VOLUME VI, NO. 51
DECEMBER 23, 1953

ELEMENTS OF HAPPINESS

SO far as we can see, the number of people who can be said to be really happy is surprisingly small. Children, perhaps, are often happy, and occasionally one finds a family whose members, without thinking much about it, seem to have hit upon the secret, but the great majority of people you run into appear to be browbeaten by the world, or angry with their fellows, or pursued by some breed of Furies which will not let them alone. The cities are filled with hungry and melancholy faces. A ride in the subway or on a street car, anywhere, any time, serves as a tour of the ever-present exhibit of human sadness and disappointment. Perhaps we should say only "disappointment," for "sadness" has a dignity in its reflective acceptance of sorrow, and the tired faces we are talking about rather bear only the telltale lines of defeat and apathy.

Yet, if you are led to wonder about the meaning or character of happiness, and start looking for discussions or explanations of what this elusive feeling is, you discover a great paucity of information on the subject. There is plenty, of course, to urge you to be happy, and the advertisements and popular magazines are filled with promises of happiness delivered to your door along with the purchase of anything from a garbage disposal unit to a Cadillac, but they don't tell you what happiness is. If you go to the library, you will doubtless find books on the subject, and perhaps some light, although we suspect that the best investigations will turn up in classical sources, and be a bit puzzling for this reason.

Thinking it over, we have come to the conclusion that an account of happiness which isn't puzzling, or does not at least take leave of the reader before he has found the answer, is of very little value. For happiness, we are sure, is a by-product of something else which is even more difficult to define. It is, so to say, an aspect of the "tone" of a person's life. Recalling the handful of people we know who might properly be termed "happy," and thinking about their lives, the thing that impresses us most is the lack of anything tangible these people have in common. Apart from children, who have a special sort of joy in life, the happiness we are talking about seems to be a kind of "stability" in relation to events, and to result from a lifetime of growth toward that stability. Perhaps this sort of happiness is little more than what we usually call contentment, and you can't be exhilaratingly "happy" all the time.

We are thinking, at the moment, of a woman who is the mother of an almost unbelievable number of children. She hasn't done "big things" with her life, yet she is happy. "But I'm too *busy* to have a lot of children," some candidate for happiness may exclaim. That's not the point. The point is rather that a happy person invariably feels that his life is worth living. He cannot, therefore, feel cheated by nature, or suffer invasion from the propaganda of those who propose to *make* him happy at a price. A happy person, then, is always someone who is practicing what other people preach. The difficulty of carrying our definition much further now becomes quite evident, for if you ask a happy person to explain why he is happy, he will probably get a little bewildered, feel around for some simple expression which, when uttered, will sound like the platitude of the ages, or refuse to discuss the subject at all. The reason, we think, our definitions are inadequate in connection with happiness is that even after you decide that happiness is a slow growth in mind and heart, you still can't give the rules for being happy, the way you would for gardening or muscle-building. The elements which support muscle-building or horticulture are constants—they don't change very much, and they can be described—but the attainment of happiness lies in an entirely different category of achievement.

In the first place, you can set out to build a muscle or grow a plant, but you can't "set out" to gain happiness—not, and reach it that way. Happiness is rather the mood in which a man responds to the experiences of life. We should like, of course, to argue that the way a man responds to life depends on the theory of life he has adopted. This would reduce the problem to a few, terse syllogisms. The fact is, however, that the people with the finest theories often seem the unhappiest of all. Or rather, we should say that they are unhappy until they learn to practice their theories by instinct instead of by painfully self-conscious effort. Here, it might be helpful to suggest that happy people live *as if* they had fine theories to apply, and do have them, in some way or other, even

though they are seldom able to explain them. The difficulty lies in trying to put a feeling into words. Usually, words impale feelings like dead butterflies upon a collector's board. That is why we need the poets and the philosophers who write in allegory. Such men seem better able than the rest of us to keep feelings alive while putting them into words.

But since there has to be a theory, somewhere, behind the experience of happiness, we have one to offer. It is that happiness results whenever a human being feels that he is somehow participating in the meaning of life. If he doesn't in some way or other reach after the meaning of life, he can't be happy. The woman who brought up all those children wasn't happy because she had a lot of children, but because, through her, a number of conscious beings were set going upon their several pilgrimages of discovery—most of all, of self-discovery. There is something about the flash of outgoing understanding in a human being which defies all formulas of thought, all expressions of meaning. That flash is *meaning itself.* All the world is made richer by a single act of understanding. New sinews come into being in the invisible world of consciousness in this way. Keats said—

> Or like stout Cortez, when with eagle eye
> He star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
> Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
> Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

The flash of understanding is the wild surmise which declares, in principle, the nature of man. It looses the floodgates of happiness, makes, for the moment, all things new.

There are thousands upon thousands of ways in which men may contribute to this process, hence thousands upon thousands of paths to happiness. Any man who works at things he values, and which will in turn be valued by other men, will have opportunity for happiness. The farmer who cherishes the produce of the land, the craftsman who fabricates the materials of earth and forest, the engineer who constructs, the architect who plans—all men who contribute to the needs of their fellows, and therefore to the abundance of life, can be happy.

Decay and sorrow come only when a man goes through the motions of a contribution without really caring about the meaning of what he is doing—without seeing the relation of his work to the needs of the world. The man who works only for money cannot be happy. The man who looks at the world and its riches simply as things for him to acquire can never experience the joy of giving to the world, and feeling, therefore, the abundance of life grow under his hand. Such a man is a heretic, a miserable unbeliever who denies the vast unity and interdependence of living and thinking beings.

The problem, however, is much more complicated than this would suggest. We live our own lives in some measure, but we also live in the lives of others, and they in ours. We are not really free, except in principle. The men of our time, for example, were born into a social structure which bends their energies and interests in certain well-marked directions. Elaborate social and economic patterns seize the young and mold them into units of an acquisitive society. The child is very early cast as a "consumer" in the play of modern life. Even the infant is a target, through the susceptibilities of the parents to claims that the health and happiness of their babies depend upon a great host of new and specialized acquisitions. Happiness, by implication, is continually being defined in terms of goods and services. Only the most determined of families can resist the infection of all this penetrating doctrine of pseudo-security.

It is no small wonder that adults are like little children in their forlorn search for happiness. Happiness, they come to suspect, comes from forgetfulness of one's pains and disappointments. So, for happiness, they tend to apply the formula which works very well in the nursery, but poorly in adult life. They try to "change the subject," or "distract the attention." Note the trend in technology-sponsored types of entertainment—from radio to television, both methods of reaching into the lives of people in their homes and providing them with the means to stop their thinking, to fill the foreground of their minds with auditory and visual impressions which will block off memory of failure, frustration, and unhappiness. The impressions, for the most part, are cheap and shoddy, although they need not be, but in a world which is in vain pursuit of happiness as a thing-in-itself, we could hardly expect the popular to be the genuine. What chance has the genuine of being understood?

Every great modern revolution has sounded a note of rejection of these artificialities. Even the Nazi revolution, brutally insane as it was, expressed

contempt for middle-class acquisitiveness, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out. But these revolutions have not been able to put new ideals in the place of the familiar goals of an acquisitive society. They have been, more than anything else, revolutions "against." The kind of revolutions we know of from experience are not able to supply an inner structure of meaning to our lives; hence, they fail to change anything except the outward circumstances, and, after a generation or so, the circumstances seem pretty much the same.

We have, then, two problems: the establishment of an attitude toward life which takes pleasure in activities necessary to the common good, and the gradual re-creation of the social pattern and its influence on the young. It should be evident that if we can stop longing for happiness, stop teaching our children wrong ideas about happiness, and turn our attention to an interest in the work we have to do, not caring how much we can "sell" our work for, but only that we do it well, the happiness will come of itself.

Concerning "work," there is a further consideration. Sometimes a man outgrows his work. He comes to a point where he has made the best possible piano, or engineered the most efficient tractor, or composed the most beautiful song. While it is true that something "better" is always conceivable, this man has done the best his times will allow, and is now ready to work in another medium. Some lines of activity come closer to the heart of things than others. A teacher, for example, has an almost sacred calling. A man may work well with inanimate materials, yet find himself incompetent in relation to the activities of living minds. Here he may find a new work to do, mostly work on himself, at first. A man who sets out to be a teacher ought to be very sure that his choice of a profession is not a piece of arrogance. Does he hunger after the mysteries of human nature with an ardor sufficient to overcome the countless disappointments and small and large betrayals which the teacher must suffer, as a natural part of his calling? Has he the patience, the faith in man, to be a teacher? If not, he had better remain a worker with more "reliable" materials.

The graduation of man from one type of work to another, ending in, as the highest sort of work, teaching's labor of love, was doubtless the natural law behind the ancient Hindu concept of caste which, in its perversion, became the most reactionary social system in the world. There seems to be no safe or sure way to systematize the relationship of human beings to their work, nor to guarantee their happiness. Rather it is a part of the natural order of things for men to discover these things for themselves.

Letter from **CHILE**

SANTIAGO.—Here, I should like to say something about the outlook of the new generation of Latin-Americans. Though there is a danger in generalization, I believe there is one common feature that appears, more or less distinctly, behind the different sorts of nationalism existing in South America. This is the common desire of our people for economic independence. (It is granted, of course, that this and political independence are always intimately related.) The first step toward economic independence should undoubtedly be the progressive nationalization of our mines and other natural resources, and the distribution of our land according to a plan of land reform which considers that the land belongs to the tiller. Such reform would be a means of giving our starving and exploited peasants a minimum decent standard of living. Progressive development of economic independence should also include the integration of the economies of the twenty South American republics on the basis of mutual self-sufficiency, as nature has generously distributed its products in the different zones and climates of our continent. It was said by Simon Bolivar, our great liberator, that "America will be free only when she is united."

This subject obviously calls for a more thorough study than is possible here. It is important to state, however, that this emancipating tendency, increasing in our countries, makes us firmly united with similar movements of independence arising in other continents such as Asia and Africa. In fact, these various movements are only a common expression of what someone has referred to as "the alliance of the people that eat rice." It is also an alliance which goes deeper than a common political and economic background.

Many people all over the world, observing the characteristics of Western civilization and life in the United States and in the Soviet Union, have concluded that in spite of the very important differences that exist between them, they have, as leading exponents of the Industrial Revolution, many things in common. In both the State is highly centralized, and this has created small political or economic groups who control power; the common men in this hierarchical structure of society feel isolated and far from being able to control the power of the state, and this tends to make of them merely passive elements. Both civilizations speak in terms of large-scale projects and standardization, of efficiency much more than morality; and even culture is understood merely in terms of mass-culture controlled by the State. The American radio programmes insist on persuading us to live according to the "American way of life," and while we don't know very much about the Russian "way," many people suspect that both American and Soviet civilizations emphasize quantitative rather than qualitative values. While we of South America cannot escape the consequences of the Industrial Revolution, we perhaps are in a position to avoid some of its evils.

It is difficult to say which cultural elements should be encouraged, as we evolve the form of democracy that will finally emerge as a consequence of our economic independence. They will undoubtedly have something of the mark of our indigenous culture, though little is yet known about our pre-columbian civilizations, apart from the great historical and architectural treasures they have left us. But a few of the indigenous agricultural communities have been able to resist the ravages of time, and may be found in both Bolivia and Peru. There is an element of permanence and stability in all agrarian civilizations; India and China are a good example. Perhaps their stability lies in the importance they gave to small communities, where the human being remains closer to nature and where life in small groups allows him to develop a greater social awareness and a deeper appreciation of creative values. This, as well as a reasonably balanced agro-industrial economy, would certainly help us in Latin America to build a new society in which, together with economic rights, qualitative values—the art of living—would have its full expression for the happiness of the individual.

CHILEAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
"ETERNITY" PERSEVERES

ACCORDING to the latest *Saturday Review of Literature* poll, James Jones' *From Here to Eternity* again rates as the country's best-seller. A large number of the costly hardcover volumes have been consumed by libraries alone, to keep up with reader demand, and now, since a 75 cent paper-back reprint is available, it is safe to assume that a staggering total of Americans will be reading this novel. The motion picture version of "Eternity" is also before the public, which is sure to boost both sales and library requests.

There is reason to think that Mr. Jones has produced, very literally, a memorable work. We have encountered few readers of *Eternity* who fail to retain vivid impressions of Jones' unusual characterizations, or fail to appreciate the subtle dimensions of those characters interesting to talk about. The attention gained by this volume seems qualitatively different from that accorded sprawling "epics" such as *Anthony Adverse* and *Gone With the Wind.* The latter books were all the rage for a time, but we doubt that they will compare with *Eternity* in capacity to endure (!). In any case, *Eternity's* popularity developed slowly, in comparison with the two other gigantics mentioned, and only now seems to be approaching a peak, a fact which at least tends to support the above estimate of its worth. So we have a case for further analysis of the book, together with its film version by Columbia, since the two are not the entirely separate entities which result from so many screen adaptations.

Despite a long-held apprehension that the movie would capture nothing of the book but the title, we feel that the integrity of Jones' writing was sufficient to impress itself upon celluloid—no mean feat. Each member of the cast did an inspired job, from either superlative direction, or personal sympathy for the original, or both.

Several minor themes MANAS considered of especial interest in the novel were, of course, deleted. Digressions on philosophy and the psychology of non-violence appear in the book via an ideal character named "Malloy," who doesn't show in the film at all, but the same general feeling is preserved. If this opinion stands up under criticism, by the way, we are in sight of an interesting point: if you take away both the chief idealist and the bordellos, and still nothing seems much changed, it should be obvious that *Eternity* doesn't depend upon either verbal idealism or erotic settings for its impact. The real idealism, instead, is seen to emerge from the attitudes of the leading figures, and is not superimposed. The bordello atmosphere just happened to be there, too; it didn't play a truly important role in the story, nor, on the same view, did Jones' determined realism as to language. In other words, if, when a story is "cleaned up" to meet motion picture requirements, its psychological quality remains unaltered, one can reason that cleaning up is irrelevant, that the book wasn't basically obscene in the first place. A great deal hinges, then, upon whether you feel that the movie faithfully represents the book.

We rest part of our case for Mr. Jones on the conviction that the movie is indeed a true, if incomplete, version of the book. While *Eternity's* characters are but a bare cut above "nuthin," from the standpoint of conventional appraisal, as Private Prewitt himself remarks, they evidence sensitive human perceptions, courage, and loyalty, despite their environment and conditioning. It is this contrast between appearance and reality in the lives of men and women close to the bottom rung of the social ladder which impressed us so deeply in the first place. The heroism shown by them is not often of a familiar sort, but it is there, encouraging the reader to feel that whatever a man may seem to be, and wherever he may be, no one can stop him from being a man.

Private Prewitt's ideals are all his own—self-constructed, and strongly built. It is his sense of humanity which leads him to quit a promising boxing career, and not all the brass in the army nor the persistent cruelty of "the treatment" can bring him into line. Not only does he stand adamant in the face of psychical abuse and divers other threats; he also will not be enticed by the promise of promotion.

How many men, in or out of the Army, can match this sort of integrity? How many are sufficiently heroic to stand off both fear and ambition? Prewitt is a hero, and if he consorts with prostitutes and mingles with other sinners, he is a hero none the less. In fact, it may be that what stirs us so about Prewitt is that people seldom expect *his* kind of heroism of men in the regular army.

Prewitt had a surprising measure of what intellectuals call "the broader view." His army tortured him, reviled him, imprisoned him, but he developed no retaliatory hate. He liked the army—he

even liked the outfit whose officers misused him. His alienation was thus an additional torture, but he accepted it without complaint. And Prewitt won; he won the respect and the affection of his top sergeant, finally the respect and affection of his entire company before he lost his life.

If there is a serious fault in the picture version, it is probably in depicting the causes of Prewitt's suffering. The film creates villains who are personally responsible, but Jones did not intend this. There was villainy in plenty, but it arose from *situations* that bring out the worst in average men. In the book, even the most distorted characters evoke our sympathy, especially as we see something of their background; and since, with exception of one or two, each exhibits signs of a corrective conscience. The army, as would be expected, gets a bit of a whitewashing from Columbia Pictures. The suspicion that an army, any army, is conducive to callousness and brutality is carefully allayed by having all obvious injustices rectified by fatherly commanders.

As we said in our first review of *Eternity,* Jones is an idealist—even an extreme idealist. To this we have not the slightest objection, since we like our fiction characters to display nobility. If Mr. Jones' critics had accused him of discovering an improbable number of "idealists" in a situation hardly calculated to attract them, the critics would have had a point—even if an unimportant one. But how it can be maintained that Jones is a foe to idealism, we cannot see. Perhaps the issue here is a very old one: Are our conceptions of virtue and "right-mindedness" derived from conventional stereotypes or from independent evaluation of character? Perhaps many of those prejudiced against Prewitt are inclined to be prejudiced against non-conformists in general. If so, the reaction is certainly understandable, for Prewitt really believes that "unless a man goes his own way he's nothing." An army man who has the effrontery to refuse an officer's designs to further his career is, perhaps, a bit beyond the ordinary imagination.

When *Eternity* first began to loom large in the public eye more than two years ago, MANAS said that Mr. Jones was an unusual writer and his book, for those who could put up with the barracks-room language, an occasion for much reflection. While one or two subscribers felt that MANAS should not give serious attention to a volume so loaded with profane and obscene language, other readers praised the review, defending the fitness of our qualified praise. We now add to that praise by noting that Jones' characters grow throughout the book—grow in heartwarming ways. There is quite an upward and onward feeling communicated by any story which gives you people you neither like nor admire at first, yet who later win your respect by what they try to become. We wonder if this emphasis in *Eternity,* inconspicuously but undeniably present, has not been an important factor in the book's popularity. Many authors who are too genteel to transmit barracks obscenity nonetheless seem to delight in depicting the disintegration of personality, and the contrast in Jones may be deeply appreciated. So, while a lot of people may read Jones for the wrong reasons, and be impressed by the wrong things, we wonder if Jones hasn't earned his popularity after all.

COMMENTARY
FOR HUMAN SOLIDARITY

NOTICING that this issue is dated December 23, we were in the midst of reflecting that, despite all the "commercialization" and the routine ways in which the Christmas spirit is exploited, there is still something deeply heart-warming about the season, when along came a note from the executive secretary of Spanish Refugee Aid, Inc., asking that we tell the story of an all but forgotten group of people.

Fifteen years ago, the tattered remnants of a defeated army of freedom trickled across the Pyrenees into France to escape the vengeance of the victorious Franco. These Loyalist troops brought their wives and children with them, numbering 160,000 in all, and France, having offered them asylum, began to absorb the homeless Spanish families into the French economy. At least 90 per cent of the refugees are strong anti-communists, having vivid memories of communist treachery and terror during the Civil War. While the small communist minority has been well cared-for by party funds, the rest have practically dropped out of sight of the rest of the world—and out of mind.

Many of the refugees have found ways to make a living and to support their families in France, but there are still the aged, the sick, and the mutilated by war who have nothing but the pitifully small benefits of the French Government to keep them alive. It is for these, who cannot help themselves, that Spanish Refugee Aid, Inc., was formed. The Spanish cellist, Pablo Casals, and Lázero Cárdenas, former president of Mexico, are honorary co-chairmen of the organization. Operating on a budget which allows for almost no overhead except for printing and postage, the working committee has sent to some 500 Spanish families almost $9,000 in cash or goods during its first six months of operation.

The appeal is for money—to be sent to Spanish Refugee Aid, Inc., 45 Astor Place, New York 3, N.Y. Or, if you prefer to send packages direct to a family of refugees, the committee would be glad, we feel sure, to supply you with the names of urgent cases.

Within the experience of the MANAS staff, the relationship of sending packages to these families of Spanish refugees is peculiarly rewarding. They are people who have served the dignity of man with their hearts and their lives. Unlike those who, from personal misfortune or impersonal disaster, endure privations because they had no choice, the Spanish Loyalists voluntarily accepted the hazard of the fight for freedom.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WE still have a few tag-ends of letters on "educating for self-reliance in the home," some of which should be of general interest. One correspondent recalls statements in "Children" for last March 18, remarking:

> The writer's notion of "impersonal laws . . . as necessary adjuncts to living," given rigor by retributions "which pronounce no moral judgment whatsoever," is interesting, but will it work? And particularly will it work in a society such as ours where laws, customs and moral judgments have so largely fused? Furthermore, would it work in isolation, only in the home, as the writer recommended, while all other laws and ways of existing, which are such a source of conflict, anxiety and guilt in our present utterly non-congruous . social melange, would be in opposition? Would it not be piling Pelion on Ossa and expecting serenity to be achieved through sheer preponderance of burdens? Would this not be treating symptoms rather than causes, and tend to aggravate the disease by deepening conflicts and adding new anxieties that would not only push their victim towards greater irresponsibility but would in effect demand of him irrational behavior?
>
> I see no way, as yet, to avoid sanctions for transgressions against the rights of others; but it must be established that the penalty itself is neither immoral nor in basic conflict with the ethical goals of the society.
>
> Moreover, if a child is educated "under two flags," as it were, with no reason for even such expedient loyalties and obligations except sheer custom and fear of punishment, wouldn't the rational inference eventually be drawn that one conforms only for the sake of rewards or the avoidance of penalties, and that where there are neither rewards nor penalties there is neither good reason nor necessity for the behavior? In short, what has been advocated as a method for training in good behavior is precisely a training ground for a thoroughgoing ethical and moral relativism—which is exactly the disease we wish to cure!
>
> Furthermore, is there a *human* being who can shed his morals—good, bad or indifferent—merely by crossing a threshold, the threshold of his home?

The main point we had in mind in the March 18 column was that a parent who runs a home on a disciplined schedule, into which the child is required to fit, runs no risk of damaging the child's personality. A home can have "laws" which prevail, simply because those who provide the home feel them to be necessary, without being "authoritarian" in the derogatory sense of the word. Management of property one has worked for and earned is simply good custodianship, and those who have provided a home have a natural right to direct the way in which the utilities of the home shall be used, and in what way other members of the family can assist in maintenance. (Both the lawn and the kitchen floor, incidentally, are utilities.)

The fact that our correspondent confused this argument with supposed justification for superimposing a special "home morality" upon the child is understandable enough, for "laws," "ethics," "customs," and "morality" are pretty much confused in general usage anyway. But a law is not the same thing as morality. A law proposes only to establish a requirement in regard to one specific obligation. It does not require a designated attitude in the compliance, or even agreement that the requirement is ideally conceived. A child, for instance, who is made to understand that his part of home maintenance will involve certain chores, scheduled for performance at specified times, is not restricted in his general freedom. It is an "impersonal law" that man must eat to live, and that he must wash occasionally if he is to be allowed within speaking distance of his fellows. We do not think of these facts as constituting restriction of freedom in either attitude or behavior. The "laws" of a home can be considered to be like the laws of a ship at sea. After completion of the community tasks of the voyage, upon which the livelihood of the sailors themselves depends, and in the progress of which they have therefore been necessarily involved, the exercise of independent judgment for each crew member begins. Children, too, should be allowed shore leave— plenty of it, because the need of their work in and for the home should be relatively small, and because we should never restrict anyone beyond the degree logically called for, and because the child will never discover his own unique individuality if all of his life is made up of directed behavior. Yet unless children work on the decks part of the time, they are apt to acquire the false notion that life intended them to be permanent guests on a pleasure cruise. Also, they will never learn how to run a ship of their own unless they become familiar with the labor entailed.

Morality, however, is another question. This word implies an over-all set of attitudes and beliefs. When a parent requires the child to adopt a certain morality, he is asking a compliance of the mind, which is quite different from demanding that one's progeny turn to with necessary works of the hand. Then, also, morality, as associated with conventional religion, usually is some ninety per cent concerned which what a person is *not* to do—a negative orientation. The "laws" of a home, as described, are positive, practical requirements.

But our correspondent, somewhat inadvertently, perhaps, raises a question of basic importance which we should like to see discussed by other readers. The question is whether a parent is justified in encouraging an entirely different conception of morality from that which prevails in society. If we have one "morality" at home, and the child encounters another in the community, is this not a "preponderance of burdens"? Won't this encourage "ethical relativism," since attitudes held acceptable in one situation are not held acceptable in another?

In order to stimulate discussion, let us attempt some generalizations. First, why should we wish to cure "ethical relativism"? Are not "good" and "evil" always relative, varying in application according to time, place, circumstance, individual motivation and attitude? It has been contended that the notion that one *knows* what is Good and what is Evil for other people is responsible for two thirds of the world's ills, and for much confusion, self-righteousness, and even fanatical fratricide: with this contention we are in basic agreement.

Can a knowledge of Good and Evil be taught? We think not. It is not simply that a child will discover better ideas of Good and Evil if he is allowed to establish their definition for himself. It is rather that no other definition of Good and Evil will have compelling reality for him.

He can follow a line of approved conduct which is represented to him as someone else's ideal morality, but this will make of him only an imitator—never a philosopher. Moreover, he will usually follow someone else's morality only through fear of punishment or hope of reward, and if he is once dissociated from the rewarding and punishing agency, he will be left without any orientation in conduct save the mechanical tug of habit.

Can ethics be taught? Yes, because ethics is the science or art of evaluating the principles governing in human action. Ethics is a study of attitudes—primarily one's own —while morality is a description of behavior. How do we teach ethics? Probably by insisting upon the validity of moral relativism, among other things, for this emphasis can become the means by which we penetrate the veil of differing customs and beliefs, discovering a common humanity beneath. Of course, the student of ethics, whether child or adult, must start with a first supposition—that there is a Right and a Wrong, a Good and an Evil, involved in every human action. His business is to discover which is which. If his home offers him one standard of attitude and behavior, his school another, and his first "job" yet a third, he may be troubled, but he is also goaded to reflection. Will he be led to question the social morality? He probably will, and that is all to the good, especially if attitudes in his home, against which he will measure social morality, are a positive affirmation of a father's or a mother's convictions. For anyone with a truly affirmative conviction is not apt to be much concerned with that negative aspect of morality which children instinctively dislike and of which the world has seen too much. Many agencies within society are still devoted to passing moral judgments *against* this or that view, form of action, or belief. If parents strive to be ethical rather than moral, though—if they are less interested in virtue or lack of it than in truth—the child will be encouraged to a good start. He may find, as an embryonic philosopher, that he has a tough row to hoe in the world, that he will be judged and found wanting for all sorts of peculiar and illogical reasons, but if his home has provided a rational oasis in all the confusion, he will be less apt to feel lost and alone.

FRONTIER

The Race that Never Ran

WHEN Prof. Ernest A. Hooton, Harvard anthropologist, was asked to express an opinion on the "Piltdown Man hoax," recently exposed by experts of the British Museum, he replied: "It's like implying that the Secretary of the Treasury is running a counterfeiting business on the side." In short, the somewhat sardonic Harvard expert on ancient man found practically unbelievable the report that someone possibly the dignified Smith Woodward, late head of the British Museum, or Charles Dawson, amateur geologist of Sussex, where the Piltdown remains came to light —had deliberately faked the fossils, manufacturing them out of modern ape and human bones.

It *is* puzzling. As all the best newspapers have musingly questioned, What on earth would anyone do it for? The British Museum workers started a new investigation of the authenticity of the remains several years ago, after Franz Weidenreich bluntly claimed that the lower jaw bone alleged to belong to the Piltdown Man was the jaw of an orangutan. Applying various tests, they first came to the conclusion that none of the bones was particularly "old." A dispatch from London (New York *Times*, Nov. 20) continues with the story of the exposé:

> Now the opinion of comparative anatomists and further tests by chemists have established that the jaw is that of a modern ape treated with potassium bichromate and iron salt, giving it an aged appearance.
>
> It has also been established that the teeth have been pared down so that they could have been associated with the jaw of a primitive man.
>
> The cranium is believed to be genuine but about 50,000 years old. This age brings the "first Englishman" into line with scores of early men found in Europe and elsewhere.

The majestic proportions of this hoax become evident when one turns to Henry Fairfield Osborn's *Men of the Old Stone Age*, finding, under the title, "The Piltdown Race," the following impressive statement:

> The "dawn man" [the Piltdown find was labelled *Eoan thropus* because of its supposed great age} is the most ancient human type in which the form of the head and size of the brain are known. Its anatomy, as well as its geologic antiquity, is therefore of profound interest and worthy of very full consideration.

While Dr. Osborn referred to evidence that the Piltdown jaw may be that of a chimpanzee, thus confusing somewhat theories of the Piltdown's position on the human family tree, he nevertheless spoke with assurance of the Piltdown *Race*, apparently feeling, along with Smith Woodward and Elliot Smith, that the other pieces of skull, then regarded as authentic remains from the Pliocene epoch, were of sufficient importance to justify the use of this expression.

Even more troubling than this eager, scholarly acceptance of the Piltdown remains are the carefully sculptured busts of this supposed "human" of half a million years ago, which may be seen in various museums. Executed as representing undoubted evidence of the "ape-man" theory of human origins, the pouting, brutish features of this entirely imaginary "missing link" have impressed the countless schoolchildren who troop through the museums with all the authority of austere scientific "fact."

We don't like the "ape-man" theory of human origins, never have, and take considerable pleasure in presenting evidence of tendentious scientific argument for this theory whenever it turns up. Interestingly enough, it turns up rather often, these days. In his last published work, *Apes, Giants, and Man* (University of Chicago Press, 1946), Franz Weidenreich showed that when the Piltdown skull is reconstructed from its fragments on strictly morphological lines, the form and features of the resulting brain case appear to be virtually the same as modern man, while the jaw, similarly restored, exhibits "a completely simian character." Even before the hoax was known, therefore, anthropologists stretched probabilities far beyond the call of duty in showing a finished head based on the combination of such dissimilar remains.

Weidenreich also calls attention to Thomas Huxley's curious method of persuading his readers of the intimate relationship between man and ape. In his famous drawings of the skeletons of orangutan, chimpanzee, gorilla, and man, the anthropoid postures are straightened up to come closer to the human stance, while the human skeleton is bent forward a bit to seem like a natural sequence from the anthropoids. Weidenreich's drawings, unlike Huxley's, emphasize the radical differences between man and ape in anatomical structure, such as the great difference in length of the hind limbs in relation to the forelimbs. When an ape walks on his hands and feet, as apes naturally walk, its head is relatively erect. If a man attempts this posture, his head is necessarily in a strained position, lower than his back, which sticks up in the air as a result. Weidenreich argues that the human line of evolution, whenever or wherever it began, was probably independent of the anthropoid line. As he puts it:

> Anthropologists used to speak of primitive characters of early man, equating primitive with anthropoid-like and anthropoid-like with gorilla-like or chimpanzee-like. This is misleading and, indeed, has led to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It is not necessarily so that each peculiarity displayed in early man occurs in anthropoids. It may represent a human specialty which demonstrates the early independence of man's development.

Reviewing evidence connected with the dentition of the apes, he adds: "In other words, the evolution of that primate branch which we call 'man' must have begun much earlier than we ever dreamed."

Only a little reading in such books soon shows how well justified was the science editor of the New York *Times,* Waldemar Kaempffert, in saying:

> The theory that man is descended from an anthropoid ape has been so thoroughly shot to pieces that only the fundamentalists believe that evolutionists believe in it. Years ago it was decided that man and the anthropoids stemmed from some common ancestor, so that the gorilla, orang and the chimpanzee are cousins rather than ancestors. . . . Prof. W. E. LeGros Clark, one of Great Britain's most distinguished anthropologists, expressed the opinion that the resemblance between man and the gorilla or chimpanzee could be regarded as a case of parallelism.

This same LeGros Clark, it may be remarked, however, is a bit uncertain about the nature of this common ancestor or common stock, from which both apes and man may have derived. In his work, *Early Forerunners of Man,* he "postulates" the existence of this stock, "in the absence of serious evidence to the contrary." Modern anthropological theory conceives the general evolutionary history of man's supposed mammalian ancestors somewhat as follows: At the end of Mesozoic (Secondary) times there emerged a basal stock of placental mammals which split up to become the forebears of the various orders of mammals known today. One group which split off from the main stem was the basal primate stock, characterized by certain evolutionary tendencies. Within the primate group further differentiations took place, among them the ancestors of the Tarsioids. This, it is supposed, occurred at the beginning of Eocene times. The Tarsioids, Prof, LeGros Clark believes, "may have provided a foundation for the emergence of the Anthropoidea," remarking, however, "It is certain that no closer relationship between the Anthropoidea and the Tarsioids can be claimed than is implied in such a common origin from the very base of the Tarsioid stem." Although nothing is actually *known* about the origin of the so-called "Anthropoidea" (a sub-order of the primates in which are placed monkeys, apes, and man), Prof. Clark says:

> The line of evolution of the anthropoidea has been marked by successive branching off of specialized groups from a central stem in which a progressive expansion of the brain has been accompanied by the retention of a bodily structure of a remarkably generalized type. It is this main stem which culminated in the appearance of man himself.

Here, we should like to emphasize the fact that this "main stem" is wrapped in mystery. It is possible, even likely, that the root stock from which man developed bore very little resemblance to an ape-like form. Frederic Wood

Jones, another English anthropologist, takes the view, based on anatomical evidence, that the speculative accounts of primeval man in books on human origins are very wide of the mark—that the true "dawn man" was not a shaggy, bowed-over creature, but something very different—a being who at least walked erect. It is even conceivable, as at least one nineteenth-century anatomist suggested, that the great apes are hybrid deviations from the human stem —blurred copies of the original type of man, produced, perhaps, by some sort of primeval miscegenation.

Oddly enough, this apparently wild proposal has interesting support from a modern naturalist. In *Animal Treasure,* Ivan T. Sanderson writes:

> The people of Assumbo [a tribe of Southeastern Nigeria] believe gorillas to be another race of man, and not animal at all. As these Africans probably see more gorillas and know more of their habits than does any other group of human beings in the world, I think their opinions should at least be listened to. I myself as a zoologist, a naturalist, and an ordinary sane person, am in absolute agreement with the Assumbos.
>
> We spent much time later trying to photograph the gorillas. Seeing these creatures in life, listening to their calls and talk, and examining them both alive and dead alongside chimpanzees and men, I can only regard them as a retrograde form of human, or at least, subhuman life. They not only have hands, faces, and to a certain extent, feet like our own, but they use them exactly as we do. They have constructive ability, shown in building sleeping platforms, using sticks, and sorting out objects, that is on a par with some adult humans. They tie knots in creepers to hold down saplings in their construction. Their speech contains as many different sounds and types of sounds an any human language. Furthermore, they bear strong family resemblances and equally well-marked interfamily differences. The natives of these mountains know all the families by sight.

While Mr. Sanderson may be loading his argument a bit to make a point, other observant travelers have returned from Africa with much the same tale. One thing, at least, seems plain: there ought to be more flexibility in the assumptions we make about both man and the anthropoids, and less cocksure certainty on the part of scientists. Since the victory of science over theology, generally, in the matter of the basic idea of evolution, as opposed to miraculous creation, has been fairly decisive, the world of scholarship and research can well afford to maintain an open mind in regard to alternative theories of human origin. The ape-origin theory, perhaps, was a powerful weapon with which to bludgeon into fragments a literal interpretation of the Garden of Eden legend, but there is no need, now, to maintain a well organized scientific front against theological criticism. Nor would it be especially politic, for science, apparently, has a few legends of its own to be ashamed of, as witness the Piltdown hoax.