VOLUME XVII, NO. 29
JULY 15, 1964

TOWARD A SCIENCE OF MAN

OUR article, "The Edge of the Abyss" (MANAS, April 1), was in part a continuation of the discussion of the preceding issue ("Toward a Redefinition of Science"—March 25). It brought a second letter of comment from Ralph Borsodi. (His first letter, concerned with the March 25 lead article, was printed in Frontiers for May 27.) We have held this second communication for several weeks, mainly in order to accumulate some further perspectives on the issues raised. In it Mr. Borsodi says:

> The fact that you recur to "man as subject" in your April 1 issue makes me burden you with a second letter.
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> Your hearty endorsement of Matson's proposal for "a new and constructive science of human behavior" must surely make it necessary to accept the fact that no such "reconstructive science" can be created if the subject is studied subjectively. No matter how extraordinary the insights which can be—and have been—obtained by introspection, it will never produce a science. It will produce only—as it has in the past—an endless variety of doctrines, religions, philosophies, and pseudo-sciences, none of which will achieve the consensus which alone will provide confused mankind the conviction it needs. What is needed to provide this is a consensus as complete as that which has developed with regard to the heliocentric theory and the theory of evolution; without that, the existing confusion about "man as subject" will continue.
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> Such a consensus will emerge only if both the conclusions of the new science can be tested objectively and the methodology it uses in arriving at them can be used scientifically by anybody and everybody. If both conclusions and methodology are then accepted by a sufficient number of authorities—men trained by science to detect fallacies and inadequacies—it will establish itself in precisely the same way in which the heliocentric theory and the theory of evolution have established themselves.
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> The problem boils down to this: What is it that can be used to establish the truth about the nature of man's nature including his subjective nature, which is of an objective nature? As I said in my previous letter, the answer to this question points to *individual human actions.* Man reveals objectively what he is subjectively in only one way—by what he does. As the Chinese put it, "I hear what you say, but I see what you do."
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> It is true that what human beings do, as reflected in both individual and institutionalized actions, is a compound of what is in-built in the species hereditarily and genetically, and what is acquired after birth environmentally and culturally. The first component is invariant and the second endlessly variable. But my own studies, even though based upon only a trifle over 8,000 cases, convince me that whenever a sufficient number of cases of particular types are used, it becomes relatively easy to distinguish what is invariant from what is variable in human nature.
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> The ironic fact is that I know of no other studies of this kind, and as I said in my last book, until others use the same method and on a large enough scale, my confidence in it will not be vindicated. Because of the complexity of the human animal—a complexity great enough in all animals but rendered infinitely greater in man because of *homo sapiens'* subjective characteristics, we would need many scientific workers in the field using hundreds of thousands of cases to create a science and produce a consensus. But until this is done, assuming that the methodology proves valid, and we establish as a result norms for human behavior, we will continue to put into the hands of *homo sapiens* more and more of both material and organized power than he can use without making himself miserable, and without danger now that he may entirely destroy himself.

It is the task of the philosopher of science to choose the best methods of investigation in a given field. Mr. Borsodi's letter is a brief outline of a decision of this sort. If we understand him correctly, and a capsule account of his meaning be allowed, he is proposing that Behavioristic methods be followed, but without the prejudicial assumptions of the Behaviorists. The Behaviorists deny meaning to the idea of "subjective " reality in man, and can have no interest, therefore, in

seeking evidence of its nature; Mr. Borsodi affirms the reality and acknowledges the importance of the subjective, and is interested in obtaining such evidence, by means of behavioristic research, along with evidence revealing the character of other aspects of man's nature.

There is a sense in which Mr. Borsodi's proposal lies in the center of the flow of the great tradition of American psychology. If we go back to William James, we find him insisting that psychologists must exhaust the possibilities of "objective" science in the study of man. In his introduction to *The Principles of Psychology,* which was a survey of the disciplines of physiological psychology—and therefore a forerunner of Behaviorism, although without its focus on the conditioned reflex—James wrote:

> To work an hypothesis "for all it is worth" is the real, and often the only, way to prove its insufficiency. I shall therefore assume without scruple at the outset that the uniform correlation of brain-states with mind-states is a law of nature. The interpretation of the law in detail will best show where its facilities and where its difficulties lie. To some readers such an assumption will seem like the most unjustifiable *a priori* materialism. In one sense it doubtless is materialism: it puts the Higher at the mercy of the Lower. But although we affirm that the *coming to pass* of thought is a consequence of mechanical laws,—we do not in the least explain the *nature* of thought by affirming this dependence, and in that latter sense our proposition is not materialism.

Elsewhere James added:

> At present psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo and the laws of motion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the notion that mass is preserved in all reactions. The Galileo and Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed when they come, as come they some day surely will, or past successes are no index to the future. When they do come, however, the necessities of the case will make them "metaphysical."

Now if "metaphysical" can be taken to have among its meanings reliance on introspection for some of the data of psychology, then there are a number of men working in Psychology today who are testing the reliability of James's prophecy. Meanwhile, Mr. Borsodi would restrict research to objective or "objectified" material. Any other sort of evidence concerning the nature of man, he proposes, will remain unverifiable and therefore unpersuasive. He chooses to work the traditional conception of science "for all it is worth" in psychology. It hardly needs pointing out that a great many people share this general view, although we do not suggest that others are pursuing the same sort of research Mr. Borsodi has undertaken. The common element is the methodological assumption.

What other views are there about the practice of psychological science?

In the Fall 1963 number of the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* Dr. Carl R. Rogers sets out to give an answer to this question. In a paper entitled "Toward a Science of the Person," he begins:

> I share with Maslow and others the view that there are three emphases in American psychology. These resemble three ocean currents flowing side-by-side, mingling, with no clear line of demarcation, yet definitely different none the less. Like the flotsam and jetsam which floats on each ocean current, certain words and phrases identify, even though they do not define, these separate flowing trends. Associated with the first trend are terms such as *behaviorism, objective, experimental, impersonal, logical-positivistic, operational, laboratory.* Associated with the second current are terms such as *Freudian, Neo-Freudian, psychoanalytic, psychology of the unconscious, instinctual, ego-psychology, id-psychology, dynamic psychology.* Associated with the third are terms such as *phenomenological, existential, self-theory, self-actualization, health-and-growth psychology, being and becoming, science of inner experience.*

In this paper, Dr. Rogers proposes an answer to the question: "What are the consequences, for psychological theory and research, of the third stream of thought—the phenomenological, existential, self-theory stream?" He adds that he will not attempt to speak for "psychology as a whole," nor even, except as an individual who is part of it, for the third trend, since the latter is

"too diversified, its boundaries too vague." After review of what he conceives to be the different sorts of "knowing" which take place within the work of this third stream, Dr. Rogers offers this general conclusion:

> One of the major consequences of this phenomenalistic-existential trend is that psychology will become a more inclusive and a more profound science. There are, without doubt, some individuals in this current of thought who maintain the hope that this new point of view will supplant the behaviorist trend, but to me this is both highly undesirable and highly unlikely. Rather it will mean, I believe, that psychology will preserve the advances and contributions which have come from the behavioristic development, but will go beyond this. Psychology will now be capable of focusing on a broader reality, which will include not only behavior, but the person and the perspective of the observer, and the person and perspective of the observed. It will recognize, as physical scientists have been forced to recognize, that "as human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a centre lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to absurdity" (Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge,* 1958). It is from this absurdity that the new trend will rescue the science of man.

Dr. Rogers now turns to a measured defense of this view of psychology:

> It is quite unfortunate that we have permitted the world of psychological science to be narrowed to behaviors observed, sounds emitted, marks scratched on paper, and the like. In an attempt to be ultrascientific, psychology has endeavored to walk in the footsteps of a Newtonian physics. Oppenheimer has expressed himself strongly on this, saying that "the worst of all possible misunderstandings would be that psychology be influenced to model itself on a physics which is not there any more, which has been quite outdated." ("Analogy in Science," *American Psychologist,* 1956 127-135.) I think there is quite general agreement that this is the path into which our logical-positivist behaviorism led us.
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> As I read the history and philosophy of science, there seems to me no alternative to the view that science in every field has advanced by discovering new perspectives, by theorizing in new ways, by utilizing new methods, quite without regard to the question of whether they fitted into the then current tradition in science. While, of course, it is obvious that the newness of a method or a theory or a perspective is no guarantee of its heuristic value, it is nevertheless true that science should resolutely set its face against anything which would limit its scope, or which would arbitrarily narrow the methods or perspectives of its own pursuit of knowledge.
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> Valuable as have been the contributions of behaviorism I believe that time will indicate the unfortunate effects of the bounds it has tended to impose. To limit oneself to consideration of externally observable behaviors, to rule out consideration of the whole universe of inner meanings, of purposes, of the inner flow of experiencing, seems to me to be closing our eyes to great areas which confront us when we look at the human world. Furthermore, to hold the beliefs, which seem to me to characterize many behaviorists, that science is impersonal, that knowledge is an entity, that science somehow carries itself forward without the subjective person of the scientist being involved, is, I think, completely illusory.
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> In contrast, the trend of which I am speaking will attempt to face up to all of the realities in the psychological realm. Instead of being restrictive and inhibiting, it will throw open the whole range of human experiencing to scientific study. It will explore private worlds of inner personal meanings, in an effort to discover lawful and orderly relationships there. In this world of inner meanings it can investigate all the issues which are meaningless for the behaviorist—purposes goals, values, choice, perceptions of self, perceptions of others, the personal constructs with which we build our world the responsibilities we accept or reject, the whole phenomenal world of the individual with its connective tissue of meaning. Not one aspect of this world is open to the strict behaviorist. Yet that these elements have significance for man's behavior seems certainly true.
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> It is clear to me as it is to the behaviorist that to enter these areas, which have always been thought of as the realm of the subjective, could lead to a morass of speculation and introspectionism. But the vital hope for the future is the fact that this does not necessarily follow, as I hope I can show. If this trend should lead only to a pseudo science, as I am afraid the Freudian insights have done, then it would be tragic indeed. But there is increasing evidence that this need not and probably will not be so.

So much for the pros and cons of the argument about subjectivism in psychology. At this point, all we can be sure of is that the argument is a big one, and will continue into the future. Actually, issues of this sort, which are essentially philosophical, not matters of fact so much as questions about the nature of man, are never finally settled, and certainly not settled by argument. Quite possibly, much more important than the argument itself are the incidental insights it produces along the way. For example, there is Dr. Rogers' questioning as "completely illusory" of the assumption "that science is impersonal, that knowledge is an entity, that science somehow carries itself forward without the subjective person of the scientist being involved." This apparently casual challenge has implications which, in sum, threaten total subversion to an exceedingly widespread modern conceit: That in Science men who are both righteous and intelligent have a bludgeon which they can use to *make* people "see the truth" and conform to the best possible design for the Good Society.

If you think about it, you see that Dr. Rogers has endless documentation and support for this challenge. It begins, you could say, with Buddhism's *Diamond Sutra* and continues in unbroken line through all the legitimate questionings of the finality of *any* statement about values based on "objective reality." The challenge is backed, in modern thought, by the entire content of E. A. Burtt's *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science,* more recently by David Lindsay Watson's (unfortunately neglected) *Scientists Are Human* (London: Watts, 1938), and in another way by the epistemological impasse reached by every serious logical-positivist thinker.

The important "scientific truth" of any age is important because the *men* of that age *think* it is important. This thinking changes. The uses of "established facts" change with the thinking. Therefore the facts themselves change, because the reality of a fact lies in its *meaning to men,* not in its external shell.

Because men are men, because they are subjective entities and realities, they make the facts serve their purposes. The idea of a "fact" has no meaning at all except in such service. Break this thread of connection between facts and human purposes—purposes which form the continuous, living flow of subjective reality—and you have only a senseless mass of meaningless relationships. It takes a man to give meaning to the facts.

A man armed with facts-plus-meanings which are not understood by other men is as impotent as Cassandra armed with her fateful prophecies. He says, They will *have* to see! but they don't have to see. They are busy with facts-plus-meanings of their own. Whole mountains of facts will not persuade them, save as they climb the mountains, themselves, hewing out their own ascents. The truths—the facts—that make men free are always self-discovered, never borrowed from the recorded certainties of other men. This is a first principle, you could say, of the science of man.

Letter from BEIRUT

BEIRUT.—A world-renowned professor of philosophy at the American University of Beirut recently expressed his regret that this institution is losing its integrated Arab character. A casual walk through the campus illustrates what he may have meant. One meets considerable numbers of Africans and Asians, part of the one thousand such students who represent perhaps 30 per cent of the total.

It would be incautious to describe the "Arab character" by itself or as applied to an institution, but after a five-year absence one has the feeling both in Beirut and elsewhere in the Arab world of a newly intensified search for a character. As with adolescent youth, the old certainties are gone or have proved undependable, and there is an awakening search for identity. For the friendly observer this provides both opportunity and difficulty: opportunity because among Arab friends I have found a new willingness to question and criticize, and difficulty because the phenomena one sees and senses are not sufficiently clear to indicate the nature of the changes one feels. Can these changes be described?

We used to say jokingly of Syria that a *coup d'état* could be expected every six months, and the record of the '50's very closely supports the pleasantry. One quality of these *coups* could once be depended upon: for all the frenzied shouting, nobody ever got hurt. Even in the days of the would-be dictator, Adib Sheshekly, and even according to the scare-hungry columns of far-distant newspapers, shots could seldom be heard.

We used to say, too, that Syria's Ba'ath was the only genuine political party in the Arab world. One of our glib judgments was that if only this *real* political party took power, the Arab world would quickly mature and grow toward political stability. Alas for innocence! The Ba'ath has had and muffed its chance for responsible government in Iraq, and while still in office in Syria, it clearly remains so only at the price of bloody repression, which has to date cost lives up toward the thousands, and may cost more. A few days ago I had a private meeting with a senior member of the Council of Ministers, a personal friend. I said he looked well, to which he replied—"So far. *Insh'allah!"* and ostentatiously touched wood. He was not smiling, and he was not joking.

Violence, then, is one characteristic of some of the changes now taking place in the Arab world. Frustration is another, perhaps more basic. Visiting one day recently with an able Arab economist, a group of Western visitors stopped, enthralled at the sight of a countryman filling his traditional, four-legged goatskin bag at a village water supply. The economist was almost in tears with frustration as he tried to explain that these picturesque customs were the evidences of backwardness which he and others felt it so utterly urgent to replace. There is an ordinance in Cairo banning camels from downtown streets. I saw no camels. But an attempt in the same spirit some years ago to forbid the wearing of the flowing, nightgown-like garment of the male Egyptian ended in quick and convincing failure. A recent major speech in Tunis by President Habib Bourguiba dealt at length with certain customs connected with observance of a major Moslem feast. He estimated that this one feast in April of 1964 would involve the ritual slaughter of 900,000 sheep in Tunisia, most of which had to be imported for the purpose! The importance of the speech was this: having been frustrated in his attempt a year ago to overcome such customs by fiat, the President was wisely taking forethought for 1965 and beginning a very early educational campaign. It is some measure of the difficulty of modernization when a much-respected leader like Bourguiba, solidly in power, must plan a twelve-month campaign to wear away resistance to so simple and sensible a reform.

There is greater diversity of attitude and reaction now in the Arab world than I have ever

before observed. Modernization of the most depressing of monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Yeman is under way, by diverse means. The Hashemita Kingdom of Jordan, formerly the butt of all, is grudgingly conceded a chance, under its courageous little King, of meeting the needs of a modern State organization. Tunisia, described by a former Arab Prime Minister as "The Educative State," is pioneering a thoughtful path toward Socialism, while Syria and Iraq hack their way in the same general direction by main strength. Egypt, as yet frustrated in its moves toward organized Arab political unity, is yet making some strides toward economic and social improvement. But the emphasis one wants to make is that, for perhaps the first time in fifteen years of acquaintance, something is stirring all over the Arab world. The sleep has been long. Dare one hope for a real awakening?

ROVING CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

ONE MEANING FOR DEATH AND REBIRTH

JOSEPH CAMPBELL'S *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* has an important companion volume in *The Wisdom of the Serpent: The Myths of Death, Rebirth, and Resurrection* (Braziller, 1963). The authors, Joseph L. Henderson and Maud Oakes, represent the Jungian school of analytic psychology. Dr. Henderson is a practicing psychiatrist and Maud Oakes is a Bollingen Foundation researcher in comparative religions, ethnology, and symbolism.

In this psychological study of the central myths of universal history, Dr. Henderson views death as a key to the understanding of the conditions of life and growth. There is this paragraph in the first chapter of *The Wisdom of the Serpent:*

> Whenever we find the theme of death, whether in recurrent myths or modern dreams, we find that it is never seen to stand alone as a final act of annihilation. Apart from extreme forms of pathological depression or of infantile sadism, death is universally found to be part of a cycle of death and rebirth, or to be the condition necessary to imagine transcendence of life in an experience of resurrection. Somewhere between the myths of death and rebirth and the myths of death and resurrection we find abundant evidence for another theme in which the experience of death and rebirth is central—the theme of initiation. Initiation provides the archetypal pattern by which the psyche, whether in individuals or in groups of people, is enabled to make a transition from one stage of development to another and therefore brings the theme of death and rebirth into close relation to problems of education whether in a religious or a secular sense.

Chapter IV deals with present-day experience of death and rebirth as initiation. The authors show the intimate relationship between the trials and subsequent initiation of the classical hero and those of the contemporary man or woman whose descent into an apparently hopeless labyrinth of the psyche may be followed by a new discovery of the self:

> The archetype of death and rebirth has become in our time a kind of touchstone for the understanding of certain important psychological experiences of which I should like to present a brief example. In my psychiatric practice I have frequently noticed that when people have what is called euphemistically "a breakdown," this term is a mild reference to what feels to the patient like a death. Still more euphemistically we say such a person is "sick." None of our terms goes the whole way as they would if they did justice to the condition from which such people suffer.
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> I was once forced to hospitalize a patient, not because she was insane but because of an unalterable conviction that she was going to die. In trying to understand what she meant by death I gradually found that death meant to her fear of losing her mind.

During hospitalization, this patient "experienced for many weeks all the horror of Shiva-the-destroyer or confrontation with the Queen of the Dead without any mitigation except during occasional periods of sedation." Finally this particular ordeal ended—the "dangerous mood" was over. The illusory search for homeostasis gave way to acceptance of the saving truth of continual confrontation and transformation of the personality. Dr. Henderson continues:

> I asked what had happened to the mood of death in which I had last seen her, and she replied this had passed when one day she could let herself die, figuratively speaking. It had been a kind of letting go, a diving into the depths until she hit the bottom, and then she said she had been able to come up again and after that she could come back to life. She felt like a different person, one who has been not just renewed but changed in the process, and because this change was so new she felt the need of holding onto it with great care lest it get away from her.

At the conclusion of the chapter on "Initiation as an Education," Dr. Henderson elaborates on the two chief phases of the process, variously dramatized by the mythological hero:

> The experience of the labyrinth, whether as a pictorial design, a dance, a garden path, or a system of corridors in a temple, always has the same psychological effect. It temporarily disturbs rational conscious orientation to the point that like the

Malekulan "dead man" at the sight of Le-Hev-Hev, the initiate is "confused" and symbolically "loses his way." Yet in this descent to chaos the inner mind is opened to the awareness of a new cosmic dimension of a transcendent nature.

And so it is that the spiritual need of modern man reiterates the original initiation pattern: "separation" is followed by "transition" which is followed by "incorporation." This is experienced no longer in the outer ceremonial of past times, but inwardly as a meaningful procession of images: from descent to a death as sacrifice, there is passage to a sacred marriage rite, thence to a symbol of new birth from this union and an ascent and re-emergence into a light of that consciousness which has the power to redeem and reunite those elements of ego or of Self which were originally unconscious. . . After having been quiescently at one with each other, ego and Self were subsequently set at variance, and the initiation archetype was inevitably activated as a panacea to relieve such suffering and resolve the conflict.

From the standpoint of comparative religions, the significance of this study is enormous, affording luminous perspectives. Is the "soul" immortal? From the standpoint of experiential psychology, how shall we account for the central conviction in all religions that the soul continues beyond the death of the body? The following is from a chapter titled "Initiation as Liberation":

In spite of the vast difference between the goals of Christian resurrection and Buddhist liberation, the process of initiatory death and rebirth provides a common denominator which is also the characteristic of any universal religious archetype. Thus in Eastern and Western traditions of initiation we find homologous concepts which imply that there is a psychic reality or soul image which is so real that it cannot merely be dismissed as illusory, yet so changing in its structure that it cannot be concretized once and for all. The concept of a "subtle" or "divine" body becomes therefore the object of an "opus" or psycho-philosophic work whereby the gross material of the body-soul complex is refined (as in alchemy) and transformed into a permanent thing. Whether we call it Nirvana or Resurrection or the Philosopher's Stone it does not seem to matter. We shall never see it face to face unless we become saints or master yogis, but we shall believe in it as firmly as if we could. Only thus can the spirit become as real a motive for existence as instinct. And, after all, who knows what comes after death; at least a certain preparation for something that may come has given the greatest minds of the greatest centuries much to think about.

It seems that, after all, man's struggle for inner comprehension follows a cyclical pattern. The essential reference-points in the *Upanishads* are the experiences of death and rebirth, and Henderson and Oakes are saying that, despite the enormous complications of modern culture, we are led to the same general view by psychological investigation:

When we explore the inner life of modern individuals in respect to those end points of initiation, the difference between the symbols of rebirth and resurrection is not so easily found as in the history of religious literature. We are often left with a sense of confusion as to whether functions of engagement or disengagement are uppermost. In some cases the direction of psychic energy is of course crystal clear and we do not need dreams to show us that a young person is in need of becoming disengaged from his family or social group in order to find his own intrinsic nature and vocation. Also we can be quite certain that a somewhat older, but still young person, who has achieved his first initiation into life, vocationally and sexually, needs to become engaged, rooted, incorporated into a meaningful socio-religious context along with his peers. Again, we can see quite frequently in later life, after many years of meaningful engagement during which people have exercised their vocations and raised their families, that the spirit of shamanism asserts itself in an impulse for release. The individuating factor expresses itself, therefore, at either of the extremes of engagement or disengagement whether with the objects or people of the phenomenal world or the images of the dream world.

But the real crisis of individuation expresses itself in mature people who apparently need both these principles working together. The symbolism of the Self, at any rate, seems to combine these two principles as psychic impulses or directions which should meet and in some way intersect each other.

COMMENTARY
THE WORLD'S DILEMMA

DR. MAYER'S article in Frontiers emphasizes the diminishing returns of "toughness." Toughness is variously defended—as a means of making sure you "get yours," or, as the only way of showing the bad people that they will have to behave.

What, exactly, is "toughness"? It is a vulgarization of strength. Naturally, we admire strength. No matter what the end of human life, we somehow know that it cannot be realized without strength. But since men have little certainty about human ends, their societies, which fear uncertainty, formulate vulgar working averages of human ends and hold these up to the populace as goals to be sought. A society, after all, has its conceits, its pretensions to excellence. But being deeply uncertain, nevertheless, the various societies engage in competition. Nations vie with one another. Ideologists insist upon their exclusive claims to truth. People who know what they are about make no "claims" and are not impressed by them. They do not indulge in rivalries. Their problems, when they have them, do not arise from insecurity or fear.

Anxiety about ends makes men misuse their strength. The similitude of toughness to strength may cause the fruit of tough behavior to seem good for a while, but after the practice of collective toughness over a few centuries, another kind of harvest begins to make itself felt. Gentility and refinement have a diminished role in human life. Excellence is replaced by barbarism. Kindness gives way to rude self-assertion. Being confronted by itself, toughness gets tougher and tougher. Finally, through this sort of escalation, an absolute limit of toughness is reached. The working compromises with the requirements of toughness erode human character. The public apologies for toughness lose all rational relationship to the strength-as-virtue idea. It comes upon men, all at once, that they have acquired the habit of defending inhumanity and bestiality. They are horrified, but they do not know what to do.

They have reached a crisis of moral decision. It is a time of absolute dilemma. They see that they must not go forward, but going back seems impossible, too. And standing still is almost as difficult.

An absolute dilemma, expressed in historical terms, can be met only by an absolute decision. If you want to argue that the human race, when it reaches a time of such need, has the resources to find a way out, you have an explanation of M. K. Gandhi. Gandhi took an absolute position in regard to toughness. He rejected it. But you could also say that the extremity of Gandhi's position was created by the dilemma of the world, not by Gandhi. He simply declared that he would not harm, and turned this position into a political absolute. The world, he saw, could understand nothing else. Not Gandhi, but the world, had drifted to the brink of self-destruction. Its rationalization of toughness was its betrayal. Gandhi set another current going by taking an absolutely opposite stand.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
CURRICULUM PHILOSOPHY

PLANNING curricula for the ever-expanding populations of the secondary schools—and their sometimes hastily-acquired teachers—requires a good deal of specialized knowledge This is one case, however, in which the emergence of a "professional" group within the educational system has led to obviously constructive evaluation. For instance, a curriculum supervisor can hardly fail to realize that elementary schools, high schools, and institutions of higher learning have long operated in comparative isolation from one another, and since there has been little consultation among them, the lack of integration between the various levels is apparent. The most important consideration is the development of a sense of continuity and synthesis. All learning of significance depends upon continuity, and the student making the transition from elementary to high school or from high school to college faces unnecessary obstacles if he encounters gaps, unexplained in methods of teaching, etc.

A Coordinated Education Project has been recently established in Santa Barbara, California, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, under the direction of Dr. Ernest Boyer. The significance of this endeavor, we feel, goes beyond the practical need to eliminate random changes in content and uncoordinated repetition. Coordination can clarify the philosophies of education, and if we assume that genuine learning consists of a series of discoveries made by the individual student, it should be possible to help him *see* this.

For example: from the earliest grades on, it can be made plain that American History in the elementary school will emphasize teaching at only one level of penetration; that the next introduction to American History should seek meaning at another level, and will not be repetitive but will open the way to a new series of "discoveries" respecting the relationship between thought and activity in history. The first stage of instruction would involve the necessary groundwork of information, as in learning the basic ideas of the Constitution. The next stage would be represented by a further "educational dialogue," comparing diverse viewpoints. The final stage in education is achieved by participation and commitment, enlightened by both information and dialogue.

We have at hand a paper titled "Knowledge for Learning," presented at the Conference on Current Curriculum Developments at Seattle, Washington, prepared by Walcott H. Beatty of San Francisco State College. After noting the pressure of many events and concerns from outside the field of professional education—in behalf of speeding up of the whole process—Dr. Beatty points out that this haste should not be permitted to eliminate opportunity for evaluative thinking. Under the subheading, "The Nature of the Learner," he relates the problems of education to the insights of the new psychology:

> The curricula we develop for children and the strategies we propose for teaching them are based upon fundamental assumptions we make as to the nature of man. We know this in other areas and would think it ridiculous to try to program a computer without first understanding the nature and functioning of the computer. However, we tend to ignore it when we are "programing" children and jump right into the job on the basis of implicit assumptions, many of which may be wrong.
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> My analogy between curriculum construction and programing a computer makes a point, but actually, it is a poor analogy. This should be clear as I describe this first assumption about man. Thinking within the fields of psychology and psychiatry has changed radically within recent years. Much has been learned about biological and psychological functioning, and as a result, there has been a switch from mechanical explanations of man's behavior to more dynamic accounts. A common idea has been emerging that healthy individuals strive actively toward the maximum realization of their potential. Goldstein in physiological psychology, Rogers in personality and therapy, Maslow in motivation and personality, Kelly in education, and Combs in education and psychology, to name a few, have

described the idea well and have used such terms as *self-actualization* and *self-realization* to name this important quality of humanness. The implications of this idea are many. It means that individuals are not just passive but actually seek the stimuli and conditions which will foster their development. It means that all knowledge and skills are merely the tools by which an individual develops richness and complexity. It means that the individual's motivation is on our side unless we subject the individual to experiences which distort his development. It means that the key element of an educative experience is the meaning it has to the child. Each of these implications could certainly be expanded, and there are more implications which can be derived from the idea.

A second assumption is that *man is purposeful.* Unlike all other animals, man must build his relationship with the world in which he lives. The instinctual drives of lower animals have evolved in direct integration with their environment so that their survival activities—food gathering, sheltering, mating—are transmitted through the chromosomes. Man, in contrast, is born helpless with limited patterns built-in for coping with the world. He is born into a cocoon of culture which protects him from meeting "nature in the raw." Man must learn to cope. Over the generations before him, complex patterns for survival have evolved, but they are embedded in his culture, not in the organism. They are transmitted independently of his biological inheritance. These patterns of culture form the general outline of the relation he will build with nature, but each individual must learn anew and develop his own unique pattern from this model. Unless he does so, he cannot survive. This fact lays a clear foundation for the assumption *that man must strive to establish an adequate relationship with his environment.* This purpose gives direction and meaning to his learning and to his life. This idea, too, has many implications. It is incorrect to say that we motivate a child. Instead, the motivation or the driving force behind learning lies within the individual. Further, it means that what is learned will be the skill, the fact, or the emotional disposition which will relate the individual to his environment effectively. There will be no motivation to learn irrelevant things. Facts which are learned to achieve a pleasant relationship with a teacher (or to avoid an unpleasant one) will be promptly forgotten when no longer demanded by the teacher.

A third general idea about humans which has deep significance for work with children can be stated as follows: this dynamic, self-actualizing individual is always in the process of becoming.

FRONTIERS

The Uses and Abuses of Toughness

IN recent times the cult of toughness has attracted more followers than ever before. Thus in international relations it is popular to urge a posture of belligerency; in education a tender-minded view is equated with low standards; in legal matters it is often believed that stricter punishment will help to solve the rising tide of juvenile and adult delinquency. Our agencies of information feature a standard of violence which indicates that callousness has invaded our national morality.

Those who have a more enlightened view of man and civilization tend to be in the minority. They are accused of being unrealistic and of being idle dreamers. The basic assumption is that high ideals cannot be applied to national and international affairs in which apparently the laws of the jungle prevail.

Machiavellianism is being used by the major nations in their conduct of foreign affairs. This implies a dualistic moral standard whereby immoral means are used to accomplish expedient goals. Machiavelli sounds strikingly modern when he wrote in *The Prince:* "A ruler should seem compassionate, trustworthy, humane, honest, and religious, and actually be so; but yet he should have his mind so trained that, when it is necessary not to practice these virtues, he can change to the opposite, and do it skillfully. . . . It is necessary that he have a mind capable of turning in whatever direction the winds of Fortune and the variations of affairs require. . . ."

In modern times the Western world has been governed by the balance of power concept. Alliances have been concluded between various nations, ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining peace, but invariably creating seeds for war. Thus before World War I the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy was vying with the Triple Entente, which contained France, Russia and England. Before World War II the Axis nations including Germany, Italy and Japan concluded a pact to fight Communism, but in reality their efforts were directed against the interests of France and England as well as the United States.

There are those like Hanson Baldwin, military commentator for the New York *Times,* who believe that a balance of power can maintain peace. From a superficial standpoint their argument is quite convincing. They claim that the only thing that counts in international life is *power.*

This concept, however, is fallible for history indicates that sooner or later an attempt is made to change the balance of power. Dictators arise, like Hitler; the demand for national security becomes more insistent, and audacious missions for intervention are launched which are called "statesmanlike" by the supporters at home, but which inevitably provoke retaliation.

In the atomic age there can be no balance of power because new inventions forever change the strategic strength of the various nations. Those who possess the most up-to-date weapons of warfare are in danger of adopting a Maginot psychology whereby they feel too secure with their temporary advantages. On the other hand, those who do not have the most up-to-date weapons are frantically trying to catch up and, if possible, surpass the other nations. It is clear that the period of a gentlemanly declaration of war is definitely over. Hitler taught the statesmen of the world the value of an undeclared, lightning war.

In the eighteenth century, when the balance of power concept dominated Europe, the antagonists were not separated by ideological barriers. There were no iron curtains; wars were fought more like games of skill, not as campaigns of total violence. One nation, England, was able to see to it that the balance of power was maintained. In the twentieth century, however, there is no one arbiter of international affairs. And as the division between Eastern and Western nations increases, neutrality even for small nations becomes more

difficult. In the twentieth century wars have usually started in small nations like Serbia or Poland. When they are attacked the major powers must aid in their defense, the reasoning being that if such action is not taken, a world conqueror may arise.

More and more in the twentieth century, foreign policy is being conducted by the military forces. Security becomes the first consideration. Security is found in strong armaments and in a constantly expanding budget for national defense. It is not surprising to see the military advocate everywhere impregnable defenses; in this manner they believe they are guarding their respective nations.

It is assumed in many nations that a successful general can be just as effective in politics as in military life. It is argued furthermore that foreign powers have more respect for a nation if it is represented abroad by strong men.

Still, the war leaders in the major nations have been educated to regard war as a science and they view conflict between nations in an entirely professional manner. Exposed to military training in their early years, they have absorbed the gospel of force. The militarist views human nature in somber terms. To him, life is a merciless process of competition. Only the strong can survive, while the weak are eliminated. He points out that there always have been wars and he thinks that there is no reason why they will not continue.

To be successful in the military system, it is necessary that an individual should not be audacious in his approach, nor have too many independent ideas. An Alexander or Napoleon would be utterly out of place in the modern military machine, which needs conformists. World War II produced a few brilliant generals like Rommel, Zhukov, and Montgomery, but in the last analysis the battles were won by the organizers and planners who were able to harmonize conflicting ideas and interests.

The military mind intensifies the trend toward standardization and mediocrity. By means of an iron discipline it, enforces unanimity and unquestioning obedience to commends. Rebellion against military authority is strictly punished, especially in Russia. While the Russian army of the Revolution had an elastic code of discipline, it has changed considerably since that time. More and more it enforces an arbitrary pattern of authority and uses severe punishments against offenders.

The security which the generals demand can never be completely achieved. The only way it could be accomplished would be by a world conqueror, but there is no possibility that another Roman Empire will arise and keep the peace of the world. The only result of this constant demand for security by the major nations is insecurity and chaos for all.

Woodrow Wilson, in his Fourteen Points, tried to prevent such a condition by open diplomacy. It is true that secret treaties and secret commitments necessarily increase suspicion and hostility. This technique makes the diplomatic game almost like a mystery story; the contestants are always fighting some unknown, secret figures, veiled in darkness. It appears that diplomats have short memories. They frequently forget the commitments which they have undertaken. This point can be verified by the stormy history of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements which were interpreted so differently by Russia and the United States.

Open diplomacy can be just as dangerous, however. As Brogan indicates in *The American Character,* the American people naturally want to be fully informed and want to be on the inside, along with the commentators who reveal the innermost secrets of the White House, Downing Street, and the Kremlin. It goes without saying that frequently such information is false or is vastly exaggerated.

However, that is not the major point. As Bevin observed, the Moscow conference of 1947

was handicapped by the incredible eagerness of the American journalists who were determined to obtain an insight into all the proceedings of both the preliminary and the major sessions. That eagerness may have enlightened the people at home but it did not aid international amity. For instead of bargaining skillfully, the statesmen acted as if addressing a campaign rally in their own nation.

In the twentieth century, diplomacy is often conducted like a presidential campaign, with countless charges and counter-charges, with threats and promises and emotional exhortations and, above all, with a fanaticism which always blames the opponent for the failure of the various conferences.

Probably most Americans have too much faith in frankness. Frankness is an excellent technique when mutual ideals and interests exist. But if a state of tension exists already, such frankness deteriorates into crudeness and only creates more suspicion and hostility.

It is important to remember that a strong man does not resort to hostility. He has enough inner security to be unafraid. He walks firmly and confidently. The same concepts can be applied to national and international life. We need firmness in long-range goals, not toughness based upon short-term expediency. We should be unafraid of the future, for as education improves so will the prospects for the victory of democracy. We should regard compromise not as a sign of mediocrity, but as a symbol of maturity. In a period when Machiavellianism has become popular we can learn from Jefferson, who said in his *Second Inaugural:* "We are firmly convinced . . . that with nations, as with individuals, our interests soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties."

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