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GREAT QUESTIONS: X

WHEN, about two months ago, it was suggested here that "the great mass of people in the world have no particular interest in dominating the lives of others"; that most people want only "a few simple things"; and that "the ill-housed, underprivileged and hungry . . . have no yearning to conquer the world for any ideology" (MANAS, Aug. 6), some readers may have felt that the intent of these statements was to affirm the helpless innocence of all but a small minority of Machiavellian exploiters. This was hardly our purpose, although there is a sense in which the "little people" of the world *are* caught in currents over which they exercise no control. What the little people do not see—a failure which contributes to their helplessness—is the melancholy truth of Thomas a Kempis' aphorism, "All men desire peace, but few men desire those things which make for peace."

This blindness is the subject of a series of comments from one of our readers.

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. . . the "ill-housed, underprivileged and hungry all over the world," as well as those "common people" of our own country, who are ever so much more favored in all the material things of life, are themselves the root of all the woes heaped upon them by wars and by power contests. Let me turn the spotlight on this country, for while I am not a stranger to other lands, I have spent most of my life here. Finally, the principle is universal. Only the details vary.

The great mass, you say, want only a few, simple things. During the recent war, those same simple people gouged and shoved, sweated and scowled, crowding to get all the cigarettes and nylons they could buy up. Others made it their boast that they could get all the gasoline coupons they wanted—and proved it by driving into town to shop of a morning; to get another pack of cigarettes after lunch; another drive to take a child to a matinee; and still more driving that evening. Then there were the hoarders

Our entire group is dedicated to acquiring more and more gadgets, and aside from the craze for an even "higher" standard of living, there is the competitive angle—outdoing the Joneses. All benefits are in terms of the material and external. A higher standard of *thinking* is never included even as an accessory. . . .

The highways are a slaughter house: because of greed for speed, greed for outdoing others, indifference to the rights of others. . . .From the local sporting page I gather that on the opening day of the deer season, the score was "One (man) killed, five shot and wounded, five lost and only one found; and scores arrested for carrying loaded rifles in their automobiles." (Check stations of the Mendocino and Los Padres National Forests reported more than 17,000 hunters for the opening week-end.) Let us for the sake of argument stipulate that the eating of meat is necessary, and that the killing of animals is necessary. Here, however, we have killing for the sport of killing, an entertainment so highly esteemed that the hunter spends extravagantly for a chance to kill. The space devoted to hunting and fishing, *as a sport*, by the big-circulation "slick" paper magazines testifies to our universal acceptance of the idea that killing is fun, a splendid recreation. That it is "sport," even though the "he man" is armed with a high-powered rifle and has telescopic sights as an aid to eliminating yet another uncertainty! The Masai custom of sending a teen-age male alone and armed with only a spear, either to bring back his first lion, or to remain and be eaten, has a certain soundness, even utility—and though hardly

designed as sport, does have what might be called a true sporting element.

Add it all together: our individual greeds, competitions, blind resentments, and our love of killing those who have not yet achieved the human state of evolution; raise it to the *nth* power; multiply it by as many millions as you wish—and what do you get but an international equivalent, in greed for power, and its servant, war?

We simple, everyday, common people wallow needlessly in a war psychology in our everyday dealings with each other, and with the lower, animal kingdoms. The dictators, the war-mongers, merely epitomize the group. We make our leaders—they do not make us. Individually, we do not have any "yearning to conquer the world for any ideology," but only few individuals have the imagination, the mental scope, to picture any such large-scale operation. But we, all these kindly, common people, added together, in thought and emotion, one infinitesimal shred after another, produce in the aggregate that very thing which we have.

The simple, kindly individuals want only the fruits of war, not the exertions and pains of war. They want to kill and compete for fun, but do not desire the inevitable reaction. This is unrealistic: the law of life and of action, however, has a realistic response—and by realism on the part of sufficient individuals, the response of the law could be changed to a sweeter operation.

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So, the "kindly, simple people" stand convicted of a lack of realism—they do not like war, but they like the things which make for war. To be just, however, we need to distinguish between direct responsibility and the guilt which grows out of ignorance. If the "little people" who are betrayed by men of greater talent, of more "imagination," would do the same if they could, they are nevertheless betrayed, and have the negative virtue of their limited capacity for evil.

The question of "guilt" for social and moral disaster is always more complex than it seems. After the European war broke out, Archibald MacLeish contributed to the *Nation* (for May 18, 1940) an article charging American intellectuals—writers, novelists, scholars—with neglect of their duty. He blamed the novelists for spreading disillusionment and condemned the scholars for disdaining to notice the great social and moral issues of the time. Whether or not one agrees with the end of the poet's passionate exhortation—in effect, a war to purge the world of the crimes of evil-doing men—the "treason of the intellectuals" has seldom been more forcefully described. Our men of letters, MacLeish insisted, unlike the learned of other times, have lost the stature of whole human beings. For the scholar of the past, "learning was no plump pigeon carcass to be picked at for his private pleasure and his private fame but a profession practiced for the common good. . . . Whatever struck at truth or closed off question or defiled an art or violated decency of thinking struck at him. And he struck back with every weapon masters of the word could find to strike with." Now come lines which deserve to be remembered:

> Milton defending freedom of the mind in sentences which outlive every name of those who struck at freedom. Voltaire displaying naked to the grin of history the tyrants who were great until he made them small, Bartholomew de las Casas gentling cruel priests and brutal captains with the dreadful strokes of truth—las Casas, Milton, and Voltaire were men of letters, men who confessed an obligation to defend the disciplines of thought not in their own but in the general interest.
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> Had men like these been living in our time, had the intellectuals of our time been whole and loyal, it would, I think have been impossible for the revolution of gangs to have succeeded where success has been most dangerous—in the perversion of judgments of the mind. Murder is not absolved of immorality by committing murder. Murder is absolved of immorality by bringing men to think that murder is not evil. This only the perversion of the mind can bring about. And the perversion of the mind is only possible when those who should be heard in its defense are silent.

> . . . intellectual responsibility has been divided in our time and by division destroyed. The men of intellectual duty, those who should have been responsible for action, have divided themselves into two castes, two cults—the scholars and the writers. Neither of these accepts responsibility for the common culture or for its defense, . . . The single responsibility, the wholeness of function of the man of letters, has been replaced by the divided function, the mutual antagonism, the isolated responsibility of two figures—the scholar and the writer.
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> Why this substitution has come about—whether because the methods of scientific inquiry, carried over into the humanities, destroyed the loyalties and habits of the mind or for some other reason—I leave to wiser men to say.

One more passage:

> The irresponsibility of the scholar is the irresponsibility of the scientist upon whose laboratory insulation he has patterned all his work. The scholar in letters has made himself as indifferent to values, as careless of significance, as bored with meanings as the chemist. He is a refugee from consequences, an exile from the responsibility of moral choice.... It is not for nothing that the modern scholar invented the Ph.D. thesis as his principal contribution to literary form. The Ph.D. thesis is the perfect image of his world. It is work done for the sake of doing work—perfectly conscientious, perfectly laborious, perfectly irresponsible.

We could easily enlarge the terrain of these moral barrens by passing to other critiques—of the church, of the politicians, of educators, of artists—but the point, we think, is clear enough. Whatever the intellectuals, the men with imagination, with "mental scope," ought to have done, they have not done it. As a class, they have largely sold out, whether to academic security, or to Hollywood and the *Saturday Evening Post.* Their sin is not particularly distinguishable from the sins of the rest of us, who acquire a measure of conceit at college, and get our relaxation at the movies or in a magazine. It is simply that they are capable of better things. And, fortunately, you cannot punish a man for not doing his best. One of the great secrets of being human is that you do your best, when you do it, not because anyone threatens you, or moralizes at you, or promises you a reward, but for strictly private reasons.

The fact remains, however, that the intellectuals have left our society a morally leaderless mass. Thus the "kindly, common people" are not entirely to blame, unless we subscribe to the superficially democratic dogma that men of capacity have no greater responsibility than others. If we argue that the rise of modern intellectuality, with its political expression in the secular state, marks a genuine stage of progress over older, authoritarian forms of social organization, then the leaders of this scheme of self-reliance have high obligations to fulfill. An aristocracy of some sort seems organically necessary to human society, whether or not we like the word, or whether or not we are interested in being a part of it. For thousands of years, human societies were ruled by aristocracies of blood and caste. After the Renaissance, another sort of elite was called for to assume, not "rule," but a larger sense of responsibility. Milton, las Casas, and Voltaire are MacLeish's examples of men who accepted this responsibility. Ortega y Gasset implies the need for more such men, showing, in his *Revolt of the Masses,* what happens when the habits and aims of mediocrity become the model of human good. Among the ancients, Plato seemed to grasp this principle when he proposed that only men who shrank from power should be allowed to become Philosopher-Kings.

What has been lost is the conception of the role of the intelligent individual in the human community. How has it been lost? Through, perhaps, as MacLeish suggests, the transfer of the methods of science to the humanities; through, perhaps, the slow but persistent identification of virtue with wealth, in consequence of the perversion of religion; and, finally, through the dying out of the sense of the heroic, as a result of the contempt for transcendental philosophy, and the popularity of mechanistic explanations of the world and of human behavior.

To look out on the modern world may excite our disgust, but there is also occasion for pity—a feeling of sadness which includes a sympathy for ourselves, as among the victims of this great cycle of disillusionment. Perhaps we don't hunt deer, personally, or seek pleasure in the peculiar forms of emptiness which are taken by the "bread and circuses" of the twentieth century, but our friends, our children, and even ourselves are periodically caught in the whirl of senseless motion, made to drink the dregs of a brew of endlessly advertised monotony.

We can find no other meaning in all this save that we have to learn to save ourselves. We have to establish islands of intelligent living—oases, as Arthur Koestler once suggested, in the desert of the world as we know it. There is as little point in looking for leaders and saviors as for scapegoats and devils to blame. As the mechanics of the world community grows into one system, so the evil and the good are uniformly distributed. It is becoming too costly to search out and destroy the Evil Men—too costly to ourselves. Further, it becomes increasingly difficult for "normal" people to harbor the delusion that some men are evil, others good. Perhaps we have reached the place where we can accept the Evil Men theory of our troubles only by giving up our sanity.

We may look around for leaders, but we find only little men—men who, while inviting the confidence of the people and asking to be placed in high office, can think of little more to say than to criticize each other—as though the problems of the world turned upon such petty fallibilities. If there are any great men about, these days, they are not, we think, trying to be "leaders" according to accustomed patterns. There must be changes in our private ways of living and our ways of thinking, and it will take great men to discover what they are. These changes are only remotely connected with politics—only remotely connected with any of the familiar institutions of our society. They go back to the roots of our lives—back to what men think about when they wake in the morning, planning the day; back to what they think about as they watch their children; back to the things upon which men's hearts are set. We cannot, perhaps, gird ourselves in armor and go out into the field to defeat the disaster of our time, for wherever we go, we carry the disaster with us. But we can, perhaps, outgrow it. The death of a salesman might not seem so tragic, if, through it, there might come about the birth of a man.

Letter from **JAPAN**

TOKYO.—With the sudden dissolution of the Japanese National Diet on Aug. 28, the Japanese people found themselves in the midst of a heated election campaign with the pay-off slated for Oct. 1. And when the people troop to the polls on that day, great international issues which go far beyond mere domestic interest will be settled.

Two of the most significant questions which will be answered are whether or not Japan will continue her present pro-American policies, and whether or not she will embark upon a serious program of rearmament. The two issues are, of course, closely interrelated, for the pro-American political parties are the ones which have come out for the nation's remilitarization, while the anti-American, pro-Soviet groups are vigorously opposing rearmament.

Judged purely on the basis of these two issues, the various political parties stack up roughly in the following way:

The Liberal Party, majority party for the past three and a half years, is definitely pro-American, but favors a go-slow rearmament policy which will be in keeping with the nation's economic capacity. It has, however, actually launched a remilitarization program for all practical purposes, since security costs took up 21 per cent of the current fiscal budget.

The "Hatoyama" faction of the Liberal Party (led by former party leader Ichiro Hatoyama, who was purged on the eve of his nomination to the prime ministership six years ago) is generally pro-American—although some bitterness remains over the SCAP purge—and is a strong advocate of immediate rearmament.

The Democratic Party, the second largest party, stresses close relations with Southeast Asia and less dependence upon the United States, and also demands immediate and forthright remilitarization for defense.

The Socialist Party's right wing, established following the breakup of the Social Democratic Party in the aftermath of the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty, is not completely unfriendly—but is cool—to the United States, preferring a neutral course for Japan, and while recognizing the need for self-defense, it is unwilling to sacrifice living standards for rearmament.

The Socialist Party's left wing favors "absolute neutrality" and is anti-American, seeing eye-to-eye with the Communists on many points; it is totally opposed to any remilitarization whatsoever.

The Communist Party is violently anti-American and anti-rearmament.

As the first election since Japan regained her national independence, the October balloting will enable the Japanese people for the first time in the postwar period to voice their true opinions at the polls. It would, however, not be entirely true to say that the coming election will be a test of Japan's democratization. Democracy will have little to do with the actual issues at stake. Powerful forces will be at work—through political leaders—to better their position in the global "cold war."

Actually, there is still confusion in Japanese minds over the sudden change in American policy midway in the Occupation. The first few years of the Occupation can best be characterized by the fact that the American authorities gave Japan the world's first "war renunciation" Constitution. The awakening to the Communist menace—brought into the limelight by the Red conquest of continental China—changed the picture completely and the subsequent Occupation policy began to give tacit approval in increasing degrees to Japanese remilitarization. The Korean war gave this move a further boost. The American stand at the time the Occupation ended can best be described by the fact that the Japanese Peace Treaty placed no restrictions upon Japan's possession of arms and that the U.S.-Japan

Security Treaty provided for basing American troops in Japan until the Japanese people are able to defend themselves.

The fears held by the United States and other nations of the Western camp over the growing influence and power of the Communist regimes are undoubtedly being transposed here. Japan has historically feared Russia. And for all of the unpleasantness which inevitably accompanies any military occupation, the Japanese people on the whole are friendly to the United States. But it is equally clear that the majority of the people are strongly opposed to war. The undercurrent toward rearmament, however, is running strong and becoming deeper. Many Japanese thus see danger here, for the line between rearmament and war seems extremely thin.

We have never heard of anyone arming for aggressive war; it is always for national defense. And there is always an urgency about remilitarizing. And there is no limit to the extent of armament necessary for self-defense.

Unfortunately, the memory of men is extremely short. The seventh anniversary of the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was observed last month, and numerous ghastly photographs of the effects of that terrible weapon of war were made public for the first time by a few enterprising publishing firms. The photographs were so horrible that it made many a viewer sick to the pit of his stomach. But Japan is gradually taking up arms once again. Must history forever repeat itself—and with increased ferocity?

An arms race is on and Japan is surely being drawn in. Even the Communists who so piously oppose rearmament want disarmament for everyone but themselves.

JAPANESE CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

HOW TO APPRECIATE MR. FAULKNER

WHILE literary professionals have formed the habit of according William Faulkner front-rank status in contemporary literature, we are sure that ordinary readers not belonging to the literati may at times have great difficulty in understanding why, and even considerable difficulty in understanding Mr. Faulkner. But though we—not of the literati—are as inclined to believe the literary critics wrong as to believe them right, in the case of Mr. Faulkner, we think, there is a good deal to warrant agreement.

While some of Faulkner's stories are extraordinarily depressing, even macabre, others soar to idealistic peaks, though sometimes in strange metaphor. Both Christ and anti-Christ are encompassed in surprising and original fashion—his last novel, *Soldier's Pay*, illustrating the former, and an earlier work, *Sanctuary*, gruesomely dissecting the latter. Faulkner cannot help but upset simplicities of mind, whatever he writes about. *Soldier's Pay*, which could so easily have been a mere expedition through the mire of human confusion and degradation, concerns some of the highest qualities of which men and women are capable. The evil in this tale is vanquished by great goodness. Faulkner respects and loves men in travail; he sees the best in them, but despises the complacency of familiar standards and the perverted motivations which easily flower in a culture devoted to triviality. One reviewer has noted Faulkner's "preoccupation with the theme of death." This interest, perhaps, grows from the fact that death, at least, is never trivial, and that, in the presence of death, human actions and thoughts often rise above the dull average.

In Faulkner's *Wild Palms*, his tendency to depict the strength of men pitted against impossible hardship and misery is especially apparent. The convict who lives through an incredible saga of survival in the teeth of a giant Mississippi flood, working his body far past exhaustion to save and return the little rescue boat he was asked to row—in circumstances giving a miraculous opportunity for freedom—symbolizes how the simplest of men may have the greatest integrity. The governor and the prison board, however, have forgotten all about this—just as they had forgotten about the convict after declaring him officially dead when he disappeared in the swirling waters. So, when he returns with the boat, they give him ten additional years for "attempted escape," since they can't figure out any other way to enter the matter on the books.

We found ourselves encouraged to discuss Mr. Faulkner after reading a reviewer's comment on the two other leading characters in *Wild Palms.* The young doctor, it is said, is "caught in a passion which borders on madness," carrying him to "complete disintegration." Even we know better than this. Faulkner's doctor is an extremely sensitive, morally balanced man, and remains so, essentially, until the end. Faulkner has given us an impressionistic sketch of one phase of this person's psychological universe, and would, we think, feel that no man need be ashamed of similar behavior under similar stress. Nor can Faulkner be legitimately accused of unrelieved grimness. In both *Intruder in the Dust* and *Knight's Gambit* are men both good and true by nature. *Knight's Gambit* is Faulkner's answer to the detective story—and not a bad answer, for one learns more than a little psychology while following the intricacies of crime detection and courtroom trial. *Intruder in the Dust*, written by a southerner, is profoundly illuminating on the "race" subject, leaving the reader with much to think about, but with no oversimplified dramatic situations. In other words, Mr. Faulkner is a man of conscience as well as of sensibility, yet a moralist who never flourishes the usual credentials of the moralist's profession.

These scattered notes serve principally as introduction to portions of a speech delivered by Mr. Faulkner in accepting the Nobel prize in literature for 1950. It is pleasing to have an

author interpret what he is trying to do in his fiction, and gratifying to hear such thoughts as the following—with a becoming humility to match:

> I feel that this award was not made to me as a man, but to my work—a life's work in the agony and sweat of the human spirit, not for glory and least of all for profit, but to create out of the materials of the human spirit something which did not exist before. So this award is only mine in trust. It will not be difficult to find a dedication for the money part of it commensurate with the purpose and significance of its origin. But I would like to do the same with the acclaim too, by using this moment as a pinnacle from which I might be listened to by the young men and women already dedicated to the same anguish and travail, among whom is already that one who will someday stand here where I am standing.
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> Our tragedy today is a general and universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up? Because of this, the young man or woman writing today has forgotten the problems of the human heart in conflict with itself which alone can make good writing because only that is worth writing about, worth the agony and the sweat.
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> He must learn them again. He must teach himself that the basest of all things is to be afraid; and, teaching himself that, forget it forever, leaving no room in his workshop for anything but the old verities and truths of the heart, the old universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion and sacrifice. Until he does so, he labors under a curse. He writes not of love but of lust, of defeats in which nobody loses anything of value, of victories without hope and, worst of all, without pity or compassion. His griefs grieve on no universal bones, leaving no scars. He writes not of the heart but of the glands.
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> Until he relearns these things, he will write as though he stood among and watched the end of man. I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure: that when the last ding-dong of doom has clanged and faded from the last worthless rock hanging tideless in the last red and dying evening, that even then there will still be one more sound: that of his puny inexhaustible voice, still talking. I refuse to accept this. I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail. He is immortal, not because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice, but because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance. The poet's, the writer's, duty is to write about these things. It is his privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honor and hope and pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past. The poet's voice need not merely be the record of man, it can be one of the props, the pillars to help him endure and prevail.

COMMENTARY
A LEADING AUTHORITY

BROCK CHISHOLM, Director-General of the World Health Organization of the United Nations, is a psychiatrist of international reputation whose public pronouncements reflect an impressive store of practical, clinical experience. For those who may regard with suspicion the professional authority of the psychologists quoted this week in Frontiers, we suggest a reading of the material collected from Dr. Chisholm's writings under the title, "World Health and the Survival of the Human Race," for use by study groups. While Dr. Chisholm does not say exactly the same things as Drs. Gladstone and Kelman, the similarity of their basic contentions is too striking to be ignored.

The following passages by Dr. Chisholm, taken from various sources will illustrate:

> We are the kind of people who have got the world into the mess it is now in. We are the kind of people, as all our ancestors have been, who fight each other enthusiastically every 15 or 20 years. . . .Until quite recently the fact was of relatively little importance. When people used to fight each other ordinarily only a few thousand or occasionally a few million people were killed. Times have changed. . . .The new and efficient methods of killing . . . have produced a situation where . . . it is quite clear now that warfare and suicide are synonymous terms.

> Can we identify the reasons why we fight wars . . . ? Many of them are easy to list—prejudice isolationism, the ability emotionally and uncritically to believe unreasonable things, excessive desire for material wealth or power, excessive fear of others, belief in a destiny to control others, vengeance, ability to avoid seeing and facing unpleasant facts and taking appropriate action. These are probably the main reasons. . . . all well-known and-recognized neurotic symptoms. The only normal motive is self-defense to protect ourselves from aggression, but surely we should be able to see the aggression coming long before it breaks out in warfare, and take appropriate action to satisfy or suppress it. Even self-defense may involve a neurotic action when it means defending one's own excessive material wealth from others who are in great need. . . .

What must be done? Here, as elsewhere, Dr. Chisholm is unequivocal:

> . . . the world must have, and soon, large numbers of people in every country who have grown emotionally beyond national boundaries and are sufficiently mature to be capable of being "world citizens." Up until now very few people indeed in any country have really developed emotionally even to a truly national degree of maturity. Such development to a national level requires an equal degree of concern for the welfare of *all* kinds of people within the nation, irrespective of color, racial origin, religion, education, social or economic group, or even political party. Few people have reached this stage of development and yet only through this stage is it possible to develop to a degree of maturity in which there is a "belonging" feeling in relation to all peoples and an equal concern for the welfare of all of them. Very few such people have been developed, but it is clear that they are the prototype of what the world must have, in large numbers, before there can be any reasonable degree of assurance that the human race will survive for even another generation.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

[This discussion of "Teacher-Pupil Rapport" is comprised of portions of a paper prepared by an experienced public school teacher engaged in graduate study in administration. Readers will appreciate its treatment of the parent-child relationship in the home, as well as the teacher-pupil relationship at school. Because the language is simple and "non-technical," it may serve as a basis for further discussion in these columns.]

THE problem of teacher-pupil rapport, what it is, how it can be established, and how it affects learning, has been brought sharply into focus recently because it has been necessary to give unofficial suggestions and counsel to teachers and prospective teachers concerning their inability to "reach" their classes. How best may we help young people who expect to teach, or even experienced teachers, to feel the satisfaction of having really awakened the minds of the pupils in their charge? Every teacher knows that there have been times when mutual harmony existed between himself and his class, or the individuals in the class, and other times when there was nothing. Very few, if any, writers in the field of education are willing to point to teacher-pupil rapport as a thing real in itself. All of them list teacher qualifications, and stress that of teacher "personality" in one way or another; but they do not suggest that such a harmonious bond between pupil and teacher is a tangible, palpable reality. This may be due to the fact that such an admission approaches metaphysics, dealing as it does with what is unseen, and certainly beyond the realm of the five senses. Yet everyone has felt, as a result of his own common experiences, that very real pull of rapport between himself and others. He knows when the bond is broken, or when it is established.

The word "communication" is used to identify this bond. Perhaps we could be more exact if we defined rapport as the *line* of communication. The electrical current that carries messages over the wires is the invisible line of communication. We might compare the wires themselves, the instruments of reception (telegraph or telephone) to the words which one person speaks to another. After much observation of classroom "communication," and discussion with several experts in education, the conclusion has been reached, that rapport is not necessarily the result of good teaching methods, class control, or even excellent teacher qualifications. Some or all of these may be evident in the classroom, yet rapport may, or may not, exist. To paraphrase one eminent educator: rapport is not the sum of a large number of discrete elements; it is a functioning whole. That is to say, it comes about as a result of the "valence" of two human beings. Any number of positive characteristics within the situation or the individuals involved may be catalytic agents. But in themselves these characteristics do not add up to rapport—it is not their total.

The complete picture may be described thus: Whenever the human consciousness perceives, through the mind, a quality or interplay of qualities in another human being which is *identical* to that within its own vehicles, it reaches out by means of a positive personality trait. If there is a similar reaction in the other individual, a harmonious vibration is set up between the two. We call this rapport. The "vehicles" are the body, the emotional nature and the mind. Thus rapport may have its inception on the physical plane, *i.e.*, the mother and infant. Psychologists and doctors have begun to realize that a child's sense of security and balanced outlook may begin the first day of mother-child contact. For this reason they have arranged in many hospitals for the baby to be with the mother from the moment of birth. Rapport may begin on the emotional plane, when two people perceive in each other a similar emotional reaction. Or it may begin on the plane of mind, when one perceives the extension or identity of his own ideas in the thinking of another. The positive personality traits are the antennae which reach out to another. When two

individuals "reach out" at the same time, rapport is established. The higher the plane upon which identity is perceived, the higher will be the level of rapport. And the higher the plane on which rapport is established, the less evidence there may be of it in physical action or emotional expression.

We come now to the pupil and the teacher. The pupil, if he is a child, is not aware that any such bond can be established. He certainly does feel it, perhaps with parents, siblings, friends, or teacher. But as far as he knows it is merely the way he "gets along" with these others. The teacher on the other hand, knows that rapport may be established. Further than that, the teacher hopes that he, by conscious effort, can bring it about. If the teacher were dealing with another adult, he might expect that other to go "half-way" in establishing the bond. But with a child he cannot expect this. The teacher must go almost all the way himself. This does not mean that the teacher is necessarily going to *do* a great many things. He is not going to suddenly turn on all his positive personality traits like so many full-running faucets and deluge the child with "charm, graciousness, courtesy, interest, companionship," and the like. In fact, the teacher's actions and evidences of traits may be only a small part of the consciously planned process of building rapport. Right here is where we have made our mistake in supposing that, if the teacher is a vital, well-adjusted person, he will surely be able to arouse respect and admiration in every child. We have tried to show that rapport goes much deeper than this. The first step for the teacher is—observation of the child—*thorough* observation, not just of his actions, but of his mind and "heart." This includes *really* listening to what the child says, and trying honestly to understand the child's ideals, perceptions, and the meaning of his personality traits. The second step is—to analyze what ideal, thought, or feeling can be found in himself which is identical to some thought or feeling in the child. The third step is—to indicate to the child by word, gesture, or the absence of these, this identity between the two of them.

But if the teacher expects to arouse in the child this sort of response, the teacher must learn to correct or criticize, not the child, but only his actions. The teacher must bring about a situation in which he and the child are both viewing the action together, considering it objectively and with discrimination. There is no blame to be attached to the child as a person; the child himself has not disturbed the teacher, but his actions have resulted in trouble.

Much has been said about the teacher who is inconsistent, or unjust. Every child senses this as a form of dishonesty. It arouses only negative response in him, because his own higher mind causes him to expect justice. He will find fault immediately with the teacher who is unfair. And once he finds fault, the magic spell is broken—rapport is gone. Rapport, according to definition, is an intimate, harmonious relation. We will go farther and say that it is a magnetic tie. It is real. It can be established immediately, or built up slowly. It can be destroyed in an instant, or slowly dissolved. Without it a teacher may struggle for hours, using the best teaching techniques, and the best human relations techniques, without enlightening the child's mind. With it, he may, with a word or two, or a simple gesture, open up a new world of wisdom for his pupil. An osmosis takes place through this magnetic tie, so that the pupil is enlightened by the teacher. Without rapport, the finest of equipment and supplies, the most visionary curriculum, the ultimate in teaching skills, will go for naught.

FRONTIERS

The Proposition Is Peace

THOSE who read at all in the literature of modern psychology, especially educational psychology, are likely to have wondered, as we have wondered, whether these writers will ever get around to an analysis of Nationalism, or even a critical discussion of the foreign policy of the United States. The major powers often seem to adopt policies and to strike attitudes in relation to other nations which break *all* the rules that the psychologists declare must be obeyed in order to have good human relations. We ask, therefore, can the educational principles based on modern psychological studies ever be applied in politics, or are we to regard suggestions of this sort as either premature, unpatriotic, or both?

Interestingly enough, two professional psychologists raised this question more than a year ago in the correspondence columns of the April, 1951 *American Psychologist,* organ of the American Psychological Association. The fact that the writers are also pacifists may help to explain their daring although it does not, so far as we can see, diminish the force of their logic. These psychologists, Arthur I. Gladstone and Herbert C. Kelman, of New Haven, Connecticut, set the issue in four general propositions. Noting, to begin with, that the aim of the foreign policy of the United States is, "presumably, the preservation of peace," and that this policy "is based, among other things, on certain assumptions about human behavior," they start out with a consideration of the Frustration-Aggression relationship:

> It is a truism that aggressive people are frustrated people. To reduce aggressive tendencies you must reduce frustrations. If aggression is met by counter-aggression, the action serves as an additional frustration and increases the aggressive tensions. So the aggression may increase on both sides until one or both opponents are worn out. We know no instances, in history books or in psychological case-books, in which force or the threat of force has frightened the aggressive tendencies out of an individual or group (although the mode of expression may have been somewhat changed). So argue the pacifists. U. S. national policy depends on certain assumptions concerning the effects of threats and force on human behavior. If these assumptions are wrong, a worldwide catastrophe is likely to occur. . . .

A fairly clear case of national frustration is found in the situation of the Japanese people in, say, 1936, and doubtless before. In that year, the Harvard University Press issued *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy, by* Albert E. Hindmarsh, presenting the results of a detailed investigation of Japan's economic problems. Prof. Hindmarsh ended his book with these words:

> Japan's case . . . seems . . . sufficiently real to secure support from the masses of the nation and her intelligent leaders. It is well to know that there is some basis for her claims and that the expansive policies appeal to so many Japanese as the only alternative to "starving to death in their own backyards." Only in that realization can we appreciate the motives and motivating forces of Japanese policy and pretend to know whence it moves. To cry for peace and ignore the actualities of international relations is to court disillusionment and loss of faith in the possibilities of world order. . . .For the United States, the beginning of wisdom in the determination of our Far Eastern policy lies in an honest appraisal of the realities which Japanese statesmen must face.

Apparently, one need not be a psychologist to grasp the reality of the Frustration-Aggression relationship. While observations of this sort will doubtless arouse bristling questions and suspicions in some readers, along with angry murmurs about Pearl Harbor, no amount of righteous indignation can alter the facts. Nor the Frustration-Aggression situation. Not even a major war can do very much to alter a situation which arises from basic economic problems.

For example, turning to the Sept. 10 issue of *U.S. News & World Report,* we find an article, "Free Japan: A U.S. Headache," in which the principal disclosures are that Japan has too many people, too little food, and too few jobs. This island country, which had sixty-eight million people in 1936, seventy-two million on V-J Day, has eighty-five million people, now—and will have an estimated population of ninety-two million in 1960—is in exactly the same difficulties it was in twelve or fifteen years ago, except that the difficulties are greater. As *U.S. News* puts it:

> Officials working with the problem regard it as the most dangerous element in a country that is relied upon by the U.S. as a friendly outpost of Western defenses in Asia. Overpopulation was the pretext of Japan's seizure of Manchuria and for attempts to

> conquer vast chunks of Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Now Japan—stripped of its outlying possessions after World War II—is a much smaller country with millions more people.
>
> Against this background is the recent remark of a Japanese industrialist in Osaka: 'We will not starve quietly."

A reader of the *U.S. News* article who is acquainted with the facts in Hindmarsh's book might remark, laconically, "This is where I came in," and do his best to get away from it all.

The second proposition of the psychologists takes note of the fact that people react to situations as they see and understand them, not as the situations "really are." Gladstone and Kelman put it this way:

> In the present situation, it does not matter whether we are objectively threatening the welfare of the Chinese or Russians. The fact that they perceive us as doing so is the important thing. While we may intend our military preparations to be used for defensive purposes, these preparations may be quite honestly viewed as a threat by the communists and so they react with counter threats. If we wish to avoid war with them, we must seek to understand how they see things and strive to make our actions seem non-threatening to them. So argue the pacifists. An attempt to appear less threatening is likely to be decried as "appeasement." What have psychologists to say about the pros and cons?

This seems a reasonable analysis, but it ruffled the feathers of several psychologists who replied in a later issue of the *American Psychologist.* One implied that for the U.S. to look "less threatening" would be to distort reality for Far Eastern observers!

The third proposition deals with the therapeutic approach. The argument is that people who resort to violence are psychologically disturbed. No good psychotherapist allows himself to "aggravate" a disturbed patient. So—

> If the "patient" is a national or political group we may use persuasion, economic sanctions, social ostracism, non-cooperation; in short, the methods of non-violent resistance. To use violence would be to defeat our own purposes. Favorable change requires benign and permissive conditions.

This presents obvious rhetorical difficulties, with more rumblings about Pearl Harbor to be expected. However, we don't know of many pacifists who claim to offer a panacea which can be applied at the last minute before a war starts, or the first minute after it has started. The pacifist point, here, seems to be that peace, if we are ever to have it, is worth a long-term effort in this direction.

The fourth proposition discusses the danger of habituation to war:

> Training and experience in the techniques of mass murder which comprise modern warfare are bound to have unfortunate effects on the participants. Callousness at bloodshed and violence, stimulation of hate, deterioration through disuse of the habits of peaceful living seem likely to result. . . The widespread adoption of authoritarian patterns which total war requires in civilian activities as well as in the military organization is also bound to have unfortunate effects. Habituation to taking orders, suppression (to a large extent) of the practice of free inquiry (because of the dangers of subversive thought and disunity), placing military expediency above all other values, a tremendous increase in control from above with a corresponding reduction in democratic participation in decision-making, are all likely results. In attempting to defeat the opponent through military means the U.S. seems forced to adopt the measures of totalitarianism which it opposes so strongly. Once we build up these habit patterns it will be tremendously difficult to break them and we may find ourselves unable to do so.

Most of the arguments presented by Drs. Gladstone and Kelman are far from being original with pacifists. So far as we can see, they represent plain common sense, although the application of this sense may threaten to create insoluble dilemmas. It is just possible, however, that we should be glad to live in an age in which the moral issues of group relations are so sharp as to compel us to face and resolve these dilemmas, either singly or in groups. It is just possible, also, that acts of clear moral decision are more important than any sort of national survival. Some very great men have adopted this view.