

AFFIRMATION ON FREEDOM

FREEDOM for the modern world—for the individuals, that is, living in the modern world—is no longer a political problem. This we affirm flatly, unequivocally, without significant qualifications. For several centuries, now, Western thinkers have defined freedom in political terms. There was justification for this in the eighteenth century, justification for it in the nineteenth century. Today, at the midpoint of the twentieth century, political definitions of freedom are virtually meaningless. We see no available political processes that can lead to a free condition of man. All the available political processes, as such, are mechanisms in bondage to fear. The mechanisms of fear are the mechanisms of slavery, not of freedom.

We are here concerned with matters of current fact, not with ideal political objectives or utopian considerations. We are talking about freedom, now; not freedom after the next war, or when world government has been established. The freedom promised for after the next war is the hypothetical freedom for which men must sacrifice today's actual freedom almost entirely. In this promise, the moral freedom of today must be given up to gain political freedom for tomorrow. We deny the sequence as unhistorical and denounce the logic that proposes it. Moral freedom always comes first. It never follows political freedom, but itself creates the social temper that makes political freedom a possibility.

There are many definitions of moral freedom, but the simple one is the best. Moral freedom, then, has two meanings. It means, first, the inner fearlessness of the human spirit. It means, second, that condition of society in which the highest value has been placed upon the free exercise of moral choice by the individual.

Democracy has for its key conception the recognition of "the effort of men to affirm their own essence and to remove all barriers to that affirmation." Democracy was the political form evolved to articulate that affirmation for the social community. Opposing parties in a democratic society are supposed to afford its citizens a choice among the ways to increase that affirmation. When no political party or influential political minority presents a program for increasing the affirmation of human individuality, but instead, all agree in asserting that, regardless of politics, the freedom of the individual must be sacrificed for the sake of sheer survival, then freedom is no longer a political problem. It has reverted to its original character of a moral problem, which is we think, rapidly becoming the case, today.

To state it simply, fear of war is destroying political freedom in the United States and elsewhere in the world. Last April, this magazine described the plan for the organization of the material resources of America in case of war. (MANAS, April 7, p. 6.) The plan first came to public attention through an article by Charles E. Wilson, president of the General Electric Company, in *the Ordnance journal* for March-April, 1944. The evolution of the Industrial Mobilization Program during the post-war period was carefully traced in a report, *The Militarization of America*, published by the National Council against Conscription (1013 18th Street, Washington 6, D.C.) in January, 1948. The plan is now receiving "popular" publicity. In the syndicated newspaper magazine section, *This Week* (for Oct. 31 a writer informs the public of the "mobilization blueprints" which "top military and civilian strategists" are working on to assure the efficient drafting of the total of seventy-five million people who, it is said, will be needed "if another conflict breaks out." The demands of the

military, as described in *This Week*, include fifteen million men and women in uniform and sixty million civilians in a "tightly controlled labor force." With the exception of the "institutional population" in asylums and prisons, every able-bodied person between eighteen and sixty-five may be ordered "to work or fight." The local draft board will have almost omnipotent power over practically everybody except the suckling and the dying. The entire nation is to be made into a vast and intricately organized war machine.

This program, it goes without saying, will have little or no effectual *political* opposition, should war come. It is no longer pertinent to urge that people *do* something to stop this terrible trend. It is no longer, therefore, a political problem, but a personal one—a personal moral problem.

Nor is it a religious problem, as "religion" is popularly understood in the United States. The same Mr. Charles E. Wilson who declared in 1944 that industrial mobilization for war "must be, once and for all, a *continuing* program, and not the creature of an emergency," is also chairman of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. There is reason to think that he is equally interested in mobilizing the forces of religion to help supply "morale" in the next war. In an article in the November *Ladies' Home Journal*, "God and the American People," critical inventory is taken of the religious beliefs of Americans, apparently to see if our stockpile of "faith" is big enough to cope with Communist atheism; and, to provide a kind of text for this article, Mr. Wilson is quoted as calling the present "cold war" a contest between "the God-fearing power of democracy and the God-hating power of Communism." In a confirmatory mood, the writer of the article adds that "inevitably, history shows, the irreligious state is a police state," contending that "any government that rejects the moral sanctions of religion has to employ other means of maintaining social order."

The *Ladies' Home Journal* writer, Lincoln Barnett, also says that "democracy, with its reverence for the individual conscience, is a product of religious ethics." This statement would make more sense if he had called attention to the fact that the Founding Fathers deliberately created the American Republic a *secular* State, neither religious nor irreligious, for the precise purpose of preserving that reverence for "the individual conscience." According to the First Amendment to the Constitution, the American Government can neither approve nor reject "the moral sanctions of religion." To do either would be to ignore the clear meaning of the Bill of Rights. He might have noted, further, that while the avowedly irreligious State of Soviet Russia is undoubtedly a "police state," the avowedly religious states of past history have been police states, too. Mr. Barnett should study the history of the Roman Church, with special attention to the activities of the Inquisition. He should recall, also, that Henry VIII and some of his equally bloody successors employed "the moral sanctions of religion" in ways peculiarly oppressive to individual conscience. John Calvin's theocratic rule of the city of Geneva and the similar policies of his Puritan imitators in New England are further examples of "religious" statecraft which Mr. Barnett ought to consider.

But suppose we agree with the *Journal* article and say that democracy, with its respect for personal moral freedom, is a product of religious ethics. What, exactly, does this mean? It means, we think, that democracy is founded on the idea that every human being is, in essence, an immortal soul with a transcendental destiny. And what, in turn, does this mean? By *soul*, we can understand only the idea of a free moral agent—a being with the inviolable right and the inalienable capacity to choose between truth and error, good and evil, wisdom and folly, for himself. Any definition of soul which leaves out this meaning is, we think, not worth repeating. What, then, is an immortal soul? This must mean, it seems to us, that the good of the soul lies on both sides of death; that

death is only an incident in the life of the soul—the end of one interval of moral growth, and, in all likelihood, the beginning of another.

As we read both history and biography, faith in the soul and the soul's immortality is the foundation of moral courage in human life. We do not say that moral courage is never displayed by persons who disbelieve in soul and immortality, but that those who have moral courage and are also able to *support it on rational grounds*, have been men convinced of the immortality of the soul. Plato, in the *Apology*, the *Crito* and the *Phaedo*, can best explain what we mean.

In other words, a man who thinks of himself as an immortal soul is a man who can live, *wholeheartedly*, without fear. He lives in a material world, but he is consciously working out a higher destiny. You can crucify him, break him on the wheel, burn him at the stake, bury him alive in a concentration camp or drop an atom bomb on his wife and children; you can do all these things, but you cannot make him lie or steal or betray the ideals he believes a man should live by. Thus, Democracy, as "reverence for individual conscience," means that organized society is prevented, by constitutional law, from trying to force anyone, by these or other means, to do things which he believes are wrong, are contrary to the moral direction of his life as a soul.

The crux of democracy lies in the fact that a certain fearlessness is necessary to all, if freedom of conscience is to be allowed to some. Free men have to possess confidence in one another. How can you allow freedom of religion to others unless you believe that those others, like yourself, are competent to work out their own salvation? Or, to reverse the situation, if you believe that you are unable to defend yourself against the attack of some enemy—if you think yourself incompetent in the face of physical danger—and are unwilling to accept the personal consequences of your weakness, you will want other men to be conscripted into an army to defend *you*.

The question that ought to be asked by everyone-but occurs to almost nobody—is, What would happen if the modern states had only voluntary armies? Armies, that is, in which men served only by free choice? This is a question, of course, that no one can answer except on the basis of numerous and large assumptions. It cannot be answered at all without making ultimate judgment about the moral attitudes of human beings. If you think the world can be divided up into good and bad people, according to external religion, foreign policy or national "aspirations," then you are an isolationist regarding morality, and you will believe in physical or military intervention and everything that goes with it—strategic alliances, national totalitarian control for industrial and manpower resources—and you will believe in the absolute sovereignty of the military community, instead of the absolute sovereignty of the moral individual.

But if you think that "moral power" is more than a verbal expression used by visionaries and impractical men like Gautama Buddha and Jesus Christ and M. K. Gandhi, you will decide that the quality of human society is determined by the degree of fearlessness attained by the human beings who make it up. You will believe that no compromise is possible between the integrity of man as a soul, a free moral agent, and the moral isolationism which begins with expectation of war and the organization of the entire community in preparation for war, and ends with the absolute despotism of fear.

It is true that only a very few people have taken one or the other of these extreme positions. There are not many Hitlers, not many Gandhis, in the modern world. There are mostly half-consistent, verbally disguised Hitlerian tendencies, and weakly supported, half-hearted Gandhian tendencies. The idea of having to choose between these two extremes seems a kind of alarmist fanaticism to most people. It is, they think, "too simple" a formulation of the problems confronting the world. Human affairs are too involved with

inconsistencies and irrational intrusions of the unexpected. They still believe, although with growing apprehensiveness, that some sort of "political" balance can be struck between the democratic forms of freedom and the despotic or totalitarian forms of military security. They maintain this, although with an underlying desperation, because they want it to be true, not because there is any convincing evidence that it *is* true. They want it to be true for two reasons: first, because they fear that there is no other kind of freedom except political freedom to be had; and second, if there should be some other kind of freedom, such as moral freedom, they suspect, and rightly, that it will require of them the strenuous moral courage that belongs naturally only to heroes, saints and martyrs. And since when have the teachers, statesmen and religious leaders of Western civilization told their people that they must be heroes, saints and martyrs, in order to be free?

Heroes, saints and martyrs, whatever else they may be, are nonconformers to evil: they are at war with the evil of their times. They are what they are because they see the evil others do not see.

What is the hidden evil, today? Its most thinly disguised expression is, we think, a deep-seated psychological delusion—the delusion that freedom can be won by political means. It is this delusion which is betraying the billions of the world into a servitude which will last as long as the delusion itself. It is this delusion which has made the atom bomb, the guided missile, the bacteriological poison, the military cloister for scientific genius, the propaganda techniques of distrust, hate and fear and the tight harness of conscription for the entire population become acceptable as the means, the best means, the only *reliable* means—the means which nothing can persuade us, in our collectivity as a nation, to get along without—for sheer human survival. There is only one kind of politics, today—the politics of war. Who can name a single political idea which

is free from practical bondage to military necessity? First things come first, and in our society, war comes first.

The only real survival worth talking about is the survival in the individual man of the determination to live his own life and to die his own death. Political freedom can be destroyed by political events, but nothing can destroy moral freedom except the individual, for himself. Political events can circumscribe and confine moral freedom until it is only a state of mind—but the mind is the essence of moral freedom, its place of origin, its true harbor and the source of its renewal. A hero, a saint or a martyr is only a man who never stops trying to burst the circumstantial and political confinements of moral freedom, who is incurably determined to make moral freedom *more* than a state of mind—to make it, that is, a community affair, a cultural affair, and not just a personal affair.

What the world needs today is men and women who will recognize no necessity greater than moral necessity in their lives and who will live by its mandate. A man *could*, of course, suppose that the politics of war and moral necessity are the same thing—but *how many do*?

The choice between living a morally free, individual life and accepting the compulsions of despotism is now becoming inescapable for the common man. Since last August, nine young men have been arrested for refusing to register in the draft. So far, three have been convicted and one sentenced to two years in a Federal prison. To refuse to register is only one of the ways in which a man can declare his allegiance to moral freedom, but it seems to be an important one, these days. In a free society, a man ought to be able to refuse to take part in a system which in wartime will consecrate the entire resources of his nation to indiscriminate destruction of other human beings. A society which imprisons nineteen-year-old youths for so refusing is no longer a free society, but is on the way to becoming a slave society. For those youths, it is already a slave society.

Meanwhile, those who make it their "duty" to interpret the despotism of fear to the common man are redefining the meaning of democracy to suit the requirements of military necessity. The *This Week* article previously quoted explains that numerous "inconveniences" will have to be imposed upon, and be borne willingly by, the entire population during the next war. The war, we learn, is "dreaded" by the military experts who plan total conscription. High military authorities, filled with sympathy for the regimented masses, are devising clever techniques to increase the respect for human personality during wartime. Benign psychologists will keep square pegs out of round holes in the services. A less painful inoculating needle has been invented. The General heading the Selective Service System—"who looks about as much like a general as Einstein"—has a humane, neighborly feeling for the boys drafted into the Army. They're not, just numbers out of a hat to *him*.

The next war will be streamlined for efficiency and deep human understanding of the conscript population. The common man will have everything except the right to think and to choose for himself whether he will take part in an operation that will almost certainly doom millions of other human beings to sudden or slow and agonizing death, and most of the survivors to unspeakable and unending misery.

We have an article of faith—a dogma, if you will—to propose. It is that human life, to remain human, to be preserved from falling to a subhuman level, must afford an alternative to all this. If there is no political alternative, there has to be a personal alternative. We could be wrong in our choice, *but not wrong in demanding the right to choose*.

This proposition implies a second, which is that human beings, if they are to deepen and live by their sense of moral necessity, need to regard themselves as souls pursuing a course of moral evolution. What can moral freedom mean, unless it encompasses a higher destiny than physical

survival? And without the will to live for a higher destiny than mere physical survival, no freedom—political or moral—can long endure.

Letter from **GERMANY**

BERLIN.—Here, Opinion among all classes regards the Russian occupation as increasingly objectionable. In their effort to check the political progress of the Western powers in Europe and in Berlin itself, the Russians find that their measures to impede the Allies are also making life more restricted and more difficult than ever for Berliners. It becomes pertinent, therefore, to draw a parallel between the former totalitarian regime of Germany (the Nazi government) and present occupation conditions in the Eastern zone. Each totalitarian regime began its rule with the promise to "clean up" the "unbearable conditions" and to bring about a brighter future. But in both cases, old conditions were removed only to be followed by *new* unbearable conditions. In both cases, the policies followed at last produced a vacuum of public opinion, nearing the end of the totalitarian regime; a totalitarian regime itself constitutes the negative pole of public opinion—and nothing else seems to follow. The breakdown of the regime—usually enforced from the outside, although prepared by its own rottenness from within—is preceded by a collapse of public regard for the totalitarian regime.

This point of development has already been reached in Berlin and in the Eastern zone. The crisis resulting from general refusal to accept the Russian ideology is clearly recognized and reaches far into the Russian-controlled party, *i.e.*, the Socialist Unity Party (SED). With the changing of the international situation and the growing strength of the Western bloc, this development will be of importance.

Not unnaturally, there is also growing expectation in Berlin that the present political system in Russia will sooner or later fall—probably sooner—under the steady although never quite-in-the-open pressure of the enormous economic and military strength of the Western Allies. Thus, after 30 years of struggle for

survival and possible expansion, the days of the Soviet Union are seen as numbered, the lives of its leaders endangered, the great experiment of a "Socialist island"—as it pretended to be—approaching an end.

But the connection between the radical workers' movement all over the world and the present political system in Russia is still of some importance. While the military leaders of the West regard this workers' movement as a potential "fifth column" in a future war, what will happen to this workers' movement when its "spiritual leader"—"Socialist" Russia—has disappeared?

There is the following possibility: should the present Soviet system be destroyed—either from without, or by an inner "explosion," *i.e.*, a clash between the bureaucrats and the militarists or other factions—a great ideological and spiritual awakening in the Communist and leftist parties or movements in other countries will follow. The scholastic "freezing" of Marxist thought in Russia and elsewhere—especially in Russia, where Marxism has become the State ideology and catechism—will then be finished, and a new theoretical activity may be expected. There will be fresh and extensive discussion of problems which have seemed to be set aside in the course of history. Certain humanistic traditions of socialism will again come to the surface.

It seems, from observing dissident groups of former Communist (SED) partisans in Berlin, that the ideological re-awakening will start with pronounced criticism of so-called "Leninism," a "theory" which ruled—due to the initial apparent success of the Russian revolution—the heads and hearts of radical workers respecting their leaders throughout the whole world. Lenin is sometimes spoken of as the man who first introduced into the Bolshevik Party the slogan, "The end justifies the means," a slogan which should—by the justice of history—in the end destroy the moral backbone of his own party and his own former companions, with the exception of a few (the worst ones!). But the importance of Lenin as theorist lies also in

his conceptions of (1) materialist philosophy, (2) imperialism, (3) proletarian dictatorship, (4) party organisation. The criticism of Leninism will probably start, among socialists, with these problems, and, quite possibly, the unwholesome moral principle of Lenin—that the end justifies the means—will be as severely attacked as his other political theorems.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

TWO NOVELS

WHENEVER Somerset Maugham or Thomas Mann turns up with a new novel, Book Club members are certain to find it on their bill of fare. This, we suspect, is because these authors, among others, have established themselves as the exponents of ultra-sophistication, and because the Book Club judges know that if there is any one thing their adherents crave, it is that they should be plentifully supplied with that psychological commodity. Of course, the word sophistication means nothing more than familiarity with the subtle cross-currents of opinion which characterize an intellectual elite. The sophisticate is usually the somewhat cynical eclectic of his age. It is as if he says, "By my indulgence, you, the reader, shall be initiated into the purposelessness of life in a highly fashionable manner. The thing that must be learned is that life is infinitely complicated and also totally inexplicable."

Both Mann's *Dr. Faustus* and Maugham's *Catalina* deal with miraculous experiences, yet evolve no central thesis for their explanation. Here, for the hundredth time, we see the infiltration of a popular emotional trend into novel writing, accomplished by "artists" who know that when a public state of mind is reflected in the imaginative terms of fiction, it seems daring and provocative to the very public whose psychological habits called it forth. *Dr. Faustus*, especially, indulges the new fashion of exploring the supernatural "artistically." It is as if the author has decided that there is nothing more worth writing about in the common experiences of the everyday world.

Mann presents us with the life of a German musician who, we are led to believe, makes some kind of pact with the Devil in order to release his creative energies for the mastery of music. It is obvious that while Mann intends the story to be symbolic, he does not intend it to be altogether so. Apparently, he wishes his readers to speculate as

to whether, in some entirely illogical manner, the Devil *really* exists. Those who are familiar with Mann's *Magic Mountain* will recognize the author's continued preoccupation with the interconnectedness of sensuality and disease. This might be set down as a carefully re-worked Freudian thesis. But in Mann's philosophy, the relation of death and disease to sexual experience takes on another aspect. All warmth and tenderness is, to Mann, dependent upon the existence of sensuality. But, when the tenderness and warmth are abstracted, sensuality becomes destructive. The man who is drawn either to human tenderness or, inexplicably, toward the fascination of disease and death, is not able to release himself adequately for creative mental endeavor. The musician, Leverkuhn, leaves both sensuality and tenderness behind him in order to become a "genius," and his pact with the Devil offers him that release. Yet Mann is not released from the demands made on the human mind by sensuality, for Leverkuhn's supposed advance to cold, intellectual musicianship is forever accompanied by the author's Proustian asides.

Finally, Mann may be regarded as having produced a work which richly merits the dislike of literary critics. It is an impressionistic jumble revealing nothing so clearly as the author's desire to escape from the world of meaning. What people can derive from a reading of this work we shall never be able to understand.

Somerset Maugham's *Catalina*, however, was a great surprise. With the exception of two or three chapters in which the writer reverts to his tendency to describe earthy love affairs in a somewhat bawdy manner, *Catalina* seems a genuine help in understanding the motivations and attitudes characteristic of the age of the Spanish Inquisition. This book will make all intelligent Catholics vaguely uneasy, even though it is graced by the surprising appearance of the Blessed Virgin and a succession of heavenly miracles. Maugham seems to be saying, "All right; I will grant, for argument's sake, that religious experience exists

and that all the miracles of religious lore actually took place. But this does not in any way excuse the remarkable perversions of mind encouraged by religious institutions."

A leading character in the book, Don Blasco, is a famous Inquisitor, noted alike for his humility and for the thousands of heretics whom he delivered to the fiery stake. Yet Maugham shows true insight by leading us to understand the sense in which Don Blasco's life is simply an intensification of the tendencies of his age. We consider this book about the most useful of all Maugham's writings, though we would hardly expect the author himself to class it as important. But in *Catalina* Maugham allows himself to be both more human and more indignant at religious decadence than ever before. And since it is really not a sophisticated novel, it becomes a rather good one. The miraculous experiences which might otherwise be regarded as organic to a plot in a conventional Christian setting are compensated for by a deathbed scene. Don Blasco had once gained much of friendship and wisdom from an itinerant Greek scholar who carried with him the aura of Plato and Socrates. Finally, when the Greek is seized by another Inquisitor and condemned to death at the stake, Don Blasco misleads his friend's captor into thinking that some sort of final repentance has taken place, so that the old Greek's torture may be eased. But afterward Blasco himself is tortured by the thought that if he had not succeeded in reducing the final suffering of the Greek, a genuine repentance might have occurred; therefore, he sees himself as possibly responsible for an eternity of torment for his erstwhile friend. Yet when Blasco himself comes to die, the Greek appears before him in a vision and states that his afterlife is a very happy one, since he is able to converse with Socrates and Plato. Blasco dies a more humane man than he was able to be while alive. The falsities of orthodoxy are stripped away and leave, at the last moment, a tolerant soul who no longer fears either God or Devil.

Maugham's introduction of heavenly miracles, unthinkable from his pen of ten years ago, is characteristic of the same desire to escape from naturalism to supernaturalism as is manifested in the work of Mann. But for once, Maugham is neither cynical nor complicated. *Catalina* is a good psychological novel, though its very simplicity may mislead readers to think that it is the least of its author's productions.

COMMENTARY

REVIEW POLICY

FROM time to time, we receive for review books for which no space will be found in MANAS. Generally, we return the review copies of such books to the publishers. Our basic policy is to review only books that we think will be both interesting and valuable to our readers. Occasionally, as with the book club volumes, we review books for what they reflect of broad tendencies in writing and the public taste, rather than for what they are, in themselves. If we think books so noticed are a waste of time, we try always to say so, and to say why.

What we particularly dislike in some of the books that come to us—books sent by writers and publishers probably because of our obvious interest in unorthodox religious ideas and matters like ESP—is the note of pretentiousness that often creeps into works that have a "cult" background. We have no objection to the bizarre, the mystical or "occult," as such, but often the writers on these subjects, we find, are lucid only when they borrow, and dull and unoriginal when they speak for themselves.

If a man wants to bask in the reflected glory of Eastern wisdomism, that is probably all right, so long as he seems trying to be generally consistent with what Eastern philosophy stands for. But he shouldn't use the East for glamor on one page—as in one book we have returned—and then call the atom-bomb a catharsis for a Sodom-like Hiroshima somewhere else. An idea like this last will not mix with any good idea we know of, least of all with the kind of thinking that could produce a Gandhi or a Tagore.

There is something basically wrong with being very "radical" when it comes to the deeper "mysteries" which ordinary folk know nothing about, but agreeing with every last half-baked slogan that the "average man" is supposed to revere. The kind of cultists we are objecting to never go out on any kind of a limb. They are for

God and Country *and* what an unlettered Arab uttered in his trances. Or they think Mr. Roosevelt was a reincarnation of Diocletian, and hurrah for the Nuremberg Trials.

We are not agnostics. Maybe Astrology or the Pyramid Prophecies can help a man to be a better citizen and live a better life. But so far, nobody has explained to us just how.

CHILDREN ... AND OURSELVES

READERS of this column have been helpfully articulate in their comments and criticisms, so that a relatively accurate judgment is possible as to what suggestions on education have seemed useful—and what ones have been confusing or disturbing. Our two brief attempts to stimulate discussion of "parental love" have apparently fallen short of their objective, since some wonder if we have not minimized the deep ties of parent-child relationships by suggesting that love may be either "won" or "lost," or must be continually "earned." The core of our difficulty in writing is very obviously the fact that there are many kinds of love, and that not all of them are easily subjected to the same type of analysis.

We have a certain sympathy for the Romantic Tradition, from which familiar definitions of "love" are mostly derived. But there is also a great vagueness surrounding the Romantic Tradition—a fuzziness which may easily confuse parent-child relationships. If one is considering simply these psychical or emotional ties, moreover, he must be prepared to admit vicissitudes and fluctuations. It might even be said that no *personal* relationship is ever entirely constant. Constancy, in a human relationship, depends upon factors we might almost call *impersonal*: *i.e.*, concern for the welfare of others and for the following of correct principles in conduct. If the strongest loves (not the most turbulent) are the least personal, as we suspect is the case, it seems reasonable to argue that personal affection, while having an excellence of its own, *cannot* be counted upon to be changeless and sure. The emotional aspects of shared love, in other words, are a by-product of integrity and vision. And we have, so far in this column, been speaking primarily of this emotional "middle ground" of love—neither passion nor impersonal tenderness.

Confusion about love can easily lead to a condition where only *pretended* love is known, involving possessiveness, and psychological dependence. Further, if a child receives a great deal of pseudo-love, he will probably grow up thinking that he has all of it he can stand, and that no other kind of love exists. It seems to us, therefore, that discussions concerning love, among parents, and ultimately between parents and children, are a necessary insurance against emotional misunderstanding, maladjustment, and even hypocrisy. When we say, "Of *course* I love my child all the time," may we not in fact be arguing for a periodical pretense of affection? It is, after all, impossible for any two human beings to exist in a state of perfect emotional and mental rapport without at least temporary interruption.

Often, it is true, a quality of *stability* is given to a human relationship because one or both of the persons involved perceive that, regardless of ups and downs, the type of relationship is valuable, or its opportunities exceptional. Here we may recognize the values adhering to such words as "family responsibility," "duty," and "constant devotion." The practice of these virtues, especially if not confused with the feeling of spontaneous love, may even make that feeling possible.

At one time we offered this broad definition of love—"the outgoing of the soul towards that which is regarded as excellent." If we have children, we shall probably feel that the family situation itself is "excellent," and we will devote ourselves consistently to seeing that the most is made of the opportunities for human improvement within that situation. We can, in a sense, "love" the family situation—even if we do not feel affectionate toward all of its members all of the time. Further, we can show a constant "love" for the potentialities of the child-potentialities which we may rightly feel can never be entirely obliterated by harmful actions on the part of the child. But we shall wholly *love the child, as an individual*, only when we find his unique qualities to be "excellent," and when we *feel them*

manifesting through his actions and attitudes. This is no more than to say that each of our children must stand in the same love-relation to us as does anyone else in the world. They, too, must win our moral approval, to be fully loved. There can be no real love without moral approval. Emotional involvement is not love. Love, even in the romantic sense, must be a blending of emotional approval and moral approval.

If a child violates the integrity of a promise or seeks to injure or deceive another person for his own gain, we cannot feel the full manifestation of "love" toward that child. There is an interruption of feeling, whether or not we like to admit it, and to conceal that interruption from the child is extremely detrimental—if we are seeking to prepare a youngster for constructive life with other human beings. If the child does any of those love-numbing things, he should know that his parents are standing by, willing to help him in any of the predicaments his actions have precipitated, but it is also necessary for him to know that he has *lost* their moral approval by his action, and that if he wishes it back again he will have to work for it—not by seeking to please or placate his parents, but by striving for integrity. We cannot give any human being our spontaneous affection while watching him retrogress to weakness or compromise. Instead, we are sad, and perhaps the feeling of desire to help is stronger than the feeling of affection. As we see it, our most severe critics on this matter of love between parents and children believe that the parent should be constant and consistent in giving attention to the needs of the child. Such attention, we agree, shows responsibility, and an admirable devotion—but it is not identical with love.

If we have in mind the sort of love encouraged by great religious teachers (which we once described as "universal fairness"), we will never weigh our actions in favor of any human being because of blood-ties—not when "our" child acts in a manner we would condemn in anyone else. If we mean by love psychological rapport of

strongly-felt sharing between people—and this is the accepted version in the western world—we only love when we are *able* to love, and when the other person involved *enables* us to love him. In educative relations, responsibility and love should not be confused, even though a genuine expression of either aspect of a human bond will almost inevitably inspire something of the other. We recommend treating children as beings capable of giving of themselves freely and fully, in such a way as to increase affection and "love" in the world.

FRONTIERS

RELIGION AND CHARLES DARWIN

THE things that men will do, ostensibly in the service of religion, are a source of never-ending amazement. The particular instance at hand is an anti-evolution leaflet by a rabid defender of Genesis who invites the reader to write him personally, if "anxious of soul."

Apparently, the people who get out such leaflets feel perfectly free to distort, misrepresent and generally to falsify the views of eminent scientists, secure in the belief that such dishonesties, if on behalf of God, are somehow purified of fault. Quite possibly, some of the scientific theories are wrong—but how could that justify a falsifying attack upon them? What sort of a God would want such a defense for his Revelation?

In the leaflet we speak of, the writer, attacking the idea of organic evolution, attributes to Charles Darwin the words, "We cannot prove that a single species has been changed," giving as reference page 210 of Vol. I of "My Life and Letters," supposedly by Darwin himself. Other quotations, one from Haeckel and one from Virchow, are intended to shatter the Evolution Theory into bits. Having on hand the two volumes of the *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, edited by his son and published by Appleton in 1887, we found the reference to Darwin so misrepresented that we haven't bothered to look up the other statements.

The only thing right about the Darwin reference is the page number. The title of the book is given incorrectly; the statement occurs in Vol. II instead of Vol. I; it is not by Darwin, and it is a misquotation, the word "been" not appearing in the original. Actually, the quotation is an interpolation by Francis Darwin, inserted between brackets to explain a clause in the postscript of a letter written by Darwin to

Bentham in 1863. The entire postscript reads as follows:

P.S.—In fact, the belief in Natural Selection must at present be grounded entirely on general considerations. (1) On its being a *vera cause*, from the struggle for existence; and the certain geological fact that species do somehow change. (2) From the analogy of change under domestication by man's selection. (3) And chiefly from this view connecting under an intelligible point of view a host of facts. When we descend to details, we can prove that no one species has changed [i.e. we cannot prove that a single species has changed]; nor can we prove that the supposed changes are beneficial, which is the groundwork of the theory. Nor can we explain why some species have changed and others have not. The latter case seems to me hardly more difficult to understand precisely and in detail than the former case of supposed change. Bronn may ask in vain, the old creationist school and the new school, why one mouse has longer ears than another mouse, and one plant more pointed leaves than another plant.

The statement attributed to Darwin by the writer of the religious tract was an awkward explanation by Darwin's son of an equally awkward clause by the great evolutionist, neither of which, obviously, has the meaning given it by the religious author, for this meaning is twice flatly contradicted in the same paragraph. It is apparent that the writer of the tract had not the slightest interest in what Darwin *meant* to say.

Mr. Darwin, we think, was a great man and a great scientist. We have no particular reverence for his theory concerning the descent of man, as he puts it, "from some member of the Simiidae." We agree with a later anthropologist, Henry Fairfield Osborn, in thinking that Darwin's expression is "misleading." (*Science*, May 20, 1927.) But we had much rather be misled by Charles Darwin than "saved" by this champion of Bible Christianity, if we had to choose between the two.

The point is that no one who followed Darwin's example could be really or permanently "misled." Darwin never adopted another man's conclusions without critical examination. And he was a more severe judge of his own conclusions

than of the views of others. The value in reading a work like the *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* is not so much in the "scientific" information one may acquire—although that would be considerable—but in the discovery of what it means to be a serious scientist. The thing that impresses the reader as much as Darwin's capacity for hard work is the humility of the man, his exceptional patience with his critics and his obvious desire to do complete and even more than justice to those with whom he disagreed.

Darwin's thoughts on religion are well expressed in various letters. To one inquirer, a student, he wrote, "I may say that the impossibility of conceiving that this grand and wondrous universe, with our conscious selves, arose through chance, seems to me the chief argument for the existence of God; but whether this is an argument of real value, I have never been able to decide."

On immortality, he wrote:

Believing as I do that man in the distant future will be a far more perfect creature than he now is, it is an intolerable thought that he and all other sentient beings are doomed to complete annihilation after such long-continued slow progress. To those who fully admit the immortality of the human soul, the destruction of our world will not appear so dreadful.

His final remarks on the subject of religion were these:

I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic.

The profound lesson of the thought of Charles Darwin is, we think, in the absolute honesty and undeviating fearlessness with which he faced the problems of both science and religion. These qualities seem to us to be greater and more important than any scientific or metaphysical theory, for if a man has them, he is potentially capable of discovering whatever truth really exists; and without them, he will find out nothing worth knowing at all. Further, these qualities might easily be regarded as forming a

"metaphysic" of human behavior. They are principles of conduct and therefore judgments about the nature of things. Actually, the study of Darwin's life brings home the conclusion that first principles, to be worth anything at all, must be moral principles. In contrast, his Fundamentalist critics seem oblivious to moral principles in their zeal to discredit evolutionary theory.

Such Fundamentalists, it may be quickly admitted, are hardly representative of the best in Christian thought. Educated Christians would not dream of denying the fact of organic evolution. The *Christian Century*, for example recently published a thoughtful appreciation of Darwin by Edwin G. Conklin, a leading biologist and former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The attacks on evolution are usually by ignorant men who imagine that fanaticism is a substitute for learning and that loyalty to their God will take the place of all ordinary human responsibility.

But what, it may be asked, is wrong with a religion that makes ignorant men arrogant, and even proud of their ignorance? Why do Old Testament Christians, in order to praise their God, so often find it necessary to blaspheme against man? The more sophisticated Christians, while deploring the fact both publicly and privately, never discuss at any length the cause of this "religious" phenomenon. If they had the same determination to know the truth as Charles Darwin, they would do so.