VOLUME XII, NO. 4
JANUARY 28, 1959

WHAT ARE WE ARGUING ABOUT?

LAST fall (Oct. 29), MANAS published an article, "American in Moscow," contributed by a post-graduate student in international law who had been sent to Moscow by an American foundation to study certain economic institutions of Soviet Russia. The article was an openhearted discussion of the writer's experiences, together with some general comment on the tensions of the cold war, and a proposal that *people*—both American and Russian people—could do more to create the foundation for peaceful relations between the two countries than their governments are able to do.

We now have the reactions of a German reader and contributor, Heinz Kraschutzki, to this article. Mr. Kraschutzki will be remembered as the writer of an exposition of the Tolstoyan anarchist point of view which appeared in MANAS for Nov. 5. His letter is too long to be published in full. Instead, we shall print what seem to be his most important paragraphs, adding some comment of our own. Mr. Kraschutzki begins:

> There are several remarks in "American in Moscow" which make me think that even you are not free—how could you be?—of the effect of the ferocious propaganda against Communism which has existed since Communism has existed, and which became even more violent after Communists and Capitalists had been allies in a long war.
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> As I have confessed to be an anarchist, and you have accepted that confession by publishing my article, I hope that I shall not be suspected of being a friend of the totalitarian State.
>
> Your writer said: "These people do not have access to the truth." That is true. But who has? They are surrounded by "a seamless web of half-truth." Certainly. But what is American public opinion about the Communist world? Is it really better?
>
> In one way it is. In the U.S.A. and the rest of the world it is possible for some independent papers (like MANAS) to exist. This is not possible in Russia, so far as I know. I appreciate this advantage. Americans and Western Europeans are able, if they try hard, to find more than half of the truth (never the whole). But how many Westerners are reached by such papers? One half of one per cent? Make a Gallup poll of what Americans think about Russia or the Communists at large. The foolish views you will get together will not differ, in quality, so very much from what you would get together in Russia about the U.S.A.

We should like to know just what this argument is about. As a good anarchist, Mr. Kraschutzki can hardly want the government to become responsible for the spread of truth about international affairs and other countries. Generally speaking, the anarchist notion of government does not permit the hope of an impartial government; certainly not the government of a modern power-State. The most that could be expected of a government, from this point of view, would be that it refuse to get in the way of free communications among the people. It is admitted that the government of the United States does refuse to interfere with free communications in this country, and that such communications are not possible in Soviet Russia.

It is true, of course, that in recent years the channels of free communication in the United States have been seriously clogged by a flood of official propaganda of various sorts. This is a great misfortune. However, no attempt is made to muzzle the free organs of opinion which regularly and thoroughly expose this abuse of bureaucratic power. For example, it has been said a thousand times, if once, that the Atomic Energy Commission tells the American people less than the truth about the facts of nuclear testing and the measure of danger from fall-out and from other aspects of the AEC's experimental program. The

Reporter, a magazine with circulation running into hundreds of thousands, printed a devastating story on the AEC's policies in this respect. The *Reporter* is not a radical magazine. It is a liberal paper with a good reputation for impartial reporting. Another influential magazine of even larger circulation is the *Saturday Review*, whose editor, Norman Cousins, has printed absolutely uncompromising criticisms of the United States Government. It would take too long to list the public criticisms of the acts of the United States Government by eminent Americans as well as isolated "radical" figures. Supreme Court Justice Douglas' position is not threatened in the slightest by his outspoken objections to American foreign policy, nor is the academic standing of a man like Stringfellow Barr in jeopardy by reason of his suggestion that Americans ought to "join the human race" by making peace with the rest of the world.

The estimate that one half of one per cent of the population of the United States bothers to inform itself on issues of international affairs is either about right or a little high. That would be close to 85,000 people. Actually, 85,000 people committed to intelligence in foreign affairs could do a lot to change the course of events. In time, perhaps, they will. There is powerful minority opinion in this country in behalf of a rational foreign policy. To know about this segment of opinion, it is necessary to read magazines like the *Nation* and the *Progressive* and a few others. Such papers, incidentally, have no illusions about the apathy which has to be overcome and the misinformation which has to be swept away. Take for example the following passage from an article by Sidney Lens in the *Progressive* for January:

> There is slowly evolving in America a "mass man" who is immune to radicalism, even when his social needs demand it, and whose horizons seem incapable of being extended beyond the present scheme of things. Whatever rebelliousness there is in this mass man is a rebelliousness without a cause to harness it. He "rebels" only in his own behalf or that of his family; he seldom if ever ties it in with social rebellion. Thousands of rebellious youth—"rebels without a cause"—become juvenile delinquents, who in another era might have become young socialists. Most youngsters, of course, are decent, law-abiding, even studious. But it is significant that rebelliousness in youth has no cause to latch on to; in the extreme, therefore, it ends in delinquency and crime.
>
> Never in history has a nation imposed on itself the strictures of conformity as thoroughly as America has done since World War II. Hitler had to use unabashed terror and concentration camps to exact conformity from the German people. Stalin murdered a whole generation of Bolshevik leaders and imprisoned millions in slave camps to create a similar mood of fear and conformity. But in postwar America, without slave camps, without frame-up trials, without totalitarian terror, a whole nation has mesmerized itself into conformity. The era of McCarthyism—now tapering off—made people fearful for their jobs, but not for their lives. Outside of a dozen or two political prisoners, Communists and Trotskyists prosecuted under the Smith Act, no one was jailed for his political beliefs. Conformity was not won with the whip. In the United States, it was self-imposed, willingly accepted by the majority of its citizens as the normal way of life.

No government can be blamed for this unhappy trend. The difference, in America, between the freedom of expression and action that is allowed, and that which is *exercised*, is enormous. Americans can have no scapegoat. If the American people would actually support a press devoted to printing facts about international affairs, that press would immediately spring into being. The editorial offices of the commercial newspapers hide plenty of good reporters who would work for very little in order to practice self-respecting journalism. It is a basic fact of American publishing that journals which come into being for the purpose of supplying unbiased information and serious discussion of contemporary issues have to be subsidized by benevolent people with money.

When Mr. Kraschutzki draws a comparison between the American people and the Soviet people, suggesting that both are ignorant of the true character of their "opponents," his implication is that in both cases the government is responsible. In America, we know that the government is not

responsible. It is the American people who are responsible. In Russia, however, it is the government which is responsible. An American who goes to Russia and who says that the Russians are victims of a controlled press is telling the truth. This is not true of the United States. The American press is commercial, irresponsible, and frivolous in its approach to world problems, but it is not controlled by the government.

No one knows what would happen in Russia if suddenly free expression were allowed. We know what is happening during the "thaw." Boris Pasternak knows, too. As he put it, recently, in an interview with a Swedish journalist: "Actually, the demands of the hierarchy are very light. You should hate what you like and love what you abhor! . . . ."

Possibly other Russians will follow Pasternak's example and "test" their government for soft spots in the program of thought-control. Eventually, the USSR may develop a minority populated by writers and artists and other freethinking individuals which will compare favorably with the similar minority in the United States. Certainly, the proposal of the writer of "American in Moscow," for as many exchange students as possible between the two countries, would help to bring about the existence of such a minority in Russia.

It is foolish, of course, to argue that the Americans are "better" than the Russians, or vice versa. It is not foolish to say that a political system which allows free expression, even though difficult and expensive, is better than a political system which prohibits and penalizes it. The greatest argument the communists could produce for their system would be to demonstrate that it is strong enough to allow free expression on the part of the people living under the system. Whatever Americans think of their own system, it is at least a system they can say what they like about, and they can try to do something about it, however unsuccessfully.

Other portions of Mr. Kraschutzki's letter deal with the Korean war and the indifference of American editors to the charge that the South Koreans were as responsible as the North Koreans for its outbreak, or even more responsible. He cites I. F. Stone's *Hidden History of the Korean War* as evidence of this. Well, we have read the same thing in other sources; in fact, the "seamless web" of half-truth attributed to Russian control of public opinion at home is a charge that might easily be directed at virtually all the accepted histories of modern wars. On this subject, all we feel able to point out is that the revisionist historians of the United States and England and certain European countries are probably responsible for some of the strength of the pacifist movement in the West. Anyone familiar with this literature learns to start out with the assumption, seldom inapplicable, that the first casualty in war is *truth*. This sort of distortion is common in connection with wars between "capitalist" countries and is hardly to be singled out as evidence of unfair treatment of communism. It is a phenomenon of war and self-justifying nationalism. Our only point would be that revisionist historians can draw their breath in relative safety in the United States. I. F. Stone published his book here and circulates a magazine of his own.

Mr. Kraschutzki says further:

> Your correspondent writes: "This [the Russian people] is not a people motivated by fear. There is . . . a tremendous hatred of war." I know this is true and I equally know that the American people in its vast majority does not want war. But why then the daily accusations in the American press that the world is menaced by a Russian attack? Just now the negotiations about ending atomic tests have broken down because the West says, without a system of control they never could trust the Russians. Why not? Hitherto all statements of the Russians about their atomic tests have proved to be correct, which was not the case with the American statements. How much nearer the world would be to real peace, if the Americans would stop considering themselves as the honest people and the Russians as the enemies of mankind!

Well, one could put together quite a case for distrust of the Russians, if this were important to do. There is for example the utter ruthlessness of the Stalinist regime, from the time of the Moscow Trials, in which honesty and truth had no meaning at all, to the latest misrepresentations of what took place in Hungary. Why should a nation which has no respect for truth in domestic affairs be expected to tell the truth to its cold-war opponents? Trotsky long ago declared the Communist policy as to "truth-telling" and other maxims of bourgeois morality (in *Their Morals and Ours*) and we know of no repudiation on the part of the Communists of this expedient attitude toward Western ideas of morality.

On the other hand, if Western diplomats could be brought to practice what they preach, the Millennium might indeed be brought into sight on the horizon, even as Mr. Kraschutzki suggests! Certainly, there is nothing to be said in these pages in defense of the nuclear testing projects of the United States.

In another section of his letter, Mr. Kraschutzki questions the idea of "free elections":

> *Free elections* seems to be the latest dogma in the West. Countries with so-called "free elections" have the honor to belong to the "Free World," while other lands are despised as totalitarian.
>
> This "Free World," of course, includes the Dominican Republic, a family enterprise of the Trujillos, Guatemala (where a government based on free elections was violently overthrown by foreign troops), Portugal, Spain (whose dictator was recently praised by John Foster Dulles), the Union of South Africa, and a good many more of the same character. This you know, but I may be able to tell you something that you do not know.
>
> A few days before leaving Berlin I visited the embassy of North Korea in East Berlin. There I inspected resolutions passed in the spring of 1958 by the governments of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. The Koreans asked for free elections in all Korea. Now North Korea has ten million inhabitants, against twenty million in the South. Yet the North Koreans want to have free elections, under the supervision of foreign powers which had no part in the Korean war, while South Korea has just outlawed a political party which sought peaceful unification of Korea, and Syngman Rhee is pledged to military unification. My opinion is that the people who are for "free elections" are the people who see a chance to win them. In Germany it is the West, in Korea and Indo-China it is the Communists.

Last summer, a group of American tourists came to Berlin. We showed them around, ending, as planned, with a long discussion in East Berlin with political people of this area. We have done this before and believe that all the participants learned a lot—at least, that is what both Americans and Communists have said to me. Many of the Americans in last summer's group were Baptists, among them several clergymen.

> One of the Americans asked the Communists: "Why have you no free elections?" The man who spoke first tried to dodge the question and I knew that this would not satisfy the Americans. Sitting beside me was a professor who is a Communist who had been in England during the war and spoke good English. He said: "No, we have no free elections, as you call them. I will tell you why. In this country a man came to power whose name you perhaps remember—Adolf Hitler. He received eleven million votes. Other parties then supported him, so he came to power in a democratic way. As a consequence of these really free elections, we lost some six million young people, and some of your American boys who came to fight Hitler are buried under German earth. Free elections, after our experience, are no guarantee of peace. And we want peace. Sixty per cent of the higher ranks of the Adenauer government are admittedly former followers of Hitler. We don't want free elections at the risk of falling once more into the power of such men."
>
> Frankly, I am not an admirer of free elections. I have little confidence in elections at all. You probably do not know the electoral system as it is practiced in East Germany. It is entirely different from what you Americans imagine it to be, and there is a good deal of influence exercised by the public, not on election day, but earlier, when candidates nominated by the parties can be rejected by the public. It would take much space to explain this. But just the influence of elections on American politics as I have observed it during several years of study of American newspapers is not convincing. Important decisions even in foreign policy seem to be made with a view to its effect in the next election. The decisions

are not made out of wisdom, but to pave the way to power.

We can accept everything that is here proposed and still maintain that the failure of free elections is not a condemnation of democratic processes but of the people who misuse or neglect them. The alternative to free elections *as a principle* is some kind of autocratic or paternalistic control *as a principle.* The comparison of an ostensibly "good" use of paternalistic authority with a bad use of democratic processes is a specious comparison. For any government or any people to condemn democratic processes is a confession of weakness. Americans may have made a dreadful mess of their democracy, but at least they do not blame their freedom for the mess. They blame, when they think about it, their own irresponsibility. Hitler was not a man from Mars. Huey Long and Joe McCarthy were native Americans and the fact that they played hob with democratic processes for a time is nobody's fault but our own.

The last portion of Mr. Kraschutzki's letter is of great interest:

> In September I took part in a two-day discussion in East Berlin about non-violence. The meeting was held at the invitation of the East and there were ten people from each side. The participants had been to the Stockholm Conference of the World Peace Conference (regarded by most Americans as "entirely a Communist affair," which is untrue), and had heard a long address on non-violence by Mrs. Nehru (a cousin of India's prime minister). They wanted to know more about it. On the second day of our meeting in East Berlin, two Indians, Aryanayakam and Ashadevi, came, after having toured East Germany for two weeks, speaking on non-violence. (Aryanayakam took Gandhi's place as leader of the Ashram at Sevagram, while his wife, Ashadevi, is a co-worker of Vinoba Bhave.) The discussion was a good one and there will be others of a similar sort. This would have been quite possible, of course, in the United States, but few Americans want to believe me when I say that it is also possible in the Soviet zone of Germany.
>
> I am writing a book about Gandhi, here in Spain where I have much time. It is being prepared for a publishing firm in East Berlin. I told the manager that his firm should publish something about so outstanding a man and he asked me if I would write the book (I have been in India). Of course, I said I could not make a Marxist out of Gandhi, to which he agreed, and we left open the question of whether he can publish the book or not. But it seems to me worth trying. It is we who have to bring such ideas to them, and as long as we do not try to do so, we have no right to blame them for not acting on the principles of Gandhi.

Well, by a parity of reasoning, we in America have no right to complain about the Iron Curtain, if we will not listen to so fair-minded an advocate as Heinz Kraschutzki in respect to certain aspects of the East-West controversy. Many readers of MANAS, at any rate, are likely to envy him his opportunity to meet with East Germans, to experience them as human beings instead of as the abstractions the word "communist" means to most Americans.

REVIEW
REFLECTIONS ON INDIVIDUALITY

THE Foundation for American Studies in 1956 sponsored a "Symposium on Individuality and Personality," to which were invited specialists in natural science, economics, history, literature, philosophy, politics, rhetoric, and sociology. The intent was to encourage untrammeled discussion of the problem of Individuality versus Regimentation. In a preliminary announcement, the Foundation noted that "an increasing number of scholars have turned their attention to the problem of man's freedom in the face of modern society's seemingly irresistible urge to socialize and regiment the thought and action of the individual." In particular an attempt was made to secure the participation of men "whose writings have shown a particular awareness of the . . . challenge to . . . individual privacy, responsibility, and self-determination. . . . "

Twelve essays were contributed in preparation for the Symposium and are now published under the title of *Essays on Individuality* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), edited by Felix Morley, who was himself a participant. As Morley remarks, these writings, although they were not formally read at the Symposium, "reveal not only the scope but also the high degree of interlocking support and intellectual integration in the proceedings." The contributors were John Dos Passos, Conway Zirkle, Richard M. Weaver, Felix Morley, Helmut Schoeck, Roger J. Williams, James C. Malin, Milton Friedman, Friedrich A. Hayek, Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., Joseph Wood Krutch, and William M. McGovern.

While all these essays are of value, we were especially impressed by Richard M. Weaver's "Individuality and Modernity." Weaver seems to be saying in sociological terms something of what Joseph Campbell makes us emotionally aware in his *Hero with a Thousand Faces:* Man wants both to *be* and to *do.* His essential being demands secure orientation, a status in relation to value, but he also seeks a significant role to perform, a work worthy of his creative energies. Weaver puts it this way, with emphasis on the difficulty encountered by the modern who attempts to distinguish between "status" and "function":

> Just as the individual requires a balance of status and function for his real happiness, so it appears that he requires a balance of outer and inner life. Part of his life has a public orientation, but part of it does not. He has a private self that looks inward, and he should be able to feel with some distinctness the difference between public and private roles. It strikes me that those eighteenth century individuals who wrote letters to the newspapers, signed "Publius" or something like that, were giving expression to this difference. When the writer appeared before the public in the common interest, he was conscious of stepping outside his private considerations and entering into another capacity, of assuming a posture. The rest of the time he was his own man, with his thoughts and feelings reserved for himself.
>
> What barrier made this delicacy possible has long since been broken down. It is now felt that the individual's entire life is subject to public report and review. Any claim to privacy is viewed as a form of exclusiveness, to be denied in the interest of an onrushing democracy.

Weaver decries the tendency to oversimplify the nature of the human Self in "scientific" description. For, he says, without a sense of privacy or inwardness, we tend to accept a "one-dimensional" definition of ourselves—the dimension exposed by behavior and statistical analysis. Further:

> Possibly the worst result of this one-dimensional concept of the person is that it makes self-knowledge deceptively easy. In spite of the popularity enjoyed by psychology in recent decades, it may be questioned whether men understand themselves any better today than they did when Socrates was exhorting the Athenians to examine themselves and to learn whether man is a creature mild and gentle by nature, or a monster more terrible than Typhon. Or, one might conclude that what psychology has done to advance such understanding, political romanticism and advertising propaganda have largely undone. The pressure against the habit of contemplation and the displacement of the humanities from a central role

> in our education have worked against what are probably the two best means of getting to know the nature of the human being.

As one would expect, Joseph Wood Krutch addresses himself penetratingly to the question of individuality. Recalling the thesis of his *Measure of Man,* Krutch points out that the person who has reached "societal" integration and adjustment may begin to feel that there is something basically wrong. As Krutch puts it: "The lack in such a man is simply this: He has no face. The fact that he not only exists but functions successfully in the struggle for survival is the most convincing argument on the side of those who contend that man is nothing but the product of social forces and that he can be made to accept as right, proper, good and desirable whatever his society approves. This is the mass man whom the experimental psychologist and the 'social engineer' can make. He is also, presumably, the man of the future unless it is true that human nature is something in itself, that man is capable of rebelling and of resisting conditioning." Krutch concludes:

> The most inclusive encouragement of the failure of individuality is simply the scientific and philosophical theory that the characteristics commonly attributed to man as a Being are illusory and that, since he cannot in that sense be, there is no reason why he should make the attempt or why society should encourage him to do so.
>
> As a man thinketh so he is. Man is tending to become what we have thought that he is.

John Dos Passos supplies precise information on his views in "A Question of Elbow Room." Unlike many successful authors of fiction, Dos Passos plays an active role in intellectual debates. "A Question of Elbow Room" shows a familiarity with the basic principles of Jefferson's and Madison's thought as Dos Passos applies these to present dangers to individuality. For instance:

> Consult any sociologist today as to the meaning of happiness in the social context and he'll be pretty sure to tell you it means adjustment. Adjustment, if it is freedom at all, is freedom of a very negative sort. It certainly is the opposite of elbow room.
>
> To . . . Jefferson the "sublime Science" consisted of designing a government that would allow the greatest possible freedom to its citizens; to the political leaders and theorizers of today the "sublime Science" consists in teaching the citizen to adjust himself to the demands of Society and state. He has to learn to put up with an ever-increasing lack of elbow room.
>
> We are hardly conscious of the immensity of the change which has taken place in the aims of statebuilding because we still use the vocabulary of our individualist tradition in literature and politics. The change has been so gradual through the years that we have failed to notice that the words don't apply any more to the facts they are supposed to describe. This lag in definition makes it extremely difficult to project our traditional notions of individuality, which are still thoroughly cogent in their own context, into the mid-twentieth century society we have to live in. Perhaps the reason why we are so uncomfortable with the very term "individuality" is that its redefinition will bring us up against a set of realities highly unpleasant to face.

As Dos Passos remarks, to argue that the freedom to develop individuality is necessary for attainment of "the true human stature" would have been gratuitous fifty years ago, but today "we live in an epoch where the official directors of opinion through the schools, pulpits, and presses have leaned so far over backward in their efforts to conform to what they fancy are the exigencies of a society based on industrial mass production, that the defense of individuality has become a life and death matter."

COMMENTARY
WHEN SILENCE IS "NEWS"

THE "thaw" in the official Soviet policy toward dissident intellectual opinion is mentioned in this week's lead article the treatment of Boris Pasternak being taken as an illustration of the limited "tolerance" of writers who dare to say what they think. Some editorial notes in the *Reporter* for Jan. 9 suggest that a better understanding of Soviet attitudes toward Pasternak may be obtained by noticing what has *not* happened in Russia as a result of official condemnation of *Doctor Zhivago.* Of the American accounts of the Soviet attack on Pasternak, the *Reporter* says:

> . . . our press has failed to remark the quite startling fact that *not one single prominent Soviet writer—not Ehrenburg, not Sholokhov, not Dudintsev*—has in his own name breathed a public criticism of Pasternak. This fact is so extraordinary, so much at variance with traditional Soviet practice, that it is worth tracing the history of the affair in the Soviet press, for any clues it may offer.

Accordingly, the *Reporter* examines individually each major notice of the Pasternak book in the Soviet press. The first blow, apparently, was struck by an unsigned editorial in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Oct. 25,1958). This editorial, the *Reporter* says, condemned "Pasternak's acceptance of the Nobel Prize in terms which, under Stalin, could only have served as preliminary to an obituary." Along with this editorial, the *Gazeta* printed a long letter (dated September, 1956) to Pasternak by the editors of *Novy Mir,* explaining why they refused to publish *Doctor Zhivago.*

Next came a party hack's polemic against Pasternak in *Pravda* (Oct. 26). Then the *Gazeta* (Oct. 28) printed a joint resolution of the administrative boards of two writers' organizations, expelling Pasternak from the writers' union. The resolution was said to be "unanimous," although preceded by "fierce debate." However, as the *Reporter* points out, there was no general meeting of writers to produce this resolution, which was entirely a bureaucratic expression.

On Oct. 30 the Soviet papers printed a speech by Semichestny before a mass meeting of Komsomols. In this speech, Pasternak is likened to a pig. The Komsomol youth paper printed this passage, but *Pravda* suppressed it.

In November the Moscow branch of the Union of Writers passed a resolution asking that Pasternak be deprived of citizenship. The *Reporter* notes: "Only thirteen writers are reported as taking part in this discussion; none of them is in the front rank." A month later (Dec. 8) another attack came from the writers' union and was reported by *Pravda,* but it passed unnoticed by any other Soviet paper.

The *Reporter's* summary of the affair is illuminating:

> Never in the entire history of the Soviet Union has a press campaign been so badly orchestrated. (Some important papers—including *Izvestia*—hardly gave any coverage to the Pasternak affair at all.) Inefficiency is clearly not the explanation. Rather, it would seem to be a case of sheer bafflement before an experience the leadership was ill-equipped to foresee and cope with.
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> There can be no doubt that Krushchev's indignation was genuine. . . . But Krushchev is not the Soviet Union. He may vilify Pasternak; or he may—as he did recently—invite Lysenko (remember him?) to address the party's Central Committee. But he cannot, apparently, always carry Soviet opinion even on fairly official levels, along with him.
>
> Silence can bear effective witness, in its own way, to Russian realities. Provided, that is, western observers know that silence can be "news."

Well, what about book publishing in the United States? The book business in America is probably more free than any other sort of publishing, yet a lot of books appear with no more justification for them than that they conform to somebody's notion of what will sell, or what people "want." Sidney Lens (in the *Progressive*

article quoted on page 2) has a story on "formula" publishing:

> A few years ago a large publishing house decided to publish a novel with appeal to Catholics. The publisher didn't wait until some writer had presented such a novel to its editors. Instead it sent out dozens of salesmen to find out what Catholics would like to read about in a novel on Catholicism. The editors then called in a prominent writer, gave him a list of the points that those polled wanted, and assigned him the task of writing a novel to order. The book eventually sold more than a million copies.

American authors get fairly bitter at this approach to "literature." James T. Farrell, Sidney Lens recalls, wrote a fable about a publisher who became rich by inventing a novel-writing machine which made authors unnecessary. It could do four books a day, combining "plots, descriptions, and verbiage like a giant Univac machine." The books pleased almost everyone, since they made no problems. "The clergymen," Farrell wrote, "were grateful because they no longer had to write sermons about immoral books and could speak from the pulpit about God and Goodness. . . . These machines never erred and never produced an immoral or sad book. They whirred out works of joy and hope at a cost of ten cents a copy. . . ."

Now, if *Pravda* could be persuaded to publish an attack on Farrell as having authored a thinly veiled attack on Soviet censorship, maybe Farrell could get big distribution of his fable in the United States. That has been Pasternak's way to fame in America!

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

ERIC HOFFER'S *The True Believer* contains some interesting material on the historical relation between "mass movements," both religious and political, and the psychic ties of the family group. Strong family ties, Hoffer argues, signify a healthy immunity to the belligerent extremes of nationalist or revolutionary ideologies. So, during those centuries of Western history in which "mass movements" have swept the Occidental world, the apostles of these movements have attacked "all existing group ties," including the family:

> Where a mass movement finds the corporate pattern of family, tribe, country, et cetera, in a state of disruption and decay, it moves in and gathers the harvest. Where it finds the corporate pattern in good repair, it must attack and disrupt.

As Hoffer explains, the attack on the family is less a deliberate maneuver than the result of an ideological persuasion, which moves toward disruption without conscious direction. We find, for instance, that the revolutionary period in Russia was accompanied by policies which minimized the value of family life. "Communism" became the opposite of *communal,* since the natural community is a result of both cooperative and blood ties developed by spontaneous selection. While young Soviet children came to spend more and more time away from home, in government-sponsored schools and programs, the characteristics of a mass movement were dominant and those of community recessive. But similarly, in America, the decrease of communal life—with greater parental dependence on the schools for children's upbringing—has meant greater susceptibility to mass suggestion. The child of today, who appears to be so "free" from family responsibilities, may have no more of the psychological freedom which makes for true individuality than the Russian child.

In any case, the difference between communal thinking and mass thinking is most dramatically illustrated by the psychological conflict which occurs when the representatives of Western nations—dedicated to both "individualism" and mass movements—clash with the communal patterns of living practiced in older cultures:

> The discontent generated in backward countries by their contact with Western civilization is not primarily resentment against exploitation by domineering foreigners. It is rather the result of a crumbling or weakening of tribal solidarity and communal life.
>
> The ideal of self-advancement which the civilizing West offers to backward populations brings with it the plague of individual frustration. All the advantages brought by the West are ineffectual substitutes for the sheltering and soothing anonymity of a communal existence. Even when the Westernized native attains personal success—becomes rich, or masters a respected profession—he is not happy. He feels naked and orphaned. The nationalist movements in the colonial countries are partly a striving after group existence and an escape from Western individualism.
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> The Western colonizing powers offer the native the gift of individual freedom and independence. They try to teach him self-reliance. What it all actually amounts to is individual isolation. It means the cutting off of an immature and poorly furnished individual from the corporate whole and releasing him, in the words of Khomiakov, "to the freedom of his own impotence." The feverish desire to band together and coalesce into marching masses so manifest both in our homelands and in the countries we colonize is the expression of a desperate effort to escape this ineffectual, purposeless individual existence. It is very possible, therefore, that the present nationalist movements in Asia may lead—even without Russian influence—to a more or less collectivist rather than democratic form of society.

Sally Carrighar, in *Moonlight at Midday,* describes the typical attitudes of Eskimo families in Alaska. These inhabitants of northern regions, she shows, give a different meaning to individualism. They are truly *communal,* and would therefore furnish few candidates for Communist cadres. While the Eskimos in some measure practice the communal rearing of their children, the family comes first. In fact, it is the extension of the familial ideal which encourages impartiality toward the children of several families growing up together. The family is never forgotten, but horizons beyond blood ties are developed. *Moonlight at Midday* (Knopf, 1958) describes the psychological orientation:

It frequently happens that Eskimo families trade children around; a couple who have none, or only one or two, may take some of those from a more numerous family. In Unalakleet there were cases, too, in which a strong bond had grown up between some adult and a neighbor's child, and its parents showed no sign of jealousy. The child was perfectly free to have this rich supporting relationship, and from time to time he slept and ate some of his meals at his second home. A few prosperous Eskimos have reared numerous orphans.

In civilized countries we have been talking as though emotional security depends almost entirely upon one's parents: are they affectionate, do they always make a child feel he is wanted? It may not be necessary for all of that reassurance to come from a mother and father. It should come first from them, but for an Eskimo child neighbors, too, are like a devoted family. Everywhere that a child went in Unalakleet, he was welcomed with pleasure. Everywhere love opened out to him—proof that, small though he was, he was recognized as a valuable human being. It appeared to me that this wide acceptance was one of the reasons why the children were so relaxed, also perhaps why they were never aggressive. Neither at home or anywhere else were they ever on the defensive.

It must not be thought, however, that Eskimo parents are not fond of their own. They love them so much that they generally refuse to take all the family out in a boat at one time. If the boat should capsize and its riders be drowned, the parents want to be sure that at least one or two would be left alive.

When the sense of community is strong—when community and family blend—there seems to be a heightened awareness of the needs of individual children. Also, as Miss Carrighar points out, the Eskimos make natural distinctions between child and adult responsibilities. While we in America seldom expect our children to perform useful work, we are likely to expect them to meet adult standards in what we do require of them. All the Eskimo children work, but they are taught to work in the same way a good instructor teaches a child to swim, with allowance for the slow development of capacity. Miss Carrighar talked to a twenty-six-year-old Eskimo artist of Shishmaref about work:

I asked if the children in his family helped with the work.

"All of us did. The older boys chopped the wood, and the younger ones brought it in. We helped with the dogs and the hunting and trapping; the girls helped our mother. Everyone did what he could in the work of keeping the family going. My parents were always telling the small ones that they must mind their older brothers and sisters, but they told the older ones not to expect too much of the little ones."

Wilbur then looked at me with some mischief in his eyes, as if he knew that I would react to what he was going to say next. "They told us: 'Do everything well, but don't get too tired.' They reminded the older children to be careful not to work the small ones too hard."

I did react. I said, "Wouldn't that tend to make a child lazy?"

"No," Wilbur answered. "As my parents said, 'If you don't get too tired the first time, then you won't rebel at doing the same work again.' "

Knowing Eskimos rather well, I believe there was also the thought that a very tired child may become an overwrought, keyed-up child, and the natives are cautious about getting out of emotional balance.

Until white people came, with their nine-o'clock school bells and jobs that begin on time, Eskimos used to sleep until they were rested completely. Their poise, their relaxed attitude, must have been partly due to that fact. They know that fatigue can cause nerves to be frayed, and in teaching a child to stay well inside the limits of his energy, they are helping him to have self-control.

Such advice could be part of a toughening program, and it is evident to me now that they do consciously toughen their children. To love them and toughen them: apparently that is the way that an Eskimo parent forms, molds, his child into a good adult.

It took Miss Carrighar two years to write her first book on Alaska, *Icebound Summer*. Then, instead of returning to the United States as planned, she stayed seven more years, so fascinated was she by the culture and the psychology of these gentle people.

FRONTIERS

Changing Attitudes

IT is a small item of news, perhaps, that seven Englishmen decided to work out a solution of their own for London's transport problem, yet it seems worth repeating.

London's local transport system is apparently quite inadequate for the number of people who need to be carried to and from work. Anyone who lives in or near a large metropolitan area in England, the United States, or any other industrial country can well understand this. In fact, a student of local transport recently pointed out how silly it is for nations like America to be spending many millions of dollars on rocket transport to the moon, when it is not yet able to get people to work on time!

London, however, has the added traffic load growing out of reduced services. According to a recent issue of *Freedom*, seven London Liberals on the Finchley Borough Council, led by one Frank Davis, decided to start a bus service themselves and obtained two 35-seater coaches. These they operate by licensed drivers and unpaid amateur conductors—Mr. Davis and his colleagues and their wives. They run the service during rush hours, morning and evening. *Freedom* reports:

> So far all the cost is being borne by the operators, rides being free to the public. Mr. Davis says the cost works out at 145 a day for himself and his six fellow-workers, since that is surely what we can now call them.
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> These militant Liberals arrived at the anarchist conclusion that if you want a thing done you must do it yourself (only unlike so many anarchists, they actually do it!) after their petition to London Transport for return of the official service had been turned down. Now, in providing a *free* service they are giving the LT a headache. If unofficial bus services start springing up all over London—where will London Transport's monopoly be? It is of course protected by law against any *commercial*, fare-taking service being started, but a free service has it worried!

Other news from London suggests that the English are really getting sick of the "class" aspect of their society. This, we gather from various sources, is what the "angry young men" are angry about, and an article in the *Nation* for Jan. 3, by Raymond Williams, speaks of a general movement to abandon class attitudes. There is widespread rejection of the idea of "change as organized from the top, a social engineering by experts for an abstraction called the public interest." In Mr. Williams' words:

> . . . we are trying to think, not what might be best for the working people considered as objects of benevolent social change, but what we and our families, who are the working people, ourselves want. This same principle applies to recent thinking about education and the welfare services: not what should be done for the poor and under-privileged, leading to the old thinking about minimum standards, but what common services we all need, and what scale and attitudes in them we ourselves are prepared to accept. . . .
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> We do not, in fact, think of the working class in primarily political terms. The transfer of power, in the name of a class, is not our objective. Our emphasis is on the quality of ordinary life, not on the superstructure of power. . . . The belief that work should be judged, not only by whether it is useful or profitable, but also, and primarily, by its effect on the man doing it, is also again being put forward.

The essential campaign, says Mr. Williams, relates to education and the arts:

> What we see is a selective minimum-standard education system, and this we are determined to change. We see also the mass media being used, not for popular education and entertainment, but for the substitute idea of public relations with the masses. We see our arts reduced to a marginal existence, unless they fit into this philistine system. In one way and another—in exhibitions, meetings, films, books, periodicals, lectures and classes—we are trying not only to fight the system, but to make the alternatives practical. Our politics are the politics of culture, not only because of this central emphasis on the arts and education, but also because of the substance of ordinary living which, to us, these represent.

Less encouraging is a report from Italy by Ignazio Silone, yet his analysis of Italian politics is

itself evidence of a new attitude toward the political means. In a recent conference sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Silone spoke of the transformation of political parties in Italy from instruments of action in behalf of an ideal into harbors for the security of their members. He points out that in 1914, no political party had more than fifty or sixty thousand members, while today the parties, including their subgroups for women and youth, and the "cultural" organizations, number as many as ten million. Silone writes:

> It goes without saying that this rush on the political parties has completely changed the atmosphere of our political life in general. Precisely because the motive for joining a Party is no longer the acceptance of an *ideal* or of a *political program,* it has happened that whole sections of the Communist Party have left the Party and joined the Christian Democrats: in these cases there is no question of a change in political ideals but merely a change in protection. (Quoted from an article printed by the *Radical Humanist,* of India.)

The parties themselves have also undergone radical change. Effective party machines are needed to control the mass membership and direct its action. Silone comments:

> . . . these machines, as they exist at present, are very different from the old Party bureaucracy. The prototype of these machines is what Stalinism first created within the Russian Communist Party. They are characterized by the socialized training the members get, by the presence of the men they trust in all sectors of economic life, in factories, offices, and big apartment houses. This highly centralized organization of the political parties enables the leader to dispense at any moment of the will of the members without even consulting them.
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> So one can really speak of a general "stalinization" of our parties, including the anti-stalin parties. For instance, the structure of the Christian Democratic Party in Italy is rather similar to that of the Communist Party in Poland, a fact which is confirmed by its efficiency. Perhaps one must always take up the structural features of one's opponents if one really wants to defeat them.
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> I would like to point out other consequences of this change The predominance of the machine has meant that twilight has come over the political lawyer as an old party figure. This means, in turn, the end of the importance of eloquence in political life in general. The member of the machine is a very different man compared to the traditional politician. In most cases he is a young fanatic, without doubts, who obeys orders received. He prepares and dominates Congresses according to the directives of an Executive Board. . . . We still have a Parliament as everyone knows. But it would be incorrect still to define the mainspring of our political regime as being parliamentarian. One should rather say "Party-ocracy." Indeed, the center of political decisions is no longer in Parliament, but in the Party Organization. . . . The era of parliamentarianism seems to be giving way to a relatively firmly entrenched Party-ocracy.

Few observers of current psycho-social trends are as acute as Ignazio Silone. But the truth of what he says is at once manifest to the reader. This is a world-wide trend, although there are great differences in the degree to which Party-ocracy may have come to dominate the public life of a country. It is hardly necessary to recall that Jayaprakash Narayan left political life in India in explicit rejection of conditions much the same as those described by Silone. For such men, it is now a question of discovering alternatives.