

## THREE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY

IN keeping with the modern mood of self-consciousness, contemporary writing on political problems is increasingly a fresh examination of first principles and an evaluation of their present-day practice. A particularly useful example of this kind of thinking is found in the latest *Autonomous Groups Bulletin* (Winter, 1955-56), in two articles, one, "Are Autonomous Groups Democratic?", by the editor, Maria Rogers, the other, "The Two Democratic Traditions," an abridgement of a paper by Dr. George Sabine.

The pertinence of such discussions is fairly obvious. "Autonomous Groups" are groups which come into being more or less spontaneously, to pursue ends which the members hold in common. They may be educational, recreational, or socially-based activities, involving purposes which make them worthy of scientific study. The *Bulletin* is issued by an informal association of "laymen, social scientists, and community educators" which itself qualifies as an "autonomous group," whose members believe that "the growing evidence of social disintegration requires critical examination of the role of such groups in modern society."

Introducing Dr. Sabine's paper, Mrs. Rogers writes: "Democracy is one of those slippery words which has been made to mean all things to all men. It is a term which anyone interested in precision is fearful of using." The Sabine paper goes far to remove the ambiguity of the term, and those readers who share a sense of the importance of clear definitions will probably wish to write to the *Bulletin* (1004 Hotel Ambassador, New York 22) for a copy of this issue. Dr. Sabine begins by tracing two lines of influence in democratic tradition. The first derives from John Locke and the English or Puritan Revolution. Boiled down to its essence, this revolt was in behalf of the

freedom of religious minorities to pursue their interests in peace. As Sabine puts it:

What the English Revolution contributed to the democratic tradition was the principle of freedom for minorities, together with a constitutional system both to protect and to regulate that freedom. For the individual it meant freedom of association in accord with his own understanding of his own interests, and for the group it meant freedom to decide for itself its own manner of life within a framework of legally supported and legally limited rights and duties consonant at once with public order and a considerable, but not an unlimited, competence for self-determination.

The other democratic tradition, stemming principally from Rousseau and the French Revolution, is that of Equality. A chief grievance of French revolutionaries against the Bourbon regime was the endless hierarchy of special privileges accorded to status: "French society was a maze of corporate bodies that were at once legal, vocational, and political and that were endowed with privileges and monopolies and duties. Whatever rights a Frenchman possessed he had as a member of one or more such groups; his rights were privileges in the etymological sense of the word, that is, private laws. In French politics there were hundreds of liberties, corresponding to the hundreds of positions or ranks or stations, but there was no liberty conceived as the civic or political attribute of men as citizens." A French patriot and revolutionary declared: "Happy is the land where there is no form of association but the state, no collective body but the country, no interest but the general good!" The contribution of the French Revolution conformed to this ideal:

The French Revolution, devoted to the ideal of equal citizenship within the single unity of the state, assumed that communities within the state are potentially a threat to the state. So far as it could it abolished religious communities not only Catholic but

Jewish, in the latter case often against the will of Jews who preferred their old corporate status to the new equality. Indeed it sought to spread the principle of radical individualism right across the social structure. It abolished the corporate character of schools, hospitals, charitable foundations, the universities, and the learned academies. It nationalized perhaps a fifth of the land in the country but only for the purpose of transforming it to individual owners.

If we were to pause, here, it would be to point out the ease with which a society organized in these terms—with only the state and its citizens, without intermediate social structures—may fall into absolutism, as soon happened, in the case of France, with the rise of Napoleon. More fundamental, however, at this point, seems inquiry into the implications of the views of both the English and the French revolutionary thinkers. Sabine deals first with the English attitude, giving a summary of the philosophy of John Locke:

In the first place [according to Locke], religion is not a matter that directly concerns either the theory or the practice of a political society; what needs to be said about it can be summed up in the single word "toleration." This was indeed a summary disposition of a question that had been bitterly controversial; it accepted as a foregone conclusion a degree of secularism in politics that as a rule neither the Puritans nor their opponents had been able to imagine.

In the second place, men and women, in so far as a political theory needs to consider their nature, are socially and morally adult, in short, reasonable. They acknowledge, and in general they practice, rules of fair dealing, justice, and right in their relations with one another. The validity of these moral rules may therefore be taken for granted; the "law" in this broad sense would be binding even if there were no governments. The state itself, considered as different from society, makes no moral rules at all but only supplements them when impartial judgment and enforcement are needed to give them effect. Its field of operation is limited, and government is in a sense a superficial thing in comparison with the society of which it is, so to speak, the coercive arm. A government may become tyrannous and its subjects may need to rebel against it, to replace it, and to create a new government consonant with their interests, but a society is never dissolved short of complete chaos. Society provides an underlying

moral structure that states support but do not create. For this reason they ought to act only by known rules of law and within limits set by constitutional guaranties. The justification for coercion, when it becomes necessary, is that it supports a moral and social order that is not coercive...

In the third place, Locke assumed as a matter of course that society, just as it should permit many churches, will harbor a maze of private relationships and permit a multitude of groups and associations that pursue their own interests and mostly make their own rules, subject only to such control by the state as is needed to protect the public interest and to preserve the inherent social purpose of the group itself.

Here, plainly enough, is the source of the idea that rights not relinquished through the social contract remain the *unalienable* rights of the individual. These rights are inherent, not conferred. Nor can anyone be deprived of them save through the implied consent of participating as a citizen in a government to which he delegates the corresponding powers. The right of association is prominent among the rights reserved to individuals by the English Revolution.

Dr. Sabine now turns to the French tradition, offering a free paraphrase of the thought of Rousseau (pointing out, however, that while Locke soberly recorded his reflections a generation after the radical phase of the English Revolution, Rousseau wrote as a messianic prophet a generation *before* the French Revolution):

First, the human individual apart from the state is not at all the adult and reasonable being that Locke had taken him to be. Natively he is a non-rational and non-moral animal guided in his behavior solely by instinct, and his instincts are directed toward his own self-preservation. He achieves morality and reason, and therefore freedom, only when he becomes a citizen, for only then "the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and the right of appetite." The rights of man, therefore, are his rights as a citizen, and until he is a citizen he is not a social or a moral being at all.

Second, it follows that the claims which the state can make upon its citizens and the area in which it can rightfully act are by no means limited, as Locke had regarded them.

In Rousseau the state and society, which Locke had definitely but inadequately distinguished, are merged; the state overlaps and includes every phase of society. To the state the citizen surrenders totally his private rights and interests. His personal will, when properly understood, is identical with the General Will of the society, and this Will is identical with morality, is infallibly right, and quite exhausts the citizen's will when he has contributed to forming a consensus. If he imagines his interest to be otherwise, he is mistaken, and if he is coerced, he is "forced to be free."

Third, a private association of citizens, merely because it is private, is inimical to the public interest. Deliberation about the public good would always reach the right conclusion if it could be conducted in such a way that "the citizens had no communication with one another." A party is a faction and faction defeats the common good. Corporate bodies, as Hobbes had said, are like "worms in the entrails of a private man." Ideally they ought not to exist and if they exist they must be weak. For every association absorbs the citizen's loyalty, which ought to be directed solely toward the state; a democratic society should be one in which absolutely nothing stands between man and the state.

The close affinities between the present-day practice of communism and the theories of Rousseau in their estimate of the individual—their reduction of him to an atomistic existence within the State—are plain enough, here. In Rousseau's behalf, it should be noted that he did not have all France or all Europe in mind when he wrote the *Social Contract*, but only the small city of Geneva; nevertheless, the notion of the General Will, with its overtones of infallibility, has been responsible for endless apologetics for totalitarian oppression and fury.

Here, then, are the two great principles of Democracy—Liberty and Equality. The American tradition has been chiefly an expression of the Lockean view, although liberty, in the United States, has been both tempered and debased by the idea of equality. Liberty has been tempered by the regulation of the activities of private groups to prevent their interference with the equal rights and freedom of others; it has been debased by an indiscriminately "levelling" tendency which in

education and in other spheres of the common life has worked against human distinction and individual excellence.

A present instance of the friction which may develop between these two views of the democratic way of life is found in the recent reaction to the first Report of the Fund for the Republic, submitted by Robert M. Hutchins, the Director of the Fund. As reported here a few weeks ago, one of the activities of the Fund was to sponsor publication of Yarmolinsky's *Case Studies in Personnel Security*, in which the proceedings of loyalty investigations of fifty civilian employees of the government were described without comment. Since the Fund is directed by its charter "to advance understanding of civil liberties," and since the examination and possibly the discharge of civilian employees of the government could very easily involve a violation of the civil liberties of these individuals, publication of such a work is an eminently proper pursuit for an organization like the Fund for the Republic. The organization headed by Mr. Hutchins is obviously an association which fulfills the expectations and provisions of John Locke. It has, moreover, the distinctive merit of performing a public service by informing the citizens of this country concerning the activities of their government in relation to the fundamental rights secured by the Constitution.

Since the appearance of the Yarmolinsky study of government practice in personnel security, and publication of the Fund for the Republic's Report, however, with something more than ordinary irony, three sources of "conservative," if not "pseudo-conservative," opinion have lashed out in criticism of the Fund. David Lawrence, editor of *U.S. News and World Report*, charged the Fund with conducting "a one-sided campaign to discredit the Government's investigation of Communists and security risks," saying that the Report "reveals a marked tendency to disparage the government security program." Fulton Lewis, Jr. is making like comments on the

radio and the National Commander of the American Legion, Seaborn Collins, declared that the Fund "is threatening and may succeed in crippling the national security." Fortunately, we still have a free press, so that interested citizens may read for themselves the account of the Fund's activities and projects in Mr. Hutchins' report, and also take notice of what is happening to the victims of anonymous accusers in Washington.

The point, here, of course, is that the stalwart "defenders" of the American Way are in this case advocates of the Jean Jacques Rousseau line of the infallibility of the State—becoming, thereby, the ideological companions of Lenin and Stalin!

Turning, now, to the occasion for the appearance of Dr. Sabine's analysis in the *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*: readers, apparently, had been writing in to ask, "But are autonomous groups *democratic*?" The answer is no, according to Rousseau, but very much so, according to John Locke. Mrs. Rogers observes:

The dynamism of democracy is inherent in, and a consequence of, the guarantee of freedom of association, with its correlative phenomenon of multitudinous self-governing groups with an almost infinite variety of purposes and motives. In the light of this analysis, it becomes legitimate to draw the conclusion that freedom of association is the cornerstone, or keystone, of modern democracy. One may even go so far as to infer that it is the basic freedom upon which democracy is built. . . .

Dr. Sabine shows that equalitarianism—equal citizenship, equality of income, equality of opportunity, equality before the law—is secondary in importance to freedom of association as a criterion of democracy. . . . Denied freedom of association, humanity is leveled down to a mass and crowded into a structureless organization that is merely gregarious. This has the effect of isolating individuals and thus rendering them powerless to think clearly and to make responsible judgments on public affairs. The end result is that the government becomes all-powerful and tyrannical.

But . . . although equality may be subordinate to freedom of association as a criterion of democracy, it is nevertheless an indispensable element in democracy. When equality is harnessed to freedom of

association, however uneasy the relationship and however productive of friction and tension, the result is modern dynamic democracy, in which each individual is challenged to become a spontaneous, active, and contributing member of a social community. This seems to be the ideal towards which the West has been, and now is, striving. . . .

Concerning the presumed "undemocratic" character of autonomous groups, Mrs. Rogers has this to say:

The fact that their memberships are selective, even exclusive, does not make them undemocratic, since each individual enjoys an equal right to choose certain persons for associates and to exclude or reject others. But when we leave the realm of theory and turn to everyday practice, it is a matter of common observation that many individuals feel frustrated and embittered by being left out of groups to which they yearn to belong, to which they feel entitled to belong when living under a democratic system based on equality as well as freedom of association. What answer can be given to them if they feel discriminated against, deprived of equality, or under-privileged? The only answer is a frank acknowledgement of the truth . . . that there is a fundamental tension between freedom of association and equalitarianism which can be resolved only by patient processes of conciliation, compromise, consultation, and negotiation.

The important point, here, seems to be that voluntary associations must be distinguished from the basic political association provided for by government. Equality before the law is a principle on which there can be no compromise, and the recent and belated action of the Supreme Court to end segregation in the public schools of the United States was a fulfillment of that principle. The role of government is regulatory and coercive, and a democratic government can not, therefore, discriminate between human beings. Voluntary associations are an entirely different matter, for which the application of "equality" becomes a moral issue, or merely a practical one. A society of learned mathematicians could hardly admit to their company a youth with no knowledge of the disciplines which unite them in a common interest, simply because he asserted himself to be "equal" to them as human beings. On the other hand, the discrimination of, say, college fraternities against

Negroes or Jews is of an entirely different character. While this practice may be quite "legal," it is morally indefensible. There is this, however, to be said. The mature individual will never seek an association in which he is not wanted for reasons of prejudice or snobbery. Why should he waste his time in such gatherings? The man who longs to belong to some kind of social "caste" or "grouping" which has anti-equalitarian reasons for excluding him is in a very poor position to claim a "democratic" right to belong to it—since the practice of the group is undemocratic and unworthy of the membership of a man who believes in democracy. He may, on the other hand, be seeking to break down the custom of discrimination, and by insisting on his right to join, hope to change the character of the group. If, for example, a private body has gained sufficient prestige with the government to have gained a virtual monopoly over the exercise of certain activities which would normally be "free," then the body is no longer a truly voluntary association, but a semi-official group, and should be obliged by law to observe the equalitarian principle or rendered powerless to affect government decisions. The American Medical Association is a case in point, which controls the appointment of doctors in the United States Navy. Without AMA approval, a man with a medical degree cannot practice his profession in the Navy. The AMA, to vary the illustration, can also render a hospital impotent to serve its community if the local AMA branch should disapprove its policy, such as a willingness to allow an osteopath to use the hospital's facilities. Through the power exercised over its members, the AMA can cause a walk-out of the doctors of the hospital, until the hospital administrators agree to conform.

The moral of all this obliges us to complete the great trinity of revolutionary watch-words—Liberty, Equality, and *Fraternity*. Or, as Mrs. Rogers says:

To attempt to resolve all such tensions by resort to the one principle, equalitarianism, is to open the road to totalitarianism. To disregard such tensions is

to commit treason against the democratic ideal of a social and political system in which each individual is an active, spontaneous, contributing member of the community. Neither course is compatible with loyalty to democratic values. There is no way out of the dilemma but by the narrow road of constant effort, by groups and individuals, to play fair with one another, to show mutual consideration, to rely on free communication to ally or reduce conflict through mutual understanding and a meeting of minds. This is the hard self-discipline which democracy demands of its members.

## *REVIEW*

### EDUCATION FOR PEACE

THAT no nation—not even its business community—profits from modern war has been a clearly established fact ever since Norman Angell published his *Great Illusion* in 1910. We say "Clearly established," but we ought to say, "factually and logically established," since the kind of analysis Norman Angell presented in this book is never widely publicized so long as those who take responsibility for maintaining psychological preparedness for war among the populations of the world control the channels of mass communication. Today, of course, not even the blindest jingoists imagine that economic progress can come from war, but thorough analysis of the issues of war is prevented by two other factors—the *fear* of war, which encourages preparation for mutual destruction among the nations, and the fact that the domestic economies of all the great nations are now very largely supported by enormous production for war purposes.

Since the reconversion of a nation's industry to genuine peacetime production schedules would be mostly a problem for technical ingenuity to solve and since there is no lack of technical ingenuity in the modern world—the problem of war comes to a focus on the matter of *fear*. Elimination of fear, for obvious reasons, will be gradual and must be international.

A program to eliminate fear, again, will have two fronts. First, it must seek reduction of the things we do which have the effect of inspiring fear in others. Second, it will try to get behind the manifestations of belligerence produced in other, potentially "enemy," nations by the fears of their own, and to expose the real feelings and longing for peace among the people of those nations. It is surely evident that no other program can ever produce peace.

Individuals and groups, of course, have been working along these lines for many years. There are the pacifists and the humanitarians who, if not

pacifist, work genuinely for just and conciliatory policies calculated to reduce international tensions. What is perhaps not realized is that so-called "hard-headed" businessmen are sometimes found in the latter group. While businessmen may be as responsible as any for the maintenance of an economy based upon government contracts for armament and military supplies, there is hardly a businessman in the world who believes that an all-out war would be desirable. When war comes, the business community undoubtedly tries to make the most of it, but while a choice still seems to remain, businessmen, as such, are often its strongest opponents. This has been true, in the United States, at least, ever since the Spanish-American War at the turn of the century.

It is true today. Some months ago, Ernest T. Weir, chairman of the board of the National Steel Corporation, addressed the members of the Cleveland Engineering Society on the subject, "Which Future—War or Peace?" After reporting his observation that Western Europe is experiencing a cycle of general prosperity, promising plenty of business for the steel industry, he remarked that the recovery of Europe has brought a new spirit of independence to her peoples, together with a demand for greater voice in international decision. He then underlined the chief difference of opinion between the European countries and the United States. Europeans are convinced that there can be peace with Russia without war, while, until recently, there has been little evidence of this view in America. Mr. Weir told the Cleveland engineers:

Make no mistake about it. There is nothing of appeasement in Europe's position. The people there are every bit as firmly dedicated to the principles of individual freedom . . . and every bit as strongly determined to preserve the free way of life . . . as the loudest and most frantic champions of the "get tough" policy in the United States. It is just that they think there is a better way to do it than to blow Russia and China off the map... and ourselves in the process. . . .

Europe believes that peace is possible and is convinced that the people of Communist countries are just as strongly opposed to war as the people in the

Western World. And because of that, Western Europe believes that a way can be worked out to live with Russia and China on a basis of peace. Now there, of course, is where the rub comes in. This is where Europe differs so sharply from those who argue for a "tough" policy in the United States. But this is what Europe believes and this is the line that Europe is going to follow.

I place this emphasis on Western European policy for two reasons. First, in and of itself, it is something that the United States must take into account. Second, it raises the question of whether a similar policy is not also the right one for the United States. For my part, I definitely believe it is. . .

Mr. Weir gives as his principal justification for advocating this policy the fact that war with atomic weapons would leave the victor—if there could be a victor—"presiding over a world that had been reduced to a heap of cinders." If distrust and expectation of war continues, there is always the danger of an "incident" precipitating a major war. He adds:

As Bertrand Russell put it recently, the only real choice that the people of the world have today is this choice: To *live* together or to *die* together. The fact is that war has moved to such levels of destructive power that it has lost whatever excuse it *ever* had as an instrument of international policy. Every nation knows this. I believe that it would have a most salutary effect if the principal nations acknowledged it. . . . They know not only that what we now call *conventional* war is outmoded, but that war, itself, is now removed beyond the bounds of sanity. They know that they have only one recourse and that is—whatever their differences, they must settle them by the methods of peace. This being true, why should they not openly admit it—and openly renounce war?

To those who argue, "But you can't trust Russia," Mr. Weir replies:

Remember what our ultimate choice is—to *live* together or to *die* together. Those who follow the "You can't trust Russia" line are casting their vote for dying together. Their arguments all boil down to continuance of hostility and suspicion . . . of the warlike posture that surely will lead eventually to *actual* war.

Now, we must realize that to a large degree the basis for this position is the thought that Communism can be eliminated from the world. The fact is that

war—the rejection of peaceful coexistence as the only other alternative—would *not* eliminate Communism. Communism is an idea. In all history, ideas have *never* been changed or driven from the minds of men by force. Force has simply served to strengthen and spread ideas.

Mr. Weir has no hope that the Russian people will arise to throw off the communist yoke. Many of them don't regard their form of government as a yoke. For the most part, Russians "believe that Capitalism is bound to fail, that inevitably it will be replaced by Communism through out the world, and that it should be." The specialists in foreign affairs that Mr. Weir talked to, however, are convinced that the Russians now think that this revolution can be peacefully accomplished. Christopher Mayhew, for one, a British MP, and former Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, believes that the Russians "have come to the definite conclusion that forcible means up to and including war are an instrument of no value in promoting Communism." Mayhew and other European diplomats think that the cold war should be converted into peaceful competition between the different ideologies and systems of government, with restoration of all possible relations, including trade relations, between the communist and democratic countries.

Concerning this proposal, Weir observes:

In my mind, at least, there is not the slightest doubt as to the outcome of such a competition. I am so thoroughly convinced of the rightness of our basic principles and ideals that I believe they will prevail—not in a few years or decades, but certainly over the long pull. With a basis of competition from which the threat of war is removed, two forces of enormous power work on the side of enduring peace. *They are the passage of time and the operation of the universal longing for peace, security, and better conditions of life.*

Mr. Weir also points out that the Russian people openly express a longing for peace and fear of war even more pronounced than in the West, remarking that the Communist leaders, while possessed of autocratic authority, "know that if they go against widespread and deeply-held

desires of the people, they can also be *thrown* out of power by the revolution."

On the occasion of this address, to a gathering of engineers, Mr. Weir said in conclusion:

Very often in such talks to businessmen, I feel that it makes no impression at all . . . that it is water rolling off a duck's back. I certainly hope that will not be the case tonight. I cannot urge too strongly that this matter of a national policy for world peace is vital . . . literally a matter of life and death for all of us . . . and that each of you will leave this room tonight with the firm resolve that you personally are going to do something about it.

While considerably in advance of the business community as a whole, these ideas, presented by a man who heads a major steel company, give evidence of the kind of education for peace a leading industrialist is capable of offering to his contemporaries.

## *COMMENTARY* RECALL TO SANITY

SINCE many readers of MANAS will not have opportunity to read for themselves a copy of Adam Yarmolinsky's *Case Studies in Personnel Security* (see page 2), we call attention to an excellent review of this volume in the Aug. 20 issue of the *Saturday Review*. The writer is Charles P. Curtis, a well-known Boston attorney, whose book, *The Oppenheimer Case*, has just been published. The editors of *SR* introduce the review as "the cry of indignation that comes when a lawyer sees the skills of his profession perverted, its principles poisoned—and men and women hurt in the process." We hope that all MANAS readers will find the time to read what Mr. Curtis has to say.

The reviewer does not attack the members of the security boards. On the contrary, he finds the boards on the whole courteous, conscientious, and, while sometimes stupid, "usually aware that they are required to be stupid." The boards are saddled with requirements that give them little choice. They are obliged to assure themselves that they have no reasonable doubt that the reinstatement of the accused individual before them would be "clearly consistent" with national security. Mr. Curtis comments:

How can a man dispel another man's doubt when he doesn't even know what the doubt is, or who raised it, or why there is any doubt? . . . You are asked to turn an inquiry of the truth into a search for a doubt. . . . The inquiry goes beyond the inquisitorial into the confessional, and I can think of no worse confessional than a suspicious security-review board. But you will agree that such an inquiry cannot be just a trial of past facts and past conduct. It is an inquiry into a man's future conduct, and such an inquiry leads, with a terrible logic, into an inquiry of the whole man or the whole woman.

It is hard to say what is not logically relevant to such an inquiry. . . . What impressed me was the immediate and persistent assumption that all these employees were indeed disloyal or that they were security risks. Abruptly taken off their work, removed from their office or employment and

suspended without pay, they are told that they have a right to appeal to a review board for reinstatement. . . . The burden of proving their innocence is on them, and it is made the heavier by the Government's reluctance to make specific charges and by its refusal to confront the employee with the witnesses against him or even to tell him who they are. . . . It seems to me that this assumption of the guilt of the employee is the root of the evil in our security system.

The Yarmolinsky study of these procedures has shed the light of day on the methods pursued in security investigations, and, as Mr. Curtis observes, while there are some few things our public officials do best in secret, "passing judgment on their fellow citizens is not one of them."

## CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

IT IS our pleasure and privilege to reproduce here a short article prepared by the Department of Education of UNESCO. Under the title, "A Task for Free Minds," Mr. Baldoon Dhingra offers an excellent introduction to the attitudes and methods characteristic of UNESCO's steps toward the goal of *international* learning. "A Task for Free Minds" is one of a series of "UNESCO features" designed "to encourage the mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values." A further program is planned: "Unesco is convening a meeting of experts in May 1956. They will consider methods of improving textbooks and teaching materials in Western countries with a view to promoting a greater understanding of Asian cultures. Substantial reports on this subject have already been received from Austria, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Western Germany, while 21 Unesco Member States have agreed to carry out a study on the question. At a later date, perhaps in 1957, it is hoped to convene another meeting to study the treatment of Western cultures in the textbooks of Asian countries." Mr. Dhingra's article follows.

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### A TASK FOR FREE MINDS

In his excellent book *Ambassador Report*, Mr. Chester Bowles, former American Ambassador to India, records the following conversation with his son who, fresh from his Asian experiences, is about to join an American school:

"I'll make a bet," says Mr. Bowles, "that the world history which you will study begins in Egypt and Mesopotamia, moves on to Greece by way of Crete, takes you through Rome and finally ends with France and England."

"But that is not *world* history," argues his son, "that leaves out three-fourths of the world."

"Unfortunately," remarks Mr. Bowles, "I won the bet."

What Mr. Bowles says about the United States holds good for the countries of Europe. This view is amply borne out by the various reports Unesco has received. Western textbooks are still bounded by an exclusively European spirit or, in the words of a German report, by "occidentalism." "All doctrinal obstacles to an impartial and objective picture of non-Western peoples should be eliminated," continues the report. "In judging foreign civilizations, we tend to apply the same standards which we apply to our own and constantly find that, by those standards, our cultural achievements are superior to those of other peoples." And the writers conclude: "The ideal would be an historical picture treating the world as a whole."

To achieve this objective of giving children a balanced picture of the world "as a whole," a campaign has been started which aims at improving the teaching of Eastern culture in Western schools, and of Western culture in Eastern schools. The success of this campaign will depend to a large extent upon the close collaboration of Asian and European teachers. This, at present, is sadly lacking.

Yet, already, good geography teachers can do much to help children understand distant countries. They can show differences in conditions which affect the way people live and show the similarities too. It seems to me that the same method could also be applied in helping children to understand the history and culture, the problems and aspirations of other peoples.

Many teachers will argue that the child's mind is already sufficiently stuffed with matter. To present the culture of Asia adequately would mean endless labour, changing the curriculum, enlarging the syllabus, increasing the number of pages in textbooks. All this, they say, would only tire the child. This is fair criticism if the history and culture of different countries are considered as a series of isolated facts, and are not viewed in a general perspective. But the problem is insoluble if we think of education as the mere adding together of more and more separate facts.

It is possible, however, to present the peoples of other lands in a fascinating way which, far from

taxing the child, will help him to learn more about his own country and the world in general. We should show him that his own community is a world in miniature, and yet but an infinitesimal part of the great world. In so doing we must always consider the fundamental traits of culture: the character and characteristics of other peoples, for it is essential to find out where the differences lie, before arriving at understanding.

This is where the difficulty arises, for people tend to think that an unbridgeable gulf separates East and West. Our thinking has been based on comparisons, so we create for ourselves artificial contrasts which we conceive as eternally fixed and static. We distinguish youth and age, heat and cold, light and darkness, although we know that they are not absolute opposites at all, but artificially fixed concepts that gradually shade off into each other. The only way of coming to terms with an opposing point of view is to look for a unifying principle, by learning to regard contrasts as deviations from an ideal middle point, and remembering that, without unity there can be no opposites. One can only measure two things by reference to a third one, which is the unity behind them.

If we consider the people of Cologne and Munich as opposites, we may end by regarding them as two entirely different sorts of beings, who can never see eye to eye; but if we consider them both as Germans—which is the higher unity in this case—and contrast them with the Indians, the similarity between the Germans will suddenly appear very great, the differences very small. Again the difference between Indians and Germans, which seems great from one point of view, diminishes when one considers them both as human beings.

It is true that there are important differences between cultures, and especially between "Eastern" and "Western" cultures. But men need not be bound by these differences. Gandhi used to say: "I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be swept off by any."

How can a synthesis be effected? By an intellectual universalism that transcends all narrow

perspectives, breaks through all frontiers of the mind, all "isms." When this point is reached, the terms Eastern and Western become irrelevant. This then is a task for men who act simply as truth-seekers, who join truth to truth, regardless of where these truths were first propounded, regardless of name or label.

The real synthesis should be achieved in man, in whom intellect and experience, knowledge and intuition, certitude and dreams, should be equally balanced. Synthesis means, a joining of theory to theory, truth to truth. We must learn to assimilate differences. The work of synthesis cannot be performed by imprisoned minds. It is the task of free minds to step out of a school of thought, a creed, into the universe.

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Mr. Dhingra's article is based on a lecture delivered at a conference of German teachers and educators which met at Cologne, in June, 1955. With such efforts at arousing the will to intercultural understanding being carried on by UNESCO, it seems the duty of all liberal publications to acquaint their readers with the significance of this work—especially since UNESCO continues to be "under fire" from reactionary groups.

## *FRONTIERS*

### More on "Genocidal Preparedness"

AFTER rereading Waldo Frank's "Toward a New Radicalism" in the *Nation* (Sept. 3), we are more than ever convinced that this piece of writing, while it will reach a much wider public than Dwight Macdonald's *The Root is Man*, offers the same essential reference-points for analyzing current attitudes and issues. By way of discouraging contrast to the valuable psychological penetrations of Frank's discussion, we also note a series of advertisements accompanying a current meeting of the American Rocket Society in Los Angeles. Quite clearly, the application of Frank's criteria to the opportunities for gainful employment in armament construction could play havoc with "National Defense" as popularly conceived—an eventuality that would, however, disturb us not at all, nor, we suspect, Mr. Frank. Three of the largest "new frontier" corporations of the United States are advertising in the local newspapers to invite "engineers and physicists possessing unusual ability" to enter the exciting field of guided-missile development. As the Missile Systems Division of Lockheed puts it, "the technology of guided missiles is literally a new domain. No field of science today offers greater scope for creative achievement." Westinghouse Electric takes bigger space to lure technicians eastward. Electronic engineers are addressed with the question: "Tired of the heat and smog?" Candidates for an idyllic life are told:

The pleasant Chesapeake Bay country of Maryland is the home of Westinghouse Baltimore Divisions. Engineers are needed to fill positions of unlimited creative opportunity. . . working on advanced design and development projects in the fields of communication, radar, fire-control and missile guidance. Apply by letter for prompt and confidential interview.

Enjoy ideal geographic location . . . in beautiful Chesapeake Bay country, only 38 miles from Washington, D.C. and 198 miles from New York City.

Interesting creative work in modern facilities, currently expanding for the future. Top income and opportunity for advancement.

Advanced education at company expense at the Johns Hopkins University or the University of Maryland.

Sperry-Farragut Company is in there pitching with comparable inducements—and by ironical twist as well as apparent design to appeal to "red-blooded

Americans," all three advertisements appear in the sports section of the Los Angeles *Times* (Sept. 18)! These glowing inducements to American engineers may make extremely unsettling and annoying reading for nearly every other country in the world. They reveal the very attitudes which inspired Mr. Frank's invitation to war-resistance "radicalism." Above all, the need is for each individual to take the responsibility of relating his own actions, and his own livelihood, to the international continuum. Many young men who work or will work for Lockheed, Sperry-Farragut, or Westinghouse may have a capacity for searching thinking, but little or no encouragement. The unquestioned assumption behind the appeal of these high-toned "help-wanted" ads is that it is "good" to play a part in making the United States the most impressively armed nation, and it is precisely at this point that Mr. Frank's remarks are most pertinent. A passage not quoted in last week's review of "Toward a New Radicalism" reads:

There must be an end of our "ptolemaic" nationalism. By this term I mean the emotional behavior of every state as if it were the universe's center; as if all nations revolved around it; and as if its one absolute duty were to survive. America acts from this premise—and Russia and China—and Paraguay and Sweden, although of course none of them admit it. Its equivalent is the egocentricity, the egomania, of the child. At least in theory, individual man has outgrown it. It is axiomatic in every culture that a man risk his life, even give it up, when certain values demand it. One who is not prepared for this we call craven and despise. We say bluntly that "life at any price" is as foul a principle for a people as for a person. With our genocidal preparations we are committing a crime that no caution and no crime by another, can condone.

More and more writers are beginning to grasp the issues so well explored by Dwight Macdonald in "The Responsibility of Peoples," an analysis of German war guilt published at the time when everyone was discussing "German war-crimes." What Mr. Frank and the editors of the *Nation* now see is that it is the blind acceptance of nationalist premises, far more than the machinations of any select group of "international gangsters," that may induce a nation to genocide.

The modern world, meanwhile, has passed beyond any possibility of assessing good and evil in theological terms, for the bright young man who rises to fortune by way of guided missile development may possibly attend

church every Sunday, even be kind to his mother-in-law. And if an "expert," he may know what he is doing so well that he will not know what he is doing at all. For his benefit, we should like to see paragraphs from "Toward a New Radicalism," printed in opposing columns to all such advertisements as those we have quoted from the *Los Angeles Times*. If "Education" is to save the world, as our teachers and intellectuals proclaim, it will only do so when issues of this nature are made strikingly clear.

Such education, should begin in the secondary schools. The conversion of the facilities of our great universities to research for war preparation is a threat that can be combatted in no other way. The major issue is now the question of personal responsibility, the only real point from which both "good" and "evil" can be touched, anyway. People are intellectually passive because they have become disclaimers of responsibility for the condition of the world and the condition of their own psyches. Disclaimers of responsibility naturally seek escape, because man is a being who knows he *ought* to consider himself responsible—sensing that he really is, in fact.

That there are stirrings of uneasy awareness among some of those who play a professional role in "genocidal preparedness," seems clearly reflected in the pages of armed service novels written during the past ten years. A current example in the "pocket book" line yields the following passages in which *Port of Call's* most admirable character, Lt. Prather, trades ideas with a companion, Nethercutt—a man with a strictly navy-issue mind:

"Maybe this life is getting me down," he said wearily. "Sometimes I get to wondering what it's all about. Here we are floating around in the big middle of nowhere, doing nothing and not going to do anything. Even if we head for the Pacific and start blasting people, it won't accomplish anything. Not really. Don't you ever get the feeling that it's all a waste of effort? This ship, I mean, and everything it stands for."

Nethercutt never did. "No, I don't," he said positively. "It may sound corny, but I think I'm doing a real job for the world by doing just what I'm doing. The way I see it, we've got to have carriers and there's got to be men to run 'em, and we're it. We're helping to keep the peace," he added a bit self-consciously.

"You're dreaming!" Prather snorted. "Keeping the peace! Holy—! Tell me something. If there are two big

dogs sparring around a bone, what's going to keep them apart? Nothing! They're going to fight sooner or later—they may be scared to death, but they'll have it out—'cause they're never sure which one will get the bone until they have a go at it and learn the hard way. That's the way it is with us—a war's inevitable."

"You've sure got some screwy ideas, Prat," Nethercutt accused. "Besides, there's no use in getting worked up about a war. There's either going to be one or there isn't, and our worrying won't change it one way or the other."

"I'm not *worried*. Not exactly. I think I'm more irritated than anything else. Just plain irritated because my life has to be loused up by a mess that I had nothing to do with. It's stupid, and if you let yourself get completely wrapped up in it, then you are stupid too. And with my pretty brass buttons how much more involved can I get?"

"Ah, Prat, you've got the wrong slant. Cripes, you've got to believe you're doing something worth while in life or you'll never be able to live with yourself. There's got to be a navy and somehow you've been picked to be a part of it, and there's no point in wondering why or who or what for. That's the way it is—period."

This was Nethercutt's peroration on the subject, and he delivered it with a self-satisfaction akin to that of a Christian who, while arguing religion with a heathen, pretends toleration of the other's views, yet who, if bested in the argument, simply states that he *knows* his viewpoint is the correct one and justifies dogmatism as the persuasions of faith.

"You're always talking as though you dislike the navy so much," he challenged. "Just what would you do if you could live the—let's say—the full, satisfying life?"

"I don't know really. Build a house, invent a new toothpick—anything would do, I guess—but it seems that a man's life ought to be more than just waiting for something to happen. He ought to make something, something constructive that he can leave behind him and that never would have existed if he had never lived." A note of wonder crept into Prather's voice, as though, without trying, he had stumbled upon an important discovery about himself.