

THE AIMS OF THE "FATHERS"

IT seems that our admiration for the Founding Fathers of the United States has led us into pitfalls of inaccuracy, or at least to generalizations which are neglectful of certain facts. A reader who is apparently a student of the Constitution-making days of American history writes to call attention to what he claims is a visionary distortion of the character of the men who shaped the basic law of the United States:

"I take exception to one sentence particularly: '. . . the framers of the Constitution . . . were men . . . who looked beyond groups and factions to the Nation as a whole.' [MANAS, Dec. 24, 1952, P. 8.] They did *not*. Have you never read the Fathers' words in the debates on the Constitution and in the *Federalist*, . . . and Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the United States*? The framers of the Constitution *did look for groups* (rich businessmen) and such factions for their good, through public exploitation, to prevent democracy by checks and balances as the framers said in their own Convention speeches and in public and private writings! They *feared and hated democracy*, the people. They were the harbingers of the eventual Fascism in this country. . . . Read Madison's Essay No. 10 in the *Federalist*, for example, for proof of their views that the people differed biologically in intelligence or intellect and that such *alleged* biological difference accounts for differences in wealth, and a Constitution originally designed to keep the people 'in their place.' "

There is so much material for discussion, here, that we shall have to deal with these points as briefly as possible. First of all, the view that the Founding Fathers "looked beyond groups and factions to the Nation as a whole" can be supported, we think, from the sources cited by our critic. The tenth essay in the *Federalist Papers*, by James Madison, is aimed directly at the problem of how to protect the new nation from dominion by "faction," and while our correspondent apparently objects to Mr. Madison's solution, which was representative democracy, or a republic, we must at least credit

Madison with constructive intent. Further, Benjamin Franklin, whom our correspondent singles out as a target for special charges and contempt (there *is* no space to examine these charges, so that we omit repeating them, referring readers to Albernethy's *Western Lands and the American Revolution*, which is said to contain evidence of Franklin's Speculations), was the only eminent "Father" who, at the Constitutional Convention, held out for "pure democracy." In a useful article, "The Economics of the Founding Fathers," in *Harper's* for November, 1937, Abram L. Harris describes Franklin's position:

. . . he [Franklin] pictured the country enjoying a long reign of peace and happiness under the regime of an equalitarian democracy of free holders and small property-owners. This theory of society was the only one in which he could have faith. His belief in such a society limited his intellectual horizon and caused him to underestimate the tempo of economic forces. But in steadfastly adhering to it to the end of his life he came nearer than any other father to advocating a "pure democracy." A government of checks and balances was repugnant to his conception of democracy. And, as a representative at the Constitutional Convention, but one too old to exert much influence, he was unmoved by "aristocratic" opposition to his belief in an unrestricted manhood suffrage, annual parliaments, and a single-chamber legislature representing a democratic electorate.

There is little doubt about the fact that all the Founding Fathers believed that economic power determines political power. They had concluded this from history and personal experience. Jefferson as well as Hamilton saw this, the difference between them depending upon the question of which propertied group should maintain the balance of power. As Harris puts it:

. . . viewed in its true historical light, the conflict between Hamilton and Jefferson will be seen as a struggle between small and large capitalists. That this conflict took the form of the opposition of agrarianism to finance and commerce was inevitable

because of the peculiar character of emerging American capitalism. . . .

In this new empire where feudalism had never been known and where virgin forests, untapped natural resources, and free land permitted every man, it seemed, to start from scratch in the race for enrichment, equalitarianism acquired an unprecedented and vital reality. Under these peculiarly American conditions the only conflict that could arise was the conflict between those who had acquired a little and those who had accumulated a great deal. This conflict envisioned by the founding fathers was devoid of class consciousness. The participants were all common men, laborers who aspired to become capitalists, and capitalists who had been laborers.

Suppose we admit that the Founding Fathers were at one on the general proposition that government normally reflects the dominion of property: Does this mean that they were wholly without "vision," and that it is justifiable to call them "harbingers" of Fascism? Let us look more closely at James Madison's essay (No. 10) in the *Federalist Papers*, to see how accurately he has been described. The subject of the paper is the elimination or control of the factious spirit in American society. Madison says:

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

Madison concludes that there is little hope of eliminating the causes of faction, since this could be done only through either the suppression of liberty—a cure worse than the disease—or by unifying opinions and human interests, and this is also out of the question, for reasons which he details:

The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these

on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and properties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. . . . The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation. . . .

Developing his argument, Madison points out that since the causes of faction cannot be removed, it becomes necessary to control its effects, and this is best accomplished, he urges, by a republic, or representative democracy, rather than through a "pure" democracy, for governments of the latter sort, he says, "have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."

The existence and problem of factions are hardly debatable. Let us then consider Madison's brief discussion of the "diversity in the faculties of men," which our correspondent finds so offensive. Madison does not, we may note, term them "biological" in origin. He says they are "sown in the nature of man," which is no more than affirming their existence. Will anyone in his right mind deny these differences? Or that they lead to conflicts of interest?

Here, it seems to us, Madison is chronicling certain facts about human behavior. He has no particular "theory" of human differences; he simply accepts them as real, endeavoring to formulate the best method of dealing with them. There are of course other theories of dealing with human differences and their resulting inequities than that proposed by the Federalists; but we are not here debating political and economic doctrines, but whether or not Madison was a proto-fascist and an evil man. It seems to us that he was neither, but rather a remarkable political thinker and a man committed to the public good. Readers are invited to go to the *Federalist*

Papers, themselves, for the evidence, and to read, also, Madison's *Memorial and Remonstrance*, addressed to the legislators of the State of Virginia on the importance of freedom of religion. The *Memorial* contains this crucial sentence: "Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other religions, may establish with the same ease, any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other sects? that the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute *three pence only* of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?"

Exploiters and fascists, from Constantine to Mussolini, are not famous for their defense of freedom of religion, but for the opportunistic "deals" they make with religious authorities.

We hope that readers will follow the suggestion of our correspondent and read Beard's valuable study, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*; and then, along with it, read Beard's much later book, *The Republic*, which is an impressive study of the wisdom of the Founding Fathers and their absolute commitment to constitutional methods in national or governmental decision. Here, we think, Mr. Beard put his finger precisely on the genius for freedom of the Founding Fathers. For those still unconvinced, there is an excellent study, *Liberalism and American Education in the Eighteenth Century*, by Allen Hansen, which sets forth in detail the educational vision of several of the Founding Fathers.

Finally, while we hold no brief for the relationship between economic power and power in government, current history compels the admission, today, that no revolution short of a great moral revolution, which would accomplish a change in the ends of human beings and the things which they hold dear, gives any promise of dissociating the two. For a century or so, radical thinkers hoped that a socialist or communist revolution would work the necessary

regeneration, but so far the attempts to *force* economic equality on human beings have meant an almost absolute loss of political freedom, and the creation of a new caste of rulers who are the *managers*, if not the *de facto* owners, of the property and means of production said to belong to the "people" or the "State."

Madison accepted the fact of human differences, without attempting to explain them, and argued for a form of government which, in his eyes, would afford freedom, justice, and stability. We make no defense of the abuses of their freedom by men of great wealth, nor do we minimize the justice in radical criticism of modern capitalism. We simply suggest that under Communism, property, in this instance the property of the State and its military resources, affords control of political power, and that this sort of totalitarian control is certainly less desirable than the control which, even if very imperfect, still permits criticism, agitation, and vigorous opposition to existing authority.

We repeat, then, our view that the framers of the Constitution were men of vision who looked beyond groups and factions to the Nation as a whole. They were men who dealt much less in "slogans" than the politicians, of whatever persuasion, of our own time, and their devotion to the public good is, we think, a matter of public record. We say this in full awareness of the self-interest which played an extensive part in the writing of the Constitution.

Letter from ENGLAND

LONDON.—Events in South Africa have sharpened interest in England in the colour bar question, for, except among that type of "pukka sahib," now happily almost extinct, whose career was with "the lesser breeds," there has never been, so far as your correspondent has observed, much race prejudice here. Where it has found expression it has generally been in the form of some action prejudicial to a coloured person taken under pressure. For example, where Consadine, the noted coloured cricketer, was requested to vacate his hotel because of the protests about his presence from white guests. Consadine, by the way, still lives in England and his work is that of social service in Liverpool—the sort of citizen, of whatever breed, a fully civilized State would welcome. But, save for such painful incidents, there is, I think, little colour prejudice here, save among those with experience of Far South or Far Eastern lands.

Nevertheless, the cruelties inherent in these arbitrary distinctions are real, are real and widespread. Recently, noticing in this, the legal quarter of London, many coloured students, I thought it might be of interest to accost a number, invite them to my chambers for tea and ask them how they found life here. I am aware that there has been much expert analysing of this problem; that it engenders tremendous heat in the Cape Dutch, and in the U.S., also; and that it was the subject of an UNESCO Report not so long ago. Even so, it is not without a certain value to enquire direct, as one private individual of another, since evidence given before committees must have the handicap of conditioning the response of witnesses. Over a cup of tea, in a dwelling erected less than a century later than the discovery of America, one can feel human and at ease.

The first student (Law) whom I fished up from a student's common room, was a magnificent

specimen from the West Indies. He was a pure-blooded African, though he had never been in Africa and his cultural background was, save in the domestic circle, that of the white man. Mr. A, as I will call him, came from Jamaica to read for the Bar. He had the advantage of knowing folk here and so had easy access to lodgings. Finding this lodging too far from the city's centre, he moved to Maida Vale, relatively central. I summarize Mr. A's experience. *So long as he pays*, landlords make little distinction between white and coloured. He felt, however, that he was kept "at arm's length." This might be accounted for by the lack of culture in the landlady, to whom a coloured man might seem strange and a trifle intimidating. Mr. A had never been made to feel any embarrassment in public vehicle, restaurant, theatre, or other public place. He did say, however, that he had noticed that white waiters did not care very much to wait upon coloured customers.

Mr. N was a West African, twenty years in England. A Civil Servant. His father, a wealthy West African merchant, was able to allow him 500 pounds a year—princely! He tried for Oxford. College after college excused itself. Only when he gained the interest of an Oxford man of great distinction did he succeed in obtaining entrance. He graduated. He found no discrimination there. He read Law thereafter. Summary: If the coloured student has money he is well received. But where funds are low he encounters discrimination. If he takes lodgings among working class folk he must accept their ways of life or amusements—pubs, darts, football, betting. If they suspect him to be better educated, they display resentment at once. In better surroundings, he is decently received, but only with a surface friendship. Women will be friendly in the house, but short-sighted on the street.

The reason for that is plain. A girl might find an educated coloured man pleasant company. But, in public, might be conscious of exposing herself to criticism in which the sexual

connotation would be inevitably the objectionable element.

Mr. G was from Malay. In England he was received for what he was, a charming and cultured man. He has been received everywhere. Now, a university graduate and barrister, he faces his dilemma. An equal here, he must accept a lower status if he returns to Singapore where the colour bar is rigid, rigid and cruel. There are men who have passed through Eton and Oxford, only to find themselves excluded from the Clubs of Singapore.

The students from India with whom I talked are in a different category. They are highly caste conscious, as between themselves; and all regard themselves as superior to western peoples. In short, they have their own colour bar. This has its amusing aspects.

These notes are fragmentary. They were prompted by the report from South Africa of twins, one of whom was barred from a white school, the other accepted. A decision, surely, biologically absurd, since both are the product of the same genes, even if not "identical twins."

In England there is a very strong feeling against the present South African policy of *apartheid*. Only among the passing breed of the "pukka sahib and memsab" does the old dogma of the white man's superiority prevail.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

THE RETURN OF CHRIST

IT takes consummate artistry to fit into a readable and credible story the always provocative puzzle of what role Jesus of Nazareth would play in our present society. Mary Borden, author of *You the Jury* (Longmans and Green, 1952), seems to have succeeded, displaying marked capacity for both integration of themes and subtlety of portrayal. *You the Jury* might therefore be regarded as one of the most valuable selections on Book-of-the-Month lists.

A number of readers, perhaps, will pass through this novel without comprehending the core of meaning intended, for there is nothing obvious about the personification of Martin Merriedew, son of an English country doctor, as the reincarnation of the crucified prophet. As a boy, young Martin is found "difficult," by both adults and his childhood friends, since he is entirely uncompromising in nature, fearlessly independent, and apparently egotistical in the assurance of his own unusual perceptive powers. Martin does not know the story of his own past, nor does he know his destiny—he simply knows that he has thoughts different from those of his fellows and that he is bound to trust his own judgment. He studies to be a doctor, but becomes impatient and disillusioned by the pedantic, mechanical approach so common in the profession, and turns to faith healing. Leaving the old family house without a word of apology, he consorts with "sinners," taking up the task of inspiring a drunken prostitute to achieve a higher life. The need of this woman, to Martin, is a genuine soul need, for the girl has integrity, sincerity, and vitality. When Martin is later brought to trial for treason on a charge of giving aid and comfort to wounded German prisoners "beyond the bounds of propriety," and of speaking actively against war in the front lines, Teresa is the only one of his heterogeneous following who staunchly stands by. Here we have the inevitable theme of the complete turning about of

conventional values which would be incident to any portrayal of Christ's life in modern times. Other dimensions of the reversal include Martin's disavowal of religion, politics and judicial procedure.

You the Jury is very much a novel for pacifists, but in two rather contradictory respects. Martin himself was registered as a conscientious objector and served in a semi-civilian capacity, caring for the wounded, but his conscience was not easy under the definition of status and proper behavior which his fellow C.O.'s meekly accepted. The chief basis for the accusations which led to his trial and conviction for treason against His Majesty's Government revolved around an incident in a canteen near the Italian front, which indicated Martin's entire disregard for circumspection. It was Christmas night, and the soldiers were having a try at singing the world's best-known Christmas song. At the trial the bartender, testifying against Martin, told what happened:

"The boys round the stove started up that song, 'Quiet night, silent night,' and the prisoner flung down his bottle of beer, and dived into the middle of the crowd round the stove, shouting, 'Stop! That's not your song, and you've no right to sing it. It belongs to the men you call your enemies. They're singing it now over there on the other side.

They've a better right to it than you, haven't they, if one of their people wrote it? But here's an idea. Why don't we go over there and sing all together?'

"The boys were so surprised that they'd stopped when he shouted, but then one of them laughed, and he turned on him like a tiger—really he looked quite terrible. 'It's no joke,' he yelled. 'Or if it is, the joke is on you, and it's being played by the devil. What do you think you're doing here? Who sent you out here with orders to kill those chaps and be killed? You think you are fighting for God, for your king and your country. It's a lie. You're being fooled. Why do you do it? Why go on with it? Those men up the road aren't your enemies, they're your fellow men and as helpless as you. Come, and I'll show you. Come, follow me!'

"They'd all been like paralysed up to then, but suddenly they went for him. There was pandemonium. That's all I know."

So Martin Merriedew was no ordinary pacifist. Serving with others classified as conscientious objectors, his own example of completely unmitigated and uncompromising "avowals on principle" aroused criticism and suspicion, even among them. Not a C.O. stood with him in his hours of need, either when he was physically attacked in the canteen by angry soldiers, nor when on trial for his life in England. Their own "convictions" were thus shown to be sufficiently tinged with caution to amount to conformism of another sort.

Merriedew insisted upon giving his blood equally to those who needed transfusions, regardless of whether they were German or English. He treated his German "enemies" with such kindness that many of the German prisoners even despised him for what they thought to be servility. He befriended a lonely man who proved to be a German agent masquerading as a British officer, and was entirely unconcerned when the man's complicity in espionage was revealed. Martin had no enemies and no suspicions, and thus none was able to stand beside him for long, even though all felt the compelling power of his moral excellence—and usually came to resent it.

The story is narrated by the daughter of a wealthy English family whose brother became a playmate and devotee of Martin's during their childhood. Mary Borden's subtlety is exercised chiefly in the nuances of dim and fitful comprehension concerning Martin's character which this "average" British woman displays in the telling. She was never, for instance, able to altogether like Martin, though fascinated by him, and she feared him a little. She also found herself opposing Martin in a battle for control of the destiny of her brother's life. The narrator, by quirk of fate, marries an English jurist who is later chosen as the judge in Martin's trial for treason, and in her description of the attitudes of mind by

which the famous jurist appraises Martin's actions we have a thought-provoking screening of traditional values. Justice Collit, though possessed of excellent reasoning powers, finally has no recourse but to regard Martin as being "crazy as a coot." The Justice is clearly affronted by Martin's display of an allegiance higher than political, by the calm claim to an ultimate in individualism. Collit can only regard this as "anarchistic" and dangerous, and hence is willing to make arrangements for life imprisonment for Martin as a humane gesture to prevent hanging after conviction has been obtained. Martin certainly flouted all the "virtues" of his age and yet "we, the jury," may see him, through Mary Borden's eyes, as the only virtuous man in the courtroom. As might be expected, some of the most trenchant passages occur during the trial. A rather soured old lawyer takes Martin's case and finally, in spite of himself, is carried away by his feeling for his client's sincerity and greatness of character. His appeals to the jury and to Justice Collit embody much of Mary Borden's conception of a Christlike man. The following example will suffice, the introductory part of which is taken from Milton:

"I will ask your indulgence and read to you again from the introduction to this little book. We needn't go beyond the introduction:

"No man can be sure that he has found the truth until he has compared all forms of error. No man can be sure that his will is firmly set towards the goal until he has gone forth into the battle and proved his armour against all possible forms of evil. It is the same in conduct as it is in speculation. In both, the individual soul is responsible, in neither can it shuffle off its responsibility upon the infallibility or the authority of others. It is the individual reason, the individual will that alone counts; and the essence of both is individual choice and individual decision. Destroy these and we have destroyed the one thing that gives value to the trust of life we have received from God; we have struck at that which makes the very being of the soul; we have killed will and reason.

"My lord and members of the jury, I would have you notice one thing. It is a small thing but not

without interest. This book was one of the favourite books of the prisoner at the bar.

"The prisoner at the bar is an individual, members of the jury. He is a man who has always thought for himself and fought for the truth as he saw it. He did not go into battle in defence of his country; he is a pacifist, no one denies it, and a conscientious objector, like his former colleague who has given evidence meant to hang him, but he has been engaged all his adult life in a battle for liberty of conscience, for the individual responsibility of the human soul, that gives value to the trust of life we have received, as the great poet John Milton, put it, from God.

"And his battle landed him in trouble, my lord and members of the jury, as I have already said, with the authorities, both in peace and in war. He is a fighter for the truth as he sees it; and he was forever fighting. My learned colleague has described treason as a secret and deadly plan, kept on ice in a cold mind. Nothing could be less like the prisoner. Nothing has come out in the evidence brought against him that suggests anything of the kind. The mind that emerges from the evidence is no cold secret mind. On the contrary, the witnesses who have witnessed against him have painted for us the picture of a fiery mind, a passionate mind, a courageous, obstreperous mind that refused to accept an authority in conflict with his conscience, and insisted on individual liberty when the mass of our men and our women had been asked, had been ordered, to surrender their liberties for the good, yes, for the salvation of our nation.

"A man of peace at loggerheads with the rule of war. I do not pretend that he was docile, that he accepted all the precepts and regulations of wartime. He refused to kill, he refused to hate, even the enemies of his country; but he was not a traitor, he was not disloyal to our king or his fellow citizens."

In concluding the story, which the Justice's wife said she wrote from an inner compulsion and puzzlement, the narrator confesses, "I feel that I have missed something. The chance, perhaps, to be safe? Could it be that? I don't know. I have written this book because of a great uncertainty. It is finished and I am still uncertain."

So this is not a book of victorious crusade, nor a book of good men and evil men, but a book in which we see the shades of doubt and certainty

and the shades of moral aspiration and moral cowardice inextricably mixed together.

Martin was heard once to murmur in his cell, "How many times will I have to die?" The implication clearly is that a being such as Christ may have reincarnated on earth many times, never being understood for what he is nor in terms of the truth he brings—least of all by the orthodox representatives of religions or societies formed in his name.

COMMENTARY

TWO REVOLUTIONS

Two things ought to be borne in mind in considering the economic thought of the Founding Fathers of the United States. First of all, theirs was a revolution against hereditary privilege and for political equality. Unlike some others, their revolution was *successful*. The American Revolution did abolish hereditary privilege and it did establish political equality. In the economic sphere, the objective was such equality of opportunity as was possible.

The revolution to establish economic equality began to gather strength some two generations later, with the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848. Today, critics of communist countries claim that the disparities in income between different groups under this regime are actually greater than the disparities existing under capitalism, and that the political equality gained by eighteenth-century revolt loses its meaning under communism, since it is an equality of complete submission to authority, without right of minority opposition.

Despite these developments, however, the liberal in so-called "capitalist democracies" still tends to judge men like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison by comparing their views with the *hopes* of the economic equalitarians. This is neither just nor practical, although easy to understand. After years of thinking and repeating the radical criticisms of the free enterprise system, as inherited from the economic and political thinking of the Founding Fathers, plus the abuses and corruptions of lesser men, it is natural for men who see extreme injustice practiced in the name of economic freedom to be attracted by theories of economic equality. But such critics now have opportunity to recognize, also, that the application of the theory of economic equality has been by the method explicitly rejected by Madison—the method of destroying freedom in order to prevent faction. Further, the economic equalitarians have

endeavored to erase human differences by means of political terrorism, and a deluge of propaganda.

These results must now be weighed in any comparison of the economics of the Founding Fathers with the program of the economic equalitarians.

Meanwhile, the problems to which the radicals have pointed still remain, and the equality of economic opportunity sought by the Founding Fathers is no longer easy to assure, under the highly developed capitalist system of the present. It would be foolish to ignore such facts, even though we may recognize that the method of coerced equality fails just to the extent that coercion is involved.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

A RECENT report of a "Commission on Higher Education" declares:

Society should educate its top talent. Any plan aiming to attract a higher proportion of able young people to college depends upon identifying them at a fairly early age. The Educational Testing Service is now developing tests for important educational objectives beginning at the fourth grade. It is hoped that their results may be used in the identification and guidance of talented youngsters. We have recommended that cumulative records be kept in schools which would contain scores on development tests, achievement tests, and aptitude tests, as well as the actual school record. We believe that upper-quarter students might very well be given more difficult tasks in the elementary schools and that their work might be accelerated. . . . One of the difficulties in carrying out this suggestion, as well as some of the other suggestions of this report, relates to something we have discussed earlier, direction and control. We take justifiable pride in our ability to run our schools and colleges by local or decentralized control. But the fact that we run them this way means that we have the constant problem of amateur government. . . . If a school board member says "I don't believe in mental testing," this may put an end to testing in a particular school. Such a person would not say to a physician "I don't believe you can make a judgment about the heart condition by taking the pulse," nor would it occur to him that his opinion would find high favor with engineers or architects about the problems of building a bridge—yet the difficulties in education are even more complicated.

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"Dear boy, there are times when you don't sound like an 'upper quarter' mind at all. No social responsibility. Don't you want to grow up to be an officer?"

"I'm a rebel, Georgie. What I want is to grow up and be subversive, have a lot of wild hair and a lot of wild women. Also, being subversive is about the only way not to be like everybody else."

"On you perhaps The Process stripped a gear. This infantile talk about individualism and all! I just bet you aren't Upper-Quarter down deep

inside. Nobody with your brains could be so stupid as to want to stay Unintegrated." "Look, Georgie, I'm straight serious. *You* asked *me* if I didn't want to grow up and become an officer, remember? When I answer, you're a little afraid I'm not kidding, aren't you now? Anyway, I do want to *grow* up—that's the main thing. As it is, I'm being grown, like a goddam broccoli—the right fertilizer punched in, all other green material disked under, so many months figured for the thing to be ready to eat. But I don't want to be fertilized or disked. Why I want wild hair is because everywhere I look in this 'first quarter' bunch every head is chopped off crew to exactly the same length, and the reason I want wild women is because all the dolls I meet are just as much like each other as the crew cuts. What I think used to be called treason; now its called 'cerebral dislocation' to talk like this. Maybe you don't turn me in, but if I keep on talking for 24 hours somebody will. And you know what will happen then? They'll be very kind and sympathetic to my folks and send me to the Psychosolarium. And you know what I'll find there? Wild hair and wild women. You see, Georgie, even in 1960 you can't keep a man from getting what he wants."

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The foregoing dialogue, supposedly involving two sophisticated eighteen-year-olds, illustrates our version of George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, stepped back down to some ten years from now and twenty years before then. Two items, apart from our opening quotation borrowed from Byron S. Hollinshead's *Who Should Go to College* (Columbia University Press, 1959), prompted this fantasy—one a news release on research toward a more "integrated" education, the other a few paragraphs from the provocative book, *Player Piano*, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. The New York *Times* for March 25 revealed that intensive efforts are being made "to consider the role of American education in the specific preparation of individuals for service in the armed forces, giving special attention to the large and important area of officer

education as it is now carried on in over 300 higher institutions." The Ford Foundation, it became known, undertook research in this field at the behest of the "Pentagon manpower specialist, Mrs. Anna M. Rosenberg." Perhaps this item caught our eye because the Ford Foundation has been mentioned several times in MANAS with a tentative sort of praise—noting that this huge endowment has shown an interest in preserving the civil rights of the individual, and the *Times* story doesn't at all sound like a defense of "individualism." (Of course, it is barely possible that the content of the Ford report will publicize some of the dangers incident to too much integration of education with military training.)

In Vonnegut's book we found another imaginary conversation, dated somewhere between 1960 and 1984. The eminent "Director of Machines," Dr. Paul Proteus, has wandered from the environs of his elite society to the other side of the river, where he encounters numerous representatives of the now idle Common Man, whose mental scores showed them unfit to be managers or directors. One of these buttonholes the Doctor:

"Let's drink to our sons," said the man with thick glasses suddenly. His voice was surprisingly high for so resonant-looking a man. Several glasses were raised this time. When the toast was done, the man turned to Paul with the friendliest of smiles and said, "My boy's just turned eighteen, Doctor."

"That's nice."

"He's got his whole life ahead of him. Wonderful age, eighteen." He paused, as though his remark demanded a response.

"I'd like to be eighteen again," said Paul lamely.

"He's a good boy, Doctor. He isn't what you'd call real bright. Like his old man—his heart's in the right place, and he wants to do the most he can with what he's got." Again the wailful pause.

"That's all any of us can do," said Paul.

"Well, as long as such a smart man as you is here, maybe I could get you to give me some advice for the boy. He just finished his National General Classification Tests. He just about killed himself

studying up for them, but it wasn't any use. He didn't do nearly well enough for college. There were only twenty-seven openings, and six hundred kids trying for them." He shrugged. "I can't afford to send him to a private school, so now he's got to decide what he's going to do with his life, Doctor: what's it going to be, the Army or the Reconstruction and Reclamation Corps?"

"I suppose there's a lot to be said for both," said Paul uncomfortably. "I really don't know much about either one. Somebody else, like Matheson, maybe, would . . . He's got to have a graduate degree." He reddened. "That's policy, and I didn't make it. Sometimes we get Reconstruction and Reclamation people over to help put in big machines or do a heavy repair job, but not very often."

We of MANAS are not here predicting the macabre end for society outlined by Orwell, nor even the less complete dehumanization of *Player Piano*. We do feel, however, that fictional notice of the "super-mechanization" trends of the present encourage us to reflect upon the *nature* of dehumanizing attitudes. There are many counter trends also observable, however, and hopeful attitudes given no attention by Orwell—nor by Aldous Huxley in his earlier *Brave New World*. Actually, as MANAS has so often pointed out, intelligent cries against submersion in *states quo* values now are often heard from the psychologists. It is probably *a* (we do not say the present) "science of psychology" which will emphasize more and more the necessity for retaining "autonomy" in the selection of values.

FRONTIERS

Concerning "Ideal" Societies

THE plain man—the plain man in Europe more than the plain man in the United States—is beginning to wonder why it should be so difficult to have peace, when practically nobody wants war. The "peace-loving" nations, some of them, at least, seem to be turning out a little more "peace-loving" than Americans have bargained for, so that the moves on the international chessboard to isolate the United States as the chief satire-rattler of the West are showing some success. Where wisdom and justice lie, in this complex scene, we do not pretend to know. It seems evident, however, that the longing for peace among Europeans generally has become so intense that their governments feel compelled to reflect this attitude.

It is equally evident, however, that the apparent reluctance of the United States to be a party to sudden peace moves grows out of an essential distrust that these moves will result in much more than lengthy diplomatic maneuvers, with attempts to discredit this country before the bar of world opinion—and also, doubtless, out of the expectation that a peace which satisfies communist demands will involve considerable loss of face for the Americans.

But what remains true, regardless of how one interprets the "right" or "wrong" of international differences, is that peace-making is always a difficult art, and it almost always involves taking some chances, and at least the appearance of losing some "face." The point, here, is that "face" is never of much importance to the really mature man or community. The just man is not disturbed very much by appearing at a disadvantage, mainly because he is more interested in justice than in appearances. In a recent paper, "Social Control of International Aggressions," Thomas D. Eliot, of Northwestern University, observes:

Only a strong nation, or an inter- or super-national power, can afford to be rational, patient, self-

confident, and generous in its treatment of enemies. This principle may come to be supported by world opinion. To the extent that it is, magnanimity toward an enemy may itself become a symbol of power and prestige: The leaders of a nation, by treating its enemies patiently, without spite, may win new status for their country as one strong and confident enough to be generous to enemies and innocent of greed for power and wealth. (*American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1953.)

What hope is there that any of the modern States will learn to behave in this way? Very little, we think, unless there be some rather extraordinary progress in the understanding of what the State is, as a type of social organization, and what society is, as a community of human beings. We propose, in other words, that part of the explanation of modern war lies in what may be called the Fallacy of Misplaced Idealism. It is a fallacy which arises from the human need to believe in something high, good, and above reproach, which holds the promise of security for all. For many millions, the idea of the State fulfills this need. Accordingly, whatever attacks or threatens the State—our State—strikes at the heart of our ideals, as a lie strikes at truth, or as a blasphemer mutters shameful indecencies. How can such an enemy be treated "generously"? A similar sort of idealization occurs in respect to "society." The order of society is reflected in its laws and customs. A violator of this order is more than a thief or a burglar—he is a *public enemy*. Society is good and he is evil, and the evil must be erased. Discussing this question, Mr. Eliot reviews the over-simplifying tendency to popularize a redefinition of crime as "war." To counteract the glamor of the Robin Hoodish type of offender, a deliberate program of "re-education" has been attempted in the United States. As Eliot says:

Of recent years in the United States a successful effort has been made to offset the popularity of gangsters and to glorify the personnel and processes of law enforcement by a barrage of propaganda (stories, radio, cinema, TV, comics, print, pictures, and toys) in which the enforcers of the law, the FBI, detectives, and police are the heroes in a campaign

against "Crime." In order to dramatize this shift of roles, however, crime situations are even more sharply defined in terms of war. The leading criminal of the day (*e.g.* Dillinger, Capone) is denominated "Public Enemy No. I."

Hopkins, echoing every modern criminologist and criminological psychiatrist, proceeded to show that the war theory of crime and the corresponding treatment inflicted on criminals both at large and captured have been futile and worse than futile. They fail to solve the perennial problem of criminality. Some criminals have been punished, some vengeance has been selfishly satisfied; but the criminals have not been reformed or prevented, and the public and community have not been protected, by the "war against crime." It is almost a unanimous verdict of modern social psychiatrists and criminologists that the war theory of crime is worse than a failure: it has defeated itself and is an admission of society's failure as well as of the criminal's.

The syndrome of blaming-ordering-forbidding-and-punishing may be discovered in children, in parents, and in communities. It may be derived from infantile death wishes. Dreaded persons are merely wished destroyed. Such reaction patterns are not realistic. They take no account of their own predictable social effects. They ignore "the dangerous resentments and justifying rationalizations" which such repressive and reprisal techniques almost universally produce in the punished offenders and their families and friends. Those punished—unless they be already self-accusatory and ready to take punishment for their guiltiness—almost universally define or redefine their situation in terms of a "frame-up," injured innocence, undeserved martyrdom, self-justification, or rebellion against tyranny or exploitation. They are then more, rather than less, dangerous to the public after being treated as enemies. The resulting tensions are cumulative, and destructive hates are perpetuated and multiplied.

The basic fallacy lies in imputing to offenders spontaneous, "willing," evil and hatred and therefore treating them not merely as accountable for their acts, but as personally guilty. Blame and guilt are very actual feelings, but they derive from false premises. An enlarged perspective would show the offense and the offender emerging as parts of a larger situation-process, in which the offended community also provides the essential milieu and both are injured parties.

The logic of all this rests, of course, on the basic assumption of modern criminology, which is "that the community should be protected from crime," and that "crime must be dealt with in such ways as will protect the community." Once we really accept this premise, abandoning the idea that the criminal must be "punished" for what he does, the force of Mr. Eliot's argument, which is far from new, becomes unmistakably clear. Actually, most people seem to have greater resistance to this premise than they are willing to admit. Even Thomas Mott Osborne, as Eliot reminds us, when he took over direction of Sing Sing, "had the solitary cells torn out because he was afraid he would be tempted to use them." Genuine repudiation of the idea that we ought to administer *retributive* justice to our offending fellows will probably come only after we have grown up to a theory of human nature which is quite different from the Christian notion of man as "sinner," and of God as rewarder and punisher of the good and evil people of the world. For few if any men are able to behave in a manner superior to the actions of their chosen deity.

But suppose men were able to overcome their habitual tendency and emotional drive to administer punishment, and thought only of "protecting society." They would then be open to the notion offered by Mr. Eliot, and by many other students of social disorder, which affirms that crime is almost always a failure of the community as well as of the offender. This idea would be acceptable for the reason that no one would feel obliged to measure the *relative* responsibility of any law-breaker, since, punishment no longer being a motive in dealing with him, there would be no need to make the punishment "fit the crime." The action to be determined upon would then be conceived only out of regard for the protection of society.

Also involved in this attitude would be sensible recognition of the fact that "society" is at best a very imperfect arrangement of human relationships. Its laws are for the regulation of the

behavior of the "average" man, who does not and cannot exist at all. Further, such laws and their administration always reflect with great faithfulness the apathy of man for man, the indifference of the mass to the unfortunate or under-privileged individual, and the impersonal cruelty of public institutions to misfits and other victims of "majority" rule. A careful notation of these realities would help to eliminate most of the self-righteousness displayed by the supposedly "law-abiding" citizen, and would also require an entirely new version of human "goodness." The norms of desirable behavior, instead of being founded on conformity to existing custom and law, would represent the pursuit of far more important objectives than a frictionless existence within the limits of the *states quo*. The community or society would be acknowledged for what it is—not an "ideal," but at best a makeshift, a compromise arrangement which grows less and less important and demanding as individuals become increasingly mature.

Let us note, in this connection, the intimate relationship between warring definitions of the "ideal society" and the warring nations of the modern world. What is the "cold war" about? Ignoring *realpolitik* considerations, which doubtless play a part, the "cold war" is a war between peoples who insist that they and no other have the "ideal" society, and who angrily resist the idea of living under any other system than their own.

It seems fairly obvious that if all these people, and especially their leaders, could accept the idea that *no* society is ever "ideal"; that even the best society can never be free from serious imperfections; and that the worst society of all is the one claiming to be unequivocally best, which leads it into the most dangerous delusions—if this general analysis could be granted, then most of the ideological issues of the present conflict between "East" and "West" would fade completely away. For the State, which is committed to preserving the "good" society, would be enormously reduced

in importance, and the vicious circle of rivalry and suspicion would be broken by the withdrawal of human emotions from the misplaced worship of "society" and "State."