

THE ISSUES BEHIND THE ISSUE

OCCASIONALLY MANAS receives a dissenting comment which seems to be just what is needed to press some inquiry to a more fruitful result. We have such a letter concerning a recent lead article, and print it in full.

Editors, MANAS: In your main essay in MANAS for March 15, you state that *the* issue before the peoples of the world is disarmament. My purpose here is not to dispute this, nor to quibble on semantics, but to ask you to devote more space to the discussion than this essay permitted; to explore more aspects of the entire problem; and to consider the merits of the counter arguments advanced recently by Emery Reves in an article entitled: "Why Waste Time Discussing Disarmament?" (in the March issue of a leading popular magazine).

Emery Reves argues that disarmament is a complete and total impossibility in the present context of independent sovereign nation-states. He cites the sorry efforts of the great powers to effect disarmament in the 1920's and 30's, and notes that the very phrases currently used... "arms control," "effective inspection," etc. . . were employed before. His main point is that no disarmament is possible outside of a world government standing above the nation-states and able to provide them with full security from external threats to their independence. He cites the record of history to the effect that peace has never been achieved by disarmament, but *only* when a superior power of arms and law has been imposed upon formerly sovereign states—such as happened when Rome brought the *Pax Romana* to the war-weary Mediterranean world, or when kings ended feudal violence in Medieval and Modern Europe, supplanting feudal fighting with royal law enforced by royal courts and armies. He notes that the people of New York state do not

fear the people of Illinois or Washington state, though nuclear bombs are being made in these states. They do not fear each other, even though both are areas where these ultimate weapons reside, because both areas are protected by the larger legal entity of the United States. The same argument, you may have noticed, was set forth with somber clarity by E. B. White in the *New Yorker* last year.

Would you be willing to discuss the validity of these arguments? If the record of the past (our sole empirical check upon current rational analysis) is totally against the argument advanced in your essay, what remains of your contention that disarmament is *the* issue before mankind today? Surely you meant by implication that this issue is one of *means* toward the controlling and absolute issue of human survival. For it is this issue that is unique, unprecedented, and *in extremis*. Since the actual survival of the human species is the *sine qua non* of our time, all issues become essentially matters of the available means. Mr. Reves and Mr. White argue that world government is the sole means for effecting the continuance of man. Herman Kahn argues that nuclear arms and the will to use them are the sole practical means in the present world. His book, which has been greeted with such bitter reviews, such moral revulsion, has the supreme merit, I believe, of presenting with sardonic and brutal candor the actual policies of the USA, in contrast to the stated policies, "sicklied over with the pale cast of propaganda."

The Kennedy Administration appears to be committed to some form of "arms control," as set forth in the issue of *Daedalus* of last year and now in print in book form. MANAS and other magazines, such as *Liberation*, *Fellowship*, and group and individual pacifists, argue that the sole means is unilateral disarmament. Surely it is clear

to you that the latter is a profoundly revolutionary position because it breaks completely with the entire framework of modern governments and popular opinion. You state elsewhere in this issue of MANAS that no one knows the true state of public opinion on this matter of nuclear arms and peace and war. You are probably right here, but it would be naïve to assume that there is any widespread *conscious* awareness of what you are discussing. From my own contacts with students and adult groups in Massachusetts and Connecticut I believe that there is very, very little awareness of what the world is moving toward. People are anxious and fearful below the surface, but on the surface they continue to think and speak in terms of deterrence, balance of terror, stable situation, without any awareness of what C. P. Snow warned against in the address you referred to.

In his article entitled "A World of Law: For a Disarmed World" (in the March 25 *Nation*), Louis B. Sohn argues with great cogency that arms reduction is not sufficient, that even in the *unlikely* event of a start upon arms limitation, for nations to be willing to move toward complete disarmament will require a congeries of major institutional, legal, and political changes, as well as drastic action to reduce the poverty of some two thirds of the world population. His argument in brief is that the progress in any one field requires concomitant progress in a host of other areas, that gains in one will induce gains in the others. The great problem is not technical, but psychological—and—metaphysical.

I agree fully with your position, and with your oft-stated conviction that mankind must move beyond politics if it would break free from the present descent toward doom. But this is because I am a pacifist, prenuclear and present nuclear pacifist. What prompts me to write you this time is to urge you to continue this discussion, to consider fully the arguments of men like Reves.

My own pessimism concerning the prospects for peace is rooted in the conviction that very few

people appear to realize that peace is itself the most revolutionary matter in the present world, and that if it is to be even partially attained, nothing less than a wholesale transformation of our attitudes is required. Most people want peace *and* everything else too, their stake in the materially comfortable *status quo*. Peace and the continuance of the present system of independent world powers are incompatible. We owe something of an ironic debt to Herman Kahn for showing us with such remorseless and post-human logic the full implications of the present defense policies of the USA and the USSR. What do you think?

DAVID P. LEONARD

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Mr. Leonard's comments are far too pertinent for us to want to quarrel with what he says in any important way. The situation of the world and the gravity of the decisions before the peoples of the world are such that it would be a dreary folly to waste energy trying to score debaters' points or, as he says, "quibble on semantics." There may be value, however, in chewing on some of the questions raised.

Let us look, first, at the argument cited from Emery Reves. Mr. Reves proposes that the people of Illinois do not fear the people of Washington, though both have facilities for nuclear attack, the reason being that these states "are protected by the larger legal entity of the United States." There is some truth in this, but if moral or political differences between the people of these states became sufficiently acute, a civil war would be at least conceivable. We had such a war in the nineteenth century, although it was conducted without the blessing of nuclear "deterrents." Further, we doubt if the people of Washington fear the people of Canada any more than they fear the people of Illinois. The people of both these regions are united by ties of race and cultural tradition. They would find it most

difficult to think of a *reason* for going to war with one another.

But these points are not intended to build a contention against some form of world government. What they are intended to suggest is that such a social order can come only after the peoples who adopt it have developed enough common interests—or enough *awareness* of their common interests—to make them see the good sense of such an arrangement. While law—in this case international law—has an important educational role, the educational process cannot begin without a measure of general acceptance of the law's "legitimacy." Before world government can become a fact, there will have to be world constitutional conventions that the nations and the peoples of the world will take seriously. It may be argued that the efforts of the world Federalists and other groups to hold meetings symbolic of such conventions are educational efforts which seek to establish the legitimacy of the idea of world government. We accept this argument, but would add that the constitutional convention, as a symbol of a world society united by world law, is not the only educational means to this end, nor even, perhaps, the most important means.

The constitutional convention can confirm, articulate, and rationalize the unity of a civilization; it cannot create the unity. A variety of cultural developments and subtle moral and intellectual and practical influences united to produce the temper which led, finally, to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. As John Adams put it in a letter to Hezekiah Niles (Feb. 13, 1818): "The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the hearts and minds of the people . . . This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution." One might say, with equal force, that the condition of world peace under world government will have to be preceded by a like change "in the hearts and minds of the people" of the world.

Well then, how do you go about producing such a change? Only utter fools would claim to have the final and complete answer to this question. It is obvious that there are countless ways in which human attitudes and opinions are modified for the better. As a MANAS article said some weeks ago:

It is certain, finally, that none of our sharp definitions and projected programs can be a precise anticipation of the future course of history. Dozens of leavens are doubtless already at work, some above, some below, the threshold of conscious life. There must be concealed as well as apparent vectors in the complex course of human events, and what we do, by plan and deliberation, will probably survive mostly in the form of intellectual and moral attitudes. What else, after all, has supplied the continuity to civilization?

Mr. Leonard says: "Surely it is clear to you that the latter [unilateral disarmament] is a profoundly revolutionary position because it breaks completely with the entire framework of modern governments and popular opinion." Mr. Leonard is right on both counts. Unilateral disarmament does have these implications, and we are aware of them. However, we are not so unaware of the processes of sociopolitical change as to imagine that, one bright day, there will suddenly be enough pacifists carrying banners and picketing the chancelleries of the world to swing the balance of decision to universal disarmament and eternal peace.

What might be argued, however, is this. The simple slogan, *Wars will cease when men refuse to fight them*, has profound truth in it, despite its simplicity, or even oversimplification. A further application of this idea is that nations, too, will have to refuse to fight in wars. The corporate decisions of nation-states are admittedly the result of complex pressures, and seldom reflect the high principles on which individual behavior may be based. If a social community should ever reflect the unified moral intentions of which pacifists and other idealists dream, it will be a social community very much changed from the condition of the present ones we know about. What is the role of

the individual in respect to the social community of which he is a part? If he wants to change its orientation or policy, he must find some means of exerting influence upon the people who, together, make its decisions. If he believes in or wants to use nonviolent methods, he will avoid intrigue and power politics, and will direct his appeal to the moral perceptions of the people. He will look for practical means of rejecting social actions which he cannot honor (he may become a conscientious objector to war, a tax-refuser, or adopt some form of civil disobedience), to demonstrate the extent of his feeling and to gain attention for the views he thinks are right.

At once arises the question of whether or not what such people do is "practical." The question is as ambiguous as the word. The practical affairs of the world are now governed by certain rules or sets of rules. These rules, whatever their origin, are usually independent of the immediate moral intuitions of men. The layman, for example, is often bewildered by his lawyer's explanation of why he prefers to argue technical issues of law. Moral questions have to be reduced to legal conventions before they can be "processed" in the courts. There are reasons for this, but they seem quite unsatisfactory reasons to the man concerned now with Right and Justice. His lawyer, however, points out that if he wants to be "practical"—that is, to win his case—he had better shape his campaign to conform to the legal conventions.

Of course, if your objective is capable of precise definition in legal terms, then the issue of practicality is less important. The Montgomery Bus Strike, for example, had the simple objective of desegregation of passengers riding on busses.

But if you want to work for world peace—a goal involving far-reaching moral and emotional complexities—you are not provided with any such simple, practical objective. In this case you have to isolate some particular goal as *representative* of the condition of world peace. So, you say, disarmament would be representative of world peace. Disarmament is an "objective" reality

which would result from the condition of world peace. But disarmament, while a peculiarly apt symbol of the peaceful condition (arms into plowshares, etc.), is profoundly involved in national and international conventions and the sticky web of diplomacy. The pacifist cuts the Gordian Knot of this situation by coming out for *unilateral* disarmament. This is a way of saying that it is no longer practical to remain practical. The only practical thing to do, these days, is to declare that the familiar methods of trying to control or avoid war have become wildly *impractical*. And this, as Mr. Leonard points out, is a revolutionary position.

The pacifist, nuclear or otherwise, is saying that the conventional avenues of action *don't work*. He is saying that the time has come to find a means of action that *will work*.

The dilemmas and moral and intellectual confusion which arise in a historical situation of this sort come from the attempt to unite two universes of discourse—the moral universe and the "practical" or "legal" universe. It is difficult if not impossible to keep these universes together for more than a brief moment. They are together at the instant of successful revolutionary action, but then, soon after, they begin to grow apart. "Why," asked a mournful writer, some years ago, "does the Left always make the Revolution and the Right always write the Constitution?" The moral feelings which compel this question are the same feelings as those which inspire the anarchist to maintain his iconoclastic views. He will not tolerate the idea of a social system in which the legal or the conventional modes of action are permitted to confine the moral aspirations. It is fair to ask whether the anarchist is "practical" in his contentions, but whatever the answer obtained, it is necessary to realize how indispensable is the moral ground from which the anarchist takes his principles. The least practical situation of all would be one in which nobody ever thought of trying to break out of the confinements of legality

and tradition in order to assert the primacy the moral law.

Now it does not, it seems to us, matter so very much whether the proponents of unilateral disarmament are all of them consciously aware of the logical or "practical" difficulties in their position, nor even whether they believe—somewhat naïvely, it may be—that they have begun an ortholinear march which will end directly in the temple of world peace. However they think of what they are doing, they are helping to create an *atmosphere of questioning*. The real objective, so far as we can see, may be put more or less in the words of John Adams—we seek a "radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people." The campaign for unilateral disarmament is a means of calling attention to issues which, once closely examined, may begin to produce that radical change.

Someone may say that laying down one's weapons, when the rest of the world is armed to the teeth, seems so unnatural, so *weak*. It has not the dignity that would attend a great world conference for peace in which the leaders of the nations, as civilized persons, would all agree to abandon the method of war in the settlement of differences. There is considerable psychological validity in this claim. Our only answer is that the world is sick, sick, sick, and the good and the natural don't seem to work any more. Have you ever witnessed a Caesarean operation? The surgeon takes a sharp knife and *cuts a woman open*. It doesn't seem natural at all. You and I wouldn't be able to do it. But it saves the life of the child, and perhaps the life of the child's mother.

The pacifist or advocate of unilateral disarmament is not, alas, a skilled surgeon working in the universal hospital of mankind. He is an inexperienced midwife, an *amateur* in every sense of the word. He welcomes, or ought to welcome, all the intelligent criticism directed his way. To some of his critics—say, the world government advocates—he might reply, "You're

so *right*, but let's get the show on the road. You want a world government, but I want and am trying to work for the moral awakening which has to take place before very many people will take the idea of world government seriously." Mr. Leonard says: "I believe that there is very, very little awareness of what the world is moving toward." In this case, the campaign for unilateral disarmament is just what the doctor ordered, since its ballyhoo methods to gain public attention may at least cause more people to consider the questions which the pacifists raise. Has anyone else done as much to get the issues out into the open?

Mr. Leonard says that MANAS, with other journals, has declared that "the sole means [to peace] is unilateral disarmament." Well, if you go back and read over our article in the March 15 issue, you will find that it starts out by saying that disarmament is the issue in the minds of many thoughtful men, and that they seem unable to let it go. What we meant to suggest is that disarmament, and, more effectively, unilateral disarmament, has become a symbol of the crisis in the affairs of the world. In its development, our article suggests that the enthusiastic, go-for-broke aspect of the campaign is directly correlated with the weakness and the half-measures of the great Powers, so far as waging peace is concerned, and with the ineffectual proposals of non-revolutionary and non-pacifist liberals who seem to be content with the methods of traditional politics and diplomacy. Unilateral Disarmament, you might say, is an all-or-nothing argument. It is being adopted by more and more people because, with all its defects—or perhaps its gaps rather than real defects—no other argument is worth listening to. We do not say no other argument can be made; we say it is not being made.

Finally, it is at least true that unilateral disarmament is based upon a great moral idea—the idea of nonviolence. Just twenty years ago Gandhi contributed to *Liberty Magazine* an article in which he said:

The world of tomorrow as I see it will be, must be, a society based upon nonviolence. That is the first law, for it is out of that law that all other blessings will flow. It may seem a distant goal indeed, an unattainable Utopia, it is often criticized as such. But I do not think it in the least unattainable, since it can be worked for here and now. I believe it to be perfectly possible for an individual to adopt the way of life of the future—the nonviolent way—without having to wait for others to do so. And if an individual can observe a certain rule of conduct cannot a group of individuals do the same? Cannot a group of peoples—whole nations?

I think it is necessary to emphasize this fact: No one need wait for any one else to adopt a humane and enlightened course of action. Men generally hesitate to make a beginning if they feel that the objective cannot be achieved in its entirety. It is precisely this attitude of mind that is the greatest obstacle to progress—an obstacle that each man, if he only wills it, can clear away himself, and so influence others.

It is conceivable that Gandhi established in the world a great keynote for the historical development of mankind in the twentieth century. And it is certain, at least, that the advocates of unilateral disarmament conduct their labors in the light of this vision—a vision which has already become, in a few short years, for many, many human beings, the light of a great tradition.

REVIEW

THE LANGUAGE OF DREAMS

IN SO many ways, as MANAS has noted, an ancient and profound conception of the nature of man is returning for new consideration in the context of contemporary thought. In the simplest terms, the "soul"—or, if we prefer, the concept of soul—completes a cycle after complicated involvements, first with monotheistic religion, and subsequently with "scientific mechanism." For some psychologists and philosophers, man once again begins to be viewed, neither as a creature of God nor an accident of the cosmic process, but as an independent creative agent, a synthesizer of meaning from encounters with experience, absorbed around some central point of a self-existent individuality.

It is not surprising, then, that a number of interpretations of the meaning and function of dreams should be now superseding the once dominant influence of Freud's "dream analysis." For instance, a graduate thesis recently submitted to the faculty of the Department of Fine Arts of Los Angeles State College, *Dream Images in Art*, experiments with the thought that dream language may be as profound as the language of art, and that both, in their higher manifestations, may contain important affirmations regarding human potentiality. The author, Richard C. Smith, introduces a study which parallels some of the writings of Erich Fromm and Joseph Campbell:

It was assumed that dreams, rather than existing as a meaningless curiosity, fulfill a function. Dreams have value. This was the premise on which this study was based, indeed, it was intended that the study would reinforce this premise.

Much of the literature examined was written by psychiatrists, and presented the painting of dreams from the psychological aspect, as a method of encouraging their patients by depiction, to resolve specific inner conflicts, and emphasized the significance of this process as therapy for those individuals. In this study, however, an effort was made to show how dream images have been, or may become, a contribution of the dreamer-artist to the

advantage of many others. By translating through painting these images the artist and the viewer may become more aware of shared concepts. Thus each is reinforced in his identification with all peoples.

The significance of Mr. Smith's approach becomes clear when we consider that most dream *analysis* presupposes an external cause for the particular dream image or sequence. If such a cause can be determined, we have only established another link in a chain of causation leading from environment to neurosis. But if it is possible for the dream to actually be, in its higher manifestations, a kind of creative act, the perspective is entirely different, and takes us full circle back to the naturalistic, symbolic religions of ancient times. We have, moreover, a perspective which leads to "identification with all peoples" in terms of a common language of myth and dream. Erich Fromm develops this view in *The Forgotten Language*:

Different peoples created different myths just as different people dream different dreams. But in spite of all these differences, all myths and all dreams have one thing in common, they are all "written" in the same language, *symbolic language*.

The myths of the Babylonians, Indians, Egyptians, Hebrews, Greeks are written in the same language as those of the Ashantis or the Trukese. The dreams of someone living today in New York or in Paris are the same as the dreams reported from people living some thousands years ago in Athens or in Jerusalem. The dreams of ancient and modern man are written in the same language as the myths whose authors lived in the dawn of history.

Yet this language has been forgotten by modern man. Not when he is asleep, but when he is awake. Is it important to understand this language also in our waking state?

A conjoining of these perceptions is provocative, and correlative reading is available. In a book published in 1952, *The Dream—Mirror of Conscience*, Dr. Werner Wolff, professor of psychology at Bard College, proposes that the "synthesizing" element in the dream must be tapped if its true significance is to be established. He explains what he considers to be the limitations of dream analysis:

From the point of view of analytical interpretation the dreamer is *driven* by that drive the particular analytical school focuses upon. The synthesizing approach conceives of the dreamer as the synthesizer of his thoughts into the dream picture or dream play. Man is considered as the *driver* of the dream, which, like a loom, interweaves the manifold threads of imagination, according to his organizing design. In the words of the Upanishads, in his dreams man is the creator. The dream is a creation like a work of art. And just as in judging a work of art it is of less importance to know its origins than to understand its message, so the dream is important for us as a message expressed by its story and by its design.

The dream synthesizes conflicting tendencies of the dreamer, who tries to find a solution by this synthesis, the synthesizing agent being man's conscience. While psychoanalysis sees man as divided in himself and against himself, we focus upon man's effort to overcome this division by his creative attempt to combine the antagonistic forces into a dynamic design. The history of dream interpretation, from the ancients up to our time, shows opposite approaches: by means of analysis or synthesis, a static or a dynamic, and organic or a functional, a rational or a metaphysical approach. The dream has been considered as a moral or an amoral phenomenon, as a voice of chaos or of divine inspiration, as the language of drives or of man's conscience. According to the concept of synthesis, the dream is not "either-or" but presents the opposite aspects of a situation. It is the voice of opposites, of good *and* evil, of emotional *and* rational, or organic *and* functional phenomena; it is the synthesizer of antinomies.

Dr. Wolff, it seems clear, proposes a creative—and therefore individual—human "destiny." The ancient concept of soul is implicit rather than explicit. But what is the soul, non-theologically speaking, if it is not the "self-moving unit" of Plato and Pythagoras? On this view the function of the artist is the same as that of every man as dreamer—he highlights, as it were, a certain aspect of destiny. Dr. Wolff concludes *The Dream—Mirror of Conscience* by explaining why "dream translation" should be "interpreted according to the synthesizing main concept":

Our synthesizing interpretation of the dream corresponds to our concept of man as the synthesizer in his organic, psychological, social, artistic and

philosophical activity. As synthesizer, man tries to give meaning to what appears to be meaningless. In the dream he synthesizes his thought in the symbol, his problem in the dream play and his self in his actions in the dream. Hence at the end, man, the synthesizer, becomes the configurator of his personality, and since his personality determines his life and destiny, the concept of the ancient Greek is revived: "Man's character is his destiny"—is *His* destiny.

COMMENTARY

THE DECLINE OF "OBJECTIVITY"

REVIEW, this week, begins by noting the growing interest in subjective experience, in this case, in dreams. The review article reminds us of Ira Progoff's book, *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology*, since it illustrates the release of the study of dreams from the Freudian strait-jacket. In his study of Freud, Jung, Adler, and Rank, Dr. Progoff shows how the psychoanalytical movement, while beginning under the cloud of nineteenth-century materialism and mechanism, eventually abandoned these assumptions as useless, and even harmful, in any endeavor to understand the psychic life of human beings, turning to some form of implicit idealism as a working therapeutic philosophy. The new attitude toward dreams adopted by men like Erich Fromm is representative of this great change.

It is a change, however, by no means limited to the workers in psychotherapy. There is a general turning away from the cult of objectivity and the notion that only what can be measured, weighed, touched, or tasted—perceived, that is, by the physical senses—can be accepted as "real." The genuine "revival of learning" of the twentieth century, sponsored and in large part inspired by Robert M. Hutchins, has not been, as some of the enthusiasts of Objectivity used to claim, a return to medieval philosophy, but a revival of Humanist rationalism, with a new recognition of the primary reality, for human beings, of conceptual values. This is another aspect of the rebirth of interest in man's subjective being.

Changes of this sort sometimes remain unnoticed until they are practically complete. For example, in *Diogenes* for the summer of 1959, Georges Gusdorf discusses "The Ambiguity of the Sciences of Man," showing that, because of their devotion to "objectivity," the practitioners of the various sciences of man—psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, etc.—have no clear subject or object in their studies. Evidence for this somewhat ridiculous situation piles up in the numerous quotations from leading scholars cited by Dr. Gusdorf, who is apparently articulating a consensus rather than offering a fresh critical view.

The Existentialist revolution in philosophy, the Western Renaissance in Oriental mysticism, the new

current of questioning about identity in the modern novels—these, also, represent further awakenings to subjective reality and values.

In these days of depressing events the world over, it is well to remember that changes in the initiative of human action often require generations before their historical impact is widely felt. But if the renewal of the subjective life is a contemporary fact—and if this renewal is eventually reflected in the values men are willing to strive and sacrifice for—then the old forms of possessiveness and acquisitiveness, and their political counterparts in imperialism and economic exploitation, are destined to lose their vigor. New problems will no doubt appear, since the subjective areas of experience have their own complexities and pitfalls, but during the transition we may find that the old sources of rivalry and angry conflict have no more energy than the habit patterns of tired institutions.

While the evolutionary development of mankind is basically a bootstrap operation, the struggling pioneers of this great venture seem sometimes to have the assistance of nature. It is doubtful, for example, that the extraordinary achievement in self-government which followed the American Revolution could have been realized without the field of an untouched continent to engage the unleashed energies of the American people. This was an appropriate stage setting for the kind of greatness of which Americans were capable.

Today the scene has changed and new areas invite exploration—the moral and intellectual resources of human beings themselves. Old dogmas about the nature of man have withered from lack of nourishment. Like the old argument between Science and Religion—nineteenth-century materialism is practically a dead issue. Other questions, other views of the human being and what is important to and about him now engage the attention and creative capacities of the coming generation.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves YOUTH FOR INTEGRATION

THE *Nation* for Feb. 11, with Bruce M. Galphin's article, "Georgia Rejoins the Union," gives light on the vital role played in achieving integration by students of the University of Georgia. A student newspaper—on a still all-white campus—campaigns earnestly, judiciously, and persistently for acceptance of integration, thus providing an atmosphere of welcome for the two unusual Negro students who finally appeared on the campus. Subsequently, when university officials, under political pressure, discovered grounds for "suspension" of the two Negroes, 400 members of the 500-man faculty petitioned for their readmission.

There is no doubt but that disciplined, well-conducted sit-in protests during the past year have contributed substantially to increasing Southern acceptance of federal decree. Significantly, the number of white students from universities throughout the United States who have joined in similar protest actions has increased with each month, showing that the supposedly "silent" generation has found a cause.

An editorial in the *Christian Century* for Feb. 22 comments on the action of white students in Virginia who, as a result of participation in the sit-ins, drew 30-day jail sentences. The editorial reports:

A Methodist Information release says that two of the students, Rebecca Owen and Mary Edith Bentley, are Methodists and are leaders in denominational student organizations. As is characteristic of denominational press releases, this one does not name the other students or indicate their church affiliation. The release does state that two of the unnamed students are Negroes. From other sources we have learned that two others are Disciples from nearby Lynchburg College. Whatever their name or sign, we congratulate the churches, including the Methodist, for this evidence that some students care enough about human equality to sacrifice their liberty to uphold it.

Again "youth" moved first—and also a young vicar who immediately came to their support:

The Episcopal Church deserves an accolade because John H. Teeter, white vicar of the Church of the Good Shepherd in Lynchburg, attended the trial and found a way to identify himself with the cause of the persecuted. Entering the courtroom with the president of the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and two other Negroes, Mr. Teeter was told that Judge Du Val Martin had ruled that seating must be on a segregated basis in his court. When the young vicar objected, two deputies hustled and removed him from the room. A news photographer did the rest, and the next day papers across the country carried the picture of a young man with an unmistakable clerical collar being treated to the indignity suffered by Montgomery Ward President Sewell Avery in the days of the N.R.A. Mr. Teeter probably does not share the late Mr. Avery's economic views, but he can be equally firm in standing (or sitting) for what he does believe. "They threw me out of court and told me not to come back," he said. "They" wasted their breath, ministers like Teeter and students like the six will return to court so long as anybody is wrongfully penalized for acting in behalf of human dignity.

Noting that protests against discrimination have "assumed the proportion of a national movement," a *New York Times* (Jan. 19) article by Claude Sitton emphasizes the contribution of the young:

The sit-ins continue today in cities like Atlanta, where merchants have refused to desegregate eating facilities. But the lowering of racial barriers at lunch counters in more than 125 Southern communities has led the students and their adult supporters to turn to other fields of protest. There have been stand-ins at theatres, kneel-ins at churches and wade-ins at public beaches. Demonstrators have prayed on the steps of Southern capitols, paraded through the streets and picketed courthouses and city halls. "Selective buying" has become a widely used weapon against businesses that practice discrimination.

The movement has spread far beyond the South. Northern chain stores have been boycotted because their Southern outlets discriminate against Negroes. Protests have been staged in the North against de facto school segregation and discrimination in housing and other fields.

Negro adults and white liberals, mostly students, have joined the movement. Behind their action lies a factor that many observers consider more significant than the desegregation of the lunch counters. This is the psychological impetus that the demonstrations have given to the over-all civil rights struggle.

"It has brought a reawakening among both whites and Negroes," Mrs. Ruby Hurley said this week. She is regional secretary in the Southeast for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In her annual report, she said of this new attitude: "By the year's end, more Negro adults had turned from their old casual ways to more dynamic action. Many white persons have been shocked into the realization that lines of communication must be established between the races, that positive changes must be made."

The history of the "sit-in" movement recalls that youth groups have been moving ahead with consistent Gandhian purpose for nearly ten years:

The sit-in technique had been used before. A bi-racial group pioneered it in Chicago in 1942. This group later founded the Chicago Committee of Racial Equality, parent organization of the Congress of Racial Equality, also called C.O.R.E. The Youth Councils of the N.A.A.C.P. had also employed the sit-in. The act of four freshmen caught the imagination of Negro students across the South.

This occurred at a time of growing dissatisfaction with the slowness of school desegregation. It offered an opportunity for the Negro youth to rebel against the gradualism heretofore accepted tacitly by his elders. It appealed to the student's taste for the dramatic in a way that voter registration campaigns and litigation never could.

Our summary of a year or so ago of opinions and attitudes characteristic of "the beats" took note of Norman Mailer's theory that the vitality and honesty to be found in many areas of Negro life drew white youths to the Negro idiom and the music, and finally to a feeling of sharing with them, as well as to disorientation with the usual sort of role-playing in adult society. There is no doubt in our mind that "the best of the beats," however disinclined to "social action," have helped to modify the national psyche in a manner

which brings forth more "activists" for the sit-ins and other protest demonstrations.

Quite possibly, the youth of our time are doing more than we realize, and it may even be that the youths who are "way out," in one way or another, are those to whom the whole of America will some day owe a substantial debt.

FRONTIERS Unusual Requiem

THE first anniversary of the execution of Caryl Chessman on May ~—a death strongly protested by hundreds of thousands of persons throughout the world—is not passing unremembered. Throughout 1960 the complexity of factors involved in the disposition of Chessman came to haunt first one and then another thoughtful writer. A remarkably thorough summary of the entire case, and of the sociopolitical factors which made it momentous, appeared in the *Progressive* for December, 1960. But to our mind the thoughts which strike home to the human heart have never been better expressed than by Elizabeth Hardwick in an article for the *Partisan Review* (Summer, 1960), called "The Life and Death of Caryl Chessman." Miss Hardwick writes—from England—as follows:

The "abominable and voluptuous act known as *reading the paper*," Proust called it. In a bleary, addicted daze I followed the last years in the life of Caryl Chessman and, with increasing interest—or *consumption*, perhaps one should call the taking in of the flesh and blood of a person through the daily press—his last months. After the shock of his pointless execution, after his exit from the front pages, Chessman still did not entirely remove himself from public contemplation to make room for the young criminals who seemed to spring from the earth just as his bones were lowered into it. Even during the triumphal procession, soon after his death, of Tony and Margaret—the short, little couple, their hands raised as if in a benediction—his ghostly, beaky, droopy, heart-shaped face remained, creating one of those accidental juxtapositions whose significance is everything or nothing.

Before he entered Death Row, as Miss Hardwick says, "Chessman had been non-existent as a criminal, as a case, as a doomed young man":

He had to bring himself forth from the void of prison, from nothingness, from nonexistence. This condition of his nothingness, his nonexistence, makes his remarkable articulation, his tireless creation of himself as a fact, his nearly miraculous resurrection or birth—which it was we do not know—a powerfully moving human drama. With extraordinary energy,

Chessman made, on the very edge of extinction, one of those startling efforts of personal rehabilitation, salvation of the self. It was this energy that brought him out of darkness to the notice of the Pope, Albert Schweitzer, Mauriac, Dean Pike, Marlon Brando, Steve Allen, rioting students in Lisbon (Lisbon!)—and, perhaps by creating his life, Chessman had to lose it. The vigor of his creation aroused fear, bewilderment, suspicion. In his brilliant accounts of his fellow convicts on Death Row, it is usually the lost, the cringing, the deteriorated who are finally reprieved. A man needs a measure of true life in order to be worth execution.

People on the street, talking about the case, found Chessman's energy, his articulation of his own tragic trap, his stubborn efforts on his own behalf, truly alarming. These efforts were not mitigating; indeed they were condemning. He had trained himself to sleep only a few hours a night so that he could write his books, study law, work on his case. But suppose another condemned man wanted his sleep, couldn't bother to work on his own destiny, hadn't the strength or the talent to bring himself from darkness to light—what then? Lest his very gifts save him, some people wanted him executed in order to show the insignificance of personal vigor before the impersonal law. And, true, his energy is very uncommon among habitual criminals. "Flabby, bald, lobotomized" Lepke; dreamy parietic gangsters; depressed, deteriorated murderers; goofs putting bombs on planes. Chessman was a young hoodlum who was able, in the last decade of his life, to call upon strange reserves of strength. His early violence and his late effort at personal integration seem to have come from the same mysterious source. Life is haunted by one so peculiarly instructive, a history so full of fearful symbolism.

"Fearful symbolism" indeed. For all the evidence clearly indicates that Chessman was killed by propaganda—even as you or I may be, some day. Of what does propaganda consist? Manipulation of the mass media of communication, utilizing the responses to be found on the lowest notes of the scale of human emotions. In his searching *Progressive* (December, 1960) article, "Did the Press Kill Caryl Chessman?", Melvin Martin explains why he wrote this story—a story that will not be dated until a "New Order of Ages" has arrived:

This is the story of the hysteria surrounding the Chessman case and the apparent journalistic origins of that social madness, a case study of errors and distortions which, through repetition in the press over a period of years, won acceptance by millions of persons as indisputable facts. It is a tragedy of newsmen who perpetuated the virulent myths and then moved on in the faith that ideas so widely accepted about such a well-known man must have been substantially true.

The question of what really killed the thirty-eight-year-old convict-author is more than academic. The issue has a significance that extends far beyond the boundaries of criminal justice. For if press-induced hysteria rather than objective legal procedures determined the outcome of the case, there is cause to be concerned about the destructive potential of such a powerful force at other times and places. And it should be of special concern to a world in possession of suicidal bombs that can be ignited in the heat of a relatively minor emotional outburst.

Perhaps these factors added to the peculiar feelings many found themselves having about Caryl Chessman himself. Overstatement though it may seem at first, one has a right to believe that this once-snarling convict was fighting the fight of the whole world. And this is perhaps also why he lost. To return to Miss Hardwick:

In a sacrificial death, the circumstances that the mass fears and dreads and violently condemns may arouse involuntary feelings of wonder and grief in others. There was something almost noble in the steely, unyielding effort Chessman had made to define and save himself. One could only say that when he died this poor criminal was *at his best*. It was dismal to think his struggle counted for nothing.

Obviously, Miss Hardwick herself was not content to have this struggle, with all of its crucially important ramifications, "count for nothing." In its entirety, her study, "The Life and Death of Caryl Chessman," is the sort of documentary which carries even greater significance than careful surveys in terms of dates and facts.

William F. Graves, a San Quentin physician, one of the growing number who have refused to serve at executions, displays the sort of insight Miss Hardwick is apt to awaken in her readers. In

an article in *Frontier* for last May, Dr. Graves said:

A man like Chessman, in every sense, is the prodigal son. He has come back, and we are refusing to accept him. Of course, he personifies a problem which is much larger than himself. We do this to many other people as well, but the Chessman case causes capital punishment to stand out in all its gruesomeness because, unlike others on death row, Chessman will not allow us to escape the fact that he is a human being.

And in Melvin Martin's *Progressive* piece, we find this summary of the character of the man who was finally executed after many eves of death:

I spent approximately thirty hours in private conversation with Chessman from 1957 to 1960. Not once did he snarl or sneer. He was polite and cooperative. He exhibited a profound remorse for his early life of crime, and he expressed an intense desire to dedicate his intellectual talent to creative pursuits. He told me he hoped "someday to graduate from my current level of pamphleteer to that of a serious novelist." In support of this ambition, Chessman displayed a remarkable knowledge of literature, psychology, philosophy, religion, history, politics, and science.

I talked with many other reporters and professional persons who visited Chessman, including death-row physician William F. Graves. No one detected viciousness. All found evidence of rehabilitation. Associate Warden Achuff told me early in 1960 that "Chessman has not been the custodial problem that you might imagine from reading the newspapers." The prison's Catholic chaplain, Father Edward J. Dingberg, told another reporter, "Chessman changed much for the better."

While Chessman was dying, a San Quentin guard told me that "they're killing a man who became a worthwhile human being. He always treated everyone with respect, regardless of the person's importance to him. If I weren't in uniform, I'd be out in front of the prison, helping all those people to demonstrate against this thing."

What of the future, in respect to the possible execution of other "Chessmans"? The most concise and humane advice is provided by America's most distinguished psychiatrist, Karl Menninger, as he examines the problem of the convicted murderer after guilt has been assigned

by judge or jury. In *Harpers* for August, 1959, Dr. Menninger wrote:

"Verdict guilty—now what?" My answer is that now we, the designated representatives of the society which has failed to integrate this man, which has failed him in some way, hurt him and been hurt by him, should take over. It is our move. And our move must be a constructive one, an intelligent one, a purposeful one—not a primitive, retaliatory, offensive move. We, the agents of society, must move to end the game of tit-for-tat and blow-for-blow in which the offender has foolishly and futilely engaged himself and us. We are not driven, as he is, to wild and impulsive actions. With knowledge comes power, and with power there is no need for the frightened vengeance of the old penology. In its place should go a quiet, dignified, therapeutic program for the rehabilitation of the disorganized one, if possible, the protection of society during his treatment period, and his guided return to useful citizenship, as soon as this can be effected.