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THE QUEST FOR SIMPLICITY

MANAS enters its sixth year of publication with much to be thankful for in the way of encouragement and cooperation from readers, whose expressions of approval for what is attempted in these pages are so frequent and so thoughtful as to provide the editors with abundant moral support. If growth in circulation proceeds more slowly than we had hoped, this lack can hardly be explained by an absence of enthusiasm in those who have already subscribed, since many readers send in the names of potential subscribers and do all that they can to increase the readership of MANAS. Whatever our growth, it is due, we may say, to this friendly help.

It might be said, further, that MANAS readers have a relation to the publication which differs rather markedly from the ordinary relationship between readers and editors. Our readers are not "customers," but people who share certain ideals, aims, and principles with us. It seems suitable, therefore, on such anniversary occasions as this—and perhaps once or twice a year besides—to discuss the publication itself, considering its hopes, its methods, its contents, and its successes and failures.

We feel sufficiently well established—five years, as we look back on them, make a long, long time!—to dare to discuss what may be the "failures" of MANAS. Like other editors of publications with limited circulation, we tend to console ourselves that while our readers are few, they are indeed a very select few, and also, in their several ways, an influential few. We have reason to think that this consolation, in the case of MANAS, is not entirely vain, because of the sort of people who are attracted by the paper, and how they seem to be using their energies. But however true this may be, there is the possibility that the appeal of MANAS to the general public has not a broad enough base. The questions raised in last week's Letter from Norway deal with this possibility and ought not to be left without attention. Our correspondent wrote:

> . . . such discussions [as are found in MANAS] are for the few. . . . Although we must repeatedly claim the right and duty to explore undogmatically the realms of mind and universe, and in spite of the deep pleasure some individuals find in exploring the borderland of human knowledge, we must never forget the needs of less adventuresome minds. . . .
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> The analytical attitude originating from natural science—abstraction in art, poetry, and philosophy—the general sabotage of traditional church life—the cultural lag. . . all this leaves man alone and deserted. Is he left by a truth-seeking elite to care for himself? Or for a dictator to offer him substitutes for religion? . . .

Comments of this sort touch editorial nerves made tender by much soul-searching. We care nothing for any "elite," in the ordinary meaning of this term, and our readers, we gather, have similar feelings. Nothing would please us more than to be able to publish a magazine with the circulation of a *Life* or a *Look*, bringing to millions the kind of thinking and stimulus which, we are profoundly persuaded, the world needs more than anything else. What stops us, then? Is it lack of interest in what we have to say? This, perhaps, would be one way to put it. Or is it a lack of editorial ability to say it well enough? Doubtless lack of ability on the part of the editors plays a part. The sense of need for clarity and simplicity is a gadfly which allows the working staff of MANAS little chance for relaxing complacency.

There is still, however, an unexplored area in this problem. After five years of publication—five years of trying to write about what seem to us the most important subjects in the world—we have come to certain definite conclusions about the MANAS project. One primary conclusion is that, after allowing for our personal limitations, the simple utterance we long for in respect to the world's problems is exceedingly difficult to come by because the problems of the world are not simple.

From some ultimate point of view, they may be easy enough to phrase and ponder. James could say—

> From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members?
>
> Ye lust, and have not: ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, yet ye have not, because ye ask not—

and we will not disagree, except to add that both gloss and commentary are needed to make his verses intelligible to modern man. Even the simpler expression of the *Bhagavad-Gita*—"The gates of hell are three—desire, anger, covetousness"—or the universal rule of the *Dhammapada*—"Hatreds never cease by hatreds in this world. By love alone they cease. This is an ancient Law"—seem cryptic echoes of a forgotten past, when left without interpretive investigation.

We propose, in short, that the world of today has no vocabulary that can be used for simple discussion of moral issues, for the reason that the moral issues of today are terribly confused. Authentic simplicity, it seems to us, is possible only when there is cultural unity. "Let us raise a standard," said a great American, "to which the wise and honest can repair." But how shall we agree upon what that standard is to be?

There is no religious unity today. There is not even a unity of religious slogans. And hard upon the fragmentation of religious thought has come the disillusionment of men with scientific authority. This disillusionment is not with the competence of science as technology, but with the dream of science as the highroad to Truth. The eighteenth-century vision has died away. Only a small minority of men still regard science as the avenue to Truth—a minority which includes Dr. Einstein among its number, but he is a philosopher first, we think, and scientist after, so that, like all true philosophers, Dr. Einstein feels the throb of verity in the stuff of the universe which he contemplates.

For most of the rest of the world, the authorities of yesterday have failed miserably, their voices become either empty echoes or "wicked whispers," since there is no heart of conviction in them any more. It is good, perhaps, that all these failures are now increasingly evident. It is good that men are being thrown back on themselves, for now there is some hope of their recognizing that their reliance on authority was in principle wrong. The advantage of primitive circumstances is that, when men are no longer protected from the consequences of their follies by elaborate social superstructures, they are obliged to discover what is wrong with their own lives—or at least that *something* is wrong. The breakdown of authority creates a kind of reversion to primitive conditions, although this effect is in some degree masked by the false fronts of outworn institutions.

It is this stage that we seem to be entering, today—the stage when we realize that *something* is wrong. For a while we thought it was the Nazis. Now we think it is the Communists. Eventually, we shall not be able to evade the awful truth that something is wrong with ourselves.

The circumstantial conditions of modern life are of very little help in hastening this realization. The modern world is "one world" in one sense only. In another sense, the modern world is an endlessly subdivided world. In an article, virtually a classic of modern sociology, "The Garrison State," published in the *American Journal of Sociology* for January, 1941, Harold D. Lasswell called attention to an important aspect of the disunity of the present:

> . . . we sometimes fail to notice . . . the multiplicity of special environments that have been created by modern technology. Thousands of technical operations have sprung into existence where a few hundred were found before. To complicate the material environment in this way is to multiply the foci of attention of those who live in our society. Diversified foci of attention breed differences in outlook, preference, and loyalty. The labyrinth of specialized "material" environments generates profound ideological divergencies that cannot be abolished, though they can be mitigated, by the methods now available to leaders in our society. As long as modern technology prevails, society is honeycombed with cells of separate experience, of individuality, of partial freedom. Concerted action under such conditions depends upon skilfully guiding the minds of men; hence the enormous importance of symbolic manipulation in modern society.

This, in 1941, was an ominous analysis. It is more ominous today because of its partial confirmation by history.

But is it, after all, so unnatural that the pursuit of separate ends—private acquisitive ends by private acquisitive enterprise—should have created a social structure "honeycombed with cells of separate experience," from which men look upon their fellows with less than human regard? Is it any wonder that the men who make capital of *distrust* have been the successful politicians of 1952? That average "good" men are brought to admit, even if wryly, that the witch-hunters are, after all, performing a necessary service?

Here, in this "philosophy" of fear and suspicion, we have the genesis of "symbolic manipulation"—a skilful guiding of "the minds of men"—to the development of which there is no foreseeable limit.

So, superimposed upon the disunity, both moral and circumstantial, and upon the bewilderment, both intellectual and social, is the enclosing pattern of "symbolic manipulation," by which a wholly spurious standard is raised, to which only the frightened and conforming can repair.

In what tongue, then, shall we address the multitude? What tokens of authentic truth can be offered? What are the keys to the human heart in this age of confusion? We live in a time when only the few think at all. The great majority are caught up in the vast sweep of historical determinism—in a current which is slowly but surely wearing itself out. It seems almost certain that the free men of our time are the men who are alienated from their time because they love their fellow men and cannot abide the forces which are playing out the tragedy.

We have another and pleasanter hypothesis about the present. It is that history has a meaning, and that the meaning is educational for man. Specifically, we like to think that no sooner do human beings exhibit some mastery over the complexities of their time than they are thrust deeper into the variety of life, and made to struggle anew. Dr. Lasswell notes that "thousands of technical operations have sprung into existence where a few hundred were found before." For man considered as moral agent, this means that he is called upon to use greater powers of imagination. More complexity of experience demands wider generalizations of understanding. In a complex environment, self-deception and rationalization are more easily accomplished, and, therefore, more disastrous, cumulatively, in their effects. In a mass, industrial society, virtue must become impersonal and far-seeing. It must join hands with psychology, learning to understand more fully the processes of human growth, the character of human freedom.

These, it seems to us, are some of the inescapable realities of our time. If we could find the words to say these things simply, so that no one could mistake our meaning, no eight-page weekly could contain our exhilaration. But these are matters which we spell out, laboriously, and tentatively, to ourselves, and to the friends who have joined with us in this investigation. That certain keys to these mysteries seem to us fairly clear in importance, our readers already know. We are committed to the idea of the soul as the responsible free-agent within the human being. We are committed to whatever will support the responsibility and freedom of the soul. We are committed to the idea that Nature works in knowable ways, and that, being knowable, these ways are orderly and just. We are committed to the view that no man lives for himself alone, except in misery and disgrace with himself, and that human happiness is inseparable from human understanding and human growth. These views, we have concluded, are a minimum credo for a life that is worth pursuing. In order to pursue such a life in our time, it becomes necessary to regard the multiplicities of experience in the light of these views, helping them, as we can, to interpret each other.

Out of this, perhaps, and out of the efforts of all those who strive in similar directions, may evolve a common vocabulary and, finally, the speech of a common resolve. Then, in a future toward which so many lonely and disheartened men look longingly, there may be born the wholeness of vision that will raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair.

Letter from
CENTRAL EUROPE

VIENNA.—Government affairs have become somewhat muddled during recent weeks in Austria. One morning the papers spread the news that the Chancellor (Dr. Figl), then on a State visit in the Netherlands, and other ministers who had left Vienna, had been called back for urgent reasons. Next came word of the withdrawal of the Cabinet—a Cabinet which had been active since 1945 and had been called the "most unshakeable government of Europe."

The resignation took place because the two coalition partners (the Austrian Peoples' Party and the Austrian Social-Democratic Party) could not reach an agreement on the budget. As a matter of fact, their differences grew out of diverging opinions about the handling of 400 million shillings, while the budget as a whole involves about 12,000 million shillings. But the disposition of these 400 millions seemed to collide with a principle of both.

One of the causes is that, during recent years, this small country has hardly avoided currency inflation, since the State expenses have more and more exceeded income. Some six months ago the Austrian Peoples' Party appointed another Minister of Finances (Dr. Kamitz) to institute an "austerity-programme." This new man has tried since to solve the problem by cutting down expenses and, in the present budget, left out part of the supplies which—during the past six years—have been spent by the Government for long-range projects such as the erection of huge power-stations which—drawing on Austria's Alpine water energies—are supposed eventually to become a source of income through sale of electric power to neighbouring countries.

However, such "cut-expenses policy" means unemployment, just as the "increase-incomes policy" meant inflation. If the two coalition-partners in government could have come to a compromise about the 400 millions, this would have put another bandage on the economic wounds of Austria. But new elections are in sight, and both parties hoped to impress the public and convince the population of their altruistic intent: the Austrian Peoples' Party with its resolve to avoid inflation, and the Social-Democrats by opposing unemployment. The average Austrian, however, feels that the quarrel about the 400 millions has deeper roots. Austria has passed through the post-war period which was marked by extensive financial support from the USA and the parallel attempts of both parties to restore—at least in symbol—what World War II had ruined. From now on, life in this country will become more trying. The first reason is that the "liberators" who promised to occupy Austria, "just for a short while," have made themselves rather comfortable in this—by Nature blessed—territory. They seem to want to stay for an unlimited time. Second, the Russians have not only taken possession of all the oil wells and most of the heavy industries for their own profit, but, apparently, want also to turn the situation into a permanent one by refusing a "Peace Treaty" to this tiny Danubian state. Finally, Austrian exports are more and more endangered by reviving German competition which has larger possibilities, cheaper raw materials, and a range of accessible seaports.

It is not out of the question that the elections for parliament—due in the summer of 1959—will take place in January or February. Whatever the result, the new government will be confronted by tasks more difficult than those of many years past.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
DOUBLE TROUBLE

FRIENDS of the "Great Books" adult-education program are not apt to be overly pleased with Dwight Macdonald's Nov. 29 *New Yorker* analysis of the Encyclopaedia Britannica's just-issued version of the GB's. True, Macdonald does not attack Great Books adult education, but most Great Bookers will not like the piece anyway—some for reasons we think defensible, and some for reasons dubious. The tone of Macdonald's critique may be easily picked up from the following:

> For $249.50, which is (for all practical purposes) $250, one can now buy a hundred pounds of Great Books: four hundred and forty-three works by seventy-six authors, ranging chronologically and in several other ways from Homer to Dr. Mortimer J. Adler, the whole forming a mass amounting to thirty-two thousand pages, mostly double-column, containing twenty-five million words squeezed into fifty-four volumes.
>
> In its massiveness, its technological elaboration, its fetish of The Great, and its attempt to treat systematically and with scientific precision materials for which the method is inappropriate, Dr. Adler's set of books is a typical expression of the religion of culture that appeals to the American academic mentality. And the claims its creators make are a typical expression of the American advertising psyche. The way to put over a two-million-dollar cultural project is, it seems, to make it appear as pompous as possible.

Titled, "The Book of the Millennium Club," Macdonald's thirteen-column satire exposes the difficulties involved in claiming that either Great Books or Great Ideas can be numerically classified, bought or sold for $249.50, or pontificated about, and then delivers pointed warnings against "hieratic" scholasticism.

Thus far, well and good. Every institutional version of culture or education is apt to produce factional 'isms, arrogance, and complacencies of one sort or another, and we do not mind Macdonald's suggestion that Great-Ideaclassifier Mortimer Adler may have been more interested in riding Great Ideas to popular victory than in their independent value. But the *New Yorker* piece, we are afraid, is too pleased with the devastation it accomplishes, and, like some other *New Yorker* essays, seems to imply that criticism itself is a *summum bonum.* Like the thirteenth-century Papal Legate, Arnold of Citeaux, addressing his minions before plunging down to purge the plains of Southern France of Albigensian heretics—who formed an indistinguishable part of the otherwise orthodox population—Macdonald seems to be saying, "Kill them all. God will know his own!"

Being acquainted with many Great Bookmanites, we know that not all are "hieratics." In our opinion, it would be quite a waste to kill Robert Hutchins off, even though we think God would know him. It seems only in degree less regrettable to encourage readers of the *New Yorker* to regard the whole GB effort as mostly a laughing matter. And this will be the total effect, we think, upon most who read Macdonald. Even though the adult-education program escapes without mention, its sponsors receipt for enough derogation to discredit their adult-education undertakings as well, and here, as always, we dislike the "guilt-by-association" process.

Possibly Macdonald would have probed this whole question more deeply if he had been writing for his old *Politics* audience. (That clientele was hungry for more than clever words and negative criticisms—and heretofore Macdonald has always seemed to regard ideative and ethical tastes as more important than aesthetic ones.)

What, for instance, of the real problem which the whole Great Books education idea is meant to help solve? Ideas, not guns or economic circumstances, ultimately determine the course of history, and it has been Hutchins' contention that this realization alone can save civilization from international fratricide. The logic is simple. While an idea can be mistaken, ignorant or evil, you can contend with ideas which need opposition by means of education. On the other hand, all you

can do with men believed to be evil is to shoot them. This latter belief has made the world an armed camp, and we think there is much more sense than nonsense in Hutchins' belief that a revitalized faith in the power of disciplined minds can alone change this orientation. Macdonald is an educator, too, by inclination and practice. He, too, believes in "the rule of reason," and it is the rule of reason which the Great Books discussion groups were contrived to further. Adler may be a fly in the ointment, and, as Macdonald insists, a pompous fly to boot, but if ointment is scarce, you take what you can get, and try to improve the ingredients as you go along. Hutchins and Adler are in the present mixture together, but this is no guarantee that they are twin souls, any more than Senator Joseph McCarthy is proof that all Republicans believe in witch-hunts.

We would like to extricate Mr. Hutchins, pretty much intact, from the wreckage Macdonald's writing accomplishes, and the "Great Books" *idea* along with him, for neither deserves this kind of ignominy. High purposes do not become worthless because of imperfections in personnel or flaws in execution, and this particular institutional juggernaut of "culture" is, Adler and all, healthier than some other institutions we know about. The greatest danger for its devotees will be the temptation to assume an air of intellectual superiority, and here, at least, we can be unreservedly thankful for Macdonald's type of warning criticism.

Much of "The Book of the Millennium Club" is indeed more than clever lampooning. The analysis seems thorough, and the validity of many of Macdonald's specific criticisms is evident. The brunt of the attack falls upon Adler, who has been the "supreme arbiter" of the master-indexing system for ideas, collected in a breath-taking creation called the "Syntopicon." The reader is supposed to be able to trace, through references provided in the Syntopicon, all truly important thoughts on truly important topics. Macdonald argues that "insofar as the set has a *raison d'être*, the Syntopicon is it," and since Macdonald has a worthy prejudice against supreme arbiters of anything—particularly of ideas—and since if he did have to put up with some such authority he would probably be particularly unwilling to vote for Dr. Adler, the whole five-foot shelf is viewed with an understandably jaundiced eye:

> Every man makes his own Syntopicon, God forbid, and this one is Dr. Adler's, not mine or yours. To him, of course, ideas seem to be as objective and distinct as marbles, which can be arranged in definite, logical patterns. He has the classifying mind, which is invaluable for writing a natural history or collecting stamps. Assuming that an index of ideas should be attempted at all, it should have been brief and simple, without pretensions to either completeness or logical structure—a mere convenience for the reader who wants to compare, say, Plato, Pascal, Dr. Johnson, and Freud on love. Instead, we have a fantastically elaborate index whose fatal defect is just what Dr. Adler thinks is its chief virtue: its systematic all-inclusiveness.

Macdonald is of course right. Indexes of ideas *cannot* be all-inclusive, and there is no possible "summa theologia," nor "summa" anything else. But Macdonald here and elsewhere seems to be confusing two things—Dr. Adler's presumptuous gadget for use in study of the Great Books, and the value of the Great Books themselves. Or perhaps we should say that the confusion is really between Adler's predisposition to be arbitrary and the basic contention for which Mr. Hutchins stands—that we need encouragement to seek a philosophical and ethical education from great books, and should cease regarding them as merely aesthetic or "cultural" experiences. Dr. Adler's personal notions as to how philosophical subjects should be arranged is yet a third matter. The arrangement, however, is not really so important, is it, unless it be taken as Gospel? It is important for men who wish to educate themselves to be encouraged to *seek* syntheses of thought which will aid critical evaluation. Every man does make his own syntopicon, and Dr. Adler, God wot, cannot stop this. If not less but more synthesizing capacity is needed, and if Adler indirectly helps anyone to try

out his own, a favor will have been conferred, however justifiably he dislikes the complaisance of Adler's version.

But it is at this point that Macdonald, perhaps, can stand a little more criticism. So far as we have been able to determine, the "academic American mentality" does not, Macdonald to the contrary, believe that civilization may be served by the philosophic evaluation of ideas, nor does the prevailing climate of academic opinion encourage the view that the truths of great writings can have any greater value than personal preference arbitrarily assigns. The trouble with the hundred pounds of Great Books is mostly, we think, the same trouble that one runs into whenever institutional means are selected for achieving a philosophical end, and we doubt if Macdonald himself has the answer to this one, unless it be to say that no institutions should be allowed to live—which is, in its turn, but another half-truth.

Of course, this whole commentary must be admitted to be tough sledding for us, who have admired both Hutchins and Macdonald for quite some time. Here, we have attempted to credit the valuable points Macdonald makes, and then to counter with other thoughts in defense of the "Great Books" idea.

COMMENTARY
SOURCES OF DISCOVERY

THE odd thing about so many of the opponents of the Great Books program is that they have never attended a seminar or have never honestly tried to get out of reading and discussing a great book all that is possible to get out of these activities. The annoyance displayed by some critics seems to arise mostly from the notion that the Great Bookers claim an almost supernatural virtue for the Great Books. This, of course, is nonsense. What is a fact, however, is that if you collect eight or ten interested, intelligent people, persuade them to read Plato's *Apology* carefully, and then invite them to talk of what they think about this book, the result can hardly miss being educational.

The United States is filled with "discussion groups." We have the "discussion group" habit. The Great Books provide a content for discussion groups which, if seriously used, brings depth and perspective to thinking. Even if the participants learn only to recognize what a man like Socrates may stand for in a social community of more or less conventional people, with the usual quota of prejudices, fears, and illusions, and forget nearly everything else (which is unlikely), a major educational objective will have been attained.

Large numbers of people like to think of themselves as "idealists," but until they are able to recognize the character of the opposition—as found, for example, in the *Republic's* case-study of Thrasymachus—their idealism is apt to be compromised and ineffectual from the start. People talk about the dignity of man, but so many of our habitual attitudes toward other human beings are little more than immature Machiavellianism that those who pass through life without ever reading *The Prince* may easily allow the idea of the dignity of man no more than a slogan-like validity.

Doubtless there are other ways to make discoveries of this sort. The Great Books have no monopoly on clarity in moral and psychological analysis. Further, it is pitifully simple for discussion leaders who are not serious people to trivialize the content of the Books, making a mockery of their aims and the aims of men like Mr. Hutchins.

We are contending, here, simply that a Great Books seminar *can* be a vitally educational enterprise, and often is. We are contending that unless this fact is recognized, criticism tends to be less than useful. And we gladly admit that, after this fact is recognized, of almost equal importance is recognition that education through the Great Books may be frustrated by pretentious Aristotelianism, a blandly authoritarian air, and pious institutionalization.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

LAST week's critical references to the "Mechanism" of Percival Symonds' *Dynamic Psychology* reminded us of a contrasting passage from another of Dr. Symonds' works which in fairness should also be cited. When Dr. Symonds concerns himself directly with *education* absenting himself from abstract psychological theory, he writes more as a humanist than as a behaviorist. He says, for example:

> A teacher's first task is to win liking from her pupils. This must be an individual matter. . . . A teacher's first obligation with each new group of children is to know them. This is a necessary preliminary before effective teaching can begin. . . After rapport or "transference" is established, perhaps at some time in the middle of the school year, a teacher can begin cautiously and tentatively to interpret each child's behavior to himself. . . . For too long teachers have assumed that criticism of their pupils is one of their main prerogatives. But criticism before rapport is established is almost certain to arouse emotion and antagonism and to provoke aggressive behavior.

Readers may recall the portion of a school administrator's thesis on "Teacher-Pupil Rapport" printed here Oct. 1. Re-reading the original paper recently, we discovered that its writer felt impelled to suggest new definitions of the essential elements of human personality—or, at least, of classifications radically different from those accepted by most theoretical psychologists. We return, then, to "Teacher-Pupil Rapport" to quote previously omitted passages, hoping that readers may find the suggestions useful.

* * *

If we seek at times to reduce the various characteristics, qualities, and personality traits of the human being to common denominators, we may gain a perspective that will help us to deal with these qualities in detail. We propose presently, then, to analyze the human being by attempting to group his familiar qualities, and in so doing to simplify the discussion. However, we shall not pretend that by simplifying the question we shall settle it. Our purpose is to indicate that there may be metaphysical antennae, which become, when they touch their like in another human being, "rapport." The medical man can readily explain the exact position, development, and function of the umbilical cord which furnishes nourishment to the unborn child. But the unseen tie between mother and child, after birth, or between teacher and pupil, may also be admitted to exist, and to have its equally important role in the life of man.

Perhaps the human being is, from one point of view, fourfold in his complete nature. We must disagree with Dr. Gesell when he implies that the total child derives from his nervous system. We propose that at the highest level each human being is a center of consciousness, to which each one of us refers when he says, "I." ("I changed my mind.") In evidence, we quote from a *Coronet* article (March, 1951), "Science Finds the Human Soul":

> But all other marvels of the Neurological Institute grow pale beside the marvel of its discovery that, when everything about the brain (including all its physical and mental associations) has been explained and explored, something inexplicable remains. The surgeon can make the patient move, hear, see, have sensations and even dream dreams. But the patient never believes that he does these things of his own accord.
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> He has dreams but he knows they are only dreams. He is fully aware he is in the operating room. The human mind, in other words, seems to stand to one side as an observer and watch these actions take place, as if they were occurring in another person.
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> The doctor can force the patient to lift his arm, but he cannot make the patient *will-to* do it. In other words, the surgeon, although he now can probe into the brain's deepest recesses, still cannot manipulate the human mind. Nor can any outside stimulus influence that remarkable faculty known as human will power.
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> In this way, scientists have begun the discovery of the physical basis of the mind—the "seat of the soul," if you like. But their work, significant as it is, does not explain the nature of the elusive spirit that seems to dwell there.
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> "What we have done," say the Institute scientists, "is to find out a little more about the switchboard. But let us not forget that there may be a switchboard operator."
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> These scientists, who have been confronted in their work by this Presence, call it simply "a spiritual element." And they add: "Perhaps we will always have to visualize something, beyond our reach and

beyond our comprehension, which is capable of controlling the mechanism of the human brain."

Let us propose further that the mind, directed by this center of consciousness, is its tool or vehicle, and that the mind of itself is dual in its action. We could designate this dual action as primary and secondary, or (again to simplify) as "higher" and "lower" mind. The facets of the higher mind could be considered as creative thought, abstract thought, insight (intuition), and (moral) judgment. The phases of lower mind then would be concrete thought, *post-hoc* reasoning, memory, and imagination (day-dreaming, as distinguished from creative thought). Perception is of course a quality of both the higher and lower mind. The terms overlap because actually the mind is one, but can be turned in two directions. Higher mind is concerned with abstract principles, concepts—with ethics rather than ethos. By means of this capacity a man *or child* may contemplate his own nature and perceive moral values impersonally. The lower mind is chiefly concerned with events and personalities. It is directed and deflected by the emotions.

The emotional nature is, we think, or can be, another tool or vehicle of the abstract consciousness. Its relation to the mind and the body is obvious. Yet the fact that the emotions affect the body, and are in turn affected by it, gives us the clue that the emotions are not the result of bodily action. We are dealing, on any plane beyond the physical, with a "fourth dimension" of interpenetrability, which again discloses that the whole is not the sum of its parts.

The "higher" mind can be characterized by the word "impartial"—and the lower mind by the word "egoistic." In other words, the man considers the whole of the universe (himself included) "objectively" with the higher mind, while with the lower mind he views himself as the center of the universe. Through the latter, self-respect becomes personal pride; integrity becomes the kind of honesty that is "the best policy," in the transition from higher to lower mind. The individual consciousness is a *power* to choose and to perceive. The human being, then, may choose to perceive his world through the higher or the lower mind. The greatest battles ever fought have been the struggles within each human being resulting from the constant two-way pull between the partial view and the impartial. When the struggle is temporarily lost, the emotions inundate the lower mind, leaving such debris as prejudice, preconceptions, avarice, and the like. A struggle permanently lost becomes some kind of insanity.

The proportion of negative or positive traits shown by an individual is an indication of which way the "battle is going." Every positive trait is a possible magnetic tie with other human beings—one or more. If a person exhibits a positive link with another individual, there is a possibility of rapport with that one. If he has so directed himself toward the higher mind, his emotions become compassion toward many other beings, and he may establish rapport with the many.

The child will begin to make an effort unconsciously, then, to do the same. Many children do try to take these steps themselves, as they try to take all steps, without realizing how or why they do it. "Teacher" to them may mean someone to be respected and admired. Therefore they seek a reciprocal respect in the best way they know.

When two people extend toward each other their best qualities and perceive in each other only the positive traits of personality, they will find no fault with one another. This "finding no fault" is the Open Sesame of the pupil-teacher relationship. In ancient times, when the disciple had complete confidence in his teacher and found no fault, he was entrusted with sacred knowledge. It is likewise true, today, that when a child *accepts* his teacher, the child as an adult will remember that teacher as the one who "taught him the most."

* * *

Readers will have no difficulty in seeing why we value this effort at psychological analysis, especially since it is part of a thesis composed to satisfy the requirements of a degree. Philosophical speculation certainly should have a place throughout the educational field, and if the results sound a great deal more like Plato than John B. Watson, so much the better. The writer would undoubtedly accept other classifications of human qualities than those set forth here, we think, the main point being that it is the *qualities themselves*, rather than their supposed biological origins, which have claim to first attention in considering the nature of the child.

FRONTIERS

The Conditions of Freedom

REVIEWING in the *Nation* (Dec. 13, 1959) James B. Conant's *Modern Science and Modern Man*, Joseph Wood Krutch has this to say in conclusion:

> It seems a pity that so many psychologists and sociologists insist upon clinging to conceptions of science by now pretty well abandoned by those physicists who have the best know[edge of that branch of science which seems to be making the greatest strides today.

So far as we know, physics has always been the science making "the greatest strides," and the science, also, in which there has been the greatest originality, intellectual daring, and willingness to revise opinions in the light of new facts. While special students of the progress of science may debate this claim, we think it remains true at least in comparison with most other branches of science. The reason, we suppose, is that physicists originated the canons of the scientific method, set the example of method to all the other sciences, and that physics is, in fact, more of a genuine science with first principles and a body of verified conclusions than any other discipline.

At any rate, physicists have shown less fear of "authority" than, say, the psychologists who may be supposed to cling to doctrinaire views simply because their subject-matter is so elusive and difficult to generalize. Physicists and mathematicians, for instance, have been much more hospitable to the idea of extra sensory perception than the psychologists. Men who practice a genuine science can afford to be less tradition-bound than others.

It was the physicists, however, who first devised the dogmas of modern materialism, more or less as a result of their occupational habit of regarding the universe as a vast machine. And it was the physicists, also, who were first among the scientists to reject it categorically. (We speak, of course, of the general trend of thought among physicists, and not of the views of unusual individuals, to whom no labels of any sort may be justly applied.) Going back twenty years in modern physical thought (that is, in the philosophical theorizing of physicists, based upon their science), we find Robert A. Millikan, one of the leading physicists of the world, reviewing (in *Time, Matter, and Values*, Chapel Hill, 1932) a series of important discoveries, ending with the theory of relativity and the Heisenberg principle of uncertainty, and concluding:

> Result, dogmatic materialism in physics is dead! If we had all been as wise as Galileo and Newton it would never have been born, for dogmatism in any form violates the essence of scientific method, which is to collect with an open mind the brute facts and let them speak for themselves untrammeled by preconceived ideas or by general philosophies or universal systems.

While it may be questioned whether the "brute facts" of science would be able to find any voice at all, unless supplied by some sort of "philosophy" or "preconceived idea," we quote Dr. Millikan here for his testimony on Materialism. What he is saying is that the Newtonian "worldmachine" of moving parts operated by mechanical forces is not an adequate representation of physical reality and that this notion ought not to be made the basis of theories concerned with the meaning of nature and life.

A few years later, in a little-known but epoch-making book, David Lindsay Watson, a theoretical physicist, gave historical perspective on the developments marked by Dr. Millikan. Writing in *Scientists Are Human* (London, Watts, 1938), he said:

> Science is trying to make a dignified retreat from its recent uncritical faith in the "objectivity" of the last century. Reassuring bulletins are issued describing this movement as an "advance." It is my belief that, when the retreat has been completed, scientific men will find that the majority of their ideas will have to be surrendered. The sources of scientific truth will be found to be much more subtle and elusive than even the most emancipated of the relativists is now willing to admit. . . . We have been

> led to believe in recent years that science draws its authority from a mechanical integrity, whereas, for the real scientist, it is a moral integrity that is the essence of the matter. A lack of understanding of this has produced an exquisite confusion, both within the gates of science and without, where, in the lay mind, the qualities of both science and scientist have been inferred to be those of the uninspired hod-carrier.

We are now ready to read a quotation from James B. Conant's new book, *Modern Science and Modern Man* (Columbia University Press), which confirms and perhaps goes even beyond Mr. Watson's anticipations:

> The idea that there could be two diametrically opposed theories as to the nature of heat, or of light, or of matter, and that both could be rejected and confirmed as a consequence of experiments would have been considered nonsense to almost all sane people fifty years ago. . . . The new insight comes from a realization that the structure of nature may eventually be such that our processes of thought do not correspond to it sufficiently to permit us to think about it at all. . . . We are now approaching a bound beyond which we are forever estopped from pursuing our inquiries, not by the construction of the world, but by the construction of ourselves.

Commenting on this passage, Mr. Krutch, who selected and printed it in his *Nation* review, draws out its implications:

> What this ultimately comes down to and what President Conant [of Harvard], without using quite these words, seems ready to admit is simply this: the old objection that certain metaphysical concepts like those of right and wrong, free will, individual responsibility, and so on are necessarily false and meaningless because they are not consistent with the known facts of the "real world" will no longer hold, for these "known facts" about the "real world" are not consistent with themselves, and the paradoxes and ambiguities of physics are now at least as great as those of even theology, not to say metaphysics.

This is no time to revel in "I told you so's," although the fact is that philosophers and classical humanists have been urging this view upon scientists ever since the shadow of the world machine first began to dominate the horizon of modern intellectuality. That the scientists have now come around to it, themselves, may mean, however, that the solid floor of matter has dropped right out of the scientific universe, leaving a dimensionless vacuum of uncertainty in its place. Where, now, shall we look for the final word upon matters of importance?

We can either return to the church, which has nothing new to offer—nothing, really, save the same old exhortations and the same reproaches it has been repeating throughout the reign of the materialistic heresy—or we can turn to the resources to be found within man himself. If we adopt the latter alternative, there is need to consider the transformations which have affected man's idea of Man, running parallel to the emergence and development of physical notions. For a review of this sort, a passage from Julian Huxley's *Man Stands Alone* (1941) provides an apt summary. Before the rise of science, Dr. Huxley writes:

> Man saw himself as being set apart, with the rest of the animal kingdom created to serve his needs and pleasure, with no share in salvation, no position in eternity. . . . With Darwin, the reverse swing was started. Man was once again regarded as an animal, but now in the light of science. . . . At the outset the consequences of the changed outlook were not fully explored. The unconscious prejudices and attitudes of an earlier age survived, disguising many of the moral and philosophical implications of the new outlook. But gradually the pendulum reached the furthest point of its swing. What seemed the logical consequences of Darwinian postulates were faced: man is an animal like any other; accordingly, his views as to the special meaning of human life and human ideals need merit no more consideration in the light of eternity (or of evolution) than those of a bacillus or a tapeworm. Survival is the only criterion of evolutionary success: therefore, all existing organisms are of equal value. The idea of progress is a mere anthropomorphism. Man happens to be the dominant type at the moment, but he might be replaced by the ant or the rat. . . .

Dr. Huxley continues, outlining further developments pertinent to what has happened in physics:

> Of late years, a new tendency has become apparent. It may be that this is due to the mere increase of knowledge and the extension of scientific

> analysis. It may be that it has been determined by social and psychological causes. Disillusionment with *laisser faire* in the human economic sphere may well have spread to the planetary system of *laisser faire* that we call natural selection. With the crash of old religious, ethical, and political systems, man's desperate need for some scheme of values and ideals may have prompted a more critical re-examination of his biological position. Whether this be so is a point that I must leave to the social historians. The fact remains that the pendulum is again on the swing, the man-animal gap is again broadening.

Viewed in these terms, could the outlook be brighter? What more can we hope for than that the collapse of faith in authoritarian systems should be accompanied by a revival of faith in the potentialities of man?

Our space is used up with quotation, so that comment must be brief. But what, after all, remains to be said, beyond pointing out that the words of these eminent scientists and thinkers all point to the emergence of *ideal conditions for human freedom?* The conditions are psychological and philosophical, it is true, but when has true human freedom depended upon anything else?