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AN EDUCATIONAL IDEAL

WHEN so many well-conceived and ambitious educational projects go awry, it is natural to wonder what may be the reason. To say that, despite the ample resources of this country, and despite the active intelligence of a number of remarkably good men in the field, education in the United States is nevertheless marked by considerably less than outstanding success is almost a commonplace utterance, often voiced by educators themselves.

The answer drawn from the Eternal Verities, to the effect that modern man has been unable to discover any central purpose for his life, doubtless applies. But while we are investigating this large and important problem, there are considerations to be noted.

Many students, for example, seem to think that to be educated means to undergo a process, to submit to a routine. And many teachers and parents have the impression that the job of the educator is to make that routine as attractive and as inoffensive as possible. Here, of course, there are shades of meaning involved. If the contrast is to be between a dull and punishing routine and a pleasant and exciting one, then, by all means, let us have the one which may be enjoyed.

On the other hand, we should like to quarrel with the idea that there is any element of "routine" or "processing" at all in authentic education. Educational institutions may and do have routines which are necessary to the facilities of education. The facilities, however, are not a part of education, any more than the diving board is the dive, or the temple an act of devotion. It may be argued, further, that any sort of routine, once it is thought of as a *part* of education, becomes anti-educational in character and influence. Routines are instruments of conditioning and of habit. Conditioning and habit affect the part of man which may be trained, but they easily confine or inhibit the part of man which responds to and participates in the act of education.

To be educated, a man or boy or girl must want to be educated. This means that anything which hides this fact from the young is a foe of education. Further, the importance of wanting to be educated cannot be disclosed by anyone except those who want the same thing. Thus the only good teachers are people who still regard themselves as learners, who are determined to continue the learning process for themselves throughout their lives. Possibly, for this reason, Socrates is still the natural type of the true educator—a man whom the Oracle called the wisest man in Athens, simply because he thought himself in need of education.

Quite obviously, propositions of this sort invite comparison of a theory of education with the institutional practice of education. The institutional practice of education—a thing which we find it comfortable and convenient to take for granted—may be in direct opposition to the theory of education which insists that education must be wanted. In fact, a great deal of so-called "democratic thinking" on the subject of education may be opposed to this theory.

Albert Jay Nock once suggested that the proper environment for education is that created by a man hard at work at his chosen profession, craft, or calling. Education begins when students are permitted to approach him—quietly, so as not to disturb him—respectfully, since he is in a position to give them what few or no one else can give them. There seems to be a great deal of sound sense in this conception of education. It may be wildly impractical, yet, if it is sound, it should be examined more closely.

Perhaps the first thing that the young will have to recognize is that a genuine education is going to be very difficult for them to get. They need to be disillusioned of the notion that education resides behind any properly appointed ivy-covered wall. Where, then, shall we begin with the business of acquainting the young with the difficult course which lies ahead?

Here, we have a problem. Education does not begin at college age, but practically in the crib. The basic issues of education present themselves all through childhood, becoming increasingly important as what we call the "age of responsibility" is approached. One primary issue emerges when the parents talk over the question of whether or not Johnny should be given violin lessons so long as he refuses to practice on his own time. Our theory on the answer to this question is far from being worked out. The genius or prodigy offers no problem, since he is the extraordinary child who insists on practicing far beyond the call of duty. Such a child has somehow already learned the secret of getting an education, at least in respect to playing the fiddle. But for the ordinary run of offspring, the question of how much well-meant cajolery and constraint should be applied in such situations is a puzzling one. A person brought up in an atmosphere of the arts is liable to argue simply that children should be made to get through the unpleasant drudgery of learning "technique" so that later, when they are older, they will be free to enjoy their expression.

We have only a general principle to suggest: that eventually a time will come when the parent will need to convey to the child, as simply as possible, and without being too ponderous or oppressive, that most of the things worth having in later years will be the result of really wanting them now, and taking the steps necessary to having them. One might almost regret the existence of our imposing public school system, the crafts centers, and a score or more of other facilities—making the educational opportunities of our time resemble a smorgasbord array of delectables. Least of all do we like the fact that, very often, the people available to serve these wares have what amounts to the role of a clerk behind the counter, in our society. This is a downright smear of the arts and of education. It might be better to resolve to be an ignorant Philistine, rather than to dabble in a "cultured" way in all these things.

The revolutionary side of our argument, which we have been rapidly approaching, involves the fact that what is supposed to be education is brought to the young on a silver platter, and as a result the pupils are helped to imagine that it will always be thus. Probably the basic tools of communication—reading, writing, and ciphering—should be taught by the State, if only in self-protection. And doubtless the politicians will demand that other subjects be taught, such as plenty of nationalistic American history. And the industries will want young men fitted for technical positions. We may accept all these incidentals, since, at least for the present, we must—but we are under no necessity to regard them as educational.

Genuine education, it seems to us, should be set apart from all the routines and techniques of instruction. As early as possible, the child should be helped to understand that education can neither be bought nor paid for. Perhaps stories of the founding of the great universities of the Middle Ages would help to get across the idea. Peter Abelard, who had something to do with the start of the University of Paris, was followed about by ardent young men who wanted to listen to him question the orthodoxies of his time. Those young men, we suspect, gained as much education as the times would allow. Abelard was a serious thinker, and other serious thinkers flowered in his atmosphere. Is it too much to say that there is no education, except in an atmosphere of serious thinking? That the mistaking of a lot of degrees, academic buildings, expensive laboratories and other plant for education is a vast deception

foisted upon the young by the old? That this deception is subversive of a free society, since it raises up, not a generation of thinkers, but rank upon rank of deluded little conformists who have learned only to echo back to their instructors the settled formulas of the *status quo?*

We do not suggest that educational reforms are the duty of the State, but that only parents—parents, and a teacher, here and there—can do much of anything about a situation of this sort. It is a matter of refusing to allow education to be throttled by the educational institutions which have grown up all around us—of rejecting any doctrine of education which overlooks the simple primitive conception that education is the transmission from one generation to another of the high skills of men who do their work well—men who are generous enough to permit themselves to be observed by the young, and to answer an occasional question.

Some notice should be made of the fact that the educational ideal of bringing educational opportunity to *everybody* seems to have had the unfortunate effect of cheapening education. Surely, we hasten to add, this is not a necessary result of education for everybody, but it may be a necessary result whenever education is conceived as a process which may somehow be imposed upon human beings, whether or not they care about it at all. We might be able to recover some of the lost glory of education if we keep on insisting that learning cannot take place without deep yearning and aspiration. Even when we do "too much" for the young—as it often seems that we must, in a complex society such as ours, in order to have any contact with them—we can still make it plain that they will make no real gains unless they seize upon what we offer and create from it their own expression. There ought to be some way to convince them that all anyone can do for another is to open a door. Walking through the opening one must do for oneself.

Actually, an idea of this sort can take hold only through the slow process of recreating the entire cultural outlook of a society. But what may not be appreciated is that some such re-creation is needed not only in the field of education. The man who wonders about the growing popular reliance on the resources of the Welfare State ought to realize, also, that the psychology of dependence is at the root of State Power, and that the threat of totalitarianism is more than a merely political development—it is a psychological development founded on a low estimate of the human being and his inner resources. What is wanted, actually, is numerous "Swiss Family Robinsons" who will practice ingenuity and self-reliance within the slowly crystallizing matrix of towering but increasingly meaningless institutions.

We might set the problem in this way: There is always a wilderness to conquer, always a waterless desert to traverse. No child can escape the struggle for wisdom and maturity because his father endowed a library or because his country has hired eminent scholars to render him service. His education will be in the struggle to learn and to know. Anyone who hides this fact from the young is planting the wilderness of tomorrow with impassable thickets of delusion.

Letter from GERMANY

FRANKFORT ON THE MAIN.—Beyond a Western suburb of Frankfort, called Griesheim, near the Main river, lies a German refugee camp of about 400 persons. In gray barracks which were built during the last war to keep prisoners of war as cheap labor for the chemical factory situated close by, and intermingled with German workers who are employed now in surrounding huge American army depots and repair shops, live men, women, and small children of German nationality who fled from Russian Bolshevisation in the Eastern zone of Germany. Each barrack is separated into four departments and each of these is settled by two families of three or four persons. They have their iron stove in the middle of the room and electric heaters to cook their meals. There is no privacy, and every cry of the children is heard through at least half the barrack. Heat and cold alike permeate as unhindered as the noise. The surroundings are drab, the air often filled with smoke and chemical odors. The difference in life for some of the refugees who used to have good living quarters of their own is considerable. Some of the men and women are already at work in town, because unemployment is not high (1.2 million in all of Western Germany); others get public support. In general, one can say that these refugees are victims of the cold war, and it is quite symbolic for them to be in a former prison camp; but this time the Germans are inside it.

The Hessian population, as elsewhere in Germany, is not too friendly to the refugees. The latter take the scarce living room everywhere, they have priority for newly built apartments, although many young couples, freshly married, long for their own flat, and although other evacuees, who were forced to leave because of destruction of their homes, cannot yet return to Frankfort or other places. The refugees bring sharper competition for jobs and create other disadvantages for the Hessians. Meanwhile, it is the policy of the German *Bundesrepublik* to open the door to the refugees—a policy which does not always satisfy the obstinate population, already heavily involved in its own struggle for existence with high costs of living and relief for the aged.

The latest development inside the Soviet zone of Germany, with its swing away from "Socialisation" to more “normal" conditions, does not very much attract the refugees to return to the East. They see too clearly that these recent governmental measures have other causes than moral and human principles, and that no promises to refugees will be kept for long under the stress of the world situation, but may be broken as easily and fast as they are published.

On the other hand, the picture of rigid frontiers is now melting a little with the first concessions of the East. One consequence will probably be the reduction of the number of Eastern German refugees, who in recent months have amounted to about 1,500 to 2,000 persons daily. Curiously enough, even the newly arrived refugee in the *Bundesrepublik* draws a deep breath of relief when hearing that the human flow from the East is diminishing, because he thinks that his own troubles will also diminish, or, at least, not increase**.**

Thus, existence has become so precarious under the stress of our time that not much room for humanity to others has been left, either with the inhabitants of Hessia or among the freshly arrived Eastern refugees. The question arises: when in the future will this decline in human sympathies—observable in all regions of activity—change to a new attitude?

The answer may be at once simple and complex. We have to create new conditions and to educate for solidarity and gentleness. But several hindrances stand in the way of this program. Present production flows for the most part into channels which do not satisfy human needs; oppressive political conflict everywhere points to destruction of human beings and not to their emancipation, although the moral demands for a decent life and attitude are heard more today than ever before in history. This contradiction between the actual state of things and its inner possibilities is striking! The solution—good will and planning—may be ultimately brought about because of the impossibility of going further on the road of purely private interests. If the Eastern German refugee continues with his old state of mind to struggle alone for his own, his experiences and attitude will not alter or improve the general situation; instead, his burdens will augment the huge load of human suffering until present existence becomes unbearable and a change of direction is inevitable. Thus, the refugee—whatever his outlook—moves toward a state of society under which endurance of old conceptions will soon be impossible, and new conceptions, new ways of life, will have to be found and realized.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
"MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF"

ROLLO MAY'S book of this title (Norton, '53), further blocks in the increasingly comprehensive revaluation of man taking place among the psychologists. Fromm and Horney gave us a "real self" as distinct from a "false self." Fromm has claimed that the only integral life of man is the life of the Inner Self, and later indicated that it has a language all its own. Rhine has given us the "psycho-centric" view of man—a term designating the semi-independent existence of what might quite easily be called the Soul; while, as recently noted (in "Children…and Ourselves"), educational psychologist Arthur Jersild distinguishes between "the temporary self" and "the permanent self." Dr. May's complementary emphasis is suggested by Chapter 8, under the heading "Man, the Transcender of Time."

The "timeless self," the "inner self," the "real self," and the "soul," are all ways of speaking of that part of man which is significantly more than his physical responses. It is this "man within the man" who is presumably capable of distinguishing genuine love and affection from possessiveness, who does not place commercial values on friendships, nor seek to elevate himself by social distinctions, but who is concerned chiefly with the development of an affinity for deeper values.

Two paragraphs from May's Preface illustrate his orientation:

> This book is not a substitute for psychotherapy. Nor is it a self-help book in the sense that it promises cheap and easy cures overnight. But in another worthy and profound sense every good book is a self-help book—it helps the reader, through seeing himself and his own experiences reflected in the book, to gain new light on his own problems of personal integration. I hope this is that kind of book.
>
> In these chapters we shall look not only to the new insights of psychology on the hidden levels of the self, but also to the wisdom of those who through the ages, in the fields of literature, philosophy, and ethics, have sought to understand how man can best meet his insecurity and personal crises, and turn them to constructive uses. Our aim is to discover ways in which we can stand against the insecurity of our time, to find a center of strength within ourselves, and as far as we can, to point the way toward achieving values and goals which can be depended upon in a day when very little is secure.

Here, again, Dr. May carries on the "Fromm tradition," for he shows considerable interest and awareness of the great philosophical lineages of the past, being, for instance, much intrigued by the psychological implications of Spinoza's *sub specie æternitatis.* Dr. May apparently has come to believe that man *should* live "under the form of eternity" because he *is,* himself, timeless in essence and origin. Thus he endeavors to point out that the nature of the age we live in, its peculiar strengths and weaknesses, its proclivity for attracting atom bombs, even its frenetic urban living, are all a bit beside the point so far as affecting a man's discovery of himself is concerned. May has adopted the "conclusion that, on the deepest level, the question of which age we live in is irrelevant."

> The basic question is how the individual, in his own awareness of himself and the period he lives in, is able through his decisions to attain inner freedom and to live according to his own inner integrity. Whether we live in the Renaissance, or in thirteenth-century France, or at the time of the fall of Rome, we are part-and-parcel of our age in every respect—its wars, its economic conflicts, its anxiety, its achievement. But no "well-integrated" society can perform for the individual, or relieve him from, his task of achieving self-consciousness and the capacity for making his own choices responsibly. And no traumatic world situation can rob the individual of the privilege of making the final decision with regard to himself, even if it is only to affirm his own fate.

Spinoza, we take it, would have liked Dr. May's rendition, and we hope that many of the orthodox psychologists who have endorsed Dr. May's earlier works will like it, also, refraining from a sad headshaking and the remark that "old May seems to have gone mystical on us."

May, like Fromm, is not easy on conventional religion, an implication we can derive even from the following analysis:

> Every creative act has its eternal aspect. This brings us to the deteriorated forms of the religious idea of "eternal life." The phrase "eternal life" is popularly used to imply endless time, as though eternity meant going on year after year limitlessly. One sees this view implied in the question frequently painted by some persons—with what motives heaven only knows—on the sides of buildings to challenge the passerby on the highways, "Where will you spend eternity?" This is about it. "Spend" implies a given quantity—if you spend half your money, you have only have left; and could one "spend" half or two-thirds of eternity? Such a view of eternity is not only repugnant psychologically—what a boring prospect, that one spend year after year endlessly!—but it is also absurd logically and unsound theologically. Eternity is not a given quantity of time: it transcends time. Eternity is the qualitative significance of time. One doesn't have to identify the experience of listening to music with the theological meaning of eternity to realize that in music—or in love, or in any work which proceeds from one's inner integrity—that the "eternal" is a way of relating to life, not a succession of "tomorrows."

W. W. Norton's jacket praise of *Man's Search for Himself* should be of interest to all students of psychology, for the four psychologists who endorse the volume are Erich Fromm, Carl Binger, H. A. Overstreet, and Gordon W. Allport. These men have one thing definitely and clearly in common—the proclivity for deepening and enlarging their own definitions of "the nature of man" with each passing year. We hope that the less creative academicians will not be long in recognizing this transition, and acquainting university students with the fact that such psychologists are *not* "beyond the pale" of their field but rather represent the movement toward a synthesis of non-authoritarian religion, philosophy, and psychological science.

When one begins to experiment with such ideas and phrases as that of "the timeless self," moreover, one is much less apt to adopt the "beyond the pale" approach to either persons unlike oneself or unfamiliar concepts. Perhaps the development of "field-physics," "field-biology," and a "field theory of education" has encouraged men to live more "according to the order of eternity," and thus helped them to go beyond purely temporal biases. There seems to be a sort of race going on between development of new technical knowledge and new philosophical perspectives, which *does* give a special relevance to such works as *Man's Search for Himself*. What we probably need most of all is a point of view which makes fear of "A" or any other kind of bombs seem childish, and, if we don't fear bombs we probably will not perpetuate the conditions which inspire their construction, by either ourselves or our "enemies."

COMMENTARY
TWO PSYCHOLOGIES

WHILE Review and Frontiers for this week do not consider precisely the same subject-matter, both discuss modern psychology, yet reach conclusions which are practically polar opposites. Frontiers rebukes academic psychology for its amazing disregard of paranormal happenings, such as thought-transference, whereas Review is extensively appreciative of the work of men who follow in the psychoanalytical and psychiatric tradition. Why should there be this radical difference between two branches of psychological science?

The answer, it seems to us, lies in the fact that while academic psychology borrowed its philosophical first principles—largely principles of negation—from nineteenth-century physics and biology—the psychology of the analysts and psychiatrists has grown from practical attempts to meet human needs. The one, that is, has been anti-theological and empirical, while the other has been pro-human and empirical. (It should be noted that Gordon Allport is an academic psychologist, and probably Rollo May, although both have obviously absorbed much of the psychiatric outlook—a development which is rapidly increasing, these days, among men working in universities.)

It is the men who represent an effort to *heal* sick human beings—sick in mind, sick in emotions—who have been brought to use expressions like the "timeless self," and the "inner self," as ideas which seem necessary, or at least useful, to a therapy evolved from practical experience. On the other hand, an academic psychologist who used these expressions seriously would probably be in danger of being jeered out of the profession.

These expressions have a functional origin and employment in modem psychotherapy, but they also have obvious metaphysical implications. It is to the credit of the therapists that they seem quite willing to introduce such terms, despite their extreme unpopularity with academic psychologists. The next step, very likely, will be to face up to the problems of metaphysics and discuss them openly, since clinical workers are not the sort of people who allow themselves to use words which remain high-sounding abstractions. In short, we are likely to obtain a genuine philosophy of "soul" from the psychiatrists and analysts, as it becomes evident that the best therapy is therapy which helps a man to fill his life with affirmative conviction about the nature of things.

Actually, the gradual inclination of psychotherapists to a metaphysical vocabulary is something of a tribute to the American pragmatic philosophy. These terms are emerging because they are seen to be *useful.* And if they are useful, the pragmatist is bound to admit that there is a sense in which they represent "reality" or "truth." One could argue that the ancient formulation of such terms, as, for example, by the authors of the *Upanishads,* was the result of a similar recognition, and that it is only when such ideas become crystallized in some theological system and made into matters of uncritical belief that they take on the overtones of dogmatic religion and priestly pretense.

Doubtless the academic psychologists will resist the notion of an inner, timeless self for quite a while. They will resist it for the same reason that they are intensely suspicious of telepathy or ESP—because they fear a return to theological deceptions in which the idea of "soul" and "salvation" may become weapons of psychological oppression—or because they are caught in a closed-minded theology of their own, of which they are unaware. But neither of these causes is apt to haunt the subconscious of the clinical psychologists. These pioneers, more than representatives of any other branch of modem thought, have had to evaluate carefully as they went along. As a result they have themselves pointed out the *specific* effects, psychologically speaking, of each sort of uncritically held belief. It is the analysts and psychiatrists, therefore, who have at least suggested that there may be a way to unite the discipline of science with the insights and philosophy of religion. We can imagine no greater service to modern civilization.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

THE summer is now upon us and so are the children, with their sudden freedom from routine responsibilities. Some parents welcome this change, for it occurs to them that a special opportunity then exists for "education" of the child along other lines than that afforded by the classroom. Others, busy with their own family and business problems, discover that children often grow restive without sufficient guidance. Scout camps and other organized summer activities seem quite desirable, and many youngsters are already on their way.

This is an appropriate time, then, for asking consideration of a rather "radical" thesis supplied by a subscriber some time ago. We do not "oppose" sending the young to summer camps, nor, in fact, did our subscriber do so either. But we feel that parents should become thoroughly aware that piling of summer camp weeks upon school years does not necessarily result in maximum of educational opportunity. It is not, of course, a question of whether summer camps have any value at all, but of a proper measure of their significance.

"Nature-contact," in our subscriber's opinion, is *qualitatively* as well as quantitatively a very different thing when established independently by the child. As the letter of our subscriber puts it:

> To be introduced to nature through the leader, who is the symbol of authority for the children whether the teacher wants it that way or not, and to have it "explained" verbally in a language that implies the authoritarian concept of the world—plus having the competitive idea coupled with this introduction to nature—seems to me to make it almost impossible for the kids to get the idea that this world of nature is one place where they belong and where shining in the eyes of their fellows has no place. That is, in nature, man is not pitted against an unfriendly force, but finds that he has a place, where, if he learns the laws of nature of the world, he can survive. Whether he builds a better fire than his schoolmate is completely beside the point. Here his guide should be belonging, understanding, and becoming an intelligent functioning part of a larger whole. If on the other hand his first introduction to nature is through the school, I think he does get the idea that this is a hostile force that must be dominated, that superiority over his fellows in woodsmanship, is the desired goal instead of understanding and fitting in with a larger reality. He further gets the idea that this authoritarian outlook is the cultural and therefore the approved outlook, and, if he should happen by some accident to begin to feel differently, he will think that his feelings are wrong instead of that the culture is wrong.

The foregoing applies specifically to "school camping" programs which are now regular adjuncts of education in several California communities. The author of the *Saturday Evening Post* article which we quoted (MANAS, July 30, 1952) believed that youngsters benefited considerably from exposure to standards of group evaluation different from those characteristic of the schoolroom, and this seems a justifiable view.

A capacity for steady manual work, the observant eyes and the careful foot of the "good out-of-doors-man," made it possible for some youngsters who failed to shine in regular school activities to excel in woodcraft and in caring for themselves generally. It is true that a feeling of competition might here become involved, but while competition is by no means the best way to approach an understanding of the natural world, we at least have a *contrasting* sort of competition to that typical of the rest of the year; further, the revaluations of personality among the young ones themselves are undoubtedly good for all concerned.

An important and often neglected point is made in this letter—a point, moreover, which applies to many children who are not "school-campers," and who receive their introduction to field and stream from fathers who are terse and all-knowing Authorities on matters of hunting and fishing. For we must realize that the man who hunts and fishes is not necessarily either a nature-lover or one who is psychologically self-reliant in a natural environment. Hunting and fishing, too,

are definitely competitive, and the child whose beginning of woods experience comes in this way is apt to have a very specialized competitive idea involved with all his future sojourns with nature. Thus a child whose father is a fanatical hunter or fisherman, forever urgent in his quest for game, has little better chance of establishing aesthetic rapport with the natural world than other children who go to school or summer camps. In the latter case, there is inevitably too much noise, but in the former there is entirely too much specialization—with nearly all of the youthful powers of concentration given to imitation of measurable achievements. "Mountain climbing" or "sailing" parents very easily indoctrinate and discipline in their particular lore, too, leaving the child little chance for relaxed expansion of attitude; and we agree with our subscriber that the child *has* to have leisure and freedom to find his own way in the out-of-doors.

To sum it all up, then: If we grant that few children will have the opportunity for a free wandering in a natural habitat, and that few have parents who do not overspecialize their own trips out of the city, a certain amount of *relative* value is usually gained by children in schoolcamping, from hunting and fishing expeditions, and even from the supercharged botanical instruction which naturalist parents are apt to supply their progeny. But the language of authority is not really the language of nature-contact at all, and the children who are left most to themselves will undoubtedly show the greatest benefits in later life.

Having recently quoted Margueritte Harmon Bro's *Su Mei's Golden Year,* it occurred that Mrs. Bro is a good author to have in mind for summer reading, with her *When Children Ask* a good staple for all year-round parental perusing. The *Su Mei* book helps to show how unspoiled people who have little of the world's goods may enjoy what opportunities they do have, and how they are apt also to appreciate the smaller pleasures of life far more keenly than others surfeited with food and possessions. *Su Mei'is* also the story of a wise parent—one, with practical agricultural wisdom which might have greatly helped his community; yet the elders of the village hold him in disdain for being small and apparently insignificant. We thus see dramatized a struggle against traditional reactionism. Finally, the complacency of the village elders is replaced by a new and becoming humility—which invariably must accompany a willingness to learn.... These are very old themes indeed, but like some of the legends and tales known to former generations, always worthy of repetition.

We recently concluded a leisurely perusal of Nevil Shute's *The Legacy,* noting, by the way, that Mr. Shute is often excellent for a parent to read to a child. Not only is he a good storyteller, but he also gives many of the simple, timeless virtues new meaning in contemporary situations. He makes the virtues attractive by avoiding moralizing tones, and, last but not least, he refrains from the creation of improbable situations. *The Legacy* is concerned with one of the few lands where pioneering is still possible. Mr. Shute is fascinated by Australia, both because he loves the country and because he believes that this is one of the few continents allowing the better aspects of "free enterprise" to develop for the benefit of all concerned.

Both in this book and in most of his other writings, also, Mr. Shute shows his belief in a rather mystical destiny which men and women weave for themselves by habitudes of thought. His characters often follow a kind of "inner light," which, though it points out no special destination, yet leads them by instinct to precisely the right sort of persons and situations. As in the case of the fairy tales, a man and a woman in Shute's stories may be drawn half way across the world to meet each other—by no other forces than dynamics set in motion by their inner selves.

Such ideas are as old as the oldest religion, and in themselves are much more impressive than the ritualistic and creedal appendages which so often accompany them. We should like to see our

children have some cognizance of these points of emphasis, often known in earlier eras through poetry, and, as soon as they are old enough to appreciate the adult aspects of Mr. Shute's novels, his seem a very worthy introduction. However, we should like to hear the comments of any parents or teachers who have the time to check our interpretation of Mr. Shute. *The Legacy*, by the way, is now available in a twenty-five cent reprint, and all will at least agree that Mr. Shute avoids the exciting dramatics which tend to leave youthful readers in a psychic ferment. Yet he is not dull—or at least we have not found him so.

FRONTIERS

"The Future Belongs To Dissenters"

YEARS ago, a man who was then the "dean" of the intelligence-testing psychologists, James McKeen Cattell, informed the readers of a scientific journal that he and his colleagues made no pretense of measuring "character." This, he said, was beyond the scope of the known methods of "scoring," which dealt rather with the capacity of the subjects to manipulate symbols. This seems a fair definition of intellectual ability—the capacity to manipulate symbols. It applies with obvious exactitude to that most intellectual of the sciences—mathematics.

But what we started out to say, after quoting Dr. Cattell, is that not only are psychologists unable to measure "character"—which is probably a great relief to most of them—but they also seem largely uninterested in its existence and importance. We say this somewhat deliberately, after reading an open letter addressed to anthropologists in the June 1953 *Journal of Parapsychology*. This communication is by John R. Swanton, a retired ethnologist who was at one time president of the American Anthropological Association. His last professional post was with the Bureau of American Ethnology.

Dr. Swanton's letter is evidence that not all scientists have capitulated to the dry-as-dust style approved for technical papers in professional journals. He writes with a vigor that recalls the highly literate expressions of scientists of the nineteenth century. His subject is the ignorance and disdain manifested by present-day academic psychologists in respect to the findings and conclusions of modem psychic research—most particularly, the research carried on at Duke University by Prof. J. B. Rhine.

What interests us, at the moment, is what for purposes of discussion may be termed Dr. Swanton's "character." He tells how, after leaving his professional duties, he had occasion to read some reports of psychic investigations. Before this time, he explains, "the assumption of extrasensory perception cut squarely across my scientific frame of reference and I was not surprised at the counter-criticism it [ESP] aroused and which I accepted as justified." However, he was impressed by the small book he read on thought transference. Then he happened to fall heir to a collection of reports by members of Psychical research societies. Giving them interested study, he found in these writings "a great deal resembling that which parapsychologists are now investigating." One psychic researcher of the past was none other than the celebrated William James, who reported that the psychic capacities of the noted medium, Mrs. Piper, were beyond dispute, so far as he was concerned. As James put it:

> If I may employ the language of the professional logic-shop, a universal proposition can be made untrue by a particular instance. If you wish to upset the law that all crows are black, you must not seek to show that no crows are; it is enough if you prove one single crow to be white. My own white crow is Mrs. Piper.... Science, so far as science denies such exceptional occurrences, lies prostrate in the dust for me; and the most urgent intellectual need which I feel at present is that science be built up again in a form in which such things may have a positive place. Science, like life, feeds on its own decay. New facts burst old rules; then newly divined conceptions bind old and new together into a reconciling law.

We have often wondered—as doubtless Dr. Swanton has wondered, too—why so few of William James' professed admirers in the profession of modem psychology find occasion to quote this passage, or even refer to it; and why the essay, "Final Impressions of a Psychic Researcher," included in the volume, *Memories and Studies*, printed in 1911, has received almost studied neglect from psychologists of the present. Is it because James was too big a man for these latter day *epigoni* of psychological science to accept whole? For in this essay James announces his unequivocal conviction of *"the presence*, in the midst of all the humbug, *of really supernormal knowledge."* Dr. Swanton comments:

So there it is. Was the writer of the above possessed of a crude, third-rate intelligence? It was the intelligence that founded American psychology. Was he deceived by a woman so exceedingly clever that not even detectives were able to catch up with her and, although examined by some of the most experienced investigators of England and America, was never "exposed"?

. . . It is often demanded that advocates of allegedly "occult" phenomena present a complete, thoroughly checked case. Well, here it is, and presented half a century ago. Why, then, did it not register, and has it not registered? Simply because the majority of psychologists *would not and will not believe* or accept its implications.

So that is what science, or at least psychology, has become! A set of dogmas which the "faithful" must accept or be damned. Is this science or is science what James called it, "a certain dispassionate method" as opposed to "a certain set of results that one should pin one's faith on and hug forever"? This latter interpretation, as James warns, "degrades the scientific body to the status of a sect," a degradation which the main body of psychologists is now engaged in bringing about. What has become of that alleged willingness to accept truth from whatever quarter it comes? Are we to understand that facts must be censored by the high priests of the cult, and have a "none-genuine-without-our-signature" tag affixed?

One might suspect from this energetic indictment of psychological sectarianism that Dr. Swanton imagines the apathy of modern psychologists toward ESP to be unique. His studies, however, have been thorough enough to acquaint him with the ignominious history of scientific relations with psychic research. He recalls the rejection of the findings of that eminent nineteenth-century physicist, William Crookes, giving ample quotation from Crookes' experience and that of similar investigators to show that a massive prejudice has barred the acceptance of psychic research for nearly a hundred years. Dr. Swanton continues:

William James himself had the following experience:

"An illustrious biologist told me one day that even if telepathy were proved to be true the savants ought to band together to suppress and conceal it, because such facts would upset the uniformity of nature, and all sorts of other things, without which the scientists cannot carry on their pursuits."

According to that biologist, then, science *is* "a certain set of facts that one should pin one's faith to" and a faith to be protected by systematic suppression like Medieval religion or Communist ideology. Presumably the autos-da-fe will follow. At present the technique employed seems to be suppression by silence.

In his final paragraph, Dr. Swanton considerately offers the psychologists a minor justification by suggesting that since there are a number of charlatans who profess to operate as psychologists, "the regular members of the discipline are sensitive as to their status." He adds that for this reason, a protest from one who is not a psychologist at all may be in order. Further:

I am not merely in another field but fortunately well situated in having my professional life behind me and in being willing to stick out my neck in place of those who might fear for their reputations and their careers. Adhesion to current orthodoxy is always more profitable than dissent but the future belongs to dissenters. Prejudice and cowardice in the presence of the *status quo* are the twin enemies of progress at all times and of that "dispassionate method" in which science consists.

To return to our real subject, Dr. Swanton's "character": we think it not unlikely that if he had come across research material on psychic happenings earlier in his career, he would have been heard from just the same. (We think this, despite the illustrious precedent, established by Socrates, of waiting until "invulnerable" old age for radical declarations.) One great psychological question that is even more neglected than "psychic" mysteries is the question of why some men stand up to be counted on issues like this one, and why others do not.

Apparently, there is a fashion in such matters, governed by the diverse cultural traditions in a complex society. We have no doubt that there are psychologists in plenty who would brave all sorts of criticism to defend the victims of academic loyalty probes and purges—as a matter of fact, the

American Psychological Association, as we recall, was the first academic group to make public protest against the loyalty oath sponsored by the Regents of the University of California. And even if in this case they were spurred on by a "tradition" in which they had been schooled, it might be unfair to term the psychologists, or the majority of them, perpetual conformists. The question, however, is this: Can psychologists afford even a temporary submergence in any orthodoxy, without losing their claim to usefulness?

The issues raised by Dr. Swanton are subtler than the problem of civil liberties or academic freedom. As Dr. G. E. Hutchinson, Yale professor of biology, put it: "The reason why most scientific workers do not accept these [ESP]results is simply that they do not want to and avoid doing so by refusing to examine the full detailed reports of the experiments in question."

Often men trained in science argue that they have no interest in psychic research because they do not regard it as particularly "important." This is a curious conclusion, since the most vigorous opponents of ESP have insisted that psychic phenomena, if admitted to be real, will shatter the known scientific universe by demanding admission of laws or forces concerning which the established sciences know absolutely nothing!

So we argue that, not mere acceptance or rejection, but *impartial examination,* of the findings of parapsychology, involves, among other things, a problem of *character*. And this problem can be evaded, we think, only by withdrawing from the time-honored view that science is the quest for truth. The Positivists have already made this withdrawal, although on other grounds, yet the issue remains for all those who still cherish the ideal of science as conceived by the great founders of modem science of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.

Well, some may say, scientists are human. Agreed. Agreed, also, that the rest of us are as faulty as the scientists, and should be as critical of ourselves as of anyone else. But here we have a profession which avows high aims, declaring the noblest of principles as its guiding light. A profession, moreover, which has acquired rather extraordinary authority with the general public during a scant three hundred years. It is surely not unfair, therefore, to make the workings of the scientific mind a matter of study, and to examine in some detail the all-too-human aspects of scientific orthodoxy.