

A MIND-TO-MIND COMMUNITY

YOUR August 16 issue is another one of those issues that touch a vital nerve. The reference, by your Review writer, to Dewey, and the optimistic, progressivist enthusiasm of the twenties and thirties hits close to me, although I attended school not in the twenties and thirties but in the fifties, by which time an interest in Dewey had ceased to be a social craze so that, to have an interest in Dewey was to be "out" not "in." But for all of the zeal of the Dewey philosophy—and there is plenty of that—there just isn't enough to overcome the obstacles that have cropped up in subsequent years. Disillusionment has set in, and the Gospel According to John Dewey is proving to be somewhat less than the last word on matters pertaining to personal salvation. The trouble is that one's second religion—and I am one of those who adopted his socially oriented philosophy pretty much as something of a religion—is not so easy to shake off, as one's first religion, which one can dismiss as childhood myth and drop off as one drops the other things of childhood. It is difficult, for example, to go from faith in science to skepticism of what science can do, from optimism to pessimism, from a fairly certain social determinism to a wavering existential indeterminism, etc. These are the things that are happening to us as we face up to the crises that confront us today, and refuse to live in the shadow of a philosophy that once moved us, but that no longer speaks to the contemporary condition.

Dr. Progoff is quite right when he says that what we need is not a new philosophy, a new set of ideas and beliefs, but a new orientation to the world, a new connection to life. As the existentialists, and now a man like Dr. Progoff, make clear, traditional philosophy is doomed. For that philosophy spoke to the partial man, to the intellectual side of man, not to man in his whole being. A newer, existential philosophy that is concerned with the whole man is just now developing, though no one knows what form it will take or even whether it *is* philosophy in any sense of the word. But of the older philosophy,

there is one thing that can be safely said about it, and that is that it is dead, irretrievably dead.

Your lead article on "The Psychological Revolution" closes with an excellent quotation on the Eichmann Case—the best I have yet seen, and one that gets to the core of what the Eichmann Case really means. Here, I am especially interested in a statement you make just before that quotation, and leading up to it. You write: "We need now, therefore, exercises in *social* identification with other peoples, other societies, other men." The alternative need not be the one that Eichmann followed, but it can be one equally as disastrous to ourselves. We need social identification not merely to avoid a nuclear holocaust, but to avoid a personal holocaust, the holocaust engendered by our alienated and empty lives. Since this latter is something that you have discussed on many occasions, I should like to pick it up here, and relay on to you an idea that occurred to me recently, as a practical means that we might use to alleviate the condition that we find ourselves in, and achieve, as Dr. Progoff puts it, a "closer connection to life."

The idea to which I refer occurred to me when, a short time ago, I stumbled across a letter which Sherwood Anderson had written to Theodore Dreiser back in 1936. In that letter, as in other of his writings, Anderson expressed a keen awareness of the root problem of our time: the isolation of the individual in modern society, and his need for identification with others. He bemoaned the plight of the stranded, lonely individual in a vast society, and got up the idea that if people—earnest, sensitive, thinking people—could only reach out to others of their kind (who, for all the millions of people in this land, are not too easy to find), the problem from which they suffer would be solved—or, at least, greatly attenuated. His solution was a simple one: "It would help," he put it, "for all of us to return to the old habit of letter writing between man and man that has at certain periods existed in the world."

Anderson is supposed to have distrusted philosophic generalities. Perhaps it was such a man as this who, with a flair for the concrete, could come up with so simple a solution that it would never have occurred to more sophisticated and "intellectual" souls; perhaps it was such a man who might offer some way out of the predicament that so many of us face today. Here is a case of an "unofficial philosopher" (to use MANAS' own phrase) who has something of truth for the rest of us, when the "official philosophers" have failed to be of any value. In any case, it apparently has taken just such an "unofficial philosopher" to issue so plain and simple a call, as that for letter writing "between man and man."

Now, it has occurred to me what a fine and wonderful thing it might be, if something like this letter writing that Anderson talked about, could be instituted among a group of people such as form the readership of a publication like MANAS. Here, surely, is a group of like-minded persons, persons who are deeply concerned about themselves and the world in which they live, persons who thrive on addressing themselves to the live issues of the day and therefore reach out to MANAS as one publication—almost unique for its genre—which dares to address itself to these issues.

We, who are interested in these problems and searching for a better life, are separated from one another, and do not know others like ourselves. We plod our individual paths in silence. For while the world is big, the world to which *we* belong is microscopic, and we hardly ever encounter other members of that world, in our daily lives. Indeed, it sometimes seems that the world to which we belong is only populated by one, with, as it were, vague voices from afar breaking in, on occasion, to let us know we are not alone.

I don't know if it would be feasible to carry out such an idea as I am here suggesting, the writing of letters between an interested group of MANAS readers, something like a "Committee of Correspondence" only oriented not around political, but around non-political, psychological and philosophic problems. Here, at least, would seem to be one very real, concrete means of helping to

overcome the alienation that we experience so strongly, and that afflicts us at times so terribly. Here, at last, would seem to be a means of implementing the penetrating theoretical discussions which have been carried on so ably, in the pages of MANAS. In any case, the idea seems to be important enough, the problem urgent enough, to be worth exploring.

I am enclosing a copy of Anderson's poignant and moving letter (taken from Viking's *Portable Sherwood Anderson*, edited by Horace Gregory.)

HARRY ZITZLER

Chicago

Marion, Virginia
January 2, 1936

Dear Teddy:

For the last year or two I have had something in my mind that you and I should have spoken about and during the last year or two it has been sharpened in my mind by the suicide of fellows like Hart Crane, Vachel Lindsay, and others, to say nothing of the bitterness of a Masters. In your play, *American Tragedy*, the play ends by the pronouncement that we can forgive a murderer but that society cannot be forgiven. To tell the truth, Ted, I think it nonsense to talk this way about society. I doubt if there is any such thing. If there has been a betrayal in America I think it is our betrayal of each other.

I do not believe that we—and by the word "we" I mean artists, writers, singers, etc.—have really stood by each other. There is a curious thing in America. The land is very vast. I think for example that French society has been able to attain to a real culture because we can say that Paris is France . . . as we could say London is England.

Now we know that New York is not America, Chicago is not America, San Francisco is not America. We have a curious situation. We are too much separated. I have hinted at this matter to you before and I take it to you because you are one of the least guilty, in the way I mean, of any of us. I know of no one more willing than you to put out a hand to

others, more ready to give yourself. I know of no man among us with less bitterness in his nature. One of the reasons I love you is because in your presence I never do feel this bitterness.

Now what I have been thinking is that we need here among us some kind of new building up of a relationship between man and man. I feel so strongly on this matter that I am thinking of trying to get my thoughts and those of others who also feel this thing into form. I think even of a general letter or pamphlet that I might call "American Man to American Man." I think it is our loneliness for each other that has made most of us throw too much on woman and I also think that this is so much true that we are habitually making women carry more than their load.

I do not think that it is necessarily unfair to women to say frankly that the imaginative world is naturally the male province, but look what we do. We try to compensate for our loneliness for each other by throwing ourselves into the arms of woman. I believe it is in the nature of things that this is not sound. Instead of demanding of women we should be giving. Woman really wants personal beauty, one might almost say showered down upon her, that can only come out of the imaginative life. We have all been shirking our jobs but I do not believe that our shirking is due primarily to our own weakness but to our confusion and that our confusion comes partly from the tremendous size of the country. I even think that our Civil War was brought on by the impossibility or seeming impossibility of man finding man.

I have written you something about this before but have not amplified my idea as I am trying to do in this letter. I have been trying to think my way through this problem and the thought has occurred to me that in a country like this where personal relations in any sustained way between men working in the imaginative field are almost impossible, that it would help for all of us to return to the old habit of letter writing between man and man that has at certain periods existed in the world.

For example, Ted, suppose that every morning when you go to your desk to work you would begin

your day's work by writing, let's say, one letter to one other man working in the same field as you are. Suppose we did, by this effort, produce less as writers. There is probably too much being produced. I am suggesting this as the only way out I can see in the situation. It isn't that I want you to write to me. I could give you names and addresses of others who need you and whom you need. I think it possible to build up a kind of network of relationships, something closer say between writers and painters, painters and song makers, etc., etc.

I think now that we are too much confused by the political. I think this need of man for man in the imaginative world is more important. I think that if it had existed, men like Crane and Lindsay would not have committed suicide. I would like to issue a pamphlet, or a general letter, on this subject, not for publication in some magazine where the idea might be muddled by all sorts of sentimentality, but where it might reach out to all sorts of men needing what I am talking about here.

Teddy, the truth is that although I am addressing this letter to you, I am only doing it because you may possibly be the most distinguished man among us and I tell you frankly that I may use this letter as the basis of what I want to say to many others.

If I do this, I will ask you and several others to whom I may send copies of this letter to send me letters expressing their feelings in the matter to be included in the pamphlet.

I will say no more about all this today. I am writing of this on New Year's day. The project is very close to me. I think it may be to you.

Sincerely yours,

Sherwood Anderson

REVIEW

OFFSPRING AND ORPHANS

FOR practitioners in that realm of modern inquiry known as History of Ideas, it is axiomatic that no idea can be investigated, much less interpreted, *in vacuo*. Individuals and cultures alike tend to adopt or reject, ignore, retain or modify ideas according to changing patterns of human wants. Needs may not change. Wants, the ways we make or find to satisfy needs, must change. Now, say the historians of ideas, no one adopts, retains, or modifies an idea simply because, like Everest, it is "there." He must first feel he now needs, or will need, this idea—and this feeling of need, well-grounded or not, articulated or dumbly sensed, helps to define the idea for him.

Take, as a case in point, the cluster of ideas making up Confucianism. For many of us in the West, "Confucianism" probably represents a stable, rather tame, ingenuous set of attitudes towards one's ancestors. All too often we regard Confucius merely as a gentle, genteel sage—hardly of the revolutionist breed—and the religious philosophy bearing his name as a monument to cosmic obsequy. Is it any wonder, then, that we find ourselves still playing the '30's game Confucius-Say and thinking of the reality behind the game as a kind of antique Asian "peace of mind" cult, spiced with pithy riddles, which somehow "caught on"?

But the reality (as Emerson said in another connection) is more excellent than the report. Our difficulties in comprehending it, in seeing the Confucianist dynamic as a unique civilizing force, are suggested in the following:

What is Confucianism? When we look at the volumes which have been written on China and its historic culture, it is plain that this vast subject cannot be discussed in any depth without reference to Confucian ideas and Confucian values. Yet it is perilously easy for writers to treat Confucianism as if its content were self-evident, simple, and unchanging.

The indiscriminate use of the term Confucian leads rather to one of two evils. In many a

discussion, all Chinese things, people, ideas, acts, institutions turn out to be Confucian ones, no matter how varied they are seen to be; as a result, "Confucian" comes to mean simply "Chinese"; its use adds nothing to what we already knew. The word becomes a useless counter, empty of content; and although it is used in many a learned pseudo-explanation, it scarcely amounts to more than a comforting noise. Or worse: the word Confucian, applied to everything indiscriminately, is felt to have content, albeit this content is fuzzily conceived. All Chinese entities, all elements of Chinese culture and history, are wafted into one vast limbo of hazy similarity. All are Confucian; and the variety, the sharpness, the individuality which distinguishes one idea, institution, mode of behavior from another is lost sight of. All could have been accounted for from an examination of one or another of the Confucian classics, or from some idea intuited from the welter of Chinese historical and cultural fact. Confucianism lacks any internal variety, does not change with time, and within the world of Chinese history and culture it includes everything.

. . . it is nonsense to say that "Confucian" really means simply "Chinese." Taoism, some forms of Buddhism, pure Legalism, and Taiping mysticism, to name but a few credos, are indisputably Chinese; they are not Confucian.

. . . Confucianism is no monolith, no repository of the unchanging truth, impervious to time and tide. Han Confucianism, Sung Neo-Confucianism, and Tokugawa Confucianism are not one philosophy, but many, compounded under three labels; and there are other varieties, often similar to these, but not identical.

These statements come from the introduction to *Confucianism in Action*, edited by D. S. Nivison and A. F. Wright (Stanford University Press, \$8.50). They indicate some of the stereotypes which the book's twelve contributors, all distinguished scholars and members of the Association for Asian Studies, have taken as challenges to combat "a very widespread misconception of Chinese civilization—to wit, the image of a society whose ideas and institutions were in a perpetual harmonious balance":

Such an image has had a perennial charm for Western man; it has colored most popular books on China and has insinuated itself into scholarly studies, but it gives no clue to what made the Chinese people

persistently creative or what inspired them to build the most stable polity known to history. The papers in this volume will, we hope, present a more believable account of Chinese creativity, by documenting some of the concrete problems with which the Chinese have struggled down the centuries, and by analyzing some of the vexing tensions and conflicts of thought that have stood at the very center of their way of life.

The studies are primarily concerned with four areas of Chinese and Japanese life in which Confucian ideas have been prominent: "familial institutions," "bureaucratic behavior," "power relations between monarch and the literati," and "the political and educational role of professional Confucianists." All of them attempt to acknowledge the genuine offspring of the Confucian vision, and to distinguish these from the orphans—the elements of rival systems—which in the public mind have become identified with Confucianism.

William Theodore De Bary's "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism" is an exercise in historical definition. It discovers, through examples of the partial but inadequate adaptation of Confucian ethics to the requirements of modern nationalism, five "minimal beliefs" characteristic of Neo-Confucianism in China and Japan. *Fundamentalism* was a reaffirmation of Confucian ethics by simple restatement of its principles as self-evident. *Restorationism*, going farther, was a series of attempts to reassert Confucian ethics by reclaiming from the past the social institutions most compatible with Confucius' ideal of the *chun-tzu* ("noble man"). *Humanism* was the recurrent emphasis of man's place in society as interpreted by a doctrine of "the essential goodness of man, which virtually all schools of NeoConfucianism upheld (though they interpreted it differently)." *Rationalism* involved a threefold conviction: the universe possesses an order underlying things and events; this order is discernible by man; and the highest calling of the *chun-tzu* is to contribute to knowledge which allows men to live in harmony with themselves and the universe. *Historical-mindedness* was a

determination to study man both as conditioning and as conditioned by his social circumstances. "Though the Neo-Confucianists' obsession with the past proved a serious weakness," De Bary contends, "we are hardly justified in concluding from this that the original Confucian teaching itself was wholly bankrupt. . . . the very fact that it has exerted such a powerful attraction through the ages would lead rather to the presumption that there was something in Confucianism central to the life of the Chinese people—and perhaps central to human life—that would keep it alive in some form despite its failure as a self-sufficient system of thought and conduct."

Benjamin Schwartz' "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought" uses the metaphor of polarity to explore and explain certain major themes in the Confucian tradition. Among these are: Self-Cultivation and the Ordering of Society, Inner and Outer Realms, and Knowledge and Action. Throughout his analysis of these "inseparably complementary" poles, Schwartz emphasizes ways in which "the central tragedy of the Master's own life" (that is, Confucius' failure to find any opportunity to fulfill his public vocation in a manner in keeping with his superior attainments through self-cultivation) was repeated in the lives of innumerable idealistic Confucian gentlemen down through the centuries. He never lets us forget that Confucius was, first and last, a visionary. The Confucian vision, however, was accepted by a whole society. When it became an "official" philosophy of a centralized bureaucratic state, it was fragmented into theses which its followers had to defend and apply. In many cases this fragmentation led to a radical redefinition of the vision itself.

Hui-chen Wang Liu's "An Analysis of Chinese Clan Rules" examines "how and with what effect the clan rules transmitted and applied the Confucian teachings to successive generations in the various clans." Mrs. Liu defines *clan rule* as "any formal instruction, injunction, regulation, stipulation, or similar passage found in a

genealogy which explicitly prescribes the conduct of clan members." Clan rules depend on moral persuasion: they derive their sanction from authority and aim at strengthening group integrity. Yet, in terms of individual adaptation, they are flexible. One clan rule concedes that "there is more than one way to achieve the essence of a good family life." Another recognizes that "rituals are originally based upon human feelings and hence their observance should not be compulsory regardless of circumstances." Still another declares that "studying books should not make one follow the books in a deadly rigid manner; and in managing a family one should not adhere to deadly fixed rules." From Mrs. Liu's analysis we learn that the most effective clan rules were basically Confucianist—with an admixture of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religion. They expressed both the influence of state law and the scholar-officials' interests. Finally, they were responses to prevailing social customs: they held, for example, that no religion should be permitted to subvert the family clan institutions, and that "though it is disgraceful for widows to remarry, adultery without remarriage would be far more shameful."

Denis Twitchett's "The Fan Clan's Charitable Estate, 1050-1760" attempts to clarify some questions concerning joint clan property. Among the most important items constituting joint clan property were the *i-t'ien* (charitable lands) and *i-chuang* (charitable estates). These were trust properties held in the name of a clan, endowed out of the charity of clan members, and non-transferable. They produced an income to relieve needy clan members and to help pay those expenses—weddings, funerals, the cost of education—which could easily cripple a poor family of gentry status. Twitchett exemplifies these practices in an account of the charitable estate of the Fan clan. He shows how its value and mode of operation changed with the fortunes of the Fans over seven centuries. His account was, for this reviewer, fascinating: the kind of subject which invites the attention and talent of a

historical novelist treated in a manner wholly consonant with the best standards of historiography.

C. K. Yang's "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior" considers closely a problem underlying most of *Confucianism in Action*. To what extent did the Chinese bureaucracy embody Confucian ideas and ideals? Here, Yang follows Max Weber's four basic features of a bureaucracy: specialization of functions, a hierarchy of authority, a system of formal rules, and impersonality. (In *Essays in Sociology* Weber attributed the enduring stability of the Chinese state to its organization as a "patrimonial bureaucracy.") Yang concludes that (a) contrary to the general assumption that functional specialization is a necessary feature of bureaucracy, in the Chinese bureaucracy the "generalist," usually a Confucianist, held a position superior to the specialist; (b) though the Chinese bureaucracy was organized and operated by formal rules, a system of informal norms—again, usually Confucianist—also played a prominent, often contradictory part in bureaucratic behavior; and (c) while "formalistic impersonality" was recognized as a basic norm in Chinese bureaucratic behavior, its functioning was seriously disrupted by the constant pressure of the bureaucrat's informal social and personal relationships.

James T. C. Liu's "Some Classifications of Bureaucrats in Chinese Historiography" draws upon three groups of material which "form in a sense three layers of Confucianism." First is the group of theoretical Confucianist teachings, beginning with the Ancient Classics that Confucius drew upon, which classifies officials according to ideal types. Here, as we would expect, the highest type is the *chun-tzu*. His special capability is the exercise of moral leadership in influencing others. His opposite is the *hsiao-jen* ("unworthy person"). Second is the group of historical writings; it adopts Confucianist ideal types but develops, in addition, certain

historical types. Among the highest of these are the *ming-ch'en* ("famous statesmen") and *hsun-li* ("principled officials"); a middle type is the *liang-li* ("good but ineffectual officials"); the lowest is the *k'u-li* ("oppressive officials"). All these types are determined primarily by their ability to show "superior administrative results." Third is the group of encyclopedias dealing with government conduct. Its classifications are more detailed and "realistic" than the first two. In general, they show "a tacit recognition of the cold fact that moral qualities are not necessarily essential to political achievement." Mr. Liu concludes that all these schemes of classification were influential. The perpetual struggle among them, he finds, can be best understood when we realize that while Confucianism is "a morally-oriented body of thought," the bureaucratic state—like all states—is a power structure. "However, it is to the credit of Confucianism that, by adapting itself to political realities to a considerable measure, it succeeded in effecting a fusion of its theories, including their moral emphasis and normative values, with the laws and practices of the state institutions."

C. O. Hucker's "Confucianism and the Chinese Censorial System" examines the ideological implications of one characteristic institution of the Confucian state, the censorial system, with special reference to its operation during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). The censorial system was the set of self-policing activities used by officials in all branches of the Chinese bureaucracy. Against the formulators of undesirable policy, its weapon was *remonstrance*; against the implementers, *impeachment*. Hucker shows that the actual operation of this system was a compromise between Legalist and Confucianist attitudes. The Legalists maintained, on the one hand, that man is amorally self-seeking. The people exist for the sake of the state and its ruler. The people must therefore be coerced into obedience by rewards and punishments. Law is a supreme, state-determined, amoral standard of conduct and must be enforced inflexibly. Officials must be obedient instruments of the ruler's will,

accountable to him alone. *Expediency* must be the basis for all state policy and all state service. The state can prosper only if it is organized for prompt and efficient implementation of the ruler's will. On the other hand, the Confucianists maintained that man is morally perfectible. The state and its ruler exist for the sake of the people. The people must therefore be encouraged toward goodness by education and virtuous example. Law is a necessary, but inescapably fallible, handmaiden of the natural moral order and must be enforced flexibly. Officials must be morally superior men, loyal to the ruler but accountable primarily and in the last resort to Heaven. *Morality*—specifically the doctrines of good government expounded in the Classics and manifested in the acts of worthy men of the past—must be the basis for all state policy and all state service. The state can prosper only if its people possess the morale that comes from confidence in the ruler's virtue.

D. S. Nivison's "Ho-Shen and His Accusers: Ideology and Political Behavior in the Eighteenth Century" analyzes the rise and fall of a political opportunist. Ho-Shen, a Manchu favorite of the Emperor Kao-Tsung, achieved in the last two decades of the eighteenth century something of a record for bureaucratic corruption. How was Ho-Shen able to gain such influence, to entrench himself for over twenty years, and to remain virtually untouched? Partially by appealing to the Emperor's self-esteem, says Nivison; for since Ho-Shen was an uneducated, almost illiterate man, he lacked the embarrassing prestige of a professional Confucianist. But with Ho-Shen's suicide in 1799, the power of the Manchus faltered, the Confucianist scholar-officials came back into favor, and the influence of the *chun-tzu* in government inevitably increased.

J. R. Levenson's "The Suggestiveness of Vestiges: Confucianism and Monarchy at the Last" deals with modern China's attempts after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to adapt Confucianism to the requirements of monarchy and nationalism.

Levenson contends that all hopes for monarchy were lost with the failure of the Ch'ing to improvise after the Rebellion. Traditionally the ruling class, the Ch'ing were in a hopeless dilemma. They had to "modernize" if they were to avoid being held responsible for continued Chinese disasters. But their sponsorship of modernization, the abandonment of traditional Chinese folkways would end their only claim to legitimacy as Chinese rulers—a legitimacy which though the Ch'ing were an ethnically foreign people, pre-nationalist Chinese culture had accorded them. This claim, however, Chinese nationalism (necessarily spreading as the culture changed) found inadmissible. Consequently, in their last decade the Ch'ing faced a discouraging choice. They could go down to defeat as "traditionalists," out of sheer maladaptability in a world of outer pressures and inner strains. Or they could go down as "modernists," aspiring, at least, to strengthen China and thereby extend their title to the traditional mandate—but, at the same time, running afoul of the nationalism which modern foreign-strengthening methods entailed. They were, in short, given a situation in which the best of both worlds was, in another light, the worst. They tried to be "modern" enough to defend their traditional status and "traditional" enough to take the curse off modernism.

John Whitney Hall's "The Confucian Teacher in Tokugawa Japan" discusses the relationship of the *jusha*, the Japanese Confucian teachers, to members of the *samurai*—the politically dominant class—during the Tokugawa period (1624-1868). During this period the *samurai's* way of life and dominant concerns changed radically. One of the most obvious and important changes was, so Hall maintains, the imprint of Confucianism on his thinking. At the end of the period many of the *jusha's* fundamental aims in the education of the *samurai* had actually been achieved; "Japan's leaders had become a well-educated, rationally thinking, socially oriented group whose professed ideals in government, society, and letters were strongly Confucian . . . Even in those aspects of

samurai activity which were farthest from the Neo-Confucian experience, such as military training, Confucian thought and values had made their mark."

D. H. Shively's "Motoda Eifu: Confucian Lecturer to the Meiji Emperor" examines the career of a Tokugawa Confucianist after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. At the time of the Restoration, Motoda was one of many Confucian scholars, too old to change with the times, who seemed destined to be discarded with the old regime. Motoda had just made up his mind to retire from his provincial office when in 1871 he was summoned to serve as the Emperor's lecturer on Chinese books. He interpreted his function in the broadest possible sense; for him, it was nothing less than a continual challenge to gain a convert to Tokugawa Confucianism. At this time the Emperor was eighteen, Motoda fifty-three. He remained with the Emperor for twenty years, seeing him almost every day. Motoda's career is of particular interest, explains Shively, as being "one of the last significant demonstrations, historically, of Confucianism in action at the highest levels of government . . . It is a kind of index of the rapidity of Japan's development that a Tokugawa Confucianist could survive long enough to give political advice, exclusively in Confucian terms, to the ruler of a modern state."

As the reviewer has indicated, *Confucianism in Action* is a book contributed by, but not exclusively or mainly addressed to, specialists. It is filled with philosophic and historic insights, parallels, and demonstrations. In background knowledge of Confucianism, it begins where most of us probably are. And in choosing to deal "not with the reflections of the philosopher in his study, but with men active in society and in government, and with the values and beliefs we can see them applying," it can take us a long way towards appreciating a distinctive and distinguished civilization.

RALPH S. POMEROY

Davis, California

COMMENTARY

CORRESPONDENCE IN DEPTH

MANY readers, we have no doubt, will be as interested in and pleased by what Mr. Zitzler has to say as we were. His idea of an interchange of correspondence among kindred spirits—something like the papers of the participants in the *Newsletter* of the contemporary Committee of Correspondence, including Erich Fromm, David Riesman, and others—might just work; at any rate, it ought to be tried.

Mr. Zitzler suggests that the letters focus on "non-political, psychological and philosophical problems." This region of inquiry, we think, holds more ultimate promise than political questionings and investigations, but it also holds more hazards. Current events give form, focus, and specificity to the subject-matter of the Committee of Correspondence *Newsletter*. The insight and skill of the contributors make the *Newsletter* worthwhile reading, but the "objective" nature of what they write about frames what they have to say and contributes a fortuitous discipline. You do not have this advantage in psychological and philosophical discussions.

In other words, the contributors to a symposium or a round robin or whatever, of the sort Mr. Zitzler proposes, will undertake a more difficult task than the contributors to the *Newsletter*, to say nothing of the intrinsic obscurity of the subjects to be examined. The pertinence of what they say will have to be created by the perceptiveness of what is said, rather than by events.

Still, the project, we think, ought to be attempted, and by anyone so minded who feels he has something to say.

To help get the thing going, if it can be got going, MANAS is willing to print an occasional four-page supplement which would be folded and inserted into the magazine, loose, and mailed to all subscribers. Our theory would be to wait until there is enough good material to fill four pages (in

typescript, similar to the Committee of Correspondence *Newsletter* in format), and then lithograph the typing as a low-cost addition to an issue of MANAS. The supplement would appear whenever the material accumulates sufficiently to make one up.

Contributors would have to be willing to submit to cutting and a little editing, in order to fit the material into one issue of the supplement.

The project should be attempted if only as a tribute to the luminous letter Sherwood Anderson wrote to Theodore Dreiser in 1936. Except for Walker Winslow's "Hour of Man" contributed to MANAS for Jan. 31, 1951, we can think of no other communication with this quality of inspiration.

CHILDREN

. . . and Ourselves

CORRESPONDENCE AND NOTES

ONE Of our correspondents, while sharing Paul Goodman's sympathy for the "beats" (*Growing Up Absurd*), feels that another writer quoted in "Children" carries a similar evaluation too far. Following is the criticism:

In the article commenting upon Goodman's book, the writer quotes William Stringfellow's remarks on the Harlem gang: "They risk their lives for evidently unworthy purposes." Stringfellow likens this to that "One who offers his life for all, even though none are worthy of his life." I must say, I find this comparison ludicrous, to say the least. Stringfellow ignores the differences in motivation, in risk, in the structure of the striving, etc. And he projects *our* judgment of the unworthiness of the delinquent activity onto the delinquents themselves. But the delinquent does not look at the object of his striving as unworthy; so he engages in no sacrifice such as "the One who offers his life. . . ."

As a caseworker in a detention setting, in daily contact with delinquents, I cannot share Stringfellow's romantic conception of the delinquent. The delinquent's rebellion is largely unprincipled, selfish and without constructive purposes. He is one of the society's victims, not its saviour. This, Goodman points out in his book, and nothing could be more foolish than to see in the delinquent some mode of salvation—just because he is a rebel. The delinquent is, to use a phrase of Lindner's, a "rebel without a cause." He doesn't have the resources to rebel constructively against the conditions that oppress him, so, in desperation, he resorts to destructive forms of retaliation. His acts of delinquency are his futile and perverted protest against his oppression, but are not better than, do not lift him above, that oppression. (Just as the adult hero in the English film, *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning*, is not able to rebel in any other than an infantile fashion against the system in which he is enmeshed. The pathos is that he saw his acts of defiance as bold and daring, when they challenged the existing system not a whit.)

Perhaps our quotation from Mr. Stringfellow was too abbreviated, though we tried to suggest that he was endeavoring to see both the best and

the worst that could be said about delinquents and the lower echelons of the beats. For instance, he described the numb despair which is apt to be characteristic of a young gang member who "knows at last that he has nothing to commend himself to another human being." At the same time, this youth longs to get into the stream of life somewhere. So, along with perverted loyalties there may be an upsurge of a genuinely sacrificial impulse. All this may be rather abstract, but when one probes the psychic predicaments of many delinquent gang members from a sympathetic standpoint, meanings of this sort are apt to emerge.

An article in the Summer issue of *Dissent*, by Harry Slochower, titled "The Juvenile Delinquent and the Mythic Hero," approaches the same point which Mr. Stringfellow was endeavoring to make:

Errant or delinquent behavior is also a form of symbolic communication. As Freud suggested, there is a connection between symbol and symptom; only a very fine line divides genius and pathology. Writers, such as Thomas Mann, have viewed the artist as a borderline case and shown his inner relationship to the criminal. In his personality and behavior the criminal may often reveal, though in a distorted and sometimes brutal form, those same impulses of rebellion which move the artist and which the artist embodies in his hero. These impulses represent the *productive* and *usable* elements of deviant conduct. Just as in therapy we address ourselves to the intact ego of the patient, so in regard to juvenile delinquency and adult crime, we must seek out these elements, and assist in their redirection.

Dr. Slochower then turns to a particular case history:

One of the motivations for delinquent behavior is a desire to assume a heroic role, in order to compensate for the feeling of so many young people that they don't belong, that they aren't important enough. Among the insignia the gangs adopt are Supermen, Panthers, Dragons, Tarzans, Enchanters Devils, Rebels. Of the delinquents who have come to my attention, Jack Koslow comes closest to a distorted figure of a mythic hero, suggested by his intense interest in Greek mythology.

Jack was a highly gifted boy with an IQ of 135 when he was 9 years old. He was in a class of "gifted children" and made high school in 3 years. He did not suffer economic privation and came from a fairly stable home, although he hated his father for beating him. Despite these relatively favorable circumstances, Jack became a drifter, went from job to job, finding fault with everybody. From June 1954 on, he was unemployed and lived as "a bum."

When Koslow was asked to characterize his activity, he said: "Just hit or miss. . . . He looks at you out of one eye. It's disgusting. It incites me to hit him." Wasn't Koslow's disgust with being looked at "out of one eye" disgust with an aspect of himself? Wasn't his war against bums a war against his own hated identity as a bum? He said of the murder: "I had to do it to preserve my individuality"—a formulation strikingly similar to Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov who killed to prove himself, "to have the daring." And when the Negro fell into the water, Koslow cried out: "Now, we're all murderers," expressing thereby not only the need to socialize his guilt, but also to confess himself a murderer. His self-assertion was also a self-accusation. . . .

Mr. Stringfellow's point is that we must recognize the significance of the delinquent's insistence upon action: he is doing the wrong things most of the time, but he is *doing*.

Since our correspondent was so favorably impressed by Paul Goodman, we suggest this relevant passage from the conclusion of *Growing Up Absurd*:

Generally, all the recent doings of problematic youth whether in the middle class or among the underprivileged juvenile delinquents, have had a stamp of at least partly springing from some existent situation, whatever it is, and of responding with direct action, rather than keeping up appearances and engaging in role playing. There is also among them a lot of phony role playing, but no more than in present acceptable society, and rather less than in the average young man or adolescent who has a "line."

FRONTIERS

You Can't Fool ALL the Important People

MANAS seldom finds itself quoting either clergymen or politicians—for one thing because neither are particularly known for opposing partisan bias. Yet we presently stand impressed before some of the things that the Right Reverend James A. Pike has been saying, and a great many things written by Senator J. W. Fulbright in a recent controversial memorandum to the White House and the Pentagon. Both these men not only understand clearly that dogmatic partisanship is the true maker of war, but are willing to make specific criticism of unthinking and combative nationalist dogma.

The Reverend Pike addressed the World Affairs council in the Statler Hilton hotel in Los Angeles, last April 24. The gist of his remarks was summed up by the Los Angeles *Times*:

In his speech, Bishop Pike roamed freely in his criticism of American dogma, declaring that what we often hold the Russians to be guilty of we ourselves are as guilty. This is true, he said, in six areas in which America is critical of Russia. He listed these as materialism, the presence of elites, interference with religious freedom, denial of civil rights, "little care for honesty" and lack of integrity in foreign affairs. "I don't think the most useful citizens are the patriots who wave the flag," he asserted.

Bishop Pike also undertook to show that opinions solidified at the extreme "right" are fully as dangerous to world peace as opinions of the extreme "left." And this is the essential theme of the now highly-controversial Fulbright memorandum to the White House, as summarized—rather grudgingly, we feel—by *U.S. News and World Report*. The Senator from Arkansas called into question the practice of indoctrination by the military. Sen. Fulbright first noted that the military sponsors only extreme right-wing speakers on public occasions, and that the content of the "educational" activities of the military, including the training of draftees, is noticeably antagonistic to any sort of liberal

opinion. One portion of the Fulbright memorandum reads:

The content no doubt has varied from program to program, but running through all of them is a central theme that the primary, if not exclusive, danger to this country is internal Communist infiltration. . . .

The thesis of the nature of the Communist threat often is developed by equating social legislation with socialism, and the latter with Communism. . . .

This view of the Communist menace renders foreign aid cultural exchanges, disarmament negotiations, and other international programs, as extremely wasteful, if not actually subversive. . . .

There are many indications that the philosophy of the programs is representative of a substantial element of military thought, and has great appeal to the military mind. . . .

There is little in the education, training or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, training and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the President's total "strategy for the nuclear age." . . .

Senator Fulbright's voice is not apt to be lost in the wilderness, for he is chairman of an apparently strong foreign relations committee. At the crux of the foreign relations problem, psychologically, is the sort of fear-dislike complex which so often leads to a precipitation of hostilities. The Fulbright memorandum continues:

In the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we've got. Particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos.

Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean War, led to MacArthur's revolt and McCarthyism. . . .

It is probably the view of most members of Congress today that if foreign aid were laid before the people in a referendum, it would be defeated. The question arises, how will it be 5 or 10 years from now? . . .

The radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal during such periods. . . .

If the military is infected with this virus of right-wing radicalism, the danger is worthy of attention. . . . If, by the process of the military "educating" the public, the fevers of both groups are raised, the danger is great indeed.

A columnist in the Los Angeles *Times* for May 31 quoted from *The Manchurian Candidate*, by Richard Condon, a recent novel on the subject of brain-washing. These passages help to show why this country, and the world, could stand a great many more clergymen like Bishop Pike and needs at least a few more senators of the calibre of J. W. Fulbright:

If Madison Avenue can make us react instinctively to such trigger words as thrifty, special, bargain, crisp, milder, easy, and politicians can make us react to such words as un-American, fellow-traveler, bureaucrat, egg-head, do-gooder, and lobbyist, it is inescapable that in the hands of trained brain-washers more sophisticated and more complicated gains can be obtained.

If a man could be conditioned to build his whole emotional outlook around a concept of total loyalty, and at the same time the technicians had expunged any concept of disloyalty, then a man could be dedicatedly loyal to diametrically opposite interests. . . .

The point is we're entering a new phase in human relationships. Advertising has proved you can transfer almost any commercial point of view to any mass of people, governments have proved you can transfer any political point of view to any mass of people, and the real peril of brainwashing is that people still don't believe there is any such thing.

Socrates said that the unexamined life is not worth living. It now may be added that the unexamined idea is not fit to accept. Only one sort of revolution can help us now—the revolution against preformed opinions: not just bad opinions, but any kind of preformed opinions. They corrupt the mind, and a man whose mind has been corrupted is hardly a man.