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MUTUAL AID

A READER of our notes on Leonard S. Kenworthy's (August) *Progressive* article, "Primer on World Politics" (MANAS, Sept. 23), writes to offer a radically different perspective. Kenworthy had presented facts showing that world population is concentrated in Asia, that the vast bulk of Asian peoples suffer from hunger and malnutrition, and that the comparatively wealthy United States is not very much concerned with these ominous realities. The U.S. 1953 contribution to the funds of the World Health Organization, Kenworthy remarked, is just under $3,000,000—about one hundredth, we might add, of the cost of an experimental H-bomb. Considering the difference in income between the average American and the average inhabitant of Southeast Asia—nearly fifty to one—Kenworthy wonders what chance the U.S. has for good "foreign relations" with the world's hungry masses.

These, broadly speaking, are the points of the *Progressive* article. We print below the rejoinder of our subscriber.

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I think we need to examine still other points of view in regard to the lesson which Mr. Kenworthy would have us learn from the world's poverty. Passing over the lament that "most of the world is illiterate" (Coomaraswamy and others point out that great cultures have flourished in India, China and the Pacific—and in Europe, too—based on rich oral tradition, and that they faded and deteriorated upon the introduction of literacy), are there not further facts which *social* "idealists" like Mr. Kenworthy have not faced or dare not face? (I do not admit that there can be a *social* idealism, any more than there can be a "beautiful" nation.)

It is true that our allotment to the World Health Organization is only three million dollars; but our over-all bankrolling of our neighbors for some years now has been approximating a cool three *billion* annually. Is it not generally questioned now whether all these lent-leased and lost moneys have made even the slightest improvement in the "international relations" about which our author is so rightly concerned?

An impoverished America will be of little aid in saving the rest of the world. We are far along the road to exhaustion of our American natural resources. For example, Department of the Interior studies show that domestic reserves of more than 20 essential minerals will be exhausted in another 30 years. Man subsists on 9 inches of topsoil, of which 3 are gone in the U.S., due to faulty methods of agriculture ("mining" the soil), and about three inches alone remain in Greece, southern Italy and China. So urgent are the warnings of such students of the problem as William Vogt and Fairfield Osborn that I feel we need to "revolutionize our thinking" and acting in quite contrary directions to those implied by Mr. Kenworthy.

The Population Reference Bureau, a private study organization, points out that in the United States today resources are being drained at a "suicidal" rate, while the population is spiraling upward at the rate of 300 persons an hour. "We cannot merely hope," says the Bureau, "that future generations will possess the ingenuity and intelligence to create new sources of natural wealth or substitutes," for "meanwhile the vast resources held below the earth's crust and in the oceans are beyond the reach of profitable extraction."

There is a seldom-mentioned moral aspect to the subsidizing of foreign countries. "Let us stop howling [his word] about how little they appreciate us in Europe and Asia," said President Buell Gallagher of City College (New York), on his recent return from a trip abroad, "and rather *increase* our foreign aid." And Dr. Gallagher went on to echo the now familiar cliché that outsiders have no more general dislike of us than they ever had; they only dislike Senator McCarthy. But such is not the impression of other observers. The more you throw your weight around the less weight you have, and you can't go swashbuckling around the map attempting to force other nations into a

scarcity-defense economy and cold wars and think that you are endearing yourself.

But now to the moral point, and I hope the pacifists (I'm one myself) among your readers won't find it too hot a potato. When they tell us that "generosity" requires us to expand the Point 4 program, or something akin to it, I think we might reply somewhat as follows (you may print this in *raised letters*, if you like): "Yes, generosity to the uttermost of our own individual, personal free-will giving by Americans exercising their freemen's prerogative of voluntary contributions. But you cannot increase one iota the amount of good will *by law*, or by Governmental action. When you try, you get only robbery and fraud, and these robberies and frauds will come back and hit you at a later date in some way you least expect." This *may* not be common sense or common experience, but, if not, Jefferson had no common sense and Tolstoy was serenading the dark side of the moon.

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We have a basic sympathy with this reader's general point of view, yet in the interest of clarity some qualifying questions probably ought to be raised. First of all, while Dr. Coomaraswamy did show (in *The Bugbear of Literacy*) that it is foolish to suppose that the ability to read and write assures the presence of either intelligence or wisdom, it remains a fact that these skills become practically essential in a technologically advanced society. India regards her high illiteracy not as a blessing in disguise, but as something to be overcome as soon as possible. While the use made of literacy is undoubtedly more important than the fact of being literate, this should not make us blind to the possibility that the ethical needs of the modern world require the practical support of simple information about the peoples of the world.

Now, as to funds for other countries—there may be a tremendous difference in the purposes for which such funds are dispensed. A distinction should be made, we think, between money appropriated to arm another country against some potential enemy whom we should like to see "encircled," and money supplied to help that country to achieve a balanced, self-sustaining economy.

Again, there is a great difference between money or food sent abroad as some kind of "bribe" to win "good will" for one side in the "cold war," and the ideal of, say, the Point-Four Program, which is to send experts to teach particular skills to other peoples, so that they may learn to help themselves.

These distinctions, it seems to us, are vitally important. Mr. Kenworthy did not make them; but neither does his critic who writes above. Concerning the drain on American resources in preparation for war, it is fair to remark that if only a fraction of this tremendous financial subsidy to Mars were diverted to a simple, no-strings-attached sort of aid to countries where hunger is a major problem, we might soon discover that the need for extensive military preparations no longer seems so urgent. There is nothing new about this idea; scores of thoughtful people have been repeating it during the past three or four years.

The impoverishment of the United States through the wasteful exploitation of the natural resources of this continent is still another subject. Here is involved, we think, a basic alienation of many Americans from the natural world. There is blind irreverence in "mining" the soil, not to mention economic stupidity. Wasteful, get-rich-quick methods and attitudes contribute to a mutilation of the earth and lay a heavy mortgage on the lives and happiness of future generations. When the top soil is washed away, when the forests have been reduced to newsprint, and when the oil is gone from underground reservoirs, perhaps technology will discover new means of producing at least some of the required commodities from waste materials, but the one thing technology will never do is to instruct future generations in a sense of cooperation with nature that will make both our lives and the surrounding landscape serene and beautiful. It is here that our scientific know-how and our engineering genius break down.

Two points in our contributor's last paragraph need consideration. First, there is his version of the Buddhist maxim: Never let the hand of another come between you and the one to whom you would give. We bow to no one in our distaste for impersonal, institutionalized "charity"; it may easily corrupt both giver and recipient—the former, by

allowing him to give without understanding or even genuine sympathy; the latter, by subjecting him to the indignity of some kind of "dole," often dispensed by persons who develop a kind of professional egotism and indifference to the *human* realities of the situation. Bitterness may be compounded in geometrical progression on both sides of this transaction.

Yet it is easy to imagine circumstances where the organization of aid is a practical necessity. How would you meet the emergency of, say, a flood disaster, or a ravaging fire, without organization? If famine sweeps a country, shiploads of supplies are needed, and capital in large amounts to get them moving and delivered. Our point would be, here, that it is difficult, but not impossible, for such ventures to be undertaken in a spirit of voluntary and generous giving. The Friends Service Committee, for example, while doubtless not perfect, is an organization with a notable record in undertakings of this sort. And if the Quakers can do it, so, perhaps, can a nation. The important consideration would be to be sure that organizational efforts are never allowed to replace or freeze out the face-to-face relationships in giving and receiving, wherever individual "unorganized" help ought to be adequate to the scale of human needs.

The problem that the Buddhist maxim does not cover is really a problem which occurs more broadly in connection with the social contract. Put into moral terms, this problem is defined by the question: Can a man who delegates certain responsibilities to others, for the sake of practical efficiency in accomplishing ends acknowledged to be good, *still maintain vital touch with these responsibilities?* This is the central problem of representative government.

It is true, as our correspondent insists, that "you cannot increase one iota the amount of good will *by law*," but this claim is not really contradictory to the view that you can make good will reach farther and become more effective by agreeing to work with others toward a common end; and if a "law" is a way of making public acknowledgment of that agreement, then the law is a kind of register of the collective intent and useful as a reference for all who have agreed to it.

It is necessary to admit, of course, that this "ideal" description of how the social contract is supposed to work often seems very remote from reality. But we ought also to admit that the social contract probably works far better than we realize, for when it doesn't break down into sheer pretense, we don't notice its operation at all. We simply take the smoothly running aspects of the social contract for granted.

The offensive side of all contracts lies in the *compulsion* which is invoked when a contract is breached. But what about all the different sorts of contracts which are not breached, but which serve in the way that they were intended—simply as a record of the agreement of certain human beings to behave in a certain way?

The role of a contract is to generalize and ratify preexisting intentions. It is, so to say, a "memorandum." The best sort of contract, from the moral viewpoint, is the contract which provides for no compulsion at all.

Such a contract or agreement could be withdrawn from at will by any or all parties. It might be regarded as "impractical" by most people, but it would still be the best sort of contract. Conceivably, the wisest of men would be inclined to enter into no other sort of contract, since a wise man knows that only those agreements which are freely kept will be of lasting service to the human race.

This is one of our correspondent's points with which we agree.

Letter from
ENGLAND

LONDON.—It is not often that a Royal Commission displays psychological subtlety. Yet that is a term that may fairly be applied to the Report of the Commission on Capital Punishment. Its terms of reference did not include the case for abolition, but limited the enquiry to the questions of legal definition, criminal trial procedure in murder trials, and the relative merits of methods of execution. The Report has taken four years to prepare and runs to nearly 900 pages of small type.

Now there is in England a general disquiet concerning the ethics of capital punishment and large numbers of people are revolted at the continuation of hanging, a left-over from medieval times when revenge was the motive uppermost in the minds of judges and populace. As I have said, the Commission was precluded by its terms of reference from considering abolition. Instead, it proposed a novel change in criminal procedure in capital charges that would, were it carried into effect, almost inevitably result in *de facto* abolition, if not *de jure*.

The proposal is one of great interest. A murder trial is to be divided into two separate parts—to become, virtually, two trials. The first trial would remain as at present, with this exception: that after verdict no sentence will be passed. (At present the law prescribes only one punishment, death by hanging.) The second part of the trial, with the same jury, would be to determine the issue of life and death. A recommendation by the jury, after hearing circumstances precluded from the first part of the trial by rules of evidence, would have the force of law. A recommendation of mercy—extenuating circumstances—would be final.

The suggested change would alter the functions of a jury as they have been exercised for centuries. They would become, in effect, jury and judge, too.

The national Press has risen almost unanimously against this proposal.

But there is a certain suspicion in your correspondent's mind that the proposal is an acute device for circumventing the limitation on the Commission's terms of reference. For the men and women who would, perhaps, vote against abolition, might well feel very differently when faced with the decision of life and death—a terrible responsibility.

Yet, as the Commission sees it, in no other way can we continue to retain this form of punishment.

Another recommendation that has aroused interest in view of the recent execution of a youth of 18, was that the age for capital punishment should be raised to 21. This will suggest to the reader with some knowledge of psychology that the members of the Commission were content to consider this point in terms of chronological age, ignoring the reality of the psychic situation, namely, that a man of 21 may have a mental age of ten, and a youth of 18 a mental age of 21.

The Report, by the time this letter sees the light, will have become the subject of heated debate in the House of Commons. For just now the British public is very self-conscious about capital punishment and the general trend—a personal estimate only—is that a referendum would see abolition law. The late Labour Government introduced a Bill for abolition, but it was thrown out by the Lords. There is a likelihood of a later Bill becoming Law.

For if this Report does not recommend abolition, it goes as far as it can to hint that is what its members, all distinguished men and women, would like to see.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
THE HOPE OF THE WORLD

"ISN'T there anything," an anguished reader exclaims, "that is *constructive* going on in the world, today?" proceeding to lament the enormous amount of depressing material that appears in print, as though there were nothing else that could be said or reported.

Like most of its serious contemporaries, MANAS is hard put to find very much of encouragement in the "news," although, when it comes to trends of thought, there are many developments which promise events of a more heartening character—events which may come about when their causes, now largely opinions and attitudes of mind, reach the "news-making" stage. One such trend, which is rather a hallmark of the entire modern epoch than a single current in thinking, is the habit of responsible individuals to seek to understand their own time. This effort seems to grow out of a determination to gain what may be called a sense of history—a peculiarly modern need for orientation. Sometimes the urge to attain a "sense of history" achieves a dramatic effect. There is an unforgettable scene in the autobiography of a Russian army officer who, on leave in Moscow when the Russian Revolution broke out, sought a library and began an intense study of modern revolutions in order to determine, if he could, what his duty was at this great historical juncture.

It is this spirit, we think, which may be identified as the major constructive development of our time—as, indeed, the hope of the modern world. There will be those to say that something more "practical" is needed for our inspiration than the image of scholarly individuals hunched over books in libraries. But what, in reality, can be more practical than just this—men earnestly searching the record of human experience for guidance before they take sides? Most of all, we want intelligence and the spirit of justice in our acts of great historical decision. Is there any way to get justice and intelligence other than through study and comparison before decisions are made?

The question of revolution is a case in point. Practically every writer and thinker with any perception at all of what is going on in the world today keeps on telling us that a "great revolution" is in progress. This revolution, they usually add, is bigger and more fundamental in character than those predicted by any known revolutionary ideology. It is a transformation of human relationships, already under way without having received any clear characterization from historians or sociologists.

What, in essence, is a revolution? Basically, a revolution seems to be a redefinition of human rights, responsibilities, and duties. The maker—the planner, rather, or instigator—of a revolution examines existing human relationships and, finding them evil or unjust, sets out to describe how human relationships ought to be arranged. He then endeavors to tell what must be done to arrange them so. Insofar, then, as a revolution is the deliberate undertaking of men who seek a change for the better, it originates in ethical feelings. From ethics, the course of revolutionary activity turns to ways and means, which involves politics and psychology. Both these steps of revolutionary activity require the making of far-reaching judgments—judgments concerning the nature of man and what is good for man—concerning the springs of human behavior and how men are to be moved to gain the good for themselves. Especially in modern times, when the organization of society is complex, revolutionary activity has involved elaborate theories of history in support of the ways and means proposed for a successful revolution.

Before the advent of the machine, a revolution involved fairly simple ethical, emotional, and military considerations. The revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, have been elaborately doctrinal to meet the special requirements of a technological society. Here, in this fact of the inevitability of complex ideological thinking in

respect to revolution, lies the reason for the need for *study* of recent revolutionary assumptions and methods. This, naturally enough, brings us to the question of Marxism, as the revolutionary ideology which has so largely shaped modern thought and standards of evaluation—even the thought and the values of those who have no idea that this heritage looms behind their conclusions. There are many ways of approaching Marxism, but for a brief discussion, there should be an advantage in selecting certain themes which are capable of isolated analysis. Among the most influential of the Marxian doctrines are three notions, one a theory of historical causation, one a concept of ethical relationships, and, third, a proposal of revolutionary method. We do not suggest that comprehension of these notions is any sort of equivalent of "knowing" Marx, but that to understand the character and influence of these ideas should be a big step toward clearing away the moral confusion which stands in the way of effective thinking about the future and the revolutions, if any, we may wish to support.

The theory of history urged by Marx is to the effect that all of man's "serious thinking"—his ethical ideas, cultural views, intellectual and legal attitudes, termed collectively by Marx the "superstructure"—is the direct and indirect result of the conditions of economic production. Marx stated categorically (in the Introduction to his *Criticism of Political Economy*) that "The political and intellectual life of a society is determined by the mode of production, as necessitated by the wants of material life." The development of new modes of production, Marx maintained, creates tensions with the old forms and property relationships, and this establishes a revolutionary situation; meanwhile, the struggle has been translated into the artificial terms of ideological conflict, and the battle for supremacy is waged at this level. As Marx put it:

> With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is, gradually or rapidly, subverted. In order to understand such a revolution, it is necessary to distinguish between the changes in the conditions of economic production, which are a material fact, open to scientific observation and research, and the legal, political, religious aesthetic or philosophic, in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as we do not judge of an individual by the opinion he has of himself, we cannot judge of a revolution by men's consciousness of it. On the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained from the conditions of their material life, from the conflict between the social forces of production and the conditions of production.

The fact of the matter, as later critics have pointed out, in the case of the French Revolution, is that it was the economic processes which were relatively obscure, and unavailable to ready scientific investigation, while the so-called "superstructure"—the ethical and social thinking of the period—was abundantly recorded in numerous documents and records. Marx was one of the discoverers of the importance of economics and it was perhaps natural for him to make economic forces primary in his theory of history. There is no space to argue this question at length, but it may be pointed out that the vast bulk of the important economic changes accompanying the industrial revolution came *after*, and not before, the French Revolution. Not the economic circumstances, but the ideology of the Revolution, brought the changes. As Karl Federn notes in *The Materialist Conception of History*:

> There had been no substantial change in the productive forces [in France} during the last centuries; a great industry scarcely existed, and the government, far from putting any obstacles in the way of the few big establishments and wholesale manufacturers that existed, did its utmost to smooth the ground for them. Neither had the conditions of production undergone any substantial change; the distribution of economic power and influence was more or less the same as it had been a hundred years before. It was the changed ideology that brought about the revolution and, through the revolution, produced new laws and new conditions of property and, finally, as a further consequence, a complete change in the conditions of production. . . . a new ideology in men's brains had broken the fetters and had made possible the use of new productive forces and the formation of new conditions of production. The best proof of this is that in 1810, more than twenty years after the revolution, there were in use in France but two hundred steam engines, while in Prussia there were but two in all as late as 1902. The first practicable steamship sailed on

> the Hudson in 1807; about the same time the first locomotive made its appearance. In England, matters were different. The English Revolution having been fought out in the seventeenth century, there was a high degree of political liberty in the land, and, consequently, of economic liberty also. Thus, the steam engine had long ago been put to use, and their number in 1800 was estimated at no less than 5000.
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> The succession of events is now clear: first came, about the middle of the eighteenth century, a purely ideological revolution in France; half a century later there followed the political revolution enforcing a complete change of the legal order. Not before all these changes had been accomplished, did the great economic change set in. This time, to be sure, it may be examined and studied with scientific precision, because economic science had made enormous progress at the same time. The evolution and the succession of events is exactly the reverse of what Marx and the Marxists claim it to be.
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> The economic revolution which succeeded the political upheaval had ideological consequences in its turn and produced a good number of varied illusions and self-deceptions. One of the most noteworthy ideological phenomena derivable from it is the Marxist theory of history.

This passage is not quoted, nor are the facts there presented by Federn intended, to demonstrate that in no case does history follow the pattern described by Marx, but only to indicate the unreliability of dialectical materialism as a rigid form of analysis. We may be grateful to Marx for bringing attention to the role of economics in shaping our lives, and for his exposure of the pious rationalizations often made to defend economic injustice, without adopting his ruthless elimination of any but material causes in the unfolding of historical change.

The ethical idea in Marxist doctrine is the assertion of the Class Struggle as the climactic force in history. Marx claimed this to be one of his original contributions to the "Marxist" system. Whereas previous revolutionaries had spoken of the "brotherhood of man," Marx felt no brotherhood for the exploiters of the working classes. The Marxist ethic was the fighting ethic of the Class Struggle. He ended the *Communist Manifesto* with the words: "Let the ruling classes tremble at the prospect of a communist revolution. Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. PROLETARIANS OF ALL LANDS, UNITE!" A righteous hatred demands "liquidation" of oppressors who have broken the bond of human solidarity.

Now comes the program for revolution, which is to be inspired by a class ethic instead of a universal appeal to all men. Through the unions and the working class movement generally, the political power of the proletariat is to be fostered and developed, until, finally, its leaders are able to seize power. In this respect, Edmund Wilson has some lucid comments in *To the Finland Station*:

> What Karl Marx had no clue for understanding was that the absence in the United States of the feudal class background of Europe would have the effect not only of facilitating the expansion of capitalism but also of making possible a genuine social democratization; that a community would grow up and endure in which the people engaged in different occupations would probably come nearer to speaking the same language and even to sharing the same criteria than anywhere in the industrialized world. Here in the United States, our social groupings are mainly based upon money, and the money is always changing hands so rapidly that class lines cannot cut very deep. There is among us as compared to Europe—Mr. Lundberg to the contrary, notwithstanding—relatively little of the kind of solidarity which is based on group intermarriage and the keeping of businesses in the hands of the same families.

Historically speaking, political movements in the United States sailing under the colors of the Class Struggle have turned out to be fiascos, especially since the end of the first great war of this century. For the great preponderance of the labor unions in the United States of today, the Class Struggle idea, so carefully nurtured by Samuel Gompers some seventy-five years ago, is The Forgotten Issue. As Macdonald notes in *The Root Is Man*, present-day progressive unions are even more conservative than the Declaration of Independence of the United States, which, instead of the *Communist Manifesto*, is quoted in the

Constitution of the CIO United Automobile Workers union. Macdonald dryly remarks:

> But even the 1776 brand of radicalism is too strong for these modern proletarians: they include the statement about governments "deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," but they omit the rest of the sentence, which declares that the people have a right to overthrow a government if they don't like it. . . . They have nothing against capitalism or the wage system; all they want is "a mutually satisfactory and beneficial employer-employee relationship" and "a place at the conference table, together with management." And this is in many ways the most class-conscious union in the country!

Plainly, the dynamics of nineteenth-century revolutionary theory have either been turned into rituals or are altogether forgotten. The old issues, at least in the United States, have practically lost their meaning, and the new ones are not yet recognized. Macdonald speaks of the some 150,000 card-carrying proletarians who labored for many months on the Manhattan project without knowing what they were doing, then cheered when the Bomb fell on Hiroshima. It was a handful of scientists, not proletarians, who worried about the implications of atomic bombing. The working class was strangely silent on this subject, and still is today.

COMMENTARY
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE brief treatment accorded the complex subject of the Class Struggle in this week's review seems to call for an additional comment or two. Those who have the impression that there is little or no trace of the Class Struggle in American history have some interesting reading to do, starting, perhaps, with writings by the Founding Fathers, from which it becomes plain that these early American statesmen did their best to sever all psychological ties with the traditional European version of the "caste system."

Then, for insight into the persistence of class distinctions in the United States, and related economic injustices, a book like Louis Adamic's *Dynamite* is extremely useful. *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, in which is found, among other things, an account of the dynamiting of the Los Angeles Times building in 1910, is also illuminating on the subject. Oscar Ameringer's *If You Don't Weaken* is a rollicking life-story of a European-born American radical which gives an inside view of the class struggle at its height in American history. A perhaps prejudiced but brilliant witness on this subject is Howard Fast, whose fictionized biography of John Peter Altgeld, *The American*, is worth reading from almost any point of view. Then, Irving Stone's *Clarence Darrow: For the Defense* might complete the picture with a moving account of the great Pullman strike and the almost incredible injustices to the workers of the Pullman Company, which incidentally changed Eugene Debs from a union official into a crusading socialist and leader of the American radical movement.

The relation between European and American radicalism is a subject of intense interest for students of American history. Something of the commitment and spirit of self-sacrifice of the European radical may be gleaned from Alexander Berkman's *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist.* Perhaps, as a final perspective, one should turn to Adamic's *My America*, where the themes of both European and American radical thinking blend into an altogether admirable study of the American scene.

As we so often say in these pages, the resolution of the social problems of the world, and of, today, the problems of international relationships, depends in large part upon a general understanding of the radical movement, its origins, its assumptions, and its role in shaping opinion in other countries, as well as in the United States. Such books as these could easily constitute a basic introduction to the historical background of the radical movement.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

As background for understanding the complicated factors contributing to the "disorientation" of present-day youth, some paragraphs by concerned psychiatrists are of interest. Our first quotation is from Erich Fromm's well known *Escape From Freedom,* and deals with what has been called "the problem of identity." According to Fromm, there are two forms of "selfishness" which lead to anti-social action. The first is the ordinary garden-variety against which moralists—and parents—have been preaching since the beginning of time. The second, however, originates in a *false identification* with one's social surroundings. Man's fulfillment can be pretty well proved to depend upon a self-discovery of individuality and creativity, while submergence in a group leaves a person without a clear sense of who, what, or why he is. The effects of this submergence are particularly noticeable today, when so many transformations of mind and of mores have taken place.

A profound truth expressed variously by men of philosophical and religious insight is that the discovery of qualities *within oneself* which demand fulfillment in values beyond those represented in "society" is actually a *prerequisite* to the best "social" living. Fromm says:

> Selfishness is rooted in the lack of affirmation and love for the real self, that is, for the whole concrete human being with all his potentialities. The "self" in the interest of which modern man acts is the social self, a self which is essentially constituted by the role the individual is supposed to play and which in reality is merely the subjective disguise for the objective social function of man in society. Modern selfishness is the greed that is rooted in the frustration of the real self and whose object is the social self. While modern man seems to be characterized by utmost assertion of the self, actually his self has been weakened and reduced to a segment of the total self—intellect and will power—to the exclusion of all other parts of the total personality.
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> Modern man's feeling of isolation and powerlessness is increased still further by the character which all his human relationships have assumed. The concrete relationship of one individual to another has lost its direct and human character and has assumed a spirit of manipulation and instrumentality.

Turning to a recent international conference on Health and Human Relations, we find psychoanalyst Erik Erikson comparing the psychological prospects of youth in America with those characteristic of Hitler's Germany. Dr. Erikson notes sobering similarities, while granting plenty of differences as well. "We should not underestimate," he writes, "the cultural price which youth is ready to pay for the 'social stamp'—and the price which youth is ready to make others pay as well." He continues:

> In America where we are free of mass standardization by state measures there is nevertheless an abundant and sometimes senseless spontaneous community life among young people in which certain styles of clothing, certain gestures, and certain ways of speaking are made mandatory, and are always adopted with the manifest feeling of how individualistic and how free of bonds one is. At the same time the true individuality of American tradition and with it much promising talent often remain buried underneath such a superficial standardization of the appearance of freedom. But let us not judge; we are facing here a worldwide problem.
>
> In order to come closer to this matter let me go back to individual pathology. The necessity of finding a stamp and standardization at this time is so great that youth often prefers to find and to adopt a negative identity rather than none at all. One may well say that youth sometimes prefers to be nothing and to be that thoroughly than to remain a contradictory bundle of identity fragments.

In other words, when the intellectual basis of a culture is confused and contradictory, we must expect youths, like everyone else, to seek some kind of stable definition of self. One form of security, even if specious and dangerous, is found by acceptance of mass standards. This, in the view of many psychiatrists, is what the Germans accepted when they accepted Hitler. As Dr. Erikson puts it:

> Through national socialism, German culture learned to know one kind of modern standardization, totalitarian standardization dictated by the state. This standardization offered to youth the identity of a

> nation, of a "race," and of a class as a very much simplified escape from the sense of role-diffusion. In America it is not always understood that the need for such totalitarian standardization among the youth of great, formerly agrarian countries which face abrupt industrialization is not only brought about by harsh police methods but also corresponds to a spontaneous, dynamic, and historically unavoidable need. This very need poses the greatest and most decisive challenge to the vitality of our free ideals and institutions.

Now, if some youths gravitate towards passive acceptance of national or group standards in order to narcotize frustration and confusion, others react oppositely, seeking fraternization in a spirit of rebellion. As Dr. Erikson indicates, there is a measure of satisfaction in being "against everything" too—which amounts to seeking a "negative" identity. The youth who poses as a complete rebel or anarchist has at least identified himself with some kind of united outlook, instead of constituting a "contradictory bundle of identity fragments." When parents stress virulent criticism of a certain type of personality, and suggest to their children that they seem to be becoming that sort of person, they may unknowingly be influencing the young to move in that direction. "It happens that mothers and fathers who are more preoccupied with the avoidance of some repudiated identity," writes Erikson, "at the end find that they have helped along the materialization of the negative identity."

Lest the foregoing seem unnecessarily complicated by what appears to be psychoanalytic jargon, we might reflect that no other vocabulary exists for discussing these phenomena. The importance of such observations for the parent and educator is indicated by another of Erikson's passages, wherein he explains the dynamics by which the "negative identity" takes over control of the total personality. "Youths often attempt," he writes "to evade a dangerous role-diffusion by the formation of a pseudo-identity which is derived from membership in criminal or drug-addiction gangs. If such pseudo-identity is accepted as a youth's final and *natural* identity by teachers, by judges, and by psychiatrists, he not infrequently invests his pride in becoming exactly what the pessimistic and intolerant community expects him to become."

We recall reading a novel in which one character, a law enforcement officer, explains why it is necessary for him to refrain from *expecting* guilt of possible suspects in a criminal case. Not only does suspicion sometimes lead to the prosecution of the wrong man, he said, but the *attitude* of suspicion—suspicion which expects the worst motivations in people—may even move the suspect toward that kind of behavior. He told the story of a man who persistently accused his wife of infidelity over a period of ten years, even though there was no real foundation for the charge. Finally the wife did become unfaithful. Question: who was responsible? According to this unusual law enforcement officer the accusing husband was far more responsible than his wife. So it may be with parents who out of fear or outraged pride assume that their adolescent child is one of the least pleasant "identity fragments" he has picked up from a fragmented society.

Here are reasons for suggesting that parents will do well to refrain from basing their evaluations of a youth upon *either* the "social" or the "anti-social" role he is currently playing.

FRONTIERS

The Other Half of the World

READERS who share our enthusiasm for the writings of Justice William O. Douglas and, in particular, his continued insistence that we labor to free ourselves from occidental provincialism, will be interested to know that at least one "institution" has taken up the same cause. At hand is a brochure issued by The American Academy of Asian Studies, established in 1951 in San Francisco, "because of the appalling neglect of this other half of the world in our educational system, particularly of the areas outside China and Japan—areas containing almost a half of mankind." The Academy is "an independent non-profit institution, devoted entirely to the study of Asia." It has an impressive list of sponsors, and its advisory board includes Carlos P. Romulo, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs from the Philippines, Madame Pandit, former Ambassador from India, Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister of Indonesia, and Robert Sproul, President, University of California. Lynn White, Jr., President of Mills College (author of *Educating Our Daughters*) is a Trustee, along with the Consuls General of India and Pakistan.

The chief working feature of the Academy is its graduate school, whose activities are described as follows:

> The curriculum is designed to give an integrated picture of the nature and spirit of Asian cultures as a whole, and the relative position and emphasis given to the various subjects—philosophy, psychology, art, literature, politics, languages, etc.—is based on Asian rather than Western academic traditions.
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> Thus philosophy, psychology, and religion occupy the dominant position in the curriculum, because this is the position which they hold in the traditional cultures of Asia. Languages, the arts, politics, and the social sciences occupy their important but subordinate position, just as in, say, Hindu society the Kshatriya (military) and Vaishya (merchant) castes hold positions subordinate to the Brahmana (spiritual).
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> In its study and presentation of Asian thought, the Academy is making a most serious effort to avoid two extremes into which Western interest in these matters has largely erred. These are the extremes of sensational, uninformed, dilettante cultism on the one hand, and, on the other, the purely linguistic, antiquarian, and usually patronizing interest hitherto characteristic of academic oriental studies.
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> As an essential adjunct to these courses the Academy is forming a well-selected reference library for its particular purposes. The special objective of this library is to constitute a unique collection of books and periodicals published in Asia. The Academy's library is in regular receipt of numerous Asian periodicals not normally found in university libraries.

It is interesting to note, also, the wish of the Academy's sponsors to promote the growth of an understanding between East and West which will "involve not only the specialist but the general public as well." The function of various departments "is to make the work of the Academy available to the layman who does not wish to take courses for academic credit." Here we should like to interject two paragraphs from an article by Dr. C. W. De Kiewiet for the *Saturday Review of Literature* (Sept. 12). His title is "Let's Globalize Our Universities," and since what he suggests is very close to what the American Academy of Asian Studies is attempting to do, his discussion of the need for this sort of education is of interest:

> How many people have a good enough acquaintance with the history and thought of India to understand the neutralism of Mr. Nehru, which controls the balance of power in Asia, or to discern the possible truth in the assertion that the capital event of our generation may well be not the antithesis of Russia and the United States, but the coming effort of a liberal India and a Communist China to solve the same momentous problems of poverty, disease, under-equipment, debt, landlessness, over-population, and ignorance by the use of very different economic and political principles and procedures? How many people see that the search for power in the Middle East or Africa is also a search for dignity and self-respect? How many of us know enough of the needs of Africa and Asia to mourn over the pity and the waste that America, one of the great frontier societies of history, should have to transform itself into a great military power, when its experience in conquering want and disease could be at work helping on the new frontiers of the earth to create the longer years of human life that Americans enjoy?
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> America's consciousness of its world must undergo the same transformation that occurred in

> Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a result of the great voyages of discovery. The knowledge of new places and peoples, beliefs and practices crowded upon Europe's consciousness. Paul Hazard called it "*La crise dans la conscience européenne*." Truths that had seemed absolute became relative beliefs that were assured became doubtful. Large new bodies of information had to be incorporated. Discrepancies between ideas and collisions between beliefs had to be reconciled and mediated.

The Academy's prospectus cites statistics from a 1951 survey made by the Social Science Research Council, revealing that in the whole of the United States there are but seventy-seven graduate students concerning themselves with study of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Near East—a fact which the Academy calls "a sorry comment on the inadequacy and provincialism of our educational system." Undergraduate courses in these fields, incidentally, are "almost non-existent." Furthermore, although there are seventy-seven students—from the twenty-eight largest universities of the United States—who are presumably interested in understanding various aspects of Asian life, not one of them has concerned himself with the religion, philosophy, literature or the art of Asia, while, as the Academy's spokesman again points out "the basis of all Asian life is spiritual and philosophical." He continues:

> These most important aspects of Asian life are completely overlooked even in the limited studies which have been undertaken in American universities today.
>
> This is basically due to the fact that facilities for such study were not generally available until the establishment of the American Academy. This is why government and business have met with so much difficulty in their efforts to work with that part of the world. The real root of the so-called Asian problem is our complete lack of knowledge of Asian culture, and the problem will continue so long as this lack remains.
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> The Academy proposes to be a nucleus for the expansion of Asian Studies in the United States. Its graduates would be a reservoir of teachers for other institutions of learning, or specialists for government and business, as well as a source of sympathetic and qualified assistants for Asian governments and peoples in their efforts to improve their conditions. The Academy's teaching techniques, text books, and lectures will be made available to all educational institutions in the United States. Furthermore, a widespread knowledge of the Academy's activities will make it possible for other university faculties to obtain authorization to devote a greater portion of their budgets to Asian studies—thus expanding the work in this field throughout the nation.
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> The existence of the Academy has already exerted a calming influence on the Asians' well-founded resentment to the usual Western attitude of superiority. A school devoted entirely to bringing a real understanding of Asia to the United States is concrete evidence of our sincere desire to overcome this attitude through real knowledge of the life and thought of Asian peoples.