

## CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

TO be misunderstood is a privilege that is properly enjoyed only by the wise. The rest of us have an unvarying obligation to pursue the greatest possible clarity in communications, since we cannot be sure that, when misunderstanding occurs, the confusion is not of our own making. If a discussion seeks to isolate the elements of human good, the argument will naturally take place in a framework of familiar assumptions concerning the good, and it is here that the confusion often arises. This sort of confusion is inevitable, in a sense even justifiable, although there must be an effort to avoid it. It is inevitable because people *care* about their beliefs concerning the good and how it is to be obtained. If you say something that seems to slight one of those beliefs, you are bound to hear from one of its believers. And since you cannot always be explaining and qualifying, but must get on with the argument, the confusion is in some degree justifiable.

What, specifically, is at issue here? MANAS has received another letter asking for less discussion of the "cold war," and we keep getting communications which object either to our patience with Capitalism or our apparent fondness for Socialism.

Why not prevent the confusion by avoiding the familiar assumptions? Why not choose subjects which will not evoke objection?

A serious discussion is intended to throw fresh light on current problems and questions. If you fail to approach these matters in any familiar terms, it will seem to many readers that you have not approached them at all. For example, today most people think of the problems of mankind in terms of war and politics. It follows that serious discussion focuses on war and politics. The discussion about war is either on how to win it or

how to end it. Some form of political activity is generally involved as the means, both for winning or ending war and for establishing the good life. While there are few people who still find St. James's account of the cause of war—

From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members?

—a sufficient explanation, it is possible that they are right, in the sense that wars do come from inner conflicts in men. But even if they are right, and no further explanation of war is needed, these people exhibit a certain disdain for the opinions of the great majority, who believe that other causes are more important to consider. By refusing to examine other approaches to the causes of war, the followers of St. James remain sectarians, since they can converse only with one another.

While a case for James's statement may be constructed from the findings of modern psychotherapy, it is necessary to add to what he said, or is reported to have said, before it will be generally accepted. It is necessary, for example, to show that the familiar lines of thinking about war are reaching a dead end. We need, in short, some historical analysis. Proceeding, then, on the theory that the familiar assumptions about a human problem must be disposed of before fresh thinking can have serious attention, we turn to a book which is brilliantly critical of prevailing ideas concerning both war and politics—Hannah Arendt's *On Revolution* (Viking, 1963, \$6.50). Dr. Arendt begins by giving three reasons why war is outmoded and obsolete, so far as rational statecraft is concerned. The first reason is that war no longer performs one of its chief functions—to protect and secure the civilian population. Dr. Arendt writes:

. . . the seeds of total war developed as early as the First World War, when the distinction between soldiers and civilians was no longer respected because it was inconsistent with new weapons then used. To be sure, this distinction itself had been a relatively modern achievement, and its practical abolition meant no more than the reversion of warfare to the days when the Romans wiped Carthage off the face of the earth. Under modern circumstances, however, this appearance or reappearance of total war has a very different political significance insofar as it contradicts the basic assumption upon which the relationship between the military and the civilian branches of government rests: it is the function of the army to protect and to defend the civilian population. In contrast, the history of warfare in our century could almost be told as the story of the growing incapacity of the army to fulfill this basic function, until today the strategy of deterrence has openly changed the role of the military from that of a protector into that of a belated and essentially futile avenger.

Dr. Arendt proposes that the defense of "freedom" as a justification of war became a popular argument only "after the First World War had demonstrated the horribly destructive potential of warfare under conditions of modern technology." It is true that the wars of the twentieth century have practically all sought some kind of ideological justification, but the "idealistic" apology for war began to be a psychological necessity for rulers during the nineteenth century, probably because the revolutions which closed the eighteenth century had popularized conceptions of the common good which made wars of conquest appear increasingly immoral. An instance of this tendency is found in the pretentious rhetoric of Napoleon III when explaining the moral compulsions which forced him to join with England against Russia in the Crimean War (1854):

"I have gone as far as honor allowed. . . . Europe well knows that France has no thought of aggrandizement. . . . The day of conquests by force is past, never to return. Not in extending the limits of its territory may a nation henceforward be honored and powerful. It must take the lead in behalf of noble ideals and bring the dominion of justice and righteousness everywhere to prevail."

Concerning the "defense of freedom" argument for war, when used today, Dr. Arendt observes:

To sound off with a cheerful "give me liberty or give me death" sort of argument in the face of the unprecedented and inconceivable potential of destruction in nuclear warfare is not even hollow; it is downright ridiculous. Indeed it seems so obvious that it is a very different thing to risk one's own life for the life and freedom of one's country and one's posterity from risking the very existence of the human species for the same purpose that it is difficult not to suspect the defenders of the "better dead than red" or "better death than slavery" slogans of bad faith.

The significant conclusion in relation to Dr. Arendt's first reason for claiming that war is obsolete is this:

. . . freedom has appeared in this debate of the war question like a *deus ex machina* to justify what on rational grounds has become unjustifiable. Is it too much to read into the current rather hopeless confusion of issues and arguments a hopeful indication that a profound change in international relations may be about to occur, namely, the disappearance of war from the scene of politics even without a radical change of men's hearts and minds? Could it not be that our present perplexity in this matter indicates our lack of preparedness for a disappearance of war, our inability to think in terms of foreign policy having in mind this "continuation with other means" as its last resort?

Here the argument touches briefly on St. James's explanation. We may not have to wait, Dr. Arendt suggests, for a "radical change of men's hearts and minds" in order to do away with war. However, what she seems not to consider is that some kind of "radical change" in thinking may be necessary before the force of her argument becomes widely apparent.

Her second reason for war being obsolete is political. It is that no government can survive a defeat in modern war. "The truth is," Dr. Arendt says, "that even prior to the horror of nuclear warfare, wars had become politically, though not yet biologically, a matter of life and death." She adds: "And this means that under the conditions of

modern warfare, that is since the First World War, all governments have lived on borrowed time."

The third reason grows out of the gruesome charade of "deterrence." The ruling idea of policy, today, is to plan never to fight an actual war, which would be manifest insanity, but to prove by various demonstrations of the immeasurable extent of nuclear destruction that war *must not* be allowed to occur. While the claim that preparations for war are pursued solely for the sake of peace is an old one—"as old as the discovery of propaganda lies"—something new has now been added:

. . . the point of the matter is that today the avoidance of war is not only the true or pretended goal of an over-all policy but has become the guiding principle of the military preparations themselves. In other words, the military are no longer preparing for a war which the statesmen hope will never break out; their own goal has become to develop weapons that will make a war impossible. . . . It is as though the nuclear armament race has turned into some sort of tentative warfare in which the opponents demonstrate to each other the destructiveness of the weapons in their possession; and while it is possible that this deadly game of ifs and whens may suddenly turn into the real thing, it is by no means inconceivable that one day victory and defeat may end a war that never exploded into reality. . . . Seventeen years after Hiroshima, our technical mastery of the means of destruction is fast approaching the point where all non-technical factors in warfare, such as troop morale, strategy, general competence and even sheer chance, are completely eliminated so that results can be calculated with perfect precision in advance. Once this point is reached, the results of mere tests and demonstrations could be as conclusive evidence to the experts for victory or defeat as the battlefield, the conquest of territory, the breakdown of communications, et cetera, have formerly been to the military experts on either side.

There is a sense in which the truth in Dr. Arendt's analysis becomes *effectively* true by being recognized and acknowledged. So long, that is, as the makers of policy fail to see the persuasiveness of these arguments, they will continue to plan and in all seriousness commit the nation to actions which are absurd in the light of

rational maturity. But this is always a problem in relation to political truth. Its meaning must be grasped before it can be made historically "true."

We now come to the central thesis of Dr. Arendt's book. It is that while the present may be an age in which war will be abandoned as wholly unproductive of any desired result, revolution as a process of social change will in all likelihood remain. Already, she points out, war is the portal to revolution, and the only conceivable justification of war for modern man is "the revolutionary cause of freedom." Dr. Arendt continues:

Hence, whatever the outcome of our present predicaments may be, if we don't perish altogether, it seems more than likely that revolution, in distinction to war, will stay with us into the foreseeable future. Even if we should succeed in changing the physiognomy of this century to the point where it would no longer be a century of wars, it most certainly will remain a century of revolutions. In the contest that divides the world today and in which so much is at stake, those will probably win who understand revolution, while those who still put their faith in power politics in the traditional sense of the term and, therefore, in war as the last resort of all foreign policy may well discover in a not too distant future that they have become masters in a rather useless and obsolete trade.

The practical import of this conclusion is that the future lies with those "who understand revolution." The possibility that those who maintain a total and uncompromising stand against war may also be those who understand nonviolent revolution is not considered by Dr. Arendt, but it is surely evident that some sort of social change that should be called "revolutionary" will come about.

This brings us to the second part of our discussion, which may be launched by quoting from a reader's letter. He begins by asking for "a little more emphasis [in MANAS] on individual responsibility and integrity," which, he says, "come ahead of a responsible community." Such emphasis, he adds, "will appeal to dyed-in-the-wool anti-collectivists." He concludes:

I sense an awakening by the man in the street to the utter folly of looking outside one's self for material or any other kind of well-being. MANAS must be careful not to espouse collectivism or pacifism or any other kind of "ism." As you say these are to most minds ends, not means. The cause, for which one seeks a certain form of government, or for which one fights and kills, governs.

We are far from sure that we wish to appeal to "dyed-in-the-wool anti-collectivists," any more than we wish to appeal to doctrinaire socialists. This correspondent is certainly right, however, in saying that individual responsibility and integrity "come ahead of" a responsible community. In fact, the insistence upon achieving the responsible community *first* has been, it seems to us, the major delusion of the revolutionary movement of the Western World. Our correspondent seems to think people are now recovering from this delusion, and we hope he is right.

Let us look for a moment at the various segments of political opinion in the United States, making a loose analysis of the population for this purpose. It must be said that the great majority of Americans are still resting upon the somewhat faded political laurels earned by their ancestors. They are going through the traditional motions of political responsibility, while feeling vaguely discouraged at the mounting problems of the nation and the growing complexity of the processes of self-government, which they do not understand and are not about to attempt to understand. There is no radical movement in the United States, today, unless it be the pacifist movement. The few communists who remain are the extreme rightists of collectivist social philosophy. Most socialists have either become "liberals" or remain nominally socialists while exploring in a questioning mood the most obscure political scene of some two hundred years of history. The journals of serious political opinion no longer represent the driving energy of men with programs, but have turned into organs of critical commentary which pursue sociological muckraking investigations. Practical politics, today, is in a state of total drift, so far as new

ideas or new moral inspiration are concerned. The labor movement is in no sense revolutionary and has not been so for many years.

There is a sense in which Western man seems to have exhausted the potentiality of political forms of action. If Dr. Arendt and others are right, the military form of action has reached a *reductio ad absurdum* with the development of nuclear weapons. Only symbolic action is now possible at this level, since "real" action would almost certainly put an end to both the political and the human community. Visionaries still dream of a decentralized agrarian society in which the virtues of the good earth would impart their healing magic to small-scale community units, but no one can think of how to bring such a reconstitution of society about. The isolated capitalist state with a "free market" economy is equally impossible to imagine in a world made small by the technology of rapid communications and transport, and centralized collectivism is hardly an ideal that any Westerner in his right mind is willing to pursue. What is left?

So far as we can see, the only thing left is to reformulate the issues of human life in non-political terms, and to set about the business of creating a better life according to those terms, within the framework of existing political institutions. This would not mean the total abandonment of politics, but rather a sensible refusal, at last, to expect of politics something which it cannot possibly provide—a good life for human beings. Politics may be able to supplement and stabilize the order of the good life after it has been achieved, but the temper of human goodness arises from a substance beyond and above the political level of reality.

In what terms, then, ought the good life to be defined? It was given a political definition in the eighteenth century, but for long centuries before that it had a moral definition. Today, after many disillusionments with the unfulfilled promises of political good, we resist returning to moral definitions, and we may never return to them.

This is a fact of interest about the present, which ought to be explained. Those who are old enough to remember the political discussions of the 1930's, during the hard years of the Great Depression, will recall that any attempt to introduce ideas of individual morality as having importance was rejected with impatience, and even contempt. Such talk was regarded as either unrealistic naïveté, or as a device to escape from *social* responsibility. The only sound and pertinent equation relating to the social good had to do with the distribution of wealth. It was generally believed that the economic system which would accomplish an equitable distribution of material goods was the key to the good life for all. The contempt for any apparently "moralistic" doctrine had its genesis in the centuries of exploitation of the poor by the rich, masked by religious sanction of class privilege and the power of inherited land, wealth, and authority. The role of religion during the long centuries of revolutionary struggle for equality and justice was anything but distinguished, and those who now see the lack in merely political solutions of our problems are precisely those with a clear historical sense and a natural reluctance to propose new solutions in the language of a religious or moralistic tradition that was so misused.

This historical situation does not apply to the same extent in other parts of the world. In India, for example, where the beginnings of a new kind of politics seem to be emerging, there is not the same alienation from religion, although the Gandhian heritage is certainly revolutionary in a religious sense, by comparison with orthodox Brahminism. In any event, the traditional religious values of Indian religion have re-embodiment in the social philosophy of Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, although how they will develop in the non-sectarian framework of a great social reform will remain to be seen.

In the United States, it seems more likely that the ethics of the future will draw instead upon the growing resources of modern psychotherapy—a

school of thinking which, while not "irreligious" in the sense of aggressively condemning religion, obviously prefers to develop its moral values by independent reflection and from the empiricism of individual psychological experience. "Health," rather than "goodness," is the acceptable criterion for the new imperatives of moral behavior. In this way all the self-conscious stickiness of pretense to "virtue" is eliminated, while a strong, impersonal ethic results. Something of the promise of this development may be seen already in the works of Erich Fromm, Clark Moustakas, A. H. Maslow, and Viktor Frankl. It has been apparent for years that the psychotherapists have important things to say concerning the psychological health of modern society. Not many of them have felt the call or had the courage to speak out. Erich Fromm is a notable exception, and his book, *The Sane Society*, is perhaps epoch-making for this reason. It is fair to say that no thoughtful doctor, whether of body or mind, who has to do with the ills of modern man can help but recognize that grave ills afflict contemporary society. A generation ago, they drove one impulsive physician, Norman Bethune, the inventor of the collapsed lung treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis, into the ranks of the Communists. He tired of healing poor patients who were doomed to eventually succumb by economic conditions which made recovery impossible.

The "dyed-in-the-wool anti-collectivists" who want to avoid the irreversible disasters of the fully developed Welfare State had better recognize that only thorough-going individual responsibility on the part of men who have economic power can avert what they fear. The state is a kind of octopus which inevitably takes over in areas where there is a breakdown of individual responsibility. No system of any sort, whether of social welfare or of individualism, can ever replace the full duties of the individual.

The obvious problem, here, is the old question of "What can one man do?" In the face of this apparent futility, the answer has always been,

*"Organize!"* And so, with this answer, we are back at our earlier beginnings, beginnings which have been followed by final failures, since from organization of the masses we have produced the totalitarian Collectivist State, and from organization of the classes we have produced the Organization Man, whose qualities are equally unattractive, although we probably don't recognize this fact as yet, there being so many of Him around.

What we have to learn from all this is the complete impossibility of converting either set of rival virtues—either the sterling qualities of the self-reliant, make-your-own-way individualist, or the active conscience and altruistic concern of the social philosopher—into a workable political system. Nor can even the two kinds of virtues be successfully merged in a *system*. They have to combine, first, in human beings, and then, perhaps, a system appropriate to both our capacities and our problems will come quietly into being, as the natural expression of the character of the people by whom it is to be.

## *REVIEW*

### "FREE EXPRESSION" BY JUSTICE DOUGLAS

AMONG political philosophers in public life, Justice William O. Douglas has no peer. This eminent member of the Supreme Court of the United States, whose forthright analyses of the essential ingredients of working democracy are often disapproved by reactionaries, is a consistent educator in matters of principle. Now a new paperback (Pyramid), *The Right of the People*, presenting his lectures delivered at Franklin and Marshall College in 1957, provides lucid statements on civil rights.

The first lecture, "Freedom of Expression," explores the meaning of the First Amendment. As Justice Douglas shows, it is possible for a presumed "democracy" to suffer from attitudinal totalitarianism. In Russia and China, totalitarian attitudes are overt, but similar rigidities of mind can overtake America unless education in the meaning of "freedom" is continuous:

In the totalitarian state there is freedom of expression in a limited sense. In Russia there are great debates concerning the course to follow, the choice of procedures, the policy that should be adopted in factories or on farms. Criticism fills the papers and magazines of Russia. But this criticism and debate do not challenge communism as a system. Rather, they assume that communism is the ideal state. Once that postulate is expressed or implied, discussion and debate go on apace. The same seems to be true in Red China, where the communist regime recently approved a new slogan derived from the Chinese classics: "Let hundreds of schools crow in competition." Yet in both Soviet Russia and Red China, if the discussion goes so far as to question the premise on which communism rests, it is condemned as counter-revolutionary.

My thesis is that there is no free speech in the full meaning of the term unless there is freedom to challenge the very postulates on which the existing regime rests. It is my belief that our First Amendment must be placed in that broad frame of reference and construed to permit even discourse or advocacy that strikes at the very foundation of our institutions. The First Amendment was a new and bold experiment. It staked everything on unlimited

public discussion. It chose conflicting values, selecting the freedom to talk, to argue, and to advocate as a preferred right. It placed us on the side of free discussion and advocacy, come what may.

The First Amendment does not say that there is freedom of expression provided the talk is not "dangerous." It does not say that there is freedom of expression provided the utterance has no tendency to subvert. It does not put free speech and freedom of the press in the category of housing, sanitation, hours of work, factory conditions, and the like, and make it subject to regulation for the public good.

Justice Douglas speaks forcefully of the dangers of military encroachment upon private freedoms. "It is," he writes, "a great and dangerous weakness to take the attitude that the military can solve our important problems":

We need the force of public opinion marshaled against this trend.

As Fairman has said, "For an ordeal of blood, sweat, and tears, a nation must draw upon its deepest spiritual roots. Army rule is not the sort of leadership that evokes an all-consuming popular effort—quite the contrary. The 'unspoken premise' that the Army must 'take over' is dangerous on spiritual as well as on administrative grounds."

There is wisdom in the tenet that the military should not take over the functions of civilian authorities even in days of war, unless the public danger makes it imperative. For as Briand said to Lloyd George in World War I, "War is much too serious a thing to be left to military men."

Pacifists and conscientious objectors will be particularly interested in Justice Douglas' remarks during a lecture on religious freedom, for here we find recognition of the fact that the right of conscience, in respect to refusal of military service, must not be regarded merely as a privilege—nor simply as a provision for persons who are members of "recognized" religious sects. The Selective Service Act of 1940 has not, Douglas shows, been adequately interpreted from a constitutional standpoint:

The 1940 Act, as amended in 1948, made individual religious conviction the test, whether or not the individual belonged to an organized religious group: But the religious conviction test was somewhat narrowly defined to mean "an individual's belief in a

relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."

If the exemption of the conscientious objector is not a matter of grace, but protected by the First Amendment, then it seems clear that it is irrelevant that he is not a member of a religious group but stands on his own. It likewise seems irrelevant that he does not believe in a Supreme Being. Freedom of religion should include freedom to be an atheist, an agnostic, or a spiritualist.

When the conscience of man cries out against taking a certain step or performing a certain act, he should have the same protection under the First Amendment as those whose conscientious objections have been formalized into a creed.

*The Right of the People* is more than a series of illuminating essays by one man, for Justice Douglas often selects quotations from other contemporary jurists to illustrate matters of constitutional principle. Fragments of decisions—and sometimes of dissenting opinions—establish the stature of Justices Black, Frankfurter, Brandeis, Hughes and Warren. A few statements by Warren, for example, in a decision which went against the House Un-American Activities Committee, explains the background of a pointed controversy. Chief Justice Warren said:

An excessively broad charter, like that of the House Un-American Activities Committee, places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance between the public need for a particular interrogation and the right of citizens to carry on their affairs free from unnecessary governmental interference. It is impossible in such a situation to ascertain whether any legislative purpose justifies the disclosures sought. . . .

When the definition of jurisdictional pertinency is as uncertain and wavering as in the case of the Un-American Activities Committee, it becomes extremely difficult for the Committee to limit its inquiries to statutory pertinency.

Closely related is the subject of loyalty oaths. In a notable dissent, Justice Black spoke of all test oaths as the "implacable foe of free thought." After making plain the position taken by Thomas Jefferson in respect to such matters and tracing

the lineage of "opposition to test oaths," Justice Douglas summarizes their adverse effects:

Those who refuse to take such an oath are often eminent people who object to the requirement of the oath, although they could truthfully sign it. An organization that uses the non-communist oath does not lose subversives—it loses qualified men who do not believe that a teacher or employee should be singled out and made to forswear a course of past conduct. The casualties inflicted by the test oath are in the main not suffered by those at whom the salvo is aimed.

The exculpatory oath and the test oath are extremely unwise choices to determine qualifications for employment. Procedures may be set up to establish a lawyer's qualifications to practice law, a teacher's competence to teach, or a citizen's fitness for government employment. The test oath and the exculpatory oath do not materially aid the inquiry.

When these oaths relate to past conduct, or to matters of conscience and belief, our history and heritage are on the side of the man who refuses the oath.

Discussing "The Right to Defy an Unconstitutional Statute," Justice Douglas explains why respect must be accorded nonviolent "direct actionists" of the present:

The moral right to defy an unjust law was certainly not unknown in the American colonies. John Locke, an intellectual father of the American Revolution, wrote that, if the sovereign should require anything which appears unlawful to the private person, he is not obliged to obey that law against his conscience. Locke's philosophy found expression in the Declaration of Independence.

Emerson wrote that "no greater American existed than Thoreau." Thoreau's insistence on his right to lead his own life and to resist the encroachment of government was typically American. In 1846, he refused to pay the town tax because he disapproved of the purposes for which the money was to be spent. For this, he spent a night in jail. He was released only after a friend had "interfered" and paid the tax. His short imprisonment resulted in Thoreau's dramatic essay on civil disobedience, where he insisted that he had the right to disobey an unjust law. "Under a government which imprisons any unjustly," he wrote, "the true place for a just man is also a prison."

## COMMENTARY

### A NEW FOLKWAY

PEACE WALKS it seems, are here to stay. Probably the first walk to gain world-wide attention was the Aldermaston March of 1959 in which British pacifists and objectors to nuclear armament walked the fifty-three miles from the British Atomic Weapons center at Aldermaston to London (March 27-31). This anti-war pilgrimage ended with a meeting of some fifteen thousand people massed in Trafalgar Square, which was said by the *Manchester Guardian* to be possibly the biggest demonstration in England during the twentieth century.

The next public protest of this sort to catch the popular imagination was the San Francisco-to-Moscow Walk of 1960-61, in which the people of many nations participated. The core team of Americans which began the walk in San Francisco in December was joined by others who went varying distances across the country. The European segment of the walk brought additions from the people of the countries through which it passed. Dozens of Walks have since been sponsored and carried out by peace workers in many parts of the world, the most recent extensive trek in the United States being last year's San Diego-to-Vallejo Walk which ended with civil disobedience demonstrations by several of the participants at the naval installation at Mare Island.

Now another great walk has begun—called the Friendship March—from New Delhi, the capital of India, to Peking, the capital of China. It is described by Radhakrishna in this week's *Frontiers*. Indian peace-makers have perhaps more reason than those in other countries to adopt this method of showing their convictions, since for eleven years the Gandhian leader, Vinoba Bhave, has been walking from village to village in an endeavor to solve India's land problem, in the spirit of *Satyagraha* or non-violence. Vinoba's aim is to achieve a redistribution of agricultural

land—by gifts (*Bhoodan*) from those who have more land than they need to those with less, or none—and by the more thoroughgoing gift of all the land of a region to the village community itself, which is then held in common by the inhabitants and used cooperatively. This kind of gift is called *Gramdan*.

Readers will recall the article; "Across National Barriers," by Ed Lazar, in *MANAS* for Jan. 16 of this year, in which a walk from India to China, such as is now being undertaken, was proposed. This idea, no doubt in the minds of Indians as well as Americans, was adopted by Indian pacifists and became a project of the Sarva Seva Sangh, the body which represents the federation of institutions and organizations Gandhi helped to found. Mr. Radhakrishna, writer of this week's *Frontiers* article, is General Secretary of the Sarva Seva Sangh. "After Gandhi," he explains, "these various organizations merged themselves into one and now coordinate their activities through this group."

To make an interesting supplement to Mr. Radhakrishna's account, we print some extracts from a letter by one of the American participants in the March, written on its third day (March 3), in the town of Dadree. Our correspondent says:

The walk has thirteen core participants, two Japanese, two from the U.S., two English, one Austrian, and six Indians. There are also a Swiss boy and three other Japanese with us at present, besides many other Indians. We started at 5:30 P.M. from the Gandhi Memorial at Rajghat, in New Delhi, after a moving and colorful farewell. Surprisingly, our reception has been most warm and the people appreciate what we have to say—I say "surprising" because India is a nation at war and we are talking of friendship and understanding reconciliation with the "enemy." . . .

In the small towns and villages through which we've passed thus far, we have been emphasizing that people must place human values before nationalism and recognize that an arms race will increase tensions and the likelihood of war, besides wasting resources that should be used for the development of India and China. . . . We have no definite word as yet about whether the Chinese will admit us. . . .

The Indian Government has taken no steps in opposition to the March, and Prime Minister Nehru refused to arrest its participants when a Congress Party member of the Indian Parliament asked him why they were not jailed for making a demonstration which runs counter to Indian national policy.

Just possibly, these various "walks" represent the creation of a new folkway—a way of turning individual human responsibility for peace into a living idea that will eventually reach around the world. There is little hope for the world without the spread of this idea. Great populations are now in the grip of institutions which are totally unable to take the initiative for peace. This grip must be broken, and only individuals have the power to take such a revolutionary step. All the world waits for the sense of this power of individuals to take root and grow.

This kind of demonstration, then, has a meaning which goes far beyond its immediate end of opposition to war. It represents new principles of human behavior and stands for the creation of a new kind of social life.

# CHILDREN

## . . . and Ourselves

### CHILDREN AND THE MYTHS OF WAR

A PAMPHLET with this title, prepared by John Rae for the Friends Peace Committee, is another indication of the trend toward "hard-headed" pacifist argument. A similar theme finds expression in the current film, *Reach for Glory*, and, as a writer in *Anarchy* (January) put it, conditioning towards violence is quite evidently "aided and abetted by the entire adult world." A single paragraph from *Children and the Myths of War* illustrates Mr. Rae's argument:

During the war a generation grew up in a world that glorified violence and it was inevitable that some of that generation should have become violent themselves; they used knives and razors instead of bayonets and flame-throwers, but the result was usually the same. And today if a young thug kills an old woman it is because killing is still . . . accepted . . . you need some money so you bash an old lady on the head; you need law and order so you hang a few murderers; you need the Canal so you shoot a few Egyptians; you need national independence so you are prepared to drop a bomb that will kill a quarter of a million people, all of whom will be no more deserving of death than the old woman. I do not believe that you can separate the different forms of killing, state-owned and private enterprise. Where one breeds, so will the other; when it comes to reproducing itself, violence can compete with the amoeba.

Arthur Uloth's review in *Anarchy* proposes that while Rae's dramatizations are effective shock-material, the development of positive peace-making attitudes is the real problem. Mr. Uloth writes:

By all means let us do all in our power to counter the cult of war and violence which is thrust upon children. I do not think that the situation in this field is as hopeless as is often supposed. It is a popular saying that "children are little savages," but there are degrees of savagery, and there are plenty of children who detest real violence, and avoid it as much as they can. Instead of being made to feel ashamed of themselves as they are today they should be encouraged to develop their non-violent attitudes.

The cruelty of children is always "news," like the man who bit the dog. The kindness of children is forgotten. It can never be the basis of a sensational novel or a dramatic film, so it tends to get overlooked. The children who dislike violence are our potential allies.

And there are of course different sorts of violence as well. There is a world of difference between the situation where a small boy rushes into the kitchen with a toy pistol and shouts, "Bang! Bang! you're dead. You must lie on the floor," and the situation where the same little boy, a couple of years later is put into barrack-like conditions and made to do drill. The one situation is a play situation, the other is serious. In the first case the little boy knows at heart that it is a game. In the second the dividing line between play and reality has become dangerously blurred, to say the least of it. We are already in the world of reality, and the guns may have real bullets in them, as in the film. The violence in the first situation is no more than an outlet for childhood's energy, in the second it is violence under discipline, violence stimulated and at the same time kept in check, to be released at the appropriate moment and directed in accordance with the rulers' desires, as one directs the water through a hose.

Again, it would surely be wrong to make children feel guilty, as is sometimes done, about getting angry, punching their parents or throwing things about. And surely there is too a certain degree of legitimate self-defensive violence? One does not have to submit to being knocked about or bullied in the interests of world peace. Nor should children who enjoy games of war, cowboys, Indians, pirates and so forth be made to feel abnormal in present society. (Actually those children who most delight in such games are by no means always those who become most militaristically-minded in after life. Here again one needs to distinguish between the "bang-bang" sort of violence, the "friendly wrestle" sort of violence and the real savage, hurtful kind of fighting. A child may not care for all three. A taste for the first and second does not imply necessarily a taste for the third.)

This is an interesting point—that the children who most delight in the games of imaginary violence are not especially likely to have a penchant for violence in later life. In thinking back over our own experience this seems to be true. Perhaps the reason is that the uninhibited child, enjoying games of imaginary violence, and having no particular reason to distrust his

motivations, fully realizes that the "game" is strictly symbolic. The emotionally disturbed child, on the other hand, doesn't feel the same freedom to "play" in this way; he *feels* violence as a personal emotion and may also feel that he should be ashamed of it.

Mr. Uloth sums up from the anarchist view:

To teach children the truth about war, about the horror, futility and ingloriousness of it, is not enough. The logic of authoritarian society demands armies and war. It is no good encouraging constructive interests, as opposed to warlike ones, if the children are eventually going to be whisked away by conscription, or whatever the modern equivalent will be in the "exciting" new age of rocket-bombs and push-buttons. The children will have to learn the origins of war. They will have to learn that society is unjust, to its very foundations. They will have to learn that our economic and social arrangements cause war and that, if war is to be abolished, these must be done away with and new ones substituted.

Mr. Uloth is no doubt largely right, but we should prefer to say that "economic and social arrangements" are *among* the causes of war—or that they are proximate causes—whereas the root causes are primarily psychological and philosophical. Adverse "conditioning" by any aspect of the environment will eventually induce reactions which culminate in violence, but the adverse conditioning which is most important is not, we feel, so much circumstantial as it is attitudinal. It has long been assumed that most Asians put up with degrading circumstances because they are temperamentally unable to gear themselves to violent rebellion. Now we know that this is not so, but rather that the attitudes that make for war have never been widespread in regions where Buddhism has left its mark.

Unfortunately, the incursions of Christian culture have typically increased violence in Asia—despite the fact that Eastern social systems have often worked great hardships upon the downtrodden. What is the essential difference? Basically it is that if you believe that evil can be erased by violence, you will have many who feel able to "locate" evil and to attempt the erasing.

Asian social systems may have many intolerable features from a Western point of view, and Asian attitudes of resignation may be most unattractive, yet on this point we have still a lot to learn. Perhaps we can learn it before the Asians in turn become so Westernized that they decide to wipe the "evil capitalists" off the face of the earth—making the project of mutual destruction a world-wide affair.

## *FRONTIERS*

### Peace Walk—India to China

ON March 1, 1963, the Indian Peace Movement launched from Rajghat, in New Delhi, the spot where Gandhi was cremated, a Friendship March from Delhi to Peking. The March is envisaged as a trek on foot over the distance of 4,000 miles between the two capitals. Marchers will walk eight to ten miles per day and hope to cover the distance within fifteen to eighteen months. During their halts in wayside villages and towns the Marchers will take the opportunity to meet people from door to door and in meetings, and to explain why they were inspired to undertake the March, and what social climate they expect to achieve by the March.

The March is International in its auspices and personnel. It consists of two Americans, seven Indians, two Japanese and two British. Four more—one from the U.S., one from South Africa, one from Ceylon and one from South Eastern Asian Region are expected to join. The Shanti Sena Mandal of India made the proposal and the World Peace Brigade has now taken up the organization.

The March will cover almost equal distances in India and China and the basic message of the March is addressed to the people of India as well as the Chinese. Commencing from Delhi, it will cover areas of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, go through East Pakistan, on to Assam, to Nagaland and Burma, before getting into China. At the moment of starting the journey, there was no indication of what attitude the Chinese Government will take regarding the entry of Marchers.

The basic message of the March is twofold. It seeks to express the desire for communication between the people of China and India as also to discuss with people in the villages and towns along the route the problems of war and peace, and issues which might divide them unless mutual understanding is achieved. In a world of increasing Governmental responsibility and

centralisation, the Marchers plead that people of any country should retain their direct democratic initiative. The destiny of any country—which in this age is almost equivalent to the destiny of the whole world—is too important to be surrendered to an individual or a small group of people, however benevolent or inspired. The March is an attempt to reawaken in India and China the feeling of the individual's responsibility for his fellowmen, and individual responsibility for the acts of Governments. The individual should be encouraged to respond creatively to new situations.

The other aspect of the message of the Marchers is that violence and wars do not solve any problem. Their commitment to non-violence is not merely a matter of discipline for the March but as a way of life and a basic method to achieve creative social change and resolve conflicts. They believe "that no good can come to any one from armaments, much less from war; no problem can be solved by such means, especially in this atomic age." Indian and Chinese involvement in an arms race or resulting conflict, they say, will only contribute to the process of mounting militarisation, which may well involve us all in a global war and annihilation. The energies wasted on war and preparation for it could well be utilised for bettering living conditions throughout the world.

As they left on the March the group urged the people of India and China to seek to resolve their conflict in a nonviolent manner by—

- (a) placing human values before nationalism,
- (b) devoting individual energies to building a nonviolent society through social and economic cooperation
- (c) establishing personal contact and cultural exchange between India and China;
- (d) learning methods of nonviolent action like massive non-cooperation as an alternative to war, and
- (e) writing to newspapers and speaking publicly to end the promotion of a war psychology.

They have expressed the hope that individuals can also stimulate their governments to—

- (a) negotiate differences in a positive spirit;
- (b) accept third party arbitration, if necessary, perhaps by a balanced group of neutral nations;
- (c) find areas in which cooperation between India and China is possible—for example in Joint projects;
- (d) begin a process of unilateral disarmament and enlarged peacetime economic development
- (e) continue to sponsor Chinese participation in International Councils such as the UNO; and
- (f) to be keenly aware of and to take necessary steps for the protection of minority rights.

Ever since the commencement of the Sino-India border dispute the Indian peace movement has been undergoing what might be called a crisis of conscience. In spite of the fact that the movement fully subscribes to the fundamental faith of non-participation in war, the situation is such that the movement has found itself in full sympathy with India. It has felt that the conflict has been forced upon India and an aggression has obviously been committed. It urges the believer in non-violence to devote all his energies to the task of increasing the people's power of nonviolent resistance. This nonviolent resistance should, however, be not meant to secure victory in a conflict for any one party, but only to establish truth and friendship.

The efforts of the Sarvodaya movement are directed towards enrolling large numbers of volunteers for peace work and strengthening the peace corps in the border districts. It is also well realised that a mere programme of resistance alone is inadequate to meet the challenge inherent in the present situation. The situation calls for a programme to establish and strengthen the values of justice and equality in the economic and social fabric of the nation. This they have taken up through intensifying the Bhoodan (land-gift) and the Gramdan (village-gifts) programme. In the midst of the temporary insanity that has enveloped the atmosphere, the Sarvodaya movement has called for continued negotiations and the preservation of an atmosphere of non-enmity and renewed efforts to end this conflict.

This pilgrimage of Friendship is undertaken in the spirit of seeking to establish friendship and understanding and not in any effort to resolve any of the outstanding issues between India and China. For, obviously, the people of these countries themselves have to find solutions and this quest of the Marchers is not conceived so as to sit in judgment upon anybody over one issue or another. On the contrary, the marchers hope that by carrying the message of friendship people will be helped to consider problems out of narrow limitations. This should import new dimensions into thinking and help one to relate basic non-violent attitudes to situations of conflict today. It is a revival of the historical tradition of travellers from China to India, who not only increased communication between these countries, but helped in widening understanding and establishing closer and friendly links.

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