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SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

A CORRESPONDENT discusses briefly the question of scientific acceptance of ESP (telepathy, etc.), reaching a conclusion that seems to us of considerable importance. He writes:

> I don't know whether psychologists should accept ESP in their thinking—probably they should. However, there is certainly no scientific reason why it should be accepted by physical scientists except perhaps that their opinions carry untoward weight in our present society. In point of fact, the physical scientist neglects nearly everything of basic importance to an ordinary human being, in favor of manipulating abstractions which are much more amenable. . . . I find that such a concept as "color" has no meaning that I can express and it gives me a headache to think in such terms. I feel that it is fruitless to expect such a discipline to uncover the "fundamental order of the universe". . . . However, I also feel that so long as subjective experience remains incommunicable, the scientific discipline will be important as a tool for testing concepts arrived at in other ways.
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> Psychology, however, seems to be venturing into the field of philosophy where, in my opinion, it belongs. This is where such a phenomenon as ESP, once demonstrated scientifically should, in my opinion, be mainly considered. There is obviously no known force of the human brain sufficient to manipulate dice, start fires, or instigate whatever occurs. It seems to me that the investigator has to fall back on the concept of the "mind," a word which, so far as I know, has no meaning whatever in biochemistry, physiology or anatomy.
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> Inasmuch as psychologists and philosophers are both interested in the workings of the alleged human mind, brain, or whatever, we may finally have reached a junction between the disciplines of physical science and philosophy. In my opinion, if this could be recognized and the psychologists given a little philosophical training, or vice versa, things might proceed a little more rapidly.

Is it too much to say, in agreeing with this correspondent, that when the junction between science and philosophy takes place, science will become a far more important field of inquiry than it has been to date—simply because, through this junction, it may arm philosophy with powers of demonstration?

Science once belonged to philosophy—Newton took the relationship for granted, as we recall, speaking of his researches as endeavors in Natural Philosophy. In any event, sharp division between physical and philosophical inquiry is peculiar to modern times. The division was logical enough, however, in view of the circumstances attending the birth of modern science. Galileo barely escaped with a whole skin because of the "philosophical" *(i.e.,* religious) implications found in his discoveries by the learned doctors of the Church. Perhaps the impersonal clarity of mathematics made Galileo relegate to "secondary" qualities of nature all those phenomena which do not submit easily to mathematical analysis—the "subjective" attributes of things, including color, etc. But, perhaps again, Galileo was also inclined to this division because it left him free to practice his science without seeming to rake up "philosophical implications" that would involve him in still more disfavor with the Inquisition. Whatever his motives, the consequences for modern thought of this division have been far-reaching. As E. A. Burtt says in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science:*

> . . . the primary-secondary doctrine in Galileo is worth a moment's pause, for its effects in modern thought have been of incalculable importance. It is a fundamental step toward that banishing of man from the great world of nature and his treatment as an effect of what happens in the latter, which has been a pretty constant feature of the philosophy of modern science, a procedure enormously simplifying the field of science, but bringing in its train the big metaphysical and especially epistemological problems of modern philosophy. Till the time of Galileo it had always been taken for granted that man and nature were both integral parts of a larger whole, in which

> man's place was the more fundamental. . . . *Now, in the course of translating this distinction of primary and secondary into terms suited to the new mathematical interpretation of nature, we have the first stage in the reading of man quite out of the real and primary realm.* Obviously man was not a subject suited to mathematical study. His performances could not be treated by the quantitative method, except in the most meagre fashion. His was a life of colors and sounds, of pleasures, of griefs, of passionate loves, of ambitions, and strivings. Hence the real world must be the world outside of man; the world of astronomy and the world of resting and moving terrestrial objects. The only thing in common between man and this real world was his ability to discover it, a fact which, being necessarily presupposed, was easily neglected. . . .

Here, quite plainly, is the foundation of our correspondent's complaint about physics. But is it likely that Galileo's enthusiasm for "matter" would have been so partisan, if there had not existed in his time a religious institution of ominous political power which maintained an exclusive monopoly over the realms of spirit and soul? It is fairly well known that Descartes, a few years later, evaded the issue of the Copernican Hypothesis, having noted the unpopularity it brought to both Copernicus and Galileo.

We speak, today, of the distorting effects political "witch-hunting" is having on education and academic studies. In the history of the rise of modern science, we have the classical example of such effects. Science not only broke away from religion—first in self-defense, then in independent pride but it eventually declared that both religion and philosophy were "expendable," from the scientific point of view.

Now, our correspondent notes, there seems to be a movement toward the synthesis of psychology and philosophy. Let us welcome the synthesis, but let us also note the hazards which are involved. If psychology unites with philosophy, there will be a technical similarity between this conjunction and the view of man and nature which prevailed before the time of Galileo. Until this conjunction, scientists have been free to investigate without bothering at all with "philosophical implications." Indeed, as our correspondent points out, the disciplines and the vocabulary of the various sciences make it almost impossible for them to take cognizance—official cognizance, that is—of philosophy, for how can a science which has no meaning for the word "mind" interest itself in philosophical questions?

Perhaps this is a protection, besides being an obvious limitation. If scientific language easily lent itself to philosophy, it could also be turned to religious purposes, and then we would have the irresponsible among the sectarians twisting science into justifications of their dogmas. As a matter of fact, a skillful theologian can do this already, although scientists are not as yet very much interested in such attempts.

So, as we move toward synthesis between science and philosophy, let us recognize that disciplined thinking here becomes even more important than it is in science, proper, since scientific philosophizing will deal with the hopes of man, instead of merely the facts which make up his external environment.

Our correspondent says there is "no reason why ESP should be accepted by physical scientists." If this means "physicists," another way of looking at the situation may be of value. Since the physicists were the first to abandon the unified, pre-Galilean outlook on the world; and since the physicists, more than any other branch of science, have achieved practical success in their undertakings, there is ample reason, we think, for physicists to relax their skepticism. They are not fighting for recognition any more. They have it. In other words, the achievements of physics are so notable that they do not need the protection of ideological consistency. A physicist can afford to dabble in metaphysics, since the foundation of his own science is so secure. We have seen no recent figures, but we suspect that a much higher proportion of physicists accept the idea of ESP than prevails among psychologists. If ESP should turn out to be undeniably real, Einstein's equations will not fall into meaninglessness. Oak Ridge,

Tennessee, will still be in business. The industries applying the fruits of physical research and discovery will continue their production unaffected.

Not so with the orthodox brands of psychology, which are still speculative as to theory—and psychology, let us note, because of its subject-matter, is obliged to be more theoretical than the other sciences. The attempt to eliminate theory from psychology ended with the cycle of Behaviorism, which was probably the final episode in the development of Galileo's premises by modern psychology. So, for psychology, ESP is threatening, subversive, revolutionary doctrine. It can invalidate the assumptions of a lifetime.

Having said this, we should not neglect to point out that there is a branch of psychology—the latest offshoot, which grew up in consultation rooms and clinics rather than on campuses and in laboratories—which is rapidly embracing philosophy and metaphysics. We speak of psychiatry and psychoanalysis; and, to be more specific, of certain of the leaders in this field. A group of psychotherapists have already formed a society to consider the pertinence of parapsychology to their practice. Unlike the academic psychologists, who have inherited a tradition, these men work with patients daily and tend to be less bound by the past. *Their* universe will not come apart at the seams if telepathy turns out to be a fact.

But where, it may be asked, may the interested but cautious scientist turn for the means of uniting his discipline with philosophical inquiry? We know no simple answer to this question. We take the view that scientists gifted with exceptional intelligence and a spirit of impartiality will themselves work out this problem gradually. Such men are already writing books suggesting thought in this direction. Erwin Schrodinger's *What Is Life?* is one example, Fred Hoyle's *The Nature of the Universe* another. Then, among older works, there is Max Planck's *Where Is Science Going?* and Hermann Weyl's *The Open World.* There are a number of others, of course. We would not include, however, a book like Gustav Stromberg's *The Soul of the Universe,* nor du Noüy's *Human Destiny.* These latter, we think, are in too much of a hurry to arrive at the "true" philosophy.

There is an obvious value in being able to rely upon scientists for an accurate measure of "the sense of the meeting"—the meeting, in this case, being the aggregate of the best minds in the field of scientific inquiry.

It is, perhaps, a quality of mind in regarding the world around us that we need from our scientists—a spirit something like the ancient Greek capacity for wonderment. This is the gospel that is true for every man, as distinguished from the finalities of revelation, the certainties of doctrine. This quality, we think, is what the best of the Progressive educators have been feeling for, and what Robert M. Hutchins means when he speaks of metaphysics.

Finally, there is the problem, raised by our correspondent, of the incommunicability of subjective experience. Short of becoming masters of telepathy, we can think of no solution save the old one of great literature, which, by its evocative magic, seems capable of making men feel the same way about certain transcendent values in human life. Such literature, perhaps, stimulates mystical perception, providing a common denominator for the secret aspirations of mankind.

Letter from ENGLAND

LONDON.—National complacency in the virtual infallibility of our criminal courts, with all their complex rules of evidence designed through the centuries to eliminate that which is not subject to demonstrable proof, has received a shattering blow. The facts must here be severely summarized.

In 1950 an illiterate lorry driver was charged with the murder of his wife and baby. In English law only one murder can go to an indictment. Two indictments were made against this man, Timothy Evans. The charge of murder against the wife was dropped; that of the murder of the baby was proceeded with. At the trial, however, evidence as to the death of the wife was admitted.

The star Crown witness was the landlord of the small London house in which these crimes took place. By name, Christie, this man's evidence secured for the Crown a verdict of guilty. Evans, to the end protesting his innocence, was hanged. Both crimes first charged against him were murder by strangulation.

Now, there has just ended in a verdict of guilty the trial of the former Crown witness, Christie, for the murder by strangulation, in the same house, of his wife. Though Christie was indicted for that murder alone, bodies of women were found on the premises, and the skeletons of others in the back yard. At his trial Christie gave evidence and confessed to seven murders, including that of the wife of Evans. But he denied the murder of the Evans baby. Then, within fourteen days of his execution, he confessed that he murdered the infant as well as the mother.

In short, the country is now faced with the grim fact that an innocent man has been hanged, after due trial, for a crime of which he was, as he throughout protested, innocent.

Nor is that all. Christie, at the time of giving evidence against Evans—evidence that consigned the unfortunate man to the gallows—was a man with a criminal record. His "dabs," or finger-prints, were on record at Scotland Yard, since he had served a term of imprisonment for battering a woman on the head.

Thus, in addition to the circumstance of a miscarriage of justice, there is the second disturbing circumstance of police ineptitude, and that from the much-advertised and, one may think, over-praised, Scotland Yard.

There is to be an official judicial investigation into the trial of Timothy Evans, but since this can do no more than establish the innocence of a hanged man—that is, a man judicially murdered—the wider issue of capital punishment looms up. There are today to be questions in the House of Commons; an appeal for a five-year suspension of the capital sentence. The movement has the support of Members of both Parties.

There has been for a long time a growing feeling in England against capital punishment. The short argument is that it is the irrevocable sentence of a fallible court. The Evans hanging well underlines the force of this argument. It is supported from other quarters, mainly, by the experience of those States which have abolished it. They have not developed a higher murder rate than such countries as this which have retained the sentence. Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Holland, Portugal, Australia (Queensland), Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela and New Zealand all have abolished capital punishment. In none of those States has the murder rate risen. On the other hand, in England, where few convicted of murder escape the hangman, the murder rate has tended recently to increase. In 1923 there were 151 murders; in 1939-45 (a period including the disruptive War years), there were 1,057. Of that total of homicides "known to the police," only 474 were put on trial. Of that total 208 were found to be insane, 14 were children under 18 years of age, 11 sentences were quashed on appeal, 56 were reprieved, 82 executed.

A few years ago, under the Socialist Government, capital punishment was suspended. But it was reintroduced. Now the issue is once more before the country.

There can be no doubt that, just as there is a very wide gap between the legal definition of insanity and the scientific, there is also a very great difference in the legal criteria of *proof*, and that of science. The consequences of this lamentable exposure of the fallibility of our criminal courts and the shortcomings of our much-vaunted police, will be far-reaching.

A poor, illiterate man in his early thirties has been killed by the State. Nothing can undo that most frightful fact. Thus there is a real likelihood of capital punishment being abolished, since public opinion, in the final analysis, determines such issues.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
LINCOLN, THE INTELLECTUAL

EDMOND WILSON'S *New Yorker* (March 14) review of the collected works of Abraham Lincoln (Rutgers University Press) makes notable and provocative reading, for Mr. Wilson, whose respect for Lincoln is apparently second to none, calls attention to usually neglected phases of the martyred president's mental life. Lincoln, it seems clear from the quotations assembled, was a great deal more than the "back woods saint" of popular memory. An omnivorous reader and an able writer, Lincoln possessed a disciplined and acute mind. Like Jefferson, his philosophy was too profound for any conventional religious expression; he belonged more to the tradition of Thomas Paine than to that of Christianity.

To illustrate, Wilson abstracts from Herndon's memoir:

> Mr. Lincoln's perceptions were slow, cold, clear, and exact. Everything came to him in its precise shape and color. To some men the world of matter and of man comes ornamented with beauty, life, and action, and hence more or less false and inexact. No lurking illusion or other error, false in itself, and clad for the moment in robes of splendor ever passed undetected or unchallenged over the threshold of his mind—that point which divides vision from the realm and home of thought. Names to him were nothing, and titles naught—assumption always standing back abashed at his cold, intellectual glare. Neither his perceptions nor intellectual visions were perverted, distorted, or diseased. He saw all things through a perfect, mental lens. There was no diffraction or refraction there. He was not impulsive, fanciful, or imaginative, but cold, calm, and precise.

A letter by the Marquis de Chambrun indicates the degree to which Lincoln was virtually a savant as well as a political genius and an inspired leader. "No one," wrote de Chambrun, "who heard him express personal ideas, as though thinking aloud, upon some great topic or incidental question, could fail to admire his accuracy of judgment and rectitude of mind. I have heard him give opinions on statesmen and argue political problems with astounding precision. I have heard him describe a beautiful woman and discuss the particular aspects of her appearance, differentiating what is lovely from what might be open to criticism, with the sagacity of an artist. In discussing literature, his judgment showed a delicacy and sureness of taste which would do credit to a celebrated critic."

While no authorities on Lincolniana, we think Mr. Wilson's review about the most interesting discussion of Lincoln we have seen, and, incidentally, excellent correlative reading for Robert Hutchins' *The Higher Learning in America.* A truly great man, it appears, carries with him always the discipline of exact thinking and the capacities of a philosopher-psychologist. And Lincoln was a mystic, too, in the sense that Thomas Paine was a mystic; he saw visions of an infinite future for the moral and intellectual improvement of mankind, and dedicated himself to its encouragement. Thus Lincoln embodied, as Wilson says, "a moral conviction perhaps unique in American politics," and his convictions were based, in Wilson's view, "on a sharper and deeper judgment than Theodore Roosevelt's attack on the trusts, or Woodrow Wilson's vague gospel of the New Freedom, or Franklin Roosevelt's cavalier baiting of the economic royalists."

What we should like to emphasize in connection with this essay on Lincoln is that appreciation of the delicate blending of intellectual and moral qualities found in "great" men is not only a legitimate subject for study and contemplation, but one of the most important. We belong unashamedly to the school which holds for the relative "perfectibility" of the human being, and, from this basis, feel that the "great man" has simply accomplished a further development of qualities all men already possess in embryo.

This view of Lincoln, we think, involves something more than ordinary "hero-worship," there being an important distinction between "hero worship" and reflection upon the qualities of heroism. The former may be entirely an emotional

response, while the latter calls for the exercise of critical judgment and sustained employment of reason. In Mr. Wilson's essay, the emphasis placed upon Lincoln's discipline of mind should afford us encouragement to evaluate Lincoln's life and career by criteria more substantial than emotional responses.

This brings us, in Wilson's essay, to what may be thought of as a helpful redefinition of "mysticism." Mr. Wilson names his article, "Abraham Lincoln: The Union as Religious Mysticism," but in the course of the discussion we discover that Lincoln's *philosophical* mysticism can never be represented clearly by anything less than a man of intellectual power. The Lincoln described in the passages already quoted is the same Lincoln who dramatically and accurately foretold his own assassination—the same Lincoln who tried to appreciate the mystic "laws of the universe" which regulate alike all matters of individual and social evolution. The mysticism of Lincoln, in other words, might even be regarded as a refinement and distillation of mental perceptions brought into clarity by an able mind. So, we may ask, are "mysticism" and "intellectualism" inevitably opposed, or is it merely their immature expressions which file counter claims against one another?

Lincoln was serene in his belief that only the realm of ideas had much bearing on the good of man, thus constituting himself a Platonist. As Wilson puts it: "A lecture delivered in 1859 on the subject of Discoveries, Inventions, and Improvements is a curious production for its period and was understandably not a success, since most of Lincoln's time was devoted to extolling the value to humanity of language and the art of writing, the only discovery, invention, or improvement that appears to have excited his enthusiasm. This is quite characteristic of him, for he evidently felt that the use of the word was the only technique he needed; for him, it had been also a discovery and an improvement."

A final quotation will serve to sum up Wilson's points of emphasis. He speaks of the "unity of Lincoln's career," "its consistency," "its self-contained character," continuing:

> Lincoln is not tempted to dissipate his energies; he has no serious conflicts of interest. Everything hangs together. He is conscious from the first of his public role, not only in relation to the history of his country but also in relation to the larger world for which all the old values will be modified, the social relations altered, if it is possible to prove to it the practicability of the principles of the Declaration of Independence. With conviction and persistence, he performs this role, and he is always articulate in it. Every word that he utters belongs to the part, but in order to appreciate Lincoln's lines, you have to see the whole drama.

COMMENTARY
TOWARD PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCE

THIS week's lead article proposes that if science joins hands with philosophy, "it may arm philosophy with powers of demonstration." In cold type, the statement sounds a bit extravagant. Just which philosophical propositions might science support?

So far as we can see, the practical importance of philosophy in human life has to do with the possibility that moral and mental factors—and even spiritual factors—stand in a causal relationship to human experience. Such relationships, at any rate, would constitute a logical field for investigation by philosophy-oriented science. Could, then, the ancient Buddhist concept of *Karma*—or Emerson's "Law of Compensation"—be tested scientifically? Would there be any way of gaining any scientific certainty concerning, say, the Pantheistic conception of Deity, or Herbert Spencer's "Absolute"—or Hegel's notion of Universal Spirit, seeking self-consciousness through embodiment in matter?

Off hand, we should not like to be asked to design an "experiment" for measuring the validity of these ideas!

Yet scientists—some scientists, that is—have been profoundly convinced that truth lies in them. Perhaps we should start out by admitting that such questions, which involve ultimate judgments of value, will never be answered in a cut and dried fashion.

On the other hand, *if* evidence can be dug up to show that a mind—a human mind, activated by conscious will—can influence the movement or behavior of physical objects; without any intermediate physical means, then it is reasonable to say that mind may exercise a casual influence on the material world. Further, if there is evidence—evidence such as that assembled by biologists working on morphogenesis—indicating that organic forms are brought into being and governed in their functions by some dynamic *inner* form, or a guiding intelligence, which is the "principle" of form, then we may also suppose that "mind" more commonly operates on matter in an indirect way, through subtle agencies affecting organic growth.

In a loose sort of way, these ideas correlate with Arthur Eddington's view that the ultimate substance in the universe is "mind-stuff"—as he put it, not just "stuff," and not just "mind," but *mind-stuff*.

What we are really suggesting is that when a hypothesis concerning life processes is formulated, the door be left open for the play of a mind-factor. We realize that scientists are exceedingly skeptical of any "wild" element or cause. They have always strongly opposed any *particular* expression of the "will of God," simply because such a force is, by theological definition, far too versatile and capricious to be captured and defined through scientific research. But notions of the "will-of-God" class are dangerous to science only when they are cast in major roles or used to take the place of discipline in inquiry. Possibly the vitalistic researches of Hans Driesch could serve as an illustration of a fair-minded way of going about the search for a transcendental factor in biological processes.

In any event, work already done suggests that there may be a number of intermediate levels of study which lie *somewhere between* mind and matter—levels open to rigorous investigation. And such work can proceed under hypotheses which allow the possibility of metaphysical causes—proceed much better, perhaps, than according to theories which reject them absolutely.

Finally, if such developments are prohibited by an unreasoning skepticism in scientific circles, there is the likelihood that the charlatans and self-appointed revealers will find themselves able to by-pass "scientific authority" altogether, and to lead more and more of the public into paths of religious extravagance and modern miracle-mongering. From this point of view, scientists have a great responsibility to become philosophical—which they can ignore only at great cost to the world of rational inquiry.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WE wish to recommend especially for teachers and prospective teachers a brief autobiography, *It Takes Time*, by Dr. Marie Rasey (Harper, 1953). It seems appropriate to call attention to this volume for two reasons. First, it is a book which even young "prospective teachers" may read with interest, for Dr. Rasey's early schooling and later training for teaching make a "story" which holds the attention. Second, the author uses extensively the philosophy developed by Karen Horney, maintaining that the only education worthy of the name brings introduction to what Dr. Horney called "the real self," as opposed to "the idealized self," and "the actual self." No mention is made in Dr. Rasey's work of Arthur Jersild of Columbia, but she has obviously been inspired by the same considerations which prompted Jersild's exploration of classroom techniques for pupil self-evaluation, and his positing of a "permanent self" within the changeable one usually manifest.

The "actual self," in Dr. Horney's terminology, is "the self at any given moment in its growth, as the individual behavior reveals it." The "real self," on the other hand, is "that central inner force common to all human beings, and yet unique to each, which is the deep source of growth." Dr. Rasey indicates that only a concept of this nature gives "meaning, significance, and value to the whole human process. It [the "real self"] might be viewed as the pregnant, potential, not-yet-differentiated stuff of personality, moving always toward higher integration and fuller manifestation. It gives substance to the description of man, 'that it hath not yet been revealed what he shall be'."

Dr. Rasey's own career is an interesting odyssy, full of self-revelations and of receptions of inspiration from other educators. She found a profound truth in the Hindu proverb, "When a learner is ready a teacher arrives"; every teacher, she saw, himself needs many teachers, and never passes beyond that need. When significant help is offered by either the writings or the presence of someone whose thought has passed beyond one's own, one has the opportunity, in Dr. Rasey's words, of undergoing a "great experience." We suspect, however—and the tone of *It Takes Time* provides good grounds for this suspicion—that only those who are capable of finding continuous self-revelations in classroom experience will know how to recognize the "teacher" they themselves need.

Dr. Rasey describes how "Dr. Garn"—her own pseudonym in *It Takes Time*—once "finished a presentation of the values involved when pupils learned under the drive of their own purposes, as compared to the learning which derives from required attention upon purposes other than one's own. In the same moment that she had finished what she would have called a good presentation, she heard herself say, 'Tomorrow I shall bring you the list of required readings and also the topics for the term papers, from which you must choose one'." But then—

> As those two sentiments dashed in the air, they erupted in her mind. To what a colossal hypocrisy had she given herself! She looked about her class. Everything was as usual. Young people with at least a surface expression of interested attention. Did they not hear what she had heard? Were they so inured to this dichotomy that they registered no protest? Was she in the midst of a bad dream? Evidently not. For there were the same grimy walls, the same black smoke patterns above the air vents, the same dirty windows on which some idling student had inscribed the perennial: Wash me. Everything was the same except herself.
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> Why had the incongruity struck her now? It was surely not the first time nor the tenth in which she had done approximately the same thing. If own purpose was good for one set of students, why in the world was it not good for all? A blow on the back of the head could hardly have produced more sense of light. If own purpose was the key, what was she doing dictating reading and assigning topics for writing? What was the connotation of "required, assigned"?

Dr. Rasey, in other words, had a rare sensitivity to paradoxes, for knowing when she

was confused and *what* she was confused by. In one of the concluding chapters of *It Takes Time* the author's philosophical orientation is identified. She notes that, despite the advances toward understanding of the child fostered by "Progressive Education," pedagogical terminology has for a long time been chiefly concerned with analysis. "There was no vocabulary for wholeness," she found. "The enrichment had been on the side of analysis. Terms designed for dissecting were not usable for totalities. Hyphenations came on to plague the most wary. Psyche was given in marriage to great promiscuity ranging from genesis to analysis to therapy. The vast increase in abstract terms in areas where most we sought concreteness; the semanticist's reiteration that the word is not the thing; the blind faith of teachers on all levels in the regurgitated words as evidence of control of the ideas and processes for which they were but symbols—all these added further chaos to the situation." (We should note that this paragraph is hardly representative of discussion easy for young minds to follow, but suffice it to say that such conceptual involvements occupy only a portion of the book.) Here are passages which will be of special interest to those who have been impressed by either Horney or Jersild. "Dr. Garn" is groping towards the conclusion that each child must be helped towards the knowledge of what self-understanding means. She writes:

> The actual self is defined as that which the individual is at any given moment, sick or well, of high or low potential intellectually, with or without any special aptitude. It is, whatever it is, the tool of the self, dull or sharp for hewing away at the job of living. One of Dr. Garn's students had once defined it as "the place where I live." This was a difficult concept to lay hold of, for the actual self was not only the tool but also the user of the tool and the arena in which tool and tool's user operated. This was an important area for the teacher to understand. How well did a self know itself? How well could it know? Did one attain equal skill in recognizing his strength as well as his weaknesses? Could the learner learn to love and nurture his actual self, if and as he came to recognize it? Could the teacher learn to help the student to a self-evaluation, and the requisite courage to look kindly upon whatever he found himself to be, the better to grow himself? Would it be possible to learn to accept oneself as the paraphrase of the old hymn had it: "Just as I am, and asking not to be relieved of one dark blot," understanding that it was he and he alone who could do the relieving? Might not he find the courage for his task in accepting: "Just as I am, without one plea, except that Life has need of me"?

Next comes an adequate summary of all Dr. Rasey is attempting to say in *It Takes Time:*

> What Dr. Garn wished to study now went deeper than the doing of the actual self. It went deeper than the actualities of everyday doing and being. It had to do with some deep compelling force, at the core of being, "that central inner force common to all human beings and yet unique to each, which is the deep source of growth." This Dr. Horney called the real self. When the real self was overgrown with the demands of the idealized self, it functioned feebly. The individual could scarcely extricate himself by his own effort. He had to have help. The frustration and failure which the false claims of the idealized self made upon himself clogged the wellsprings of his being. Dead purposes polluted its stream. Yet this central force never completely denied. The urge to completion seemed as persistent in the area of personality as in that of protoplasm. This urge was evident in the youngest child and the oldest teacher. Clearing the clogged springs of growth might well be the doctor's function, but helping to keep free-flowing streams to continue to be free and to help the individual avoid the clogging—this was teacher business, and she proposed to learn more about it. It might well be that the real self was in essence what some had thought of as "spirit"—the rushing, driving force of life, the mystery of life, which might prove to lie outside the limitations set by mortality.

Dr. Rasey's title, *"It Takes Time,"* derives from a saying which she found in Elbert Hubbard's *Philistine*, early in her teaching career: "Noah was six hundred years old before he knew enough to make an Ark!" For Dr. Rasey, teaching has been a challenge; her contact with students demanded that she continually extend the range of her own perspectives, and she feels that no one can really *teach* unless able to learn as much from the pupils as they are able to learn from the teacher.

FRONTIERS

Complete the Circle

WE are wondering, in these days of impassioned defense of civil liberties by liberal and humanist writers, when the convictions of the libertarians and the insights of the psychiatrists will finally meet, to produce a new political intelligence and a psychotherapy which has not only sick people for its patients, but the world.

For one thing we may be thankful: that the raids on freedom of speech and freedom of thought in the United States have provoked an increasingly vigorous response from certain leading citizens—men like Stringfellow Barr, Justice William O. Douglas, Robert M. Hutchins, and some others. Further, what seems the rapid knuckling under of the silent majority to rabble-rousers of suspicion is beginning to produce reflective analysis of popular action, including attempts to understand the psychology of people who are willing to follow the lead of persons like Sen. McCarthy and to echo the attitudes of those who claim to be guarding the United States against subversion from within. "Why They Voted for McCarthy" *(Nation*, Sept. 20, 1952) by H. H. Wilson, was a notable step in this direction. Now, in the *Humanist* for May-June, 1953, George Simpson, a sociologist of Brooklyn College, writes on "The Conspiracy Against Reason" in a way that exposes further the anatomy of the witch-hunting trend.

(Before quoting from Mr. Simpson, we should like to insert a note on the *Humanist*, the bi-monthly organ of the American Humanist Association. The most noticeable orientation of this journal is in the direction of scientific humanism, as distinguished from the humanism, say, of the late Irving Babbitt, or the humanism of the Humanities practiced by Robert M. Hutchins. However, as the months and years go by, we have noticed a gradual lessening of doctrinaire "science" in this periodical, with greater play for the reason which is unrestricted by any academic or professional tradition. Further, the *Humanist* probably does a more thorough job than any other journal in watching and reporting the attempts of religious pressure groups to invade the free area of public education in the United States. The Department, "The Sectarian Battlefront," conducted by Edwin H. Wilson, is immeasurably useful as a barometer of aggressive sectarianism and as a source of the information needed to take personal action in defense of democratic institutions. The *Humanist* is published at 117½ Glen Street, Yellow Springs, Ohio, at $2 a year and 35 cents a copy.)

Mr. Simpson's prose is as excellent as its content. We reprint his opening paragraphs:

> These are times that try men's reason. Abroad in the land is emotional insecurity—fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. None of us is quite sure of what the morrow will bring: world war, atomic blasts, revolution? Two world wars fought for peace and freedom, and there is no peace, and millions have lost their freedom. Our sons are being called into battle, and a standing army—anathema to Americans of earlier days—is part of our institutional life. A ruthless ideological and political enemy, foreign to our traditions of liberty, equal opportunity, individualism, and free thought, wages unending psychological warfare. Life has become a permanent state of the jitters.
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> Balked in their quest for certainty, security, and peace by political forces which live on the opponent's uncertainty, insecurity and fear, men tend to search out not answers but scapegoats. Like the neurotic who does not analyze his personal situation but seeks to berate somebody for having brought it into being, our people are being led down the pathways of the bogey-man, the hate crusade, suspicion, fear, and intimidation. Hatred is so much easier than thought, since it requires no conquest of oneself, no self-constraint, no admission of one's motives, and no intelligence.
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> Groups and individuals have come into this general situation to reap a harvest. They have no faith in democracy and freedom, place no hope in literacy, scorn the higher enlightenment of science, and attack the secular goal of Humanism which is basic to our religious tradition. Long have some of these groups and individuals lain in wait for such a golden opportunity. And little did they expect that in

> the heyday of industrialism, of economic prosperity, of scientific achievement they would find it. And an enemy that would divide and conquer cannot fail to chortle in his cells, fractions, and bureaus as he sees us tearing at the heart of all that has made us strong and can keep us strong.

Here, then, is a statement of the general weakness of our society to attacks from within. Mr. Simpson continues, showing that the groups and individuals who menace democratic institutions in this way may be divided into several classifications, of which he indicates five: (1) power-seeking ideological-religious groups; (2) politically ambitious persons who would ride to high office on waves of fear and anxiety; (3) vested economic interests which oppose any change in property relationships and fear curtailment of profits; (4) the multitude of sufferers from neurosis or mild psychopathic disorder "who cannot bear to live in a world of free inquiry and scientific truth"; and, finally, (5) the intimidated and the frightened, who are easily made responsive to demagogic appeals.

Simpson discusses each of these groups in turn. It is the fourth group, we think, which merits the closest attention, for this classification is probably growing rapidly, and its weaknesses are found in lesser degree among many other human beings. Mr. Simpson's account of this group begins:

> The fourth group who use "communism" as a way to advance what they think are their interests, comprises the lunatic fringe. It consists of emotionally unstable people, terrorized by the atomic age or their own life histories, who latch onto this movement of unreason as a way of salving their own anxieties, relieving their tensions, and covering their own shortcomings. Not understanding the complexities of modern industrial society, relatively illiterate in social science, weighed down by the heavy demands made on intelligence by modern scientific and secular ideals, they seek what they suppose is the good life, not through goodness, but through flagellating some scapegoat of evil. Haunted by guilt and fearful of death (as are all of us humans), these people have found an enemy on whom to relieve their guilt and expend energy so recklessly that though they may not dream of immortality any longer, they can at least forget mortality. All those who do not agree with them are Communists. Their lives are devoted to exorcising from the external world devils which exist only within them, and so they join the conspiracy of irrationality and downright stupidity which uses opprobrium as a substitute for the understanding of problems.

The hope that libertarians and the new psychotherapy may ultimately arrive at synthesis of outlook is largely pertinent to the problems of this group. We all know about these "unstable" people—we meet them, hear them complain, orate, whine, and threaten nearly every day of our lives. The question is, what to do about them? Or, more important, what are the contributing causes of their unhappy condition? Mr. Simpson speaks of those who "cannot bear to live in a world of free inquiry and scientific truth," yet we should like to submit that practically nobody is *born* to this state of mind, or mindlessness.

The fact that must be faced, we think, is that the causes which make this group so large, and therefore so threatening to democratic institutions, are causes inherent in the social and cultural environment of Western civilization. And libertarians, we further suggest, must do more than mark these tendencies for identification: they must study them, try to understand them, and work out at least tentative programs for reducing their prevalence.

For years and years, for generations and even centuries, the liberal and revolutionary minorities, through their publications—pamphlets, periodicals, books, and tracts—have been identifying the forces of evil in the world. The "enemy" in each historical period is described, his crimes listed with enthusiasm, his elimination promised by the forces of righteousness. But after each "purge," even though conducted by political or "rational" means instead of totalitarian liquidation, the enemies reappear in new guises, often more numerous than before.

Now, however, with the sort of analysis and identification Mr. Simpson and some others are providing, there is at least the hope of a new kind

of "attack" on the problem. Now we can say to ourselves, "These people are sick, and we, as representatives of the society we have helped to shape, have a measure of responsibility for their condition." We do not here propose a sentimental *mea culpa* attitude, but the realism which recognizes that people who attempt leadership thereby assume a kind of responsibility for both past and present, as well as for the future.

We need to ask ourselves, then, not only for a picture of the sort of society which will "produce" individuals with healthy minds and emotions—a society in which people will be eager for the responsibilities of freedom and creative endeavor—but, also, to ask ourselves what sort of currents of action may help to produce such individuals, *now*, within the matrix of a culture which seems increasingly to discourage appreciation of the values of freedom and to discount the vital importance of independent thinking.

The imperatives of such programming seem not to have occurred to most of those who write about the enclosing forces of emotional reaction which have made so many regions of life in the United States sanctuaries of complete mediocrity and conformity. Yet, as we see it, there is really nothing else of importance before us to do. This is brought home by a quotation provided by Mr. Simpson from George P. Kennan, taken from the latter's book, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950.* Characterized by Simpson as "one of America's greatest diplomats," Kennan contributes the "what is" to a study which will be usefully complete only when others have added a "what might be" that is both desirable and credible. Kennan writes on "public opinion":

> I . . . suspect that what purports to be public opinion in most countries that consider themselves to have popular government is often not really the consensus of the feelings of the mass of the people at all but rather the expression of the interests of special highly vocal minorities—politicians, commentators, and publicity-seekers of all sorts: people who live by their ability to draw attention to themselves and die, like fish out of water, if they are compelled to remain silent. These people take refuge in pat and chauvinistic slogans because they are incapable of understanding any others, because these slogans are safer from the standpoint of short-term gain, because the truth is sometimes a poor competitor in the market place of ideas—complicated, unsatisfying, full of dilemmas, always vulnerable to misrepresentation and abuse. The counsels of impatience and hatred can always be supported by the crudest and cheapest symbols; for counsels of moderation, the reasons are often intricate, rather than emotional, and difficult to explain. And so the chauvinists of all times and places go their appointed way: plucking the easy fruits, reaping the little triumphs of the day at the expense of someone else tomorrow, deluging in noise and filth anyone who gets in their way, dancing their reckless dance on the prospects for human progress, drawing the shadow of a great doubt over the validity of democratic institutions. And until people learn to spot the fanning of mass emotions and the sowing of bitterness, suspicion, and intolerance as crimes in themselves—as perhaps the greatest disservice that can be done to the cause of popular government—this sort of thing will continue to occur.