

AN ANCIENT QUEST

IT is an old story, but one needing continual retelling, that summations of people in terms of political or other collective generalizations do irreparable injustice. Doing injustice is bad enough, but the habit of thinking and judging in this way is really worse, since, in time, it makes the doing of justice impossible. Further, it coarsens the mind and destroys sensibility, until, finally, there is no longer any capacity for sympathy or love.

If we go very far with this discussion, we shall encounter the viewpoint that insists upon the necessity of hardening one's heart. A number of "practical considerations," such as the preservation of our standards of living, and the morale of national defense, will be urged upon us. The practical considerations, we may admit, are not entirely without weight, but they turn, it is readily apparent, upon the compulsions of fear.

So there should be an advantage in pursuing the question as though fear did not exist. How should we like to live, if there were no practical considerations to interfere with our choice?

The tacit assumption, here, is that other people would abandon their preconceptions as we abandon ours, but this is probably too much to expect. Of course, you don't just "give up" preconceptions. Opinions of other people, whether individuals or groups, are made not only of a blend of fact and fancy. Every opinion involving decisive judgment of others has an x factor in it, derived from one's opinion of oneself. The tendency to comparison is almost irresistible, so that there is more to this undertaking than the elimination of fear—of fear, that is, which arises from some tangible external cause. There is also existential anxiety—the uncertainty that arises simply from being human and alive.

Who is exempt from existential anxiety? Fools, artists, and the wise. Fools have not the wit to know their own deep need, artists are filled with wonder, which displaces anxiety, while the wise have understood themselves and look at the world from this stable foundation.

The rest of us do the best we can in the existential situation, trying to comprehend what we are and what is best to do with our lives. No one can take flight from the existential situation, since wherever he goes, the situation goes too. But there is great progress in learning not to confuse the existential problem with things that happen to us as the result of what others do. What others do will pass, or change, but the existential problem changes only as we change.

How do we change? How does a plant grow? An indirect approach to this question is probably best—if, indeed, it ought to be approached at all.

But from the viewpoint of the individual, there can be little reconciliation with the existential situation so long as one falls prey to stereotyped judgments of others. The man who thinks and acts according to such judgments suffers the confinement and rigidity of the conventional institutions of his time.

Suppose one were to go to India—or Russia—or Yugoslavia: At first he would see mainly the stereotyped ideas in those people's lives. And then, with time, he would see that they form their ideas much as he forms his. By a process of this sort, we penetrate the stereotypes of others and begin to lose our own. The common human values and qualities emerge into the foreground. There is a tremendous power in simplicity of thought and action. If the visitor gives evidence that he is not bound by stereotypes, then those who meet him may

experience a sudden weakening of the psychological grip of their own. It is not that anyone should be without opinions, but that the opinions that are expressed should have a manifest relation to individual thinking. Another way of getting at this distinction is to propose that a man should make a strenuous effort to recognize, in his own thought, the difference between what he believes and what he knows. No man who works at this sort of personal clarification can help but be an educational influence on everyone he meets.

It is difficult to see how, without such work, there can be any peace, any art or literature, or any sympathy and affection among the peoples of the world.

But if we make this admission, it is necessary to go on to other recognitions. What is involved, here, is a kind of "awakening to the self" as being independent of cultural institutions and inherited concepts of value. Even if the traditions of our civilization are good, we have to free ourselves of them in their institutional version in order to adopt them again as individuals. Traditional ideas and values are like conventions; they may serve many good purposes, but they are double-edged until they are held by individual decision. You often find representatives of both these sorts of attitudes in humanitarian movements—people who are in a movement because they feel the basic inspiration which brought it into being, and people who are in it because their sense of being "righteous" and "good" is fed by the formal activities of the movement. Externally, all these people seem in agreement, but there is actually a great difference among them.

The people who obtain their feeling of identity and security from "belonging" are the makers of dogmas and the organizers of sects. For one sort of man, an organization or movement is a tool; for the other, it is a refuge and a citadel of self-defense. In our time, this polarity among human beings is defined by the gamut between "maturity" and "immaturity." The great religions all make the same distinction, although in other

terms. Jesus spoke of those whom he instructed in parables, while to his disciples he revealed "mysteries." In the *Bhagavad-Gita*, Arjuna is vouchsafed a vision not available to other men. A democratic culture has considerable trouble with such notions, but political taboos notwithstanding, the difference is real and it keeps on presenting itself.

The trouble with the political taboo concerning differences in maturity is that it hides the essential problem and directs attention to inconsequential issues. We all know, of course, how the taboo became established—for the best of reasons. The equalitarian principles of the revolutions of the eighteenth century were directed at the elimination of the abuse of power. Since political revolutions cannot change "people," the great emphasis was upon the control of the powerful. And since it takes power to control power, the crucial value of the revolutionary philosophy of the West was soon defined in terms of power. This worked fairly well so long as power was limited and controllable by the organized power of the State. But today, power has become incommensurable. We are confronted, today, by the prospect of incommensurable power wielded by finite authority. The result is the sudden disappearance of the moral value of power. Power is now overwhelming and means the dissolution of all value.

The conclusion seems self-evident: The mature men of the world must renounce the use of power and thus do away with the political taboo against recognition of maturity.

Maturity of course means much more than the rejection of the political means of power. It means also the rejection of stereotypes in judgment and the setting of an example of independent thinking in all matters of importance. But out of this criterion of maturity, certain problems arise. There is no such thing as a sudden maturity. Maturity comes only through pain—the pangs of birth—and most human beings

seek to avoid pain. Maturity is a reconstitution of being. Our education and theory of education take only a superficial account of this process, but if someone were to ask what sort of education takes proper account of growth to maturity, we should be at a loss for an answer. It is no answer to say that it would be education at the hands of teachers who have been through the process themselves, but that is all we can say.

Of a certainty, it is growth into some sort of self-reliance. It must involve a kind of faith in Life, but what is this, more than a familiar word begun with a capital letter? We should add that it is self-reliance without the self-deceptions on which so much of human confidence depends; then, it must also be a self-sufficiency, but a self-sufficiency which is vulnerable to the honest pain of other human beings.

Part of becoming truly self-reliant is the discovery of how those who are not self-reliant are held together—by the various means of integration supplied by social institutions. An awareness of these bonds seems to have been common knowledge in antiquity, but to have died out in the twentieth century. Today we see the managers of new republics wondering whatever can be the matter with their people, and trying improvisation after improvisation, expressing disappointment, and sometimes hinting at a severity to come, if there is not more "discipline" and "responsibility." Of all the nations which came to birth during or since the eighteenth century, the United States has probably been the most successful in the great experiment of self-government, and therefore, appropriately enough, it is in the United States that we find the greatest self-consciousness of weakness and failure. The institutions of the United States are predominantly of a "rational" sort, meaning that they require more self-reliance of individuals in order to prove successful. If we must say that the American civilization is showing signs of failure, it is only fair to add that the failure is at a level not attempted (until recently) by other peoples.

How should the failure be explained? In the context of the present discussion, we should say that Americans fail because of their stubborn determination to acknowledge no scheme of order save the political order, and to accord no serious honors to any achievements in maturity save the peculiar sort of sagacity necessary to the acquisition of wealth. They fail because they have tragically misconceived the meaning of success, which is, basically, learning how to live with the existential problem without being able to solve it—not being overcome by it, and not pretending that it does not exist, or declaring that it is only a problem in economics. They have dodged the main issues of life, having, it is true, their attention taken up with many promising preoccupations; but now the essence of our historical situation is that events are *forcing* attention to the real issues, making Americans wriggle like worms on a hook, or like small boys who are told that it is time to come home.

Maturity, we suggested, means a reconstitution of being. It means finding in oneself the principles of balance, the laws of restraint, the ideals and vision of value which were once supplied by the cultural community. What soon becomes evident to one who seeks this sort of realization is that it involves a kind of war with many of the typical habits of one's community. An instinct for this kind of conflict is responsible for all the talk about individuality versus conformity. The talk won't die out because the fundamental issue won't die out; it can't, because it represents an aspect of the drama of the existential situation. It is possible that in years to come, the struggle of men to gain individuality—or maturity—will supply what so many have sought, from William James on: A moral equivalent of war. There have been a lot of suggestions—the romance of the war on hunger and poverty, the "challenge" of scientific research and discovery, and every sort of humanitarian conquest of the foes of human well-being. The fact is, however, that none of these proposals involves the necessary ingredients. In war, a man risks his life—he bets it, one could

say, for what, traditionally, have been regarded as the highest stakes. That is no doubt why the symbolism of war is often employed in religious teachings, as, for example, in the *Bhagavad-Gita*.

If war is to have a moral equivalent, it will have to be something of the same, all-demanding nature, calling for total commitment and the same immeasurable risks. Do-good substitutes will not suffice. Nothing short of the ancient quest for the self—the quest for the Holy Grail, the search for the Golden Fleece, Rama's recovery of Sita, Siegfried's winning of the Nibelungen hoard.

The cries of angry poets, the revolt of novelists, the frenzy of men, everywhere, who feel themselves denied a cause worthy of their energies and dreams—what is all this but a Promethean complaint of the human spirit imprisoned in a culture which has nothing to say of human destiny—in a culture which speaks to them only with dead voices echoing the demands of "practical considerations"?

It takes no great prophetic insight to see that the history of this epoch will be followed by wild fury upon wild fury, so long as "practical considerations" dictate the patterns of behavior for masses of mankind. Nihilism is the only intelligible reply to a program of systematic suppression of the human spirit, done in the fashion of "practical considerations," accompanied by a liturgy of fear.

A Visit to YUGOSLAVIA

[When Vimala Thakar, an Indian colleague of Vinoba Bhave in the Bhoodan Movement, was in England recently, she described her reactions to a brief stay in Yugoslavia, during a tour of various European countries. The following is a report of her remarks on this occasion, sent by a reader belonging to a pacifist community in Wales.]

SPEAKING not as a technical expert, but as a common citizen, an ordinary human being, I have been very deeply impressed by the experiments in Yugoslavia. First, they are genuinely trying to decentralize political power. They have what is called the Commune system. A population of 5,000 forms a Commune, the administration of which is in the hands of the Commune Assembly. This consists of a People's Committee and a Council of Producers which join together to form it. The People's Committee consists of elected representatives of every industry, craft, and educational institution. The Council of Producers is drawn from those who are actually tilling the land or working in factories. No industry can be started in the area without the consent of the Commune Assembly. They have power of taxation and collect the revenue, and they decide what percentage of it should go to the Federal Government. They send their representatives also to the State Government and the Commune Government. Industries are owned by the community, not by individuals or firms.

This experiment in the decentralization of political and economic power was started in 1953. It cannot be denied that much of its success is due to a well-knit and well-organized Communist Party which has its workers in every village. But there is also a great self-confidence among the working people themselves. I talked with members of Workers' Councils in at least five Republics and I found that a psychological change has taken place. The Trade Unions and the Communist Party stand behind them; but it is clear that as the ordinary workers grow in maturity, the

active participation of these organizations in Commune affairs will become less and less necessary.

Secondly, the Agricultural cooperatives impressed me. Some 90 per cent of the land is owned by private land owners, but they join together for agricultural operations, for purchase of equipment and for sale of produce. In 1948 an attempt was made in collectivization of land, but the villagers said they were not prepared for this, and the government had to give way. At present only 10 per cent of the land is owned by the State and farmed collectively. The rest is owned by private owners with cooperative farming.

Thirdly, I found a much greater degree of individual freedom than I had expected in Yugoslavia. People talked to us quite freely in coffee houses and hotels, and at the University, about matters in which they differed from the Government politically or economically. They are at liberty to do so provided that they do not try to organize an opposition party. To do this would mean forfeiting one's freedom. But I found that the lawyer who defended Djilas, Comrade Shebir, continues to work as a professor in Belgrade University. Madam Djilas herself has a job in Belgrade and is free to talk with anyone. It is possible to meet and talk with Djilas himself and take him the parcels which arrive for him from all over the world. I had not expected to find this degree of individual freedom in a Communist country.

There are many things we can learn for India. The Commune System may help us if we can find out how to adapt it to a multi-party context. And the National Congress Party of India has declared itself in favor of general agriculture cooperatives.

I would also like to mention one aspect of life there which seemed to me to constitute a danger. Yugoslavia's target is the American standard of living. The average per capita income in Slovenia is about 600 dollars. I said, "Aren't you satisfied now?" They said "No; in America it is 1,000 dollars." In order to reach this target they are

industrializing the country at break-neck speed. They need technicians and experts, and they must get them from the Yugoslav Universities. Until 1953 Yugoslav youth tended not to go in for higher technical education because it was remunerated at the same level of wages as that of the unskilled or unqualified worker. In order to attract the number of technicians needed for the industrialization program, the Yugoslav Government has paid the price of compromising with its principles. Today, on its own statement, the difference in remuneration between unskilled and skilled labor is 1 to 10. The study group to which I belonged concluded however after six weeks' study that the true ratio is nearer 1 to 20 and the gap is growing wider. I had a very interesting discussion on this point with the Chairman of the "Working Alliance of Socialists," *i.e.*, the National Front. I asked him, "Why are you compromising basic principles? You say that the change from Capitalism to Socialism is a qualitative change; and here you are tempting youth with higher wages." He said, "Yes, we know that. But people say that after fighting in the war of liberation they ought to enjoy the fruits of the struggle." I asked him when he thought they would be able to eliminate this, and he replied, "Not in my lifetime."

Now I feel that if, today, they are unable to convince a small minority of educated people, and are making this compromise in values for the sake of speedy industrialization, it will be very difficult indeed for them to bring this realization to the majority of the people five or ten years hence. Moreover, today the textile industry is dependent upon the market in Greece and other neighbors. What happens to Yugoslav industry when these countries develop their own? The same question must be asked about the huge steel plants and other industries which are being established. In five, or ten, or fifteen years at most, what will happen to the surplus?

VIMALA THAKAR

REVIEW

FROMM'S ANALYSIS OF FREUD

WHEN Erich Fromm's second contribution to the World Perspective series—*Sigmund Freud's Mission*—first appeared last year, we noted some strongly critical reviews, and wondered what caused them. Not all the critics were devoted Freudians, and since Dr. Fromm has always shown himself temperate in judgments, this was a puzzle. After reading the 120 pages of the book, we are able to express sympathy both for much of Fromm's treatment and for his critics.

It is possible that there is something a little indecent about the public "analysis" of a person. Here we encounter something far different from a listing of case histories, for in the latter instance the attention is drawn to a *type* of analysis or therapy, rather than to a single, well-known individual. And although this was not, in our opinion, Fromm's intent, the reader in this instance may form the impression that Sigmund Freud—and all other human beings as well—may be explained by conditionings and complexes.

Some of Dr. Fromm's best work appeared in a *Saturday Review* series titled "The Limitations of Psychoanalysis," headed "Man is not a Thing." In that article, Fromm indicates a danger inherent in the psychoanalytic situation—the danger that the analyst may consider himself able to evaluate fully a given individual, and adopt an unconscious arrogance and presumption. It is precisely this charge which is now leveled at Dr. Fromm himself. However, Dr. Fromm's critics should have found in *Sigmund Freud's Mission* ample evidence that Fromm does *not* consider himself to have made a fully analyzable "thing" out of the personality of Freud. Rather, Fromm is establishing a distinction between a mysterious *individuality* in which the greatness of the founder of psychoanalysis lies, and the personal idiosyncracies of Freud—which have also influenced the literature and attitudes surrounding psychoanalytical therapy.

The most valuable portions of *Sigmund Freud's Mission*, to our way of thinking, occur in the first chapter, "Freud's Passion for Truth and His Courage," and in the concluding chapter, where he attempts to justify a turning of the Freudian spotlight on Freud himself. The final paragraph, here, still may seem presumptuous to defenders of Freud and critics of Fromm—a kind of tongue-in-cheek genuflection after the damage is done—but against this view we submit as evidence Fromm's consistent recognition of a tremendous debt to Freud, not simply by saying so, but by his notice of the philosophical depth of some of Freud's insights. (See Fromm's *Psychoanalysis and Religion*.) In any case, this is the final light in which Fromm sees Freud:

He is a lonely man, and unhappy when not actively pursuing his discoveries and his quasi-political aims. He is kind and humorous, except when he feels challenged or attacked; altogether a tragic figure in one essential aspect, which he sees sharply himself; he wants to show man a promised land of reason and harmony, and yet he can only visualize it from afar; he knows he will never get there, and he probably senses, after the defection of Joshua-Jung, that those who stay with him will not get to the promised land either. One of the great men and pathfinders of the human race, he has to die with a deep sense of disappointment, yet his pride and dignity were never dented by illness, defeat and disappointment. For more independent minds than were his loyal followers, Freud was probably a difficult person to live with or even to like; yet his gifts, his honesty, his courage and the tragic character of his life may fill one not only with respect and admiration, but with loving compassion for a truly great man.

Here are passages from the first chapter to which we feel critics of Fromm should have paid more attention:

Speaking of Freud's passion for truth would leave an incomplete picture if one did not mention at the same time one of his most extraordinary qualities, his *courage*. Many people have, potentially, a passion for reason and for truth. What makes it so difficult to realize this potential is that it requires courage—and this courage is rare. The courage which is involved here is of a special kind. It is not primarily the courage to risk one's life, freedom or

property, although this courage too is rare. The courage to trust reason requires risking isolation or aloneness, and this threat is to many even harder to bear than the threat to life. Yet the pursuit of the truth by necessity exposes the searcher to this very danger of isolation. Truth and reason are opposed to common sense and public opinion. The majority cling to convenient rationalizations and to the views that can be glimpsed from the surface of things. The function of reason is to penetrate this surface, and to arrive at the essence hidden behind that surface; to visualize objectively, that is, without being determined by one's wishes and fears, what the forces are which move matter and men. In this attempt one needs the courage to stand the isolation from, if not the scorn and ridicule of, those who are disturbed by the truth and hate the disturber. Freud had this capacity to a remarkable degree. He resented his isolation, he suffered from it, yet he was never willing, or even inclined, to make the slightest compromise which might have alleviated his isolation. This courage was also his greatest pride; he did not think of himself as a genius, but he appreciated his courage as the most outstanding quality in his personality. This pride may even sometimes have had a negative influence on his theoretical formulations. He was suspicious of any theoretical formulation which might have sounded conciliatory and, like Marx, he found a certain satisfaction in saying things *pour épater le bourgeois* (to shock the bourgeois). It is not easy to identify the sources of courage. To what extent is it a gift Freud was born with?

It seems to us that Dr. Fromm shows considerable courage in his discussion of the psychoanalytic movement, for his book is sure to be anathema to orthodox Freudian practitioners and to many other analysts simply because they *are* analysts. In the "Summary," we find Fromm returning to the basic criticism so brilliantly illustrated in "Man is not a Thing":

The foregoing analysis has tried to show that Freud's aim was to found a movement for the ethical liberation of man, a new secular and scientific religion for an elite which was to guide mankind.

But Freud's own messianic impulses could not have transformed psychoanalysis into the Movement had it not been for the needs of his followers and eventually those of the wide public which became enthusiastically attracted to psychoanalysis. . . .

But the new religion shared the fate of most religious movements. The original enthusiasm, freshness and spontaneity soon weaken; a hierarchy takes over, which gets its prestige from the "correct" interpretation of the dogma, and the power to judge who is and who is not a faithful adherent of the religion. Eventually, dogma, ritual and idolization of the leader replace creativity and spontaneity.

The tremendous role of the *dogma* in orthodox psychoanalysis hardly needs any proof. . . . The *ritualistic* element in orthodox psychoanalysis is equally obvious.

Fromm criticizes the Movement from a philosophical point of view, arguing: "Many of the patients are attracted by this very ritualism; they feel themselves to be part of the movement, experience a sense of solidarity with all others who are analyzed, and a sense of superiority over those who are not. Often, they are much less concerned with being cured than with the exhilarating sensation of having found a spiritual home. Eventually, the *idolization of Freud's personality* completes the picture of the quasi-political character of the Movement. . . . It was applied to a small sector of reality, man's libidinal strivings and their repression."

It may be felt by many readers, as well as by Fromm's critics, that the latter's treatment of the same "small sector of reality" in Freud's personage is similarly disproportionate, since it makes it appear easy to "sum up" by this means the totality of any great individual.

COMMENTARY

THE WORLD IN FLUX

DISCUSSING "Peaceful Coexistence" in the January *Foreign Affairs*, George F. Kennan notes that contemporary Soviet spokesmen write as though "there exists outside the Communist orbit a static and basic condition—a set of practices known as 'capitalism' and expressed primarily in the private ownership of the means of production—which has undergone no essential alteration over the past 50 years, or indeed since the lifetime of Karl Marx." It was our own surprise at Vimala Thakar's account of what has happened and is happening in Yugoslavia which made this sentence from Mr. Kennan's article worth quoting. We don't know which is changing the most—Communism or Capitalism—but the fact that both are changing, all the time, ought never to be overlooked.

Encounter for January has an article by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Varieties of Communist Experience," in which the author reviews a month of travel through the Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Both Kennan's and Schlesinger's articles should be read—Kennan's for its dispassionate evaluation of recent declarations by Mr. Khrushchev, Schlesinger's for its cautious evaluation of developments in Communist countries. Summarizing the impact of his tour, Mr. Schlesinger writes:

For this traveller, one impression above all was paramount. We have often tended to suppose that Communism, as the most explicit and comprehensive of the ideologies of our day, would stamp the nations under its sway into a fairly uniform mould. The very phrase "the Communist world" conveys the customary notion of essential homogeneity. But what strikes the casual observer—or at least this one—is precisely the heterogeneity of Communist practice. This phenomenon, I think, is worth examination, because, it seems likely that such heterogeneity holds out the best, if not the only, hope, for eventual world peace.

Communism, says Mr. Schlesinger, is not a monolith, but a spectrum, at one end of which lies China—"messianic, austere, passionately

ideological, deeply fanatical"—and inaccessible to Americans, now, by reason of barriers created by Peking. At the other end of the spectrum lie Poland and Yugoslavia, where the varieties of Communism practiced "confound the clichés which have dominated Western thought in the last decade." Between these extremes is the powerful Soviet Union, unpredictable, dominant, an exasperating combination of "venturesome innovation and rigid ideology."

While the two smaller countries may be negligible as to power, Mr. Schlesinger points out that "if the Polish and Yugoslav experiences express a possible direction in which Communism might evolve, then what is going on in these smaller countries may be of incalculable significance." He adds: "The one safe generalization about the Soviet Union is that it is in flux."

One could wish that Soviet readers might have as effective a destroyer of stereotypes as American readers have in Mr. Schlesinger.

CHILDREN

. . . and Ourselves

WHAT EVERY YOUTH SHOULD KNOW

WE wonder how many high school instructors have realized that the present struggle for integration in the various "tension" states of the U.S. is a significant phase of the effort to maintain a democratic government for America. Neither the Revolution of 1776 nor the Civil War can, of itself, be said to have involved such far-reaching consequences. For school integration is the final test of the dream of the Founding Fathers, a dream which goes beyond legal guarantees of equality to the development of attitudes which preclude distinctions and discrimination.

The battle for enlightenment and brotherhood will undoubtedly continue for a long time, and it should not be imagined that the Supreme Court action alone is sufficient to establish America's stand before the world. Prejudice and discriminatory attitudes must wane and then die out in every state of the Union, no matter how small the racial minority involved, or how seemingly innocuous the manifestations of discrimination. Evidence that the southern states have a long way to go is supplied by a brochure distributed by the "Committee of 100," organized to assist the Legal and Educational Fund of the NAACP. A new legalistic device, the "Pupil Placement Law," already enacted in nine southern states, has enabled segregationists to prevent all but a handful of Negro children from attending desegregated schools. The Committee of 100 makes this explanation:

These laws have been recently passed in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. They place the burden of extending school desegregation on Negro parents even in areas where court orders have required mixed schools.

The parents of any Negro child wishing to escape segregated schooling must file a special application with the local school board or the state pupil placement board for transfer from the Negro

school. Each application is judged individually, according to a series of criteria specified in the law. These criteria do not mention race, but broad questions of scholastic, social and psychological adaptability of the pupil, most of which do not lend themselves to objective measurement.

Pupil placement laws do not appear discriminatory on the surface. In fact, they permit arbitrary rejection of Negro children who seek transfer to integrated schools. Most applications are refused. The pupil placement laws are used as a device to prevent integration as ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Last summer the parents of 165 Negro children applied for transfers to "white" schools nearer their homes. Every application was refused. The parents, with the help of an attorney of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, sought and were granted a hearing before the School Board in October. Half the parents were present at the hearing. After calling the roll of those present the School Board retired. Its decision announced shortly thereafter was: The applications of all those children whose parents were not present were denied because they were not represented. The applications of the remaining children were likewise denied, no reason given.

Experience in several states shows that where pupil placement laws are enforced very few qualified Negro children were accepted in integrated schools in the fall of 1959. In the entire state of Arkansas, only 79 Negro children were enrolled in Schools with white children, although eight cities had been desegregated. In North Carolina, three years after admission of the first Negro child, a total of only 54 Negro pupils were enrolled in white schools in seven cities. Six cities have desegregated, but only 86 Negro children have been admitted to white schools.

Nine law suits filed by N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense lawyers at the request of Negro parents challenge the constitutionality of pupil placement laws. We believe the courts will eventually find that in application they subvert the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court and deny the rights of Negro children. More suits will have to be filed in many localities and each suit contested through the courts, possibly up to the Supreme Court, at great expense. This legal action is the only way in which we can fight this legalistic device of pupil placement now being used to deprive Negro children of equal education.

MANAS seldom passes on the "fund raising" appeals of any organization or association, but the present occasion should be an exception. It will be of value for parents to discuss the significance of such a contribution with their children, and "social studies" teachers in the high schools might find a way of discussing the issues thoroughly under heading of "current events." Young people need to know that a growing number of courageous and intelligent Negro youths are enduring every manner of humiliation in pioneering integration in southern schools. Without those willing to take the lead in this way, desegregation enforced by federal insistence would be merely a token gesture. And when Negro boys and girls decide to take the step that so many southerners bitterly resent, they must be prepared to be continually shoved, pushed, and otherwise opposed. Well aware of the momentous issues involved, these few have rejected emotional retaliation. They have many times faced mobs of angry grown-ups with quiet determination and pride, and have not turned back.

The Committee of 100 lists a number of distinguished names, including Archibald MacLeish, Karl Menninger, Roger Baldwin, John Haynes Holmes, Harry Emerson Fosdick, and James Bryant Conant. The work of the Committee, as a letter from its chairman, Allan Knight Chalmers, admits, is only begun. Two million Negro children are still barred from equal education, forced to attend schools which the Supreme Court has ruled to be inferior. In Little Rock, Arkansas, four years of constant legal action have been necessary in order to insure progress. Forty-three separate court hearings, accumulating expenses of \$187,000, preceded the final admission of five students to two high schools in question.

Milton Mayer's *Progressive* article, "The Issue Is Miscegenation," is an excellent exposé of the racial prejudice which remains in even the most enlightened states. Mayer's implicit

argument is that the elimination of even the smallest degree of prejudice within ourselves is a substantial step toward genuine democracy. The issue, of course, is *not* miscegenation, but a series of conventional assumptions. The conclusion of Mayer's article (*Progressive*, September, 1959) is an arresting thesis which we may correlate with the courageous struggles of Negro youth in the South. Legal changes, as Mayer shows, may accomplish little except in principle; meanwhile—

The big change is already taking place—a bigger change than any law will ever induce: The Negro is at last rejecting the white man's doctrine of white supremacy. Not resenting it, or complaining of it, or defying it; rejecting it. It was his acceptance of this doctrine that spread miscegenation, his rejection of it will speed the rate at which miscegenation is declining. The Negro is completing the half of his emancipation that he has had to achieve himself. His hands and feet unshackled, he is climbing Jacob's ladder. He is *deserting* the white man's racism as he climbs from a sense of inferiority to a sense of equality. From there to a sense of unconsciousness of race is a long step—a step that will take a century or two for the Negro and at least that long for the white man. Along about then, or another century or two thereafter, amalgamation of the races will be a conceivable possibility. But along about then nobody will care.

FRONTIERS

Satyagraha—and Background

THE *Progressive* for last October has reviews of two volumes dealing with the significance of Gandhi and nonviolence—further evidence that the idea of non-violent direct action, having gained a certain recognition through India's great leader, will continue to provoke the human mind in relation to ethical and political questions. Dr. Joan Bondurant of Princeton has recently concluded a fifteen-year study, including four years in India and interviews with Gandhi, which now results in a volume entitled *Conquest of Violence*. Dr. Bondurant, apparently with all proper academic qualifications, has concluded that "nonviolent action" in crisis situations has fully as favorable a prognosis as employment of violence. The reviewer, Homer Jack, summarizes this conclusion:

From the author's analysis of five Gandhian campaigns, she is prepared to answer certain common reservations about Gandhism. Will Gandhism work only in an Indian environment? She shows that Gandhism cannot be explained by Indian tradition alone (there is added something of Tolstoy, Thoreau, and the Sermon on the Mount) and thus its Indian effectiveness need not be limited to the Indian subcontinent. Is Gandhism effective only toward "democratic" rulers and not toward totalitarian governments? Gandhi in his lifetime denied that it was, and Dr. Bondurant suggests that the chances for success of Satyagraha "are certainly as great as are the chances for violent revolution under the modern police-state system." She adds that Gandhism may "in fact be the only possibility open to an oppressed people in this age of highly technical means of oppression."

Particularly interesting, here, is Dr. Bondurant's treatment of the psychological preparation which makes nonviolent campaigns effective. Dr. Jack cites as important the "examination of weaknesses within the group; persistent search for avenues of cooperation with the adversary on honorable terms; refusal to surrender essentials in negotiation; and insistence upon full agreement before accepting a settlement."

Another principle of satyagraha—"self-reliance at all times"—recalls Dr. Pearl Wilson's paper, "The

Greek Way of Life," a lecture delivered before the Indian Institute of Culture in 1957. While much of what Dr. Wilson says is found, also, in Edith Hamilton's *The Greek Way*, the emphasis in this brief paper is especially interesting. During their greatest days, Dr. Wilson shows, the Greeks were distinguished from all other peoples by their determination to hear both sides of a question.

The psychological root of "active pacifism" is undoubtedly the willingness to accept and learn from differences in belief and behavior. Dr. Wilson speaks of "the inspiring result of the dynamic clash of ideas "which made possible for Athenians "their cherished right of *parrêsia*," and continues:

The word [*parrêsia*] is a compound of *pas*, all and *rêsis*, saying; and they exercised this right of saying everything they thought to an extent that has, perhaps, never been equalled since. They met and talked every day in the market place and the porticoes, in the grounds where young athletes were exercising, in the law courts, that were kept busy by their disputes, and at meetings of the national assembly, in which, because of the small size of their country, every citizen was a member.

The Greek habit of clear thinking led naturally to a recognition that there is something to be said on both sides of a question as a rule, and they were always eager to listen while arguments were presented, or—better still—to participate in the discussion. Euripides in many of his plays has a scene where each of two conflicting characters delivers a speech presenting the relevant facts in logical order, in a manner intellectual rather than emotional. These opposing speeches are of equal length, reminding one of the Athenian courts, where the same time was granted to plaintiff and defendant by the use of a water-clock. Though Euripides could infuse emotional scenes with power and sometimes violence, that have never been exceeded, he evidently chose this way of presenting facts underlying the dramatic situation in order to achieve such clarity that no one in the audience could fail to keep them in mind.

There can be no doubt that the Greeks knew how to fight, that every grown youth and every mature citizen recognized a *personal* obligation to take up arms when Athens was threatened. Yet warfare, as such, never won great admiration. Instead, war was regarded as a failure of men to

devise alternatives, however vigorously they might fight once the alternative of reason had been exhausted. Dr. Wilson points out the Athenian habit of showing respect and even sympathy for the most unreasonable opponents:

The Greeks not merely granted an opponent's right to hold and to present his own views, they refrained from sweeping condemnation of those who were opponents. This appears first in the earliest work of European literature—Homer's *Iliad*. The eminent Oriental scholar, W. F. Albright, not long ago gave the date of its composition as prior to 950 B.C., and it is possible that the study of Cretan inscriptions, now being made as a result of their decipherment by Michael Ventris, may lead to placing it still earlier.

In the *Iliad* the Trojans are the enemies of the Greeks, yet the poet shows many a fine character among them. As a nation they have done wrong in supporting the outrage committed by the young prince, Paris. . . . Yet the character of Hector, averse to war himself and bearing the heavy responsibility of Troy's defense, wins admiration and sympathy. He is the leader of the enemy, but his qualities as a human being outweigh in significance the circumstances of his environment.

Dr. Wilson even provides an Athenian parallel for the modern problem of minority groups who profess excessive admiration for their own land's enemies—and one might wish that a little of the Athenian spirit could have pervaded the attitude of Americans generally toward the American Communists! For the Athenians, the comparable situation was in relation to Sparta:

The readiness of Athenians to admire a national enemy sometimes went to an absurd extreme in the case of persons lacking good judgment. The most powerful and persistent enemy of Athens among the Greek cities was Sparta. For nearly thirty years, with occasional brief intervals, the Spartans were trying to overthrow the supremacy and the prestige of Athens in the deplorable struggle known as the Peloponnesian War. Yet in the middle of that period the number of Athenians who proudly imitated Spartan dress and Spartan customs was large enough for Aristophanes, in one of his comedies, to use their affectation of austerity and hardihood as a springboard for his brilliant wit. It was significant, however, that these imitators aroused merely the laughter, not the suspicion of their fellow Athenians.

It seems reasonable to say that these Athenian ingredients of maturity should be naturally present in those ready to undertake the disciplines of satyagraha.

Finally, of course, search for the historical sources of an essentially non-violent approach takes us back to ancient India. Marguerite Yourcenar's "The Legend of Krishna," in the December *Encounter*, refers to the inbred pantheism of the ancient Indians, and she points out that Indian mythic lore is not properly understood "if one fails to see in it a wholly fraternal sympathy for beings of other species and other domains." Miss Yourcenar comments that "such tenderness possibly comes down from ancient animistic belief, but it has long since been transmuted into a very conscious form of charity and remains one of India's finest gifts to mankind. Christian Europe has hardly known that particular form of sensibility, and then only too briefly, in the course of the Franciscan pastoral, when both bird and wolf were befriended and blessed."

Dr. Wilson also notes the psychological connection between the two great cultures, Indian and Greek, turning, then, to her own conclusion regarding the "lessons in maturity" which may be derived from both:

Recognition of admirable qualities in foe as well as friend appears among the Greeks from the earliest times, even as it does in ancient India, a notable example of which is the *Bhagavad Gita*, indicating the close kinship in philosophic thought between these two peoples. In Athens we find insistence on the rights of the individual and free discussion. Both of these would mark progress towards a sense of brotherhood. . .

Æschylus believed—and leads us to realize—that the errors and the blindness of opponents should not make us try to bring about their destruction. We should search—and never weary in the effort—to make them see and then cast off their errors. After that, all that had been good in their aims, no longer hampered by misconceptions, may be united with what is good in ours. Together we can then go forward to a higher goal.