VOLUME I, NO. 48
DECEMBER 1, 1948

THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE SOUL

WITH helpful regularity, a friendly subscriber writes in his reactions to the articles that appear in MANAS. Almost without exception, his comment is provocative and to the point. The letters from this reader attain peculiar value to the editors because of his obvious determination to think impartially and critically, while refusing to close his mind to unlikely possibilities. A recent communication, for example, deals with the idea of the soul. It also discusses other matters, such as the distinction between honest recognition of one's wrong-doing and the "sin" complex, but for the present we shall consider only the questions raised concerning the soul. While the comment of this correspondent is based upon statements made in a particular article, they might easily be made to apply to other discussions that have appeared, and may be taken, therefore, in the sense of a general observation. He writes:

> We both want to see Man endowed with a soul—something which enables his actions to be interpreted otherwise than as a mechanism. We have, I hope, the same sort of pragmatic reason for this wish: a more pleasing prospect for our children and ourselves than—let us say —reading the daily papers might give us. You, however, seem to state rather explicitly that Man *is* so endowed, and presumably will manifest the advantages of this possession on an ever-increasing scale.
>
> I wish I might find your evidence equally conclusive and feel that you were doing the subtleties of evolutionary theory and psychology full justice. As a result of years of intensive thought I have abandoned to the Enemy certain ground which you do not concede. I shall be grievously disappointed, I must admit, if it does not turn out, after all, that MANAS is in this struggle at the same point as myself. The going, here, is harder, but the goal possibly less illusory. . . .

This is a fair statement and a searching one. We shall try to provide a reply with the same qualities.

First of all, it seems necessary to establish the nature of knowledge of "the soul," supposing, for the moment, that the soul is a reality and that knowledge about it is a possibility. To assert that man is essentially a soul is a different sort of affirmation from saying that the sun shines by day and the stars by night. The existence of the sun and the stars is an objective, physical fact. They are up there, and you can see them. But the *meaning* of the sun and the stars—if, indeed, they have a meaning—is not evident to the senses, but to the mind—or rather, alternative theories of meaning are conceivable by the mind. You can say that God put them there, to light the way of his creatures on earth by day and by night, or you can say that the Nebular Hypothesis explains them; or, on some days you can believe in God, and on others in modern Astronomy. In other words, you can have a distinct theory about their meaning, or you can be confused; or, again, you can be uncertain and tentative, and be looking for the truth.

The question of whether or not man is a soul belongs, we think, to this latter order of investigation. The difference between physical facts and facts of meaning is that, physical facts, by and large, are indisputable, not dependent upon nor subject to reason, while facts of meaning *must* be reasoned about.

It is our theory, then, that physical facts are the "furniture," the scene and the environment of human life, and that the quest for meaning is the dynamic reality of conscious existence for man. But to call this view a "theory" is to minimize with a colorless word a feeling which we cannot set aside even if we would. To say it is a theory is only a manner of speaking—the rhetoric, we might admit, of intellectual disarmament. We believe it and try to live by it. And we are able to entertain as theories only those ideas which appear

to be consistent with the quest for meaning. We also try to recognize our failures and inconsistencies in this direction—our "sins," so to speak.

Now speaking to the point raised by our correspondent: We, too, confess to years of intensive thought concerning the question of whether or not there is a soul. The fruit of that thinking is the firm conviction that the soul exists as a moral agent within the body. It is simply that we can make more sense out of both the facts and the ideals of human life when we adopt the idea of the soul as a working hypothesis, than when we adopt some other view. We have neither the space nor the skill to argue this matter at length and with completeness. Others have done it better—Ralph Waldo Emerson, for instance. Certain great Scriptures of the past, the *Upanisbads*, the *Bhavagad-Gita*, in the East, several of the Platonic dialogues, in the West, and the *Enneads* of Plotinus, provide the philosophical and religious foundation for our conviction.

But this conviction is not something obtained from reading books. It begins, we think, with an inward hoping that the soul is something real. The hope may be given intellectual form and justification in great religious literature, but, like any other hypothesis or theory, it cannot be left to intellectual speculation. If it be true, the idea will have what some modern thinkers call an "operational" aspect. It will have a pragmatic part to play in human life. And from trying to see how the idea of the soul may work in practice, there may grow a deep conviction, stronger than theory. Such, we think, is the explanation of a Socrates, who lived by the conviction of what he called his soul.

Actually, we are somewhat disappointed to learn that we have seemed to assert the "endowment" of man with a soul. It has been our general intent to *suggest* the soul idea as the theory or hypothesis to which we incline. We have wished to say that it appears to have more reason on its side than any other. But, being in a sense "challenged," we have no choice but to admit that the idea is more of a conviction than a theory, with us.

The next question raised by our correspondent bears on what seems to him the unjustifiable optimism of expecting human beings to behave, more and more, like the souls we have suggested they are. Socrates was only one man, the Athenians who condemned him to death were many: why should anyone suppose that the proportion will ever change?

Here, obviously, we can have little more certainty than the next man; and yet, the soul-hypothesis of human life exerts a certain constraint upon those who adopt it—the constraint of trying to make the idea of soul appear as reasonable as possible. Assuming the idea is a true one, the fact that able practitioners of soul-philosophy are few need hardly deter anyone from trying to add to their number. If the statistical argument against his success had borne much weight with Mr. Gandhi in South Africa, nearly half a century ago, when he began his labors on behalf of non-violent resistance of injustice, he would doubtless have become a successful Indian lawyer instead of a great Indian patriot and champion before all the world of the doctrine of "soul-force."

It seems to us that the temper of humane civilization, whenever and wherever it has existed, has been due to the inspiration of men like Socrates and Gandhi—to a handful of believers in soul. What would Western culture have amounted to, without the existence and instruction of the Platonic Academy, which lasted throughout some nine hundred years? Subtract the influence of Gautama Buddha from the Orient, and what is left?

These computations, of course, cannot be carried out, yet the questions themselves are sufficient to challenge the view that a philosophy of soul acquires improbability from the fact that great souls are few and far between.

This brings us to a further objection by our correspondent, who suggests that "Evolution can account even for a 'sport' like the mind of Socrates." Admitted, but need evolution exclude the idea of soul?

We know of no generally accepted scientific theory of mental evolution—not, at least, in the terms of evolution to Socratic genius. Darwin once remarked that, in his view, the Survival of the Fittest, as applied to the human species must mean the survival of the *morally* fit, and this, it seems to us, invites rather than bars the conception of soul-evolution. When the literature of psychology is reviewed, one finds little more than controversy on the subject of psychological evolution, and nothing on moral evolution. Lewis Terman's *Genetic Studies of Genius*, for example, admits that psychological science is silent on the nature or correct education of genius. (II, 639-40.) This monumental work contains other admissions which justify the conclusion that while, in general, human greatness may on principle be said to be a growth or an evolution, the particular modes of that growth remain obscure. In other words, our knowledge of physical or organic evolution has not increased our knowledge of intellectual or moral achievement among human beings.

Evolution, then, as the explanation of a Socrates, may mean something quite different from what a naturalist usually means when he uses this term.

The desire to interpret the whole of human experience according to current doctrines of evolutionary theory is natural to the educated man of the twentieth century. The body of accumulated scientific knowledge represents a definite discipline involving rules for the determination and the weighing of evidence. Scientific method, as developed and refined through some two or three hundred years, is a protection against the extravagances of wishful thinking and a barrier to revival of illogical dogmas and unverifiable revelations. The idea of the soul, however, may not require the investigator to renounce either the discipline or the presently known facts of scientific inquiry.

Thus far, science has dealt with the objective world—its materials, forces and laws. In psychology, scientists have attempted to apply the same techniques of "objectivity" to the realm of subjective experience, yet there has been no notable success in this field. Psychiatry is an art, a functional system of subjective assumptions about the *psyche*, rather than a science in the sense that physics is a science. And psychiatry is about the only department of psychological science where the results obtained may be said to have a measure of practical validity. Critical justice will have to admit that the assumptions of psychiatrists are constantly changing with the varieties of clinical experience and the imaginative pioneering of the workers in this field.

So, we can find no substantial reason for rejecting the idea of the soul on scientific grounds. The principal scientific obstacle to it is rather the temper of the times—the general cultural unwillingness on the part of scientists to entertain a spiritual conception of man, after so long a struggle, successful at last, against the theological version of the soul-idea. But the temper of the times is not an "argument" for or against anything. It is rather a form or habit of thinking. So long as it contains the spirit of discovery, it continues to serve the cause of human progress, but when it constricts the mind or refuses serious attention to wide areas of human experience, it takes on the characteristics of prejudice and reaction.

Something of the psychology of the soul has been worked out by a few great educators—men like Friedrich Froebel and Bronson Alcott, for example. A major difference between this sort of "science" and the academic variety lies in the natural inclination of both Froebel and Alcott to deal with children as souls, as ends-in-themselves, and not as objects of scholarly research. We are unable to feel that these great teachers were any the less scientific because they lacked the

tentative, undecided attitude that characterizes the scientific method, and rightly so, in other forms of investigation. To treat human beings as souls was the first principle of their science—just as the laws of motion give physics its scientific character.

We do not mean to imply that there are no difficulties implied in the soul-idea. The precise relation between the forces of heredity and environment and the soul presents an obvious technical problem. What the soul is, and what it may do, apart from the body, presents another. But these are questions for further inquiry, not arguments against it. The idea of the soul as an independent moral intelligence, whatever the difficulties and new problems it creates, is still the best solution we know of for the multiplying enigmas and ethical contradictions of the modern world. It fulfills the need a man feels for a good reason for being alive. It gives him a transcendental purpose in his quest for truth. It becomes the rational support for his inherent sense of justice and explains great acts of compassion and altruism. It provides a principle of self-reliance and is the foundation for all enduring concepts of political freedom. It makes religion a matter of hard thinking and personal decision—as it ought to be—and it operates to free individuals and societies from the dead weight of custom and traditional belief.

Letter from **FRANCE**

A COLLEGE TOWN.—As every tourist knows, the French landscape is dotted with chateaux, fortifications, ancient houses, monuments, and other picturesque guidebook features dating from past centuries. (Some towns, indeed, exist today primarily to serve tourists who come to see the ruins and relics.) Sometimes present-day life seems rather far removed from the spirit evoked by the antiquities—as in Nimes, which struck us as a modern city which happens to have the Maison Carré and the Arena, both erected by the Romans, in its center. In other places, there seems a continuity between the olden days and the life going on today—the stream of life appears nearly or entirely uninterrupted. You get this feeling at Carcassonne, or at Avignon, where it is not overly difficult to imagine what life was like centuries ago, without the modern trimmings. The historical monuments are often preserved with as much attention and care as municipal budgets permit.

Monuments are by no means confined to past centuries. One sees, in all parts of the country—at crossroads, in village squares, on hilltops and mountain peaks—memorials erected to the dead of World War II and the French Resistance. History is part of the household goods of the people who have ancestral roots in the same soil, or even on the same farm. Just as history is everywhere in the physical landscape, so traditional attitudes and appreciations are evident in the mental landscape. Inherent in many minds from early childhood (and not only in France) is the slogan "Let us follow in the footsteps of our forefathers."

The tradition of liberty of thought and expression has been sacred to the French since the Revolution of 1789, or even longer. Criticism, literary and political, has been developed to a high degree and has produced some of the world's greatest analyses and critiques. Political authority gets its share of brickbats continually, under all government régimes. Sometimes criticism exists almost as an end in itself and impedes progress, as in the recent governmental crises before the advent of the Queuille administration. Every political group has a "party line" which, set up in advance, is a yardstick for judgment of future problems. These "party lines" are held to with a tenacity that at times obscures or even contradicts their original purposes. Parties refuse to cooperate "on principle," so the ministry has to change. No more real progress is made in this manner than when parties agree to cooperate "on principle" and sacrifice consideration of vital issues of the day to the fetish of "national unity."

Here is an interesting sidelight on division of political opinion: there are two newspapers under the same ownership in the city of St. Etienne. They share office space and printing presses, and have the same format. One is Gaullist, the other Communist. They attack each other vehemently; the boys in the composing-room must have a good time exchanging verbal blows in the papers. And the public buys one or the other, according to each man's preferred interpretation.

Criticism of authority is time-honored, in a sense, and taken for granted. But questioning of authority is a rare phenomenon; obedience is the traditional reaction. The introduction of new principles of life, or approaches to its problems, must fight against the weight of centuries. The most ominous present problem for France is the maelstrom of the world, whirling toward a new armed conflict. If France is caught in another war, there is no question in people's minds but that the government and the population will react as heretofore. There seems to be "no way out" of such a situation; hence, the outlook here today is largely fatalistic. France looks anxiously at the powerful nations which "control her destiny." Doubtless most of the soldiers fighting the Vietnam Republic, acting under orders from superiors acting under orders from *their* superiors, would prefer not to be engaged in this venture,

but, once ordered, one obeys, and that ends the matter. The position of the conscientious objector (completely lacking in traditional value) is little known in France, and less appreciated. But there are individuals committed to non-participation in violence, some of whom were imprisoned and subjected to violent punishment during the war. Wider understanding and eventual acceptance of this position involve a change in mind-set not easily accomplished.

So long as the present freedom of thought and expression remains, there is a chance for new ideas to become established. The philosophy of Existentialism, so popular at present, has the great virtue of exalting the possibilities of the individual: every man is considered a free agent. It is only to be feared that France is being pulled toward an extreme which will not permit such freedom of individual action as now exists.

FRENCH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
NOTES ON RELIGION

THE LADIES' HOME JOURNAL has printed the result of its nation-wide study of religious belief in America ("God and the American People," November), and *Time* (Nov. 1) has quoted the most "interesting" conclusion—that Americans are quite well satisfied with themselves, almost smug, in fact, concerning their spiritual welfare. The candid comments of both the *Journal* and *Time* on this point may be admired as perhaps unusual, although, like most contemporary moral judgments, they are safe enough to make so long as there seems to be nothing anyone can do about the problem. We're self-righteous, that's all.

As both the original article and the *Time* summary are easily accessible, we shall comment on only a single subject—the finding, by the survey**,** that most Americans think that they love their neighbors as themselves. The second of the Ten Commandments, the *Journal* writer, Lincoln Barnett, remarks, is the "supreme ethical testimony" of the Christian faith. Of those replying to questionnaires, 78% believe they obey this commandment in relation to business competitors; 80% claim they live up to it in relation to members of other races; and 90% think that they love the followers of other religions as themselves.

"These figures," Mr. Barnett points out, are dramatically incompatible with the facts of American behavior on every level of national existence today." The American scene is marred by constant conflicts between labor and employers; there is covert and growing anti-Semitism, and notorious discrimination against Negroes, Mexicans, Japanese Americans and other racial minorities. "Can one," the writer asks, “attribute these rejections of Christianity exclusively to the twelve Americans in a hundred [8% did not answer this question— who admit that they do *not* love members of another race?"

Mr. Barnett sees this "profound gulf" between the religious professions of Americans and their actual practice as evidence of "man's final sin, which Luther defined as his unwillingness to admit he is a sinner," and then reports the views and comments of three theological experts, a Protestant, a Catholic and a Jew. While there is some value in what the experts say, none of them, we think, even approach the psycho-social causes of this gulf.

For example, all three of the Churches represented by these theologians benefit from contributions to the Community Chest. They probably all agree that the annual collection of funds for charitable purposes by the Community Chest is a worthy undertaking. Yet we doubt very much if the Community Chest—or almost any organized charity—increases the love of a man for his fellows. Instead, we think it may have an opposite effect. You can't "love" a social institution. What you can do is hire social workers to administer your charity for you, so you won't be bothered by solicitors during business hours or bridge parties. And you can hire the board of directors of a master charitable institution to do your thinking for you, so you won't have to decide which particular charity should receive your contribution (not forgetting that a contribution to a corporate institution is deductible from your income for tax purposes, while contributions to needy individuals are not). With a little thought and attention, a strong argument could be worked out for the idea that giving to the Community Chest tends to reduce man's love for man, instead of increasing it.

The problem has other aspects. A man may love his fellow men in the abstract and on special occasions, but will he buy a home in a restricted area where persons of African, Mongolian, Mexican and Malayan descent are not wanted? He didn't *start* the custom of restricted neighborhoods, of course; he feels no particular responsibility for it, and conformity is easy, pleasant, and without embarrassment. Everybody follows these customs.

The point is, that the discriminations and injustices of our time result very largely from cultural and institutional practices, just as the task of overcoming the human results of injustice is left to the State or in the care of institutions like the Community Chest. The average man feels no personal guilt for the wrong done by either public or private institutions. If the State won't let Negroes

ride in certain cars in the South; if corporate enterprise has certain employment "policies"; if educational institutions have "quotas" for Jewish students—if special groups have investments they want to "protect," how can the ordinary man interfere? And if poverty and suffering bring twinges to the conscience of the prosperous, a large check to the Community Chest will make everything all right.

The same general criticism applies to institutional religion. Most religions have carefully worked-out conventions which represent the fulfillment of the religious life. Such conventions are *symbolic* of the virtues; they are psycho-moral substitutions for genuine religious thinking and genuine ethical behavior. And the more institutional the religion, the more artificial, as well as the more strict and well-defined, the conventions that are to be obeyed.

The "profound gulf," then, separating the ethical pretensions of Americans and their behavior needs a better explanation than the simple "sinfulness" of man. We are not at all sure, ourselves, what "sinfulness" is, anyhow, and a large part of this gulf seems accounted for by the habit of shifting personal moral responsibility to social institutions. The real criticism, we think, is to be directed at the religions themselves—all religions, that is, which claim to have an authority higher than the authority of private judgment and individual reason.

The man who accepts a religion on the basis of irrational outside authority begins with a mistake. How does he know that his religion is better than any other? Such a religion is bound to develop and strengthen sectarian attitudes in its followers, for an irrational doctrine can survive only with the support of uncritical partisanship. It dare not submit to the impartial spirit. And once the principle of irrationality is established, any amount of pseudo-religion in the shape of dogmas and creeds can be substituted for intelligent fulfillment of the heart-feeling of human brotherhood—which is the foundation of real religion. Having no rational basis in philosophy or ethics, sectarian religion is bound to create hypocrisies and self-justifications among its believers. These habits of mind, sanctioned by the authority of religious institutions, in time become cultural traits affecting all areas of human life. In a mature civilization, they may seem to have no tangible connection at all with the religious ideas of the time.

Critics of modern civilization habitually castigate “modern materialism," or they allege that the churches are not "doing their job." This is about the same as saying that materialists are "sinful," or that the preachers are "sinful," just as Mr. Barnett, echoing Martin Luther, says that man is "sinful." The advantage of this diagnosis is that you don't have to carry it any further. You just shout louder against sin. But we think, with Socrates, that virtue is knowledge—or that a large part of virtue is knowledge. We are not ready to decide how "sinful" any man or any specialist is until the delusions of sectarian religion have been corrected. Institutional, sectarian religion has the practical effect of relieving individuals of personal moral responsibility. If they don't have to think about the religion they believe in—if they accept an inherited faith, however irrational—they don't have to think very much about anything else that is important. And that, we think, is why so many Americans imagine they are loving their fellows as themselves, when evidences of the opposite are all about. They have been washed clean of responsibility by their religious institutions, and by other social institutions embodying the same basic psychology.

COMMENTARY
FAITH IN MAN

THE Frontiers article this week emphasizes something we all know already—that it is easy to achieve the dubious distinction of being labelled "Communist." The most pertinent comment we can think of is that the psychology of witch hunts *is* the communist psychology, and that so long as we use witch hunts against "isms" or "ists," we will always find more after the hunt is over than we had before it began. Because psychological forces are prior to political forces, and because the law of psychological cause and effect operates infallibly, continued feverish intolerance will only enable such "isms" to continue to the end of time—and add a few new ones with each passing year.

Once, long, long ago, before the last war to save the world, Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago commented on a widespread campaign to outlaw communist groups from the universities. While his written statement is not at hand, it went something like this: "We should encourage the study and discussion of Communism in our schools, not so that our young people may come to be Communists, but so that they will not." He wrote, as we recall, for the *Saturday Evening Post.*

When Dr. Hutchins said this, we thought he was a great man, because he was re-affirming the faith in man's capacity to *think*—and because he was combatting communist "ethics" in the only way in which they can be effectively combatted. He, and we, have faith that the most constructive ideas will win every time, when their advocates are fearless.

Of course, when you rely on good ideas, you can't expect to win in a hurry. There are times when our own effort to win converts for the idea that each man's capacity to think can be trusted, seems plainly a Sisyphean undertaking. Too many people are afraid of too many things to trust to "thinking."

Our editorial position, however, seems clear enough. We hold that the persecution of people who desire drastic social changes proves nothing save that a great many changes are needed. Such persecution aids the Communist thesis that the world is never moved except through economic power. MANAS does not like to see this thesis gain support, for MANAS stands for the contrary view that the world should be moved, not by communists or capitalists, but by the self-compelling persuasions of ethical principles.

CHILDREN
. . . AND OURSELVES

OUR title for this week might be, "Surprising Facts Children Need to Know." A few sample items are here selected and submitted to parents in the hope that what they suggest may be passed along to children as stimulants to independent thinking. The moral of this attempt is simple: we wish to encourage both parents and children to become aware of the widespread falsification of history, especially American history. This does *not* mean, however, that we wish to foster cynicism toward all cultural traditions (we still favor venerating the Founding Fathers and Abraham Lincoln). Nor do we hold America to be uniquely delinquent in devotion to historical truth. A criticism made of one nation or culture in this regard applies to all other nations in varying degree.

For example, a volume entitled, *The Inexcusable Lie* (New York, 1923), written by a Canadian, demonstrates that both England and America share a guilt in the preparation of classroom propaganda; but also that there can be, in each of these countries, a hearing for those who crusade against nationalist misrepresentations. The author of *The Inexcusable Lie*, Harold Peat, was moved by his personal experience in Canada to an analysis of textbook distortions in general. Recalling childhood experience, he wrote:

> I learned that we are the conquering race. I knew that when we fought we won. I knew that when a Briton starts to War, his cause and his cause only is right.
>
> There were in my books lists of defeats inflicted upon many other nations of the world . . . always the victory was ours, and with the victory went glory and gallantry.
>
> We were the chosen people. . . .

"The same tradition, couched in different words, but the meaning precisely the same," he found in the textbooks of other nations. French, German, Spanish, Japanese, English and American children—all learned the same "inexcusable" lies. "There is no hint of defeat, no sense of wrongness. The 'enemy' is always the villain."

> The people of the world ["Private Peat" continues] must be aroused to the evils of their history teaching and textbooks. They must come to demand that the truth be told; the existing textbooks must be surveyed, analyzed thoroughly so that all may know what are the relative merits and demerits of each book. New textbooks must be compiled, teachers interested in the newer methods, and speakers from all countries trained to go out and carry the message. The goal is so important, that there is necessity for the efforts of all.

Today, leaders call for "better education," for "world government" and a willingness to "see the point of view of other peoples." This is completely impossible of realization unless we are willing to question both past and current claims of national and cultural superiority. Nor can we, in justice to the One-World idea, afford to let a child accept any misrepresentations of important events in our own national life. Ultimately, of course, we must go beyond the factual truth of historical events to a study of those psychological factors in human nature which *allow* men to be governed by untruths. As parents, if we fail to undertake this, we convict ourselves of being uninterested in the education of our children.

To begin with very recent history, a few generally obscured facts relating to the outbreak of World War II and to the country of Japan are of considerable importance. This war ostensibly began, for the United States, with the "sneak attack" on our Pearl Harbor territorial military base. What the majority of us fail to realize is that after 1853, both America and England began to instruct, through example, the Japanese government in a principle of imperialist expansion. A book by Prof. Albert E. Hindmarsh of Harvard (published in 1936) describes the basic change in Japanese foreign policy as the result of Western influence. The philosophy of aggressive territorial acquisition, Hindmarsh showed, grew in popularity as the methods of successful U.S. and British expansion were watched by Japanese

political leaders. According to the Harvard historian:

> Japan enjoyed internal and external peace during two centuries of seclusion from the outer world. Nor does Japan's history suggest a naturally imperialistic people; the total area of her annexations before 1932 was less than 11,300 square miles—an area smaller than that of the Philippines, which the United States acquired in 1899, and not quite one-third that of the Russian acquisitions from China in the period 1858-1860. Japanese leaders, however, were much impressed by the fact that Japan's victory over China in 1895 seemed to win from the Western world a greater respect than resulted from thirty years of peaceful progress. The sudden increase in Japan's prestige which came with the end of the Russo-Japanese War strengthened her belief that, in spite of advanced Western standards of civilization, nations were classified "in the foremost files of time" in accordance with the size and efficiency of armies, navies, and industrial systems and the success of policies of imperialistic expansion. *(The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy.)*

After Japan's small but successful war against Russia, American journalists began calling the Japanese "our little brown brothers," for a stronger Japan then seemed desirable in the furtherance of Britain's and our "national interests." The initial modern militarism of Japan won the respect of England and America, which paid the Japanese dividends in increasingly profitable trade and also suggested ways of handling the mounting problem of overpopulation.

Pursuing this success in national advancement, Japanese militarists moved steadily toward control of the Japanese government. Yet even during the time of the strained relations which immediately preceded Pearl Harbor, a strong "peace party" headed the Tokyo government. Prince Konoye, in 1941 Prime Minister of Japan, repeatedly offered to confer with President Roosevelt on matters of economic adjustment, promising that his success in such matters, if not too long delayed, would make possible the start of a policy of withdrawal from Japanese occupied territory, including nearly all of the gains of the China conquest. Both Konoye and U.S. Ambassador Grew urged haste in consummating a proposed conference off the shores of Alaska, contending that the failure of Konoye's "peace party" would mean the fall of that cabinet and almost certain war. Ambassador Grew thought it possible to halt the Japanese expansionist program, "without war or an immediate risk of war," by taking advantage of the swing of Japanese popular public opinion against militaristic expansion. But Konoye's offers came to nothing. Ambassador Grew reported to his government:

> For a Prime Minister of Japan thus to shatter all precedent and tradition in this land of subservience to precedent and tradition, and to wish to come hat in hand, so to speak, to meet the President of the United States on American soil, is a gauge of the determination of the Government to undo the vast harm already accomplished in alienating our powerful and progressively angry country.

The next step which led toward war was the dismissal of the Konoye cabinet, though the Japanese ambassadors who were striving for peace in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor did represent a last remnant of the Japanese will to peace, their work crumbling only after war had been ordered by the Tojo government, without their knowledge and against their fervent wishes.

All this has much to do with education, for the reasons outlined in our initial paragraph. Here is evidence of the methods of false propagandizing which we share with the Bad Nations. It has educational significance because a knowledge of these facts may have a great deal of bearing on how your child views a Japanese boy or girl in future years. It has to do with whether your child will view himself as morally superior by virtue of his land of birth, and on whether he will grow up hating all militarisms—except that of his own country, which popular misrepresentation will allow him to admire through ignorance.

FRONTIERS

CIVIL RIGHTS SUMMARY

A CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS**,** formed, apparently, by business men, artists, writers, lawyers, educators and other professional people of Los Angeles, placed a full-page advertisement in the Los Angeles *Daily News* for Nov. 10 to protest the jailing of ten persons charged with contempt of court. The Los Angeles Ten, as these persons are now being called, refused to answer certain questions put to them before a Federal Grand Jury—questions such as, "Do you know the names of the officers of the Los Angeles Communist Party?" and, "Do you know the 'table or organization' of the Party?" Federal judge Pierson Hall, according to the Los Angeles Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, repeatedly refused to release the prisoners on bail. Attorneys for the ten finally took the case to U.S. Circuit Court Justice William Denman in San Francisco, who ordered their release without any mention of bail.

Commenting on the incident, Thomas Mann, refugee German novelist and naturalized American, said that perhaps Americans "are not yet fully aware of the significance of occurrences such as this. They have never known, never experienced, fascism, and may not recognize its maturing features in what is happening here." Mann described the jailing of the ten persons from "an extraordinary midnight court session"—they were served subpoenas that morning, requiring appearance before the Grand jury by 10 A.M. — as evidence that America is well on its way toward "the fascist police state and—hence—well on our way to war."

In New York, three hundred educators met recently to form a Conference on Academic Freedom and to demand the withdrawal of the President's loyalty order. They passed resolutions calling for abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee and charged that the "loyalty" committees in various states are using the press of the nation to endanger the personal security of witnesses. The effect of the loyalty investigations on the teaching profession was described by Dr. John DeBoer of the University of Illinois:

> Thousands of teachers have been silenced for every one who was fired. There is an insidious spread of creeping paralysis in our colleges. . . . They are softening us up for war; and they fear an economic depression.

Dr. Kirtley F. Mather, Harvard geologist, said:

> Education for democracy is endangered in America today by more serious attacks than at any time in the history of our country. . . . There is abundant reason for the wave of fear that is sweeping across our campuses and through our classrooms . . the pattern of attack is ominously reminiscent of the techniques used by Hitler in the first years of his Nazi regime.

Meanwhile, in two New Jersey towns, six federal postal employees have been suspended from their jobs by order of the Federal Loyalty Board. The charges are that these men attended certain meetings, read certain literature, and voiced criticism of the accepted American tradition. They are also accused of belonging to "United Front" organizations and associating with fellow-travelers. Algernon Black of the Society for Ethical Culture in New York reports that these six men can find no work in their home communities. Their reputations have been destroyed. "They have become displaced persons—right here in America, in the State of New Jersey." Mr. Black's comments on the practical meaning of the New Jersey Post Office purge are worth reading:

> There are two ways to destroy personal security and civil liberties. One is the crude, direct use of physical force. Troops, police, gangs and vigilantes may use clubs and tear gas to force submission. But personal security can be destroyed in another way—more indirect and subtle, more widespread and serious. This is the method of stirring up fear—fear of war, fear of attack, fear of other racial and religious minorities, fear of unemployment....

> If a man is a government employee, he had better not associate with anyone who is at all liberal. He had better not subscribe to any liberal, progressive or radical magazines, whether in the field of religion, economics, international affairs or politics. He must be careful not to join, help or contribute to any organization that challenges existing laws and institutions. A Government man not help a fellow-citizen in difficulty, if that citizen his been marked or labelled un-American, disloyal or subversive. And when the atmosphere has been poisoned with enough slander, and the listing of individuals and agencies, then it becomes dangerous to advocate a five-cent fare or a new political party, to be for peace, or to protect academic freedom and the principle of separation of church and state. It even becomes un-American to stand clearly and militantly for our old American traditions. And the insidious thing about this method of destroying personal security and civil liberties is that it is impossible to put one 's finger on the sources of propaganda—those who spread the libel and the slander. Above all, there is no way to fight back without endangering oneself and one's family.

The point that Mr. Black is making is that civil rights are virtually meaningless unless they apply to the "extreme cases" as well as to the rest of the population. Conceivably, a country with no protesting or critical minorities would be a country ripe for totalitarian control.

The red scares of present-day fear-ridden America are indeed an acid test of democracy. Fundamentally, they present the problem of how a traditionally free society should deal with the symptoms of its own moral decay—for if the number of citizens who betray evidence of having secretly renounced the democratic principle is sufficient to threaten the stability of government and the peace of the land, that *is* moral decay. And if those citizens are but few, and only the fear of them fanatical and omnipresent, that, also is moral decay. So far, the means used by official authority to counteract those symptoms have involved violations of traditional democratic liberties—again, a kind of moral subversion, practiced in the name of the principles every public servant has sworn to protect.

While the formation of liberal groups to protest the policies pursued by both federal and state loyalty committees is doubtless an encouraging sign, we could find greater satisfaction in this development if it represented renewed interest in the civil rights of everyone, and not only of those suspected of being on the wrong side of the next war. For example, what about the civil rights of persons who are against any war at all?

We have in mind Dr. George W. Hartmann, professor of educational psychology in Teachers College, Columbia University. During the war, as reported in MANAS for Oct. 20, Dr. Hartmann was the leader of the Peace Now Movement. In 1944, while actively campaigning for peace, he was variously defamed by several publications, and has since recovered damages from some of them. Other suits against magazines and newspapers are still pending. We have incidentally to correct a statement made in MANAS for Oct. 20, and to add to the facts then reported. We said that we recollected no attack on Dr. Hartmann by the *New Republic.* This, we have since learned, was incorrect, for *New Republic* carried essentially the same defamatory statements made by other papers concerning Dr. Hartmann and refused even to print a short letter he wrote in rejoinder. What is of greater importance, and pertinent to the general discussion of civil rights, is the reversal of Dr. Hartmann's verdict against the Boston *Herald by* the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. (The lower court had awarded Dr. Hartmann $7,000 damages in his libel suit against the Boston *Herald.)* The import of the Massachusetts reversal was that pacifists are "fair game" in time of war, regardless of the truth or consequences of published statements made about them. The Supreme Judicial Court held, in effect, that it is perfectly legal to "discredit" leaders of minority groups seeking social solutions other than the "accepted" ones.

Dr. Hartmann will probably appeal from this decision, so full of peril for all forms of dissent, to the Supreme Court of the United States. While the decision itself is ominous, perhaps even worse is the indifference to the case shown by the American Civil Liberties Union, which, Dr. Hartmann informs us, "refuses to see any civil rights issues in this decision." We feel obliged to add that Mr. Morris L. Ernst, author of *The First Freedom,* quoted approvingly in MANAS for Nov. 17, is general counsel for the ACLU with regard to libel actions. It is difficult to understand how so well publicized a champion of free expression can fail to see the justice in Dr. Hartmann's cause.

So, we end with the somewhat cynical conclusion that the way to win the backing of liberal organizations in America is to get yourself suspected of Communist affiliations; while the way to be ignored by the same liberal organizations is to be simply and honestly against war, and to say so in public.