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THE COSMOPOLITAN EAST

AT the turn of the century, a man who was as distinguished in philosophy and general understanding as he was in literature, Lafcadio Hearn, told his students in the University of Tokyo that Japan's best hope of gaining the sympathy and friendship of the world was through literature. He gave some examples of how great writers have served as civilizing influences, winning world-wide respect for the cultures in which they emerged.

While Hearn had in mind the literature of the imagination—stories and poetry—his counsel, it seems to us, has the greatest importance. For the civilized world is bound to honor riches of the mind, wherever they appear. The significant place in world affairs held today by India is not entirely accounted for by the fact that there are nearly four hundred million Indians. An Indian spokesman is listened to carefully for several reasons. First, he is a countryman of M. K. Gandhi, who won world fame as the inventor of the techniques of mass non-violence, and as one who imparted *credibility* to the idea that morality and truth may exercise an actual power over human affairs. The Indian spokesman also enjoys a kind of association with the author of *Toward Freedom* and *Glimpses of World History,* books which reveal both the integrity and comprehensive intellectuality of India's Prime Minister Nehru. Finally, a growing number of people in the West are impressed by the philosophical splendor of India's past. One who has read India's epics, who has even a little familiarity with *The Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Upanishads,* and knows that Gautama Buddha built his great religious reform on the foundations of Indian religion, cannot help but anticipate finding at least the flavor of these greatnesses of the past in modern Indian expressions.

What, then, is happening in India in respect to the creation of a national literature of the present age? We cannot possibly answer this question, which would involve at least months, possibly years, of reading; nor are we persuaded that the time has come to pursue such an investigation. We suspect that a generation at least should pass before any serious attempt is made to measure the synthesis of ancient with modern culture—which is almost the same as saying synthesis of Eastern and Western culture taking place in India. The making of culture is something more than a simple act of the will; it results from slow growth and draws into its processes countless nuances of thought and feeling. What we should like to report on, here, is rather a definite trend in Indian thought—a trend which gives at least an indication of the direction of modern India's cultural development.

First of all is the fact of marked self-consciousness. A useful measure of cultural self-consciousness is found in the capacity of a people to *cope* with an alien or foreign culture. While it would be silly to suggest that India has suffered the impact of Western imperialism without loss of equilibrium, the thing of historic importance is that there have been Indians and are Indians who see what has happened to them as a result of Western invasion. Both Gandhi and Nehru assimilated the fruits of a Western education. While Gandhi seemed to shed most of his Western learning as irrelevant to the work he set out to do, he did not abandon what he learned from Thoreau, Ruskin, and Tolstoy. He retained, that is, certain moral essences of Western thought. Nehru retained more—the themes of Western radicalism and the skeptical spirit of scientific inquiry. Both these men; at any rate, and doubtless others of whom we know little, knew what they were up against in their contest with the West. To know what you are up against—this is a phase of self-consciousness.

A second aspect of self-consciousness is the capacity for self-criticism. Before there can be authentic self-criticism, there must be considerable self-reliance and self-respect. The uncertain and insecure man fears to look at himself closely, lest he find weaknesses he does not know how to correct. Partisan nationalism and dogmatic religion are incapable of self-criticism because partisanship and dogma are marks of immaturity. It is gratifying, therefore, to find in an Indian newspaper, the *Hindu Weekly Review*, a full awareness of India's historical situation "between two cultures," and a clear appreciation of the problems which are involved. In the *Hindu* for Aug. 30, a large book devoted to the history of Asia under the dominance of Western imperialism is discussed at some length. The reviewer speaks well of the book, as covering with great skill a long and difficult period of Asia's past, but observes in conclusion:

> . . . it [the book, *Asia and Western Dominance*, by K. M. Panikkar] has been conceived in the classical tradition of Western historiography and the grand style of the Western masters of the art, both of which presuppose a much larger agreement on facts and philosophy of a civilization than is presently visible in the Asian scene. Mr. Panikkar has an established reputation as historian, man of affairs and diplomat, has had intimate personal knowledge of the countries of Asia, has been close to the sources which decide the relations between these countries and is thus equipped to write the epitaph of Western imperialism. But an oriental or Asian culture or civilization as homogeneous and pervasive as that of Europe is the Westernized Asian's vision of the future; the absence of pan-Asianism as a fact or feeling in the centuries covered in the book deprives it of the unity which is essential to a history that is also a work of art and handicaps the author who wishes to evolve an organic story out of a mass of discrete data from several countries. It is also inevitable that an Asian author steeped in the Western tradition should betray on every page the dominance whose decay and disappearance he accepts and is prepared to record with relish.

Here, centrally expressed, is the problem of creating a new literature and culture in India. Fundamentally, it is a problem of assimilating the best values of Western civilization and uniting them with those elements of India's ancestral culture which ought to survive in the modern world. All too often, the combination of the two lines of influence is an unattractive mixture of incompatibles rather than a synthesis of harmonizing contrasts. Gandhi, one may say, succeeded in spiritual synthesis, Nehru is valiantly attempting political synthesis, and India's scholars and learned men are busy with comparative discussions of Vedic tradition and Western sociology. The most appropriate comment, we think, is like that of the reviewer quoted, which is in effect to say that this is the process that is now going on. If it proceeds in a truly cosmopolitan spirit, without nationalist anxiety to be purely "Indian," and avoids uncertain imitation of the Western sort of maturity in the herds of science and technology, then we may surely hope for the flowering of a great new renaissance in the Eastern hemisphere—a renaissance that could bring new riches to all the world.

Especially interesting in the pages of the *Hindu Weekly* are the reviews which illustrate the filtering process now being applied to both ancient and modern knowledge. The following is said of a book on education;

> The deep dissatisfaction with modern education, despite the reform in methodology, is so universal that one is compelled to ask whether the failure is not due to its preoccupation with the present and biological needs of man. In India, as the author rightly argues, the educational system which is an imitation of the Western system is an exotic, not having its roots in Indian Philosophy and no wonder it has not enabled its products to feel that sense of security and joy which is the outcome of an integrated development. According to the author [Dr. G. N. Kaul], "in India, man is primarily divine and his present physical and mental form is only a finite representation of his infinite stature. . . . Again . . . . does the author point out that "man always aspires to be what he is not. He aspires to his fullest development, which, according to the eternally accepted tenets of Indian thought of - all shades, is divinity itself." . . . The author pleads for the evolution of a new school of Psychology based on this Indian view of life and he fervently believes that the world has come to a stage when a clearer understanding of this conception of life, with its

message of hope, is needed.

A book by C. Rajagopalachari, India's famous political leader, is a Vedantin tract in behalf of Hinduism, proposing that the only happiness for man lies in freedom from "the bonds of Karma, the unending chain of work and results," leading to reunion with the Supreme Spirit—*Sat.* "Enlightenment," according to C.R., "is not an intellectual state but a state of spiritual awakening which comes through moral rebuilding and is an overcoming of Maya, for it is not intellectual ignorance that blinds our vision but desires and attachments. The latter cause a wall to be raised between our understanding and the indwelling spirit." The first step toward emancipation is said to be "to develop the firm conviction that the *I* in us is entirely distinct from the body and the senses through which it functions."

A book dealing with "the Asian Revolution" is quoted as saying:

> The ancient peoples of Asia are now turning to their ancestral religions with a new hope. They realize that a cultural reintegration involves a religious reconstruction. They have become a very real force in the life and thought of the Asian people. But the modern Asian is keenly aware that religion can be a disastrous source of division within a nation and he is therefore anxious to avoid religious rivalry.

This, then, is a period of recovery for the ancient religious philosophies which have been in eclipse for so long, and of striving for cultural independence. It seems practically inevitable that this movement will exercise increasing influence throughout the world.

Letter from **MOSCOW**

HOTEL SAVOY, MOSKVA.—I promised to write you from Moscow, and this seems the right time to do it, as I have just been recording at Moscow Radio my impressions gathered over the past three weeks while on a 7,000-mile tour of the Soviet Union. Freedom, by the way, reaches casual levels here, measured by our orderly British standards. I was able to put over my world-shaking premiere as a radio commentator quite devoid of an edited script, and with only a few hastily jotted headings to guide me. (Friends who subsequently picked up the broadcast said it sounded as if I was talking to them on the phone and were surprised at what I was allowed to say.)

The other nine members of our Scots cultural delegation are out on a spending spree until the shops close at eight o'clock. Cultural workers, incidentally, are among the highest paid people in the Soviet Union. In this classless society they become aristocrats. Here, where culture is organised on a mass folk scale, these poor social outcasts and misfits of the Western world—the poets, painters, musicians—certainly come into their own.

So do foreigners. There are delegations to be seen in this hotel from all over the world—Chinese basketball players, Dutch astronomers, Indian dancers, West German teachers. Everywhere we are welcomed as "Messengers of Peace." As time goes on we feel more and more like angelic hosts while toast-winged words spread friendship and goodwill among peoples at the great banquets held in our honour. "Sub-foreigners" from the fifty-nine nationalities of the Soviet Union are also to be seen and they are accorded full national status as visitors to the Russian S.S.R.

Our first of innumerable toasts, "*Za Myru Myr"* (to World Peace), was in the Minski Airport restaurant with a cheery group of Moldavian Stakhanovites on their way to a competition in Moscow. In the theatre we were often delighted by the folk dancing and music of Ukrainians, Trans-Carpathians and Georgians. Each distinctive national cultural tradition is vigorously encouraged and developed along with the language and literature within the broad economic framework of the U.S.S.R.

After our sixty-mile-broad island home, the immense forests and plains of Russia seem vast indeed, yet withal there is an acute sense of "long distance proximity" strange to our insular minds which may be familiar to Americans and explain for us the particular fears for security that trouble your country right now.

Last night a Scots delegation of miners flew in from Peking—a 36-hour trip. In the morning we fly to Helsinki to catch the Transatlantic plane which could land us in New York fifteen hours after we reach Glasgow at midnight tomorrow. Southwards another night flight beyond the one we made over the snow-capped Caucasus to Georgia would bring us to Karachi.

From this land of super realism, where even painting is photographic, the outside world—with its awkward economic national differences, its superstitious religious beliefs, class distinctive snobberies, competitive party political loyalties and subtle exploitations of man by man—seems strangely out of focus, and the old Western eyeglasses no longer correct the vision. What we had thought was the "Iron Curtain" turns out to be nothing more than a dense fog of prejudice and ignorance. Goodwill such as disinterested human beings like ourselves, without the burden of national vested interests, can breathe into this dewy curtain of misrepresentation, is of infinite value at the present time. It clears the air temporarily in the immediate vicinity, but the cause—our unclean thinking apparatus—still remains. In the same way as our British "smogs" are caused by moisture condensing around smoke particles at low temperatures, so do the impurities in our thinking act as gathering points for further obscurantism.

The manufacture of this psychological curtain with its swirling clouds of words, proceeds on both sides. The Soviet idea of Capitalism in the West is obviously culled straight from Marx and Engels complete with super-Dickensian employers grinding the workers and tricksters exploiting the widow with her mite. A very free adaptation of Dickens' *Little Dorritt*, with principal roles for Mrs. Kleinham, Flintwitch and the capitalist Mr. Kesbie, was one of the Soviet equivalents to a box office success which we saw done by the Moscow Art Theatre in full-blooded melodramatic style that would have made Stanislavsky, the founder of this theatre, turn in his grave. As we left the theatre a Russian commiserated with me about life in Britain which he imagined was peopled by types just as portrayed that night on the stage.

On the whole, the Russian idea of life in the West is as out-of-date as our beliefs in a Communist slave state with a secret policeman to watch each citizen and foreign visitor. Being a nationalist, I of course travelled around this multinational Union in my kilt. If alone, as I frequently was with my ciné camera (which I was able to use with the utmost freedom), people who wished to practice their English would speak to me in the street, and answer even the most outrageously personal questions about their housing, habits and income.

The older speakers of English mostly had an American accent, a legacy of the days when many of your countrymen came here as technicians to pass on their know-how. The younger generation all spoke with the mannered Southern-English Oxford accent which in Britain is associated with the upper classes and the Public Schools, evidently learnt through listening to the BBC. It is a common fallacy in the West that listening to the Western radios is discouraged in the Soviet Union and that such curiosity is apt to be rewarded with a spell in the "salt mines of Siberia." On the contrary, we found that people were rather proud of listening in to the outer world. It is a sign of education, and width of outlook.

So, during this visit, we have come to realise that the "Totalitarians" are not what we thought they were; that "Communism" in Russia is like "Christianity" in Britain, the jug-handle for a distinctive way of life, and its customs need not strike fear in our hearts; that the classless society with its assertion of the dignity of labour is an inspiring thing to see in operation; that Democracy depends not so much on the obsolete idea of Opposition as upon the community act of co-operation for the common weal; that a free election must provide a free method of selecting representatives; that the masses can be educated in a sense of creative enterprise and purpose; that true civilisation does not depend upon plumbing and products.

These are but a few random impressions. My next mission in the cause of national understanding I am determined will take me to that greatest enigma of our time, far surpassing the Soviet Union in complexity, the United States of America. Your country is fast superseding the U.S.S.R. as World Bogey No. 1 and the Soviets find it very difficult to understand (as do we also) the social pressures that produce this lack of confidence in your own way of life, which is at the root of the fear of any rival social system such as Communism.

The rest of our delegation is drifting back now with the spoils of their shopping chase; the twin-trumpeted motor horns that sound a gusty fanfare in every Soviet city we have visited, are quiet after the rush hour, and we must now prepare for the final gargantuan reception of receptions and pack our bags for home. For tomorrow we head for the West, strong now in knowledge that this new way of life embraced by half of the world is something any honest man can live comfortably beside in constructive co-existence. Our problems in technically advanced countries, although fundamentally the same as in underdeveloped areas, differ in scale and form and demand the pursuit of other means for their solution, but there is obviously much we can all

learn from each other.

Two pictures cross my mind as I search for a note upon which to close this letter. I see the bright, eager faces of the kindergarten three-year-olds as they play communal games and build houses with bricks and toys that they share with each other—share without possessing for themselves—and I hear the note of defiance as the young Prague student guide points out the Stars and Stripes flying over the U.S. Embassy on the hill overlooking the capital. "There they sit, imagining they rule over us—but they don't.

Surely, what in the end will save us all is the development of mutual respect for that precious human part of our natures which is unwilling to abide any longer than is necessary the limitations which a hostile environment has imposed upon our physical life and has held back from release the free creative spirit of mankind.

ROVING CORRESPONDENT

EDITOR'S NOTE.—The "Roving Correspondent" who contributed this "Letter from Russia" is, as he discloses, a Scottish nationalist with a much greater interest in cultural expressions than in political ideology. We print his letter for its intrinsic interest, feeling that the impressions of a man who need not write to "please" anyone, nor to confirm already existing opinions, are valuable impressions, these days, whatever they may be. The letter is obviously written under the influence of enthusiasm; perhaps, instead of replying with wry skepticism, or hastening to point out weighty matters which he neglects, we should be grateful that there are people who are so immune to conventional attitudes that they are able to respond to concrete experience of other human beings in this way.

We need not change our views of the Soviet government, nor forget the large area of "forbidden" thoughts for Russians, in order to be glad that Russian people were able to win the friendship and admiration of this civilized visitor from a country where freedom is as native as highland heather.

REVIEW
"RADICAL" PSYCHIATRISTS

SOONER or later, it seems to us, the more alert psychologists are all going to become political nonconformists. This, at least, seems implied by the trend of commentary on national and international affairs in the quarterly *Psychiatry,* where a distinctly radical turn of criticism is apparent. For instance, Brock Chisholm, it may be remembered, was outspoken concerning "typical self-righteous attitudes toward war" while he was Director General of The World Health Organization. Other psychiatrists, also possessed of a wide reading public, have insistently pointed out the immaturity and destructiveness of the concept of nationalism—even our own—and similar analyses appearing in *Psychiatry* have been of a nature that would jolt the complacency of most "I00% Americans." Of course, the general public does not read *Psychiatry,* but university and professional men will be increasingly influenced by the global view of political affairs which *Psychiatry* reflects.

Helen Swick Perry, in the August issue, offers an impressive study of public attitudes in America in relation to the war and the atom bomb. She begins:

> This paper has grown out of an attempt to document Sullivan's statement that selective inattention "covers the world like a tent." The clinician has found that the location of a patient's areas of selective inattention often gives him a better chance of recovery—that is, as the patient comes to see what he has been overlooking, he is able to take more appropriate and adequate action than he did before. I am suggesting in this paper that selective inattention also exists in public attitudes toward national problems, and that as the social scientist locates the areas of selective inattention, more appropriate and adequate action might be taken regarding these problems. Since the atomic bomb is one of the most important and most controversial issues of our time, I have chosen it as the subject of this study. The study seems to indicate that the United States citizen in his role of national may be selectively inattending this subject. The evidence is presented in the form of (1) a brief examination of statements of public officials and public opinion polls, and (2) a modified content analysis for the examination and comparison of newspaper coverage of the March 1954 hydrogen bomb tests as reported in the *London Times* and the *New York Times.* Before presenting this study, I would like to develop the psychiatric concepts which the paper depends on, with particular stress on their relation to the concept of the role of national.

A simple illustration of "selective inattention" is furnished by Hans Christian Andersen's tale, "The Emperor's New Clothes"—in which the success of a non-existent suit depends upon the willingness of counsellors and court officials to ignore the fact that the king, when supposed to be fully arrayed, was as "naked as the day when he was born." *Why* were they willing to be so "inattentive"? Dr. Perry explains:

> To put this story into the terms which will be used in this paper: The self-esteem of each person in the kingdom was dependent on his being able to selectively inattend the obvious: that the cloth did not exist. Each man's ability to selectively inattend the obvious supported every other man in a similar process. For if a man failed to see the cloth, then obviously he would be a subject of ridicule and contempt by the others. Thus a powerful influence in the overlooking of the obvious was the fact that the members of the group supported each other in it, by social sanction; it was in fact a social process that reinforced itself until the whole group was paralyzed into inactivity. The denouement of this story takes place when the child speaks up with the obvious, and everybody is made courageous enough to look at it. If the hypotheses in this paper have any significance, the public officials in this country as well as in others may have to take on the character of the child; they too must say the obvious. For when the obvious is talked about, then perhaps wiser decisions can be made. In terms of this paper, President Eisenhower's somewhat timid attempt at "Operation Candor" was a step, however halting, in the right direction. It partakes of the same kind of honesty as the child's statement in the fairy tale.

Dr. Perry notices that most Americans reacted favorably to the proposal for serious consideration of our *global* responsibility in the use of atomic weapons, but the President, she

points out, glossed over some fundamental facts in the recapitulation of atomic history. Dr. Perry asks:

> What then was the source of the momentary relief as reflected in the American press, which widely acclaimed Eisenhower's plan for a few days? Perhaps it was thought of as an act of restitution by the American people, and as such increased national self-esteem. But the theme of restitution would have been more sharply delineated if Eisenhower had prefaced it by stating the obvious fact: in the history of all time, the United States first used the atom bomb, on Hiroshima. Instead he skirted the obvious in two one-sentence paragraphs:
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> *On July* 16, *1945, the United States set of the world's first atomic test explosion.*
>
> "Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted 42 test explosions."
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> But what happened to the middle paragraph? What happened on August 6, 1945? Statistically speaking, has this been absorbed into one of the 4~ test explosions that followed the July test?

Dr. Perry digresses to comment on "the political sense of right and wrong which seems to be characteristic of the American in his role of national"—an attitude of mind which, in more easily recognized form, also governs the "public opinions" of fanatical religious moralists. In this case, once the moralist has convinced himself that the dropping of a bomb on Hiroshima was "right," he ignores most of the testimony regarding the prolonged human suffering which resulted. But, even more important, as a national, he seeks the proof of "rightness" as soon as the bomb is dropped:

> Although, as represented in the gas warfare polls, the American people shun the idea of using a horror weapon first, once they have been identified with just such an initiatory act in the form of dropping the atom bomb, they have tended to set up reasons why it was just the thing that should have been done. From the psychoanalytic viewpoint, such a tendency represents the defensive reaction to guilt—in this case, the American's guilt about his initiatory act, the implications of which he selectively ignores or inattends.

Thus, Dr. Perry finds news about the bomb reported in the New York *Times* quite different from accounts of the same episode in the London *Times.* Headlines in the New York paper depersonalized everything connected with the atomic tests at Bikini, for instance, while the London *Times* made it clear that both Japanese fishermen and Japanese public were likely to suffer considerably from the radioactive aftermath of atomic blasts. Dr. Perry arranges in parallel columns the headings of Bikini stories in these newspapers during the period from March 15 to March 31, 1954, enabling the reader to see at a glance that mention of the Japanese *people,* if the report is of their being adversely affected (no doubt about this, from even the most coldly factual point of view), occurred *five times as often* in the London paper.

One of the most interesting passages in Doctor Perry's article describes the psychological reactions she noted in herself while making this disquieting study:

> I would like to comment briefly on my feelings in attempting to do research in this field. My initial interest was in the concept of selective inattention in public affairs; and only tentatively and slowly did I allow myself to look at public attitudes toward the atomic bomb. During the time I worked on this project, I experienced great anxiety about what I found and continuing desire to stop work on it. The idea of further work in this area interests me intellectually but is quite anxiety-provoking emotionally. I believe that intensive investigation of this whole area by small groups would be rewarding in terms of pinpointing this effect and determining whether or not the group could tolerate more awareness of this subject with the support of informed leadership and of other group members.

The same issue of *Psychiatry* includes an article concerning the typical delusions of "self-righteous moralism." In this paper the three authors, distinguished in their field of clinical study, make observations which correlate alarmingly with Helen Perry's discoveries, suggesting that Nationalism should be regarded as the number one cause of social neurosis. Drs. Rosenthal, Frank, and Nash are not discussing

directly either atomic bombs or political issues, but the immediate relevance of the following should be clear:

> Although he may pretend to understand the other members' viewpoints, he [the self-righteous moralist] tends to ride roughshod over any arguments or feelings they express, reaffirming his original point again and again without necessarily developing his argument. Some other member may feel threatened, hurt, or upset, but the self-righteous moralist seems not to recognize it, or at least does not try to counteract it, but is instead incited to aggravate the other's feelings further. He tends to conceptualize the others in terms of his own system of values, failing to recognize their actual needs, wishes, and fears.
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> Since the self-esteem of the self-righteous moralist is based on such shaky foundations—namely, that without justification for his course of action there is no defense against his feelings of guilt and failure—he continually needs to convince others that he is right. *In this way,* he tries to allay his own doubts, and to win the implicit quarrel by showing up the other fellow as wrong. It also gives him a claim to recognition which he has not achieved otherwise, and serves to justify the continuance of his anger and to assuage the anxiety and guilt connected with it. The self-righteous moralist needs to have his early claim to status recognized and supported, . . . the identification of these patterns may be not only a guide to therapeutic maneuvers, but also an intermediate step in the development of a diagnostic framework for neurotic behavior that would be more relevant for psychotherapy than the traditional one.

One who likes to dwell occasionally upon Plato's notion of a state governed by "philosopher kings" will naturally think how nice it would be if men of great ethical stature were in a position to determine national and international policies. As a not too inferior substitute for such philosophers, as classically defined, we suggest a cabinet composed of psychiatrists such as Brock Chisholm, Carl and William Menninger, Erich Fromm, and a few others. Under such governing auspices, the prospects of world peace might be greatly improved.

COMMENTARY
ANOTHER LETTER ON "THE EAST

WHILE preparing this issue for the press, we were pleased to discover in the November *Harper's* the article, "What I Saw in Red China," contributed by a French Catholic priest who was a missionary in the Far East for twenty-six years—until expelled a year ago from China by the Communists. The report gives every evidence of being unprejudiced and just. (It is not really an "article," but a letter written by the returned missionary to an American priest.)

Of immediate interest is the implication that the Chinese are on the whole satisfied with their revolution. Chiang Kai-shek is forgotten—"finished." China now has a well-organized, unified government. Further:

> The administration is perfectly organized from top to bottom. It is absolutely honest. No more venality, especially since the great administrative purge three years ago. No doubt perfection is not of this world, but I imagine that under the present regime it would be more difficult to buy a Chinese official than an official in the Western countries.

There is much bureaucracy, and all the fevers of a new regime, including elaborate practice of the cult of self-criticism and penitence, but this priest, who has no reason to love communists, declares that the government has completely wiped out prostitution and given women genuine equality of status (no more brutality by husbands to wives, no more daughters "sold" according to the father's need or whim). Opium, too, has disappeared.

Finally, the priest observes that "the greatest success of the new regime has been making a previously quite egotistic people, whose former government was so corrupt, so primarily concerned with the common good." It is the "general good," of course, for which dissenting individuals may suffer or die, but "the whole country is being educated toward a theory and pushed into a practice closer to Christianity than the ancient *fa-ts'ai* (become rich) first and last."

There is no naïve admiration of the Chinese communists. Their ruthlessness is admitted, doctrinaire Marxism and materialism noted. The essential meaning of what is happening in China is perhaps that the theoretical materialism associated with the social ideal of the Marxists has not been able to erase the human qualities of a great people. We hope that MANAS readers who find this week's Letter from Moscow of interest will look up the letter on China in *Harper's.* The peace of the world may depend upon such honest communications.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WHILE some Pollyanna-ish spirits may still take comfort in thinking "the older generation *always* says that the youngsters are going from bad to worse," there is no substantial doubt about the fact that, since 1948, juvenile viciousness has been on an alarming rampage. As Walter Lippmann noted recently:

> Statistics collected by the FBI confirm the impression made by the recent newspaper stories of horrifying crimes committed by very young men. The figures show not only a sudden increase in the number of these crimes but also in their viciousness. In a survey of 200 cities, the FBI found that last year the crime rate of adults rose by 1.9 percent while among youths, 18 years and under, it rose by 7.9 percent.

The World-War II increase in delinquency caused little consternation among social scientists, most of them confidently predicting that as soon as the "stability of the social order" was regained, the delinquency rate would return to normal. A sight dip in the figures did occur between 1946 and 1948, but a subsequent upswing made it look as if we must be in the middle of world-wars III, IV and V all put together. However, since the continuing armaments race and the "small wars" of Korea and elsewhere do not measure up to this scale in terms of recognizable social disorganization, it becomes evident that an internal cause of delinquency—call it "moral poverty"—has been revealed, and is apt to reveal itself even more fully in the future. Inadequate philosophies, while their limitations eventually emerge, may not disclose the full extent of their influence; perhaps, more than anything else, World War II simply hastened the maturity of immaturity.

In any case, most of those who now write searchingly about the juvenile problem agree that philosophical revaluation is the only answer. Another columnist, George Sokolsky, quotes from Hanson Baldwin:

> Military authorities are studying the moral weakness of many of our soldiers in the Korean War.
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> Hanson Baldwin, the military expert, once wrote a significant paragraph on this subject, referring to the Second World War:
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> "Perhaps this deficiency in determination reflects the changing spirit of our nation—the substitution of easy living for a pioneer psychology; the weakening virus of 'work less and make more', the substitution of collective security for individual initiative. Perhaps it reflects the failure of our way of life to dramatize itself in terms of values worth fighting for—our boys fought for 'blueberry pie' and the right to go home. The Japs fought for a Shinto Valhalla—death in battle meant life in heaven. The Germans died the death of martyrdom—a Wagnerian end—to perpetuate 1000 years of Hitlerian rule. The Russians fought for their motherland and died with some of the Oriental fatalism so peculiar to the eyes of the West.

Even the military, in other words, are wondering about the "sources of morale"—and morals. The devastating effects of crime and horror television shows are well known, but there are other factors at work which substantiate the thesis that poor philosophy rather than poor environment is the prime cause of juvenile unrest. Fred Hechinger sums up the problem of "community delinquency" in the New York *Herald Tribune*, quoting an address by Bertram M. Beck, director of a Special Juvenile Delinquency Project in New York City. Mr. Beck, he points out, "did not bring out any of the old whipping boys—progressive education, television, lack of trick courses in character building, etc. He went to the roots." Hechinger continues:

> Ten years ago, Mr. Beck said, most delinquents came from the city slums. This was understandable. Here were children who were "not truly part of the community, but were exiles within the community." There was the child striking out against "that which he does not feel he is a part of."
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> But that is not the problem today. Juvenile delinquency is at an all-time high—higher than at any time covered by statistics. Between 1948 and 1952 delinquency increased by 29 per cent, and during the following year it jumped by another 13 per cent. But the delinquents of today no longer come primarily from the slums. Theirs is not revolt against poverty. Its most startling aspect is, said Mr. Beck, "its spread from those (slum) neighborhoods to what are commonly called 'better' sections of the community and its spread into the less densely populated sections of our country."

This point is coming more and more to the fore, with books like John Bartlow Martin's *Why Did They Kill* emphasizing the fact that material prosperity and the best of conventional educational opportunities do not seem to retard the spread of juvenile crime. William Bernard's *Jailbait* similarly confounds

advocates of orthodox religion by quoting copious statistics on delinquency among children belonging to the Catholic Church and other religious organizations.

Returning to Bertram Beck's address, his main complaint is not that the war or comic strips or television have caused the growing lawlessness of growing youth, but rather that the "community itself is delinquent." As Hechinger says:

> Mr. Beck sees in this spread of delinquency through all economic levels "a danger signal that must not be ignored." He considers it "a sign of social decay." He warns that a youngster "reared in an atmosphere of corruption, materialism, mechanization and utter confusion as to fundamental moral and ethical values has little to sustain him." Why, asks Mr. Beck, should this youngster not strike out at the community through acts of delinquency? For "the community itself is delinquent."
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> The record shows that the last previous delinquency period hit the country in 1942, during World War II, and did not decline until 1946. The new, and worst wave began in 1948, with the start of the cold war. "Plainly, therefore," Mr. Beck concludes, "there is a pronounced relationship between a world in strife, a world steeped in aggression, and acts of aggression on the part of today's youth."

Now, having "viewed with alarm" sufficiently for the time being, it may be well to call attention to the fact that a number of educators believe they know something about what really causes the trouble, and what can be done about it. Speaking at the opening convocation of Brown University's 191st academic year (1954), President A. Whitney Griswold of Yale supplied an attractive definition of "philosophy"—what it should really mean in everyday life, and how dependent our future actually is upon its revival. He does not use the *word* philosophy—perhaps wisely—but deals with the meaning of "intelligent conversation":

> Conversation in this country has fallen upon evil days. The great creative art whereby man translates feeling into reason and shares with his fellow man those innermost thoughts and ideals of which civilization is made is beset by forces which threaten its demise.
>
> It is forsaken by a technology that is so busy tending its time-saving devices that it has no time for anything else. It is drowned out in singing commercials by the world's most productive economy that has so little to say for itself it has to hum it. It is hushed and shushed in dimly lighted parlors by television audiences who used to read, argue, and even play bridge, an old-fashioned card game requiring speech. It is shouted down by devil's advocates, thrown into disorder by points of order. It is subdued by soft-voiced censors who, in the name of public relations, counsel discretion and the avoidance of controversy like so many family physicians breaking the news gently and advising their patients to cut down on their calories.
>
> It starves for want of reading and reflection. It languishes in a society that spends so much time passively listening and being talked to that it has all but lost the will and the skill to speak for itself.

And this is why true conversation must be identified with philosophy—which also means the desire to evaluate, to determine what constitutes the Good:

> One of the things that made possible the attainments of Greek philosophy was the extraordinary fluidity of the Greek language, which the philosophers who are still read used in its purity and never in adulteration. Small talk and gossip are not conversation. Neither is indictment, with which I include any and all one-way processors of insinuation, invective, diatribe, denunciation, excoriation, anathema, and so on, notwithstanding their current popularity. Conversation is an exchange of thought that leaves all parties to it a grain the wiser. It implies progress. Though it may begin anywhere, even in the realm of trivia, it should try to get somewhere and carry every one with it as it goes.
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> The basic principles of conversation were established by Socrates both by example and by precept more than 2,000 years ago.

It may seem a trifle absurd to conclude a review of alarming statistics about juvenile delinquency with a recommendation of "more conversation," but the point behind the point is that a thousand and one distractions, including war and television, have drawn us away from the realization that the real life of man is the life of the mind. No younger generation can be expected to develop a sense of values unless parents find discussion of ethical values, and decisions based upon them, the most inspiring and interesting, as well as the most significant, aspects of existence.

FRONTIERS

The Anarchist Contribution

To most Americans, life without extensive political organization is practically unimaginable. The genius of American institutions had its origin in eighteenth-century political philosophy, and there is a natural tendency on the part of the people of the United States to turn to law-making for the solution of their problems. Insofar as the concepts of the American political tradition reflect the revolutionary view of man—the idea of the individual as an end in himself, and not? means to the ends of other men—this preoccupation with politics may be regarded as a great step in the march of human progress. But when, on the other hand, politics is elevated to almost "religious" importance, becoming the means adopted to reach every good thing, it assumes the aspect of a great national delusion.

It is here, in relation to the exaggeration of the role of politics, that the thought of modern anarchists and their criticisms of the part played by the "State" in human affairs become an indispensable tract for the times.

The anarchists do not oppose organization itself, nor even political organization, although they are extremely skeptical of the latter, being frank to admit that anarchists themselves seem unable to resist the virus of authoritarianism, whenever they organize for political purposes. As a writer in an Italian anarchist newspaper published in New York put it recently:

> The main reason for our deep, resolute aversion to the organization of anarchists into a party lies in the history of organization, and particularly of political organization, which has always been a hierarchical, authoritarian institution in which *arrivistes* at the apex exercise authority over everyone else. It is said that this is *authoritarian* organization, that an organization of anarchists would turn out differently. It would . . . except that in three-quarters of a century there has not been a single example of it.
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> In practice, those anarchists who organize have followed exactly in the tradition of other organizers, creating the organization first, and the functions to use it for later. Organization without exact and well-defined aims is organization for its own sake—an instrument without a function. . . .
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> Anarchists have always insisted that the need must create the means to satisfy it, the necessity for the function must create the organ. . . . In Italy after the war, the only anarchist activity which prospered, which was widely accepted and supported, was that of aid to political victims. And it is clear why: this committee answered to a concrete need everyone felt and was interested in. The same may be said of the newspapers, the reviewers, the publishing ventures: in each case, temporary or permanent arrangements, according to the circumstances, are agreed to, and the will and energy of many are associated to achieve a single aim.
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> I don't know if these undertakings can be called organizations; certainly they are not the paternalistic, total, classical party organizations that the "organizing" anarchists want. But they certainly represent an association of energy, in response to a definite need, existing for as long as the individual adherents consider it necessary and opportune. And if they are organizations, they are organizations *sui generic*, as various as the aims they serve, and responding to the changing will of the thinking individuals who create them and keep them alive.

This, we think, is fundamental education in the problem of government, which has the purpose of uniting men for common ends without diminishing their freedom in the process. The great contention of the anarchists is that an organization which gains an identity apart from its members, apart from their primary interests and decisions, cannot help but work against human freedom. Even if it be argued that a "stable" government cannot be obtained without making it relatively independent of popular demands—by filtering those demands through parliamentary processes of representative democracy, for example—the restriction upon freedom is still a fact. We may decide that we *need* to restrict popular freedom, but this does not alter the validity of the anarchist proposition, and there is value in admitting it.

The real reason why anarchist proposals are frightening to many people is that an anarchist

society could not organize its energies for modern war. There would not even be police power in an anarchist society. As a result, the tremendous importance of anarchist criticisms of modern society is ignored by all those who are unwilling to contemplate even a *theory of* complete political freedom.

Yet the fact is that anarchist principles will have to prevail in a warless world, and in any sort of human society where there is genuine respect of each other and trust of each other by its members. Even if anarchist programs may be said to suffer from oversimplification of social problems, and neglect of the power of evil, the solution of those problems and the elimination of evil are difficult to imagine without realization of anarchist ideals.

Present-day anarchist writing is largely devoted to criticism of modern reliance on the State as the origin of all human good. David Wieck, writing in *Resistance* (an anarchist review, Box 208, Cooper Station, New York 3, N.Y.), points out in the August-October issue that American believers in the "welfare State" are obliged to trust that the American State will not practice the terrorism of the Russian State. The trust, we think, may not be misplaced, but Wieck's point is that this sort of trust is itself a weakening thing.". . . citizens of a democracy can only hope that the liberal influence will be the dominant one. If the State betrays them, they are undone: they might turn against it—for they are not really State-idealists—but they will do so quite impotently, having scorned anti-collectivist ways of action." Wieck makes brief but effective statement of the anarchist analysis:

> The central equation of the anarchist idea of integral emancipation is this: power, expressed in government, corporations, bureaucracy, tends to isolate the individual, to render him powerless and deprive him of the opportunity for growth, while the magnification of the collectivity and depletion of the individual are expressed in imperialism and wars. To the complex of power and social atomization and war, we see as the only alternative the development among individuals of habits of freedom and sociality, and the ultimate expression of these in a free society.
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> The tendency of present-day liberal and so-called radical thinking is to abandon all hope for such a way of life, and to abandon the practice of it now, and to pray that the State and the social institutions founded upon its model can be domesticated and harnessed. Extrapolated to its ideal, this is man-protected and not man-alive; extrapolated in its present tendencies, it is man-soldier.
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> Since reform movements are generally dominated by the State-hopeful persons, the criticisms of anarchists often make us appear to be the enemies of *all reform:* we are enemies of reform which strengthens the State, and advocates of methods which will give habits of sociality and freedom a rooting in our society.

The positive value of anarchism lies in its uncompromising faith in the potentialities of unorganized individuals. Whatever men with this faith say is likely to be worth attention.