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THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

AFTER some hours spent in absorbing and pondering such dissimilar material as reviews of the Kinsey Report, a recent novel about GI love affairs, and discussions of inventive ability and genius, we have come to a kind of generalizing conclusion based upon all these matters, but closely related to none. It is that the thinking of both specialists and ordinary people which focuses around the terms "normal" and "happiness" and "adjustment" is usually a misleading kind of thinking productive of more harm than good.

The idea of "normality," of course, is regularly attacked for obvious reasons, although not very often for the best ones. "Happiness" and "adjustment," however, are non-controversial values which mean about the same thing in modern usage. The happy man is supposed to be the well-adjusted man, and the attainment of happiness is regarded as the process of 'adjusting' oneself to whatever circumstances and human relationships happen to prevail.

You can read any number of books and articles about remodeling your life for "happiness" without ever coming across the question of whether the happiness which results from adjustment to the status quo—status quo meaning, here, all the conventional social, political, economic and personal equations of the time—is worth going after at all. Quite frequently, this sort of happiness means little more than feeling pleased with oneself and one's friends. On this basis, happiness is not very different from petty conceit. Self-esteem is an important ingredient of "adjustment" in any situation; it is well, therefore, to avoid all blows to complacency—they might make a person "neurotic."

To come to the point, there seems to us something literally sub-human about being satisfied with being able to say, at the end of a lifetime—"Well, my life has been a happy one." If the happiness has come as a by-product of engrossing activity, that, of course, is another matter entirely. This is not an argument with happiness itself, but only with the idea of happiness, or "feeling good," as the objective in life. A human being ought to be interested in something more than how to get into a pleasant state of feeling, and yet, this seems to be the primary purpose advanced by most of the self-help books, and, in a more "advanced" way, by the primers on psychiatry for popular consumption.

Prudencio de Pereda's *All the Girls We Loved* is a recent collection of stories—more or less connected—about GI's in training for World War II and the girls they knew and thought they loved—whom they probably did love, in a way. We don't like to set ourselves apart—we try to keep in mind the motto of a contemporary scientist, "Except for our specialties, we all belong to the masses"—but there is a strong, other-world, almost nether-world, feeling about the people in this book. Of course, it is the world created by war and by the army, and not a "normal" human situation at all; yet there are reasons for thinking that it is a world in which certain dominant tendencies of our more complicated civilian world have gained too rapid a development.

For one thing, the men and women in de Pereda's stories seem to have arrived at the untrammelled freedom from inhibitions which some of the Kinsey Report enthusiasts and certain other psychiatrically-inclined thinkers advocate as the foundation for happy, well-adjusted lives. They have no moral problems—no wrestling with conscience and no inner fear of social taboos. They will "cope" with social taboos, but not in the way that people who believe in the taboos cope

with them. They are warm-hearted and honest characters, loyal to every impulse, and they have their ideals—only the ideals mostly belong to the opposite sex. What's wrong with that? Nothing, from one point of view: this is happy, romantic, freedom-loving America. It is just that these people don't have any real work to do, and they don't seem to miss it.

That, we think, is the fundamental diagnosis of American society. Too many people are without any real work to do. That is why they read so many books on how to be happy; and why so many psychiatrists and personal counselors are forever talking about "adjustment" and problems of "personal relations" as though they had found the Philosopher's Stone. It is the essentially purposeless life of our time that is producing the neurotic personality of our time, and all that the clever psychologists have to say is that we don't know how to "adjust" to the breakneck speed of modern civilization.

How a civilization so wedded to statistical averages and the norms of mediocrity could have developed all this speed is an interesting question to consider. Maybe it is because people are running around in circles faster to get away from themselves. It seems certain, at any rate, that they don't catch up with anything of great value, while the furious activity generates only an unsubstantial and fleeting sense of purpose. In addition, there seems to be a general dislike of any theory or suggestion that some real purpose ought to be sought. Take for example the conventional medical view of genius. A genius is not regarded as someone who has found a real sense of purpose for his life. Instead, a genius is defined in the terms of psychopathology. A recent essay on the subject concludes that "the nervous traits in the genius are genetically and psychogenetically identical with those which we term neurotic in the ordinary man."

There is, we suppose, a satisfaction of a sort in approaching human greatness with techniques of analysis that quickly pass by the imponderable elements and concentrate on the physiologic qualities that distinguish geniuses from other men. Medicine can seem to “progress" so long as it investigates only physiology and reduces the study of man to various departments of the body and the nervous system. But what do we learn about genius from such research? Just what is of value in the idea that a genius is a lucky—or perhaps unlucky—neurotic ?

Such theories, it seems to us, help to confirm the almost obsessive idea that human beings are of no great importance, that human greatness is more or less accidental—caused by some dislocated gene or a similar aberration—and that happiness and social well-being consist in adjusting everybody to the "realities" of human existence as revealed by statistical studies like the Kinsey Report. We should like to declare war on this view, as degrading to the human species. It is not that the "facts" are wrongly reported, or that we think there is no analogy between the psychology of geniuses and neurotics, or that Mr. de Pereda's young men and women are wicked when they lie in each other's arms. It is only that all this seems so completely irrelevant to life as it might be lived—life with some purpose, some savor of the mind and yearning of the spirit.

We're not speaking as reformers, here. We're not asking the GI's to join a Gandhi ashram and become vegetarians and celibates. We don't want the doctors to stop studying psychology. We're just sick and tired of the widespread notion, rapidly becoming a settled dogma, that the way the majority behave is the only “natural" way to behave, and that when people get a bit off the track of "normal living," a few scientific statisticians and psychiatrists can set them right.

We're not for One World at all, if that's the kind of a world it is supposed to be. We're for at least two worlds—the one we've got, but only because we've got it, and the one we should be trying to create. We're for spreading around the idea that human beings can have better life-objectives than being happy and well-adjusted

people; that there have been, are, and always will be human beings to whom "averages" and conventional explanations don't apply, and that these are the kind of human beings that have always set the pace for human betterment. When science, education and literature acquire the habit of ignoring this kind of human beings, and of pretending they don't exist, it is time for a real revolution—for a declaration of independence from that kind of science, that kind of education and that kind of literature.

Human life, to be worth anything at all, has to have some kind of tension in it. There needs to be struggle, wonderment, and the opportunity for heroism and daring. Not everybody wants to be a hero, but everybody needs to know that there is such a thing as the heroic life. Heaven, the Beloved Community, or the Classless Society, if we ever get there, will not be filled with people who were well adjusted to life in the twentieth century. It will be filled with people who couldn't stand being adjusted to this society and who set about making a better one. And they won't be normal and they won't be happy until they start to work.

Letter from
CENTRAL EUROPE

INNSBRUCK.—There is no doubt that Austria suffered an immense material loss in consequence of Allied actions during and after the war. To begin with, villages were obliterated in the course of air-raids and battles; towns have been badly damaged and cities have lost not only cathedrals and history-laden monuments, but extensive living quarters for their population. After May, 1945, this country was divided into four zones, occupied by the Russians, the French, the Americans and the British, according to the Potsdam Agreements. While some of the occupying powers went so far as to take away not only machines, motors, cars, rails and all kinds of installations, but to declare the remaining industrial property as their own, others, recognizing that this policy would in the long run be harmful to themselves, soon stopped the expropriation. Much damage, however, was done; the economic life of Austria had been crippled.

How does the average citizen regard all this, and what kind of plans or ideas has he in mind with reference to his economic and political future?

One fact is certain. No Austrian believes that circumstances will remain as they are. He feels like the patient in the dentist's waiting-room. He is not anxious to investigate what may happen in five or ten years' time. He concentrates on the next half-hour and hopes to get through that. "World conditions, especially European conditions, are not finally settled," remarked a simple charwoman to me lately. "The time is not ripe for reconstruction!" And, without ever listening to the radio, the far-distant mountain farmer scents, he thinks, that "something is in the air." Everyone is waiting for the time "when conditions have finally settled again."

It would, however, be a fundamental mistake to consider this disposition as one of hopelessness. Rather, the people are waiting for the normal times which they expect to follow this interval of uncertainty—times again filled with satisfying work, pleasurable holidays and the educational and economical care of the next generation. On the practical side, however, it seems that comparatively few realize how many obstacles must be overcome before "normal times" can reappear.

The happy days of Austria came virtually to an end on Aug. 2, 1914, when World War I broke out. Not only did the country lose from that war much of its natural resources, but the very industries which had been developed by Austria were taken over by her neighbours and were used—sometimes on purpose, sometimes not —to depress the market of the country which had built them up.

This is one reason, and the general industrialisation of the world is another, why Austria did not regain—between the wars—any of her former economic strength, which had been the foundation of Austrian prosperity. The feeling of part of the people that Austria had become economically weak, unable to compete with the great Powers, probably gave more support to the movement for junction with Germany than any political reason. Today, the condition of the Austrian economy has changed only for the worse, so that the hope of the average Austrian for a return of normal times seems entirely without foundation.

Austrians are generally conscious of the contributions of their country to culture and civilisation. The Stephans Cathedral, world-famous and many times copied, stood, until it was badly damaged in 1945, as a witness to Austrian architecture since the Middle Ages. The Austrian manner of dress has been adopted by many other peoples. The Austrian theatre served as a model for high achievement in dramatic art. But the main contribution to global culture is doubtless Austrian music. Mozart, Haydn, Schubert, Bruckner—these are names which will still be

familiar when many composers who seem of importance today are forgotten. The works of the Strauss family, during the last century, and the Viennese light operas and songs are not only known the world over, but have exerted a lasting influence on musical compositions of this sort.

The Austrian people feel certain that they are not superfluous in this world. They are proud to have originated high forms of art and culture enriching the lives of many millions, and they feel that they have a lot more to offer, if they can survive. They know, too, that Austria would probably range among the richest nations of this world, could its cultural export be weighed in the same manner as the material exports of other nations.

AUSTRIAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

WHAT ARE WE WAITING FOR?

IF the Cooperative Movement did not now exist, and if some thoughtful young man were to publish as his own the seven principles of the Rochdale plan, as a new proposal for economic self-help and reform, he would probably be called a crackpot and a visionary with no knowledge of either the laws of economics or the ways of human nature. But, fortunately, the Cooperative Movement does exist, the Rochdale rules do work, and the "practical" businessmen who think that private profits, Godliness and the American way of life are one and the same thing must use other epithets, such as "socialistic," to justify their enmity to co-ops.

The usual attacks by businessmen on the co-ops seem necessarily either ignorant or hypocritical, as they are certainly not founded on facts. First of all, the co-ops do not threaten the free enterprise system. In a recent litigation between the cooperatives and some power interests in the Northwest of the United States, the presiding judge, ruling for the co-ops, declared:

> In this case we see illustrated the clash between different types of government and economics. And my opinion is that the cooperative movement may well become the last defense of private enterprise against government ownership.

The fundamental difference between a cooperative and a corporate enterprise for private profit has little or nothing to do with the question of socialism. Both co-ops and stock companies are associations of people for economic benefit. Both operate under the same laws of supply and demand. Both buy in the same market, and, other things being equal, both have the same expenses. The difference is that the people who form the co-op are also the customers of the co-op, and that no “profit" is extracted from their sale of merchandise to themselves. Cooperation means distribution for use.

Unlike other economic schemes, cooperative enterprise grew as a fact rather than as a theory. It began in the Lancashire mill town of Rochdale, in 1844, with the formation of the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers by twenty-eight hard-pressed flannel weavers. All twenty-eight had been either Owenites or Chartists with ample experience in agitating for reforms and leading strikes. They had fought for the ten-hour day and campaigned for repeal of the Corn Laws. Knowledge of both politics and human nature, therefore, went into their original plan for mutual self-help—a plan which, within a century, had been adopted and put to work by well over one hundred million human beings. On the eve of the outbreak of war in 1939, cooperative organizations throughout the world were doing an annual business in excess of twenty billion dollars. In the United States alone, where the cooperative movement has taken hold more slowly than in other countries, more than a million families do their buying from co-op outlets which gross over a billion dollars in retail trade.

As we are convinced that many more people, if they knew what the co-ops stand for and what they might accomplish if given the necessary support, would lose no time in joining one, it seems a good idea to describe them rather precisely. Following are the principles established by the Rochdale weavers in 1844, and still followed faithfully by cooperators everywhere:

1. Open membership. No one to be excluded because of race, creed, or color.
2. One member, one vote. No voting by proxy.
3. Share capital to be paid a moderate, fixed return.
4. Surplus of an association to be returned to a member in ratio to his purchases.
5. Neutrality of the co-op in religion and politics.
6. Trading on a cash basis.
7. Education of members with reference to consumer cooperative principles.

The application of the fourth of these rules is the key to the successful sharing among co-op members of the savings which result from eliminating private profit. Instead of imposing upon themselves the difficult task of trying to sell goods to the members "at-cost," co-ops sell at the prevailing market price. Then, after all expenses have been paid, the remaining surplus is returned at regular intervals in the form of "dividends" to members. Those who join co-ops often allow their dividends to accrue until they amount to the value of a capital share, which then entitles them to be voting members—but no one can buy a lot of shares and control co-op policies. Each member has only one vote, regardless of the number of shares he holds.

The policy of distributing the surplus in the form of regular dividends has several advantages. First, the co-op presents to the public the same general price structure as other retail stores. By not cutting retail prices at the time of sale, the co-op avoids both the strenuous objections of other merchants and the disasters which might result from miscalculation of costs. A further advantage of this policy is that it requires a certain amount of thought and foresight on the part of those who decide to become members of the co-op. To enjoy the savings a co-op can provide, the buyer has to understand the theory of co-op organization, and, as a result, he usually becomes something of an enthusiast for the movement itself.

It is often the case that co-op members place a greater value on the spread of the co-op idea than upon immediate savings to themselves. For example, the members of the grocery co-op to which the present reviewer belongs recently voted to devote their dividends for a considerable period to financing a branch co-op store in another community. They are willing to pay the usual market price for their foodstuffs for, say, a year, in order that a beginning may be made in cooperation in a town five miles away. (Of course, the larger inventories maintained by a co-op operating two stores will eventually benefit the members in both towns.)

We had originally intended this article to be a review *of The World Cooperative Movement*, by Margaret Digby, published this year in England by Hutchinson's University Library. The only reason why we have not devoted all our space to this excellent and informing volume is that it seemed of even greater importance to outline, as simply as possible, exactly what a consumer co-op is, in the hope that readers not yet buying from co-ops will make the effort to find out, as we did recently, if there is a co-op store within shopping distance of their homes. Joining a co-op is naturally more important than reading a book about them, although Miss Digby's book should be read whether you are able to join a co-op or not. (A useful volume on American co-ops is *The Cooperative Challenge*, by Bertram B. Fowler, published last year by Little, Brown.)

Miss Digby describes the progress of cooperation all over the world, since 1844. In England, where the movement started, after only fifty years a total of 1,421 retail cooperative societies had been established. Co-op operations soon extended beyond food and clothing. Co-ops pioneered the department store type of outlet in Great Britain. By 1945 there were more than nine million members of co-ops in England and co-ops accounted for over eleven million registrations for rationed foods—something more than a quarter of all registrations for sugar, fats and preserves.

In addition to retail stores, there are various kinds of producers' co-ops, wholesale co-ops, banking and credit co-ops. In some European countries, cooperation is very nearly the most important single factor in the national economy, as in Denmark and Sweden (see Marquis Child's excellent study, *Sweden: The Middle Way).* Broadly speaking, cooperation has demonstrated its extraordinary capacity for adaptation to existing economic conditions, while at the same time prospering within those conditions and gradually changing them for the better. The

immediate ethical value of consumer cooperation should be obvious, and its practical value to the consumer has been demonstrated many times over, in every part of the world. Following are some passages from the last page of Miss Digby's book:

> Cooperation has built a system of production, distribution, banking, insurance and sundry services which is directed solely to the benefit of the community and includes no element of individual profit. Within that system there is complete personal equality. It is a voluntary system, created by personal effort, freely given. It is a free system giving scope to the group and the individual to do everything except exploit their fellows. It leaves wide areas of free choice within a planned framework.
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> The system has proved technically efficient and has beaten private enterprise on its own ground, without the intervention of political power. It is flexible and can interlock with economic life organized on other bases. But, since it is an organic growth, it tends to wilt if it is either rigidly confined or artificially extended. It has proved to be applicable to people of many ways of life and at all stages of economic and educational development. . . .

The achievements of the co-ops, described in *The World Cooperative Movement,* give evidence of an unostentatious but ever-growing influence upon the daily lives of countless people, training them in democracy, in self-reliance and responsibility. And while the co-ops are performing essential economic services, they decentralize authority and democratize power. They are also establishing a socio-economic pattern which, were it to become universal, would probably eliminate strikes, lockouts and other forms of industrial strife almost entirely. And it seems logical to think that class distinctions would be reduced to a minimum, if not entirely erased, in a society where co-ops were predominantly responsible for both production and distribution. In fact, the advantages of co-ops are so obvious, their principles of operation so simple, and the way to begin one so easy, that one would suppose that nothing could stop reasonably intelligent people from accomplishing this wholly constructive, peaceful, and non-ideological reform as rapidly as possible.

COMMENTARY

OUR HERO

WHEN the preparation of the first issue of MANAS was under way, shortly before January 7 of this year, two of the editors found themselves asserting rival claims for the appearance of Socrates in their respective opening articles. The only solution was to allow Socrates to appear in both, though this procedure seemed to risk an initial monotony—using the same historical character twice for illustrative purposes in an eight-page journal, in two different articles, seems a little unimaginative.

However, the editors consoled themselves with the thought that, after all, they wouldn't continue to do that sort of thing. Thus there were good intentions. But as the months went by, Socrates persistently intruded himself. He might even be in this issue, somewhere. From time to time, when we are especially clever, we squeeze out the name of another well-known personage to illustrate some attitude of mind we admire, but generally we wouldn't know what to do without Socrates. There ought to be a reason for this, we thought; one not completely discreditable to our connection with MANAS, for as idealists we are loath to think that anything we do here is entirely without point. Thinking some more, we were able to arrive at a few conclusions.

"Socrates" has a universal and pointed meaning today. He has been preserved for us as the legend of the eternally questing mind, which is the legend we need above all others in a world of authority and regimentation. He is the symbol for that combination of mental and physical fearlessness, that disregard for social approval or disapproval when searching for truth, which all men secretly wish they had. He appeared to be always interested in the soul, but uninterested in surrounding his concern for the soul with religiosity. He appeals, therefore, to both the sincerely religious person and to the man who has a distaste for religious forms. He was the confidant of the most gifted and of the wealthiest men of his time, but the companion as well of the derelicts and the outcastes of society. Truth, for him, was no respecter of persons. Living vitally in his legend, he breathes constant encouragement to every man who feels that human freedom is obtained by daring to be true to oneself.

We are now at a juncture of history when thinking men and women are distrustful of wealth, distrustful of social expedients, and distrustful of organized religion. Christ and Buddha may have been far greater men than Socrates, for all we know, but someone constructed religions around them. There may have been more effective champions of the poor and downtrodden, but ideologies have shrouded their memory; even the example of Gandhi raises a few political ghosts and renders his name less disarming to some persons than that of Socrates. Many men have professed to love philosophy, but too many of them have gone to college and stayed there.

We are led to conclude, therefore, that when we say "Socrates," we are trying to evoke a latent kind of revolutionary idealism, to lure it away from any factional lodgements in our own and other people's minds. In Socrates, an Independent Thinker stands forth as all-conqueror, embodying the most inspiring of all religious ideas. He knew how to renounce and how to fight. He was both a "philosopher" and "a man of action." Socrates lost everything and remained eternally victorious. He had faith in himself, more particularly in an inner voice of Self, which he regarded as the core of every human spirit. This sort of faith, we think, would have made it possible for him to endure a lifetime's confinement in a concentration camp without altering his capacity to extract something of value from each passing moment.

But here we go talking about Socrates again, when obviously we mean to speak of our hopes for the mental and moral capacities of the human being. In the final analysis it doesn't matter to us whether Socrates, or any similar individual, existed or not, but it does matter whether or not

we can believe that a life like the life of Socrates is possible for us—the way of constant nobility of thought. And particularly is the courage of Socrates important, too, for he leaned upon no system of promised rewards in a future life.

As educator, Socrates symbolizes the humility of men who have acquired considerable wisdom. Plato describes him as distinguishing between factual information and understanding, and as knowing that no amount of information would make ordinary men into "virtuous" men, *unless* something awakened in them an innate ability to live the life of the soul. Socrates stands foursquare against any form of indoctrination, for he questioned rather than "taught," and made his questions logically develop the implications of certain ideas. This, and the fact that Socrates apparently did not consider himself as anything special, like an "educator" or a "social planner," or a "reformer," endears him to us.

Socrates was just a fellow who loved truth; when he expressed it in certain circumstances he became involved in politics; when he expressed his love for truth in other ways, he became entangled with the formal religion of his day. At other times, he appears to us as a "philosopher" or "educator." But apparently he never gave much thought to deciding which one of these he was at which time. Doubtless many of today's specialists have long moments when they wish it were possible for them to follow in Socrates' footsteps. You have to be Somebody who is an Authority on Something, today, in order to gain a public hearing, and, because of this, one's statements are always related by the public to some sort of bias supposed to be characteristic of a particular profession—and then neatly pigeonholed. But you can't pigeonhole Socrates.

Perhaps there will come a time when a considerable number of men and women will have discovered the secret of Socrates' success. If this should happen—but only if this should happen—we will be free of the temptation to constantly repeat his name. Until that time he is one human being, at least, whom tradition represents as the embodiment of religion without benefit of clergy, the embodiment of political courage without benefit of party, and the embodiment of educative vision without benefit of doctor's degree. His name has also awakened in innumerable men a new and better philosophy of life and a new. and better philosophy of death.

CHILDREN
. . . AND OURSELVES

LAST week's endeavor to dissolve, partially at least, the anti-Japanese prejudice in the minds of our young, and to encourage objectivity in respect to our own national maneuverings, needs to be supplemented by some remarks on Germany. Prejudice against those of German ancestry will probably not be particularly acute in the coming years. Yet, as in the case of Japan, it is viable for children to hear the unpopular "other side" of the story. And children will not know the other side of any story unless parents and teachers learn to know it first.

The complicity of the German people in the crimes of the Nazis was successfully exaggerated during the years of World War II by British and American propagandists—successfully, since both countries had already inherited a host of misrepresentations in respect to Germany's guilt in World War I. The most authoritative study on the genesis of World War I, however, *Origins of the World War* (Macmillan, 1930) by Sidney Bradshaw Fay of Harvard, considerably revises the popular estimate of Germany's culpability. Prof. Fay is impatient with those who assign a special responsibility to any given country. He writes:

> Some writers like to fix positively in some precise mathematical fashion the exact responsibility for the war. This was done in one way by the framers of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. It has been done in other ways by those who would fix the responsibility in some relative fashion, as, for instance, Austria first, then Russia, France and Germany and England. But the present writer deprecates such efforts to assess by a precise formula a very complicated question, which is after all more a matter of delicate shading than of definite white and black. Over-simplification, as Napoleon once said in framing his Code, is the enemy of precision. Moreover, even supposing that a general consensus of opinion might be reached as to the immediate causes connected with the July crisis of 1914, it is by no means necessarily true that the same relative responsibility would hold for the underlying causes, which for years had been tending toward the creation of a dangerous situation. . . .
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> In each country political and military leaders did certain things, which led to mobilizations and declarations of war, or failed to do certain things which might have prevented them. In this sense, all the European countries, in a greater or less degree, were, responsible. One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were solely responsible. It was a dictum exacted by victors from vanquished, under the influence of the blindness, ignorance, hatred, and the propagandist misconceptions to which war had given rise. It was based on evidence which was incomplete and not always sound. It is generally recognized by the best historical scholars in all countries to be no longer tenable or defensible. They are agreed that the responsibility for the War is a divided responsibility.

Prof. Fay's dissatisfaction with the “war-guilt" clause of the Treaty of Versailles, suggests a certain justification for the feeling of many Germans, during the 1920’s, that their country had been made the victim of an international anti-German conspiracy. Nevertheless, in the period between the two World Wars, a strenuous effort was made by German liberals to assure the success of a democratic form of government. Democratic Germany, however, did not promise the sort of strong militaristic opposition to the threat of Communism which many British and American financial and political interests wished to promote. If, during the 1920's and early 1930's, the people of England and America had been always represented by statesmen who genuinely desired democracy in Germany, democracy is precisely what Germany would have had. When the Nazis were able to establish a stranglehold on the German economy, however, they were indirectly aided and abetted by "realistic" financial interests in democratic countries, which provided an amazing number of loans and other benefits with the thought of increasing financial security in Europe. As has happened many times in history, those who were seeking private gain were deluded into believing that nationalist stabilization meant "security."

It should be remembered, also, that in 1928, Soviet Russia's proposals for the complete disarmament of all nations, presented by Litvinov, received a cold reception from every major power except Germany. The only encouragement to the idea was offered by German democrats, then still influential enough in the political life of their country to be able to declare for this policy as a means to lasting peace.

A more recent and generally forgotten note on our complicity in the type of maneuvering which is now attributed exclusively to the Nazis is provided by Bernt Balchen's *War Below Zero*. This small volume, compiled by four U.S. Army officers, describes the sub rosa activities of the United States in the North Atlantic long before any open hostility between the United States and Germany. Here, of course, the charge against our own State Department and "Defense" Command is that of misrepresentation to the public. Regardless of whether or not it was desirable for us to enter the war against Germany at so early a date, the people of a democracy must *know what is happening*, or they have ceased to live in a democracy. Presumably, our resentment against the Germans under the Nazis was based upon the obvious fact that they, similarly, had ceased to live in a democracy.

War Below Zero contains this significant passage:

> Long before our formal entry into the global struggle, we realized that it [Greenland] would be an essential springboard for any Nazi air-and-sea assault on the North American continent. But our concern was not only with hemispheric defense; we had another vital interest in this obscure island. Look at your map again: the Great Circle course, the shortest air route to Europe, lies across its southern tip. Greenland is a logical stopover point in ferrying fighter planes and bombers to our Eighth Air Force in Britain. We would need adequate bases and landing strips and weather stations in the Arctic, we saw, if we ever hoped to launch any thousand-plane raids on Berlin.
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> For once, we got there fastest. In the summer of 1941, long months before Pearl Harbor, an expedition under my command sailed from the States under secret orders. Our mission was to establish an Army Air Force base on the west coast of Greenland above the Arctic Circle: the northernmost American air base in the world.

Col. Balchen apparently did not realize the embarrassing position in which publication of this statement placed the United States government, nor will all readers of Balchen's book attach full significance to his words. Yet is knowledge such as this ever included in the popular version of "how the war came"?

In a discussion like the present one, we are not primarily interested in "attacking" the English or American governments; rather, we are striving to show, by whatever means are at hand, that each child needs to have the opportunity to recognize that moral distinctions between nations, based upon propaganda, are almost always distorted and unreliable. "One World," as we have said before, can never come about in a world where men and women are educated to think in One-World terms *part* of the time, and in terms of their own superiority as members of a morally "superior" nation or group of nations the rest of the time.

FRONTIERS

SCIENCE AND ETHICS

AS a correspondent has raised the question of whether or not ethical problems can be “settled" by scientific evidence, and as the *Scientific Monthly* for last August published an unusual article illustrating the contrast and even conflict between certain approved scientific procedures and a great ethical tradition of the East, we shall attempt to discuss this question.

The ethical tradition is that of *ahimsa,* or harmlessness, which is a basic conception of Indian religion, and it has special application to cows. Hindus, in other words, will not kill cows or bulls for any reason. They don't like to kill any kind of animals at all, and will go to great pains to avoid taking life. They are known to feel tolerant toward even poisonous snakes and insects and to regard with extreme horror the generally predatory attitude of most Western peoples toward animals.

Science, on the other hand, is characteristically a Western product. It views both domesticated and wild animals in an entirely different light. Without attempting to decide whether or not the principle of *ahimsa* is a form of ethical intelligence or is merely sentimental, it may be said that the scientific techniques of animal husbandry are at least indifferent to this question. The author of the article referred to above, Prof. Burch H. Schneider, went to India to help Indian farmers to improve the hereditary strain of their cattle. All he had learned in school and from experience told him that the proper way to breed better cattle is to "eliminate" inferior offspring early in life, so that only the best stock will breed and so that calves not worth saving will consume no valuable fodder. At first it seemed that nothing could be done unless the Hindus were first persuaded to renounce their religion—an exceedingly impractical idea, in view of the fact that the Sepoy Rebellion and other disastrous affairs in Indian history resulted from violations of the traditional respect felt by Hindu farmers for their cattle. So, in a problem of this sort, what might scientific evidence contribute, assuming it would be acceptable, toward a solution?

It happens that Prof. Schneider worked out a compromise which accommodated the Hindu determination to kill no cows and at the same time created an opportunity for scientific studies of animal heredity not afforded by the usual Western method of slaughtering scrubby offspring. The solution was to castrate the undesirable bulls, and while this involved the extra expense of feeding and otherwise caring for animals that were not permitted to propagate, the compensation of being able to study the full life-cycle of all offspring seemed adequate, under the circumstances, to Prof. Schneider. In any event, without this plan he would not have been able to help the Hindu farmers at all. (As the question will naturally occur to some readers, it should be stated that the farmers made no substantial objection to bloodless castration of the scrubby bulls; killing them was what they refused to do.)

This solution, however, was hardly a "scientific" one. It was only a commonsense adaptation to religious belief. The ethical standard of the conventional scientific procedure that, except for the *ahimsa* principle, would have been applied is “the greatest good for the greatest number." This, for the scientist, means that a better breed of cows will give more and better milk, produce stronger draft animals, and that the "right," the ethical, way to develop a better breed of cows is the quickest and least expensive way, so that more human babies will have more milk sooner.

But back of this scientific procedure is the premise that the animals are made for man—or, to be more precise, that the animals, while not "made" for anything, are "available," and that man would be foolish not to take advantage of their existence in any way he can.

The Hindus have another theory. They think that the world of animal and human life is a vast

fraternity of living intelligence. The idea may be rank with overgrowths of superstition, but even if the Hindus painted the horns of their cows pink on Tuesdays and blue on Saturdays, the fact would remain that they see in animals a form of life to which they owe reverence and consideration, and this basic fact is no superstition, but an ethical principle.

The Hindu respecter of cows says to himself: Perhaps I could have more milk, sooner, to feed my family if I let the American kill the scrubby bulls. But what about the expression of life in the bull, which I frustrate by killing him? It may be only a bull, but the bull has a part to play in the world, and if I destroy the life of the bull, some other disaster, more terrible, perhaps, than hunger, may overtake my family. This is the moral law. I believe that it is possible for man and animal to live in harmony on earth. If it seems a necessity for me to kill the bull to have enough to eat, perhaps that apparent necessity hides some dark wrong of my past and the past of my family. There must be another way than killing animals; meanwhile, we shall continue to be patient while we hunger, trying to find that other way.

We know of no scientific evidence that can prove the Hindu wrong in his thinking. It might be argued in return that scientific evidence cannot prove him right, either, but on this point we are not so sure. It all depends upon what a person is inclined to accept as evidence.

Our Hindu friend would also have strong views on the subject of vivisection of animals for the advancement of medical knowledge. He might say, if he could manage to look at the problem with a little occidental “objectivity," that the information amassed from the use of experimental animals—"living material," as the ads in the scientific magazines call them—is a horrible delusion which makes our medical profession believe that it can find out what it wants to know in no other way. But the Hindu, we suspect, would be pretty intolerant of any argument on this subject. He would probably think it useless to debate a matter on which, in his opinion, sane human beings can have only a single view.

And if you reminded him of his famine-ridden country, of the epidemics which ravage the land, of the unsanitary conditions in the cities and of the tragic suffering which lack of scientific knowledge has made a common occurrence, he would not know how to answer you back, unless, perhaps, he thought of remarking that it is better to endure these trials than to be the creator of the atom bomb.

But a serious discussion of the relationship between science and ethics ought not to be conducted at the "You're another" level. There ought, we think, to be no contention between motives and techniques, and when controversies of this sort occur, as so often results from an attempt to "document" one's case from history or from current events, it is best to stop and begin all over again.

We take the view that Science, without a foundation in metaphysics, is bound to be ethically sterile and will tend toward practical destructiveness and moral insensibility. As the West suffers from an impoverishment of metaphysical thinking, its science has been adapted to short-range utilitarian ethical ideas which, by some standards of moral philosophy, could be judged to be as primitive as the Ptolemaic theory of astronomy was in contrast with the discovery of Copernicus. And it *would* be so judged, if, in some future day, we were to discover that the pantheistic reverence felt by the Hindu farmer for every form of life is founded on spiritual fact.