

THE INTERNAL SOCIAL ORDER

EDMUND WILSON'S *To the Finland Station* (now available in Doubleday's Anchor Books series at \$1.25) is perhaps the best brief study of the striving toward political self-consciousness of Western man. For this and other reasons, it was included among the seven volumes discussed in the "Books for Our Time" series (MANAS, Sept. 2, 1953). Esteeming these books very highly, it is natural for us to return to them from time to time. Our present interest in the Wilson book, however, lies in the fact of the tremendous failure it records, for the struggle of the West to attain to political self-consciousness has been far from successful. Self-consciousness implies the capacity for calm self-examination, and this has never been so difficult for the West as it is today. It is difficult for two reasons. First, most men are now reluctant to think out loud, for fear of being accused of unorthodox or even "subversive" thoughts. Second, there is a general impoverishment of the content of political thinking.

This state of impoverishment seems likely to continue for many years—for twenty years, at least, if not more. We say this because it seems to us that the roots of constructive political thinking have withered and almost died, and the soil in which they are rooted has become barren and sterile. For a quick account of why this has happened, we might suggest that, following Wilson, the beginnings of political self-consciousness emerged in the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher, Vico, who proposed that it is within the power of human beings to alter their history. Wilson traces this dynamic idea through the French Revolution, showing its embodiment in various radical figures, ending with Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Vico's idea, then, we would argue, gained from the revolutionists of the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries a purely political and socio-economic interpretation. It flowered during the period of Western thought when man was increasingly thought of as a *species*; when progressive thinkers were very much involved in trying to prove the claims of the evolutionists, and since what was known about evolution was in terms of the development of various species, it was a natural transfer of the techniques of research to regard man as primarily a species.

Since politics involves man-in-the-mass—there can be no politics of the individual—this development in science was favorable to the popularity of political thinking, but unfavorable to serious thinking about the individual. The men who devoted themselves to the individual during this period are the men who have been relatively forgotten by modern society—the Transcendentalists, German, English, and American.

It is certainly not incorrect to maintain that the only new political thinking which has had success, during the past century or so, has been thinking in which man is regarded in the mass—as a species, a class, a nation, or a race. The dynamic ideas have been mass or collectivist ideas. The political ideas founded on another inspiration—politics in *behalf of* the individual—which have survived have not changed in any important respect for two hundred years. Very little has been added to the thought of Rousseau, Locke, Paine, and Jefferson since they lived and wrote. What changes have occurred have been largely as an infusion of influence from the collectivist schools which developed in the nineteenth century.

In consequence of the extreme politicalization of thought, or the collectivization of political

thinking, the foundation of social processes in the attitudes and sense of responsibility of individuals was systematically neglected. Since ideas of morality and duty had been largely disseminated by churches and princes, and since these authorities had both suffered severe eclipse, it was natural for even the idea of morality itself to become suspect. In communist circles, for example, the idea of individual morality apart from politics hardly exists at all. This identification of morals and politics was reflected at practically all levels of "progressive" thought. If a conservative in politics was said to be a man of fine personal character, the remark was almost sure to become the basis for sneering retorts, implying that the personal morality of conservatives was no more than a cloak for their "reactionary" opinions. The fact that there was often some truth in the charge made it possible to ignore the importance of personal morality or individual character.

Fundamentally, then, the political bankruptcy of the present represents a failure of critical thinking in political philosophy. The notion of man as "member-of-a-mass" and the notion of man as a responsible free-agent engaged in working out his own salvation on his own terms are incompatible ideas. Political programs based upon them will not mix for the reason that they assume radically different things about the nature of human beings. Here, it can probably be said that the liberals, who tried to mix them, were misled by their benevolence. The new scientific emphasis on man-as-a-species made questions of individuality seem relatively unimportant, and then there were the notable economic injustices of the industrial revolution to press men of conscience into seeking collectivist forms of restitution.

So, if we accept this as a general diagnosis, there should be value in going back over the course taken by Western civilization during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to see where it got off the track of a balanced view of man and human society. Interestingly enough, we have found in a collection of Roscoe Pound's essays,

Masonic Addresses and Writings (Macoy, 1953), some interesting clues. Mr. Pound is concerned with tracing the development of the philosophy of Masonry in modern times, and the clarity of the thinkers whom he quotes may provide a fresh inspiration to readers who are puzzled by the current breakdown of revered political institutions and alarmed by the totalitarian trends in the conduct of the affairs of *all* modern States.

One of the first Masonic thinkers singled out by Pound is Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832), an obscure German teacher who never rose above the status of a kind of glorified tutor (*privat-docent*) in his professional life, but who exercised a great if silent influence upon his time. (Friedrich Froebel, the founder of the Kindergarten, for one, was a disciple of Krause.) Krause addressed himself to the central problem of maintaining the moral fabric of society. He distinguished clearly between law and what we today would call *culture*, but which he termed the moral order. Law and justice, Krause proposed (in Pound's rendition)—

uphold society in order to liberate men's energies so that they may make for the moral order. Hence the ultimate aim is human perfection. If by any act intended to maintain the social order they retard the moral order, they are going counter to their ends. . . . "Law," he [Krause] tells us, "is the sum of the external conditions of life measured by reason." So far as perfection may be reached by limitation of the external acts of men, whereby each may live a complete life, unhindered by his fellows, the law is effective. . . . Here, however, law exhausts its possibilities. It upholds the social order, whereon the moral order rests. The development and maintenance of the moral order depend on *internal* conditions. And these are without the domain of law. Nevertheless, as law prepares the way for the moral order, morals makes more easy the task of law. The more thoroughly each individual, of his own motion, measures his life by reason, the more completely does law cease to be merely regulative and restraining, and attain its higher role of an organized human freedom.

Krause sees in Masonry the instrument of moral education, essential to the social community. Religion governs, in his view, by

supernatural sanctions, and exercises coercive force. Morality, however, depends upon private conscience, and loses its meaning when coerced. The role of Masonry, Krause believes, is to supply to society the internal discipline of reason and measure:

There is nothing measured in the life of the savage. He may kill sufficient for his needs, or, from mere caprice or wanton slaughter, may kill beyond his needs at risk of future want. [Here a correction seems in order, although Krause's principle is sound enough: the "savages" we have read about were far less offenders in "slaughtering" game than the "civilized" hunters who kill for sport.] His acts have little or no relation to one another. . . . The exigencies of his desires control his actions. On the other hand, the acts of civilized man are connected, related to one another, and, to a great extent, parts of a harmonious and intelligent scheme of activity. Even more is this true of conduct which is called moral. Its prime characteristic is certainty. We know today what it will be tomorrow. The unprincipled may or may not keep promises, may or may not pay debts, may or may not be constant in political or family relations. The man whose conduct is moral, we call trustworthy. We repose entire confidence in his steadfast adherence to a regular and orderly course of life. Hence we speak of rectitude of conduct, under the figure of adjustment to a straight line; and our whole nomenclature of ethics is based upon such figures of speech. . . . the moral man, as distinguished from him who merely takes care not to infringe the law, measures and lays out his life, and the symbols of the Craft serve as continual monitors to the weak or thoughtless of what must distinguish them from the savage and unprincipled. . . . Masonry has to deal with the internal conditions of life governed by reason. Hence its fundamental principles are measurement and restraint by reason—and it teaches these as a means of achieving perfection. . . .

It may be granted that, in the early years of the nineteenth century, when Krause was setting down these ideas, the problems of the world were relatively simple. It was not peopled by tired and despairing old men, by disillusioned youth and by frightened millions everywhere. Yet what Krause says may be true, even if it is now much more difficult to apply. The task assigned by Krause to Masonry has now become the responsibility of every parent. It always was, of course, the task of

enlightened parents but the idea of parental and general cultural responsibility for the *internal* order of society is almost a novelty, these days.

What will be most difficult of all to regain is the sort of faith Krause and other idealists of his time possessed regarding the potentialities of man. Simple preaching that we *must* be idealists will only become tiresome. It is here that the works of men like Erich Fromm and a few others working in psychotherapy and related fields become important. For in the writings of such thinkers is beginning to emerge a concept of the human being for whom the idea of internal discipline and measure is once more possible. Idealism will be reborn, not merely from asserting its necessity, but from the work of those who have been able to *assimilate* the values of skepticism and agnosticism—even the values of materialism—and have forged a new idealism which contains the essences of the old idealism, without its vulnerability to criticism.

Even so, the deep metaphysical convictions of Krause—to which Pound does not refer—are illustrative of the kind of thinking that has been done by men who inspire their fellows to higher ideas of human responsibility. Krause was first of all a Pantheist—he conceived Deity as both immanent and transcendent. In the analysis of Pfliegerer, in *The Philosophy of Religion*, Krause emerges as a mystic who regards the *vocation of man* as "the unfolding of his godlike essence in his own distinctive way as an independent active being. . . ." Pfliegerer continues the account:

As spirit, man knows himself in the light of his knowledge of God to be an essential, eternal, unborn and immortal rational being, destined to fulfill in infinite time his divine destiny as a finite spirit an infinite number of times in an infinite number of periods or life-courses. The souls of men upon the earth are the spirits living together on the earth with individual bodily natures; they form a part of the infinite spirit-realm of the universe, which suffers neither increase nor diminution, but lives in and with God as an eternally perfect organism of all the infinite number of spirits. Each separate spirit enters by union with a body on one of its infinite number of

life-periods, develops itself through three ages of life to the highest point of its maturity, when it gradually withdraws into itself again in the declining curve (involution) to the point of returning to its original unity in God. But this final point or death of one life-course is at the same time a beginning, a second or ante-birth into a new life-course; and death accordingly is an experience like any other, a moment of the life which reproduces and develops itself without end. But every new life is something more than the mere repetition of the old one; it moves in new and higher curves with a new content of its own, . . . In each of these ages or life-courses the individual fulfills his vocation in the one way possible at this point of time, a way which has its own value and importance, and is by no means a mere preparation and means for a future mode of existence.

Krause envisions the possibility of further reaches of evolution, but acknowledges the difficulty of describing them. The commend of Pfleiderer is just enough:

This cautious reserve considered, we cannot press our objections to the bold anticipations of future forms of existence, of the metempsychosis of individuals and of the race; indeed we must knowledge that this form of forecast of the future has something to say for itself, as much perhaps as other eschatological pictures with which we westerns are more familiar. From the point of view of empiricism both are equally incapable of proof: from the standpoint of idealism both may prove equally elevating and inspiring.

What is most notable, here, it seems to us, is the vaulting imagination of this man who conceived so clearly the need of his time, and of the future—the need for the inner discipline, the voluntary morality which is the foundation and support of the political community: which, in fact, makes rational politics possible at all.

Letter from **CENTRAL EUROPE**

INNSBRUCK.—Since the Russian occupation authorities have to a certain extent eased their regulations in Austria, conditions are somewhat better. They have cancelled censorship of cables and letters, abolished controls in trains and cars at the boundaries of the Soviet occupation zone, renounced the costs for the occupation (which since 1945 have been raised by super-taxes, paid by the Austrian population), allowed former National-Socialists to travel outside Austria, and permitted Germans to visit Vienna.

(It must be admitted, however, that it has not been alone the policy of the Soviets to keep the Austrians apart from the Germans. Since the ending of hostilities, the frontiers between the two countries—whose inhabitants speak the same language and belong to the same ethnic group—remained hermetically closed, by decision of the "Allies" and the Austrian Cabinet Ministers.)

The links between Germans and Austrians are not limited to language and race. Both nations have developed on parallel political lines since 1945. Both, since their entrance into a new democratic life, have evolved two main political parties in their Houses of Parliament—a Christian-Democratic Party (Roman Catholic in Austria, Catholic and Protestant in Germany), and a Social-Democratic Party. Both nations are practically free of extremists and during the years since the end of World War II have had no internal difficulties, in the form of demonstrations or strikes. Both governments have proved stable since their establishment and both have been headed by a Chancellor who belongs to the Christian-Democratic Party. There remains only one difference: while, in Germany, the Social-Democrats form the opposition, in Austria they share the responsibility of Government.

The extent of the reciprocity already existing between the two countries was illustrated in the Austrian press during the last German election-campaign, when leading Viennese papers expressed the opinion that the results of the elections would affect Austrian development. A victory of the Christian-Democratic Party in Western Germany would strengthen corresponding interests in the Austrian Government, while a majority for the Social-

Democrats would support their political friends in Vienna.

The respect felt by Austrians for the economic dexterity and industriousness of the Germans during recent years has grown since those elections. The fact that the present German Government (in power since 1949) has won massive support from the voters seems to prove that the German nation wants only peace, without any interest in political experiments. And, comparing the internal situation in France and Italy (whose parliaments include powerful Communist groups), with that of Germany (where no Communist representative found his way into the House of Commons), it has been said, here in Austria, that while Germany lost the war against Western Europe in 1945, it will win the present struggle by other means.

Although still trying to hinder the development of a German-Austrian friendship, the Soviets are, at the same time, obliged to admit that the problems of both countries are after all, boiling down to a single problem. As long ago as 1943 they promised that Austria would regain her sovereignty, but found all kinds of excuses to retard the final adoption of the State Treaty. Only in recent weeks have some Soviet officials raised a corner of the veil which has hidden the true reasons for the delay; now, at last, they hint that the Austrian problem cannot be solved by itself, but must be worked out in company with the German problem.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

REMARQUE'S LATEST NOVEL

QUITE likely the *Book of the Month Club* can be counted upon to honor at least every other one of Erich Maria Remarque's stories, but we have no objections to this semi automatic arrangement. The author of *All Quiet on the Western Front* produces fiction of good readability, on top of which there are always bound to be passages of considerable depth. Philosophical asides, well dramatized, are particularly noticeable in *A Time to Love and a Time to Die*. This novel has qualities reminiscent of *Arch of Triumph*, coming as a relief after the unrelieved grimness of *Spark of Life*.

Ernst Graeber awakens to critical awareness of his German world at the beginning of Hitler's retreat from Russia. Then in his early 20's, he suddenly realizes that throughout earlier youth he had never been driven to think about the relationship of Nazi Germany to the larger history of humankind. The awakening, as would be expected, is an increasingly tortured one, but Remarque's own "love of life" is so great that we do not thereafter suffer unmitigated tragedy as we follow Graeber from battle to love, and back to battle and death. For the young German discovers himself as a human being, finally performing a symbolic act which releases him from guilt-ridden bondage to Hitlerian conditioning.

The love story is sensitive, and at times remarkable in that the reader is not intended to be entirely absorbed in the emotions generated. Both lovers learn that personal happiness, like personal suffering, is not the whole of existence—that one will always be groping, trying to construct a larger altar upon which his faith in life may burn.

The following passages occur in one of the closing chapters, when Graeber is back at the dissolving front, warmed by love, but not insulated:

He felt Elisabeth's letters in his pocket. Warmth was in them, tenderness and the sweet excitement of love. But they were no quiet lamp to light a well-ordered house, they were will-o'-the-wisps above a swamp, and the farther he tried to follow them the more treacherous the swamp seemed to become. He had wanted to put up a light in order to find his way back home, but he had put it up before the house was built. He had placed it in a ruin; it did not adorn it, it

only made it more desolate. Back there he had not known. He had followed the light without question, wanting to believe that to follow it was enough. It was not enough.

He had fought against this realization as long as he could. It had not been easy to see that what he had hoped would hold him and support him had only isolated him. It could not extend far enough. It touched his heart but it did not hold him. It was swallowed up; it was a small, private happiness that could not support itself in the limitless morass of general misery and despair. He took out Elisabeth's letters and read them, and the red afterglow of sunset lay on the pages. He knew them by heart; he read them once more and again they made him more lonesome than before.

We have the impression that most "standard novelists" are more securely wedded to the escapist tradition. Usually, the reader is allowed to feel that when man and woman meet, all that any human can expect of life has been achieved, and that the tragedy of a war-torn society is chiefly in the limits it sets upon such ecstasy. Here Remarque is different, not as a cynic or pessimist, but rather as a philosopher.

It seems to us that religion, in our time, is acquiring a new and more fruitful orientation. The novelists who moralize and catechize are out of date; we have become bored with them and, furthermore, their pronouncements no longer sound valid even to former lovers of platitudes. The interest a reader feels in Graeber is not occasioned by the fact that a young German comes to question and react against the distorted ethics of the Nazis, but rather because he seeks to understand *why* these dark forces have emerged. He is disgusted, tortured, yet does not become a hater of "evil people" or a believer that Nazism is a mere historical accident.

On furlough, Graeber returns to the home of a discredited scholar who once taught religion and philosophy. He asks what course of action can possibly relieve one of a feeling of complicity in the now evident crimes of the nation:

"Where does complicity begin?" Graeber asked. "When does what is ordinarily called heroism become murder? When you no longer believe in the reasons for it, or in its aim? Where is the dividing line?" Pohlmann looked at Graeber tormentedly. "How can

I tell you that? It is too great a responsibility. I cannot decide that for you."

"You're right," he said. "To ask someone else always means an attempt to evade a decision. Besides I didn't really expect an answer from you. I was really only questioning myself. Sometimes you can't do that except by putting the question to someone else."

Pohlmann shook his head. "You have the right to ask. Complicity!" he said with sudden vehemence. "What do you know of that? You were young and they poisoned you with lies before you had learned to judge. But we—we saw it and let it happen! What caused it? Hardness of heart? Indifference? Poverty? Egoism? Despair? And how could it become such a plague? Do you suppose that I don't think about it every day?"

"I wish you had talked to me that way before."

"Do you think it made things easier for Fresenburg?"

"No," Graeber said. "Harder."

Pohlmann nodded. "I couldn't tell you anything. But I didn't want to give you any of the many answers that are nothing but excuses. There are plenty of them. All smooth and persuasive, and-all evasions.

"Those of the Church, too?"

Pohlmann hesitated an instant. "Those of the Church, too," he said then. "But the Church is lucky. Over against Love Thy Neighbor and Thou Shalt Not Kill there conveniently stands that other saying, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' Given that, a good pulpit acrobat can perform all sorts of feats." Graeber smiled. He recognized something of the sarcasm that Pohlmann had formerly had. Pohlmann saw him. "You're smiling," he said. "And you are so calm. Why aren't you screaming?"

"I am screaming," Graeber replied. "You just don't hear it."

Such passages as these, if not unique and partly because they are not unique today—are worth pondering. The queries and deliberations might emanate from any young man serving any army on any front in any war. *A Time to Love and a Time to Die* should remind us of the inescapable fact that there are "Graebers" manning Russian tanks, commanding or being commanded in Soviet companies. Remarque apparently feels that we do not face, in Nazism and

Soviet Communism, simply a "brutal tyranny" which must be over-matched with superior force, but rather an immaturity of that portion of man's nature in which religious aspirations and nationalist aspirations alike arise.

In one place in the story, Graeber is assigned temporary quarters in an ancient church, constructed during the "Dark Ages":

He walked through the garden and out through the cloisters. The church had been severely damaged; one of its towers had caved in, and daylight poured into it mercilessly, cutting broad, bright bands through its dusky twilight. A number of windows were broken as well. Sparrows sat in them, twittering. The seminary had been entirely demolished. Close beside it was the air raid shelter. Graeber went into it. It was a reinforced ancient wine cellar, which had formerly belonged to the church. The stands for the barrels were still there. The air was damp and cool and aromatic. The wine bouquet of the centuries still seemed able to triumph again and again over the smell of fear from the nights of bombs. In the rear of the bunker Graeber saw a number of heavy iron rings fixed in the square-cut stones of the ceiling. He remembered that before being a wine cellar this place had been a torture chamber for witches and heretics. They had been hoisted by their hands, with irons attached to their feet, and they had been pinched with glowing tongs until they confessed. Then they had been put to death, in the name of God and Christian love of one's neighbor. Very little has changed, he thought. The tortures in the concentration camp have excellent models. And the carpenter's son of Nazareth has strange followers.

COMMENTARY

SELF-REFORMING INSTITUTIONS

BACK in the early days of this Republic, a writer on education spoke of America's need for *self-reforming* institutions. The first citizens of the United States were intimately familiar with the abuses which grow up around monarchical institutions, but they were also acute observers of human affairs and knew that institutions of some sort are necessary to society as a stabilizing influence.

Actually, a self-reforming institution is almost a contradiction in terms. It is the men who perpetuate and use the institutions who must do the reforming, for the institution itself, considered as a social formation, is no more than a collection of habits and attitudes integrated to perform some useful function. Unaided by the creative intelligence of human beings, an institution can do no more than repeat itself. A good illustration of how an institution can impose the dead past upon the present is found in the thirty-nine articles of the Church of England. Based upon the conclusions of religious councils held a thousand or more years ago, these articles of faith are practically unbelievable to most modern men, so that, as an English critic of the established church pointed out, men of both intelligence and integrity find it very difficult to swear that they "believe" the thirty-nine articles. This makes for a mediocre clergy in the Church of England.

A *self-reforming* institution, then, would be an institution which set up within itself the mechanisms for constructive change—such as, for example, the provision for amendments to the Constitution of the United States; or, as a very different instance, the counsel of the spiritual teacher, Krishna, in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, to his disciple, Arjuna, that a man is not really free to know the truth until he has emancipated himself from all "teachings" or doctrines and religious traditions—until, that is, he has his own

knowledge of the meaning of life, quite independent of religious institutions.

The conservative, in the best sense of the term, is a man who realizes the need for institutions as a focus or pattern for social relations. In the bad sense, a conservative is a man who ignores the folly of institutions whose patterns are no longer useful, and who opposes all change because it frightens him. Likewise, the authentic radical would abolish only those institutions which, as Krause put it (see lead article), "retard the moral order." It is the spurious radical who refuses to recognize the role of institutions in human life, and like Hjalmar, the "reformer" in Ibsen's *Wild Duck*, irresponsibly destroys without distinguishing between the good and evil of institutions.

The peculiar confusion of the present is probably due to the fact that this is a time of the breakdown of institutions, with only the germs of new institutions in evidence. It is natural, therefore, that it should be a period of extreme insecurity. Men try to pump life into old social forms, or look about frantically for a new pattern in which to place their faith. The right thing to do, perhaps, is to recognize the nature of the transition through which our society is passing and to accept its uncertainties as entirely natural. It falls to the present generation to undertake the reformation of institutions, of which the Founding Fathers spoke. If we fear to do so, if we run to the cover of Church or State, begging exemption from responsibility, then we are lesser men than they and probably deserve to lose the securities which they designed for the use of free and courageous people. But there is no real *need* for us to fear.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

As a lengthy footnote to our recent comments on "love and discipline," we present some interesting speculations from Joseph Barrell's *A Philosophical Study of the Human Mind*. Dr. Barrell establishes a fundamental distinction in personality between "feeling persons" and "thinking persons," which he believes throws considerable light upon the behavior of most children. "Feeling personalities are in the majority," he writes, but the difficulty is that the "feeling personality" is unable to be objective or analytical either about other personalities or his own quirks of temperament. The "thinking personality" is advantageous in a parent, for, according to Barrell, it is easier for a "thinking person" to learn to respect the emotional values of others than it is for the "feeling type" to learn how to think clearly and without bias. Furthermore, it is the "thinking" parent who automatically provides an environment of mental discipline for the young.

How recognize this sort of parent? "A trait of many thinking personalities is an apparent indifference to the bluntest of truths—even about themselves. Tell them they are egoists, tell them they have no friends, tell them they are colossal bores, and likely enough they will reply, Hmm, there may be some truth in that. As regards the majority of thinking personalities, there is apparently a complete separation between what may be true or false and what they may feel about themselves or other human beings. For it is not that they are without feelings (as many suppose), but that their feelings lie in a stratum unconnected with their intellect. Their ways are different, not their hearts."

On the other hand, it is nearly as easy to get out of balance one way as the other:

The essential unconcern of thinking personalities for the human feelings is evident in the upbringing of their children. Thinking personalities

will sit up nights in conference over their children's good, they will worry and lose sleep over each difficulty into which their children fall; but their concern is not for the state of their children's feelings. It is for their children's future in a most objective sense. Not that this makes them any the less fond of their children, or any the less loved in their turn, but that somehow they manage to bring their children up without an appeal to the affections and without getting emotionally involved themselves. They take the greatest safeguards for their children's health, they give them the best educational advantages they can afford, they give them of their own time freely and generously, reading aloud to them by the hour and getting up all sorts of trips and excursions. Yet they are not deterred in their discipline by tears in their children's eyes, nor are they apt to do things purely for their children's pleasure. There will be profit as well as pleasure, or pleasure both for parent and child. Feeling parents, on the other hand, will often buy anything and do anything simply for the pleasure it gives to their children, and many a feeling parent will admit that his best disciplinary efforts have failed upon the first tremble of his child's lower lip.

The corresponding advantages are summed up:

Thus, although so many things enter into the growth and development of a child that it is a hazardous business. to generalize upon the results of the one or the other environment, it is probably true that thinking children are, on the whole, better disciplined than feeling children. Certainly there are far fewer spoiled thinking children. To be sure, thinking parents, especially when extraverted, have a tendency to "projectize" their children, overplanning their holidays and overexposing them to salubrious educational influences. But they do not soften their children by overvaluing their children's emotions or their own. Their day is not made or unmade by their children's remembrance or neglect of an anniversary. Nor does the child's pain at the necessary and inevitable lessons of life provoke sufferings of their own, the whole forming a vicious spiral that circumvents the lessons and procrastinates the child's adjustment to the world. True, few parents, thinking or feeling, have any reasoned philosophy of child-rearing. But the thinking parent in his detachment unwittingly abets the general tendency of life. His children inevitably confront reality earlier. Life's lessons come sooner and therefore easier.

It will be easy at this point for critical readers to attack both Dr. Barrell's claims and his terminology. It may be conceded, however, that any categorizings of temperament should be judged for their experimental value rather than for completeness. Actually, many interesting lines of thought can be developed from A *Philosophical Study of the Human Mind*. One is that a child is unfortunate if he does not encounter, in his immediate environment, *both* "thinking personalities" and "feeling personalities." We should note, however, that the child is especially handicapped if none of his teachers, relatives, or neighbors are "thinking personalities" in the sense described by Dr. Barrell, and the reason should be apparent enough: *impressive growth within the human personality can take place only when there is some comprehension of the nature of the growth needed*. Pleasant and warming emotional experiences are balancing adjuncts to the life of a questing mind, but it is the questing mind itself which distinguishes man from animal, and makes it possible for the "normal" child to progress in a way that the mentally deficient child cannot.

The last sentences of the passage quoted from Barrell deserve special attention, since it often seems that children who fail to "confront reality" early in life present the worst problems to wives, husbands, or their own children, in later years. This theory, of course, has been copiously dealt with by the professional psychologists, but its restatement in fresh context by Barrell is interesting. To defend further the Barrell position, which may seem to some readers to be "too intellectual," it might be pointed out that a "reasoned philosophy of child-rearing" does not necessarily mean a set of fixed ideas. A philosophy, in its best sense, is simply a basis of mental orientation preserved during a search for truth, goodness, and beauty.

A philosophy can be improved, corrected—even supplanted—yet some philosophical position is always needed as a point of departure. For ourselves, we have nearly had our fill of "feeling

personalities" who have never learned how to think, and whose definition of "philosophy" is somewhere between fanatical religious worship and a warm, benevolent feeling about "doing good." The trouble with people in this category, in our opinion, is that, being so certain of their own value judgments, they conceive it a high obligation in life to correct the errors of others. Eventually, this course not only fails to win friends and influence people favorably—it fails to allow the righteous parent to make friends with his own child.

So far as we can tell, one has to be something of a "thinking personality" to understand one of the most important ideas of present-day philosophical psychologists—that each person has *two aspects* of personality. As Karen Horney put it, there is both a "social self" and an "inner self," the latter capable of evaluating the former. The "inner self," looking upon the prestige and ego-concerns of its lesser social reflection from some mysterious vantage point of impartiality, learns to make value judgments only after a careful weighing of bias. Subsequently, the man who is just with himself, even when it hurts, is qualified to be just in his relationships with others. Since it is difficult to imagine anything more important than a sense of impartial justice, the case for the "thinking personality" rests here—on pretty good ground.

FRONTIERS

The Rebirth of Affirmation

THE day of the iconoclasts is done. It is not that they were "wrong," nor that they and their work were not necessary. It is simply that people are very tired of attacking one another's beliefs, and of having nothing left to believe in themselves. In a way, this is an especially good time to be alive, to have before oneself a life to live, or a good part of a life to live, for the years ahead promise to be a time in which constructive effort should find many allies and increasing support.

If pressed to pick a period in which the classical attitude began to be reaffirmed, we should probably say, during the 1930's. For this was the period when Alexis Carrel published his *Man the Unknown*, when Ortega y Gasset wrote his *Revolt of the Masses*, and Robert M. Hutchins started an important phase of the great educational debate with his *Higher Learning in America*. These books were about many things, but they all brought into clear focus the idea of the individual man as a whole being. They were, in the best sense of the term, "conservative" works. They laid emphasis on the essential qualities in human life which the modern world of culture, science, and education had virtually lost sight of through neglect, through concentration on other matters which had, for several generations, seemed great and unique discoveries. These books endeavored to return the attention of serious human beings to the central problem of existence--the nature of the individual, his capacities, his responsibilities, and the excellencies of his life. Dr. Carrel discussed man as man, and not as a kind of impersonal host for the disease entities in which medical specialists may be interested. Ortega showed what happens to the individual when his feeling of selfhood depends upon his sense of "belonging" to some social aggregate such as the nation-state--when he ceases to behave like a man, and has identity only as the member of a *mass* of mankind. Hutchins, oddly accused of "authoritarian"

tendencies, is an impassioned advocate of the fact that man has or is a *mind*, and that he becomes less than a man if he does not use it.

Unlike some of the reformers of other days, these were or are men of balance and discrimination. They had no wish to abandon anything of value. They worked for a fundamental sort of restoration of human dignity. And, so far as we can see, they set going great currents of fresh thinking among the men of this century. In the *Revolt of the Masses*, Ortega used a phrase which sticks in the memory. He spoke of those who are able to live "at the height of their times"—men of understanding who are able to assimilate the best intelligence of the age in which they live and give conscious direction to the emerging future. Carrel, Ortega, and Hutchins seem to us to be such men. It is not a matter of "agreeing" with them in any or all particulars, but of recognizing and appreciating the general tendency of their influence. The person who reads them is, we think, in a better position to think for himself than he was before he read them. He has more independent orientation, more clarity in respect to the cultural environment in which he lives, and has at least opportunity to become more of an *individual*. Let us note that these three are men without parties. They may have admirers, even followers and imitators, but they have formed no parties, and slogans echo in their name with very little success. It is of interest that this is true of all genuine educators or teachers. The party spirit is invariably the death of the educational spirit.

We take the recent publication of a brief book by Arnold Khamat, *The Ethics of Civilization* (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C.) to be a sign of the times—a good sign. It is a book which seems to sum up the lessons of the past twenty or thirty years. We conclude that because a writer who is not a veritable "giant" of modern thought is able to utter so clearly and distinctly what seems the common sense meaning of the failures and disasters which have overtaken the world, many

other men are capable of the same wise conclusions. This may not be especially flattering to Mr. Kamiat, yet his book, we think, becomes of peculiar value and importance for this reason.

Mr. Kamiat's thesis is so simply put that it may seem almost trite, yet under development attains the depth and measure of authentic diagnosis. Early in the book he deals with the complaint that the modern world is "unspiritual":

The difference is not between periods of time, but between kinds of people. Always there have been those to whom the things of the spirit mattered most; always there have been those to whom these things mattered not so much, or a little, or not at all. The first kind, the civilizers, whom Ignazio Silone calls the seed beneath the snow, has always constituted a sadly small minority; the other kind has made up the rest of humanity. The two groups have waged a persistent struggle and one that will perhaps continue as long as human-society lasts. This class struggle is the one significant conflict; all other struggles are insignificant by comparison. Those between empires, classes, parties, and so on, possess no fundamental significance, except to the extent that they affect the life of the spirit. Otherwise, no deep significance attaches to the question of who shall have power, or wealth, or prestige, or territory. . . .

There it is, out in the open, the awful, until recently unmentionable, fact of the great differences among human beings. These differences have not been discussed without timidity or apology by anyone not a zealot or a crank or a potential tyrant or rabble-rouser for many generations. But Mr. Kamiat is untempted by the offense which led to so many crimes in the name of human differences in past centuries. He does not try to *explain* them according to some doctrine of the élite or chosen people. He accepts the differences, but has no desire to organize the "civilizers" into a party and then increase the party's size and power. Rather, he is calling attention to a natural fact:

Yes, there is and always has been a spiritual class struggle. It is a struggle between the vast majority and a pitifully small minority. This is the minority of men and women to whom the things of the spirit are the things that matter. To it, love, good

will, magnanimity, kindness, sympathy, justice, truth, reason, art and beauty are the supreme realities. These constitute life for it; these are things to be lived, and lived here and now, not in some far-off Utopia. The things of the spirit may be ultimate, but they are to be lived in the immediate here and the immediate now.

A large part of the book is devoted to criticism of the Western radical tradition. Kamiat charges the communists with engaging in a superficial conflict. "It is not a war between a higher and a lower set of values; both contestants share the same values; both aim at power and rule, dominance and wealth. Both appear only too willing to sacrifice the human spirit for the sake of victory." He charges the typical Western radical of spiritual illiteracy—with "supposing that the uncivilized can be fought only by a descent to its level." But means must be consistent with ends:

The spiritually illiterate do not know that civilized ideals must be lived to be realized. Civilized values are generated only by being lived. If there is to be love, one must love. If there is to be sympathy, one must sympathize. When people act justly, there is justice. One cannot depend on liars—or propagandists—to perpetuate truth. There must be artists if there is to be art. Spiritual values do not lie at the end of a long road, to be traversed by unspiritual means. Spirit is not a garment to be put on when the season is ripe for its wearing. It is not something that will come to people sometime in the future when they will in some mysterious way become ready for it. Civilization is a way of life, and therefore must be lived, lived here and lived now, if it is to be real. Spirit is end and spirit is also means—its own means.

There is not space for much more quotation, but it should be made clear that Mr. Kamiat is not plumping for any form of organized religion. He distinguishes between religion and religious "practices," or, as he puts it, between spirit and *the things* of the spirit. He points out that formal observances, followed mechanically, are usually honored as being "religious," or "spiritual," whereas persons who abandon dead forms and embody the spirit of religion in their lives are often persecuted. A theological heritage, Kamiat thinks,

may have practically nothing to offer in terms of real religion:

There is a great deal of commotion today over the question of starting the school day with a prayer or a reading from the Bible, as well as the question of released time for the indoctrination of school children in theological beliefs. This is called introducing religion in the public schools. It is nothing of the sort. It should be spoken of as the introduction into the public schools of the mechanics of religion.

What, finally, is Mr. Kamiat's ideal? He calls it "Ethical Transcendentalism" and develops its definition:

An ethically mature person is one who is able to give and receive love and to enter into democratic and cooperative relations with any other member of the human race, excepting those who are for pathological reasons incapable of entering into such relationships. . . . To attain ethical maturity it is necessary to transcend all group lines and to accept the welfare of the human race as paramount, exceeding in importance that of any of its constituent groups, including one's own. The ethically mature person repudiates the kind of allegiance that requires him to place the interest of his group above that of humanity. . . .no group can save humanity, and this for the reason that salvation requires an end to group dominance. Group dominance and human brotherhood are mutually exclusive. . . . People must learn to outgrow their dependence on militant groups and group leaders: on parties and politicians and political wonder-workers, on revolutionists and counter-revolutionists; on labor leaders and captains of industry; and on any and all militant movements and organizations, no matter how beautiful their expressed ideals, no matter how prepossessing their programs, no matter how plausible their philosophies. . . . The problem of living together is an ethical problem, and one of the essential cements in its solution is an ethical transcendentalism. But the latter is something no militant group can tolerate.

These conclusions are so clear from recent history that it is difficult to see how they can be denied. Unfortunately, the acceptance of their full implications will also be difficult—with this difference, that it is absolutely necessary for human survival.