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THINGS ARE CLOSING IN

IT is no problem at all, these days, to work up a crisis to write about. An ingenious editor can have a crisis pretty much at will—once a week, if need bc and stay within the area of truth and possibility. *U. S. News & World Report,* whose editors are far from incompetent, produced the makings of an authentic crisis in its issue of Dec. 2 by running two stories on war—one, concerned with Soviet cold wet foreign policy for the past eight years, the other, a report of the early results of the war games held last month by the U.S. Army and the Air Force. The story on Russian policy is titled "World War III, Russian Style," and it lists the gains made by the Soviet Union "without the Soviet Army's firing a shot." This story, while doubtless containing exaggerations, gives considerable support to the criticisms of American foreign policy, whether from the Right or the anti-communist Left. The Rightists are seen to be correct in claiming that the policy of "containment" does not contain, and the Leftists can point to the same facts as evidence that military opposition alone to the communist movement is futile, so long as the West fails to recognize the need for humanitarian measures which do not use food and economic assistance as a "weapon" in the cold war.

The *U.S. News* "crisis," however, comes to a head in the report of the war games, in which it is disclosed that a "sudden attack" was able to "knock out" nearly all U.S. air bases and half the U.S. striking forces. Just seventeen minutes after the first warning, the attacking planes were dropping atom bombs, and twenty-three minutes later the destruction was accomplished. These were the largest military maneuvers since World War II, and *U.S. News* highlights the "Basic, ominous lesson" of the unpredictable "sneak attack" in these words:

> The side in the next war that waits for the enemy to strike the first blow before retaliating may very well face defeat in the few hours or minutes before its own power can be brought to bear.

The fire power theoretically directed against U.S. bases in the forty minutes from the first warning was equal, *U.S. News* reports, to the total explosive power produced by 250,000 sorties during three years of war in Korea. The conclusion drawn by *U.S. News* is in the form of a question: *"Can U.S. actually afford to take the first blow?"*

This sort of question imposes terrible responsibilities upon military commanders. If they do not strike first, the military force of their side may be practically annihilated, as the war games showed; but if they strike first themselves, without being finally sure that an all-out war must be fought, they then bear the responsibility of touching off a shooting World War III.

The armchair strategists won't have much chance to make critical comments on the conclusions of the war games. There just doesn't seem to be any escape from the dilemma, as *U.S. News* reports the experience of the games. A "realistic" interpretation of the maneuvers inevitably raises the question behind the question asked by this magazine: Hadn't we better shoot first?

If, with the implications of the story on Soviet foreign policy, that isn't enough of a crisis, it will do until a bigger one comes along.

People who are trying to think about these things are already making up their minds. At a conference of the California division of the Socialist Party held Nov. 26, the delegates passed a resolution which rejected violence altogether as the solution for international conflicts. In part, the resolution said:

> . . . the time has come to re-examine the nature of war and the validity of critical support for our government. When we support a policy we must be prepared to take responsibility for the results that may come from that policy. Today there is a real possibility of World War III. We have built Hydrogen Bombs and it is foolish to believe we will not use those bombs if necessary.
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> The consequences of Hydrogen Bomb warfare are completely appalling. Everyone agrees on this, and yet very few are willing to draw the necessary conclusions that we must now reject any foreign policy which is based on the use of violence. Violence is now as completely destructive to the defenders as to the aggressor.
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> We are not a pacifist party. There are pacifists in the Socialist Party and they have always played an active role and hold a respected position. But the Party as a whole is not convinced that we must at all times and places be completely non-violent. There may be times when our rights and social gains can only be defended by violence, however unhappy we would be to employ that method.
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> But in the age of Hydrogen Bomb warfare one does not have to be a religious pacifist to condemn war. It is not realistic and it is not sane to develop and manufacture Hydrogen Bombs. There are some things which men cannot do without ceasing to be human. The deliberate, willful act of mass murder on the scale now being risked by both power blocs is that kind of thing. Politically we refuse support to the foreign policies of either bloc. We do not know if it will be possible to develop a revolutionary third camp as an alternative to the two power blocs. Such a policy may be unrealistic, but it is far more realistic than the policy of risking the end of the human race.
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> We demand disarmament even if it must be unilateral. We demand an end to the production of atomic weapons and the dismantling of those we now have. We give full support to members of the Party who refuse to work in war plants, to serve in the Armed Forces, or in other ways withdraw their support from the war policies of this or any other government.

At the risk of becoming the target for socialist indignation, we should like to suggest that this is not really a "socialist" manifesto, although it is offered for consideration by socialists. While the few remaining socialists in the United States enjoy the unity provided them by the Socialist Party, there is a vast difference between a small minority whose members call themselves socialist and a political party strong enough to cherish an expectation, however small, of actually gaining political power. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the existence of such free minorities—free because uncommitted by the compulsions of practical politics—is far more important and more valuable to the nation than some large political entity which would find itself unable to make declarations like this California socialist resolution on war.

There are periods of history which lie between the moments of historic decision—when whatever actions are taken by nations result from the momentum of their past and the accidents of the present. We may be mistaken, but it seems to us that the world has practically no political freedom at all, these days. Events coerce men, not men events. The ship of state—any ship of state—sails perilously in a sea filled with partially and wholly submerged icebergs, and each of these obstacles represents the incalculable potentiality of atomic explosion.

Within a generation, perhaps, with or without a precipitating catastrophe, a sense of needing to make great decisions will slowly overtake the more intelligent sector of the population, and then new political parties may arise, with new methods, new concepts of action, and new objectives. It is even possible that the slow, inexorable trend toward complete conformity in political matters, today, is a necessary process that must precede an authentic awakening. Conformity always displaces original thinking, leaving it homeless, without a field in which to work. The faceless, windowless walls of the Garrison State make a formidable structure, to those within as well as those without, but as the wall grows higher, there will be more of those who long to get out and away. The difficulty of the present, of course, is that, even if you do get out, there is no place to get away.

So far as we can see, the challenge of the present and the future to men of creative intelligence is to invent new forms of social enterprise, new alignments of idealism. It should be at once evident, for example, that a "pacifist" political party, should one come into existence, would hardly resemble any existing political formation at all. Such a group, if it possessed intellectual and moral responsibility, would have to include in its plans a program of decentralization of power on a planetary scale; it would also have to chart the progress of human maturity to a point where the trust of men—men everywhere—in each other would be the rule instead of the exception. A pacifist social order has such revolutionary implications that it is almost unimaginable, in terms of mode and degree of actual organization.

Today, the problems of culture are isolated from the problems of politics, as though there were no relation between the two. For this reason, it may be difficult for us to realize that a non-violent society would probably find the substance of the arts, literature, psychology, philosophy, and religion of far greater importance than political ends. It is even possible that political ends would lose their importance because they have been reached without being sought—reached in virtue of the attention given to the more profound needs of human beings. This, of course, is a bit of preaching to our political brethren, which may be unwelcome. It is like saying, "You have to lose your life in order to gain it," and, until quite recently, Biblical allusions have had small popularity in political movements, least of all in the radical movement.

In an atmosphere of crisis, however, people begin to look around. Desperation, while it often leads to terror and irrational disaster, sometimes reduces men to basic integrity of purpose. With or without disaster, it always leads to change, and with the prospect of change on the horizon, the duty of those who see it coming is to examine the alternatives while there is still time.

Letter from
CENTRAL EUROPE

INNSBRUCK.—By the time this letter is in print, the last Allied soldier will have left Austria. And, for the first time since 1938, Austria will be free to determine duties and rights by her own government. A National Day of Liberty will be celebrated. The Austrian crest will again be the eagle which rends a chain of iron, and the colours will again be red, white, and red.

As a dukedom, Austria was mentioned in old documents more than a thousand years ago. The dukedom grew, enlarging its territory by marriages to such an extent that, for several centuries, and after the German Emperors had chosen Vienna as their capital, Austria meant Europe and Europe meant Austria, as far as the continent was concerned. "The sun does not set in my Empire!" exclaimed Charles V.

From the eighteenth century on, however, the imperial impulse moved more to the north, where the Prussian kings successfully started to build a new German Empire, leaving Austria to rule in Southeastern Europe. A union with Hungary was created, and the double-eagle began to represent the new hegemony.

The original dukedom of Austria had for many years been ruled by the Babenbergers. Shortly after 1230—under the government of the Babenberger Duke Friedrich II—the colors of red, white, and red appeared for the first time, instead of the plain red of the Babenberger shield.

This change was said to have originated from a tunic worn by the Babenberger Duke, Leopold V, while taking part in the battle of Akkon (July, 1191), against the Saracens. The tunic was white, but became entirely red from the duke's wounds, except for a white stripe where he wore a belt.

The historically precious tunic was kept for more than 500 years in the treasury of Maria Lanzendorf. When, in 1529, the armies of the Turks approached Vienna, the tunic was hidden at Perchtoldsdorf. The same thing happened when the Turkish wave rolled on for the second time in 1683. On this occasion they not only slaughtered the entire population, but burned down the town. That was the end of the red tunic with a white stripe.

That the tunic existed, there can be no doubt. A director of one of the Austrian State Archives has, however, obliterated the legend in connection with the original selection of the colors. He found a more likely, if less romantic, solution of the problem. Earls in the district Horn wore their crest on a white shield. When they died out, their rights and properties were transferred to the Babenberger Leopold VI (son of the one whose tunic got blood-soaked). Leopold VI united the crest of the extinct earls with that of his family by laying a white stripe diagonally across the red shield, but did not make use of the Horn crest, since some members of the Horn family still lived abroad. Years after, when those foreign earls had died, red, white, and red became the official symbols.

So, even so far as her colors are concerned, Austria has again become the "green and peaceful heart of Europe."

CENTRAL EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

IN BEHALF OF AMERICAN INDIANS

THIS department is obliged to confess a certain ambivalence about the *Reader's Digest.* In short, we avoid this magazine, mostly on the theory that "digests" ought to be avoided by readers who want to do their own digesting, and also on the theory that this publication is both a symptom and a phenomenon of "mass culture," representing a kind of regimentation in the field of ideas. Then, when we do happen to read an article or a book condensation in the *Digest,* and happen to like it, we tend to feel a little uncomfortable and slightly "betrayed." What right has the *Digest* to disturb our theories?

Well, this time our theory is proved correct. The *Digest* for November has an article by O. K. Armstrong on the American Indians. It offers what are called "arresting facts about the accomplishments of America's first citizens," and its title appeals: "Give the Indians an Even Chance!" It is a good enough article from one point of view—the point of view of Caucasian Americans who will be interested to hear that, given "an even chance," an Indian can become just as "successful" as a white man in pursuing the white man's goals. The article reports that a Cherokee Indian heads the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, that Ben Harrison, a Choctaw, and other Indians helped to write the state constitution of Oklahoma, that Congressmen, state governors, and even a vice president (Charles Curtis) have been wholly or partly Indian. Will Rogers was part Cherokee. Half the staff of the Indian Bureau is Indian; well known scholars in sociology, archaeology, and Indian studies are Indians; Indians make good mechanics, nurses, professional people. The athlete, Jim Thorpe, was an Indian. Indians have been successful in business. All the Indians need, Mr. Armstrong repeats, is an "even chance."

What stands in their way? Federal wardship, segregation, and race prejudice, Mr. Armstrong says. More than half the 400,000 American Indians still live on reservations, and reservations, he assures us, are "islands of poverty, disease and idleness." Further:

> The reservation Indian is born into a condition of inferiority. He grows up as a "ward of the Government." While Indians are free to move away from the reservations, the fear of social discrimination and a feeling of incompetence prevent many from seeking a better life.

It is the reservation, this writer tells us, which blocks assimilation into American life, and which has established the policy of segregation and its attendant evils. He doesn't quite say that the thing to do is to get the Indians off the reservations and into the "normal" pattern of American life, but it is difficult to find any other implication in his article. Mr. Armstrong does imply that the only reason why the reservations still exist is that the Indian Bureau has been unwilling to acknowledge the capacity of the Indian to "adjust" to or be "assimilated" by American culture:

Reservation lands were held "in trust" by the Bureau on the theory that an Indian was too incompetent to own property and manage his own affairs. Starting in 1887, allotments of land were made to Indians on many reservations, with agreement that after a time they could receive title to their homesteads. Most of these agreements were cancelled, and trusteeship over the land was extended indefinitely.

We don't propose to argue this matter from any fixed point of view, but wish to suggest that such articles totally ignore a class of facts which represent a profound mystery concerning human beings and cycles of human development. We have read and read about the American Indians, and the Indian problem, and willingly admit that we feel very little understanding of these questions. Certain things, however, seem quite clear.

First, the Indians of the Americas, on the whole, have very little interest in "private property" and very little talent for holding it. The

chief reason why the land allotment scheme was interrupted was that conscientious Americans saw that it was mostly a means of robbing the Indians of their tribally held land. Students and lovers of the Indians, like John Collier, believe that their unpossessive attitude toward private title to land is a strength of the Indians, and not a weakness of character. They find in the Indians an ancestral wisdom which works best in a communal way of life, and which tends to break down when the individual Indian is compelled to live as an isolated economic unit in an acquisitive society. The Indians, these students feel, are a remnant of an ancient order of social life which cannot be infected with the typical modern man's zest for competition and distinction in private enterprise. The Indian way of life cannot be adapted to the way of Western individualism; it can only be destroyed by it.

There are exceptions, of course. The professions afford some escape from acquisitive objectives, as do careers in public service. These are avenues of escape for some white men, too, who dislike the quality of life involved in the competitive struggle. And doubtless some Indians find the merit and the opportunity in the white man's culture that Mr. Armstrong says are there for them. Historically, however, the "individualization" of the Indian has meant a kind of death for him, a severing of the arteries of his natural communal life.

It is a great pity that there has been so much talk about and fear of communism during recent years, since this has had the effect of hardening the minds and stultifying the social imagination of people who might otherwise learn a great deal about themselves and their human needs from various kinds of social experimentation. There are many kinds of communism. The original Christian communities were virtually communist, and some of the Christian communities of today have a communist form. For most of us, however, the word means only Russia and the authoritarian crystallization of the European revolutionary movement which has taken place in that country. This kind of communism is an expression of massive alienation. It was born in anger, survived through ferocity, and is maintained by aggressive ideological orthodoxy. To what extent the "capitalistic" matrix in which modern political communism was formed is responsible for the latter's character would be a subject worth exploring, but here the objective is to point out that there are types of communist society which are natural expressions of human inclination and wholly without the bitterness and antagonism which Marx and others fathered on the European revolutionary movement.

This is not an attempt to suggest that the "individualism" of Western social development has been a wholly negative affair, no more than an unnatural rejection of the organic wholeness of primitive communal society. Individualism is much more than an "economic" matter—in fact, the economic expression of individualism seems to us to be its most superficial form. There is a sense in which the organic society of the past is terribly vulnerable to any sort of change, and the organicism of the human being, if it is to reach philosophic maturity, must be self-contained and self-sufficient, and not dependent upon a cultural setting for its existence.

It is even conceivable that the European-American cycle of civilization was an experimental trial by nature in the direction of *individnal* maturity. It hasn't worked very well, but it may be useful to think of our society in this way. Our sociologists now look at some of the older forms of human organization—the Hopi Indians, for example—with an appreciation bordering on mystical wonder. Great secrets of harmony and serenity seem to be locked up in the Hopi way of life. Our professional people who themselves have a kind of immunity to the infection of acquisitiveness are able to look at these ancient societies without the naïve egotism of contemporary conventionality. Instead of seeing how lacking the Indians are in the things we have,

they see how rich the Indians are in things that *we* are without.

There is a difference between this admiration for the Indian sense of wholeness—so clear and well expressed in John Collier's book, *The Indians of the Americas* (Norton, 1947)—and Rousseau's celebration of the "noble savage," Voltaire's honoring of the simple honesty of "the Huron." In the eighteenth century, the trial of Western individuality lay in the future. For the reformers of that time, the Indians were a symbol, but not an example, of what was to be desired. Europe was forward-looking in those days. Now, we are backward-looking. The men who try to do the thinking for these times are wondering where the mistakes were made. No one seriously studied Indian community life to discover its secrets for the common welfare of the West until the twentieth century, when it began to be plain that the West had involved itself in a serious, perhaps catastrophic, failure to create the conditions of a good life. Perhaps the alienation of the Marxist-revolutionary movement brought widespread awareness of that failure. A sense of what has happened to the West is well put in Collier's book:

> Societies as the shapers and sustainers of life were implicitly, even explicitly, denied to exist by the epoch immediately preceding our own; the assertions or assumptions of that epoch—call it the period of the industrial revolution or the nineteenth century—govern our thinking today. The practical consequences are enormous, are even decisive for evil. Not only our popular mind, but also the minds of most of the workers in the nascent social sciences remain profoundly, unconsciously biased by the nineteenth-century presumptions as to the nature of economic and political man.
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> What were these presumptions? To state them briefly is to over-simplify, but here are some of them.
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> The "free market" and laissez-faire doctrines and practices viewed the human world as an aggregation of persons—individuals—each of whom was controlled by a universal, and therefore interchangeable, rational or calculating economic self-interest. The law of the free market was lord of all; and if it wrought havoc upon societies, heritages, ethical and esthetic values, family and community life, *and even the natural resources of earth itself,* it remained the overriding principle; it dominated conduct and assured ultimate salvation. It would eventually heal every wound it inflicted. . . .
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> Because the free market's rational self-interested man is only a small fragment of the human race, and because if men cannot have good societies they will have worse ones, there took form those new societies, exploitative of the psychotic trends in men, which World War II was waged to suppress. Yet can the psychopathic pursuit of a basic need be stopped through war or force, if the healthful pursuit of basic needs is made impossible by the condition of drift or fanaticism, or the myopia, of a world's age? . . .
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> . . . for more than a century the best minds of the Occident have accepted as fundamental the isolation of the individual, have not sought to bind themselves with either the ancient societies or with such emergent societies as labor, the co-operatives, the re-asserting folk movements. They have not tried to understand, and have not tried to do anything adequate or perservering about, that starvation of the soul within themselves and all of us, owing to that *sheet erosion and gully erosion in human life* which is silently wasting away our own society and all western societies into a sea of endless night.

In the torn and mutilated life of tribes of American Indians, Collier found an extraordinary resistance to this erosion. It seemed to be nourished by a racial and earth mysticism, restoring strength to the Indians after attacks which should have annihilated them. Lately, the attacks have begun again, through an effort to apply once more the land allotment policies begun in 1887—this effort being justified and supported by articles like the one in the November *Reader's Digest.* How the Indians will survive this renewal of the attack remains to be seen. The reservations are indeed islands—for many, they must be islands of despair—for the waves of white expansion and domination rise higher with every year, wearing away the obstacles to liquidation of these last strongholds of tribal integrity. Perhaps their survival is not to be, except in the terms of Mr. Armstrong's "even chance" to lose their identity in the American population. Yet the story of their heroic resistance may yet have another chapter to be written. In 1947, John Collier was able to

record what he called "the triumph of the *group life* of the Indians." In this triumph he saw a promise of their future:

> Across four hundred years, the struggle of the Indians in behalf of their group life was waged as an enormous delaying action. Indian groups numbering more than forty thousand social units on the two continents sustained this delaying action, each unit largely in isolation from the others. In the process of this struggle, deep changes took place in Indian life. The changes were not merely mechanical. They did not consist merely in the loss of this and that native "trait" and the acceptance of this and that European "trait." Rather, organic assimilation and vital synthesis took place.
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> There was no method of destruction that was not used against them, and most of them coped with all the methods of destruction. Legal proscription, administrative proscription, military slaughter; enslavement, *encomienda,* forced labor peonage; confiscation of nearly all lands, forced individualization of residual lands; forced dispersal, forced mass-migration, forced religious conversions; religious persecutions which hunted down the social soul to its depths, and the propaganda of scorn; catastrophic depopulation, which mowed down the native leadership and the repositories of tradition; bribery of leadership, and the intrusion of quisling governments by the exploiting power. Indian group life—Indian societies—outwore all the destructions.

An "even chance"? What is an even chance for people who have been served thus? We cannot even let them alone, for the close confinement of the Indians to reservations has already forced them into unnatural adaptations and forms of dependency upon the intruding civilization. The least we can do is to spare them our conceit in supposing that the best fulfillment of the Indian heritage is to become a successful white man. What Collier tried to do is amply recorded in his book, and now even this is rapidly being undone by the present policies of the United States Government. Perhaps the only thing that can be done for them, now, is for us to try to recover from the delusions which, in past generations as well as the present, made what we have done against them seem "right," necessary, or merely "inevitable."

COMMENTARY

AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENT

THE American cycle of civilization represents the first time in history when the individual has had opportunity to think of himself as an end in himself. This is perhaps the most important meaning of the Declaration of Independence.

To be the subject of a king is to be a subordinate, literally the *subject* of someone else. There was perhaps a moral value in the idea of serving the ends of others, but service constrained by lowly status and exacted as a tribute by arrogant men becomes a degradation of the human spirit. The American Revolution redefined the relationships of human beings. It declared for every man the right to seek his own ends in his own way.

It was natural, perhaps, that when the restraints of hierarchy and status were removed, there should be excesses. The famous "materialism" of Americans was one expression of this new-found freedom—an expression which was probably inevitable in a world where poverty and want had for centuries been the natural experience of the great majority.

We might regard the economic self-sufficiency sought after and reached by most Americans as a legitimate vindication of their individuality. But somewhere along the line, the fruits of this economic achievement began to sour. The religion of the "highest standard of living" proved an unworthy creed, and lives which were satiated with material plenty were discovered to be empty of meaning, to the point of neurotic eagerness for distraction. Even the relatively poor suffered from the debasement of ends, hoping to escape from their poverty by imitating the well-to-do and the rich. If we had to put a date to the beginning of this period of diminishing returns from American prosperity, we should set it soon after the ending of the first world war.

Americans now live in anxiety, surrounded by the inarticulate reproaches of the rest of the world for the waste of their freedom, for the trivialization of their individuality. The communist reproach is a bitter attempt to return to compelled service to others—not to a king, but to the political abstraction of the Workers' State, or the Working Class. We see the folly of a return to compulsion, but are we able to see the tragedy of a freedom that has been unworthily employed?

Who will begin to turn the tide of human reaction to these things from mutual contempt and hate to mutual understanding?

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
YOUTH AND RADICALISM

MUCH has been made, and rightly so, of the profound perceptions of which children are sometimes capable. Cutting through the societal confusions and delusions, simply because they find them incomprehensible, the very young are apt to lay bare human facts which escape the notice of priests and politicians alike. If ours is indeed a neurotic society, this means that most of those living in it, having themselves a part in the neuroticism, are by nature incapable of recognizing their own absurdities. Of course the child, too, by the time he has become "well-adjusted," will presumably have caught the same infection, but since the progress of this disease is slow, the intervening years of youth may be ones of comparative clarity.

That all this is so can be pretty well attested by even the most "neurotic" of us, if we are willing to recall the clear beauty we were sometimes privileged to see during childhood. Part of the romance of our early years flows from the simple fact that our point of view was not "cribbed, cabined, and confined" by artificial standards. So we can say—with some nostalgia—that everyone worth his salt is a kind of "radical" during his early years, and only later develops "conservative" tendencies. There is, however, a great deal more to be understood about the nature of "radicalism" and "conservatism" than this suggests.

The first characteristic distinguishing children from adults may be said to be spontaneity of action. If adults were to do many of the things children do, they would be promptly arrested; adults acting like children would appear to be very "radical" indeed. Yet neither physical spontaneity, nor any other sort, may be correctly described as "radical." The radical is one who goes back to the roots of things, and goes there in his mind. Until he is able to comprehend with his mind the nature of the problem facing him, he can hardly be called either "radical" or "conservative."

The child grows toward maturity by the practice of certain physical and emotional disciplines, for, unless some manner of restraint is seen to be necessary, he can hardly be expected to know that a "problem" exists. The practice of physical and emotional disciplines is, in the purest and best sense, "conservatism"—conservation of the energy otherwise spent in wandering impulses, which discipline stores up for more deliberate use. So, in terms of this analysis, one must become a "conservative" *before* he can become a radical, at least so far as self-discipline and reflection are concerned. Also, since one can hardly know for certain that the standards practiced by one's society are worthless until he is at least capable of meeting them, the most advanced of young men will tentatively accept a social rule or custom before they reject it—the rejection coming, finally, in the case of societal standards subversive of human dignity, after some clear thinking has gone on concerning just what one is up against.

On this basis, then, we can say that the child needs conservatism of mind in regard to family and societal obligation in order to balance an otherwise irrepressible spontaneity. But there should also come a time when these opposite-tending trends balance—when capacity for spontaneity and self-discipline are approximately equal. *Then*, we say, unless the youth becomes a "radical," unless he thinks for himself, he really fails to join the human race. In order to think for himself, in turn, he must weigh and balance; he must know the traditions of his family and society and be able to find some small part of appreciation for them. He needs, in other words, to receive a "liberal arts education," to listen in on the "Great Conversation" of our civilization, and he needs to show something of that respect for parents and family which has always counted so heavily in "tradition-directed societies" such as those of India and China.

Talking about "respect for parents" is now, as always, of little avail. There is false respect and true respect—"respect" assumed from a desire to gain approval or material benefit, and the respect of love. But a liberal education is something we *can* talk about, and a liberal education has everything to do with comprehension of the meaning of "radicalism." In the process of acquiring a liberal education one learns, first off, that all the advances in perspective and knowledge since the dawn of humankind were made by men who stepped "beyond the pale" of orthodoxy. This the Buddha did, this Jesus of Nazareth did, this Socrates did. And in the field of the sciences the same pattern holds true. Copernicus, Galileo, and, in our own day, Einstein, represent the same tradition—the tradition of the radical. In the days of the founding of the American Republic the pattern is especially clear as applying to a temper and mood prevailing among a whole group of men with like—but never identical—minds. The "Founding Fathers" were, almost without exception, radical philosophers whose ideas were transformed into action resulting in the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the U.S. Constitution.

So it seems to us that one of the most important functions of education is to teach respect for Radicalism, but to teach it in the context of full appreciation of all that is worthy in tradition. The radicalism of the Founding Fathers started a tradition, as a matter of fact, and, once started, it has needed preservation. But it can only be preserved in its purity by men who understand what "radicalism" means—who are of a questing, searching, philosophical nature; a preservation of form can never substitute for a preservation of spirit and meaning. As witness of this undeniable fact we have the whole sad story of Congressional Investigating Committees and the like, which while claiming to protect "the American way of life," have largely destroyed it within the area of their operations—by tacitly denying the right of each individual to cherish his own beliefs, and to espouse whatever political or ideological cause he wills.

This brings into focus, incidentally, another aspect of the general subject of "radicalism"—and returns us to children and youths. There is a stage during the formative years when, for almost every young person, a sad confusion takes place. Since there is a certain distinction in being known as a "rebel," many wish to be known as rebels who are simply being *conventional* in so wishing. In the adult world, the professional revolutionary is also often utterly conventional; his standards of value are as fixed as those of any orthodox conformist, and his interpretation of past history and current events alike leaves no room for a new perspective. The self-satisfied revolutionist, whether young or old, in other words, may be nothing more than a moralist—whose peculiar delusion is that he is being radically different by being the same as all other revolutionaries of his party or group. This psychological phenomenon, as the sociologists have pointed out, has a great deal to do with the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency, and, with youthful crime showing an alarming increase, one can only conclude that this sort of "conventionality" is one of the great dangers of the future.

There are two ways of teaching the sort of radicalism that is needed, and they are complementary. First, young people must be persuaded to expend enough effort to discover that part of full satisfaction in living must be attained by the successful inauguration of self-discipline. Bodies and feelings must be brought under control, made servants instead of masters. This first step is necessary because, in the absence of such self-discipline, a person will be in no position to determine whether or not the cause he espouses or the belief he advocates is simply the rationalization of his own weakness. This has been the case, as we all know, with many of the camp-followers of revolution.

Second, the young must learn that this is a world of half-, quarter-, and one-eighth "truths."

Groups claiming to represent Truth, "whole, and nothing but," invariably suffer from group delusions—because no matter how theoretically valid the collective position, important "positions" cannot be taken by groups or masses, but only by individuals.

Therefore, one is cautioned to remember that, as Buddha said, only fools regard one view as wholly true and another wholly false. Our traditions and conventions are all, or nearly all, interwoven with some aspect of truth. And they are all, also, interwoven with falsehood. This is why men, or youths, have to think for themselves to know anything at all. No one can have inner confidence in a conclusion he has not thought out for himself. During the early years, then, parents should encourage neither doubt nor acceptance in their young. They should encourage the judicial quality of mind, which, when developed, makes it possible for mature men and women to decide issues impartially—to be truly "radical."

FRONTIERS

Art and Philosophy, Again

LETTER TO THE EDITORS: Your recent discussion of Philosophy and Art" by way of citations from Professor C. J. Ducasse's *Art, the Critics and You* seemed to me to cover one aspect of the interrelationship of these two subjects very well. However, it is also my feeling that a productive train of thought will result from applying *artistic* criteria to the subject-matter, methods, and language of philosophy.

W. Macneile Dixon, whom you often praise and quote, seems to have been a perfect exemplar of the "artistic" method of criticizing philosophy. In his *Civilization and the Arts* and *The Human Situation* he returned again and again—with fervor—to the case for the poets. The poets and other artists tell us, he affirmed, far more about the human heart than the moralists, the followers of revealed religion, the "system-builders," and the logicians. The language of metaphor and figurative expression is profound because it restores perceptions temporarily obscured, and invites us to relate these to the present.

The metaphor, which seems simply a kind of image, is, in some ways, much more communicative than "logic"; its effectiveness is measured by the amount of intuitive insight it brings into focus for the reader.

Evaluation of a philosophy or a religion, from the standpoint of art, begins, I should think, with the question "Is it imaginative"? That is, does the doctrine, tenet or proposition I am asked to examine stir my thoughts deeply, inspire the imagination to roam toward wider horizons? Is there something of goodness and beauty revealed, or is there only a purported representation of "truth"?

As Dixon put it in *The Human Situation*, seeking for certainty in a world of abstractions is not only difficult, but often dangerous. When we have aligned ourselves with a particular statement of belief, no matter how impressive the auspices of its authority, our inner and outer senses alike close around the conclusion; however much we may pride ourselves upon our "open minds" and however well we can discuss contrasting views, we are literally *confined* by our own intellectual fixation. Thus those who have "decided" upon a belief no longer have the true quality of art in their lives, because they are no longer concerned with creation.

Following this line, I felt I finally understood better what the positivists and the existentialists have been getting at. Whenever we begin to discuss "the human situation" with spoken or unspoken intent to apply preconceived opinions, we are *not* truly open to all that can be gained from our daily encounters. And this is why, perhaps, when we want to *really* discuss, we are apt to avoid both the priest and the academic philosopher; we prefer, as conversationalist, someone who belongs in the category of "artist."

Eastern religion, as you have often suggested in MANAS, contains a wealth of profound "core" ideas; this, as a matter of fact, has been pretty well demonstrated by the latest developments in psychotherapy in the West. But it seems to me that the prejudice of Westerners against Eastern religion is not so much against the fundamental philosophical propositions in these ideas; it is directed, rather, against the "revelatory" mood and stylized form in which they become known to the West. I would therefore venture the thought that it is not the fundamental proposals of any religion which exasperate the man who wishes to think for himself, but rather their entrenchment in habits of belief. The founder of a great religion is an artist because he creates. Plato is read today because he, notwithstanding what he had to say about certain of the poets, was an artist, too.

The artist brings us close to experience by affording us the feeling of direct participation. This formal philosophy does not do. If philosophy is to live, it must be lived by those who love life, who appreciate beauty, and who find sterile

intellectuality without attraction. So, it seems to me that all philosophical and religious systems should be evaluated "from the standpoint of art," which means the standpoint of its blending with our instincts and intuitions—all that flowing to us both from the "natural world" and from the depths of our own being.

Since MANAS has so often quoted *The Human Situation*, one more passage can do no harm. Here Dixon describes why, in his opinion, we need to view all philosophers from the standpoint of art:

> The peculiar place of the arts in human esteem, if we understood aright the reasons for it, should throw light on many dark matters, even the most obscure. All arts are music in its Greek and widest sense, the ordered and shapely, the measured, the flowing, the melodious. They ate a rhythmical sisterhood. And we are not deceived if we regard each as a species of divination, and the artist as a man feeling his way into reality, attempting, in his own medium and manner, to fathom the inner significance of life's experiences, to penetrate its secret depths, to see things in a wider perspective. In the presence of Turner's or Tintoretto's pictures Ruskin felt as a man might feel in the presence of some supernatural being.
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> Pause for a moment and consider what it is we in truth desire, of what we are in search. Nothing else, surely, than a reconciliation between ourselves and the world to which we belong, that is—may we not say?—attunement or concord between Being and Becoming, which if attainable were pure felicity, a reconciliation or harmony which human wisdom and experience fail in the world they so anxiously contemplate either to perceive or to effect. Yet since in the arts they are in a manner found together, in essence one, for this reason human nature derives from the arts its deepest satisfactions. Poetry appears to be something we have always known in our hearts, but have never before had so vividly presented to us. In these arts of divination the waking consults the dreaming mind; the surface consciousness, in search of more favourable omens, enquires of the oracle, of the better informed and wiser soul. And the inspired priestess by whom the world is seen in the wider perspective answers, "Your experience is real, but consult the god within you and know that this is not the whole of reality."
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> The happiness the arts provide is the happiness of life more truly divined, more fully understood. Face to face with the stupendous fact of existence, our sense of it quickened, we are startled into a recognition of its unsearchable depths and unfathomable significance.

The philosopher who is not in some degree an "artist," in the sense discussed, tends to forget that full human striving always includes a quest for beauty and a search for adventure. Formal thought, and the defense of this or the other "position," leads one perilously close to the mood of theology, a mood characterized by grimness of visage and arbitrariness of thought. The philosopher worthy of attention is one who, like the "poet," invites the mind to visit undiscovered country. Philosophy can appear in either "radical" or "conservative" guise, but in either case its merit is not to be determined by reasoned argument alone; unless there is appeal to the "heart," unless spontaneous wonderings grow from its acquaintance, we have but another "tale told by fools, signifying nothing."

All of which gets around to the point I first thought of making—that what Prof. Ducasse says needs to be supplemented by recognition that philosophy must declare and affirm. Evaluation and criticism are, in my opinion, but half of its ideal function.