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THE QUEST FOR WHOLENESS

NOT since the days of the Stoic philosophers has there been so much concern with the idea of wholeness. There is a difference, of course, in the way this ideal is formulated today. The Stoics sought wholeness through a personal virtue which made the individual impervious to misfortune, indifferent to pain, and accepted only the austere consolation which comes when a man is able to feel that his life embodies the highest moral law. The modern reader is likely to feel considerable awe at the moral toughness of a man like Epictetus and to wonder where he got the extraordinary incentive to nobility which seems to be behind every thought he expresses. This sublime contempt for every human weakness, taking form in an indomitable personal discipline—how was it acquired? Whence came the extraordinary sense of the dignity of man which animated these philosophers of declining Rome?

One thing we may say: Their demands were all made upon themselves; they asked and expected nothing of the world, which they found full of short-comings and hardly attempted to change. The only principle of equilibrium they honored was found within themselves and they maintained that the wholeness of which human beings are capable, although difficult, can be obtained in no other way. The ethics of the Stoics, as the quotation from Epictetus in last week's Review showed, hinged on the idea of the will. An apt summary of this view is given by Lange in his *History of Materialism* (Harcourt, Brace, 1925):

> The Stoics had a strikingly pure and correct doctrine of the freedom of the will. Moral accountability is involved in the fact that conduct flows from the will, and so from the innermost and most essential nature of man, but the manner in which each man's will shapes itself is only a result of the mighty necessity and divine predestination which govern all the machinery of the universe down to the smallest detail. For his thought man is also responsible, because even our judgments are shaped by the influence of our moral character.

This seems to mean that the matrix of circumstances in which a man acts brings a uniqueness to his moral determinations, so that the inner balance of the individual must be entirely his own, forged by his own effort and resolve. He cannot borrow moral strength from anyone else.

Today, filled with faltering faith in eighteenth-century optimism, we admire the Stoics in somewhat the same way that we delight in the heroic exploits of the Knights of the Round Table. All human achievements in personal discipline or derring-do are seen as through a window into an other world—a world which remains unreal because its actors seem totally unaware of the goal which has dominated Western thought for some two hundred years—the *social* ideal, according to which men resolve to remake the world according to a conception of wholeness gained from quite different arguments concerning human good.

In simplified terms, the social ideal of wholeness is to be obtained by rearranging the human environment in a way that will meet manifest human needs. This social view of human good holds that a large part—no one knows how large a part—of the misfortunes and sufferings of men are *not* inevitable. Circumstances can be bettered, relationships made more just. Tyrants can be unseated, mobs controlled, and men can learn how to govern themselves according to a plan of society which sagaciously balances the twin values of freedom and order.

Even if we leave out all the other arguments in the modern defense of social action and idealism, it is at once clear that revolutionists and reformers can make little use of the Stoic

philosophy. The Stoics were in their way adepts in achieving wholeness w*ithout* a revolution. Accordingly, in a revolutionary epoch, a man who repeats Stoic maxims will be condemned as a "counter-revolutionist"—one who, with his severe, make-do metaphysic, attempts to undermine the ardors and appeals of militant men who are determined not merely to understand history, but to *change* it. In fact, *any* doctrine of human achievement through personal discipline, of making the best of things as they are, would be regarded as subversive of social ideals from the "public relations" point of view of reform or revolution, as well as on abstract philosophical grounds. We know well enough that all programs of change and arguments for social betterment through new arrangements in politics and economics are profoundly controversial, and this inevitably results in over-simplifications by nearly all who argue either for or against change. So these battles have a tendency to be fought out at the level of *doctrine,* with a great deal of attention given to the emotional forms of persuasion. This makes the participants in ideological controversy hypersensitive to the overtones of moral doctrines of any sort, and those which assert or imply that some form of human good or even individual wholeness can be achieved without the aid of political manipulation are seen as the most dangerous to social action.

There is, of course, a lot of historical justification for this view. It can hardly be denied that theologies offering otherworldly reward to submissive believers did become tools of social control. The grounds for radical alienation from the platitudes of bourgeois morality are clear enough in Leon Trotsky's pamphlet, *Their Morals and Ours.* While the attitudes of Communist leaders represent, of course, the extreme case, very nearly all those who rest their hopes for human betterment on massive changes in the forms of social organization tend to shy away from philosophies of individual morality, save in respect to commitment to the "movement" and the integrity required for its welfare and progress. By these means, "morality" becomes an obviously pragmatic affair, dependent upon the changing winds of radical and reformist doctrine. In time, and especially after power is achieved, the fallibility of this criterion of moral decision becomes obvious enough, but does not seem especially important—the day-to-day welfare of the Revolutionary or Welfare State is the thing.

Looking at these various questions from a broader perspective, certain tentative conclusions may be drawn. For example, there are increasingly sound reasons for saying that the full spectrum of possibility in manipulative political change or revolution has been exhausted during the vastly accelerated "progress" of recent years. Today, the very notion of political power is itself becoming morally suspect. The combination of military with technological power has produced horrors which are choking off the utopian dreams of thoughtful and humane men. It is no accident that the "anti-hero" and the "anti-utopia" are now popular literary forms. The growing usage and comprehensive meaning of the expression, "opting out," bespeaks the shallow character of the political optimism that remains possible in the present. The enormous influence of existentialist philosophy and attitudes is again evidence of a profound disenchantment with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century expectations from political activism and change. The struggle that has been going on in the mind of Jean-Paul Sartre concerning this problem, and the somewhat metaphysical resolution of it offered by Camus in *The Rebel,* along with the revival of anarchist thinking, the political disengagement of many through the pervasive influence of Zen Buddhism, and the candid, empirical, almost apolitical pluralism of many practical thinkers—all these strands of current thought point to the disappearance of "ideal system" goals from serious thought.

Another line of influence, one that has come into being more or less independently, is the growing body of studies and therapeutic counsels

of the humanistic psychologists. A psychotherapist is essentially a medical man who pursues a specialty which has become, for a number of important reasons, far more than a specialty. Through his practice he is made to encounter the failure of the wholeness—that is, in practical terms, the non-function—of individual human beings for reasons that may be connected with physiological difficulties or defects, but which have also come to be recognized as rooted in mental and emotional distortions. These problems are sometimes called "psychosomatic," which means that body and mind are connected in causing the malfunction. While psychotherapists, by reason of background, medical tradition, and natural limitation of their responsibilities, deal with their patients or clients essentially as individuals, without extensive attention to the social milieu—after all, a sick man has to be helped now; he cannot be asked to wait for a social utopia to straighten him out—it is of interest that, when therapists do take into account the environmental factors affecting their patients, these are interpreted more in terms of *attitude* than of "conditions." Pertinent, here, is the comment of a Harvard Medical School psychiatrist, Dr. William Ryan, in a recent (June 27) *Nation* article:

> Mental health is reflected in drives toward self-realization, mastery of the environment, and coping with one's destiny. . . . during times of civil rights demonstrations, particularly in Southern cities, when members of the Negro community are vigorously engaged in protest activity—in other words when they are engaged in "mentally healthy" activity aimed at mastering their own fate—the incidence of crime, family disputes and other behavioral pathology decreases dramatically.

What seems the most important contribution of the humanistic psychologists to modern thought is their insistence upon return to the *individual* for knowledge of the human being and conceptions of man's nature. The first notable move in this direction came with the stress on human individuality by Alexis Carrel in *Man the Unknown.* There followed extensive research into the *psychic f*actors in organismic disorders, and the pioneering researches of Kurt Goldstein—to whom is owed the expression, "self-actualization." Werner Wolff put the spirit of this trend well when he pointed out that while other sciences seek for *general* rules, as disclosed in a large range of the particulars of the field under investigation, psychology must concentrate on what is *unique* in the individual human being. This has obvious frustrations for anyone trained in the techniques of scientific research, but that the study of man from this point of view is not only possible, but enormously fruitful, is now clear from the work of many humanistic psychologists.

Only by the use of this postulate of individual uniqueness could Abraham Maslow have reached the valuable conclusions of his study of motivation—as found, for example, in chapter 3 of *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Van Nostrand, $1.95), called "Deficiency and Growth Motivation," in which he says:

> The deficit-needs are shared by all members of the human species and to some extent by other species as well. Self-actualization is idiosyncratic since every person is different.

This distinction between categories of felt need is of immeasurable importance to the understanding of a vast range of human problems. It throws an immediate light on many of the inner conflicts in human nature. For brief definition, we may say that deficiency-needs are needs growing out of actual deprivation. These, like the deprivations suffered by the organism when essential nutritional elements are denied, are to be clearly distinguished from growth-needs. Dr. Maslow summarizes:

> It is these needs which are essentially deficits in the organism, empty holes, so to speak, which must be filled up for health's sake, and furthermore must be filled from without by human beings *other* than the subject, that I shall call deficit or deficiency needs for purposes of this exposition and to set them in contrast to another and very different kind of motivation.
>
> It would not occur to anyone to question the statement that on the statement that we "need" iodine

or vitamin C. I remind you that the evidence that we "need" love is of exactly the same type.

We should say that conceptual clarity on this distinction requires much more careful discussion and analysis than is possible here, and that a reading of Dr. Maslow's books, *Motivation and Personality* (Harper, 1954) and *Toward a Psychology of Being*, can hardly be dispensed with. Dr. Maslow points out, for example, that the idea of growth-motivation is an *emerging* concept, and that, in his opinion, "it is *not* possible to define this area sharply at the present time." Human growth, in the meanings suggested by the terms "individuation, autonomy, self-actualization, self-development, productiveness, self-realization," has profound but only vaguely grasped meaning. As Dr. Maslow says: "We just don't know enough about growth yet to be able to define it well." Nonetheless, a careful reading of his work shows the precise, scientific spirit of the endeavor to elucidate the meaning of growth-needs. The obscurity and inexactitude of the discussion are qualities of the material considered, not of the method. It is fair to say that this is science-in-birth, and that the maturity of the science of man will doubtless have to await the development of a little more maturity on the part of man himself. Dr. Maslow prefers operational definition to get at the meaning of growth-needs. The data he has collected for this purpose come mainly from study of persons of exceptional health and maturity. He writes:

> So far as motivational status is concerned, healthy people have sufficiently gratified their basic needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect and self-esteem so that they are motivated primarily by trends to self-actualization (defined as ongoing actualization of potentials, capacities and talents, as fulfillment of mission [or call, fate, destiny, or vocation], as a fuller knowledge of, and acceptance of, the person's own intrinsic nature, as an unceasing trend toward unity, integration or synergy within the person). . . . While the cognitive needs for curiosity-satisfaction and for a system of explanation can easily be considered deficits to be satisfied, as can also the hypothetical need for beauty, the need to create is another matter, as is also the need to express. . . .
>
> In any case, the psychological life of the person, in many of its aspects, is lived out differently when he is deficiency-need-gratification-bent and when he is growth-dominated or "meta-motivated" or growth-motivated or self-actualizing. . . . The appetite for growth is whetted rather than allayed by gratification. Growth is, in *itself*, a rewarding and exciting process. . . . Growth-motivation may be long-term in character. Most of a lifetime may be involved in becoming a good psychologist or a good artist. All equilibrium or homeostasis or rest theories deal only with short-term episodes, each of which has nothing to do with each other. Allport particularly has stressed this point. Planfulness and looking into the future, he points out, are the central stuff of healthy human nature. He agrees that "Deficit motives do, in fact, call for the reduction of tension and restoration of equilibrium. Growth motives, on the other hand, maintain tension in the interest of distant and often unattainable goals. As such they distinguish human from animal becoming and adult from infant becoming."

In a generalizing passage, Dr. Maslow says:

> Deficit-need gratifications and growth-need gratifications have differential subjective and objective effects upon the personality. If I may phrase what I am groping for here in a generalized way, it is this: satisfying deficiency needs avoids illness, growth satisfactions produce positive health. I must grant that this will be difficult to pin down for research purposes at this time. And yet there is a real clinical difference between fending off threat or attack and positive triumph and achievement, between protecting, defending and preserving oneself and reaching out for fulfillment, for excitement and enlargement. I have tried to express this as a contrast between living fully and preparing to live fully, between growing up and being grown.

What becomes plain, if one broods for a time on these considerations, is the total incapacity of politics to make any contribution to growth-needs. On the other hand, as Dr. Maslow notes in our first quotation from him, "deficit-needs are shared by all members of the human race." Deficit-needs, therefore, are capable of statistical treatment and massive technological solution. It is the growth-needs for which politics is practically useless, since these needs are "idiosyncratic," unique in their form and expression to each individual. There is intuitive recognition of this in the

provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

This double profile of human nature helps us to understand the abortive breakdown of attempts to apply to human beings the statistical techniques of science as they have evolved out of the physical sciences. Such attempts, pursued in neglect of the difference between deficiency-needs and growth-needs, create what might be called a physics of the emotions, in which the fact of individual uniqueness is lost entirely and its phenomena ever thereafter studiously neglected. *People* are not really considered at all. Man has only fragmentized, subdivided reality in this kind of science. A kind of methodological pathology results and afflicts even the most thorough-going scientific studies of behavior. Violation or neglect of individual growth-needs proceeds in every dimension of "planning" and becomes overwhelming because unrecognized; and this, as private resistance accumulates, leads to the terrifying phenomena of nihilist reaction, blind, emotional rejection of the neat rationalizations of deficiency-need-satisfying programs which are presented and defended as all that a good society of "whole human beings" will ever need. Since failure and confusion are always examined in terms of this hypothesis in human problem-solving, even the endless debates conducted by cultural leaders do little but conceal the actual roots of our trouble in the systematically ignored growth-needs of mankind.

It is obvious that an environment hospitable to the satisfaction of growth-needs is an environment that must be *generated* by idiosyncratic cultural achievement, not *legislated* into being. It involves recognition by its participants of the importance of all sorts of intuitive checks and balances which are not, and can never be, a matter of either law or ideology.

What we may see in all this, if we will, is the gradual return of the Stoic principle of the fundamental autonomy of the individual, but on creative-spontaneous-naturalistic-Promethean grounds. And this principle is boring its way through the complicated laminations of Western revolutionary materialism-science-technology doctrines elaborated during recent centuries of history. It is producing insight into the nature of man, in the context of his present struggle to know himself, despite the enormous preoccupations made possible by the labyrinthine growth around him of the incredible structure of his own achievements and their perversion through his own self-denying mistakes. From this struggle, it now seems almost certain, will eventually develop a new and richer morality, a subtler transcendental metaphysic, and a compassionate fellow-feeling that will reach far beyond anything man has known before.

What remains difficult to see, however, is how modern man will develop the uncompromising strength and inner determination which was typical of the Stoic philosophers. They had, it seems, an invincible sense of the dignity of man and of his nobility of purpose. By a means hardly evident in the present, this vision of self-reverence will also have to be born again.

REVIEW
A NORTHERN LIGHT

IF the health of a country is known by the quality of its humorists, then Canada must be a place flowing with the milk of human kindness and the honey of romance. For some time we have been impressed by the kind of books, magazines—and even letters-to-the-editor—that come from Canada, and now we have evidence of greater pith and moment, in the form of a book titled *Needham's Inferno* (Macmillan of Canada, $6.95), a collection of the daily essays of Richard J. Needham, who is a columnist on the Toronto *Globe and Mail.*

Writers of Mr. Needham's capacity and intent are few. They somehow combine depth and whimsy, irony and entertainment, satire and fun in just the right proportions, and serve it up with a sauce of wry raffishness that is indelibly tinted with good taste. If you happen on two or three such men in a lifetime, you are doing very well indeed. How, really, do they win popularity? A dozen differing theories would not be too much to begin with, on this question. Ours, at the moment, is that they have found out some of the basic common denominators of human nature and that this, plus their skill, and secret learning, gives them endless resources for poking fun and dropping pearls. But what *gets* the reader—who often doesn't suspect why—is the freedom of the writer to do and say exactly what he pleases. Everybody wants this quality, which is desperately difficult to acquire because of the discipline behind it (one reason why what "he pleases" turns out to be so good), but seeing a little of it every day in so humble a source as the daily newspaper makes it seem more accessible—the result being something like what Li'1 Abner does for men of all ages. Except that Mr. Needham's readers, who come to grin, often remain to think, an incomparably better result.

For samples of Mr. Needham's undiluted lilting we have chosen the following:

Dear Mr. Needham: My problem is a rather unusual one. I have been swallowed by a whale. What should I do? Jonah.

Answer: I have spoken to a number of liberal clergymen and they all agree that the situation you describe is purely allegorical. Several marine biologists I consulted said it was impossible for a whale to swallow a man. A prominent radio and TV personality to whom I showed your letter said: "That proves it; there is no God." Do you perhaps have a drinking problem, and is your conviction that you have been swallowed by a whale simply part of an immense hangover? I would like to help you, but I need further details. . . .

Dear Mr. Needham: I wrote you some weeks ago telling you I had been swallowed by a whale, and asking what I should do. You said you required further details. Good Lyndon, what further details do you need? I am in this bloody big whale and I want out. Jonah.

Answer: I am rather disturbed by the impatient tone of your letter. With humanity standing, sitting, and lying down at the crossroads, with hunger and poverty stalking our fair land of Canada, and with thousands of Bay Street girls not knowing where their next Moscow Mule is coming from, I think you should "count your blessings." You are well housed, you presumably are getting enough to eat, and are travelling around the world free of charge. Whereabouts is this whale, anyhow? I might come and join you, or would you prefer a TTC guide?

Dear Mr. Needham: The computer in the office where I work has been acting strangely. When the other girls feed data into it, it just gives data back to them. But when I feed data into it, I get back slips of paper with messages on them like "Take off those heavy glasses and let me see the real you." —"I, too, know the sheer hell of loneliness."—"You and I could make beautiful Muzak together." Yesterday, it gave me a note saying, "Kom wiz me to the Buffalo Statler-Hilton, my leetle wan." What should I do? Jemima Puddleduck.

Answer: I have discussed this matter with IBM officials, who tell me it is giving them great concern. As computers become more human in their intelligence, they unfortunately become more human in other respects. One of the big banks is having serious trouble; the computer is demanding that a virgin be sacrificed to it; and this has launched the greatest search in the history of downtown Toronto.

Are you sure you have not been "leading on" the machine in your office?

When the Toronto-Dominion Bank posted placards in the Toronto subway announcing that security is "money," Mr. Needham found that twenty-nine of the bank's forty directors confessed to being Christians of some sort, and then applied himself to his typewriter:

> Well, well, well! If there's one thing that jumps out at you from the Bible (be it King James or Douai version) it's that security *isn't* a thing called money. The religion professed by three quarters of the T-D directors strongly and specifically warns people *against* seeking security in money or other material possessions.

Obviously a learned Bible scholar, Mr. Needham cites Matthew 6 and Luke 12, commenting:

> Jesus warned His followers against worrying about the future, what they were going to eat and drink and wear. Stop fretting, He told them in effect—the flowers and the animals are provided for; you'll be provided for, too. "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth. . . . Rather seek ye the Kingdom of God, a treasure in the heavens that faileth not."
>
> That's Christian teaching, of course, and maybe you can't go along with it. All right, then, look at it another way. Let's suppose that all the directors of the Toronto-Dominion Bank were roaring atheists. Wouldn't their slogan—"Security is a thing called money"—still be incorrect by all the terms of human experience?

Mr. Needham now presents a short historical text on inflation, telling what happened to the mark, the lira, the cruzeiro; he discourses on expropriating wars, revolutions, and the disappearing money of the Japanese-Canadians who with their wives and children were thrown into concentration camps (the same as in the U.S.) by the Mackenzie King government during the last war; and concludes:

> There are all sorts of good things in the Toronto-Dominion Bank, not the least the pretty tellers. But security isn't to be found within those marble halls, nor will it be found in the fifty-five stories going up on King Street West. Security is like the Kingdom of Heaven; if it's anywhere at all, it's within you.

Mr. Needham openly feuds with all forms of phoneyness; and, as a slightly grizzled Joan of Arc for the young, he delights in both direct and glancing blows at establishment-type education. This gets him speaking dates. Here is a glancing blow:

> At another Toronto collegiate, I absent-mindedly lit a cigarette while walking through the hallway and out of the building. Someone shouted at me, "Put that out!" I meekly did so, but thought to myself, "If that's how they treat adults, how do they treat children?"

Noting the rise in juvenile delinquency the world over—worst in the United States, where 48 per cent of the persons arrested for serious offenses are under eighteen—Mr. Needham muses on the eagerness of the "get tough with them" school, then makes a direct hit:

> Before you found out the cure for youthful barbarism you'd have to find out the cause; and everybody has his own theory about that. A clergyman might say it was the decline of religious faith; a planner might pin it on bad housing; a social reformer might point to poverty. Couldn't boredom be a factor, too; not the boredom which is counted by hours, but the boredom which accumulates over the years? It's a boredom of the suburbs as well as the slums, of the affluent home as well as the ramshackle one.
>
> Never before in history has human life been so intensively organized and controlled as it is in modern industrial society. Childhood and youth are spent in a tightly regimented school system whose aim is not to educate youth but to socialize, condition, and (the last indignity) price-tag them for a tightly regimented economic system where they'll work at meaningless jobs—producing junk, consuming junk—till they come of pension age.
>
> There's little scope in this system for the rebel, the dreamer the loner, the dissenter, the fighter, the innovator, the adventurer. There's little allowance made for the wild side—which is also the creative side—of human nature. Young people of any spirit must often feel that they're locked in a squirrel-cage or maybe a museum or maybe an old folks' home. . . . Sad and shabby it seems in most cases, but would you

> say that our money-grubbing, vote-grubbing society shows them much in the way of glory or grandeur, of heroism or plain, ordinary principle?

There's just no way to convey the variety of Mr. Needham's work, except by quotation, and our space is used up. But we ought to add a short personal note about him: He was born in India, lived in Ireland and England, and has worked most of his life in Canada as a newspaper man. He holds open house at lunch every Saturday and Sunday at a Toronto hotel for all the university and high school students who want to come. Incidentally, if you have the impression that Mr. Needham is sort of wholesome, you will have to overlook it. This seems to be something Canadians can't really help or even hide.

COMMENTARY
SOCIOLOGICAL JOURNALS PLEASE COPY

A REALLY exciting thing about the concept of "growth-needs," as developed by A. H. Maslow in *Toward a Psychology of Being*, is the way in which it opens the door to a psychology of the creative side of human life. The growth-activities of human beings have a magical aspect. They bring coefficients of unknown value which take hold of mundane situations and turn them into rich resources of the imagination. There could hardly be a better illustration of this than Ralph Ellison's introduction to his volume of essays, *Shadow and Act* (Random House and Signet—95 cents), in which he tells about his life with boyhood companions in Oklahoma:

> . . . our youthful sense of life, like that of many Negro children (though no one bothers to note it—especially the specialists and "friends of the Negro" who view our Negro American life as essentially non-human) was very much like that of Huckleberry Finn, who is universally praised and enjoyed for the clarity and the courage of his moral vision. Like Huck we observed, we judged, we imitated and evaded as we could the dullness, corruption and blindness of "civilization." We were undoubtedly comic because, as the saying goes, we weren't supposed to know what it was all about. But to ourselves we were "boys," members of a wild, free outlaw tribe which transcended the category of race. . . . Spurring us on in our controlled and benign madness, was the voracious reading of which most of us were guilty and the vicarious identification and emphatic adventuring which it encouraged. This was due, in part, perhaps to the fact that some of us were fatherless—my own father had died when I was three—but most likely it was because boys are natural romantics. We were seeking examples, patterns to live by, out of a freedom which for all its being ignored by the sociologists and subtle thinkers was implicit in the Negro situation. Thus we fabricated our own heroes and ideals catch-as-catch-can, and with an outrageous and irreverent sense of freedom. Yes, and in complete disregard for ideas of respectability or the surreal incongruity of some of our projections. Gamblers and scholars, jazz musicians and scientists, Negro cowboys and soldiers from the Spanish-American and First World Wars, movie stars and stunt men, figures from the Italian Renaissance and literature, both classical and popular, were combined with the special virtues of some local bootlegger, the eloquence of some Negro preacher, the strength and grace of some local athlete, the ruthlessness of some businessman-physician, the elegance in dress and manners of some headwaiter or hotel doorman. Looking back through the shadows upon this absurd activity I realize now that we were projecting archetypes, recreating folk figures, legendary heroes, monsters even, most of which violated all ideas of social hierarchy and order. . . . being boys, yet in the play-stage of our development, we were dream-serious in our efforts.

In a piece called "Harlem Is Nowhere," Mr. Ellison shows what such boys might do later on:

> . . . if Harlem is the scene of the folk-hero's death-agony it is also the setting of his transcendence. Here it is possible for talented youths to leap through the development of decades in a brief twenty years, while beside them white-haired adults crawl in the feudal darkness of their childhood. Here a former cotton picker develops the sensitive hands of a surgeon, and men whose grandparents still believe in magic prepare optimistically to become atomic scientists. Here the grandchildren of those who possessed no written literature examine their lives through the eyes of Freud and Marx, Kierkegaard and Kafka, Malraux and Sartre.

Implicit, here, is the fact that growth-responses to being-needs can sometimes compensate for the distorting effect of deficiency-needs, but that the satisfaction of the latter is a process with no such pulsing wonder in it, however much body and psyche may need this practical help, and however insistently justice demands it. Social science which ignores these idiosyncratic splendors of being human is a statistical Procrustean bed.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WHAT CAN WE SAY TO THE CHILDREN?

SOME years ago, when the argument about fall-out shelters was still raging, a school teacher in a California suburban town blandly assured her eight-year-olds that they would be perfectly safe if they hid in the tunnel they used every morning to get past a main highway on the way to school. The claim was of course ridiculous. This tunnel, wide open at both ends, would be no protection at all against the fire storms which sweep away the atmosphere of the area surrounding a nuclear "hit," to a radius of at least twelve miles.

But what *should* the teacher have said? The pamphlet, *Community of Fear*, by Harrison Brown and James Real, was then being widely read, so that, conceivably, she might have informed herself concerning the devastation and probable death to be expected by all who lived in that community, if a bomb struck, say, the Los Angeles Civic Center. Yet for this teacher to have given small children such details—well, the idea reminds you of the lurid descriptions of hell-fire which teachers of past centuries sometimes used to impress children with the importance of Christianity.

What, indeed, ought a teacher to say about the cruel, ruthless, and largely hypocritical world in which, in a very few years, the children will be growing up?

Some effort to meet this problem was made in 1964 by the Child Study Association of America, through publication of *Children and the Threat of Nuclear War* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce), a volume made up of contributions by several writers. The title essay, by Sibylle Escalona, of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, has in it passages like the following:

> When a child asks, "How big are the bombs?" or, "If it happens, where will we go?"—nothing in our previous experience suggests an adequate reply. Our imagination cannot grasp what nuclear war might be like. A child wants a simple explanation. But a parent trying to find the answer has disturbing background thoughts like these: After nuclear bombing what kind of a world would it be? Who would be in it? What happens to people who stay underground for a long period of time? What would it be like upon emerging? Would food and water be polluted? What would grow? What would be left of community life, law enforcement, the workings of government, and so much else that has regulated the only way of life we have known?

Well, Dr. Escalona does as well as she can with this problem, but it is manifestly out of bounds. It is not really a problem of "child education" at all, and can probably be left to the accident of pedagogic impulse, since there is no way to scale such total dilemmas to an eight-year-old's understanding. The question is rather what adults—parents and teachers—are or ought to be doing about the problem, since they are responsible for the environment and future of the children.

The issues of this problem have never been seriously joined in the forums of public debate, so that handing it over to child educators is hardly a reasonable procedure. It is asking them to stand outside the periphery of a "conspiracy of silence" and interpret its voiceless horror to children, making the "unthinkable" acceptable to them in terms of trust and confidence in the "wisdom" of their elders.

Verbal communications in this case can hardly be more than attempts at reassuring "noise," and what is actually conveyed to the young is the subconscious fear and sense of contradiction and inadequacy of the adult world. We know perfectly well that children feel these qualities acutely in adults, although they can hardly account for them. This begins to happen only as they reach college age, when the groundswell of dissent and disgust emerges in the student movement, making public exposure of the irresolution of the older generation.

There is a curious parallel, here, to the situation of Athens in the mythic time of Theseus. Periodically, it will be remembered, Athens was obliged to deliver to the king of Crete seven maidens and seven youths for sacrifice to the Minotaur. How, one wonders, did the parents of these young Athenians explain to the selected fourteen the "reason" for their terrible doom?

The need to "explain" the perpetual threat of nuclear war to children seems on a par with this impossible situation. Yet for parents to admit that they, the adults, have been miserable failures in making a world fit for their children—this bleak honesty can hardly be practiced while teaching the young to revere the institutions and public authorities of their native land. What is honor, truth, and responsibility in such a situation?

One essay in this book is candid enough to reveal the logic of uncompromising resistance to conventional "answers." The contribution of Brock Chisholm, "Children, A.D. 2012," has this passage:

> The Children's Bureau has been referred to as the conscience of this country in relation to children. This Bureau has done a tremendous job of work in fifty years, a hard job of work. . . . The next step, I suppose, is to consider the conscience of the children who are being looked after. What kind of people are they going to be? Are they going to be like us?
>
> It has been said, and I think quite truly, the worst thing that could happen to the next generation is that they might turn out like us. It is true. We have been and are the kind of people who have fought each other in every human generation throughout human history. Most of us are still the same kind of people.
>
> And it is not useful to blame other people for even recent wars, because we could have prevented those wars if we had faced the facts and had not fooled ourselves.
>
> A great problem is our conscience in this regard: the fact that we, most of us, do earnestly believe that when we are frightened, the way to overcome that and to increase our feeling of security is to kill more people—because this has been inculcated into us very early and very firmly, and most of the members of the human race do still believe that. . . .
>
> With all the weapons we have available now—nuclear, biological, chemical,—and traditional—we are capable of destroying the whole human race at least three or four times over. And yet many people throughout the world do believe that if we could just arrange to be able to kill everybody in the world, including ourselves, say ten times over, in some queer way we would be more secure.

The task before us is to relate these straightforward views, which are categorically *right*, to what is being taught the young in primary and secondary school, and in college. . . . Last week, in this Department, we quoted from Joel P. Smith, associate dean of students at Stanford University. Left out of our report of the Los Angeles *Times* (Sept. 22) interview with him was his comment on the dim view students take of the draft. In the words of the *Times* report:

> Smith said he especially regrets the increasing tendency of students to refuse to accept student deferments and to fight the draft in other ways.
>
> "I can understand how any conscientious student would want to sort this thing out," he said, "but I think it's tragic if he comes to a 'to hell with the draft board' conclusion."

But if he takes someone like Brock Chisholm seriously, how much choice does a *conscientious* student have? Obviously, this is no time for a "Yes, sir, no, sir, just as you say, sir," response. A literal reading of Brock Chisholm strongly *suggests* that war makes a national policy out of "to hell with our youth."

FRONTIERS

Peace by Displacement of War

ANYONE who has read C. P. Snow's *The Two Cultures* and J. Bronowski's *Science and Human Values* is in a position to recognize that to *really* unite the runaway energies of modern scientific technology with the inspiration of classical humanist values will require the services of a genius. Such a genius, we think, is now among us, and the synthesis he proposes seems almost the side-effect of an intensity of mind which reaches considerably beyond the area of conventional science/humanities debate. We speak of R. Buckminster Fuller, whose devotion to the common human good comes as naturally to him as breathing, and who is able to discuss the meaning and possibilities of the technological revolution, not as its occupational prisoner, but as one who is way out in front of its present achievements. He *thinks* like a man for whom technology is a tool, not a god, and while his somewhat jargon-afflicted vocabulary hardly reminds the reader of familiar humanist discourse, a basic respect for man controls everything he says and does.

Any one of a dozen ways could get us into this discussion. We have chosen the "Peace by Displacement of War" approach because it settles a lot of important questions right at the beginning. Fuller proposes the use of technology in a way that will make war irrelevant and obviously useless for any human purpose. He bypasses ideology as equally irrelevant, although the idea of individual freedom remains at the core of all his conceptions. It takes time to comprehend the shape and dynamics of his thinking. For a start there is this great project: Fuller has invited the students in the architectural. and environmental planning schools throughout the world to invest the next ten years (1965-1975) in finding out "how to make the world work"—"how to redesign the world's prime tool networks and environment facilities so as to make the world's total resources, now serving only 44 per cent of humanity, serve 100 per cent through competent scientific design and anticipatory planning." Under review here is what is known as *Document 4*, concerned with this ten-year program, proposed by Mr. Fuller in 1961, and now sponsored by the World Resources Inventory of Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Ill., where Mr. Fuller teaches Design Science. *Document 4* is written by John McHale, who is probably adequately described by calling him Mr. Fuller's right-hand man.

As a note on preparatory reading not suggested in this book, we should say that Lyman Bryson's *The Next America* (Harper, 1952) does much to get the mind ready for Buckminster Fuller and Mr. McHale, through his common-sense contention that *cultural freedom* is what is precious to us, and that it doesn't really matter how we produce our goods and services, so long as this is done efficiently and well. Of equal value is the important but neglected pamphlet by David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System,* issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1943. Mitrany contends that international cooperation in society-serving *functions,* until conflict seems both silly and unnecessary, is the only way to stop war. Both these theses appear in Fuller and McHale.

Toward the end of *Document 4,* Mr. McHale says:

> Culture may be defined as a distinctive pattern of living, whose shared components are attitudes, values, goals, institutions and modes of communication. These would also include the "style" of living as influenced by those man-made environment control elements and products in common usage.
>
> The important "reality" of our present world social and cultural situation is that a world society has been brought into being, and an international culture now exists. It has been pointed out that though *politically* the world has never been so sharply divided, *culturally* it has never presented such a unified appearance. . . .

Elsewhere he says:

> Our larger purpose lies with the means of designing man's way forward so that world society may proceed to its next evolutionary phase. The great potential capacities of the fully automated industrial process, and the designed provision of a related and fully developed global system of high advantage environ control service facilities, would allow man to

> be freed from his age-old preoccupation with minimal survival. The possibility of an unprecedented abundance of material wealth renders obsolete the weaponry systems which are predicated on the pre-industrial marginal survival alternatives of "your side or my side." Now, even in world terms, there can be more than enough to go around—for the first time in human history.
>
> In similar fashion, "politics" trends toward obsolescence as the primary focus for decisions and solutions regarding material problems. Politics has been called "the art of the possible." This may have been appropriate in periods of material shortage with their various pressures and tensions resulting from unequal distribution of wealth. Today's art of the possible is that of designing appropriate systems for any desired possibility—or, the art of *anticipating* which of today's "impossibles" are likely to be tomorrow's everyday requirement.

This book discusses five major areas pertinent to the design program: (1) World Literacy re World Problems, (2) Prime Movers and Prime Metals, (3) Tool Evolution, (4) The Service Industries, and (5) The Evoluting Contact Products. Now, on the face of it, it is difficult to imagine how so comprehensive a study program could be pursued by what must be a fairly small agency, as agencies go, and with funding that is doubtless extremely modest. But from reading *Document 4* one is made to realize that the undertaking is at a level of generalization which is indeed appropriate and equal to the tasks which are outlined. These studies embody the principle which Fuller finds characteristic of all of modern technological development—learning how to do *more with less*—only in this case the "ephemeralization" is the work of the mind, through awareness and comprehensive attitudes; and what gives the reader basic confidence is the manifest technological know-how which Fuller has shown throughout his enormously productive career.

We cannot really "review" this book. Despite the particularity of the contents, its essential character is one of insight, mood, and motive, involving forms of action which originate in intuitive social ethics, and which achieve conceptual-technical form through thorough intellectual mastery of the materials and dynamics involved, resulting in specific practical applications which are attended by an extraordinary *esprit de corps.*

In relation to the meaning of cybernation, Mr. McHale writes:

> New computer developments now go beyond recent numerical drafting systems, which simply mechanized an already routine process, to ways in which the designer may interact directly with the computer; having his design decisions and calculations checked and adjusted against its data storage with recall and print at any stage. They are developing to the point where design may be accomplished through, and by, the computer, then phased directly into unit production by automatic tools through automatic jig assembly to machine inventorying, checking, dispatch and transport to destination. . . . [These] overall functions underline the increasing obsolescence of man as a specialist, human "information" source and the more urgent requirement of man for his role as comprehensive designer and over-all "systems" and "pattern" creator.

Since our space is running out we had better say something about the humanist values we spoke of at the beginning. We find sufficient evidence in this book of the basic hospitality of Mr. Fuller and Mr. McHale to the kind of questions raised by Socrates concerning the learning process; the reader is able to feel that the use and development of technological skills as conceived in these plans could easily be complementary to far-reaching attitudinal reform in education, along the lines of the ideas of some of the humanist psychologists and others who are today devoting themselves to the question of individual human identity and role.

This is a subject to which we shall certainly return.