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SOME "ECONOMIC" FACTS

SINCE, periodically, MANAS receives letters urging that more attention be given to Economics in these pages, we ought, at the very least, to explain why the subject seems to be neglected. "Economics," according to the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, "deals with social phenomena centering about the provision for the material needs of the individual and of organized groups." So far as the West is concerned, the study of economics began with the Greeks, who are supposed to have produced some hundred and fifty works relating to economic relationships. Originally, economics was concerned with household management, and the study was eventually applied to communities and States, becoming known as political economy.

As an analysis of the segment of human life having to do with practical material needs, economics is of obvious importance. However, the odd thing we have noticed about many people interested in or enthusiastic about economics is that they seem to regard it as a means of getting to heaven—that is, as containing the primary secrets of the Good Life. Even the famous economists of history were moralists at heart.

There is also a curious sectarianism which develops around a special interest in economics. An atmosphere of the One True Doctrine often appears, and the True Believers manifest an ill-concealed impatience with the rest of the world which has failed to see the light. So far as we can see, this strenuous concern with economic theory ought to be classed as a kind of religious phenomenon, since the accompanying emotions and psychological attitudes are so similar to those of fanatical sectarian belief.

Men like Edward Bellamy and Henry George, it seems to us, were primarily humanitarian reformers rather than economists. If they wrote in economic terms, this was because the most obvious aspects of human injustice and suffering seemed to be bound up with economic practices. There is no sectarianism in either Bellamy or George, and no infallible dogmas have been erected upon what remains of their writings. But other enthusiasts of economics assume that the "facts" of human nature are well known, and that a proper economic system based upon the known facts is all that is needed to set the world straight. The most familiar claim of those who come out for the over-riding significance of economics is that human beings cannot be expected to lead happy, constructive lives unless their material needs are properly taken care of. We find no special reason to debate this point, although it often seems exaggerated beyond the call of duty. Our objection is rather to the fact that, with the exception of one or two writers on economics—Ralph Borsodi and Scott Nearing, for example—the champions of "sound economic knowledge" consistently neglect matters of which the formulas of the economists take no account at all, and these matters are, it seems to us, of transcendent importance.

Take the question of the modern industrial system of manufacture—not the question of ownership, nor of distribution of the profits, but of the *system* of manufacture. Some years ago, during the war, several Australian textile mills experimented with the use of subnormal labor. The managers of the mills were surprised to find that the girls brought to them from institutions for the mentally deficient were as good or better workers than so-called "normal" help. These girls were paid at the same rate as normal girls, and were found to be successful in practically every process involved in the mills. Hearing of these things, public institutions in Australia began to initiate experiments of their own, sending out mentally deficient people to work in various industries. The reports were uniformly excellent. As a result, the administrators charged with the care of such unfortunates experienced a sudden access of morale. They saw that if the mentally deficient could be gainfully employed in industry, one of the greatest obstacles to their happiness would be overcome. For to be equal to the common tasks of other people is the longing of all those who are defective in mind. Here was a means to help them to self-respect.

This is the positive aspect of the experience. A young Australian writer, however, Niall Brennan, found in the success of this program a stimulus to study the impact of modern industrial practice on people's lives. Regarding the use of mental defectives in industry, he remarked:

> When morons can be fitted into industry, on an immediate parity with normal employees, the question, on whose level this equality has been achieved, must also

> be asked. It may be good to discover that in a modern industrial plant there are conventional processes which can be performed by a boy with a mental age of less than eight years, and a severe lack of muscular coordination. It may be fine for the boy. But what were the "normal" adults doing in this same process before the crippled and retarded boy came along to do it for them? No really normal person can afford to ignore the frightening implications in the discovery that many "normal" men and women are working in jobs at which subnormals are equally and sometimes more efficient.

This conclusion stirred Mr. Brennan to extensive research, in the form of taking job after job to experience personally the sort of work men do to earn their bread, to determine how they do their work, and what their work does to them. His findings, reported in a sprightly volume, *The Making of a Moron* (Sheed and Ward), are devastating, and on the whole accurate, we think. The author happens to be a Catholic, yet here is one book by a devotedly religious individual which bears few of the marks of sectarian bias. We should like to believe that this volume represents one of the currents in the coming revolution of the twentieth century. Its pertinence to the study of economics is that, while it deals with "the social phenomena centering about the provision for the material needs of the individual and of organized groups," the facts Mr. Brennan reports are consistently ignored or held to be unimportant by most advocates of education in economics. We however, take the view that education in economics which overlooks these facts is very largely a waste of time.

The point, here, is that the concepts of value which are under criticism in this book are held in common by practically all economic systems and theories of modern times, whether conservative or radical. As Brennan puts it:

> The important point at this stage is that these premises, the virtue so-called of efficiency, and the end so-pursued of wealth, are creating a situation where morons and subnormals might have more value than sane men. That is a moronic state of affairs. It does not seem to me to demonstrate progress of any sort.

Brennan went from plant to plant, in both England and Australia. There was always the same story. The low grade of responsibility felt by many of the workers—their lack of a sense of participation in *making something worth making*—had proved itself a degrading influence. Bitterness, pettiness, and general contempt without any particular object were common phenomena. The book is not unjust, nor is it merely a crack-pot attack on modern industry. It is a deeply perceptive study of men at work for money instead of in response to an inner drive to engage their productive powers in chosen activities. It is a photographic account of a certain stage of the corruption in a social order which practices a religion of economics. In Brennan's words:

> The effect of industrial philosophy upon human society has already been shown. The objective of "business" clearly stated in every textbook of economics is the satisfaction of the self. The satisfaction of the self is the law of the jungle. The existence of the resultant jungle is clear from the effect of industrial society upon human society.

The author, of course, is a rather unusual man. How many "economists" would make this kind of personal investigation of working conditions? Actually, Brennan found that some of the plants where the mental attitudes of the workers were worst were plants regarded as "ideal" from the "welfare" point of view. The result, in this book, is a new kind of economic analysis, in which human values are raised to the preferred position.

Mr. Brennan has no dramatic solution to offer. The time is probably not ripe for an over-all solution. But what he has done is to call dramatic attention to conditions which have been staring us in the face for generations, yet which the theoreticians of economics have disregarded as either beyond repair or not coming within the province of their science. This is the time for an assembling of the facts. We should like to see a lot more books given to the collection of such facts. Then, if enough men start thinking about them, we may get to work at changing the pattern of our lives. But the solution will not lie in the design for a new "system." It will lie in the formulation of worthy ideals and occupations for human labor. And then, we think, it will be possible to have economic theories which do not take for granted doctrines of human nature which, when applied on a large scale, first degrade, then destroy, the human species.

Letter from NORWAY

STAVANGER.—Recent events in three fields may be of interest outside the frontiers of Norway. The first event is military, the second is Scandinavian-economic, and the third is religious.

Norway, as is well known, is a member of NATO, and this leads to a number of international duties such as the extensive building of airfields, increase in the length of military service, etc. Russia, naturally enough, is very apprehensive about the Norwegian bases as they represent the left flank of NATO forces and are rather near to Russia. Meanwhile, there has been much anxiety here about the possibility of having foreign NATO troops stationed on Norwegian ground in peace time, as is already the case in Denmark. At the moment, Lord Alexander, on a visit to Norway, has stated that it should not be necessary to have foreign troops in Norway, so that problem may have been temporarily solved.

Still greater concern has been aroused by the increase of the length of infantry service from twelve to eighteen months (the term of service in the other branches of the armed forces has already been extended). On this issue, both the Government and Labour have a solid majority in the Storting, but divergent opinions broke somewhat with party lines. The Government has declared itself satisfied with sixteen months. The Conservative Party voted for the full eighteen months. However, despite opposition, the Government program of sixteen months obtained a good majority, as every one expected, since the Government was under a strong moral obligation to honour commitments made at NATO conferences, promising an increase on condition of parliamentary consent. But opposition to militarization continues from a group within the labour party.

The increasing burden of armaments has no doubt been a contributing factor in the increase in the number of "conscientious objectors." Last year the number was about 1,000, which is a rather large percentage of the total of about 20,000 men drafted. This has given the military authorities some grounds for thought. Meanwhile the foreign minister, Mr. Lange, has signed a petition to the UN to ease the position of the C.O.'s throughout the world.

Economic cooperation among Scandinavian countries is going steadily forward in several ways: less restrictive passport regulations, common benefits from social services, and facilities for the freer flow of labor across national borders—between Denmark and Sweden, etc. However, a rather delicate situation exists in respect to hydroelectric power. Along the frontier between Norway and Sweden are numerous lakes fed from streams on both sides of the border. In most cases the water power in these districts will have to be developed on the Norwegian side, where it is possible to erect a few big stations instead of many small ones in Sweden. The Swedes will then be entitled to some compensation in the form of electric energy. So far, the Norwegian town of Trondheim has concluded an agreement with Stockholm for delivery of some 40,000 KW. The contract is profitable for both parties, but is an "export of electric energy" to which many are opposed. It would probably not have stirred up much disagreement except for the fact that the Swedish cooperative society, supported by state aid, plans to build a large synthetic nitrate factory which will require just 40,000 KW. And nitrates are an important export from Norway to Sweden. In practical terms, this means that Norway is going to export to Sweden electric energy which will then be used to make a product that will compete with a Norwegian industry. From the point of view of the Scandinavian economy, it might be better to make all the nitrates in Norway and export to Sweden. But that would not meet the needs of Stockholm, nor of Trondheim, which is in need of capital for the development of a Swedish free harbour.

New tensions have been developing in the field of religious thought ever since, a year ago, the strictly orthodox professor Hallesby gave a talk on eternal punishment in Hell. It created a strong antagonism in many quarters, and one of the bishops, Schjelderup, took a stand against this doctrine. He got into trouble with the congregations in his diocese and last autumn wrote a letter to his superiors, the department for church education. He wished to know whether he was free to continue to express his views. This letter has been sent to the other bishops and to the theological faculties and to the Government's adviser in matters of the State Religion. The bishops have given noncommittal answers with one exception, and the government adviser has declared that the State has the right to change the "confession." This has turned the church strife into a hotly debated political issue. At the same time, there are many signs that people, chiefly intellectuals and workers, are beginning to think for themselves about religious matters. Here and there independent "men's circles" are being formed for discussion and debate.

NORWEGIAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

DR. RHINE'S BIG BOOK

NEW WORLD OF THE MIND, published in 1953 by William Sloane Associates, is Dr. J. B. Rhine's most comprehensive work to date. While his earlier volume, *The Reach of the Mind* (1947), remains preferable as a simple introduction to ESP investigation, supplying details of the experimental methods used at Duke University and elsewhere, this latest book gives provocative attention to the philosophical implications of psychic research. Both volumes together provide, therefore, a truly comprehensive account of what Dr. Rhine and his associates are about, and why. *New World* is especially to be recommended to psychologists, psychiatrists, religious philosophers, physicists and biologists, for each of these fields is discussed in relation to ESP. Rhine's logic is unassailable in arguing that scholars and students in these categories should give prolonged reflection to ESP, while it becomes apparent, even to the lay-reader, that Dr. Rhine himself is a philosopher-psychologist of some stature.

In his chapter, "Psi, Psyche, and Psychology," Rhine condenses the central thesis of the book:

> The psi researches have established the occurrence of a mode of reaction of a living being that is both personal and non-physical. The result is to provide psychology with its first clear deed to a distinctively *mental* domain of reality. The experiments on the psi-function do this as nothing else ever has. No philosophical argument, no authoritarian pronouncement, and no mystical revelation can define for psychology this field of reality that is peculiarly its own. Rather, if such reality exists, its title must be proved by the methods of natural science! I think that the discovery of psi has now given that proof to psychology.
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> What is the result for psychology? That field can, of course, be allowed to go on comparatively undefined, tagging along in the hope of becoming a sort of pseudo-physical science. But while behind the Iron Curtain this imitation of physics by psychologists could be managed by decree, such a method is not proving wholly satisfactory in the Western world. The effort to have psychology keep step with physics has kept psychologists confined to the mere fringes of their field, timidly working out a technology on the borders of physiology, neurology, and other more objective neighboring fields.

One subject already competently dealt with in *Reach of the Mind* is given renewed attention—the matter of the prejudice of most moderns against taking ESP seriously. This problem is itself a fit subject for psychological investigation, and Rhine has initiated the first steps. Prejudice against ESP claims, he demonstrates, derives from the still confused battle between "science" and "religion." As he puts it, "the scholars of our culture have only two general sorts of explanations for things that happen: All their theories of the fundamental causes of events have to fall under one of the two headings, natural or supernatural." He continues:

> To most students of science natural law came, therefore, to mean physical law. Physicalistic modes of thought and explanation dominated the studies of nature everywhere, even in psychology, the beginning science of human nature. Most schools of psychology became and remain today more or less frankly physicalistic. The only alternative they knew, or know even yet, was the supernaturalism from which they had delivered their science. Supernaturalism had thus become the very antithesis of science, and anything that challenged physical explanation smacked of supernaturalism.

In a chapter entitled, "Claims, Challenges, and Confirmations," an interesting "self-analysis" is quoted from the psychologist, D. O. Hebb, who pauses on the threshold of serious attention to ESP, saying that "Rhine may still turn out to be right, improbable as I think that is, and my own rejection of his views is—in a literal sense prejudice." Rhine comments:

> This honest analysis of the situation discloses what it is that is unacceptable about the psi evidence: *The phenomena do not submit to physical explanation*. A psychologist who is trying to kind his way out of the "wood of animism," fighting what he suspects is only a disguised supernaturalism, fears that the admission of the psi findings to the field of psychology would cost that branch of learning its hard-earned status as a natural science. It would force upon psychology a philosophical dualism and

> throw it back into the classification with the occult, a classification from which it has long been fighting hard to escape.

Some progress from the ESP point of view is to be noted, however, even among the academic psychologists, for the percentage of those either recognizing ESP as an established fact or a likely possibility increased from 8.8 per cent in 1938 to 16.6 per cent in 1952. An amusing footnote to the Pratt-Woodruff experimental series is provided by the fact that the highest scoring rate achieved by any of the subjects "was that of a psychologist who frankly says he finds it extremely unpleasant to be forced to the conclusion that it seems there is this thing called ESP. He had responded to Woodruff's request for subjects for the tests primarily because the latter was doing other research work under him."

As has already been noted in MANAS, the psychiatrists have shown far less prejudice against ESP than their academic cousins. An increasing number of practicing psychiatrists are now interested in learning everything they can concerning the specifics of Rhine's findings, and, with some of our most interesting philosophers arising in psychiatric ranks, it is probable that serious-minded readers will gradually develop more and more intelligent interest in pre-cognition, telepathy, clairvoyance and psycho-kinesis.

With the limited space here available we can call attention to only one of the intricate problems posed by ESP statistical results. After the first few years of Duke experiments, researchers naturally grew quite interested in whether conscious control over the development of ESP was possible. The experiments did reveal that there was a definite *decline*, the longer any given subject persisted in trial telepathic or clairvoyant "runs." Rhine explains why this finding is significant:

> One of the best indications that there is something to deal with here that is different from the memory and learning curves is the fact that in a large number of these decline cases the subject goes right on down to a significant *negative* deviation before he gets through with the column or the series or whatever the unit is within which the decline occurs. This shows that there is a factor involved that is not of the nature of crowding (e.g., poor distinguishability of targets), because that would produce only chance scores. This effect is one, rather, that actually alters the mode of judgment and consistently distorts the results into a psi-missing effect.
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> The really big immediate objective in psi research at present is to learn how to get some control over the capacity, and any trace of what looks like control is a real nugget of encouragement to the explorer. Take, then, the fact that in these declines it appears that the conscious effort of the subject to choose carefully and to bring pressure to bear on the psi function is having a considerable effect, even though it is an adverse one. If it is true that conscious effort can interfere with scoring rate, at least in a negative direction, one has a right to expect that a better conscious control, a more enlightened effort, may succeed in producing positive deviations.
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> It is so often the case in science that an advance is achieved by the proper interpretation of a failure or a frustration. It may be that the very lawfulness and regularity of these declines promises a start on this important project of getting control. If so, it would, indeed, be turning adversity to account. The idea has only recently developed, and will take time to expand. It is by such ideas, however, that explorers are lured over their mountains.

Concerning the ethical bearing of ESP, Rhine points out that "the discovery of a *non*-physical element in personality . . . makes all the difference in the world to ethical values. It authorizes the social scientist to deal with the values of moral life in terms of his own principles. It frees him entirely from the necessity of first finding a physical explanation before he can admit human values into the category of scientific data. Now, in short, the world of value may be explored in its own right. If the personality of man to which value experience belongs has properties and lawful operations of its own that defy mechanistic interpretations, the scientist attempting to deal with that personality has clearance to go ahead to discover what this value psychology is, what evaluative behavior is, considered in terms of psychical as distinguished from physical theory."

As for religion, many of a naturally skeptical turn of mind will approve the sentiment that "nothing that is real in religion . . . or in any other realm of experience is beyond the range of investigation. Only an occurrence that would leave no trace or effect which, however indirectly, could bring it within the focus of man and his instruments, could be said to be beyond the reach of the inquiring mind. The existence of such an unobservable element of nature would indeed be beyond discovery and, hence, a subject of pointless speculation. I profoundly suspect with all the skepticism of my nature any claims whatsoever to *unapproachable* truth. Parapsychology, itself, like many other fields, extends well out into realms far beyond the senses. Human reason, armed with the methods of experimental design and the instruments of mathematics, has a very long reach indeed. It can reach around the universe."

The question of survival after death, generally avoided like the plague by psychologists and philosophers—with a few isolated exceptions such as C. J. Ducasse, in his unusual *Nature, Mind, and Death*—is regarded by the ESP researchers as necessarily reopened. "There are," Rhine writes, "good grounds for the survival question to survive." And, he remarks, "it is probable that the survival question would have been raised by the material I have in mind even if it had never come up before as a cultural inheritance."

When, it may next be queried, is a discovery big enough to be called "a new world"? Whenever the new outlook changes distinctly and profoundly the way we look at the world we already know; when it exerts a permanent influence on our way of life. Let us see if this new world of the mind can measure up to these criteria.

New worlds, of course, are never discovered all at once. A new hemisphere may be glimpsed first only as a few small islands, or an electrical universe as a few tiny sparks. The remaining parts of the whole factual reality have to be found and put together bit by bit. This task of completion is commonly a long one.

At a certain stage of discovery, as in gathering the pieces of a puzzle, hints of the hidden design flash across the minds at work on it. In the studies here reviewed of some of the strange, unrecognized powers of the human mind, we who are working in this field have only recently come to that stage of seeing the signs of a pattern in the odd pieces that have been found. The import of that pattern for the human situation today seems so great that we cannot wait for the full factual picture to emerge. We need, and for many reasons we want, to share it as it develops. It has, therefore, been gratifying to find that others wish to watch with us the advancing exploration of this truly new and significant world within the bounds of the personality of man.

For every reader may this new world excursion be but the first of a series of voyages, each one advancing further the boundaries of discovery in the realm of what men vaguely call the human spirit!

COMMENTARY
IN BEHALF OF THE DEVIL

THE general progress in religious attitudes chronicled by Alan Paton (see Frontiers) has an interesting and peculiarly Catholic manifestation in a recent announcement by Giovanni Papini, famous author of the *Life of Christ* (1921). While Paton notes that fair-minded Christians are unable to believe that the white race is any more important in the sight of God than darker-skinned peoples, Papini, now seventy-two years old, expresses the view in his fortieth book, *Il Diavolo*, that the Devil, so long exiled from Paradise, may have hope of regaining his high estate.

For Papini, eternal damnation, even for the Devil, is a repugnant thought. Upon being questioned, he said somewhat obscurely: "My relations with the Devil are very ancient. They go back at least fifty years. . . . The Devil, who plays an important part in the life of men, is unknown. It seems to me important that men should know him intimately."

A pondering, perhaps, on the myth of the "Fall"—which brought the bright Lucifer to earth, or, in Biblical terms, to "Hell"—made Papini wonder if the theologians are not wrong in claiming that there is no possibility of the regeneration of the rebellious spirit. For if Prometheus, who brought fire to mortals, had the promise of ultimate release from his agonies, why not, also, Lucifer, who first taught men the difference between good and evil? The service was as great, or greater, whatever else the activities of the traditional "Devil."

Papini's feelings, at any rate, are clear. He says:

> Many Christians . . . think that a God who is truly a father cannot torture his children eternally . . . that, at the end of time, that is, the present world, mercy will have to prevail over justice. If this were not so, we must think that Christ's own Father is not a perfect Christian.

A Vatican spokesman referred to Papini's opinions as "shocking and silly," but there may be many, even among Catholics, who will come to regard the idea of eternal damnation as more shocking and sillier. Papini's rejection of orthodoxy, in the very language of orthodoxy, is an encouraging portent.

And one who is not a Catholic may easily question Papini's pious suggestion that "mercy" will overcome justice, for what conceivable justice could there be in *eternal* damnation? It is time that such hideous dogmas were forgotten.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WHAT seems the best current discussion on the place of philosophy in liberal education is provided by Marten ten Hoor's "Education For Privacy," published in the 1953-54 winter issue of the *American Scholar*. We referred to this article by the Dean of the University of Alabama in last week's "Fratricide Among Educators," since it provides, at a non-controversial level, an evaluation of the shortcomings of most current educational ideals—whether "traditionalist" or "non-traditionalist."

The keynote of "Education For Privacy" is briefly expressed. "Liberal education," ten Hoor writes, "must so educate the individual that he is manifestly worthy of having his dignity recognized." Talk about the "rights of the individual" and the values of a democratic form of government in which "individuality" is respected means little unless we encourage the *development* of self-reliance and originality. Mr. ten Hoor has two major themes, both bearing on present-day educational controversies. The first theme correlates with David Riesman's finding that moderns have become increasingly "other-directed"—that is, the average man or woman is much more concerned than previously with the improvement of inter-personal and societal relations. Carried to its extreme, this tendency results in a certain proportion of the population becoming "hyper-social-minded." There are now "tens of thousands of miscellaneous social-minded folks who attend conferences, workshops and institutes organized for the improvement of the human race. . . . Never have there been so many people making a good living by showing the other fellow how to make a better one. If you are skeptical, I recommend that you try this exercise—add up, as of the current date, the social workers, planners and reformers; the college presidents, deans and professors; the editors of magazines, journals and newspapers (not forgetting college newspapers); almost everybody in Washington, D.C., during recent years."

What are the characteristic reactions of the "hyper-socialminded"?

> They become so indignant when people resist their ministrations. They are so determinedly selfish in their unselfishness. Ideas, particularly ideas designed for the improvement of others, so quickly become inflated. In extreme cases they devour themselves. How antagonistic even educators become over professional differences as to how the ignorant should be rendered less so! Note the bitterness between rival reform groups. Let us not forget that human beings have killed one another in the mass even on the authority of their religions. Note how political leaders fall out, quarrel, conspire, injure one another in their unselfish efforts to save the country. In the absence of sophistication and modesty, reform notions grow into delusions; their advocates become more and more autocratic, leadership becomes pathological, the desire to help one's fellow-men is transformed into fanaticism and tyranny—and societies become authoritarian.

On some such ground we can excuse some of the biting criticisms by Albert Lynd in *Quackery in the Public Schools*. But Lynd didn't get around to a point which Mr. ten Hoor explores to great advantage:

> Especially in a democracy, where everyone is more or less free to advocate schemes for the improvement of society, lively and self-confident minds are inclined to expend their intellectual and emotional potential on reform movements. The attention of the reformer is consequently drawn away from contemplation of the state of his own soul. Since he is so happily exercised in improving others, the habit of self-examination gradually atrophies. How then can he be sure that he is the right person to prescribe for his neighbors? Should he not stop now and then to take an inventory of his resources? Does he in fact have these resources? It is because I have serious doubts of this sort, and because of the increasing neglect in education of attention to the accumulation of these resources, that I feel it time to make a plea for education for privacy.
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> The first requirement, clearly, is to learn how to think—not out loud or in print but privately. To think does not mean to spend hours in idle daydreaming or in vagrant imaginings, or to make

> occasional impulsive sallies at ideas which happen to appear before the attention. The reference is certainly not to the semi-somnolent and comfortable ruminations which go on in the wandering mind of an inattentive student in the classroom. What is meant is systematic reflection, the constant purpose of which is to bring order out of the multiplicity and variety of things in which the human being is immersed.
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> To be sure, many people go through life with their senses alert, observing and savoring in generous measure the richness of the world about them. But what they experience they retain only in the form of materials for recollection. The mind gradually accumulates a rich inventory of goods, which can be brought out on display when there is social opportunity for it. But the relationship of these resources in the mind is one of mere contiguity, like that of goods in a department store. Experience has not resulted in an over-all understanding because it has not been systematically thought about.
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> To possess one's soul in an intellectual sense means to have found some answer, or partial answer, to the questions: What is the nature of this world in which I find myself, what is my place in it, and what must be my attitude toward it? The problem is one of intellectual and spiritual orientation.

But conventional religion is not the answer. "Spiritual orientation," in its most meaningful sense, cannot be acquired by identification with any established tradition of belief, but rather must be *created* by the individual. Such originality in conviction is not easy, especially today, but it is the only guarantee against a loss of all individuality to "groups," or to the general consensus. Elementary and high school teachers may feel that these subtleties of thought are remote from practical exigencies in their classrooms, but we see here a dimension which should nevertheless be dwelt upon by all educators: We need, and children need, an antidote for the psychological blandishments of the wrong sort of religion—the religion which makes our minds passive:

> To cast all burdens upon the Lord in one grand resolve sometimes implies ignorance of the nature of those burdens. There is only consciousness of their oppressive weight, but no understanding of their nature or causes. To be sure, the critical intelligence may also come ultimately to make this renunciation, but it will not feel justified in doing so until it has reflected upon causes and relationships and seen the problem of human trouble and sorrow *whole*. The solution must be a conquest, not an escape.
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> For this, the mind certainly needs philosophy, sacred or secular. No learned profession, however, can offer the inquiring mind an official formula which every man need only apply in order to be permanently on understanding terms with the world. To be sure, there are systems of metaphysics, sacred and secular, from which the troubled spirit can choose a ready-made synthesis. But this does not make the chosen system of ideas an integral part of the inner personality. Intellectual orientation to the world must be something more than an acquisition; it must be an organic growth. The student should by all means seek out the great religions and philosophical thinkers, study their systems, and add their insights to his own. But in the last analysis he must work out his own solution, for such a solution must be the end product of his *own* reflection in the context of his *own* experience. Only through the alchemy of private reflection do philosophical ideas become private resources. Only then will they be available in time of crisis. When the normal course of existence is interrupted by conflict and frustration, it is a bit late to begin developing fundamental guiding ideas; that is the time to apply them.

It is our contention, along with Marten ten Hoor, that every teacher can be a better teacher if he holds these considerations in mind.

"Education For Privacy" also embraces an introduction to the fine arts, for appreciation of the arts, too, is "a strictly private experience." For instance, "no other human being is necessary to the reader at the moment of reading. He is offered "an inexhaustible resource: all ages of history; all countries; all varieties of human beings, and even of animals and plants and physical things; the entire range of human thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears, conquests and failures, victories and defeats; the real and the ideal—all are available at the turn of a page for the reader's contemplation and understanding. When we measure the impoverishment of him to whom this world is literally and figuratively a closed book, whose ear is deaf to music and whose eye blind to

the glories of painting and sculpture, we come to realize the responsibility of liberal education for instruction in the arts."

We wish more space were available for quotation, since Mr. ten Hoor seems to bring the reader closer to the appreciation of the "liberal arts" felt by such men as Robert Hutchins and Stringfellow Barr. He offers, also, a philosopher's view of ethical and moral needs:

> In education for privacy more is involved than philosophical orientation to the cosmos. There is equally urgent need for education in the establishment and maintenance of moral harmony. From the days of primitive religion, through Greek tragedy, the Christian epic of sin and salvation, and modern psychology, Freudian and non-Freudian, to contemporary existentialism, there runs the theme of the uneasy conscience. The dramatic specter of moral guilt is the principal character in many of the greatest creations of literary genius. No matter what the learned explanation, the psychological state is one of inner moral disharmony. Though it may have outer causes, it is a private affliction and must be cured privately. In moments of despair or periods of cynicism we may doubt the existence or discernibility of moral meaning in the universe; but such a conclusion does not relieve the individual of the necessity for solving his personal moral problem. Even complete moral negativism, if not itself a moral philosophy, leaves the individual no recourse to establish a private moral order in his life of action and reflection.
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> Education for privacy must therefore include the education of the moral personality, the gradual acquisition by the self of moral resources. Here, too, there are available to the student in generous measure the works of the great philosophical and religious thinkers, for probably no one of the persistent problems of life has had more of their systematic and concentrated attention. It is relevant here to note that the previously discussed philosophical orientation to the world is sometimes the foundation for moral orientation.

FRONTIERS

The Role of God

ALAN PATON, South African author of *Cry, the Beloved Country*, has written an article for the *Christian Century* (March 31) concerning Christians and the problem of race prejudice. The article is so good that it takes the reader—this reader, at least—beyond the question of racial tensions to the larger one of the role of God in religious thinking. For while Mr. Paton, who writes as a Christian, and is himself a member of the Anglican Church of South Africa, mentions God quite frequently, this God is a wholly nontheological Deity, the source to which Mr. Paton attributes his ideals. God, in short, has an exemplary but not a compulsive role, in this discussion of racial problems. The compulsions to ethical behavior arise rather from the profound persuasiveness of Mr. Paton's psychological analysis, and he might as easily have obtained his ideals from Buddhist ethics or the Kantian Categorical Imperative.

We mean this as a compliment to Mr. Paton, and not as a charge of logical weakness or inconsistency. Mr. Paton does honor to his Christian education in writing an article of such universal appeal that it should be equally impressive to all fair-minded men, regardless of religious faith.

Apparently invited to discuss this subject as an issue confronting the 1954 assembly of the World Council of Churches, to meet in Evanston, Ill., next August, Mr. Paton begins by noting that Christians are finding it increasingly difficult to imagine that the white race is preferred by their God to all others. Instead, therefore, of arguing for the equality of the races in the sight of God, he examines the reluctance of Christians to practice racial equality forthwith. It is here that the searching questions begin:

> You can say that you yourself personally have no race prejudice, that you personally have Jewish friends, and that you see no reason why Asia should not belong to the Asians. But in your own country you can't go too fast. You have to consider local customs, local prejudices, and last but by no means least the power of the state. You accept racial equality in theory, but you accept racial inequality in practice. In a thousand years things may be different.
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> You also have two other powerful arguments. These are geography and culture. Colored people often live in areas distinct from white areas; therefore geographically it would be difficult to have colored people in your church. Further they are culturally different. They use different languages and have different customs. They like to have services lasting three hours, and you like services lasting one hour. You must not force them to do what they would not like to do.
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> Some Christians think that it is love that is impelling them to seek for a greater, more tangible, more visible unity among the races. But there are other Christians who doubt this, and who think that this "love" is really anything but love; it is guilt, it is busybodyism, it is patronage come back in a new and more subtle guise. Above all it is sentimentality, and what is worse, it is sentimentality that will actually defeat the ends of that true love that is so wise, so gracious, so intensely practical, so well controlled.
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> These are powerful arguments. So powerful are they that one may be pardoned for supposing that their strength often comes from somewhere else, from deeper motives whose existence we deny. These motives are fear and pride, seldom encountered in their pure state (though that can happen), but usually in compounds. And these compounds are at their most powerful when to them has been added a good dollop of love and consideration for others.
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> It is very difficult to counter these arguments; it is always difficult to counter arguments that conceal emotional attitudes. You are very much in the position of a man who must comment on all the points of his friend's sheep, when all the time he knows that inside it is a wolf. Nor does it help very much to know that it is quite a decent wolf.
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> Let us be honest: it is often not the *inadvisability*, the *impracticability*, of going faster that deters us, but the fear of it. This fear is of two distinct kinds. One is the fear we feel because we are unregenerate, the other is the fear we feel of the unregenerateness of others, especially of an unregenerate state.
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> All these attitudes are intensely human, but they are not noble, courageous, or generous. They are cautious, calculating and cold. They rule out of court any possibility that God may be calling us to transcend differences of race and culture and calling us to assert our common sonship. In a race-ridden world, but more especially in a race-ridden country, God may be calling us to proclaim something far more ineffable, far more Christian, than race difference.

The power of these observations is the same as the power in Dostoevsky's chapter on the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov*. They invite no answer because the dialogue is complete. Responsibility for decision is wholly the reader's. You may take Mr. Paton's view, or you may leave it, and if you leave it there will

only be yourself to reproach you. Mr. Paton's power is in the fact that he lays you open to the aggressions of your own conscience.

There is a tendency among those who are of religious or philosophic persuasions which claim greater universality than Christianity to ignore the pronouncements of avowed Christians on the ground that an orthodox spokesman of traditional religion can have nothing valuable to say. This is only the sin of orthodoxy in reverse. The glory of human beings is that they are continually overcoming the narrowing barriers of creed. And only those who try to recognize the quality of universal insight wherever it occurs are entitled to call themselves non-sectarian.

What Mr. Paton is calling for is honest self-appraisal of one's motives in regard to the race question. It is not a matter of accepting or rejecting a party or denominational line. Are our opinions formed, he asks, from nobility, courage, and generosity, or do they spring from fear? The issue is this:

> Christians cannot ignore the problems created by racial tensions in their society, nor problems of geography and culture. There is not much danger that they will. The danger is that they will use the existence of these problems to excuse them from action, that they will use the unregenerateness of the world to excuse their own.

The "unregenerateness of the world" may justify the lag in political or legislative action, but it affects the question of individual decision only in educational terms. And there are always *some* issues which need to be acted upon, regardless of the unregenerate world's insusceptibility to friendly persuasion. The measure of one's action, again, may be an individual affair, the important thing, here, being one's honesty with oneself in arriving at a decision.

Those who feel they must "wait" before attempting to practice racial equality might give some consideration to John Woolman, the Quaker pioneer in justice to the American Negroes, who did in the eighteenth century what many fear to do now. Being a Quaker, Woolman was also a pacifist, yet like the more recent advocate of non-violence, M. K. Gandhi, Woolman was a determined believer in the efficacy of individual action. Woolman's first journey through Virginia (he was an itinerant minister) brought him into intimate contact with slave-holding on a large scale. As Lyman Bryson noted in an Invitation to Learning program last year, Woolman found himself "almost as sorry for the man who held slaves and thereby corroded his own soul by action in an evil institution as he was for the slave." Woolman took his own action as an individual:

> He didn't, as people often do, say, I object to such and such a thing, that's true, but my objection here would scarcely be of any avail because I'm alone in my party. He acted always according to the light of his own conscience. On those trips to the South, a trip to Virginia and Maryland and South Carolina and so on, he felt that in some way, by being a guest of slave-owners, he himself was exploiting the slaves. So what did he do? He acted contrary to the usual practice of just accepting hospitality; he always went out of his way to pay his hosts for his food and his lodging, or to slip some coins into the hands of the slaves, because he didn't want to profit by this exploited labor. . . . It's owing to Woolman, of course, that the anti-slavery movement gained such great impetus and that the Friends Society was one of the first to abolish the holding of slaves by its members. But ardent as his feelings were on the subject, convinced as he was of the evil of slave-holding, he never tried to impose his ideas through force or violence or even argument. All that he did was to remind a slave-owner that: is this, after all, in the spirit of the teaching which we profess?

Woolman found various ways of giving evidence of his convictions. He refused, for example, to write wills for persons who wished to pass along to their descendants the ownership of their slaves. He did not feel impotent as a single individual, but, holding the Quaker belief that there is that of God in every man, he believed he could do a great deal. Notice of this point of view in Woolman brought an interesting comment from Walter Cohen, a participant in the Invitation to Learning program:

> I think that's one of the things that sets a great difference between Woolman and us and makes him a useful illustration of a different sort of philosophy. People no longer, I think, have that sense of the powerful individual, because they're out of touch with the motive force that set Woolman into action.

So, in reflecting on the role of God in religion, we come to the conclusion that for some men, God is a definer of beliefs, an autocrat of dogma, and a punisher of sinners through, as often as not, the aggressive policies of "His" agents and representatives on earth—the "head," in short, of a militant organization; but for other men—men like Woolman, Gandhi, and Alan Paton—God is the motive force for noble, courageous, and generous action. There should not be much doubt about which of the two Gods, or the two roles of God, is the true one, and worthy of human respect or faith.