VOLUME XVI, NO. 43
OCTOBER 23, 1963

INDIAN DILEMMA

I WRITE to MANAS in response to an urge to make things clear to myself about matters that puzzle me. I am sure you know the facts relating to Sino-Indian border hostilities well enough. China resorted to a massive attack on Indian frontiers in October last year, in two sectors—in North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh in Northern Kashmir. This unexpected attack, which amounted to an invasion, was made after China had put forward claims to extensive areas in these two regions far to the south of the McMahon Line, which has so far marked the Sino-Indian boundary. The Chinese troops withdrew a month later after declaring a unilateral cease-fire and inflicting heavy casualties on the outnumbered and out-weaponed Indian army.

This surprise attack has obliged India to seek extensive arms aid from the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, among other countries, to defend herself from another Chinese attack. During the past few months there have been disquieting reports of massive troop concentrations by the Chinese along the Indian borders and the Indian Prime Minister has confirmed these reports. Indian troops are being kept in a state of combat readiness.

The Indian Ambassador in Washington did not exaggerate when he described the Chinese attack on India as a "traumatic experience." It destroyed a good deal. For a long time Indians were unable to believe that there was even a remote possibility of a military engagement with China. You may recall that India protested against the U.S. decision in 1954 to extend military aid to Pakistan. Though the United States assured India that the arms aid being given to Pakistan was meant to counter a possible aggression from China, India emphatically discounted the possibility. Eight years later, she had to fight an aggression the very suggestion of which she had regarded as too absurd to countenance.

It will be unfair to the Chinese if we do not consider that they may well have a case against India. There are people who can sympathize with China's claims that the McMahon Line was an arbitrary imposition by "imperialist" Britain which she does not feel obliged to accept. But she irreparably damaged her case by resorting to force. It only demonstrated that she had little use for arguments while she could depend on military strength.

The Chinese attack fashioned Indian attitudes in the only way it could have, so long as people are not angels. The fury of this attack left Indians in no doubt that the Chinese had forced a war on them. Indians resolved to fight. They began to hate China passionately as an ingrate that India had earnestly tried to befriend over the years. All-India Radio, geared to war propaganda, quickly projected the image of "India and the Dragon" and it has become customary for our newspapers to represent China as a loathsome scaly monster.

The foreigner who regards the Sino-Indian situation as nothing more than a border dispute is perhaps taking a sane view. There may be Indians who think on the same lines. But India seems forced to believe that China does not feel obliged to adopt this position. China appears to be taking its ideological motivations seriously and has not done much to encourage India to dismiss as absurd notions of an intended Chinese conquest of India. China is fulminating against the "reactionary government" of Mr. Nehru, who is described as a "running dog of Anglo-American imperialism." Chinese spokesmen hint darkly at the "liberation" of the Indian people from the decadent Indian bourgeoisie represented by Mr. Nehru.

I suppose both the Communist ideology as well as the past attitudes of other nations in the West share a responsibility for putting China in this extremely disquieting psychological condition. Mr. Nehru himself has all along been aware of the unwisdom of pushing China into a "psychosis," but even he has apparently not succeeded by showing consideration for the complexes that China has been suffering from. India extended the hand of friendship to China in the early fifties when the United States and the West regarded the latter as a pariah and treated her as such. India has now learnt that she should not have expected China to have been grateful. China was only resentful of a predicament in which she needed to be introduced to the world community by India. Judging from certain press reports, it appears that the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou-En-Lai, thought Mr. Nehru presumptuous and condescending, and intended to put him in his place.

It should have come as an unpleasant discovery to Mr. Nehru that being the head of a nation-state imposes severe limitations, making it impossible for him to react to Chinese provocations except in a negative, conventional way. You will agree that as the Prime Minister of India, he has no other course open to him. So long as unmollifiable and irrational animosities like those which China vented on India persist in the world, and the nation-state continues to be a widely accepted entity, the relapse into conventional nationalist resistance like the one India has put up seems inevitable. Admittedly, such responses frustrate the efforts to usher in a new dimension in international relations of the sort that Mr. Nehru himself has been making for some time now. We are all quite familiar with the rationalist ingredients of Mr. Nehru's foreign policy, one of which is a tolerance of different social systems, varying from democracy to dictatorship. He assumed that no regime would repose an absolute faith in force and that it would be possible, with the help of tolerance and goodwill, to maintain good relations with regimes whose internal political systems could be safely ignored. The Chinese attack on India threw Mr. Nehru's rationalism into disarray.

Is it possible to cast some light on a useful approach to such psychopathological states as the one in which China finds herself? India had no known method of dealing with the Chinese attack except by summoning up her reserves of nationalism and there was a stirring response from her people, though this was hardly a healthy development.

There is perhaps nothing rational about the ferocity with which people fight to defend territorial configurations known as nations and I am wholly in agreement with some of your well-written articles on this theme. Nationalism distorts perspectives and makes people think of their fellows in other climes in certain-circumstances as ogres—Indians now being a case in point. But as long as one cannot oppose nationalism with a more inspiring concept and as long as the opposition to nationalism comes from nothing more than a threat to freedom as people generally know it, the rationalist would be hard put to suggest an alternative to nationalism or nationalist responses, despite the fact that such responses contribute little to progress in any sense. Over forty years have passed since the Russian Revolution. It began as an international movement, but settled in Russia, and its course has killed the expectations of many people who believed that it might usher in a humane and rational world order. You may be able to carry this discussion further with some reflections on the hope for progress and the prospects for rational behaviour.

C. V. GOPALAKRISHNA

Madras, India

In modern times, the unit of power is plainly the nation-state, and, so far as we can see, the tendency of people everywhere to think that the units of human progress, of growth and self-

realization, must be the same as the units of power—must, indeed, depend upon that power—is responsible for the dilemma so clearly and feelingly formulated by this correspondent.

There is considerable historical justification for identifying social and human good with the national state. Many of the modern states came into being as a result of a political revolution which brought the people liberation from economic and social oppression and established by law in their behalf certain basic principles of social ethics. Further, the national state acquired the power—through sovereignty on the one hand, enabling it to create unified economic policies, and through taxation on the other, which brought capital resources—to manipulate events for the common economic good. Add to these benefits the pride of citizenship in such an agency of progress, and the security which national law and order inspire, and it is easy to see why, for many, many men, continued life without continuing nationality, or national independence, is practically inconceivable.

If only we knew more about what is actually going on on this planet of ours; if we could say, with some certitude, what will in some far distant time be the climactic expression of human development, and what, in that hour, will be the appropriate social form for the crowning achievement of evolution—if we knew this, then, perhaps, we should be able to hold up a clear social ideal for comparison with the transitory phenomenon of the nation-state, and draw some conclusions.

But we do not have any such idea of a "social ideal" with which to assess the present. Or there is not yet any such ideal that can win common consent. One may suspect that in the Institutes of Manu there may be the seed of the social arrangements of a *Satya Yuga* (Golden Age), but the extrapolation to some utopian future of the inspiration found in an almost mythical past is a task which seems far beyond the imaginative powers of the present generation. One may think, also, that the Gandhian idea of the revival of the village as the authentic social unit, with renewed rule through the consensus of the *Panchayats*, has also at least one of the ingredients of the social order of the future. There is a manifest correspondence between this ideal of rural Indian life and the face-to-face community of the Western sociologists.

Actually, hardly anyone contests the soundness of decentralist social philosophy. The problem is not in winning votes for small communities, but in rationalizing the relationships that will have to prevail between the larger, national organizations, as systems of military and administrative power which command the allegiance of enormous numbers of people, and these tiny units of ideal social life. The incompatibilities are quite obvious. One has only to review the difficulties and problems experienced by small religious communities, such as the Bruderhof, the Molokans, and in past centuries the Mennonites and Quakers, to realize that an "isolationist" program to be undertaken by like-minded people is hardly the answer.

It seems obvious that something fundamental in terms of the lessons of human experience is being worked out through the agency or matrix of the national state. What, conceivably, may this be?

There will be no possibility of answering this question without a sympathetic knowledge of the radical movement in the West. The events of the first quarter of the twentieth century cannot be understood without an awareness of the economic pressures created by the industrial revolution during the first half of the nineteenth century. The first Communists were filled with a sense of destiny. Their revolution, they believed, would be the logical continuation of the political revolutions of the eighteenth century. They intended to complete all the popular revolts of the past, from that of Spartacus to the abortive uprisings of 1848. Passionately concerned with social justice, the Communists were determined to pattern the

socio-political arrangements of the future according to ideals that were already in the air—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. An apt summary of what they believed and what they did is provided in an article by Karl Popper in *ETC.* for last May:

> The founders of communism were not wicked men, but men inspired by the highest ideals, and so are some of their followers even today. They were revolutionaries, to be sure; but they believed that they were faced by a tyrannical dictatorship and that nothing but a revolution could bring freedom. But they held a number of mistaken theories, and they stuck to these theories even when they were refuted by experience. . . . The most important of these mistakes was Marx's theory that all forms of government amount to the same—that all governments are dictatorships. The only moral and political problem left in this field would therefore be "Who should tyrannize or dictate whom?"
>
> Marx believed that there were only two possibilities: that the capitalists tyrannize or dictate, and the manual workers be dictated to, or that the workers dictate. He decided in favor of the underdog. This was a noble decision, especially as he was not a worker himself. . . . The aim of this theory, its intention, was not immoral. What was wrong was that it was factually mistaken. The whole black-and-white picture of a society consisting, essentially, of two warring classes, an almost devilish capitalist class and an almost angelic proletariat, has very little to do with reality. And the belief that there was a capitalist dictatorship which had to be replaced by a proletarian dictatorship was *fatally* wrong. But it led Lenin to establish a dictatorship. And since this dictatorship was based upon a false theory it had to suppress opposition and free discussion, and thus it led to a rule of terror, a rule where the most ruthless are likely to get to the top.
>
> It is a sad story, and it illustrates the wisdom of an old saying which was originally not meant to apply to politics and to governments, but to individual men—the saying that the way to hell is paved with good intentions. As examples of good intentions I quote one of the early admirers of Lenin J. F. Heoker, who in a moving dedication in his book *Moscow Dialogues* speaks of "a social order where the strife of class and race shall be no more, and where truth, goodness, and beauty shall be the share of all." Who would not like to have heaven on earth? And yet, it must be one of the first principles of rational politics that *we cannot make heaven on earth.* The development of communism illustrates the terrible danger of the attempt. It has often been tried, but it has always led to the establishment of something much more like hell. Those who are inspired by this heavenly vision of an angelic society are bound to be disappointed, and when disappointed, they try to blame their failure on scapegoats, on human devils who maliciously prevent the coming of the millennium, and who have to be exterminated. . . . Communism has reintroduced slavery, terror, and torture, and this we must not condone and cannot forgive. Yet we must not forget that all this happened because the founders of communism believed in a theory which promised freedom—freedom for all mankind. We must not forget in this bitter conflict that even this worst evil of our time was born out of a desire to help others. . . . Communism may be looked upon as merely a false step which men made in what is perhaps the greatest of all moral and spiritual revolutions of history. It is a false step, but a false step within that great movement of liberation which started with the Renaissance and led through the vicissitudes of the Reformation and the religious and revolutionary wars to the free societies in which many of us are privileged to live.

Here, Dr. Popper lays down what seem the first principles of understanding the dynamics of the Cold War. Those who wish to increase the depth of this understanding by additional reading will find Edmund Wilson's classical study of the revolutionary movement, *To the Finland Station* (Anchor paperback), of great value, and Dwight Macdonald's *The Root Is Man* (Cunningham Press, Alhambra, Calif.) is an illuminating examination of what happens when political delusions enjoy the sanction of military power.

However, the typical reply of the Westerner when presented with this analysis runs something like the following:

What you say may be true, but never mind all such "history"; the Communists must be *stopped.* They must be taught to see their mistakes, and since they won't listen to logical arguments, we shall use the other tools of persuasion we have on hand—the weapons, nuclear and otherwise, of the national state.

This reply, given over and over again by spokesmen of the West, has the fine flavor of an intransigent righteousness. It calls out echoes from all the bells of nationalist tradition and reinforces emotional faith in the nation's power to compel other people to do what they ought to do by the use of armed might.

But being emotional, and impatiently emotional, this reply has certain unavoidable psychological effects. It shuts out any attention at all to the alternatives of a violent reproof to the communists. It tends to ignore the fact that nuclear war will almost certainly be a tool, not of "persuasion," but of annihilation. It generates, not the heroic virtues of an embattled, freedom-loving people, but the fanatical responses of religio-ideological passion. It repeats, in short, a central delusion of the Communists—that of blaming their problems "on scapegoats, on human devils who maliciously prevent the coming of the millennium, and who have to be exterminated."

When you have a theory of progress that won't really work on any rational hypothesis, you have only two choices. You can abandon the theory or you can stop trying to be rational.

This is the confrontation which, in the United States for example, has produced the desperate effort of the nuclear pacifists to remain rational, and the angry patriotism of the Ultra-Right, which tends to call for the use of "overwhelming" force against the Communists, "right now."

Fortunately, the Western nations are presently enjoying an interlude of comparative quiet in the Cold War, due to the falling out of China and the U.S.S.R. This accident of history may give rational analysis a new start, especially since there is evidence that a new generation of Russians—men who did not experience at first hand the passions of the Communist Revolution, and have less psychological investment in the Marxist delusion—will soon be taking hold of the management of Soviet affairs. And if men like Prof. Popper can gain a larger audience in the West, it should not be impossible to mark off some common ground for undeluded common understanding. Were this to happen, the manifest uselessness of concepts such as "national sovereignty" and military enforcement of the "good life" will soon be plain to all. Then the truths repeated by Gandhi concerning social and moral regeneration in the smallest social units, the villages; the similar findings of Arthur Morgan, who called the small community the "seed-bed of society"; the diagnoses of Ralph Borsodi (*Flight from the City*, and *This Ugly Civilization*); the writings of Lewis Mumford; the predictions of Harold Lasswell (*The Garrison State*); the warnings of Aldous Huxley (*Brave New World*) and of George Orwell (*Nineteen-Eighty-Four*); and the sociological insights of David Riesman and Erich Fromm would begin to get the serious attention they deserve.

All this, however, is cold comfort for the Indians, with the Chinese Communists rampant on their borders. Lest anyone be tempted to over-simplify the Indian dilemma, we suggest a reading of the recent book by the Dalai Lama, *My Land and My People* (McGraw-Hill, 1962), Here, applied with the accumulated rage of a people that has been stomped on by Western colonialists since the Opium War (1844), are shown the policies growing out of a fanatically doctrinaire version of the Marxist delusion.

There is only one relevant question in this confrontation: On which fact will you found your conclusions:—the fact that the Chinese Communist Revolution developed from the determined, if angry and resentful, idealism of a downtrodden people, or the fact that the policies of the Chinese State are powered by the delusion that communist politics can forcibly create a "heaven on earth"? Will you bet on the idealism of the Chinese, and its capacity to recover from the delusion, or on the capacity of the delusion to suppress and finally destroy the idealism?

History and current events do not of course present sharp and clean dilemmas of this sort. The flow of events brings endless small or large crises,

preoccupations, interruptions, and occasionally an impressive moratorium in expressions of hostility. But the opportunities so provided for intelligent peace-making and the rational reduction of delusions are certain to be wasted unless there has been serious thinking in terms of human and moral decision, even when the prospects are darkest.

There is one thing that can be directly said: India's wise men have long complained that the West has exported to the East the worst qualities of Western civilization—the "materialism," the lavish living and low thinking of a sensate culture. These, admittedly, are "delusions" which ought to be rejected. But what of war? Will India undertake to follow the example of Japan, which had from the United States the drawings from which her first great battleships were built? War, an American radical of 1918 declared, is the Health of the State. Which voice will India hear? Our drawings are a lot better, now.

REVIEW
THE DESIGNERS OF SPACE

ON the MANAS exchange list—which has grown to a formidable pile of reading matter—is a magazine which comes three times a year and always brings a fresh breeze, making the review-editor reach for it in pleasant anticipation. It is called *Landscape.* It is published and edited by J. B. Jackson in Santa Fe (Box 2149), New Mexico. It costs a dollar a copy or $3 a year by subscription.

The point of view, we suppose, is basically that of the architect. The architect naturally thinks about relating houses to people, and houses have to be in some landscape, so that the thought of the architect stretches out to include what a house means or ought to mean in the life of a man or a family, what landscape and countryside are.

The fillers in this magazine are fascinating. Here is one—a quotation from Arthur Drexler:

> To get back to the idea of an imaginary architecture, which is seen as the process of perfecting the earth. From time to time I go to visit students at various schools . . . and I love this because when I walk into a studio, the tables are covered with models. . . . The stages of the construction of the model are to me the most significant part of the education and miseducation of architects. Invariably, I have to walk past a model . . . that is merely a contour study of the site before the thing has been set down on top of the model. . . . You know how they're all done, they're tiers, and tiers, and tiers of cardboard or balsa wood . . . cut out to follow the contours of the land. They're extremely beautiful. Why shouldn't they be? Often the land is very beautiful. These contour maps—those models of the earth—are already architecture. Nothing else is needed to make a building, you know, except to pull out one or two of those layers and make a space between them. Think how many thousands of buildings in the United States could slip into the earth. Instead, the students think of architecture as the making of things in opposition to the earth.

Mr. Drexel's remarks come as accent and garnish for an article by Mort and Eleanor Karp, whose sketches for a community which is "in" the earth tantalize you with their incompleteness. Architects no doubt understand these understatements, but as people who live in boxes set on top of the land, the rest of us would like further graphic explanations of what these designers have in mind. Yet the Karps' discussion of "The Ecological City" gives considerable insight into the world of people who think intensively about these matters. In one place they say:

> Architecture is . . . continuous, and the work of architecture is not the building but the city. If the modern city is a mishmash of discordant chaos, this is primarily because the architect's attention is limited to the individual building, to the discrete element, because he is often unaware that there is no frame around the building and that, in a single glance anywhere, the eye sees not one but a tangle of buildings side by side, in front of and behind each other as well as pavement cars, signs and people. A building conceived without relation to the world around it is not architecture but sculpture. As all the streets and highways of the world form one continuous road, so it is this continuum that is the subject for design.

The architects have a terrible problem. They want to surround with beauty lives which, on the whole, are not very beautiful. They want to endow with meaning activities which, in large part, are essentially meaningless. They make their compromises because they must, but their dreams no doubt are made richer by the denials suffered by their craft. Nonetheless, the dreams get down on paper, now and then, and some of them appear on the landscape. We have seen homes and schools that were a delight to wander through. These fragmentary realizations surely supply the inspiration for more far-reaching dreams. In the vision of the Karps—

> There would be as many city forms as there are places in the world. The city *on* and *in* the sand dunes would be completely different in appearance and mood from the city on the glacier, or in the Sierra forest. Monument Valley in Arizona is, in its form, a magnificent natural city with fantastic wind-carved cliff buildings in a deep red stone surrounding large open plazas in which groups of eroded sculptured figures, two hundred feet tall, occur.

Then, admitting the ease of thinking "in terms of the spectacular," these writers give you specifications for the redesign of Jersey City. There is this concluding philosophy:

> Instead of building urban renewal projects that do not renew, and enormous highway construction that increases the congestion it is meant to alleviate, we can solve these problems, and others equally inherent in our lives, by means of a city built as a continuation of the landscape so that the hills and valleys, forests, fields and waterways, instead of being destroyed are adapted to human uses, retaining for each place its natural character, giving us a variety of city form that changes as the world does and affirming that our place on earth is as a conserver rather than a destroyer.

The architect, quite plainly, is an educator and a reformer as well as a designer of dwellings. He is also a philosopher. In this issue of *Landscape,* Yi-Fu Tuan attempts an answer to the question: "Can There Be an Existential Architecture?" This writer, a professor of geography at the University of New Mexico, shows how the idea of human nature affects art and architecture, and designs for living. Christian and Humanist views are contrasted, with deft illustration of their various consequences in structural design and human accommodations. Around the "car-port humanist," an easily identifiable environment has emerged:

> . . . we have no difficulty in recognizing him. He is our neighbor. He has a car-port with two new cars, one a station wagon. He has a split-level house esthetically surrounded by trees. He has a hi-fi set, but music is only played as soothing background for cocktail parties. His wife uses individual cellophane bags for the children's sandwiches. Their eldest daughter goes to the State University. They have an aerial photograph of the campus, taken in 1958. On it the most obtrusive feature is the cross-shape dormitory for women. In modern conveniences it vies with a Hilton hotel. As for the library, you can barely discern it under the trees. And through a hand lens you can actually see a chapel. It is useful for weddings and the baptism of infants. Their daughter, whose field of academic pursuit is Recreation, will no doubt use it—sooner than-later. The contrast here with the theology student at Oxford, who even now washes his face in an enamel basin, but attends evensong in Christ Church Cathedral, is dramatic. . . .

At the end, Yi-Fu Tuan says:

> The body needs bread and the shade of trees; the spirit, beauty. It is easy to design and plan for the satisfaction of the body. Unobtrusiveness, privacy and pleasant variety are the guidelines. ~
>
> The spirit needs beauty—the hard beauty that intrudes on life: the Beethoven chords that stop the chit-chat and wake the baby, the Pieta that disturbs and the desert that shocks the complacent needs of our bodies for softness and shade. . . .

We have noted only two articles in an issue of *Landscape* which has not a dull line in its forty pages.

COMMENTARY
EXIT THE STATE?

A QUESTION is raised in the editorial comment on C. V. Gopalakrishna's letter which the writer does not get around to answering directly. On page 2 it is said: "It seems obvious that something fundamental in terms of the lessons of human experience is being worked out through the agency or matrix of the national state. What, conceivably, may this be?"

With the decline of religion as a factor of cultural control in the West, the state has become increasingly important as the giver of all good things. Its obligation to establish "justice" and serve the "general welfare" has led to its development into what is now called the "welfare state." The extreme development of this idea by the Communists, with the objective of creating a "heaven on earth," has turned the competition between states into a fanatical rivalry which comes very close to duplicating the emotions of the religious wars of the past.

Concomitant with, and in some measure instrumental to, these changes has been a broad socio-ethical awakening to the ideal of the brotherhood of man. The Communist revolution, whatever its consequences, was an expression of this awakening. It began with the clear objective of world revolution in behalf of a universal classless society which would replace the warring nation-states. The method was to be revolution, expropriation and, if necessary, liquidation of the opposition. Brotherhood and the solidarity of mankind were at the heart of the revolutionary dream.

But the brotherhood which could not be established without the tools of intimidation and terror became, instead, a climactic expression of the totally organized nation-state, bringing, not general revolution but a general paralysis of free political growth everywhere in the world, turning political thought into ideological polemics and calculated gambits in the struggle for dominance and power.

We have before us a curious situation—a situation which, on the one hand, should make it plain that the nation-state is no longer an appropriate unit for the attainment of human ends, and which, on the other hand, reveals modern nations so tensely involved in a struggle for survival that the thought of change seems to threaten loss of all that has been achieved through national sovereignty during the past two or three hundred years.

Meanwhile, at another level of man's thinking, the ideal of a brotherhood of man has not lessened in intensity; if anything, it has increased its strength, even as its realization in political terms seems ever more remote. Added to this is the fact that the distinguished thinkers of the age seem less and less able to share in the old concepts and emotions of national identity. The creative surge in human affairs does not appear at all in the region of politics. It is more concerned with psychological mysteries and problems, and with issues and questions centering on the idea of "community." Not unnaturally, the arts are flourishing, though in the throes of a period of extreme transition, and every serious form of intellectuality seems constrained to self-examination by the wearing-out or the breakdown of past authorities. Old religious questions are being revived, but in new, non-institutional contexts, and professionals in every field are breaking out of the conventional limitations of their specialties and grounding both critical and affirmative viewpoints on obviously philosophical and ethical assumptions. An air of crisis combines with the thrill of discovery of new foundations.

What does all this mean, in relation to our question? It means, it seems to us, that the *role* of political organization is bound to change; that, eventually, men are going to think through the dilemmas produced by technologically armed national states, but that they will not be able to do this save from a ground of human values prior to and determinative of political concepts of the good. The lesson, then, to be learned from the ordeal of history in the present, is the absolute necessity to seek that higher ground.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
DEFINITIONS

Six discussions which have appeared here, under the general heading, "Education in Religion" (beginning Aug. 7), were meant to provide a basis for continued examination of the relationship between philosophy, psychology, education and religion. This approach has a special timeliness, we feel, because of the debate concerning the Supreme Court decision which declared unconstitutional sectarian prayer and sectarian scripture-reading in the public schools. The ruling which, on June 17, 1963, outlawed religious exercises which are clearly identifiable as partisan indoctrination did not in any way imply that public education could *not* concern itself with the fundamental area of religious inquiry and affirmation. Further, as a lead article in MANAS (July 17) remarks: "An education which leaves untouched the entire region of transcendental thought is an education which has nothing important to say about the meaning of human life."

In fact, the Court was clearly aware of this distinction. Its decision read in part:

> It might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization.
>
> It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistent with the First Amendment.

What seems to us one of the best "letters to the editors" following the decision appeared in the New York *Times* for June 29. Theodore Brameld, professor of educational philosophy at Boston University, wrote:

> The key issue here, which most of the debate overlooks, centers in the word "teach." If to teach means to indoctrinate any given doctrine as the only true and right one, it is inimical to democratic education. If, however, to teach means to study critically and comparatively the weaknesses and strengths of a wide range of doctrines, if it enables learners thereby to share in the conclusions that they can reach in the light of this kind of study, then religion has just as legitimate a place in the curriculum as any other conflicting doctrines.

The suggestion is that public education, to be adequate, should provide dispassionate information regarding many religious traditions—not excluding those of Asia and the Near East. We have occasionally seen evidence that liberally-inclined private schools can supply such a background for children as early as the fourth and fifth grades, and a step in this direction on the part of public school boards would certainly be desirable. After all, belief in democracy means that a truly educated person fears no idea, is willing to learn from many sources. Dr. Brameld says:

> I am only reasserting what Jefferson had in mind when he implied that public education is the central power through which a people becomes sufficiently enlightened to govern itself. But enlightenment cannot occur when any important area of human life is excluded from serious, intelligent attention. However controversial, no area can rightly be excluded, whether it be politics, economics, morality or religion. As numerous authorities on religion, conservative as well as liberal, agree, moreover, the religious area of life is capable of enlightened study as well as any other.

It seems evident, however, that enlightened education in the area of "religion" requires far more than a spread of information regarding the beliefs and rituals of religious groups. The inspired religious teacher, be it noted, did not attempt to codify doctrines for mass worship; he spoke to the individual—specifically, to the individual looking for a means of self-transformation. To appreciate this dimension of religion, which is wholly unsectarian, is to recognize that philosophy and psychology cannot be separated from religion in the latter's most important sense. "Group beliefs" tend to be political, while the teachings of a Buddha or a

Christ have nothing to do with political views. No good teacher wishes to manipulate his pupils into accepting beliefs, since his fundamental interest is in helping men to become something more than conditioned or reactive beings. This important point is touched upon in Herbert Fingarette's *The Self in Transformation:*

> It is the special fate of modern man that he has a "choice" of spiritual visions. The paradox is that although each requires complete commitment for complete validity, we can today generate a context in which we see that no one of them is the sole vision. . . .
>
> At first one lives with one vision for years before there is readiness for another. After the accumulation of experience and of acquaintance with more than one of these ways of seeing, the movement from one organizing view to another can come more rapidly. This shifting of visions is not then any the less a matter of genuine and deep commitment. It is not a sampling or tasting, not an eclecticism. For one calls upon a vision with a life, one's own, behind it.

A religious affirmation is something with which the individual is *presented.* What the individual *does* with the affirmation is his own concern, but it would seem that the atmosphere of liberal democracy should encourage the attitudes of philosophy—philosophy as a means of exploring many different points of view. Dr. Brameld writes:

> The [Supreme Court] decision invites long overdue reconsideration of how public education may provide effective study of the role of religion in the experience of mankind, and now it may do so without loading the dice through indoctrination. To be sure, this will require, for example, comparison of all the great religious movements—not merely the Judaic-Christian but the Buddhist, Hindu, Humanist and others. It will need carefully trained teachers. It will afford first-hand acquaintance with the practices of these religions. And it will offer completely free opportunity for any learner to reconsider his own religious preferences should he care to do so.
>
> This kind of teaching and learning, which is antithetical to the kind of indoctrination finally outlawed by the Supreme Court, opens a new frontier for educational adventures. At first, to be sure, experimentation in religious study should be attempted only at the senior high school level and in carefully selected communities. As it proves workable, however, I am convinced that it will become acceptable to most communities. For it will demonstrate to the American people that the choice is not between teaching one religious doctrine and teaching none at all. Rather the choice is between bad education and good education—between the teaching that forces beliefs of any sort upon learners and teaching that enables them to grow into citizens capable of evaluating, comparing, examining and finally choosing for themselves.

FRONTIERS

Psycho-Religious "Engineering"

[This communication is indicative of the extraordinary diversity of the approaches which characterize the "search for meaning" in our time. The background here is that of applied science, making it plain that those who use "computer language" are not all captives of a utopian dream in which men would no longer ask questions. This writer, Brian Carpendale, is using his language, which will doubtless seem involved and difficult for some readers, but should be of special interest to others, as a source of psychological analogy.]

IN your review of *Psychotherapy East and West* by Alan Watts (July 10), you say, "Dr. Watts is saying . . . that liberation can never be achieved by 'repression' . . . but what then of the 'moral struggle'?"

Quite apart from the possible semantic difference between a "hard choice" and "repression," I wonder if we are not involved in an old educational trap. Those who are "liberated" seem to behave in certain ways (some—but not all—become very abstinent), and therefore those who wish to become liberated should try to behave as if they already were, and mortify the flesh, etc. We try the same trick on our children—make them stifle their impulses and ape the behaviour of "adults"—and think that this is training for adulthood. Counterfeiting "liberation" without having achieved it is certainly likely to involve "repression."

Surely, what we need to do is to discriminate between the sort of exercises which are necessary to achieve a certain state, and the sort of exercises which are necessary in order to ape it. The priesthoods, once the genuine article (ability to teach or achieve liberation) was gone, concentrated on the imitation. (Interesting question: Why did they lose it? Did they lose the "technique" or did power-hungry men, who by definition could not achieve "liberation," move in and take over?)

I suspect that many of the exercises suggested for self-realization may be as unrealistic as teaching a girl how to curtsey is for womanhood, so I have become interested recently, in odd spare moments, in trying to chart out just what self-realization might mean in terms of cybernetics and control circuits, and to see as a whole the various (*a*) improved forms of input (perception), (*b*) internal lateral integration of control complexes, and (*c*) improved outputs, which might be thought to accompany it.

Some people tend to switch me off when I talk in terms of engineering, but there is nothing like an engineering analogy to clarify my thinking; once I begin to see what the engineering equivalent to "authority," "freedom," etc., is, I begin to understand better what is happening in many human beings. One has to realize, of course, that in the "sociological engine," physical energy is of almost negligible importance, but "entropy" is important, although it is still as vague a term in psychology as "phlogiston" was in thermodynamics a century ago. Major attention has to be given to interactions, structure, and channels which generate or transmit (or filter or distort) "feelings," ideas, and information.

This letter has drifted into "thinking aloud," but perhaps it is of interest to you to explain briefly what I mean. Control theory is unlikely to provide a "good" model of a person—in the present state of the art—but at least it provides a way of trying to distinguish the trees from the forest, and of seeing the shape of the forest. It teaches one to put a boundary around what one is looking at, and to realize that there must be an "input," a "process," and an "output." One then tries to look at some fairly advanced stage of cosmic consciousness, and one tries to imagine how much of it is due to (1) improved or increased input (perception), and ability to handle several sensory (or extra-sensory) perceptions at once, instead of "scanning," (2) improvements and modifications in the "process" of integrating information received, information stored,

evaluating, and applying decision rules, in relation to goals—or rather, "goal complexes," or (3) improved output, perhaps in the form of physical and communication skills, emotional range, "acting" ability, and perhaps telepathy (I think telepathic output should be treated separately from input or reception, levitation, telekinesis, healing, and what have you) .

Then, going back over these stages, one would try to see how much of it might consist of learning new tricks with existing faculties, and how much of it is the development of a "new" (or perhaps hitherto dormant) faculty.

If one regards the brain and nervous system as a set-up in which one can build almost any type of circuit one wishes, and that most of it is built by "wishing," then much of Stage I may consist of building in super-ordinate circuits which can pay attention to several things at once (a TV set, instead of a radio), and may be no more difficult than learning to play the piano with two hands. Some of it might be a matter of better filtering (attention?) or changing threshold levels; *e.g.,* sensitivity to "thought waves," or inhibiting unwanted perceptions, such as pain.

Stage 2 is the stage which most of analysis and other forms of therapy, LSD research, Zen training, etc., seems to be aimed at, and it is perhaps a pity to devote all one's attention to this one facet of the problem (and, incidentally, not even the whole of this facet). If we assume that the infant "builds in" various semi-autonomous control complexes, then one of the first ones is the "ego," in response to social pressures. Most of us come to look upon this as "ourself," and protect it as we would our physical body. However, it may not satisfy our needs to be mean, rebellious, cowardly, flirtatious, cruel, etc., so some of us also build in other semi-autonomous control complexes (personalities) which have to be "shielded" from the ego. At the same time, there are many other sub-control systems, such as learned reflexes, the autonomous nervous system, and so on.

Viewed in these terms, what are the various forms of therapy trying to do, and how much are they leaving out? In some there is an attempt to strengthen the ego so that it can stand the "sight" of other parts of the mind; not many, except perhaps yoga, do much to bring the body and the autonomous nervous system into the act. What is "deep center" in these terms? Is it a super-ordinate control, dominating all the sub-personalities? Some forms of therapy seem to be aiming for this, but to my mind this would be repeating the old problem of ego dominance (and suppression of what it disapproved of). It should be possible, by improved lateral information linkages between control complexes—or personalities—to produce a sort of "Bethel" leaderless T-group "consensus." (Human Relations Training programs run at Bethel, Maine, by the National Training Laboratories.) As I see it, complete understanding (total lateral information transfer) in computor terms produces "agreement" (and T-group experience seems to bear this out). In other words, an adequate lateral link-up (or dissolution of shielding) would result in a "group mind" taking all factors into account, and ending the "war within." It would not, of course, end painful decisions, where one "member" (*e.g.,* the body) might have to sacrifice its needs or desires for the good of the "group." Would the "deep center" be more than this group mind, plus an increased ("extra-sensory" perhaps) perception, or information input, in the form of, say, healing ability?

Then what are the roles of the exercises and tools? At the moment I am not yet convinced that sexual abstinence is a necessary part of the process. (Perhaps this is wishful thinking!) Any kind of exercise in watching oneself, in perceiving or doing several things at once with awareness of them all—seems useful in building up the necessary circuitry. On the other hand, how much of this, and also of normal analysis or therapy, is designed to try to build circuits *around* barriers or shielding? Removing the shielding, which is what LSD seems to do, seems a much more positive

approach—if one assumes that interconnections are available unless deliberately shielded.

Without worrying about exercises for "output," I have probably written enough to make my point: that one should devise "exercises" (or therapy) in order to achieve certain talents or abilities, not in order to be able to imitate those who have them. This idea seems to me to open up many potential research projects, even ones as far apart as: Does Stirling Moss, or do bantam boxers or champion fencers, really possess some ability to "compress time"? How do members of the Polar Bear Clubs manage to swim cheerfully for thirty minutes in water at 33° F.? Are some Christian Science healers much more successful than others, and can one find out why? How often do Quaker meetings "center down" and are there any common factors?—or personalities?—and so on. All these seem to be elements of faculties which might be thought to come with complete integration of the nervous system, and control of physical processes, and are reported to have been possessed by some of the "enlightened," and we do not have to travel to the mystic East to study them.

Usually when I get ideas, I find out later that someone has already had them. Can you help me with any comments or names of people working on this problem as a whole?

BRIAN M. M. CARPENDALE
University of Toronto