

ARE WE ALL HIBAKUSHA?

IT is regrettable that a good case could be made for the fact that a majority of psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, clinical and other psychologists, and related professionals have not met the obligation to contribute their special talents to an understanding of the emotional, psychological, and pathological aspects of nuclear war. The obligation stems from their special knowledge of human behavior, from the fact that there is no other professional group which has this knowledge readily available, and because there are so few of them in comparison to the rest of us whom they were trained to serve.

It is regrettable because the difference between war and peace may very well be the difference between a pervasive but stabilized mental illness which is popularly (and sometimes professionally) considered "normal," and a kind of mental health which is not at all common, but which will have to become what is "normal" if we would survive.

Quite possibly, the problems of peace and war are predominantly the problems of people (and their societies) who are mentally ill, or who are evading (or who are incapable of attaining under present conditions) the degree of mental health necessary to find and establish a peace. Instead of defining mental illness, or health, in terms more familiar, I would suggest that processes leading to, or supporting, war are illness; and peaceful pursuits are health. Few would argue this; the problem is in an imaginative but accurate extrapolation of a given process or procedure into the future. The viable ways of yesterday may contain the format for tomorrow's catastrophes: we must learn more about the dynamics of human change and growth.

With noteworthy exceptions (Fromm, Marmor, and Meerloo come to mind, and there are others), many psychiatrists retreat, after years of schooling, to private practice (as sleek young men waiting in overstuffed leather chairs: masters of the silent but affirmative gesture) in areas of the country where neurosis is endemic (Los Angeles, New York, San

Francisco, Palm Beach, etc.) and the money is, if not easy, considerable; or they stay behind academic insulation and build reputations based on papers published in obscure journals in which they argue in the jargon about problems which would probably not exist if there were no jargon; or they pose in swimming pools for *Esquire* magazine above the captions in which they allegedly say how easy it is to find work in Los Angeles; or they form semi-cults and assume messianic stances, as in the International Federation for Internal Freedom (LSD-25 will save the world!).

We cannot sustain this waste. Their knowledge and insight, perhaps more than that of any other group, are needed desperately if we are to discover enough reasons—and in time—why a majority of us support war, think peace is slightly effeminate and, anyway, unrealistic, forget what Hiroshima was, refuse to "see" what a nuclear war is, and that it is a real probability: the junction of the roads the nations are traveling—a dead end. If we could find some of the answers to these questions—at least listen to an honest attempt to make such answers (which we could legitimately expect to come from the scientists and physicians of human emotion and behavior)—then we might just be able to change ourselves and our world before we blow it and ourselves up.

An encouraging exception to the case against psychiatry is the work of a Yale Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Robert Jay Lifton (author of *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*, New York, Norton, 1961). He is currently at work on a book about his research in Hiroshima, a preview of which appears in the current *Daedalus* (Summer, 1963): "Psychological Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima . . . The Theme of Death."

After discussing the ground rules and procedures of his research (he interviewed

*hibakusha*¹ and others under as good a set of conditions as he was able to create), Mr. Lifton quotes at length from several accounts of the bombing. The essay is a running analysis of these interviews. Mr. Lifton's comments in no way detract—as they might have if less skillfully handled—from the impact of what the *hibakusha* had to say, or the way in which they said it—sometimes in a spellbinding, flat prose, almost a chant.

A railroad electrician sought medical aid for a wounded co-worker:

. . . We walked toward Hiroshima, still carrying our tools. . . . Then in Hiroshima there was no place either—it had become an empty field—so I carried him to a place near our company office where injured people were lying inside, asking for water. But there was no water and there was no way to help them and I myself didn't know what kind of treatment I should give this man or to the others. I had to let them die right before my eyes. . . . By then we were cut off from escape, because the fire was beginning to spread out and we couldn't move—we were together with the dead people in the building—only we were not really inside the building because the building itself had been destroyed, so that we were really outdoors, and we spent the night there . . .

A young university professor describes his feelings and relates them to a familiar image:

Everything I saw made a deep impression—a park nearby covered with dead bodies waiting to be cremated . . . very badly injured people evacuated in my direction. . . . The most impressive thing I saw was some girls, very young girls, not only with their clothes torn off but with their skin peeled off as well. . . . My immediate thought was that this was like the hell I had always read about. . . . I had never seen anything which resembled it before, but I thought that should there be a hell, this was it—the Buddhist hell, where we were taught that people who could not attain salvation always went. . . . And I imagined that all of these people I was seeing were in the hell I had read about.

¹ From Mr. Lifton's notes on the subject, *hibakusha* "has no exact English equivalent but means: one (or those) who has (have) experienced, sustained, or undergone the (atomic) bomb. It conveys a little more than merely having encountered the bomb, and a little bit less than having experienced definite physical injury from it."

From beginning to end—like a recurring phrase in a requiem—the theme is death: identification with the dead, intense relationships with the dead, and symbols of death.

The most striking psychological feature of this immediate experience was the sense of sudden encounter with death. I stress this encounter with death because I believe that it initiates, from this first moment of contact with the atomic bomb, an emotional theme within the victim which remains with him indefinitely: the sense of a more or less permanent encounter with death.

The *hibakusha* have reacted to this encounter in ways which seem to say something important about how we all react (this is not a conclusion of Mr. Lifton's, but one which seems to be strongly implied and justified) to the threat and incomprehensibility of a nuclear holocaust. The difference, or so it seems to me, between the *hibakusha* and ourselves is not a difference in kind, but in degree. It may be that at 8:15 A.M. on August 6, 1945, and forever after, the population of the world became *hibakusha*.

These people quickly ceased to feel anything at all; the human nervous system cannot sustain such intense experience for very long. Mr. Lifton calls this response *psychological closure*. It is a "profound and unconscious psychic defense maneuver" which permits a person to "function" (i.e., bury the dead) without being immobilized by anxiety. As Mr. Lifton states, it is a species of "denial"—a more familiar term, but, if I understand it correctly, closure fits the phenomena better than does denial. Closure is a defense which permits one to see things in their space-time relationships (gruesome scenes, dying children, dismembered relatives), but without their appropriate emotional content.

It seems that closure is clearly an adaptive reaction under certain conditions. And the fact that it does not work completely seems, to me at least, to indicate the possibility of increasing our ability to sustain certain horrible events emotionally and intellectually without closing ourselves off from them. It may be that some events in current history (the possibility of nuclear war) are such that closing them off defensively, in order to function, is now

non-adaptive. The survivors of Hiroshima may be experimenting—in their personal and collective psyches—with a way to confront a horrible reality and feel while functioning. For now, in Mr. Lifton's view, the *hibakusha's* encounter with death and their reactions to it have assumed a special, lingering, pathological significance in their lives. But it may be that what is called closure may contain the possibility of at new and adaptive form of "opening up."

Continuing in this vein, to what extent do the *hibakusha*—and all of us who qualify—use this defense maneuver to keep from feeling about problems that can be solved only by feeling? To what degree is one prevented from effective action (to bury the dead is not as effective as functioning in a way to prevent deaths) by eliminating the emotional content from problems which are predominantly emotional and psychological in origin and in solution?

The fact that closure is not total may mean that there is a way—for at least a part of the personality—to sustain intense anxiety and to feel the impact of events. This small part that will not or cannot complete the circle of closure may be the place to base hope for a generation which will have to deal with a world of horrible truths and terrible potentialities. This eye that will not close or blink may stay open long enough to see what will make the difference between war and peace.

That closure is imperfect may give reason to hope, but it is a source of pain and of dynamics that must be called pathological. The *hibakusha* related time after time a feeling of shame and guilt for having behaved in a way which they think, in retrospect, was callous. In their periods of closure, they acted in terms of "mobilized primitive emotions" which led to activities normally taboo. They feel "accused by the eyes of anonymous dead and dying, of wrongdoing and transgression (a sense of guilt) for not helping them, for letting them die, for 'selfishly' remaining alive and strong; and 'exposed' and 'seen through' by the same eyes for these identical failings (a sense of shame). . . ." The dead seem to have invaded the consciences of the living.

The mechanism of closure has to do, in part at least, with "seeing" one aspect of the horror so thoroughly as to turn it into a kind of collective symbol for all the horror. By focusing singlemindedly on one event, it was possible for them to close off the remaining, and in total, overwhelming events. "Most survivors focus upon one incident, one sight, or one particular ultimate horror with which they identify themselves, and which left them with a profound sense of pity, guilt, and shame." A social worker involved with the odious task of cremating the dead stated that these activities did not effect him as much as the following:

On the evening of August 6, the city was so hot from the fire that I could not easily enter it, but I finally managed to do so by taking a path along the river. As I walked along the bank nearest the present Yokogawa Bridge, I saw the bodies of a mother and her child. . . . That is, I thought I saw dead bodies, but the child was still alive—still breathing, though with difficulty. . . . I filled the cover of my lunch box with water and gave it to the child but it was so weak it could not drink. I knew that people were frequently passing that spot . . . and I hoped that one of these people would take the child, as I had to go back to my own unit. Of course I helped many people all through that day . . . but the image of this child stayed on my mind and remains as a strong impression even now. . . . Later when I was again in that same area I hoped that I might be able to find the child . . . and I looked for it among the dead children collected at a place nearby. . . . Even before the war I had planned to go into social work, but this experience led me to go into my present work with children—as the memory of that mother and child by Yokogawa Bridge has never left me, especially since the child was still alive when I saw it.

The theme of death is expressed in the *hibakusha's* concern over the residual and lingering effects of the bomb. "The survivors' identification with the dead and the maimed initiates a vicious circle on the psychosomatic plane of existence: he is likely to associate the mildest everyday injury or sickness with possible radiation effects; and anything he relates to radiation effects becomes associated with death."

Rumors circulating in Hiroshima just after the bomb followed this vicious circle: ". . . for a period of seventy-five years Hiroshima would be

uninhabitable no one would be able to live there . . . trees and grass would never again grow in Hiroshima; from that day on the city would be unable to sustain vegetation of any kind . . . all those who had been exposed to the bomb in Hiroshima would be dead within three years." The theme of death had been projected on to the city itself.

The real effects of the bomb (too well-known to be recounted here) plus the imaginary and psychosomatically oriented fears and rumors produced "a special terror, *an image of a weapon which not only kills and destroys on a colossal scale but also leaves behind in the bodies of those exposed to it deadly influences which may emerge at any time and strike down their victims.*"

It should not be too surprising that this accumulation of horrors and terrors, approaching and sometimes meeting in the pathological, also created a special fury: "The cosmic nature of the emotion—its curse upon (and in some cases wish for total annihilation of) the whole world resembles in some ways the retaliatory emotions of hurt children. But it contains additional elements of personal recollection: the experience of 'world destruction' at the time of the bomb. And it is a projection into the future: the even greater world-destruction one can envisage as a consequence of a repetition of the use of nuclear weapons."

The net effects of these various reactions to the encounter with death, although not complete, are sketched by Mr. Lifton: ". . . exposure to the atomic bomb changed the survivor's status as a human being, in his own eyes as well as in others' . . . they invariably conveyed to me the sense of having been compelled to take on this special category of existence. . . ."

The theme is death. "We are again confronted with the survivor's intimate identification with the dead; we find, in fact, that it tends to pervade the entire *hibakusha* identity. *For survivors seem not only to have experienced the atomic disaster, but to have imbibed it and incorporated it into their beings, including all of its elements of horror, evil, and particularly of death.* They feel compelled virtually to merge with those who died, not only with

close family members but with a more anonymous group of 'the dead.' "

After qualifying his findings with caution based on the cultural and familial factors uniquely Japanese, Mr. Lifton goes on to draw some conclusions applicable, in a tangential sense at least, to all of us:

. . . we have . . . seen convincing evidence that the Hiroshima experience, no less on the psychological than in the physical sphere, transcends in many important ways that of ordinary disaster . . . when these special psychological qualities of the experience of the atomic bomb have been more fully elaborated—beyond the preliminary outlines of this paper—I believe that they will, in turn, shed light on general disaster patterns, and, of greater importance, on human nature and its vicissitudes at our present historical juncture. We may then come to see Hiroshima for what it was and is: both a direct continuation of the long and checkered history of human struggle, and at the same time a plunge into a new and tragic dimension.

No wonder then that the world resists full knowledge of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences, and expends relatively little energy in comprehending their full significance. And beyond Hiroshima, these same impediments tragically block and distort our perceptions of the general consequences of nuclear weapons. They also raise an important question relevant for the continuous debate about the desirability of preparedness for possible nuclear attacks: If the human imagination is so limited in its capacity to deal with death, and particularly death on a vast scale, can individuals ever be significantly "prepared" for a nuclear disaster? . . .

[The atomic disaster caused] . . . *a vast breakdown of faith in the larger human matrix supporting each individual life, and therefore a loss of faith (or trust) in the structure of existence.*

Are, then, we all *hibakusha*? Is the difference between those of us who did not experience Hiroshima directly and those who did only a matter of degree? Or is our closure (since we did not experience it directly) thereby more complete? And is closure now non-adaptive? Will it be possible to find ways to break up the various forms and degrees of closure and, at the same time, find ways to sustain the anxiety resulting from such an exposure? Is an ability to see what death is, without identifying with

the dead, a function of our collective inability to confront old age and death, our international pathology of death? Is there a relationship between confronting death and eliminating war?

There are many such questions which come to mind from Mr. Lifton's research. To be all *hibakusha*, we would have had to experience some of the horror of Hiroshima. Is that horror a perception of what death really is, or is it (for the survivors of Hiroshima, too?) an experience of a parody of death, of a projection onto death of the internal expressions of hate and fear lingering in the infantile portions of the collective mind? Have any of us ever really dared to look at death?

If we are all *hibakusha*, then what we may be able to learn from imaginative research like Mr. Lifton's will be of inestimable value. Such studies may point to the apparently hidden and certainly complex causes of our inability as a world population to see what nuclear war is and to take some action (confronting a real death?) to avoid it. It would be worth a lot of anxiety, a lot of risk, to discover what death is and what death is not, and, paradoxically, the imperative to undertake such a journey seems to be our personal and collective survival.

This review-essay would have ended here, but I happened to watch a television re-run a few nights ago: "David Brinkley's Journal" for December 10, 1962: "Hiroshima." It would seem fitting that the men who dropped the first atomic bomb (our representatives and instruments of holocaust) be heard from. Here is a portion of their conversation at reunion of the 509th Composite Group in Chicago August, 1962. Are they *hibakusha*? Listen carefully:

LEVY: Well, it was war.

SHUMARD: After all, the Japanese didn't give us a chance at Pearl Harbor.

CARRON: Theirs was an awful lot worse—it was a sneak attack.

BESAR: We were dealing with Asiatics—no people like ourselves and something drastic had to take place.

EATHERLY: I think they should have dropped the bomb outside the city of Hiroshima or any other city that we were to hit and show the people what the

bomb could do and then possibly save all those lives of the civilian population.

BESAR: I don't think a demonstration at that point and time would have been effective.

SHUMARD: I can't see that it would have impressed them—we might have impressed them at the point where they might think—I don't think we would have impressed them to the point where they would quit. They just weren't built that way.

EATHERLY: They would have realized that we had something more powerful than the regular bomb—they would have relented and ended the war.

LEVY: With the psychological feeling of the Japanese—if a man dies in service he goes to Wal Halla. If he is a civilian now you're hitting him where it hurts. It's the same as coming in and threatening my wife. Threaten me all you want, but don't make a move towards my wife because I will be mad and I felt hitting the cities where they're going to feel it and know that we are out to end this thing.

EATHERLY: Most people don't realize what an atomic bomb will do and I think that if we had dropped the bomb outside of the city and then let the people know what we had here we would have been in much better shape morally.

BEVINS: I don't think the world at large was so put out about this thing at the time. I think they were probably pleased about it. There were an awful lot of guys that didn't have to hit a beach on the empire of Japan and an awful lot of mothers that didn't have to have a gold star hang in their windows and maybe those same people today may feel that morally we were incorrect, but at the time I don't think there were as many.

BESAR: On the basis of their performance through World War II the way they initiated the conflict with the United States—the way they ran rampant through the Far East; their conduct in China for years before is all indicative of a certain frame of mind . . . certain character which required and which would only understand a harsh and brutal punishment.

LEVY: I think it might let some other countries know—we used it once and we just might use it again.

SHUMARD: I don't think the American people are anxious to start something like this. We have always been noted for letting the other guy take the first pass at us and then we clean their clock.

EATHERLY: Actually Russia dropping a bomb on us, why we realize then what we did at Hiroshima.

LEVY: They had these Hiroshima maidens they brought in from Japan to take to New York to do plastic surgery on their faces. They came in to Philadelphia and were taken to one of the restaurants. The fellow in charge asked me to come down to meet 'em. I had no desire to see any of those people, the same as I don't think they wanted to see me, but this was the only time I had any feeling about it whatsoever. Really, I never felt at all sorry for them or pitied them. They started it and we helped end it.

EATHERLY: I personally feel that me nailing the city of Hiroshima and giving the order to bomb the primary target—I feel that it is partly my responsibility.

SHUMARD: My favorite saying was "I never lost any sleep over it" which is true—I was on a mission then and I would go on it again.

BESAR: I was pleased and proud of my own performance in that long process of screening, selection that of all the many men in the Air Force at the time who were skilled in the same arts that I was skilled in that I came out on top of the heap for a particular job.

BEVINS: But the fact that this was an atomic bomb—that a lot of people got killed—that didn't deserve to be killed—that didn't bother me at the time.

BESAR: If I had it to do over I don't see where it would be any different today.

BEVINS: If I were asked today to drop a 50 megaton bomb on Moscow the fact that, assuming we were at war with them, of course, I believe that I would feel that we should go ahead and do it. The only thing that would disturb me probably would be the fact that in the back of my mind I am told they could do the same thing to us and this would bug me. I don't relish the thought of having it happen to us.

BESAR: Today's 50 megaton bombs don't bother me anymore than the 20 kilatons we carried at Hiroshima. I think if you are in a war it doesn't matter how you die if you are going to die.

SHUMARD: I think it would make a pretty loud bang. I think it would be—it's got to be tremendous—after all, ours, at that time was tremendous and that was about 6 or 7 square miles that was completely obliterated so if we figure this one here is 50 megatons, it's, I would say it's a considerably bigger firecracker than the one we had before.

BEVINS: I can't comprehend really the enormous—the immensity of the bombs that are

available today compared with what we thought was big—that must be a peanut by now.

EATHERLY: We didn't realize that it would kill a hundred thousand people.

BEVINS: Maybe its a good thing that a lot of us didn't know as much as we could know—if somebody chose to make it known to us—maybe then we would sit back and say: "I don't like the looks of this—I don't want to do it."

EATHERLY: This mission over Hiroshima taught me that there's no good to come of dropping such a monster as a 50 megaton bomb.

BEVINS: But this is not the point. I don't think the leaders of our country or these other countries want to have this thing that's become so well known to all of us. They don't want us to rebel.

EATHERLY: I often see in my dreams, women and children running in and out of fires and it's just hell.

BEVINS: We know that if it were necessary either the Russians or ourselves could blow one or the other of us probably right off the map. Now this bothers me and then I perhaps take cover or refuge in the thought that there must be somewhere in our total intelligence structure a group of men that are on top of the situation—that perhaps have things a lot more far advanced than we think pertaining to our own security. At least, I hope they do.

SHUMARD: Ah, com'on fellows—let s knock it off—we re getting kind of serious—let's go on and have some chow. . . .

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REVIEW

"MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING"

OUR frequent quotation from the writings of Dr. Viktor E. Frankl, throughout the various departments of MANAS, may have given the impression that he has written a great deal. This is not the case. But while Frankl is hardly a prolific author, he is becoming a very influential one. The word "logotherapy," as he uses it, stirs interest in every major center of learning, breaking through the barriers which have separated contemporary religion and psychiatry.

We have for review Dr. Frankl's *Man's Search for Meaning* (Beacon, 1963, \$3.50), "a newly revised and enlarged edition of *From Death-Camp to Existentialism*." While it might be said that there is little in the present book which does not appear in the earlier one, Frankl's ideas are so important that any form of repetition is easily justified; in any event, the central theme now gains lucidity from rephrasing and additional formulation. Under the heading "The Psychiatric Credo," Dr. Frankl writes:

Man is *not* fully conditioned and determined but rather determines himself whether he gives in to conditions or stands up to them. In other words, man is ultimately self-determining. Man does not simply exist but always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment.

By the same token, every human being has the freedom to change at any instant. Therefore, we can predict his future only within the large frame of a statistical survey referring to a whole group; the individual personality, however, remains essentially unpredictable. Man ultimately transcends himself; a human being is a self-transcending being.

There is nothing conceivable which would so condition a man as to have him without the slightest freedom. Therefore, a residue of freedom, however limited it may be, is left to man in neurotic and even psychotic cases. Indeed, the innermost core of the patient's personality is not even touched by a psychosis.

An incurably psychotic individual may lose his usefulness but retain the dignity of a human being. This is my psychiatric credo. Without it I should not

think it worthwhile to be a psychiatrist. For whose sake? Just for the sake of the damaged brain machine which cannot be repaired? If the patient were not definitely more, euthanasia would be justified.

Dr. Frankl regards any form of absolute determinism, either socio-economic or religious, as a version of nihilism. The majority of literate humans, in all countries, are viewed as victimized by the self-denigration which inevitably follows deterministic theories based upon the "conditioned reflex" explanation of human behavior:

Every age has its own collective neurosis, and every age needs its own psychotherapy to cope with it. The existential vacuum which is the mass neurosis of the present time, can be described as a private and personal form of nihilism; for nihilism can be defined as the contention that being has no meaning. As for psychotherapy, however, it will never be able to cope with this state of affairs on a mass scale if it does not keep itself free from the impact and influence of the contemporary trends of a nihilistic philosophy; otherwise it represents a symptom of the mass neurosis rather than its possible cure. Psychotherapy would not only reflect a nihilistic philosophy but also, even though unwillingly and unwittingly, transmit to the patient what is actually a caricature rather than a true picture of man.

A "true picture of man" will of necessity take into account his capacity for metaphysical beliefs—and do so without the negative bias which insists that *all* metaphysical inquiry is a search for wish-fulfillment. As Dr. Frankl shows, psychiatry has been confined by mechanistic bias for more than fifty years. Today, the view of man as a "thing" which "functions"—and whose functioning can be satisfactorily repaired by a trained technician—seems to be slowly giving way. "I believe this dream has been dreamt out," writes Dr. Frankl. He continues:

A human being is not one thing among others, *things* determine each other, but *man* is ultimately self-determining. What he becomes—within the limits of endowment and environment—he has made out of himself. In the concentration camps, for example, in this living laboratory and on this testing ground we watched and witnessed some of our comrades behave like swine while others behaved like saints. Man has both potentialities within himself;

which one is actualized depends on decisions but not on conditions.

Our generation is realistic for we have come to know man as he really is. After all, man is that being who has invented the gas chambers of Auschwitz; however, he is also that being who has entered those gas chambers upright.

Dr. Frankl's use of the Greek word "logos" is appropriate, since the view of the nature of man which is characteristic of logotherapy involves a philosophical mysticism which found expression in the symbolic gods of Olympus, and in the thought of Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato. Why must we, indeed, regard man as only a handful of dust, whose godlike aspirations are mere pretension? Are there not constant intimations of the sort of self-transcendence which "makes of man a god"? Dr. Frankl asks such questions without apology and with considerable enthusiasm:

Are you sure that the human world is a terminal point in the evolution of the cosmos? Is it not conceivable that there is still another dimension possible, a world beyond man's world; in which the question of an ultimate meaning of human suffering would find an answer?

This ultimate meaning necessarily exceeds and surpasses the finite intellectual capacities of man; in logotherapy, we speak in this context of a supra-meaning. What is demanded of man is not, as some existential philosophers teach, to endure the meaninglessness of life but rather to bear his incapacity to grasp its unconditional meaningfulness in rational terms. *Logos* is deeper than logic.

COMMENTARY

POLARIS ACTION COMMUNITY

TOM McALPINE, who is quoted in this week's *Frontiers*, refers briefly to the Polaris Action farm in Voluntown, Conn., as an illustration of peace action which is similar in some respects to the "Factory for Peace" being established in Scotland. In a *Polaris Action Bulletin* issued earlier this year, Bradford Lyttle describes the thinking behind the Voluntown venture:

The nonviolent direct action peace movement, in whose program civil disobedience is a distinctive element, should base its organization and projects in rural, intentional communities. The most important reasons why we are economic and religious.

In such a movement it is important to use money efficiently. Supporters are few and a large percentage are young people with little means. Wealthy people seldom contribute to radical activities having revolutionary overtones. Experience has taught that only by having dangerous, stirring projects with great scope, and by cutting expenses to subsistence levels, can the nonviolent action movement avoid debts. Whenever the movement has attempted to operate with conventional rent and salary levels, deficits have accumulated.

For several reasons, a farm is a more efficient administrative center than an office in a city. Consider the matter of rent. In the city, not only must the substantial rent for an office be paid but every staff member who has an apartment or house must have his rent or mortgage payments covered as well. In addition, staff members must have salaries that will meet living expenses and travelling to and from the office. On a farm, there is no separate rent for the office and living quarters, living expenses can be much reduced by sharing kitchen and other facilities and commuting costs are absent.

At the same time that a farm is more efficient, it can be a source of income. Cash crops can be produced and small businesses operated, such as printing, woodworking and construction work. This income has the double advantage of relieving the strain on contributors and developing a spirit of self-sufficiency, independence and bread labor among the farm's residents.

These economic advantages of a farm should be particularly interesting to married people with

families who want to join the movement. Nonviolent direct action implies a high degree of commitment. A person who engages in civil disobedience and goes to prison soon realizes that he cannot hold his job if he keeps up that behavior and probably he will find it difficult or impossible to find other employment. He must become either a spectator to the movement or unemployed. Unemployment is a difficult choice even for those with no family responsibilities, but for parents with a number of children, for a family accustomed to living at middle class standards, it is nearly impossible.

A movement based in the city has no answer for these people. It cannot provide salaries or subsidies for middle class living. But a movement centered in farms has an answer. Come and live on a farm. You will find life rugged occasionally. Fineries and luxuries you are accustomed to may be lacking, but the life is healthy, modern conveniences are at hand and your needs will be met by the community while you make valuable and satisfying contributions to the movement.

A number of religious values can be inherent in communitarian life on a farm. A sense of close fellowship, a loving community can be created, which is impossible to achieve in a city office. Sharing, mutual aid and social responsibility are encouraged. Self-reliance and independence develop as people learn to grow the food they need, master handicrafts and achieve skills at running small businesses. And a farm community can become a pilot plant in society, showing that people can live together and resolve their conflicts peacefully, without the threat of violence.

The foregoing account of the Voluntown community was reprinted, not so much to woo anyone into joining as to indicate the kind of thinking people do when they have an end in life which transcends personal and even family objectives. This sort of end, it seems to us, is the secret of making community living work. The material side of existence is or ought to be a means, a basis, for doing something constructive with one's energies. The values of community living described by Brad Lyttle are very real, and can be realized, but only when they are in proper scale and subordination to an over-arching objective which goes beyond the function of the community itself. This, at any rate, is a conclusion

drawn from a small measure of experience and from some reading about the numerous communities which color past American history with their dreams. A more extended account of the Voluntown farm community may be obtained by writing to the New England CNVA, RFD No. 1, Box 197B, Voluntown, Conn.

CHILDREN

... and Ourselves

EDUCATION AND THE CAREER

A SMALL volume by Prof. Frederick Mayer, of the University of Redlands, titled *New Directions for the American University*, opens the way to effective thinking about the problems of education. In an introduction, Aldous Huxley points out that today's colleges are hampered by a limitation which is exactly the same as the limitation which mankind has suffered in all periods of history: there are not enough good teachers. Dr. Huxley writes:

Himself a gifted teacher, Dr. Mayer feels, quite rightly, that most of the problems of education would be solved if all teachers were good teachers. But in fact most teachers are not good teachers. Among the fifty-odd teachers with whom I came in contact during my years at school and college, I remember only five or six who were really first-rate. The rest were either middling, poor, or downright bad. This personal experience corresponds pretty closely to the average. Veteran educators have told me that they do not expect to find more than one first-rate teacher in every eight or ten. Teaching is an art; and in this art, as in all the others, there are few geniuses, a small number of excellent performers, and a host of mediocrities.

Whether or not he answers to Huxley's description of a "good teacher," Dr. Mayer is certainly an idealist, and something of a mystic. Here are two paragraphs which express his feeling that genuine learning must be preceded by a willingness to undergo a transformation of the psyche:

Genuine education is like a mystical experience. Mystics, whether they are of the Christian or the Buddhist variety, tend to agree that their first encounter with a deeper religion is tormenting and shaking. As St. Francis testifies, the world becomes a problem, the obvious is challenged, the bond to one's neighbor is strengthened. When he decided to follow Jesus he gave up convention and conformity and this entailed a real spiritual crisis. A similar testimony was given by Thomas Merton, a former Columbia professor, who became a Trappist monk. He too was

shaken by fundamental doubts, he too experienced the darkness of the soul.

The same process has to take place in a genuine educational experience. The student has to doubt, he has to challenge, he has to ask himself fundamental questions. He has to sharpen his powers of perception. He has to learn to make a distinction between animal faith and objective evidence. Truth is not an abstract quality, it is not a platonic superstructure, it is a relationship between ideas, it is a process which involves conviction and commitment. The end of such a search is not calmness, but another soul-searching question.

This is the ideal. But what of the reality on most university campuses today? Dr. Mayer regretfully remarks: "When a student comes to college today he tends to be generally very conventional. He has definite ideas about religion, society, and economics." Dr. Mayer continues: "As he is exposed to critical teachers and discussions, his conventions are challenged. He may become an atheist or a radical or he may become an adherent of Vedanta or a follower of T. S. Eliot or an existentialist. In his senior year he usually recovers from his intellectual excitement and he looks forward to success and an ample income."

So-the contrast is strong between the ideal of education and the practice of both educators and students; The truly "good teacher" is like the psychotherapist who obliges the patient to face certain fearful but finally liberating truths about himself. A paragraph from A. H. Maslow's paper, "The Fear of Knowing" (included in a chapter of *Toward a Psychology of Being*), applies here:

Fear of knowledge of oneself is defensive, in the sense that it is a protection of our self-esteem, of our love and respect for ourselves. We tend to be afraid of any knowledge that could cause us to despise ourselves or to make us feel inferior, weak, worthless, evil, shameful. We protect ourselves and our ideal image of ourselves by repression and similar defenses, which are essentially techniques by which we avoid becoming conscious of unpleasant or dangerous truths. And in psychotherapy the maneuvers by which we continue avoiding this consciousness of painful truth, the ways in which we fight the efforts of the therapist to help us see the truth we call

"resistance." All the techniques of the therapist are in one way or another truth-revealing, or are ways of strengthening the patient so he can bear the truth.

All too often, the "fast learners" pass into the manipulative phase—the turning of verbal ability into schemes for monetary advancement—before they awaken to genuine intellectual curiosity. It follows that the "brightest" among young career people may be most in need of therapy as defined by Dr. Maslow. In a recent lecture at Stanford University (*Horizon*, March), Louis Kronenberger speaks of the way in which the intellectual may actually benumb his own mind as a creative force:

The new careerists are a sort of debased intellectual class who, by way of their knowledge and skill, have become rather the mouthpieces and writing-hands of business than outright businessmen. Careers, for them, are not usually a tower to climb to the very top of, but a tunnel to work their way through, with plump economic security at the other end. These people have sought no philosophy to glorify their actions, have seldom rationalized their liberalism to mesh it with their livelihoods. They haven't even, a great many of them, turned hard: they are simply hardened to their roles and resigned to what they entail, not least to New Dealing, as it were, from the bottom of the deck.

The university, ideally, should be teaching men to break the mind-moulds of the contemporary world and to set loose pioneering thoughts. Yet there seems little doubt that many university students, during the entire four years, and most students for the first two undergraduate years, are developing wooden minds, rather than active ones. The habit of what Mr. Kronenberger calls "careerism" can easily be acquired by the youth who sees the campus as a launching pad to immediate success. On this subject, Prof. Mayer writes:

The development of the professional conformist is devastating for the success of higher education. The conformist, who dominates some administrative functions, is intoxicated by statistics, and he loves bigness for the sake of bigness. He has no real interest in learning; he is fond of making speeches full of unexamined generalities. Believing in safety, he does not want to be upset by new ideas. He is more concerned with the plant, especially with new

buildings, than with the individual teacher. He is intensely conscious of public relations and he desires social approval above all. He believes that education is part of a hierarchy starting with the teaching assistant and ending with the college president. He has enormous respect for wealth and social prestige. He has distrust for the individualist and he hates the non-conformist. His favorite activity is to attend committee meetings. In short, he is a huckster with a degree. . . . Many students are affected by the huckster spirit. They look upon learning as a secondary activity.

FRONTIERS

Therapy for a Sick Civilization

IN his book on Maria Montessori, E. M. Standing remarks: "Her life, taken as a whole, demonstrates the principle she was to preach in later years, that the preparations of life are indirect." Something similar might be said of preparations for peace. In a recent *Peace News*, Richard Boston writes:

You start with a slogan, "Ban the Bomb," and very quickly you find that you cannot take a stand on this one isolated issue without taking a stand on many other issues as well. You begin to look for the causes of war and try to think of eliminating these causes, and you soon find that you have to make up your mind about race relations, the Common Market, industrial conditions, housing schemes, and everything else that concerns society and the state. You try to think of ways that for example, the economic problems caused by disarmament will be solved. And you begin to realize that you can't solve one problem without solving a lot of others at the same time.

The observations of Richard Gregg in *MANAS* for Aug. 28 reach the same conclusion:

Because of the lack of a constructive program the British peace movement is floundering, and ours is also beginning to flounder. There must be not only a relieving of present social ills; there must be intimations of activities that will build sounder social relationships of all kinds. All this calls for social inventiveness of a high order.

You might put it this way: Peace is (of course) not just the absence of overt physical violence. And like happiness, peace is not something that can be obtained by action aimed directly at peace. It is an over-all condition that results from other conditions and relations and the lesser, causative conditions are obtainable by direct as well as indirect striving. That is to say, peace is a by-product that comes automatically once the other conditions are established.

If this is a correct estimate of the situation confronting peace-makers, and it seems to be, then another fact becomes manifest. It is that the fundamental attitudes which make for peace are often adopted by people who have not thought a great deal, directly, about the abolition of war.

Instead, their energies are given over to labors which are *on the side of life*. Madame Montessori is a good example of this. Early in her professional life (she was the first woman medical doctor in Italy), and more than ten years before she decided to devote herself to the education of little children, she fell ill, and her friends became anxious about her recovery. She told them: "Do not be alarmed; I shall not die; I have work to do."

Two elements in this incident seem important. First is the sense of mission which animated the young woman. People who feel a calling to *work* are not likely to contribute to the "death-wish" of a civilization. And in the case of Madame Montessori, the initial choice of work with deprived and subnormal children was certainly "on the side of life." It can hardly be doubted that the people who were influenced by her throughout her long career are living lives that support the conditions of a peaceful society. What is wanted, culturally speaking, is an atmosphere of purpose and striving which leads to intuitive rejection of violence in all human relationships, and those who help to establish this spirit must be counted among the peace-makers.

There is also the direct attempt, by peace-makers, to create institutions which are consistent with constructive human and international relationships. In *Anarchy 26* (April, 1963), Tom McAlpine, a member of the Scottish Committee of 100, describes a "Factory for Peace" which he and some others are establishing. He begins with a general explanation of the need for this sort of undertaking:

. . . many of the problems in our complex modern world appear to be beyond the ordinary individual. Bad human relations in industry, increasing materialistic pressures, lack of concern for the individual, the waste of man's creative powers, the speed of the "rat race," all overwhelm us. Our society seems to be unaware that man's work must be a natural part of the richer, fuller life which is essential for a stable, happy world.

Further:

We in the West are slowly beginning to realize that we live in luxury compared with many of the underdeveloped countries where hunger and misery are ever present. Do we realize however, that the amount of money we have been giving to such countries has been more than taken up by the fall in value of raw materials from these nations? The gap is in fact widening and our help is ever more urgently required.

Some of us feel that something practical should be done immediately. In Scotland, therefore, where unemployment is acute, some members of the Iona Community Industrial Committee, together with others from the Scottish Unilateralist movement, decided to start a factory which will aim at reducing some of the problems outlined above.

With five people, all Trade Union members, we intend to try new industrial experiments in cooperative ownership where all workers will have equal say in decisions affecting wages, new products, profits and other policy matters. This presents problems, but we are convinced that workers' participation is vital. Failures as well as success will be of use in the long run because we hope to pass back anything we learn to Trade Unions, political parties, Church groups, industrialists, individual donors, in fact to anyone who will listen.

Our products will be customer-ordered sheet metal and general engineering work, reinforced plastics and electric furnaces. No goods which may be used directly for war purposes will be produced. The profits will go to underdeveloped countries through such movements as War on Want and to further the cause of peace. An Advisory Body has been set up to ensure that these and other principles are maintained. Premises are available, markets assured, and contracts promised.

Some of the capital needed for this project has already come in, in response to appeals. The members have been buying needed equipment and may be now working part-time at production. Mr. McAlpine writes further:

It has also been interesting to see that in Britain others are prepared to begin similar ventures and that several are in progress. It may interest your readers to know of the Polaris Action farm in Voluntown, U.S.A., where several anti-Polaris demonstrators cooperate in running a farm, the profits of which assist them in maintaining action against Polaris.

It was very interesting to read in Peace News recently of the workshop cooperative of Negro families in Tennessee, and I would agree with the comments that home industries like this are essential to the development of anti-war efforts and progress in under-developed countries.

Readers who would like to help in the foundation of the "Factory for Peace" may send contributions to Rev. James W. Sim, Community House, 214 Clyde Street, Glasgow, C. 1., Scotland, and questions about the project will be answered by Mr. McAlpine, at same address.