by the Harvard University Press ($6.50). The purpose of this book is to summarize the various stances from which the arms policy of the United States is argued. The "values" of the debaters are taken as given, and as determining the various positions. What is critically examined is the logic of each position in relation to the ends proposed. These ends, it should be noted, are not always the same. One group subordinates all other hopes to the prevention of war. Another group is interested almost exclusively in the total defeat of Communism. Mr. Levine does not analyze these ends, or how they are grounded in individual conviction, on the plea that it is not his purpose to "psychoanalyze" the contestants in the debate. He has abstracted five viewpoints from the total clamor, and he says that these five have enough distinctive differences to justify his classification. He is probably right in this.

The spectrum of Mr. Levine's analysis ranges from the extreme anti-war position to the extreme anti-Communist position, a large middle ground being occupied by those whose recommendations attempt to encompass both objectives. Then, because of the differing ways in which people think about policies and proposed changes, he applies another mode of classification: there are the *systemists* and the *marginalists*. The author explains:

> . . . recommendations can be either marginal or *systemic*. Marginal recommendations are for small incremental changes in existing processes and mechanisms, while systemic ones are for large variations affecting entire systems. The common political term for those who recommend changes in whole systems is "radical," an adjective which, like "systemic," can be applied to those favoring drastic moves to the political right as well as to the left.

To fill out the meanings of these terms, we might say that the marginalists are the empiricists or the pragmatists of the arms debate, while the systemists are the big thinkers and metaphysicians. The marginalists are willing to tinker with the machine, while the systemists want a new model which operates on different principles.

Usually, the marginalists think the systemists tend to be some kind of nut, while the systemists think the marginalists will never really get off the ground. Another way of generalizing these differences in approach would be to recall Isaiah Berlin's analysis of Tolstoy's thinking. Tolstoy's mind, Berlin points out, was an arena of struggle between systemism and marginalism—or between the One Big Truth he felt *ought* to prevail and all the stubby little contradictory truths or facts he saw as a conscientious and acute observer of the field of experience. Tolstoy's various resolutions of this basic conflict took form from his art. His honesty permitted no easy solutions, while his insight brought enriching subtlety to accounts of the human struggle.

No attempt is made here to do justice to Mr. Levine's book, which assimilates an enormous amount of material to general conclusions which seem carefully and accurately drawn. We refer to it mainly in order to borrow his technique of analysis and to use it for other purposes. The motivation analysis of nation-states—which, it seems to us, is what the arms debate is really about—affords only a narrow band of possibilities. The best you can hope for is to reach some tentative judgments as to what nation-states can be expected to do when they are threatened, or not threatened, by nuclear destruction. Why do the experts want to make these judgments? Because we *have* the tools of nuclear destruction;

they are what has been evolved as means of dealing with nation-states. And the assumption is that there is no way to meet the problems before us except in terms of the encounter of nation-state with nation-state.

This assumption need not be granted. It can lead, we may argue, only to the unsolvable dilemmas of the present, and to the sort of argument about policy in which only technicians can participate. To rest content with such solutions is both democratically and humanly unsound. Citizens who accept this assumption will forever be in the position of having to submit to the sudden switches of top secret policy and to the decisions of those whose training enables them to "know best" what to do. Under the control of this assumption, political self-determination of the people in the matter of war and peace becomes a farce.

One obvious comment on this view would be that the extreme difficulties of the "real situation" ought not to be made an excuse for evading the issues it presents. The experts, after all, are conscientious men who bear heavy burdens in behalf of the general populace. Some elements of democratic decision-making might be preserved if the lay public would at least try to follow the reasoning which goes on in the arms debate.

There is little point in meeting this judgment with a counter-generalization. What is wanted is not an excuse for our inadequacy in arguing a nuclear weapons policy for the nation-state, but an alternative field of action.

Let us go back to one of Mr. Levine's categories among the arms debaters—the "systemists." At one end of the scale of systemists are the pacifists who come out for unilateral disarmament. At the other are the embattled anti-Communists, who insist upon total defeat of the Communist forces and removal of their form of political organization from the face of the earth. These extremes, we might say, are distinguished by the fact that the meaning of the values of the anti-war group is least apparent at the level of the arms debate, while the anti-Communist values have their peak validity here. From the viewpoint of the function of the military, the believers in disarmament take a totally negative position; for them, "the good" can hardly begin to come into being except as war is eliminated. They conceive the objective of a worth-while future as being possible only in a warless world, which obliges them, in the eyes of their critics, to spell out their values in what seem wholly utopian terms. These values are founded on conceptions of human life which tend to be non-political, ethical, "organic," and related to ends which are realized through cooperative, non-coercive means.

There are two ways in which the unilateralist position may be reached. One is by *a priori* conviction that it is wrong to kill, and that no good can come from killing, *per se.* This view arises from the Hindu doctrine of *ahimsa,* or harmlessness, the New Testament basis of pacifism, or some such deeply-grounded philosophy of life. It would be folly, of course, to attempt to assimilate the thinking of all advocates of unilateral disarmament to one Big *a priori* View, but it can hardly be wrong to say that so far-reaching a position must involve *some* Big View which is strongly held. And it follows that this view involves the preservation and furtherance of values which do not depend, *ultimately,* upon the survival of nation-states in their present form.

The second way of reaching the unilateralist position involves reasoning from historical experience. In this case the argument is that there is no hope of gaining a peaceful world unless there is a clean break with reliance on war as a "last resort." It is that there will be no *serious* attempt to reconcile the differences among the nations so long as the military solution remains as an alternative. Much depends, here, on what is held to be the meaning of "peace." If, for example, it is argued that the tense conditions of the Cold War are a species of peace, at least tolerable, if not desirable, then the unilateralist argument from

history cannot be impressive. But if, on the other hand, peace is understood as the free flow of intercourse among people of all origins, regardless of national barriers, giving the rich cross-fertilization of cultural interchange, with interest and pleasure, instead of fear, inspired by differences in traditions, manners, customs, and beliefs, then this unilateralist argument deserves attention.

There is of course an element of desperation in the background of the historical argument for unilateralism. The ranks of the unilateralists are swelled by people who have recently become convinced that, should nuclear war break out, the human race may never have another chance to work toward the conditions of peace. They say, in effect, that we can no longer afford any sort of "experiment" with the weapons of war. War with nuclear weapons is too hazardous, and the controls are insufficient. The historically convinced unilateralist may indeed participate in the arms debate, but his contribution can hardly be more than a monotonous repetition of his conviction that the military solution "won't work." What he says, therefore, is not of much interest to actual policy-makers, since the possible use of arms, either in military action, or restrained to a threat in psychological warfare, is just about all they are thinking about, these days.

It also ought to be noted that Big View unilateralists sometimes feel that they should at least simulate attention to rationalist or historical arguments against the use of military means, and this concession to their opponents—mainly because it *is* a concession, and not an authentic psychological need—may cause them to jump from superficial analysis to grand generalizations. This is a fault, but perhaps a forgivable one. The tendency to jump to conclusions is not uniquely a unilateralist failing.

Conceivably, the soundest argument for unilateralism is the claim that there is no other way to get another *kind* of dialogue going. It can be argued that there is obviously a morbid fascination exercised by nuclear weapons. In evidence of this it can be pointed out that the arms debate is practically indistinguishable, today, from anything that might be termed a foreign policy debate; or at least, foreign policy decisions are locked in position with decisions about the availability and possible use of arms.

The decision for unilateralism, which is heard simply as an uncompromising "No!" in the arena of the arms debate, stretches back into the lives of people who have deeply rooted convictions about human good and how it is obtained—and how it may be irrecoverably lost. They have beliefs, expectations, and hopes which, only a few years ago, were regarded as natural for all men of intelligence and good will, but are now disposed of casually as "utopian" or "unrealistic." These ideas and ideals have not changed. What has changed is the time-table of human necessity; we need a warless world sooner, not later. In the view of the unilateralists, we need it *now.*

There is a sense, however, in which the unilateralists—most of them, at any rate are not unilateralists at all. That is, they have no wish to take weapons away from men who want to use them or who would feel betrayed without them. Unilateralism is the position taken in an arms debate by people who are trying to make themselves into representatives of genuine peace-making. Unilateralism, in the context of arguments about the use of arms, is only a "token" of the unilateralist's views, which could be extended and elaborated in many directions in an entirely different dialogue.

What is at issue for the unilateralist—or *some* unilateralists—is the possibility (often felt to be a certainty) that the human race has made some grave missteps in the cultural forms it has designed for self-development and the general welfare. This argument starts out, by reason of the immeasurable destruction and disorder implicit in nuclear weapons, by pointing to the not merely anti-enemy but basically anti-human consequences of their use. This phase of the argument hopes to

produce a "shock-of-recognition" sort of impact, and, indeed, little argument is needed to achieve this effect. The spontaneous growth of the peace movement is plainly a result of this view of nuclear war. Once this position is taken, however, the next step remains unclear. But whatever is done in order to gain attention, to stir human emotion for the rejection of war, or to stimulate reflection on its increasingly apparent futility, the serious pacifist or unilateralist is bound to be drawn to questions about the very foundation ideas of modern progress and to ask if, indeed, that progress may not depend upon the dissolution of the nation-state, rather than upon a ruthless effort to make it survive. Now come into play all the recent insights of pioneering psychology and sociology. What we now know about juvenile crime, psychotherapy, education and learning processes, the reduction of hostility, the factors of security, the hunger for identity, and the striving for maturity—work done and conclusions reached in all these areas come very close to approximating, in terms of the motives and mechanisms which pervade all social relationships, the ethical counsels of ancient philosophical and religious teachers. Even if we take only the major contribution of classical psychoanalysis—that hidden motives must be brought to the surface of awareness, and understood in both origin and consequence—we see how the traditional policies of nationstates are maintained in defiance of any constructive reading of the springs of human behavior. The nation-state, being an institution with relationships with other institutions, is compelled to function in terms of the rigid policies which have been built up during centuries of the dominance of precisely those attitudes which modern therapy seeks to expose and unseat. It follows that the nation-state may not be an agency which is *capable* of making peace, if by peace we mean something more than a waiting game played by nuclear powers during intervals between inconceivably destructive wars.

And it follows, again, that while in the arms debate the unilateralist or pacifist can participate only by pronouncing his "No!", he can or ought to have much to say about the development of the elements and the structure of new sorts of social agencies which may be capable of establishing peace. The reconstruction will of course have to proceed within the matrix of existing society. And what is done in this direction could have a profoundly leavening effect on all existing social processes. It might be found that a great deal of "reconversion" of present institutional forms would go on, once new concepts of security, peace, and constructive social relationships begin to gain currency and application.

The thing to be noted, here, is the fact that most of the people who choose to engage in this sort of peace-making enterprise find themselves wholly unable to compromise their undertakings with any kind of support to the outmoded military institution. It may be true that the institutions of military defense still have some kind of role in holding modern societies in a coherent unity. These means of national defense may not be abandoned until other principles of cultural integration are more widely accepted. But there are plenty of people who are willing and eager to extract from the military means whatever benefit may remain in their use. And the number of those who are willing to attempt the dialogue concerned with new non-violent social forms is still quite small. Yet there may be nothing so important to talk about as this vision of a human society which bases its order on understanding instead of fear.

REVIEW
"WOMEN AND SOMETIMES MEN"

THE diverse comment attracted by the notes on Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* in "Children . . . and Ourselves" suggests extended attention to the most provocative book on the psychological relation between the sexes that we have seen. Florida Scott-Maxwell's *Women and sometimes Men* (Alfred Knopf, 1957; Popular Library, 1963) is a philosophic treatise. Unlike Mrs. Friedan, this author gives no impression of being "embattled," and the partisanship which arises after declarations of women's "imprisoned condition" in our society may be constructively counteracted by the deeper penetration of her book.

For a connecting link between Mrs. Friedan and Mrs. Scott-Maxwell, the following from Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* seems appropriate:

> In spite of legends no physiological destiny imposes an eternal hostility upon Male and Female as such. . . . Their hostility may be allocated rather to that intermediate terrain between biology and psychology: psychoanalysis. Woman's desire is ambiguous: she wishes, in a contradictory fashion *to have transcendence*, which is to suppose that she at once respects it and denies it, that she intends at once to throw herself into it and keep it within herself.
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> Society, being codified by man, decrees that woman is inferior: she can do away with this inferiority only by destroying the male's superiority. She sets about mutilating, dominating man, she contradicts him, she denies his truth and his values. But in doing this she is only defending herself. Today the combat takes a different shape; instead of wishing to put man m a prison, woman endeavors to escape from one; she no longer seeks to drag him into the realms of immanence but to emerge, herself, into the light of transcendence. Now the attitude of the male creates a new conflict. He refuses to accept his companion as an equal in any concrete way. She replies to his lack of confidence in her by assuming an aggressive attitude. It is no longer a question of a war between individuals each shut up in his or her sphere: a caste claiming its rights gets over the top and it is resisted by the privileged caste. Here two transcendences are face to face; instead of displaying mutual recognition, each free being wishes to dominate the other.

Mrs. Scott-Maxwell's conclusion, under the heading, "The New Morality," broadens the context of argument:

> Would it win agreement to suggest that the masculinity of the modern woman is a living of her latent side because in no other way could she make it hers, or could she prove to herself that it existed? We almost have to believe, since it is happening, that this was the only way in which woman could create herself as an individual. There must always have been women of marked individuality, but now a new thing is among us. It is happening all about us, and it amounts to nothing less than women taking on their own individuality. Not living only as a function to others, but standing between their own good and their own bad with a center, a painful and brave center of awareness, where they know they are themselves. They are attempting, and of course failing and also happily succeeding, in the integration of their masculine thought and will, adding these to devoted acceptance. It is perhaps part of the new integration that is taking place in both men and women, a new responsibility for the conflict in the soul of the individual.

The underlying theme in *Women and sometimes Men* is that both male and female have difficulty in recognizing the "characteristics" of their own sex in the opposite gender. This author is not exhorting men to regard women differently, but speaks rather as a woman enjoining women to understand themselves more completely. Woman, after all, is setting the terms for what is often strident conflict in our times, and this is because, inevitably, she is awakening to the power of a latent masculine "mystique" within her own nature:

> Woman hates the noise and the combat, and feels wronged if anyone thinks she is making it, but she is. Those she called up from within her are making it, and any man would say that she can on occasion emasculate those whom nature has made men. When one cannot reason with a woman possessed by her masculine side, and very often one cannot, and happily one cannot beat her, then the man nearest to her may know the same helplessness that women have known through the ages. For when

> a woman will not see that she is possessed by blind forces within her, she is not an individual, she is ruthless nature, and those about her can but wait for the tempest to subside. But what are we women to do with this inner man? He belongs to us, he has always been a part of us. . . .

Again from the woman's standpoint, Mrs. Scott-Maxwell points out the significance of the "man" *within* each woman. She continues:

> It is nonsense to pretend that he does not exist and that we know nothing about him. We are forced to admit his presence, and we must confess that though he can be a very devil at times, we do find him invaluable. He helps us to live our seemly professional lives, but he also disgraces us. He goes on the loose, taking us with him of course, and rages about in a storm of unreason. His noise may be our unconsidered thought, or our rebellion against thought, but his roar is what satisfies us.
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> We must confess that we call up our masculine side when we want our own way, when we feel we might enjoy a jaunt with our independent will, as well as when our families need to survive by his efforts. For there is no doubt that this firebrand in our natures helps us both in our good and in our bad, and though this has always been true, we are now losing our heads over the man. If our hearts were wiser and kinder we would not let him have his wild way, though the truth is that it is his wildness that is our joy, our sweet revenge even, and our abandoned retaliation for aeons of false agreement.
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> Our danger which we may not see or solve, yet which becomes clearer every day, is that our hope of a new birth, even our fitness to achieve the cultural task that seems to lie before us, depends entirely on our ability to assimilate and honor the masculinity within us. This is our modern problem.
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> It is the powerful "fellow" in our own psychology who robs us of our femininity and who makes us untrue to ourselves. For we cannot evade the problem of being ourselves, nor do we really get rid of ourselves by living for others. We would like to think we become ourselves when we live our masculinity, but we are mistaken, for he is not us, but only a part of us. When he seduces us into becoming him, as he does, and when we fall, as we do and enjoy doing, then we have distorted ourselves, and distorted life; and is it going too far to say that we have become destructive? What we may do to men, and to the pattern of living, by succumbing to our inner man is a thing yet to be measured, scarcely yet envisaged, and hardly taken into account.

The concern to seek the heart-wisdom of philosophy is evident throughout Mrs. Scott-Maxwell's book. In some measure, she manages to play the literary role of Krishna in the battlefield dialogue of *The Bhagavad-Gita,* attempting to direct attention beyond appearances to psychological reality. If man is latent in woman and woman latent in man, partisanship avails little—nor do complaints from either quarter assist in a forward direction. It is in this context that Mrs. Scott-Maxwell speaks to "woman":

> By living our latent sides as so many of us are now doing—or more often being lived by them—are we too stupid thus to learn that they exist, are within us, and are tearing us to pieces? And that if we but possessed the wit to see it, these sides comprise the wholeness that awaits us if we would make it ours. But if neglected, [these sides] are the evil which belongs to no one, yet exists and shames us. There is such promise of living riches here that every caution makes us pause remembering how all through time men and women have wronged each other.
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> If we only say—and surely we can go this short distance—that our present plight is a chance of self-knowledge that might prevent our planting on our partner our own worst fault. Even this might bring a new peace between us, and if a man learns to honor his feeling, and a woman becomes responsible for her masculine thought and will, there might be a new clarity between man and woman, and perhaps a new ease in giving the love each longs to receive.

COMMENTARY
COMMUNAL DEMOCRACY

WITH all the talk in this issue of the decline of politics and the contradictions of the nation-state, this seems a good time to suggest some reading on socio-political organization. The book we have in mind is an old one: *Democracies of the East—A Study in Comparative Politics* (P. S. King & Son), by Radhakamal Mukerjee, published in London in 1923. This volume is more than a review of Eastern systems, and much more than a criticism of the British attempt to inflict Anglo-Saxon legal conventions upon the organic democracy of the Indian village. It is a sophisticated account of the elements of the good society, as found and identified in ancient and existing communities, not only in India and China, but in other parts of the world.

The value of the communal principle of social organization, according to this writer, lies in its primary attention to *human* relationships. "Communalism," he writes, "takes into account the whole man and fuses any divergent or conflicting interests by placing the individual in the communal center and the communal interest in the center of individual life." And he adds: "This is as important for ethics as for political science." He continues:

> The traditional antagonism between the group-activity and individual liberty, both in village and civic, religious and social groupings, which critics of communalism may anticipate, is resolved on account of the fact that the Eastern social tradition embraces personal valuation in all its aspects as opposed to fragmentary interests of Western occupational groups, and thus leaves enough scope for the development of the creative impulse. Is it too much to hope that Eastern experience, which thus seeks to set at rest the age-long conflict between individual and group, will furnish a clue to the future reconstruction of Western society, which, in its recent experiments of group organization, anarchistic or syndicalist, is still faced with the sphinx riddle?

Here, generalization is practically useless. To see or admit the importance of democratic process, not as abstraction or logical doctrine, but as present in living societies as they have developed over many hundreds of years, one must look at or at least read about those societies. The study of these particulars is the content of Mr. Mukerjee's book. For those who wonder if the agricultural society of India can illustrate any solutions for the technological West, we suggest collateral reading of Lyman Bryson's *The Next America* (Harper, 1953). Taken together, these books should give sufficient material for the start of a new dialogue on political philosophy.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

RELIGION—AND THE TEACHING OF VALUES

[The following is a recent paper by a professor of philosophy in Santa Barbara, Dr. Timothy Fetler. It was prepared in connection with a course focusing on "values." This sort of thoughtful and lucid statement, it seems to us, would be an ideal accompaniment of any presentation of ethics in any curriculum—and a good introduction to "religious education. In the first place, it is a forthright though noncontroversial account of the teacher's point of view. Second, numerous points of departure for discussion and research are suggested by indirection, encouraging the student to undertake synthesis on fundamental issues during the lectures and reading which constitute the course. In this instance, there is also a clear identification with the point of view represented by MANAS in general, and by this Department in particular, in relation to consideration of ethics and values. And, however reinterpreted, the same factors are relevant in the education of the very young, whether at home or in school.]

The problem of a value-base

When under the impact of modern science naturalism replaced the teleological and religious world-view, the ground was laid for modern man's rootlessness and defeatism. The concept of a purposeful, moral universe could not be sustained and was replaced by the idea of a world-machine governed by blind, mechanistic forces and indifferent to values. Values became subjective and as such relative to time and place, cultural relativism becoming the key-note of the day. A stable value-base providing man with standards and direction seemed out of reach. While knowledge of means and power increased, that of end and purposes decreased, to the point where this disbalance seemed to threaten the very existence of the human enterprise.

This may be the key-problem of modern man. Is it possible, without becoming paternalistic or authoritarian, to establish a new value-base in terms of the prevailing naturalism, though not necessarily limited to it, leaving open the possibility for value-extension into spiritual or religious levels?

Psychologist Carl Rogers and philosopher Stace, among others, feel that this can be done. A naturalistic value-base does exist, and though values are subjective, it does not follow that they are all relative to cultural contexts. The fundamental needs of man can provide the base for a value-continuum, which starting with basic physical needs and progressing through aesthetic and ethical levels, would culminate in those peak experiences known to all great religions as the essence of spirituality.

Universal ends and relative means

This value-base is grounded in the two most obvious tendencies of man, his aversion to pain and his desire for pleasure, whether understood as the absence of pain or as one of the many possible states of contentment and satisfaction. Though experienced by degree and in various forms, this aversion and desire is fundamental and universal, constituting the value-ends of man. The relativist's argument that "exceptions to a common value invalidate its universality" fails to distinguish between the healthy and unhealthy, the normal and abnormal, always present on organic levels. Sight is a natural, not a cultural function of man, even though there are many exceptions in terms of blind people. And sickly, abnormal behavior patterns do not disprove man's general tendency to avoid pain and seek contentment.

It is the means, by which, regardless of how imperfectly, these ends are implemented, which differ from culture to culture, though even the means have to fall within certain limits to be effective. The effectiveness of the relative means is governed by universal ends grounded in the very nature of man.

In relating hatred to mental sickness, the psychologist's admonition "Love or perish" is the projection not of a cultural but of a natural principle.

Morality as logical consistency

Descriptively universal values stand for the common needs of man *qua* man. *Normatively*, they imply a proper and consistent relationship between relative means and natural ends. In this way morality is grounded in logic. If a person sincerely desires to live a long life the prescription "you ought not to jump off the Empire State Building" is neither authoritarian nor paternalistic. It is simply the logical application of means to ends involved in the empirical situation—the logical extension of a natural desire.

The moral problem of man

Man's moral problem lies in his predicament of having to choose between temporary but less beneficial, and the more strenuously acquired lasting satisfactions. In every value-decision there is the explicit immediate desire, and also an underlying implicit need for "that which in the long run would prove to be beneficial and satisfying." It is this long-range good that man would invariably choose if he would be entirely free and rational. Since this is not the case, man often chooses immediate, and sometimes harmful pleasures.

The moral "ought" takes into account the deeper desires of man by making explicit what is implicit in his nature, leading toward a consistency with his deeper needs and freeing him from irrationality and a self-contradictory application of means to ends.

Religion

If by religion is meant "ultimate concern," "unconditional seriousness concerning the meaning of existence" linked to a total commitment to that alternative, which, though more difficult a path, has proven to lead towards increasing freedom and satisfactions, then religious experience represents the deepest and culminating experience of man, dealing, as it does, with the meaning of life as a whole. It becomes the locus of man's deepest commitment as well as the goal towards which all other meanings point. Aesthetic, moral and spiritual values thus form a natural value-continuum culminating in those peak experiences which have produced the great religions of mankind.

It is important to realize that degrees of religious experience, as opposed to doctrinal interpretations, are as much a part of man's nature as any other value level, and that the education of the total man is impossible without taking into account the common spiritual needs of man.

Education

In much of education the ineffectiveness of moralizing has resulted either in a non-existent or purely marginal emphasis on values. In clarifying the nature of value experience, five points could be emphasized.

1. Unlike most meanings which are verbal and intellectual, value meaning arises as a personal experience, a felt-value-response. Talking about values may in itself have as much meaning as talking about music. The meaning lies in the involvement, the actual experiencing.

2. The individual discovers the experience within himself as a response to some stimulus. The teacher, however, can convey some of his own experiences by empathy.

3. In value-contexts, to be objective does not mean to be neutral or non-committed. Since the value-meaning arises out of the response, the greater the response, the clearer the meaning. Objectivity here means rather coherence, a harmonious relation between one's own responses and the collective responses of man.

4. An awareness of the difference between intellectual concentration on parts, as practiced in scientific analysis, and the intuitive awareness of broader meanings, as found in the humanities, can be of help in the value-teaching situation. Fallacies of reductionism, sometimes practiced in the name of a scientific ideal, may be avoided.

5. Value-experience is related to the state and capacity of the knower. This kind of

knowledge depends on being, and as being grows and changes so does the depth and scope of value-knowledge. The teacher's primary obligation to his own personal growth becomes evident, for he will be able to lead only as far as he has ventured himself. Here the challenge of life merges with education in its deepest sense.

The value-continuum implies that man has a potential beyond the conditions which oppose and frighten him. If he is capable of transforming his being as an individual, he may be also on the way of transforming society, possibly the only way in which society can be transformed.

FRONTIERS

Old Wine, New Bottles

ONE of the interesting things about the present is the gradual return of "morality" as a subject of both serious and respectable discussion. Thirty years ago, anyone who examined the problems of individual decision from the viewpoint of a moral criterion was likely to be condemned as a lackey of the exploiting class which rules our acquisitive society.

All this is now changed. While politics is not openly condemned as a dead-end of thought, it might as well be, for all the attention it is getting. The neglect of politics is no doubt partly due to the current fear of "controversial" topics, but a more basic explanation, we think, is that the values of political debate do not seem to take effective cognizance of the longings, the hopes, and the frustrations of *individuals.*

If, some day, political scientists and philosophers are able to develop a politics which relates to what men now feel to be their needs, the political argument may be resumed, but at present the interest is in human attitudes, not mechanisms of social control. In fact, no mechanistic doctrines have much importance, today. A good illustration of this change in the mood of inquiry is found in an article by Henry Winthrop, of the University of South Florida, in the Spring 1963 issue of the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology.* Dr. Winthrop's title is "Blocked Communication and Modern Alienation." From the days of the first inventor of the first "universal language" to the contemporary epoch of semantic analysis, a large number of people have proposed or implied that failures in communication are due almost entirely to inadequate *mechanisms* of communication. Esperanto will solve all problems; or, the words we use in speaking to others don't mean to those others what we want them to understand. Dr. Winthrop makes a different approach. He writes:

> Of greater interest to a humanistic psychology, I believe, is the impoverished relationship between man and man which springs, not from failures in and breakdowns of communication, but rather from *the deliberate attempt to avoid communication.*

Well does this assumption convert the breakdown o£ communication into a *moral* problem?

The answer must be yes and no. If a man says something to you, and you choose not to hear him, or find some way of ignoring his meaning; and if you do this, not to help him, but to serve yourself—then his failure to communicate to you is *your* moral problem; or, it becomes your moral problem in the moment that you sense, however vaguely, what you are doing to him, and why.

On the other hand, if you have said something to him, and he withdraws, or deliberately misinterprets what you say, or changes the subject, either crudely or skilfully, then you have some obligation to figure out *why* he behaves in this way. The simple solution is to make a moral judgment. You can say he is a bad man who won't listen to rational discourse. You can say that he fears the consequences in self-exposure of entering into a dialogue with you.

At this point, however, you have a choice. You can for example suspend your moral judgment—which incidentally gets you nowhere, in terms of communication—and ask yourself *why* this individual refuses to converse with you. Why does your question or remark make him uncomfortable, hostile, or devious? Is there another way of opening the discussion that will make him an interested and curious human being? How can you help him to get rid of his fear?

What, now, is the relation between moral judgment and scientific objectivity? In this instance you are still carrying the moral ball. If you pursue these questions, which seek an explanation of his behavior in terms of his past conditionings, you are not blaming him, but trying to understand him. Your morality consists in the decision that he is *worth* this kind of effort. In effect, you are saying to yourself—I ought to go

back into this situation until I reach some final juncture and cannot go any further. I ought to see if by some revision in my own behavior I can finally make an *acceptable* communication to him. Only after I have exhausted these possibilities have I any right to make a moral judgment about him. And, curiously enough, when I do follow up an investigation of this sort, I seldom *want* to make a moral judgment. I have developed too much sympathy for his problems to indulge myself in this useless sort of gesture.

Where, then, does "morality" play a part? It plays a part, continuously, since my estimate of the worth of a human being has determined my resolve to understand him. The technique of my understanding has been mechanistic. I have looked for the causes of his avoidance of what I try to say to him. But my *looking* has been moral.

It is said that President Truman used to have on his desk in the White House a sign which said, "This is where the buck stops." When you make a moral judgment, the buck does not really stop; you pass it to someone else. You say: This is too much for me; call out the marines and put an end to this nonsense. You say: These people are not rational; it's a good thing we have the atom bomb. You say: I just *can't* understand people like that!

Basically, morality is refusing to pass the buck. This is a way of saying that morality is entirely subjective. If the subjective life is real, morality is real. If you can find a way to share the subjective life of another man, you can share in and understand his morality. And if you can't do this, morality consists in remaining a mechanist in respect to others, and a moralist in respect to yourself.

Well, we have said nothing about Dr. Winthrop's article, which we set out to review. Actually, it is an excellent treatise on either morality or conditioning—depending upon where you stand, on who is who. His discussion is filled with illustrations of the unwillingness to communicate. It makes you consider the conditionings of others and the morality of your own decisions. This is sufficient justification, we think, for saying that a resumption of the moral dialogue is taking place.