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STUDY OF THE MIND

THE human mind can be regarded from at least three points of view. First of all, it is a power, or has distinctive powers of its own. Some of the distinctive powers of the mind, at any rate, are being investigated by researchers such as those active at the Parapsychological Laboratory at Duke University and at other centers of learning. Even if a person does not care for speaking of the mind as a "power," he will still have to give *some* name to whatever is behind the phenomena of thought, whether normal or paranormal, and if it be admitted that the mind is very elusive of definition, this term will do as well as any other while we pursue its meaning.

Then the mind can be thought of as an *organ.* If minds can become ill or disturbed in function, there is surely some kind of structure or form of process which experiences disturbance. When the mind is healed, it is restored to normal function. It is the work of the psychotherapist to study the ills of the mind and to attempt to give some account of the behavior of the mind in normal function.

Finally, the mind is also closely connected with identity. We think about ourselves in virtue of having minds. The search for truth employs the mind and is, some say, frustrated by the presence of the mind during the processes of the search. Accordingly, the search for truth inevitably becomes a quest for what some philosophers have termed "self-knowledge"—an expression which is difficult to do without, even though it has suffered considerably at the hands of those who delight in slogans with a religious flavor.

Of these three approaches to the mind, the first two enjoy established disciplines and are accorded growing respect by the civilized world. Parapsychology, or the study of the non-physical aspect of mental phenomena, is a fascinating field, rich in philosophical implications. From it, doubtless, in the course of years, we may expect the birth of various new philosophies, moving from the assumptions it provides concerning the nature of man. Of equal interest is the measure of vindication parapsychology may afford for ancient philosophies. In any event, we may be fairly sure that the future of man is sure to be greatly invigorated by the findings of parapsychology. Psychotherapy is a converging line of investigation. Like the academic study of parapsychology, the clinical work of psychotherapy has philosophical consequences. To heal the mind—which is to say, virtually, the man, as distinguished from his body—is of necessity to give attention to the full possibilities of mental health. And dull indeed is the psychotherapist unable to see the close connection between what a man thinks of himself—his *philosophy*—and his mental health. So psychotherapists, like parapsychologists, are compelled to think about the nature of man. The practical issue of their respective sciences may well depend upon such thoughts.

But these fields are, after all, fields of "objective" study. They involve the scientific method—to which more or less of "art" may be added, it is true, but they are fundamentally sciences. What then of *our* minds—not the "minds" studied by these researchers, but the minds we have and use every day?

This is a frightening question. It leaves us with no authorities to refer to or quote. On this third approach to the mind, the every-man-for-himself approach, a brief monograph issued by the American Academy of Asian Studies (2030 Broadway, San Francisco 15, Calif.), is remarkably helpful. It is *The Way of Liberation in Zen Buddhism* ($1.00) and is by Alan Watts, who has written extensively on Zen and other mystical subjects. There is one great difference, however, between this Eastern approach to the mind and the more familiar Western studies. Zen assumes the transcendental interests and conceptions of Upanishadic and Buddhist thought. To find its method helpful, it is practically necessary to feel some measure of philosophic commitment, for

Zen endeavors to supply clarity for those pursuing such commitment.

Briefly, Zen, according to Mr. Watts, endeavors to bring its practitioners to understanding of the mind by exhibiting the unsatisfactoriness of intellectual answers to ultimate philosophical questions. Verbal answers do not answer. Having demonstrated this, Watts writes:

> If all these answers are not particularly helpful, this is only to say that the human situation is one for which there is no help. Every remedy for suffering is like changing one's position on a hard bed, and every advance in the control of our environment makes the environment harder to control. Nevertheless, all this mental circulation does at least seem to produce two rather definite conclusions. The first is that if we do not try to help ourselves, we shall never realize how helpless we are. Only by ceaseless questioning can we begin to realize the limits, and thus the very form, of the human mind. The second is that when we do at last realize the depths of our helplessness, we are at peace. . . .

This may sound like quietism or defeatism, but Mr. Watts' point is something very different. He is really discussing the impossibility of making the mind do what it cannot, in the nature of things, do. He continues:

> Zen . . . is trying to communicate a vivid realization of the vicious circularity, the helplessness, and the plain impossibility of the human situation, of that desire which is precisely conflict, that desire which is our core, our very will-to-live. This would be . . . pure self-frustration, were it not for a very curious and seemingly paradoxical consequence. When it is clear beyond all doubt that the itch cannot be scratched, it stops itching by itself. When it is realized that our basic desire is a vicious circle, it stops circling of its own accord. But this happens only when it has become clear and certain that there is no way of *making* it stop. . . . The whole concept of self-control has been misconstrued, since it is impossible to *make* oneself relax, or *make* oneself do anything, as to open one's mouth by the exclusively mental act of willing it to open.

While this latter point may seem obscure, the paragraph as a whole throws a light on the Buddha's basic contention regarding "desire." His was not merely a moralistic analysis; it was fundamentally a philosophical analysis, indicating that the man who is ruled by desire fails to know himself as a being who is essentially beyond the temporal order of transient drives and motives. Ultimate achievements—and these are the business of man—do not come from non-ultimate strivings, however furious or "conscientious." Thus:

> . . . it is fundamental to Zen that a person who is trying to improve himself, to become something more than he is, is incapable of creative action. In the words of Rinzai, "If you seek deliberately to become a Buddha, your Buddha is just *Samsara* [illusion]." Or again, "If a person seeks the Tao, that person loses the Tao." The reason is simply that the attempt to improve or act upon oneself is a way of locking action in a vicious circle, like trying to bite one's own teeth. Release from this ridiculous predicament is achieved, at the very beginning of Zen discipline, by understanding that "you yourself as you are, are the Buddha." For the object of Zen is not so much to become a Buddha as to act like one. Therefore no progress can be made in the life of a *Bodhisattva* so long as there is the least anxiety or striving to become more than what one is.

In his final paragraph, Watts meets an obvious objection:

> A philosophy of non-striving . . . always raises the problem of incentive, for if people are "right" or Buddhas just as they are, does not this self-acceptance destroy the creative urge? The answer is that there is nothing truly creative about actions which spring from incentives, for these are not so much free or creative actions as conditioned reactions. . . .

We do not review this monograph in the hope of spurring readers to study Zen, but to illustrate the kind of thinking that may result when psychological problems and questions are approached with philosophical conviction and commitment. This may be the only sort of "science" which is practicable for effective study of the mind.

Letter from **ENGLAND**

LONDON.—The execution by hanging of a woman of twenty-eight has raised again fierce feeling on the subject of capital punishment. The circumstances may be briefly stated. Ruth Ellis was one of those socially unanchored pretty women who eke out a living amid the dismal splendours of the half world—the world of one-room night clubs or hired furnished flats and frequently-changed marital partners. Her act was to shoot in the street a man who had left her for another woman; that is to say, this was that type of crime which the French have always considered merited some consideration as the spiritual tragedy of an otherwise decent citizen. But the English criminal law does not recognize the crime of passion. At her trial this woman, with remarkable courage and integrity, admitted both act and intent. Petitions were prepared for her reprieve, as in the case of the Rosenbergs, though theirs was a different type of offence, of course.

Feeling ran very high that no useful purpose could be served the community by the execution of a young woman who was also the mother of two small children. Yet, with that implacable pitilessness which has marked the English criminal law since the seventeenth century, and which has often aroused in the foreign observer feelings of horror, the Home Secretary, in whose power lies the final decision of recommending the royal clemency, refused to cede the woman her life and she was duly killed by process of law.

Now, Holloway prison, London, in which the execution was carried out, happens to have nearby a large school. The children of this school were that day obsessed with the horrible business afoot so near their class rooms. According to a "round robin" letter sent by their teachers to the Press, the only subject of talk by the children was how the hanging was done. In short, as these protesting educationalists said, that hanging corrupted a whole school of children. It also demoralized many adults, too. What, it was asked on every side, was the purpose of the death sentence for a crime of that nature, so fundamentally different from a killing for gain, or a killing to eliminate some unwanted person? And, it was asked, would not such a woman have achieved redemption, perhaps, after some years in prison? A writer in the Paris *Figaro* observed with commendable acerbity, "The English understand only two kinds of passion—for cricket and for gambling." And Sir Beverley Baxter, MP, a Canadian, had this to say in the Press: "Let us be logical and go back to the thumbscrew, the rack and the *auto-da-fé*. We have lost the right to speak for civilized society."

But there is a sequel to this deeply-felt if transitory wave of Public feeling, both against such judicial killings and the implacability of the Home Secretary personally—a son of David Lloyd George. It comes so near in time as to make a lamentable commentary on our criminal law and the anomalies of its operation. Here are the facts.

Sergeant Emmett-Dunne, serving in West Germany, carried on a liaison with another sergeant's wife, a German night club "hostess." He killed the husband with a Commando secret blow to the neck and then strung him up to make death appear as self-inflicted. The crime was premeditated and carried out as a criminal Commando operation with cold-blooded thoroughness. The verdict is Suicide.

Seven months later the widow marries her lover—the murderer, as a court-martial found, of her first husband. Emmett-Dunne is sentenced to death. But he will not hang. West Germany has abolished capital punishment like most modern states. We have an agreement that the British military will carry out no executions in Germany. The legal authorities now say a man may not be brought from a foreign state into England to be executed. This man will serve a life sentence, that is, fifteen years, with full remission. The disparity of punishment and of crime in these two cases is so glaring that one wonders whether for much longer the government will be able to retain a form of punishment that is condemned not alone on grounds of humanity, but by reference to its uselessness. For in those twenty-six states that have abolished capital punishment there has been no increase in murder, and so the long-sustained argument that capital punishment is the prime deterrent falls to the ground. *Certainty of punishment*, not Draconian severity, as Beccaria pointed out in the eighteenth century, is the great deterrent. Our legal people and our legislature are slow to act in the light of that undisputed fact.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
KARP'S GENTLE "HORROR STORY"

DAVID KARP'S novel, *One*, like nearly all the depressing Utopias which threaten what the future may hold in store for us, has attracted considerable attention, and is, we think, a worthy accompaniment to George Orwell's *1984*, Kurt Vonnegut's *Player Piano* (now *Utopia 14*) and George Meade's *The Great Big Ball of Wax*. Orwell's book is the most famous of the four, but Vonnegut, Meade and Karp are somehow more welcome reading than the prophet of dramatic doom. In Vonnegut and Karp, it is true, we also see the insidious disappearance of individuality for the sake of a "perfect" social order. But the society both depict, far from being dependent upon terrorist policing, really suffers from just two things—overabundance and lassitude. Here is a frictionless life, arranged by a government operating without any physical coercion.

Karp's hero is an unprepossessing, middle-aged professor who for many years had thought himself to be in accord with the purposes of the regime of peace and plenty which had then been existing for some thirty years. However, unknown to "Professor Burden," his subconscious mind had been harboring seeds of heresy. Beneath habitual acquiescence of official doctrine—which allowed no one to feel that he could possibly be right in holding to standards of truth, goodness, beauty or justice at variance with those of the majority—something, perhaps the same sort of inner *daimon* who spoke to Socrates, told Burden that, despite all this, *he was* an Individual.

In the course of a routine examination by the Benevolent State, whose experts are aided by psychiatric drugs, the first of these heresies is revealed; subsequently, Burden is subjected to questioning ordeals of great subtlety. And this for the reason that, to the examiners, anyone who truly conceives himself as an individual, whether or not his conscious mind is fully aware of this distinction, is an implicit threat to the authority of the State. The chief investigator in the Burden case, significantly, is himself a reclaimed "heretic," best able to ferret out Burden's hidden individualism because he still remembers what it is like to think and feel "as if" he were a separate and distinct person.

But what of the society threatened by Burden's mild presence? His examiners are in full accord as to the necessity of destroying the present professional personality, because they see friction and war as the inevitable result of *any* renascent independence. But as we read the quoted passages we may, until the closing sentences, feel that Karp comes close to the ideal society so many presently envision. Here is an outline of the psychology of the Benevolent State, elaborated by a carefully nurtured science of personality conditioning:

> The mercantile philosophy, the concept of their cultural progenitors, had failed; the myth of self-gratification had failed; the great religions had failed; terror had failed; war had failed; technology had failed. Character was the only thing left—the deliberate, systematic, tortuous method of breeding humans of character, believing in one another and in their systems of government. It had been under way just thirty years. Its first generation of seedlings were now coming into maturity and the country was showing its effects. For one thing, crime had fallen away to virtually zero figures. The only criminals actively operating were adults in their forties and fifties. Juvenile delinquency was nonexistent. Burden knew that insane asylums were dwindling in number, that alcoholic wards handled no adults under thirty.
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> There was a great deal more family participation in self-entertainment. Reading of books and magazines had zoomed. Automobile registration had fallen enormously. Restlessness and wanderlust had decreased. People preferred to stay near home. The various churches had been delighted at the renewal of family life, the decrease in crime, the easing of emotional tensions, but they were disturbed by the empty places in the houses of worship. The Church of State was taking stronger and stronger hold. It was a strange religion. It could not be called wicked or immoral. It contained so many of the precepts of the Judaeo-Christian ethic that religious leaders were at a

loss to criticize it and yet they wondered and puzzled and sought to understand why they were losing their worshipers. They lost them by the hundreds, by the thousands, by the tens of thousands. The Church of State was a church without ritual, without ceremony, without a *mystique*. It was moral, upright, simple, and stressed the fellowship of mankind. It had no ordained members. Any member of the congregation might get up and lead the others. Members lost their identity once they joined. Their contributions to the church were made directly from a small, uniform deduction from their salary. No one could give more even if he so desired and the application for the deduction was voluntary. It could be withdrawn at any time without comment or censure. The church had no synod, no overall ecclesiastical direction. A State Church could be built by the government upon application of fifty adult citizens partially from funds contributed by the fifty and from the general fund of the church which was administered by two paid church employees, an accountant and his secretary. A government employee supervised the keeping of records and regularly examined the books but he was the sole official connection with the church. There was no other. . . .

There were so many good things in it that one couldn't complain, and yet the vague feeling persisted that the society had a catch in it, a joker that had not yet been shown. Burden had pursued this point a few times in the hopes of describing it in his reports. But the older people seemed unwilling or incapable of pinning down their thoughts. One professor had complained that the society had "no zest, no verve, no drive, no sense of excitement." Burden thought it a rather childish comment of an old man.

As Burden presented himself for the first of his hearings, at the miraculously efficient nerve center of the government, he noticed some peculiar things about the young men and women who worked there, on this occasion observing, as they ate their noon-day meal in supposed relaxation:

Everyone seemed cheerful and talkative despite the bleak weather outdoors. Burden read lips here and there among the diners about him. But most of the conversations were either overly cryptic with official language or trivial and dull. That struck him as strange. Despite the animated expressions in their faces and the intensity of their conversations, none of the people in the room whose conversations he could follow seemed to be saying anything that sounded remotely interesting or faintly provocative. At one table they were discussing summer vacations with a vivacity and a zest that suggested that all the people had just returned from their holidays just a few days before. But by the calendar that couldn't possibly be true. Those same people must have eaten together for months since their vacations ended and yet they were apparently pursuing a topic of table talk that must have been exhausted and stale long before this. Still, they showed no lack of interest. Their eyes sparkled, they listened eagerly. At another table, out of boredom, Burden had followed a long and banal discussion on food preferences. The young men and women of that group must have known each other well and yet the discussion had all the air of people baring their inner souls for the first time in their lives. Burden's eyes swept across the room. Suddenly a thought struck him. To be certain, he looked over the room more slowly, more carefully. Odd, he thought. There was no table in the room, barring his own, where fewer than four people were seated. Indeed, there were no groups of twos or threes. It was always four or more at a table. And yet the restaurant was by no means crowded. Two people could easily find a quiet, softly lit corner for themselves. And yet no two people did. The groups of four and more sat in the center of the restaurant under the brightest lights. What was still more curious, there were no tables where more men than women were seated, nor were there any tables where the opposite condition obtained. Burden's brows knit with puzzlement. Now, that *was* odd.

All were included in the conversation and all listened attentively. Now, that *was* odd. It might be the very height of social politeness, but it seemed strained. Burden snapped his fingers. That was the word he had subconsciously been groping for. There was an intense underlying sense of strain in the restaurant. The attention was too pointed, too bright, the politeness too rigid, the balances too equal, the air of conviviality too strenuously maintained. It was as though they felt compelled to act the way they did, to seat themselves like the animals of Noah's Ark, two by two.

How extremely odd, Burden thought. They acted almost as if they were—Burden checked himself. Then, looking about the restaurant with new eyes he examined the diners again. They acted like badly frightened people.

Well, the government experts finally succeeded in destroying the personality of

Professor Burden. But the most interesting thing about this tale is that even after this had been accomplished, something of a basic integrity underlying the former personage remained. Given a different name, a different set of acquaintances and interests by his capable team of psychiatrists, Burden nevertheless—under the new name of "Mr. Hughes"—found that it was more important for him to remain alone with his particular criteria of judgment on important subjects than it was for him to enjoy tranquility and security, submerging himself entirely in the will and the opinions of the zombie-like majority.

So what Karp is really saying is that human individuality will never entirely die out, even though the future may be a nippity-tuck affair. Further, that the State can never be truly benevolent beyond the point where genuine differences of opinion and contrasting orders of values are respected. We have, in the final analysis, a warning that the most effective threats to all that we traditionally hold dear will probably appear in the guise of sincere planning efforts for Everyone's Benefit.

COMMENTARY
THE CONTENT OF "RELIGION"

ONE excuse we have—if we need an excuse—for continuing to write about religion is that the content of religious issues is rapidly changing. This week's lead article, for example, tends to suggest a close relationship between study of the mind and the question of religious or philosophical objectives. If this relationship does exist, then it becomes possible to consider religious questions in the free atmosphere of intellectual inquiry, avoiding the sticky emotionalism so commonly felt to be a necessary part of the religious life.

The disciplined man's distaste for what passes in the modern world as religion is itself a subject that will bear looking into. Too often, the religious element in life appears to be little more than a sentimental blurring of hard questions. The man who is unwilling to substitute grandiloquently announced feelings for the precise expression he has learned to require in other herds may quite legitimately suspect that much of modern religion, especially in its orthodox forms, is a systematic evasion of essential issues. The radical claim that "religion is the opium of the people" has so much relative truth in it that only unprejudiced and intrepid thinkers are willing to give serious inquiry to religious matters.

It is characteristic of the present, however, that the number of such thinkers is growing. W. T. Stace of Princeton University is a good illustration of this trend. Stace need bow to no one in respect to the vigor and discipline of his thinking, yet in religious questions he finds the most searching challenge of our times. This is a way of saying, perhaps, that authentic religion is philosophical religion, and that matters that were tabled throughout the period of the scientific revolution have suddenly come to life.

The only thing we need to beware in religious inquiry is the tendency to go "soft"—to assume that piety and enthusiasm can be substituted for the rigors of scientific and philosophical investigation. This tendency was indulged by the West some fourteen or fifteen centuries ago, when the Neoplatonic philosophers were exiled from the areas controlled by Christian orthodoxy, and "faith" became a paramount religious virtue. As a result, the free minds of a millennium later became "atheistic" or "materialistic" in self-defense.

With this lesson of history before us, we ought to be able to avoid a repetition of so blinding a distortion of both religion and science.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
CORRESPONDENCE

Editor: In your comment on the psychiatrist who advised parents not to attempt to make their decisions seem reasonable to the child (MANAS, Aug. 3), you begin, it seems to me, with a fair statement of the psychiatric position; but when you say, "taken literally, we must flatly disagree with his assertion," I rise in his defense. It is just here, I think, that the "subtle point" has been missed. The psychiatrist answered the question *asked*—apparently not quite the same as the parent intended to ask—regarding a "decision" (which is, by definition, a closed issue) "affecting" (causing *emotional* reaction) an "adolescent" (one whose chief concern is the way things affect *him).* This is a totally different situation from that of "Come, let us *reason* together as equals." Few adults, even, are sufficiently "mature" to maintain, among themselves, reasonableness, logicality, and amity if there is an area of non-agreement!

Consider, then, the situation the psychiatrist probably envisioned when he "flatly advised against any attempt to be reasonable": the parent is facing a resentful offspring who is belligerent, sulky, or sneeringly aloof—according to his temperament. In the interest of "fairness," the parent may—possibly should—*state* his reasons; yet he will soon see that the adolescent is not interested in Why, but in Why Not. ("Why *can't* I do what I want to?")

If the parent is dealing with a combative adolescent, and attempts to bolster his decision by logic, he has fallen into the first booby-trap; and there will be plenty more—for the adolescent has no such compunctions about taking undue advantage, as the parent presumably has. What starts out with diabolical "reasonableness" is most likely to end with the parent shouting, "You'll do it because I say so!" A thing he *should* have been able to say quietly and decisively in the beginning, as, for example: "I've thought this over carefully, and this is my decision. When you are calmer, I'll be glad to talk it over with you if you wish."

If, however, the youngster who is faced with "parental decision" has withdrawn, has insulated himself within his lump of resentment, the parent may talk his heart out—the youngster won't even *hear* him. Just how far is calm reasonableness getting either person toward mutual understanding, or helping the adolescent toward moral growth?

The results of these examples, disagreeable and frustrating though they may be, do not carry the serious psychological import of the next situation to be considered. (Their results are out in the open; the parent knows he hasn't gotten anywhere, and the youngster has adequately expressed his feelings.) But if the adolescent affected is the compliant type, the parent will be permitted to marshal all his factors and make his points without any contention or argument, the child being too inhibited or indifferent to speak up for himself. So the parent draws a beautiful, neatly-constructed map to the scale of his own viewpoint. It goes straight from here to there without offering any opportunity to take those by-paths that suggest possibilities of entertainment or excitement to the adolescent. The road is plain; the adolescent knows he must follow it; but—he resents each step in every fibre of his emotional being. He feels that he has been coerced in a particularly sneaky manner: he has been forced to "see" the probably best thing to do, but he cannot *feel* it. Nor can he "logically" hate his parent, as he could if an ultimatum were given; so he unconsciously takes it out on himself, and his migraine headaches or laryngitis or something.

This reaction is particularly noticeable in instances where the adolescent is to be allowed to make his own decision; where the parent is quite honestly *not* trying to influence *conduct,* but only attempting to present what *he* sees as the "whole" situation. Had the youngster *asked* for the parent's viewpoint, the viewpoint of a larger experience, all would have been well. But when it

is offered gratuitously by the parent—not even *wanted* by the youngster—the latter feels great resentment because he has, as he thinks, been *forced* to see aspects of the situation with which he is not concerned. Now the youngster cannot even pretend "ignorance"; the logical implication, *not* the parent, forces him to make a decision which he is emotionally unwilling to make.

I am not talking about a philosophical *attitude* toward life-situations, but am emphasizing possible deleterious psychological effects of such an attitude applied without discrimination by a parent *temperamentally* so inclined. I am such a parent, as is, presumably, the parent who raised the question—and presumably also, the editor of this column. My experience leads me to agree with the psychiatrist: unless the invitation to "come, let us reason together" comes *from the adolescent,* the experience may have no validity, or even be psychologically harmful. Just because a youngster "has a good head on his shoulders" does not *necessarily* mean that he is emotionally able to stand the strain of taking full responsibility for his "right action." The parent can ease that strain by assuming the brunt of the decision. Yet if *that* is kept up too long, the effect will be just as psychologically harmful as was the other method! So what is a poor parent to do?

It seems to me we can at least take into account the psychiatrist's experience, instead of immediately seeking to justify our own temperamentally compulsive desire to "reason." We can further take into account the fact that to a psychologist the ability to take responsibility for one's decisions represents maturity—*not* adolescence. And I have a strong feeling (from the original letter) that the psychiatrist was answering the parent's question with a background of given situations in mind, and not decrying a general attitude of reasonableness and willingness to talk things over.

* * *

These points extend the considerations apparently held in mind by the psychiatrist whose remarks are under discussion. In our opinion, however, the central issue is not yet clear. For both the parent and the child, perhaps above all else, need to recognize that for a "decision" or a point of view to be "reasonable" does *not* mean that it is the only reasonable decision or point of view. In other words, a parent can give *his* reasons without demanding agreement "each step of the way," and can do this properly if—an important "if"—he is willing to allow the child to reject his particular form of reasoning or the conclusions to which it led the parent. But the parent can still decide, and it can be seen to be "fair" that he should, despite allowing disagreement.

Education in philosophy is education in realizing that a series of arguments is not necessarily demonstrative of an absolute truth, but only obliges a hearing and an effort to understand on the part of the listener. The trouble with most parents—such as those described by the present correspondent—is that they wish to *create* the reasoning of their children. This cannot be done, and here we can sympathize with all those who find Plato's rendition of Socrates' logic a little too trite and compulsive at times. Nevertheless, those who are taught to respect reason—and all reasons seriously presented—will in time learn to distinguish between truth and competent logic. Competent logic can be offered by those who represent opposing factions, but the truth is only discovered by each one for himself.

There is doubt that the child who is overwhelmed by the language and the conviction of rightness on the part of the parent is in worse mental case than one who simply recognizes that he must acquiesce to a decision. But listening to a parent's reasoning can be something like the attempt to learn from those who hold religious views different from our own. We do not have to agree or accept in order to derive benefit from the faith of another. Even if, at the time, we instinctively feel that there is something wrong with both logic and conclusion, there is probably

also something true and right about it. We listen and learn.

The crux of this situation, then, is the parent's own realization of the above, and his ability to make the child understand that he does not wish to *compel* agreement. He wishes to *submit* his own reasoning, and asks nothing, here, in return. He makes the *decision,* on the other hand, because he has a right or obligation to do so, and because he *can* make it. A child thus prepared is not inevitably due to build up the resentments discussed. He may be annoyed at the fact that the parent can present his point of view with more coherence than he, but this sort of annoyance may eventually make philosophers out of people who otherwise would not become such.

What needs to be transcended, then, here as in so many other instances, is the "institutional" view of rightness or truth. The parent is not ordained to find the child's truth for him, but he is ordained to discover means of communication with him. One of the important steps in communication comes when the child's objections are sympathetically elicited, and again when the parent refrains from combating these in an endeavor to show the weakness or falsity of childish logic. There may be times when the mother or father may simply nod his head to show that he has heard and listened to what the child has to say. The matter has then been carried as far as it presently should be, and the implicit assumption, left by the parent for the child, is that only time and further thinking will reveal more on the topic. In the meantime, the decision stands, even though the parent is willing to agree that the decision may turn out to be a wrong one or the logic supporting it faulty.

Well, this is the best we can presently do by way of suggesting a synthesis. What we cannot do is to admit that attempts at illustrating the communicative value of reason should be forsaken by the parent. If we were to admit this, we would be right back at the door of mediaeval pedagogy, in which the churchmen felt justified in taking the view that reasoning on the part of those who were untrained in theological matters would simply confuse them. Therefore they tried to make up for this presumed lack by vehemently identifying their own shards of reason as final, ultimate truth. Several centuries of reaction in the direction generally called "materialism" were the unfortunate result. So there are "booby-traps," to use our correspondent's phrase, no matter what point of view a parent attempts to apply, yet the only way out of the trap is by development of respect for reasoning. Finally, you can respect reason and philosophy without subscribing to every formulation thrust upon you by those who are your superiors in the manipulating of intellectual symbols. Teachers, as well as parents, should help the young to see this.

FRONTIERS

Protesting a Delusion

MOST protests and demonstrations are the expression of minorities attempting to call public attention to acts of injustice or oppression. Last June 15, City Hall Park in New York City was the scene of a new kind of protest—a protest against a delusion.

Even though it ended as end most protests which are carried out in violation of some law—with the demonstrators being arrested and persecuted—this distinction should be preserved.

June 15 was the day selected by the Federal Government of the United States, with Mexico and Canada cooperating, for a continent-wide civil defense drill. Citizens of many cities were ordered to "take shelter" (get off the streets) at 2:05 P.M., during the mock emergency of a theoretical thermo-nuclear attack. On that day, a little before the time set for the emergency, a group of twenty-eight New York pacifists gathered in City Hall Park. They had notified the authorities that they would refuse to hide in doorways or leave the open park as the program of the drill required. Civil Defense officials were on hand to arrest them immediately, so that they were unable, as they had planned, to present to the Acting Mayor of New York a letter explaining their objection to the drill. This letter said in part:

> Such public and publicized civil defense tests help to create the illusion that the nation can . . . shield people from war's effects: We can have no part in helping to create this illusion.

The demonstrators were taken to jail and were that evening arraigned before Municipal Judge Louis Kaplan, charged with the misdemeanor of violating the New York State Defense Emergency Act of 1951. (This law is enabling legislation, requested by the Federal Government and modelled upon a similar federal act. Many of the states have enacted such laws in order to support federal policies.) The penalties of the New York State law may be as much as a year in jail and $500 fine. The charge read, "Rocco Parilli and 28 others wilfully refused to take shelter." Ironically, Rocco Parilli was the only man who didn't belong in the "Parilli Case," since he, a bootblack working in the park, was on his way to a drinking fountain when the arrest was made and somehow was caught in the "dragnet." He apparently submitted in sheer bewilderment.

The twenty-eight pacifists who were arrested included representatives of the Catholic Worker Movement, the War Resisters League, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Peacemakers. A few have pleaded guilty to the charges, but most of the demonstrators hope that the case can be made to test the constitutionality of the Defense Act. A. J. Muste, veteran pacifist leader and one of the demonstrators, said in *Peace News* for July 1:

> There are informed persons, including attorneys, who are of the opinion that this may be a situation which raises an important civil liberties issue under the First Amendment to the Constitution and that the matter ought, if necessary, to be carried to the Supreme Court. The issue may be stated in some such way as this: How far can a government go in the case of a *simulated* war situation in depriving citizens of their freedom to witness and protest peacefully under compulsion of conscience? Does the government in effect have the right to decree a state of martial law in time of peace?

The New York *Times* found the demonstration newsworthy in these terms. Its report (June 18) noted the constitutional basis of the defense planned and remarked that the pacifist groups represented are "generally opposed to communism or any form of totalitarianism." The report also gave space to explaining the pacifist viewpoint.

> The pacifist will argue that they were acting peacefully according to their consciences, that they were not interfering with those who participated in the drill, and that their arrest therefore was a violation of their freedoms under the First Amendment. . . .

> In the past, pacifists generally have cooperated in raid drills. However, both Mr. Rustin [Executive Secretary of the War Resisters League] and John Swomley, executive secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, maintain that the hydrogen bomb creates a different situation.
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> They argue that there is no defense against a real hydrogen bomb raid, "which would be much more than just one bomb on Brooklyn." Therefore, they say, Wednesday's drill created the "illusion" that there was a defense and constituted a psychological preparation for war.

The municipal court judge, Louis Kaplan, met the situation with something less than aplomb. When the demonstrators were finally arraigned at 11 o'clock that night, the courtroom was filled with friends and sympathizers and a corps of public-spirited attorneys was on hand to represent the twenty-eight. To discipline one demonstrator, a young actress who talked back to the judge while explaining that she and the others had been held without food since their arrest, Kaplan ordered her to Bellevue for "psychiatric examination," and when both she and her husband objected Kaplan called for riot squads to enforce his decision. He then cleared the courtroom and read a statement condemning the demonstrators as "the murderers" of the "theoretical three million people killed in this air raid." They were held in $1500 bail each—an unheard-of amount for a misdemeanor.

It is often the case that officials unable to understand how anyone can dare to challenge the majesty of the law and the authority of the government, find outraged indignation their only available weapon. This seems the only possible explanation of Kaplan's application of the epithet, "murderers," to a group of pacifists, several of whom are nationally famous—as is Dorothy Day of the Catholic Workers—for their gentle devotion to the welfare of others.

Actual trial of the demonstrators has been put over to Sept. 14, at the request of Conrad Lynn, David Shapiro, and Harris Present, defense attorneys, who are seeking a jury trial in a court of special sessions. A committee has been formed to help with the defense and to receive funds to support the case of the demonstrators. Contributions should be sent to A. J. Muste, treasurer, Provisional Defense Committee, Room 825, 5 Beekman Street, New York 38, N.Y. A statement by the Defense Committee defines the issues sharply:

> Real police powers were exercised in a mock emergency. Basic constitutional guarantees were suspended by executive decision in the absence of actual danger—and actual danger is the only criterion under American law which justifies suspension of constitutional rights. We believe that it is imperative to challenge such an invasion of civil liberties.

Two misrepresentations of the protest in the public press should be cleared up. It was reported that one of the demonstrators resisted arrest. This is not even technically correct. Dick Kern, a young member of the group, instead of walking to the police wagon, went "limp" at the moment of arrest, obliging the civil defense police to carry him. Kern intended non-cooperation, not "resistance." It was also said in one paper that pacifists involved in the demonstration did their "fighting" in court, this being a reference to the reaction of the young woman when Judge Kaplan ordered her to Bellevue for psychiatric observation. While the girl was carried from the room in a distraught condition, and her husband restrained, there was no "fight" in any intelligible meaning of the word.

Besides the *Times* account, however, there was a sympathetic report of the protest in the liberal Catholic weekly, *Commonweal.* After reviewing the facts of the case and the issues raised, a *Commonweal* writer said editorially:

> The saint and the radical (and they are often one and the same) share a common, ironic destiny: honored by posterity they are usually persecuted during their lifetimes. Joan of Arc was burned at the stake; Henry David Thoreau was imprisoned. We honor the saint and we honor the radical—dead; alive we find them too uncomfortable for our tribute.
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> In the United States, of course, we boast of having built a haven where the saint and the radical

may follow their vocations untroubled, no matter how unpopular, how "nonconformist," their vocations may be; we have nourished a tradition of dissent, and we have guaranteed this tradition by constitutional law. Only in a "dear and present danger," we have said, may the rights of free speech and free assembly be curtailed by the power of the State.

But now they have been curtailed by executive proclamation of a *mock* emergency. And if this can happen, what else may follow? . . .

A society without its radicals is a dead society, just as a Church without its saints is a blighted Church. They—the non-conformists of every age—do not need us: we need them to remind us of uncomfortable truths, to rebuke our slothfulness and ease. When we dishonor them, we dishonor ourselves. If we imprison them we set shackles of mediocrity upon our own spirits. Dorothy Day—and those like her—may go to prison in any age, and they will go cheerfully, because they will still be free. But who will then deliver us? The rights of non-conformity are an index to the free society's well-being. We curtail these rights at our own great peril.

The great need, in considering a case of this sort, is for extended thinking about the meaning of such "defense" measures. If they are no more than sheer pretense—a pretense that something effective can be accomplished by these means to protect urban populations from hydrogen-bomb attacks—then they may amount to a terrible deceit of the people, lulling them into a false sense of security. The pacifists claim—and claim it with reasons which have the backing of eminent scientists—that *there is no defense against atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons.* Why go through these silly motions, they ask, when the prevention of war is the issue, and not hiding in doorways or even in bomb-shelters which modern bombing attacks will reduce alike to indistinguishable dust?

Other cities besides New York had civil drills on June 15, but nowhere else were demonstrators troubled by the authorities. In Chicago, Quakers distributed 7,000 copies of a leaflet prepared by the Chicago office of the American Friends Service Committee. It read in part:

NO HIDING PLACE DOWN HERE

Let's Face it

If these sirens were in earnest and this drill were real, you would be among the 500,000 to 1½ million atomic fatalities.

Any Chicagoan caught in the 5 P.M. rush hour recognizes the futility of plans for evacuating the city.

Let's Think Together

The Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists (Albert Einstein, former chairman) warned: "There is no defense against atomic bombs, and none is to be expected. Preparedness against atomic warfare is futile and, if attempted, will ruin the structure of the social order."

Let's admit that the *only* defense is to prevent war from ever occurring again. . . .

These are the questions which must be raised in relation to any defense program at all, and not only in connection with civil defense drills put on by authorities who, in their own private desperation, feel that they need to "do something."

It is to be hoped that the pacifist demonstrators in New York, now charged with high crimes, even if prosecuted for only misdemeanors, have started their own kind of chain reaction—a stimulus to public intelligence and common sense.