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THE GREAT MORAL DISASTER

EVEN if, somewhere in the 'thirties, this title was used by Garet Garrett for a *Saturday Evening Post* article which mourned the abandonment of the gold standard by the United States, these words seem the best description of the "disaster" we have in mind—the psychological impact of Communism upon the people of this country.

There can be no doubt about the fact that fear of Communism has a paralyzing effect on democratic intelligence. It brings out the worst in many men who are already inwardly uncertain about the principles and processes of self-government. Rather than directly attacking self-government, Communism, or fear of Communism, destroys faith in the practicability of those freedoms which are traditionally held to be necessary to self-government, and this amounts to an attack upon self-government itself.

Why, basically, is Communism capable of this nihilistic influence, which seems out of all proportion to its actual power, whether on the international scene or at home? Cynics and Soviet sympathizers will say that the fear springs from the hysteria of the property-owning classes, who tremble for their riches, and that since these classes control the channels of public communication, they find the infection of the rest of the people an easy matter. There is doubtless an element of truth in this analysis, but far more important, we think, is the candid acceptance of deceit as a weapon by Communist ideologists. The classical authority for this policy is Lenin, who said: "It is necessary to be able . . . to resort to all sorts of devices, maneuvers, and illegal methods, to evasion and subterfuge, in order to penetrate into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on communist work in them at all costs." Lenin, in short, rejected supra-class morals. The Communists acknowledge no universal morality, but only the morality which pursues the ends of the Class Struggle—and today, except for anti-Stalin Communists, the morality of the Class Struggle is now identified with the interests of the U.S.S.R. That is, what Soviet Russia does is, by communist definition, in behalf of the oppressed classes; therefore, since service to the oppressed classes in furtherance of Communist revolution is the highest moral good, whatever Soviet Russia does or requires her agents in other countries to do becomes the sole standard of the good.

It is this *avowed* rejection of universal morality in favor of programmatic, revolutionary party morality which frightens the rest of the world. It is, in fact, the morality of a nation at war, as distinct from the standards which prevail—in theory, at least—in peacetime. As Trotsky, defending Lenin's "amorality," wrote in 1939:

> The life and death struggle is unthinkable without military craftiness, in other words, without lying and deceit. May the German proletariat then not deceive Hitler's police? Or perhaps the Soviet Bolsheviks have an "immoral" attitude when they deceive the G.P.U.? Every pious bourgeois applauds the cleverness of police who succeed through craftiness in seizing a dangerous gangster. Is military craftiness really impermissible when the question concerns the overthrow of the gangsters of imperialism?

There are enough statements of Communist doctrine such as this to make clear that Communists, as such, regard themselves as at constant war with capitalist society. It is true that very few citizens of the United States—except the pacifists—would deny the necessity of deceit and lying for military purposes. But they do not *like* it. Overt war and its accompanying deliberate immoralities are hateful to most people. Since the Middle Ages, Western nations have tried to mitigate the moral anarchy of war by instituting certain "rules" of war, to make it more tolerable. The idea of "moralizing" war may seem a bit ridiculous, especially since the use of poison gas and the atom bomb in the wars of the twentieth century, but the human effort to reduce even war to some kind of moral order is psychologically significant. It helps us to understand the extreme agitation produced in as yet unalienated people by a revolutionary movement which, having declared that it does not believe in any of the familiar rules of peace or war, then proceeds to *use* those rules, or not use them, as expediency demands. Conduct of this sort is bound to outrage and infuriate people who still believe in the rules, or, at least, have come to rely on their protection. It is this state of mind, we think, which won Senator McCarthy so sweeping a majority in the primary election in Wisconsin.

But this is only a part of the moral disaster. It is bad enough to be haunted by fear of communism, but worse for people to suppose that communism is some sort of

alien evil genius in the production of which the West has played no part. Let us look at ourselves. Do *we* long to cast away our moorings to traditional moral ideas? Under what conditions would we adopt a morality which is similar to the communist morality? Who *wants* to live in an atmosphere of perpetual conspiracy, with feelings fed by a measureless hate for other men? What sort of people would choose careers of this sort, and under what compulsion?

At this point, two avenues of inquiry open up. One of them leads almost nowhere, stopping short with the conclusion that such men are simply *lliad* men, wholly unlike ourselves—men whom by no stretch of the imagination could we ever imitate. This is the easy way to settle the question—the way which leads to simple, uncomplicated hatred and fear of communism and communists, and to the further division of the world into two camps of fiercely opposing forces. The other way leads to the painful admission that Communism is a Western phenomenon—that it is as much a product of Western civilization as bathtubs, radios, television, the Greco-Judeo-Christian heritage, and whatever else one wants to include as expressive of European and American culture. It is as characteristic of the West as heart disease, cancer, and the neurotic personality of our time. Even if it is far more present as an obsessive fear than as a political reality, it is nonetheless present in the sense that it has become an almost decisive factor in the moral decline of the West—in the weakening of the free institutions of Western civilization.

It is already a platitude to remark that you cannot defeat communism by adopting its methods of maintaining order—the methods of suspicion, inquisition, trial, purge, and liquidation. Nor can you erase communism by duplicating its conception of "order"—a docile, obedient mass of human "producers" who accept instruction unquestioningly from their political authorities, and who labor with great love of country or ideology to prepare for the final Armageddon in which Right shall triumph and the Beast be cast into the Pit.

Such arguments are not only platitudinous; they are incapable of being heard by men who fear. What does it matter, they say, if a few visionary intellectuals lose their jobs and have to learn to do something "practical," so long as we save our country from this insidious influence? What does it matter if teachers fear to express any opinions at all; if our colleges and universities come to be staffed entirely by men who echo the most recent expression of political orthodoxy? It is our security which counts.

As usual, the abstract principle falters in the presence of the concrete emotion. And how, in the presence of this emotion, can we generate the kind of feeling for principle which is necessary to its defense?

We know of no way of meeting this problem save through the large-hearted study of history. The proposition to be defended is that Communists, along with Negroes, Jews, Democrats, and Republicans, belong to the human race. The proposition is that, insofar as the rest of the people of the world are affected by the things that have happened to them, Communists, too, have been affected by the things that have happened to them. What are those things? What will explain the painful rejection of the moral standards of Western civilization by the original communists? How did this movement gain such terrible momentum?

Did it all spring from a diabolical plot hatched by a handful of frustrated malcontents in Russia? Are the millions of the communist parties of Europe maimed in mind or predestined by some unhappy combination of their genes to be unable to see the Truth as we see it? It is important to answer this question, for on the answer we make may depend whether or not we must kill them all off and wipe out the last memory of the last book by Karl Marx and Nicolai Lenin, not to mention a few thousand other writers. One ought at least to have a theory about these things.

It is necessary to have a theory about the origins of communism for the sake of the future, if not for the present. Either the movement has "natural" causes in human suffering, or it has supernatural causes of an irrational sort. If it has natural causes, they need to be removed. If they are supernatural, we can hardly do anything about it.

The great moral disaster is not Communism; it is not even the terror which Communism inspires. The great moral disaster is that we treat Communism like an invasion from Mars, and hence have no hope of dealing with it by rational means which are within our reach.

Letter from ENGLAND

LONDON.—Some few weeks ago it was reported in the London Press that the Pope had seen the Sun dance in the heavens to divert the Queen thereof, and since the Vatican has issued no denial, it may be taken as an authentic report. Can it be cited, this astonishing claim by the Head of the Catholic Church, as illustrating the wide divergences that distinguish the many denominations of Protestant Christianity from the Catholic Church? One might well have thought so, until ample proof was provided by the Head of the Church of England, the Archbishop of Canterbury, of the curiously primitive character of Christianity in England, as typified by the State Church.

The facts build up into a storm in a teacup, which fact does not lessen their significance for the observer of cultural and theological trends. They may be briefly stated. A working class family in a small village suffered the loss of a little invalid daughter, a child who, denied the joys of childhood, had become preoccupied with the conception of the angelic state to which she would pass at death. Simple, loving, and devout, her parents paid considerable sums for the carving, in Italian marble, of a figure to represent an angel for her village churchyard tomb. The commission was duly executed by a monumental mason. Now came the hitch. The head of the legal department of the Church, a lawyer, ruled that it was contrary to law to set up in a village churchyard the effigy of an angel. He went farther and suggested that such beings had no reality. The incumbent, however, stuck to his guns. The village rose in arms. The National Press joined in. There was a heated debate. Item: Ought the figure be permitted to stand in the village churchyard or not? Item: Were there such things as angels? Item: Did good little children become angels with lovely wings directly they left earth for "heaven"?

The controversy assumed a national character and revealed the astonishing importance that is given to such matters by large numbers of people. (This, by the way, was also made abundantly manifest when the question of Prayer Book revision came before Parliament.) Now came the final chapter to this extraordinary ecclesiastical affair. The Archbishop of Canterbury weighed in with an ex *cathedra* summing up. In short, the Archbishop's finding was as follows: There are beings called angels, but they are a separate sort of being, rather than translated human beings. Therefore the little girl had NOT become an angel at death and hence to suggest it in Italian marble above her little grave was out of order, in the ecclesiastical sense. The Archbishop, though in favour of angels, was against little-girl-into-angel.

And that, one might have thought, was enough. But, no. As make-weight the Archbishop pointed out the dubious propriety of setting up in an ENGLISH churchyard an angel form shaped out of—Oh, horror!—ITALIAN marble. Here the suggestion left no room for doubt as to what was in the Archbishop's mind, namely, that something odious attaches to foreign, as opposed to English marble; and that to use such material for pious purposes on this sacred soil was somewhere near to disloyalty. And the end? No angel above the little grave, and a village embittered by an example of clerical stupidity and of a theology so primitive, so childish, that one wonders how a man who for years was a professional schoolmaster and for years the Headmaster of a great school, could lend himself to a controversy so puerile.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
RACISM'S SLOW RETREAT

DEFENDERS of civil rights have frequent occasion these days to seek assurance that the cause of human equality and fraternity is still progressing. Anti-Communist fanaticism and consequent loyalty oaths or purges have brought serious setbacks, from which both local governments and great universities will have difficulty in recovering. Yet the cause of racial equality—at root no different from the question of whether a man shall be discriminated against because of political opinions—has definitely been advanced during the last twenty years.

Statistics easily prove that sympathy toward the plight of racial minorities is gradually increasing throughout the United States. In terms of employment and housing, both Negro and Mexican populations are beginning to live in a better world. Equally significant is a general extension of the right of communication to racial minorities at the cultural level, indications of which are seen on every hand. A recent issue of *Look*, for instance, carried a featured article by Walter White, an executive of the NAACP. *Look's* editors plainly considered that what this Negro spokesman had to say about the recent presidential election would be of vital interest to their readers. Moreover, the appearance of White's article in a magazine with more than three million circulation will today strike few readers as being out of the ordinary. "Liberal" journals such as the *Nation* and the *Progressive* led the way in encouraging serious interest in the contributions of Negroes, and the present publication of such pieces as Mr. White's in *Look* definitely proves that the "masses" have been conditioned to accept journalism, at least, on a Bill-of-Rights basis.

The trend toward greater racial understanding in the United States was forcibly impressed on your reviewer by a motion picture program including Alan Paton's *Cry, the Beloved Country*. The other feature was an unusual effort called *The Ring*, dealing forthrightly with the struggle of California's Mexican population for "first-class citizenship." This picture was admirably planned and directed, so that the occasional lack of professional polish among the Mexican players failed to detract from the desired effect. King Brothers, who produced the picture, deserves congratulations, as also the director, Kurt Neuman. By coincidence, the Walcott-Marciano fight pictures appeared with the two features mentioned, marking the emergence of the first white heavy-weight champion since James J. Braddock. This event brought no "white supremacy" elation—at least, to a Los Angeles audience. Instead, the aging Walcott receipted for a considerable amount of admiration from onlookers as he fought his courageous and nearly victorious battle. We venture to say that no such films and no such reactions could have been seen twenty years ago.

Of the many excellent books now available on "the Negro problem," we should like to recommend *South of Freedom* by Carl Thomas Rowan (Knopf, 1952). Rowan, a Negro reporter for the Minneapolis *Morning Tribune*, persuaded his editors to assign him a trip through the South of his childhood, beginning with his birthplace in Tennessee, for an up-to-the-minute report upon existing race relations. *South of Freedom* makes an encouraging report, even though Rowan reveals his own subjection to Jim Crow practices en route. His account is also at times inspiring, as, for instance, in the recital of Federal Judge Julius Waring's dramatic insistence that Negroes be allowed to vote in Charleston. Social and professional ostracism resulted, and, according to Rowan, the Warings were left without a single white friend in Charleston.

Waring once remarked to Rowan that perhaps it would be a good thing if the vandals who had stoned his house and threatened him innumerable times should actually kill him. Rowan was quite naturally startled:

> I gave the Judge a surprised, say-that-again look.
>
> "No, I'm not foolish," he went on. "I don't want to die. But it is time some white people died to wake up America. They kill Negroes like flies and, as a white Georgian put it after a lynching in Irwinton: 'It's just another nigger. It didn't stop a checker game.' It's time they killed a white federal Judge. Let the people of the world see how insane this thing is, then perhaps it will wake up Americans."

As is clearly intimated by the intensity of the reaction against the Warings, "racial equality" is still a very long way from realization. Yet signs of progress are growing. The Warings, for instance, received messages of encouragement from all corners of the

United States. Here was a case in which *one* man did a great deal—an aging jurist who refused to fear, and who devoted all his vigor to an impersonal cause.

Another instance of outspoken courage provided by Rowan comes by way of the *Presbyterian Outlook.* The remarks are those of Dr. Benjamin Mays, president of Morehouse College in Atlanta:

> What has the worshipping of this god, segregation, done to the South? It has kept the South down. It has stultified the soul of the South. It has circumscribed, twisted and warped the South's mind. It has brutalized the heart of the South. It has perpetuated poverty. It has contributed to the South's illiteracy. It has made us cowards. It has made us "touchy" and sensitive. We are always defending the South, trying to prove we are no worse than other people. Defending segregation is our one consuming passion. Segregation is the root of most of the social ills of the South. We are an abnormal people.

Of course, brave words do not immediately solve the problem of discrimination—things are still pretty bad in the deep South. Here are a few statistics on the debit side of the ledger. Rowan writes:

> I found that the voting situation is more acute in rural Alabama, where artifice is ignored for the less troublesome method of physical threat in preventing the Negro from voting. In Wilcox, Russell, Henry, and Lowndes counties, no Negro has been known to vote in more than fifty years. Eight of every ten Lowndes Countians are Negroes. More than half the population is Negro in Henry County, where the N.A.A.C.P. filed a suit to re-enfranchise Negroes in 1951. In all Alabama, where there are as many Negro citizens as there are people in Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming combined, there are fewer than fifty thousand Negroes qualified to vote.

Carl Rowan was a Naval officer during World War II, and is particularly aware of the extent to which both the war and the general international situation have speeded progress in race relations. Although Rowan does not make the point in *South of Freedom*, a considerable number of Americans recognized that if the racial superiority doctrines of the Nazis were the worst features of the Hitler regime, there might be something wrong with race-superiority dogmas at home. Then, too, whatever one might think of the Communists, it is certain that they aimed at a peculiarly vulnerable Achilles' heel with their charges of hypocrisy in the treatment of racial minorities in the U.S.A. Further, during the war, the Negroes were needed, and it became increasingly clear that they would fight as first class citizens only when they were recognized to be such. Race injustice, it appears, will in time generate its own Nemesis.

One thing more, however, should be remembered. While Rowan serves both his people and his country through such reporting, his is a most trying position between two cultures. Whenever he enters a dining room or boards a train, he feels the pressure of uncertainty as to how he is to be treated. This pressure is *always* present, as it is with all Negroes who endeavor to bridge the gap "between the races." It is a pressure, moreover, so intense and persistent that no one with a rudimentary knowledge of psychology can fail to regard with sympathy any evidence of fanatical Negro partisanship, or occasional violence by way of Negro reprisal against oppression. There seem to be times in history when only through turmoil can progress be made—when the intolerable breeds the violent; but also a time when only those who see beyond the *methods of* violence on either side of a dispute have opportunity for averting an endless reactive chain of bitter strife. As for now, however, "There is turmoil in the South," as Rowan writes, "and it has moved into the national bloodstream."

Rowan's own objectivity merits appreciation. He speaks less as a Negro partisan than as a man—a man of understanding—and it is precisely this kind of friend the Negro—*and* the white—most needs. Such a friend, obviously, can be either "white" or "black." The following is a warning, but it is neither a threat nor an apology, being simply a plea for understanding of psychological realities:

> The middle-class Negro wants economic equality—the same pay for the same work, the same job for the same ability, the same promotion for the same industriousness and effectiveness. This Negro has begun to taste freedom, and he longs for more of it. That is why, in America, the Negro crying loudest about racial injustices quite often is not the trampled-down individual white Americans think he ought to be to shout so loudly. Men become addicted to freedom, ant the fuller their veins become of it the greater becomes their need for it. That is why men fight and die for it—yes, even men who have tasted but little of it. Weak men addicted to the drug of freedom lose themselves and their power of reason in the agony of being without it.

COMMENTARY
A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL

IT may occur to some MANAS readers—especially to those whose major interest is in the direction of religious philosophy and metaphysics—that an article such as this week's lead is hardly the way for a publication which needs circulation and support to make new friends. Even supposing that what you say is true, it may be argued, why go into these things at the present time, when so many people are irrational on the subject of "radicalism"? Is politics, after all, so important?

We can agree that, in principle, a frontal challenge to the fears of a disturbed individual is often unwise; and agree, also, that "politics" is a side issue in comparison with other issues and problems of our time. But in this case, the question, it seems to us, is one of sheer survival—not only survival in a material sense, but survival as responsible human beings. And people who are interested in rooting an ethical way of life in the world may find that they have shut out an enormous segment of the world's population if they neglect to investigate the processes by which the humanitarian aspirations of so many have been turned to a pursuit of the Marxist Utopia.

From time to time, history brings to human beings a crisis in which they must learn to be rational or perish. The present gives many evidences of being such a crisis. The ideal of human brotherhood, let us note, does not require agreement, but it does require understanding. And it is a truism of all arbitration that, the wider the common ground of understanding, the more hope there is for agreement.

Finally, we do not regard this problem as "political." It is a problem of justice and moral psychology. After we have admitted the stultifying materialism of Marxist assumptions; after we have condemned without compromise the tyranny of the Soviet form of totalitarianism; and after we have recognized that the Communist break with traditional moral principles and the resulting terrorism have practically *ended communication* with the communist half of the world—after we have noted and recorded these realities, it becomes equally necessary, not more nor less necessary, but equally necessary, to discover the causes of this materialism, to explain the submission to this totalitarianism, and to search for channels of communication which have not been destroyed.

Granted that not everyone is in a position to assiduously pursue these ends, but everyone can recognize that these ends are desirable, and manifest a sympathy for such inquiry. There are plenty of able students of social history to write impartially on this subject. What is lacking is an audience of people who believe in justice and understanding above all else. And people indifferent to justice and understanding can never be any better than their enemies, of whom there are always a great many.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

ONCE in a while a more than just "useful" book on education appears. One to which we wish to call special attention is *Love Is Not Enough* by Bruno Bettelheim (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1950). We remember Dr. Bettelheim for his exceptional "Human Behavior in Extreme Situations," the first thorough study in psychological terms of the Nazi concentration camps, which was published in the magazine *Politics* during the war years. Bettelheim now turns his acute and compassionate mind to an account of the treatment of emotionally disturbed children at the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School of the University of Chicago.

Bettelheim was apparently largely responsible for the planning of this school's activities, and certainly seems fitted for compiling a 375-page book in which there are no wasted words. The Orthogenic School staff has had a doubly rewarding task: not only was it possible to refine and apply psychoanalytic theories to extreme behavior disorders under conditions allowing ample time for readjustment, but, also, the implications of this work in respect to the needs of "normal" children have proved both clear and challenging.

Dr. Bettelheim's title seems particularly apt. We have all heard much concerning the need for parents to offer their children more "love and affection." Bettelheim's Foreword explains his title and reiterates a point which should be familiar to readers of "Children . . . and Ourselves":

> While the frequent admonition to "love one's child" is well-meant, it falls short of its purpose when the parent applies it without the appropriate or genuine emotions. We have known many children who have resented their parents' going through the prescribed motions of "loving" them because they felt it was not genuine. The mother who indulges her child to show the neighbours how good a mother she is will often hurt the child just as much as if she were only indifferent. The child will not understand that his mother may be acting on her fears or anxieties ("The ideal mother never gets irritated as I am so often"). He will sense only that he is being used, in one way or another, and indulgence received to impress others is no indulgence at all; actually, it is painful for him because he is misused for the mother's extraneous purposes.
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> I am aware that these and other observations about parents, both here and throughout the book, may sound harsh to the reader, or critical without relief. I must emphasize therefore, that my examples are drawn from the rearing of emotionally disturbed children. They are meant to serve the conscientious parent toward a better understanding of the reactions of the normal child, just as the study of diseases promotes our understanding of the normal functioning of the body.
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> It is not my intention in these pages to draw any conclusions as to what educators or parents should do, or avoid doing, in their everyday dealings with a particular normal child. It is hoped that such implications will be drawn by the reader on-the basis of his own experiences and the particular setting and emotions in which the lives of the children he is concerned with proceed.

Many child psychologists devote themselves almost exclusively to admonishing parents for or against certain practices of child rearing, but we prefer Dr. Bettelheim's approach. While, at first glance, *Love Is Not Enough* may seem to be largely a collection of case histories, none of the successful readjustments reported is an isolated drama involving a single psychiatrist and a single child. The Orthogenic School is thoroughly "organic," in the sense that nurses, counselors, psychiatrists, and children constitute a cooperative family in which the formalities of procedure and discipline are kept at a minimum. The goal is spontaneous expression from the children and spontaneous understanding by the staff.

We have often written here about the lack of "organic living" in the typical families of our highly specialized and urbanized society. Dr. Bettelheim and his associates deal with the psychological results of this lack of community and familial purposiveness, emphasis being given

to practical means and methods for correction of this weakness.

Two sections in particular seem appropriate for mention, the first dealing with children's dreams, the second with attitudes often developed towards formal learning in the schoolroom. This is indeed a refined and practical Freudianism:

> When they first wake up many children are eager to tell us their dreams, but this presents several difficulties. For one thing, we are naturally interested in whatever has upset the child during the night. We want to help him with the fears which the dream, for example, may not only reveal but may actually have aggravated. We also want to help him to recognize and work through his unconscious desires, anxieties, and so forth. But while these and many other reasons speak in favour of our listening to the dreams of some children, there are equally valid reasons suggesting that other children should not be encouraged to prolong their irrational phantasies because it may only make it harder for them to approach the new day realistically.
>
> Only intuition and empathy will help the counselor to encourage those children to review their dreams whose egos are strong enough to face and work through the dream material—most often their anxieties—and to see to it that others do not. The counselor must be guided here by his often unconscious impressions of how strong the child is at the moment, or how shaken he seems to be as he thinks about his dream. These indications of the child's strength or weakness at the moment are much more reliable when it comes to making decisions about how to handle the child's expressions of his unconscious than any preconceived notions based on theory.

Bettelheim's chapter, "The Challenge of Learning," gives attention to the child's basic need for a feeling of independence and freedom. "Some children," he writes, "have a routine they must go through every morning to convince themselves that they have some measure of independence from the adult and can succeed with their peers." He continues:

> Then, regular attendance in class can be assured only after the child has established his independence from the teacher, or has overcome his fear that once in the classroom his freedom to leave may be restricted. Leo, for example, had to convince himself of this by the very way he entered the classroom.
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> At the beginning, every time he came into the room, he would announce loudly: "I'm going out again. I'm not coming in this time." But the teacher went on with her work distributing papers, helping children, etc., and did not look up. When Leo finally came in, all he did was run around provocatively, and when this produced no reaction he went to the rear door, then back to the side door, pretending at each one to be leaving the room. Finally he did leave but only to poke his head in every few minutes, shouting, "I'm going out. I'm not coming in." While behaving in this way he also smiled and seemed happy. Finally he came quite close to his teacher and shouted at her, "Do you hear me, I'm going out. I'm not going to work."
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> The teacher after having said once or twice at the beginning that that was up to him paid no more attention and went on with her work. At last Leo left the room saying, "You have to catch me," and stayed out for several minutes. When nothing happened he finally came in, took his seat, and with no further acting out took up his assignment (a bit of simple work) which was all prepared for him. Nothing further was said, nor was it needed.
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> After several days of this ritual Leo felt sure of his freedom to leave the classroom whenever he wished, and this security permitted him to enter it regularly, on time, and without fear.

Our reading of *Love Is Not Enough* coincided with an inspection of Dorothy Baruch's *New Ways in Discipline.* Both these volumes indicate that the "case history" method of psychological study is particularly valuable in relation to children. Dr. Baruch's latest work, too, entitled *One Little Boy*, reviewed in MANAS for April 30 of this year, is sometimes rewarding in the same sense as is *Love Is Not Enough*, and, we think, better than *New Ways in Discipline*, the latter being full of advice to parents, but less apt in introducing the concerned adult to the actual feelings and problems of the child's own world.

FRONTIERS

Preface to all Future Theology

WITH great self-confidence, W. T. Stace, Stuart professor of philosophy at Princeton University, has written a book to invalidate much of past philosophy and most of past theology. After reading the book, we are obliged to admit that his self-confidence seems largely justified. Not that the book lacks defects. It has several important defects, to our way of thinking, which may be mentioned later on. Here, we should like to testify to the clarity, intellectual power, and readability of a volume which deals with the difficult subject of religious truth. The book is *Time and Eternity*, issued by the Princeton University Press at $3.00.

Prof. Stace, it may be recalled by some, contributed the article, "Man against Darkness," to the *Atlantic Monthly* for September, 1947. This article argued so skillfully in behalf of naturalistic pessimism and despair that the objections from the theologically minded were immediate and aggrieved. The same writer now offers what seem astonishingly opposite opinions concerning the nature of things. His explanation—if explanation be needed—is this:

> I do not in this book retract naturalism by a jot or tittle. On the contrary, I reaffirm it *in toto*. But I endeavor to add to it that other half of the truth which I now think naturalism misses. How it is possible for naturalism and religion—atheism and theism, if you prefer it—to be but two sides of one truth, is the same as the problem how God can be both being and non-being, as one of the most ancient of religious and mystical insights proclaims that He is. . . .

If Prof. Stace were not a dignified professor at Princeton and above suspicion, we should be tempted to suggest that his *Atlantic* article of five years ago was a Barnumish stunt to attract attention to the present volume; but whatever the reason for either, the fact that the same man produced both is of special interest. Further, Prof. Stace has the unusual distinction of being a professional thinker with much more than an academic concern for what he thinks and writes about. He writes, actually, with an air of discovery.

His thesis, when stated baldly, may seem prosy and familiar, yet its development should be enormously stimulating to minds interested in philosophical problems. It is that there are two orders of reality or experience, the order of the eternal or "divine," and the order of the natural, the external, and relative. The former order is experienced through intuition, the latter through the senses and by scientific inquiry.

The consequences of this proposition are momentous. Because the "Eternal," or "God," is of necessity out of all relation to finite things, all definitions, all concepts, concerning this highest reality are inevitably false and meaningless. There is no exception to this rule:

> If God does not lie at the end of any telescope, neither does he lie at the end of any syllogism. I can never, starting from the natural order, prove the divine order. The proof of the divine order must lie, somehow, within itself. It must be its own witness. For it, like the natural order, is complete in itself, self-contained. . . . The divine order however, is not far off. It is not beyond the stars. It is within us—as also within all other things. God exists in the eternal moment which is in every man, either self-consciously present and fully revealed, or buried, more or less deeply, in the unconscious

The reader should realize that when Prof. Stace uses the term "God," and capitalized personal pronouns, it is in a book which absolutely denies anything but a "symbolic" value to these terms. For "God," as we understand the term, means a "being," and Prof. Stace does not mean a being at all. The moment this highest reality is conceptualized, it becomes involved in contradiction. For concepts, like definitions, establish limits, and this violates the ineffable unity of the *One*.

The centuries-old effort of Christian thinkers to "conceptualize" their idea of God has doomed them to inevitable defeat by the sceptics and scientific critics. The sceptics attack literal dogmas and conceptual religion on two fronts—that of science and that of philosophy. The scientific critic wins by forcing the theologian or believer to revert from a literal to a "symbolic" interpretation of Scripture. This sort of defeat is only minor. Philosophic scepticism is much more deadly, for it charges that religious propositions are self-contradictory. To illustrate, Prof. Stace quotes David Hume:

> Is He [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is He able, but not willing?

> Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence, then, is evil?

Prof. Stace remarks: "All attempts to show that God's omnipotence, combined with perfect goodness, are compatible with pain and evil—although they fill countless erudite volumes—are patent frauds." To retire from the literal interpretation of religion to symbolic beliefs, except for a "core" of essential doctrine, gains only a truce with the scientific sceptics. And the philosophic criticism remains, attacking "what these men [theologians] cannot avoid, so long as they remain with one foot in the literalist camp, regarding essential doctrines, such as the personality and love of God." The lesson to be learned from scepticism is this:

> What it shows is that *all* religious language must be taken as symbolical, and not as literal. The moment you take your religious doctrine as literal, you find that it results in contradictions, for instance between the goodness of God and the evil in the world, or between God's unchangeability and His activity, or between His personality and his infinity. These contradictions are the stock in trade of the sceptic. His business consists in pointing them out. He always necessarily wins because the contradictions are real and cannot be evaded by any subterfuges. The common defense put up by religious men has always consisted in vainly trying to explain the contradictions away, which cannot be done. This is why conventional Christian apologists always appear so weak. They evade difficulties by presences such as that pain and evil do not really exist. It is in this way that the literal interpretation of religious doctrines has scepticism as its necessary and inevitable result. . . .
>
> It follows that all propositions about God are false, *if they are understood literally*. This will apply to the proposition "God exists" as well as to say any other. It will also apply to the proposition "God does not exist." God is above both existence and non-existenve.

Having followed Prof. Stace this far, the important question is: In what does religious symbolism consist, since, as implied above, non-literal religious propositions may contain truth. The answer, according to Prof. Stace, is that the intuition of mystical experience brings into play a sort of imagery which somehow conveys a feeling for the "divine order." This symbolic language is not conceptual in the same way that the language of science and logic is conceptual. It is evocative rather than logical. It seeks to create the mood of the mystic's inner apprehensions. This symbolic language cannot be translated into conceptual language without suffering a fatal violence. There is, however, a certain "logic" which may apply to the mystic's endeavor to convey his feelings—comparable, we suppose, to the scientist's logic applied to the data of sense experience. *But* it is impossible to convert the data of one order of experience into data of the other. Pursue the logic of mysticism to its source and you find an original intuition which must be experienced by each one for himself.

Prof. Stace is convinced that mystics are not unique people. All men, he thinks, have in them a sense of the divine:

> If they were sheer natural beings, if there were within them no divine on our view, of course, there exists no such thing as a sheer natural being, because the divine intersects the natural at every point in the universe—they would perceive at once that such statements as "the world of sense is only half-real" are, from the point of view of the natural order, pure nonsense, senseless words. But anyone who has taught young and unsophisticated students Plato's *Republic*, or the Upanishads, knows that on the contrary they receive such views readily—because there is something in themselves which answers back.

What, then, are the objections we find to *Time and Eternity?* They are several, and seem important. First, Prof. Stace refers to the "two" Gods of Hinduism as an "error," for, he says, "God is One." But what is philosophically wrong with the idea of the Manifest and the Unmanifest Deity? As Krishna declares in *The Bhagavad-Gita:*

> Even though myself unborn, of changeless essence, and the lord of all existence, yet in presiding over nature—which is mine—I am born but through my own maya, the mystic power of self-ideation, the eternal thought in the eternal mind. . . . I establish this whole universe with a single portion of myself, and remain separate. (IV, X.)

Parabrahm, the one, all-pervasive Unknowable is the origin of *Brahmâ*, the incessantly active potency; yet Parabrahm loses nothing nor is divided by the periodic emergence of the active, manifest deity. How from the Ineffable One comes the *symbolic* Son is doubtless a mystery, yet this birth of Time from Eternity has at least the justification of analogy in ourselves—who possess, on Prof. Stace's showing, a

sense of Eternal Being as well as the capacity for creative activity in time. *We*, it may be said, are both Parabrahm and Brahma. And so with the entire universe and all the beings in it. Every philosophic pantheist has held this view. Plato, in the *Republic*, speaks of the Good beyond all lesser Goods; and in the *Timaeus* his "Brahmâ" has the role of the Artificer who builds the worlds. A somewhat Christianized version of this dualism is found in the German thinker, Karl Krause, an obscure German *privat-docent* of the early nineteenth century who formulated a combined pantheism and theism which Otto Pfleiderer termed *panentheism (Philosophy of Religion* II, 53).

By these philosophers we are necessarily drawn to the doctrine of Emanations as expounded by the early Gnostics and the Kabalists, proposing a series of progressive manifestations *within* the One, each degree symbolizing in its totality the One, while remaining, in its eternal aspect, the One. So the *Logos*—or, in primeval succession, the *Logoi*—of ancient religious philosophy is personified in countless theologies as the Son—the second person of the Christian Trinity. The Christian Trinity, however, is a truncated version of the doctrine of Emanations. We prefer the Indian conception, as, at least to us, more plainly symbolic and less susceptible to literal anthropomorphic interpretation.

A second troublesome statement in *Time and Eternity* is to the effect that in religion, "Theories save no one, damn no one." In a sense, this is no doubt true. But in another sense bad theories can be very dangerous to human beings. Elsewhere in his book Prof. Stace proposes that a fitting metaphor may have the power to evoke mystical experience. If, then, there are ideas, even if metaphorical, which may enrich the religious life, there must also be ideas which suppress or impoverish it—ideas or theories, for example, which deny the divine essence in man, such as the claim that he is conceived in iniquity and born in sin, and can reach a state of blessedness through no effort of his own, but only by the intercession of some outside deity, saint, or whatever. This theory, it seems to us, may be pernicious and quite damning in effect. Perhaps Prof. Stace did not mean "theory" in this sense, but the matter seemed to deserve attention.

Finally, a sympathy for the quest for the divine in one's fellow men seems lacking in this volume. This lack, surely, is the defect of most mysticism, in that it seeks a compact with some transcendental reality so "utterly other" that its presence in the hearts of all men is too easily forgotten. Perhaps Prof. Stace's concession to Western religious tradition in using the word "God" and the usual honorific pronouns contributes to this impression, for if he had chosen the term "Self" instead, which is certainly not incorrect, and more philosophically suggestive of all-pervasiveness, this apparent neglect of the brotherhood of man and the brotherhood of life might have been avoided altogether.

In general, however, it may be said of *Time and Eternity* that it stakes out certain claims in respect to religious thinking—any sort of important thinking—which can hardly be ignored. The strength of the book, perhaps, is in the fact that it makes unmistakable matters which ought always to have been obvious to us. If this is the case, then the reception of his book will be a good measure of the intellectual integrity of Prof. Stace's colleagues in philosophy and religion.