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ETHICS, LIVELIHOOD, AND THE MORES

THERE is a lot of nonsense around on the questions of freedom and justice and the idea of the good life. The most important reason for this nonsense is human ignorance. The second most important reason for the nonsense is the need, or apparent need, for objective definitions of freedom and justice and the good life which can be applied in behalf of large groups of men.

The overcoming of human ignorance is too basic a problem to be discussed in this article. Here we shall look at the nonsense which arises from institutional definitions.

It is nonsense, for example, to assert that because title to land and the instruments of production is vested in the national state, the working man is no longer exploited but now enjoys a life of freedom. The fact may be that he has much less choice concerning where he shall work, what work he shall do, and how much he shall be paid. He may work for a benevolent instead of a profit-making institution, but when a government agency or a bureaucrat is his boss instead of an acquisitive individualist, he has lost even the right to decide what is a benevolent situation and what is not. The Party *tells* him what is benevolent.

Of course, this argument is easily turned into nonsense, too, since it can be shown that the feeling-tone of the words you use in developing it determines the conclusion that is to be drawn. But that is a part of the exposure we are after. We want to show, among other things, the limited usefulness of all the norms of *group* values and *group* theories of human good. No doubt modern society has need of a tentative sort of group values and theories, since we live in groups, but to exaggerate their importance or role in controlling decisions is now the worst possible mistake in political or any kind of philosophy that a man can make.

It is nonsense, again, to argue that a man is free because he can go into business for himself or quit one employer and go to work for another for more or less wages. A given field of commercial enterprise may offer an ingenious and enterprising man the opportunity to make a considerable profit, so long as he is willing to play according to the rules of the field, but suppose he finds the rules immoral, the ends contemptible? How is he free? He is free to compromise his ideals or to break the rules and fail. Or, if he is more sagacious, more skillful, and more determined than most of us, he may be able to devise some new form of business or institutional undertaking which holds compromise to a practical minimum and gives scope to his vision.

What we are trying to get at, here, is the nature of the problem. The solution will have to come later.

What problem? The problem of the young man who wonders how he is going to spend his life—what work, that is, he will do, for what ends, and how he will support his wife and children.

There is no problem, of course, unless the young man questions the assumptions of the system. There is no problem unless you want to try to build something that is not now being built in your place and time. If you can be satisfied in being a little piece of a man by holding down a little piece of a job, and not be disturbed by the "big picture," there is no problem. But even if you are willing to go along with a lot of the ways things are done these days, the rewards are getting less and less. To say there is "no problem" gives only a relative reassurance. If you go into business and are smart enough or fortunate enough to be able to make a profit, you soon find

that production of useful articles is no longer the secret of success; instead, you have to become a tax lawyer. The most valuable man in modern business is not the production man; he is not even the distribution man, who used to be the most important; the man with the most take-home pay is the manipulator of legal conventions. From any sensible, normal point of view, he is a parasite on the productive process. If you work for a company that is making a profit, either below or at the policy-making level, your duties are ultimately defined by the tax expert. Even the ownership of the company—to merge or not to merge—is dictated by tax considerations.

This situation fits in with some others. Why are taxes so high? They are high because of war. The dreams of the social utopians, the decentralists, the guild socialists, can never come true so long as plans and preparations for war are the major activities of the national State. With war always in the offing, you are going to have the kind of a culture which is produced by centralized authority, dominated by slogans, psychological button-pushing, and all the resulting degradations. Centralized authority means the Welfare State, the sapping of psychological and moral independence, the vulgarization of taste, and the subdivision of human beings. One or the other has to be subdivided: authority or people; both cannot remain whole.

So, even if you find yourself able to work out tolerable compromises in other departments, you will still be subject in your business to the conditions built up by the techniques of mass marketing. You may be contemptuous of those techniques, but you cannot ignore them. If you are going to make goods, you have to be reasonably sure that someone will buy them.

Then there is the hideous monotony of the fruits of the technological society. Take a trip across the country and notice that the only visible individuality left to Americans is in the landscape they happen to inhabit. Every town looks like every other, from the neon lights to the menus in the roadside cafes. What good will it do to colonize the moon if all you can see there is the same old stuff?

Well, is there anything on the other side of the ledger? One thing that you are bound to be proud of, traveling by car across the country, is the new roads that the state and federal governments are constructing. Then there is the notable fact that there doesn't seem to be much material poverty anywhere. You can find it, of course, but you have to look. As a MANAS reader observed recently in a letter: "Consider that in the United States of America we have gone a long way during the past fifty years toward solving the problem of the production of the necessities and comforts of life, which is an important advance." It is certainly a fact that it would be easy to compile a vastly impressive record of the achievements of technology in behalf of practical freedom from drudgery for human beings, and in behalf of cultural enrichment, as for example in electronic reproduction of fine music. You can stipulate all this progress without arguing about it; to do so keeps the discussion from turning completely sour; but it is also necessary to recognize the irrelevance of much of this progress to the young man trying to figure out what to do with his life. The important meaning of these developments is that they exhibit a kind of plateau of material achievement which ought now to become the basis for another kind of enterprise. What troubles and frustrates the young man is the almost total indifference of the scene to this kind of thinking, and the baffling uniformity of what opportunities seem open to him.

A young communist, or a young man in a communist country, is not likely to have the same problems unless he is really born out of time and place. His outlook will tend to be similar to the outlook of a young American of fifty years ago. There is still the material universe to conquer. The bloom is not yet off the material peach. The icing on the cake isn't rancid yet; so far, the cake doesn't even have an icing. The disciplines of

science and technology hold out great promise of fulfillment. There are many millions of people with urgent material needs to satisfy. Engineering, chemistry, biochemistry, electronics—all the promise of chemurgy and the button-pushing magic of technology invites the youth of under-developed or half-developed countries. The promise, for them, is not necessarily "materialistic," even though the opportunity lies in the mastery and manipulation of material forces and things. Such labors do not become materialistic until they are mistaken for the authentic meaning of human life, until the goals of conquest over matter and energy are glorified beyond their natural function and given the kind of doctrinal celebration they now receive in the United States. They already have this sort of attention in ideological Communist propaganda, but the phoneyness of such claims in behalf of material achievement is seldom felt by the people who are doing the work and who see that it needs to be done. You can't tell a man who is building a good house for somebody to live in that he is a materialist. You won't make any sense. Especially if a lot of people are still living in shacks. But if, later on, when everybody has a pretty good house, you say that in order to develop their spiritual qualities people have to have houses with twice as many conveniences and luxuries, what you say is materialism and phoney. Materialism is not in things, but in the way people look at things.

Anyhow, the problems of the young communists are not our problems. Our battles are different. Our mistake is in assuming that they have all been won.

The problems which confront our young men are not the problems you hand over to the boys with the slide rules and studious faces. We have those problems licked. If you ask the boys with the slide rules how to reduce the percentage of young men who are going to grow up into Willie Lomans, they won't be able to tell you, and they'll probably resent the question. How do you escape being Willie Loman, or the mixed-up sons of Willie Loman? Or the employer of Willie Loman?

The good men are all going into some kind of therapy, these days. What we are talking about is the development of a pattern of life that will reduce the need for therapy—what Erich Fromm called a sane society. This means breaking up the *mores*, finding ways to deviate, ways of living in the interstices.

The old social ethics used to always have "sides." The new way is to try to practice ethics without taking a "side." Taking sides, in our society, perpetuates blind partisanships. There is never a reason to ignore or overlook the principle of justice which may once have prevailed on one or another of the traditional "sides" of social controversy; to do this would be to create all over again the need for a partisan viewpoint; but when partisanship begins to operate in routine frustration of freedom and even aspects of the social good, its moral justification lapses into a historical vestige.

The difficulty, here, of course, is the difficulty which presents itself in any social change. Old methods of balance and restraint still serve limited purposes in the ordering of society, with the result that the growth of better methods is hampered by the old ways. Break-throughs require invention and daring. Changes in pattern of life are a lot easier for individuals. Resourceful men are often able to make a good living on a part-time job which allows them to undertake ventures which are closer to their hearts. A classic illustration of this is the maple sugar farming project of Scott Nearing, which left him free for his writing for half of every day. It may be argued that not all men are capable of this kind of life. This is no more than saying that not all men are pioneers. The practice of freedom is like the practice of religion. You can't organize it successfully for the masses. All you can do is to attempt to set an example. When you organize it, it turns into something else. Service businesses like a small print shop, a book store, or an activity such as manufacturers'

representative will often provide the individual with freedom and the time to devote to worthwhile undertakings.

We are not talking about geniuses, who make their own paths and find their work cut out for them by an inner compulsion. There is one thing, however, that all men can learn from geniuses in the arts and sciences, and that is the importance of having work to do and demanding a sense of wholeness in one's work. It is ridiculous to expect a society of human beings who hate their work, who regard the time spent working as stolen from the enjoyment of their existence, to be capable of self-government. A successful democratic society needs to be made up of people who have the habit of thinking in terms of wholes. This means that it is of primary importance to work for the restoration of a natural sense of wholeness in the lives of human beings. But you can't con working men on an assembly line into caring about what happens at the end of the line. Something more fundamental has to happen than application of the skills of the industrial psychologist, and anyhow the assembly line is the most advanced and massive form of the subdivision of human beings. It will probably be necessary to start with the creation of new kinds of work relationships to replace the old ones gradually. The principle of the Gandhian philosophy of work is pertinent here, but how to apply it is a question that will take long and careful answering. But more than we need theorists of human wholeness in industry, we need human beings who are determined to practice wholeness themselves, to take responsibility for the fruit of their labors, and who are more interested in what they make than in the rewards, working conditions, and fringe benefits connected with the time spent in making it. A union contract was once an important document, and may still be important in some areas of labor, but a union contract which is held to be more important than what the men are making turns both individual and social values upside-down. We couldn't care less about how much the men in a missile plant are getting per hour. The issues of the age have passed them by.

There is bitter irony in the fact that the circumstances of the extraordinary material success of the American technological society have created grooves of behavior and slogans of self-justification of its processes which are formidable barriers to any other sort of behavior, and to the fulfillment of motives different from the motives which dug the grooves and invented the slogans. A man who wishes to do something constructive with his money—and it is not difficult to make money in this society, if you have some talent for it—finds that the channels of philanthropy are all controlled by legal dykes and locks which he is compelled by law to use, or suffer confiscation of the major portion of the funds he is able to accumulate. As John Steinbeck's tipsy millionaire explained in a Monterey bar to the hungry painter—he couldn't give money to the painter because the painter was not a non-profit corporation with an exemption certificate from the treasury department. The painter, to get help, will have to fill out a lot of forms and seek a grant from some foundation which is allowed by its charter to give money to painters. Just getting an answer may take six months, and good painters are likely to be very bad fillers-out of forms. This is only one illustration—no doubt a trivial one—of how the system works. The system is predicated on the control of tax evasion, not on the exercise of freedom, and the result is the almost total conventionalization of the decent impulses of human beings. After you have made the money which the free enterprise system allows you to make, you have to filter your motives and style your actions according to the elaborate superstructure of regulations created by the acquisitive necessity of the State, and learning how to do all this successfully is now a profession involving years of study to learn the appropriate techniques. The uncalculating, spontaneous act of generosity is almost always penalized as an offense against the system. Constantine and

Torquemada would undoubtedly find it easy to work within the rules of the system we have developed, but Jesus Christ would probably end up in a dungeon, now, as in the sixteenth century.

But "philanthropy" of a familiar or even an unfamiliar sort is not the real need. Philanthropy, therapy, civil liberties, the solution of the "leisure time" problem, how to deal with the new situations produced by automation—all these activities are *restorative* functions which attempt to heal the lives of people who are without ardor and respect for their work. It is ridiculous to make a "profit" the touchstone of the free society. Freedom is the latitude a man has to determine the quality of his own life. It has never been anything else. False definitions of freedom will always constrict the true freedom of the individual and establish norms of behavior which distort the lives of all those who cannot understand what is happening to them and who, through an honest loyalty to their fellows, the land of their birth and the traditions of their history, attempt to direct their moral impulses and ideals into channels which are actually alien to the longings in their hearts. A man may really want to build bridges or automobiles; he may be interested in transport or communication, in food or nutrition, in education or publishing, in housing or in textiles and clothing: why bewilder and distract him with an ideology?

This is a question of ideals and ends, and work to fulfill them, not of the mechanisms which will make them practical. The point to be made, here, is that unless the ideals and ends are clear, we shall never be able to invent the mechanisms we need to reach them. Devising mechanisms has never been a problem for Americans. The vast ingenuity of our people in creating ways and means is the most notable historical achievement of the past two hundred years. The problem is simply and solely the clarification of ends. Politics and economic relationships can have neither sense nor order until there is an intelligible consensus of ends, and before there can be such a consensus there must be the labors of pioneers who show in practice how a man's life is transformed for good by behavior consistent with ends worth pursuing.

REVIEW
RESOLVES AGAINST FEAR—AND WAR

THE work of Dr. Linus Pauling in bringing together men of influence who are also men of good will has often been remarked in MANAS. The recent Conference Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, held May 2-7 at Oslo, Norway, gives evidence that the efforts of Dr. and Mrs. Pauling are not only indefatigable, but are also gaining substantial response. Thirty-five physical and biological scientists and twenty-five social scientists and scholars from fifteen countries chose to come to Norway. These were all distinguished men, making the conference a remarkable cross-section of the finest and most challenging minds of our time. Particularly familiar to MANAS readers will be such names as Robert Hutchins, Lewis Mumford, Alexander Meiklejohn, Alan Paton, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, Brock Chisholm, and Erich Fromm.

After five days of discussion, a statement was compiled and adopted unanimously by the participants, from which we extract the following:

> For more than a decade scientists have been in agreement that the development of nuclear weapons has made it possible for man to destroy civilization. There is no adequate defense against nuclear weapons that could not be overcome by increasing the scale of the attack. There is no way of arranging international agreements to limit war between the great powers to the use of conventional weapons or of "small" nuclear bombs. Over and over again the leaders of nations, scientists, students of international relations, and other informed people have said that the stockpiles of nuclear weapons must not be used and that the only future for the world is one in which war between nations is abandoned and disputes are resolved by recourse to law.
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> Yet, despite the negotiations in Geneva for a bomb-test agreement, despite the efforts to achieve disarmament, the nuclear stockpiles have multiplied. The nuclear weapons of the great nations have explosive energy many thousands of times that of all the explosives used in all past wars. These bombs in a war would kill a large part of the world's people.
>
> We consider that no dispute can justify nuclear war. Even small wars today are extremely dangerous, because of the likelihood that a small war would grow into a world catastrophe.
>
> In view of the danger and instability of the present arms race, the only sane policy for the world is that of achieving general and complete world disarmament with suitable international control and inspection.
>
> That is the proclaimed goal of the nuclear powers and of all other nations.
>
> General and complete disarmament can and must be achieved. Its ultimate level should be that of international and national police forces. The problem of finding ways of eliminating nuclear weapons and arriving at a general and complete disarmament is complex, but if it is given a fraction of the attention now devoted to military matters, we believe that it can be solved, and we urge that great efforts be expended on this at once.

Such a statement as the foregoing might well be regarded as primary, and it is possible that the most logical implication of a generalized statement of principle lies in a pressing towards specific proposals for unilateral disarmament. We have already called attention to Erich Fromm's *Case for Unilateral Disarmament*, first appearing in *Dædalus* (Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences). In his conclusion, not previously quoted in MANAS, Dr. Fromm remarks:

> I do not deny that there are risks involved in this limited form of unilateral action but considering the fact that the present method of negotiations has produced no results and that the chances that they will in the future are rather slim, considering furthermore the grave risk involved in the continuation of the arms race, I believe that it is practically and morally justified to take this risk. At present we are caught in a position with little chance for survival, unless we want to take refuge in hopes. *If* we have enough shelters, *if* there is enough time for a warning and strategic evacuation of cities, *if* the "United States' active offenses and active defenses can gain control of the military situation after only a few exchanges," we might have only five, or twenty-five, or seventy million killed. However, if these conditions do not materialize, "an enemy could, by repeated strikes, reach almost any level of death and

destruction he wished." (And, I assume the same threat exists for the Soviet Union.) In such a situation, "when nations are poised at the last moment when an agreement appears possible to end the risk of horrifying war unleashed by fanatics, lunatics or men of ambition," it is imperative to shake off the inertia of our accustomed thinking to seek for new approaches to the problem, and above all, to see new alternatives to the present choices that confront us.

Dr. Charles Osgood's "Acts for Peace" pamphlet, *How We Might Win the Hot War and Lose the Cold*, reprinted from the University of Chicago's *Midway*, contains some interesting paragraphs on unilateral disarmament. After remarking that he intends his three proposals simply as illustrations "of what a sequence of unilateral tension-reducing acts might be like," and that he does not consider himself able to make his proposals satisfactorily "current," Dr. Osgood outlines a program:

1. The United States government announces to the world that on a date one month from that time it intends to share with the Russians (and all other nations) the information it has been gathering on the conditions of outer space, on the manufacture of "clean" nuclear bombs, and on various other developments in science whose main values are peaceful and scientific in nature. We indicate that, whereas our own action is not contingent upon their prior commitment, we expect them to respond in kind by sharing information of a similar nature. We also announce that this is part of our new policy—to reduce world tensions by direct, progressive unilateral steps.

2. On the date set, this action is taken. Our next move depends upon what the Russians have done at this point. (*a*) If they have reciprocated, we take a larger step: perhaps we announce that one month from that time we intend to deactivate and withdraw from a major military base—one closest and most threatening to the Russian heartland—and we invite them to send observers to check this operation. Again, we assert our general policy and suggest appropriate reciprocation on their part. (It probably should be pointed out that, in an age of nuclear missiles, stable military bases whose locations are well known are "sitting ducks" anyhow, since they would be the first targets in a surprise attack against us, their only value is in terms of threat or in terms of a surprise attack on our own part—which I have argued we would not launch.) (*b*) If the Russians have failed to reciprocate to our first unilateral act, we take another small step: perhaps we announce that on a date one month from this time we intend to ban for a period of one year all further tests of nuclear weapons, and again we invite their inspection. We restate our general policy and our expectation that they will reciprocate.

3. On the date set, this second unilateral action, (*a*) or (*b*), is taken. If the Russians have been reciprocating, we take still larger steps bearing on focal points of tensions. It is quite possible, of course, that by this time the Russians may be trying to outdo us in "walking inward on the seesaw—they have already made some tentative moves in this direction (e.g., their unilateral decision to ban nuclear-bomb testing for a period). If, on the other hand, the Russians have not reciprocated, I think we should continue our series of tension-reducing but non-crippling acts until either mounting moral pressure forces them to reciprocate or their negative intention becomes completely clear.

Dr. Osgood concludes:

I believe that graduated unilateral disengagement can provide the basis for a positive and consistent foreign policy, one that is appropriate to international relations in a nuclear age and one in which we can take the initiative.

COMMENTARY
THOUGHTS THAT LIGHT

JUDGING from the sort of response we have been getting from Paul Wienpahl's "Unorthodox Lecture" (MANAS, Aug. 23), this is a discussion which separates the men from the boys. Readers have been writing in for lots of a half-dozen or so copies, in order to send them around to friends. Dr. Wienpahl seems to have touched a nerve of inner inquiry of the kind many people are secretly pursuing.

The serious thought of the time often seems to resemble the slow circling of a flight of birds. Round and round they go, but they seldom come down to earth. Dr. Wienpahl's birds light on several important places.

One or two people want to know, who is he? Well, a great thing about his article is that it doesn't matter who the author is. These observations stand by themselves. You could say that Dr. Wienpahl is a college professor who lives in Santa Barbara, a man who cares enough about the processes of thinking to pursue them to what ends he can find—such as going to Paris to study Existentialist idea, or going to Japan for a first-hand experience of the discipline of Zen—but knowing this doesn't really enrich the Unorthodox Lecture.

The point is that writing and discussion of this sort directs the attention of the reader to himself and his own wonderings, values, and objectives. This is the built-in, philosophical anonymity which MANAS strives to embody, being a paper devoted to the impersonal works of the mind. On the whole, Dr. Wienpahl is a greater success than the editors in achieving this end.

Why should we say that Dr. Wienpahl's paper separates the men from the boys?

The issues he is writing about are subjective. They have to do with the nature of human beings. It takes a grown-up man, it seems to us, to recognize the importance of these issues. They are the issues that mark the essential problems of the twentieth century. The boys don't *feel* the reality of these issues.

Ordinarily, people regard human behavior as creating the essential problems. But the behavior of people depends upon what people want and work for, and what they want and work for depends upon what and who they think they are. This is the problem set up by Dr. Wienpahl—who is he? What is he, unto himself? The unduplicated value of his discussion is that he sets it up in universal terms—terms which have meaning for every other human being who is prepared to make a leap into uncharted territory in quest of self and meaning.

When you begin to think like this you don't stop having an environment, a particular environment which is yours and no one else's. You go right on having the same sort of external experiences and bearing up under the same buffets of outrageous fortune as before, but you begin to install an independent principle of equilibrium in your inner life—a psychological gyroscope which takes the measure of disturbing forces and neutralizes compulsive responses to them. And, as Dr. Wienpahl intimates, you begin to be free.

What we particularly admire about "An Unorthodox Lecture" is its lucid account of the human situation in terms and according to values that are intuitively grasped and honored by thinking men of the present. Years ago, Henry T. Buckle said, "If immortality be not true, it matters little if anything be true." Dr. Wienpahl has a different vocabulary, growing from another sort of touch with the dynamics of selfhood, or being, but the same sort of judgment might be offered—if these considerations are not primary in the quest for truth, there is no quest and there is no truth.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
VILLAGES OF CHILDREN

Our previous brief comments on the "Village for Children" projects receive a welcome and an informative amplification in this article by George Godwin—appearing here in a slightly abbreviated form, and also being published by the Bombay *Aryan Path* in full. Mr. Godwin is the author of a much-respected work titled *Crime and Social Action* (reviewed in MANAS for July 9, 1958). He is also the chief and always appreciated contributor to MANAS of the "Letter from England."

IN 1946 a Children's Village was founded in Trogen, in Switzerland, for war orphans from all parts of Europe—including some from Great Britain—and most from Dispossessed Persons Camps where many were living under deplorable conditions.

The object of the project was the salving of healthy children and their education in their own language and in homes presided over by surrogate parents, known as house parents.

The Swiss project, now world famous, has proved so successful that a second Village of Children is now established in an old manor house standing in 174 acres of Sussex parkland, and here just outside Sedlescomb, one of the most beautiful villages in England, the name Pestalozzi is already familiar, for both Villages are known as Pestalozzi Children's Villages.

The reader—like the writer—may at this point be asking: Why "Pestalozzi"? For the answer we must go back to 1798, in which year France invaded Switzerland and many children became homeless orphans.

Johann Pestalozzi, a Zurich man, had been greatly influenced by Lavater and the Reform Party. But he abandoned politics to study child education. He put his ideas into a school which he ran from his own home, a farmhouse, but failed for lack of capital.

The French invasion was to reveal Pestalozzi's character and to reveal to him the purpose of his life, namely, the succouring of children in need. He saw everywhere children without parents, homes, food or shelter. These he collected wherever he could, and cared for them in a deserted convent.

For ten years, until he was ejected by the French, Pestalozzi strove to recreate the basic essentials of home life, early education and religious instruction, for these war-deprived children. And since Pestalozzi's objects and those of the present-day Swiss and English Villages are identical, as are the historical circumstances of their creation, his name is commemorated in the styles of both: both are Pestalozzi Children's Villages.

Today, there are in the Swiss Pestalozzi Children's Village boys and girls from virtually every country disrupted by the Second World War, even from Tibet. And there will soon be a similar cosmopolitan community of boys and girls in the Pestalozzi Children's Village now fast taking shape in Sussex—including even a Tibetan Lama with some of the Tibetan child victims of the Chinese invasion of their homeland.

Since it may seem strange that refugees from so far afield as Tibet should be finding their way into the English countryside, let me quote Dr. H. J. Alexander, the chairman of the Pestalozzi Children's Village Trust, to whom I am indebted for a very pleasant afternoon in the Village.

"Each national group," he explained, "lives in a house of its own with houseparents and teachers of the same nationality, where they speak their own language, are taught their own literature, and are brought up in the religion of their own parents and the traditions of their home country. But they mix with children of other nations, year after year, in school, for handicrafts, music, sports, and, above all, their leisure time, and thus learn how to live in peace with other people."

I did not see as many children as I had expected to during a walk around the Village. A dark-skinned boy of about fourteen was strumming at the piano in the entrance hall. Several older children were working manually under the supervision of a carpenter. They had, I was told, built one of the many timber outbuildings that are spreading about the old manor house.

Two very small children, girls, one coloured, the other blond, were playing happily with a doll near an outhouse. Three boys, amid a flutter of hens, were trying to steer two reluctant young pigs by their tails to their sties. And far beyond the emerald lawns that surround the old house, where bigger boys were gardening, I saw two small figures, armed with watering cans, busy about their vegetable gardens—each child having its own small allotment to tend.

These children will stay in their Village until their education is completed, but long before that, they spend every summer some part of the year in their native countries.

This explained why I did not see more boys and girls than I did, a number of them being absent on this annual visit.

I asked Dr. Alexander how long the children stayed in the Children's Village?

He said: "Until their education is completed." Some part of this English education is provided by the Sedlescomb Village School.

The Sussex children accept these strangers quite naturally. (For it is a fact that children have no inhibiting sense of national or linguistic differences.)

The end-object of the Village is to set up the children physically; to provide them with a sound education, to sustain in them national identity, and to sow the seeds of that tolerance and understanding of other peoples that is the last hope of the world today.

Education extends to vocational instruction. It also watches for latent talent and nourishes it when found.

"A few days ago," said Dr. Alexander, "I had a visit from the County education officer. He came to tell me that it was to be possible for one of our boys to receive higher musical education. I had noted his aptitude at the piano. In the same way, one uncovers remarkable talents in many of these children dredged from the aftermath of world war. So many of them are artistic and highly talented in this way."

Behind these practical end-objects of the Children's Villages, both here and in Switzerland, is the hope that from the mingling of the children of divers races and creeds, of widely-differing ancestry, language and experience, there will develop in time both tolerance and understanding of national differences, and with this a sense of the fundamental brotherhood of all the races of mankind.

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The English Children's Village has had the advantage of the experiences of the Swiss Children's Village.

Inherited cultural patterns are not easily obliterated. Thus every major adjustment of language, ways of life, and so forth, a child uprooted is called upon to make, presents psychological difficulties.

"Children who have begun life on the basis of a greedy individualism," said Mr. Eric Bourne, the Warden, "grow but slowly to accept the teamwork demanded by a community. Yet one must begin with first principles. If something is dirtied, then it must be cleaned; if broken, repaired; if left as litter, removed."

"There is, first, resentment and the rebellious reactions of all children to the disciplines of corporate life. Thus soon grumbling gives way to grudging willingness, and finally, comes pride."

This cosmopolitan invasion of a typical Sussex village school has aroused in both school staff and the county educational authority the keenest interest. This is the more surprising since Sussex is a county dyed deep in the conservative tradition.

Eventually, some three hundred boys and girls will be accommodated in the Children's Village and already there are rising around the old manor house large buildings to house that number.

Since the Village exists for their welfare, the children are encouraged to help. They help with the manual work, with the upkeep of the beautiful lawned gardens. They help by selling the Village's emblem, the Ladybird. The choice came via the children of the Swiss Village, the children there basing their choice on the universal popularity of that insect.

The hard work, at times not too rewarding, at others, heart-warming, falls to the lot of Mrs. Mary Buchanan, the Village's honorary secretary. But she has found time to write a book about the project—"The Children's Village." There the author describes both Villages, Swiss and English.

It is nice to know that this book has gone already into five editions. It is permissible to state the fact, since the author is passing all profits from it to the Trust which, under the Presidency of Sir John Wolfenden, manages the finances of the English Children's Village.

FRONTIERS

Eichmann and Totalitarianism

ALL of the disturbances which arose over the trial of the German and Japanese "war criminals" arise again as we think of the issues—legal, ethical and speculative—involved in the Eichmann trial. For my own part, I was never happy about either of the War Trials. I was not satisfied on one point frequently made, namely that the war criminals were being tried for crimes which were not crimes at the time they were committed. This criticism was not completely persuasive to me but in general I accepted it. Moreover, I could not escape the thought that in one sense we were purging ourselves of our own guilt feelings.

This arose out of the features in the trials which touched more on internal features of Nazism than on the German conduct of the war. For we did not—precisely did not—go to war against Germany and Japan because they were totalitarian regimes. We avoided several opportunities to engage in war for those reasons. I'm not now suggesting we should have gone to war for those reasons, just pointing out that we didn't. We went to war against Germany and Japan only when, rightly or wrongly I am not discussing, we concluded that they were direct military threats to ourselves. Germany and Japan could just as well have had the most perfect possible internal constitutional systems and that fact would not have altered our judgment about the military threat they posed to us.

After World War II when we tried their leaders there was a lingering confusion about why we were punishing them. From one standpoint they were the losers and we were doing what all victors had done. We insisted on meting out the punishment according to our own rituals, and to the exasperation of the Russians, but this also has been typical on the part of victors. Bolstering this, however, was the claim that the German and Japanese leaders were guilty of "Crimes against Humanity" and the fact that their actions had not been crimes before could be excused on two grounds. The heat of the battle and the flush of victory were still upon us, and, secondly, even though crimes against humanity had not been crimes when these men committed them, they had been talked about by a few specialists in international law, and they *should* have been crimes.

Besides, how does one ever get a new crime established? Doesn't the process often in effect involve an *ex post facto* operation? Something happens which, though technically legal, is an affront to the conscience of the community. The community avenges itself in some act of violence and then, later and more soberly, establishes the new law. It is hard to know how to feel about such cases. The community was "wrong" in every technical sense. But the countervailing question is, would the new law have gotten established if the community had not been spurred into an act of retribution so violent that its own guilt could be purged only through *ex post facto* ratification in the form of a new law, henceforth making it a crime to do what the community has already punished?

The value of the Eichmann trial is that it forces us to look at some of these questions in a way that it was possible for us to avoid when the trials of the war criminals took place. For Eichmann is not being tried in heat of battle and the flush of victory. In no sense can it be explained that Eichmann's primary crime is that his side lost. The Eichmann trial cuts away entirely all of the confusions which were attributable to the war setting of the earlier crimes and trials and poses bleakly the substantive legal issues. For now no act of wartime atrocity is at issue. Only internal features of Nazism are at issue.

The substantive legal point question in the Eichmann trial turns out to be, Is totalitarianism contrary to international law? and if so, may individuals be guilty of the crime of totalitarianism? That this is the legal issue is apparent from the fact that the Eichmann trial is

separated from the conduct of war and the crimes especially associated with war which could be viewed as crimes against humanity. Eichmann, as is often pointed out, is on trial for being what in the American vernacular would be called "a conscious and articulate instrument of Fascism." All of the problems which bother us when this rubric is applied internally against alleged Communists should also bother us when it is applied to Eichmann. But there is a further problem.

Suppose we set aside the problem of whether or not it is legitimate to regard totalitarianism as a crime at International law. Let us assume that it is. The next question is, how does one become guilty of this crime? This is a difficult problem because it involves the question of how an individual becomes guilty of any crime. A crime is an act or omission forbidden by law. It is something that can only be engaged in by a "person"—an entity, individual or corporate, regarded by the law as a person. Crime is essentially a feature of the relationship between a state and its legally responsible components.

Suppose I am a member of Murder Incorporated. As a member of that organization I am employed to murder five men. When arrested I plead not guilty on the basis that I was forced to do murder for Murder Incorporated by the threat that if I did not, I and my family would be placed in mortal jeopardy. I was not responsible for my acts, I claim. I was merely carrying out orders from superiors and had no choice in the matter. This plea might mitigate the punishment awarded me, but it would not affect the question of my guilt or innocence.

This is the situation Israel wants to apply to Eichmann. Israel wants to make it impossible for Eichmann to make such a claim affect the question of his personal responsibility for the acts he committed. But the logic of the criminal law of states will not cover the acts attributed to Eichmann. It will not because, in order for a person to be guilty of a crime against humanity, it must not only be the case that the acts in question are "crimes" in the sense that nations establish criminal law, but more important, it must be possible for an individual to commit a crime against humanity. But this is precisely what is impossible.

Suppose nonetheless that I want to commit a crime against humanity, how could I go about doing it? In order to commit such a crime as a person I must first get a state so organized that it will commit the crime. In other words, the notion of a crime against humanity presupposes a state as the responsible party. The state may be engaged in atrocities during a war against external enemies, or it may be engaged in atrocities during a "war" against internal enemies. It is the latter case only that is presented by the Eichmann trial. But a state conducting atrocities against internal enemies is another way of defining what is commonly meant by totalitarianism. Internal crimes against humanity can only be committed by states. States do this by instituting what we call totalitarianism. It is therefore an illegitimate step—a jump in theory which is not permissible—to apply the logic of state criminal law on the international level to individuals who cannot in point of fact commit the actions defined as criminal.

This certainly does not mitigate the heinous nature of the acts engaged in by Eichmann. It does not make it any less desirable to establish the principle in International law that totalitarianism on the part of states should be against "the law." But it does raise a serious question about whether Eichmann can be held responsible for the crimes with which he is charged. And if he cannot he held responsible, he cannot be convicted. The conclusion would seem to be that Israel may not validly convict Eichmann. What may Israel and its judges properly do?

In the first place Israel and its judges may provide the world with a great service by pointing out these very facts. In the second place, Israel's jurists may put the world in its debt by facing up to the fact that it is totalitarianism as a state form

which is at issue and not the action of the members of a totalitarian state. The hope here is that specific criteria for totalitarianism may be announced which will give momentum to the conception of the international illegality of totalitarianism. Finally, there remains the question of what to do with Eichmann himself.

Eichmann is not the guilty party. He cannot be. The only significance of Eichmann as a person is the extent to which his actions and his trial help us in the outlawry of totalitarianism as a state form. Inasmuch as Eichmann cannot be convicted legitimately of any crime, there is really only one thing Israel can do with him. The only action Israel can take is to deport Eichmann to West Germany after the trial of totalitarianism is completed. It is really up to the Germans to decide what to do about Eichmann and the part of their past he symbolizes. The Israelis can sharpen the issue for the Germans so that they cannot avoid confronting it. But if any personal acts committed by Eichmann are punishable, they are only punishable at German law.

It may be objected that this is in one sense a more "cruel and unusual" punishment for Eichmann than would be his execution by Israel. It may be objected that to make Eichmann a pariah before the world and a symbol of the hidden guilt of all Germans and then to send him back to Germany is a peculiarly cruel form of personal and collective torture. But it is better than convicting Eichmann of crimes he cannot be responsible for. It is better than adding an aura of martyrdom to a retributive death at the hands of affronted Jews. Moreover, there is some compelling justice for the Jews to treat in this fashion the man who compared himself to Pontius Pilate.

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