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THE GOOD SOCIETY

A MANAS reader, assuming for the purpose of discussion that "true" social ideas can be arrived at by intensive thinking and continuous self-criticism, goes on to ask some questions:

> Can these ideas be applied to the betterment of society, except through the illusory and time-honored process of organization and mass-emotion? Are there revolutionaries who possess the inspiration, the willingness to sacrifice, the leadership, or whatever it may take to accomplish this?

Why, first of all, is the attempt to better society by organization and mass-emotion "illusory"? The answer seems to be that this method turns the process of human betterment inside out. It seeks the good society, not in better men, but in better arrangements for man. That is, no one who approaches the social question as though it were a problem in arrangements seems to know much about man himself, and is ignorant, therefore, of what is good for man.

We should, perhaps, be grateful, in a backhand sort of way, for the resistance of "the masses" to the countless projects for social and personal reform offered during the past fifty years—grandiose schemes for human betterment that have never gone much further than the literary stage of development. It is dismaying, when you come to think about it, that so many well-intentioned people have felt able to draw up blueprints for an ideal human society, and yet exhibit, in doing so, an almost deliberate disregard for the inner psychological and moral life of mankind.

This judgment is not affirmed from some peak of psychological omniscience, but simply from noticing the fact that recent utopian literature lays its greatest stress on the material and political appointments of the "ideal" society, whereas what men really need is the desire, the capacity and the perspective necessary to define for themselves the meaning of the human struggle.

Who can describe in anything but psychological terms the matrix of moral intelligence? Because Lincoln was born in a log cabin, shall we seek a lonely acre equipped with a hand-plow and a goat? Because education proceeds most naturally in a "real life" situation, shall we transform the schoolroom into a country store and provide classroom imitations of courts of justice and of national parliamentary procedures on the supposition that "socially conscious citizens" are manufactured in this way? The Quakers had another such mechanical theory when they invented the "penitentiary" for the punishment of men who break the law. Because great thoughts are sometimes born in solitude, the wicked, they said, must be placed in isolation by themselves and made to think their way to penitence and moral regeneration. The theory has not worked.

"World without friction, Amen," is the utopian slogan, "Mind without complexes," the psychiatric goal. The one would re-arrange the distribution of material goods and attempt to rein by come sociological magic, as yet undescribed, the exercise of economic and political power. The other would remove all cause of inner conflict, lay bare the human psyche like an autopsized cadaver, and explain the moral mysteries away.

We see no help for it but to declare as an unavoidable conclusion that the betterment of society depends upon the adoption of uncompromised transcendental ideals, and upon nothing else. The material circumstances of life, whether social or personal, can never be anything more than just that—circumstances, not ends. We may, and should, campaign for human equality in the matter of economic welfare. We may, and

should, labor for the relief of the oppressed, and for the principle of freedom in all human relationships, but these efforts should be conceived of as serving basic human integrity, and not as the means to an ideal social order.

Anything less than spiritual ideals for human life will inevitably produce all the abuses against which reformers and revolutionaries working on the Better-Arrangements theory have vainly contended for hundreds of years. The idea that human good can reside in arrangements is basic to every rigid caste system know to history. It is the key assumption which supports acquisitiveness in economic life. If a man's happiness, his merit, is measured by his goods, he will want and try to get more goods than other men. If arrangements are the path of Utopia, determined radicals will lie and shoot their way to power, that they may then do "good" for the mass of mankind.

Better Arrangements in religion have been the making of priestly power, through dogmas of salvation and the pseudo-moral system of the churches. And now, with the new psychological creed of the psychiatrists, a complete moral neutrality is taking the place of old beliefs, as though a complacent adjustment to present circumstances were all that is needed for "mental health." While the psychiatric solution of human ills offers no particular theory of the best arrangements for the contents of the psyche, the untangling of neurotic behavior-patterns does nothing, of itself, to fill the purposeless void of modern life. If the psychopath is a rebel without a cause, psychotherapy is a means without an end. A statement of this sort, of course, implies that mental health involves living for some ideal purpose. That is what we wish to affirm: that psychology which ignores the moral end of human life is headless and heartless—a scientific monstrosity. Such a psychology will always find itself subservient to the prevailing theory of Arrangements, a mere technique at the disposal of propagandists of the status quo.

Are there, then, people who are willing to live and act according to transcendental ideals? —and who possess, in the words of our correspondent, the inspiration, the willingness to sacrifice, or whatever it may take to apply such ideals for the betterment of society?

We believe there are; otherwise, there would be no reason for publishing this magazine. We are convinced that there are numerous men and women in the United States and in all other countries who are already doing what they can in this direction, and who will take pleasure in hearing of each other's efforts, gain conviction and strength from sharing one another's thoughts.

There are teachers, professionals, scientific workers, craftsmen, office workers, housewives and home-makers, all of whom are endeavoring to live in the light of ideals. The spirit of Bronson Alcott is not dead in education. In countless classrooms there are individuals who look upon children and older students as souls, pilgrims engaged in the timeless odyssey of the spirit, seeking to understand. Everywhere, there are minds uplifted by the vision of mankind as a great spiritual alliance, who see the imprint of immortality on every human face. The world is full of people who are quietly acting on principle, eager for a more conscious fraternity with others in whom the same faith lives. These people are the builders of human culture. They create the atmosphere of true civilization, transmit respect for faithfulness in word and deed and make the moral sense the highest law in human relations.

We do not wish to sound prophetic, and yet, we cannot forebear to say that the present seems a time of birth for human culture. Or perhaps it is only the time of conception. But the omens, both historical and contemporary, are all about. Looking dispassionately at the record of history, one is persuaded that this epoch is unique in offering opportunity for the beginning of a free society. Today, as never before, there is a nucleus of individuals, isolated, but united in their free-thinking independence, who will never return to

the delusions of the past. They have rejected the blinders of religious dogma; they have accepted the rigor of scientific method without the materialism of scientific polemics; and they are free, also, of the political fallacy—they know that the human enterprise does not proceed by manifestos or plebiscites, but by the slow, sure growth of character and the shared excellence of the quest for truth.

They know that the building of a civilization is an organic process, like to the evolution of a plant succession, in which the diversity of human life finds its best flowering through the conscious symbiosis of human cooperation, and that this will be attained when enough individuals can see, quite literally, the whole in the part of the human family, and the part in the whole. Each individual human relationship will then become an expression of the unavoidable symmetry of the great brotherhood of all; and, schooled by this mood, each one will find his place and his true freedom in that place. And so, the Whole will be the God of each, and each will feel himself to be a moment of the Universal Self, his life a movement of the Spirit within eternity.

This is no dream, no spun imagining. It is but the articulation of the secret in every man's heart. A man looks another man in the eye and feels a community of being, a yearning for the deep friendship of equals—a hope that here, at last, is found the trust that was so long sought. And why should it not be so?

For ages, men have denied themselves the fellowship they need. They have hidden themselves in high places or in degradation. They have let creed, a color, an accent—Oxford or East Side—set them apart. They have feared one another, envied one another, fought one another, for the sake of Arrangements—for wealth, for status, for purity of religion or for purity of race. They have fought each other for these lies and these delusions. They have tried to make big lies serve little truths, and little truths serve big lies.

The divisions among men will not be ended by a new set of arrangements. To break the spell of human separation, we need to know the truth about man. We need to acknowledge that the human essence is inside, not outside, the man. That nothing outside a man can save him or damn him. That this moment of history is as sacred a moment of the human drama as any other; that peace and honor and brotherhood are arteries of the common life, growing from the past, through the present into the future, which cannot be cut today and joined again tomorrow, but must continue, unbroken, for all, throughout all time. This is the truth, the religion of mankind, that we must learn to believe and to practice.

Letter from
CENTRAL EUROPE

INNSBRUCK.—Two years ago, when I thought the miseries of post-war life in Central Europe, the hunger drilling in the entrails of mankind, hardly bearable any more, I reminded myself that children are sometimes told fairy tales to hide from them the sad facts of life as long as possible. Deciding to do something similar, I composed a list of good books originating in periods which seemed to me to have been happy ones for human society, and went to the library. I believed that such reading would let me forget, for a few hours at least, the troubles and strife of the present.

I started with ancient Greek philosophers and ended, not long ago, with a historian of the last century. Although I found much consolation in this reading, it came in a manner different from what I had expected. The books I read were chapters in the history of mankind, in which the writers had undertaken to describe and judge their own times—and just there was the surprise hidden. Chapter by chapter, and day by day, each period of reading was a stone broken out of the colossal building which I had imagined to be the historical monument of mankind. Sometimes I even forgot that the descriptions dealt with times gone by. Among the first was the following:

"This unfortunate generation has already paid its just tribute to misery. What calamities has it not suffered? Many have perished in the best part of their country, others have been forced to wander with their wives and children through inhospitable lands. Let the leaders contrive means to put an end to our present troubles. The treaties of peace are insufficient for their purpose—they may retard, but can never prevent our misfortunes. We stand in need of some durable plan, which ought to end our hostilities for ever, and unite us by the lasting ties of mutual affection and fidelity!" So exclaimed Isocrates in *Panegyricus* about 400 B.C.

Desiderius Erasmus, the founder of Humanism, at the end of the Middle Ages, asked in a letter to the Abbot of Hugshofen: "What pious man would not recognize this century as the most corrupt? When have tyranny and covetousness ruled more grossly and more licentiously? At what time had anything malignant a more free course than it has at present? Has love ever been so frozen?

"I notice with surprise," stated Queen Christina of Sweden, a little more than a century later, "that the insecurity of Europe grows steadily. Every nation lives in fear of the other, but no one can explain why it is threatened, and every one accuses the other of confining its right to live. Now, as peace has come, try to shape the peace securely, or the ruin of the world is near!"

And the British historian, Thomas Macaulay, wrote in his classical *History of England* about a hundred years ago: "Around us, the world twists in the heavy convulsions of the great nations. Governments which seemed to have stability for eternity have been unexpectedly shaken and are broken down . . . All those evil emotions, eagerness for profit and eagerness for revenge, class-conflicts, and race-hatred, have violently withdrawn from the control of the divine and human laws. Fear and sorrow shade the face and depress the hearts of millions. Doctrines which are strange to our philosophy, our art, our diligence and our domestic virtues—doctrines which, in reality, would destroy everything that thirty centuries have done for mankind, and would turn the most beautiful regions of France and Germany into a desert like those of the Congo or Patagonia—have been proclaimed from the pulpits and defended by the sword. Europe suffers from a menace to be subjugated."

As I have said, the knowledge of these opinions and descriptions turned out to be of a certain consolation to me. We exaggerate our sorrows, I thought—our times are not worse than others have been since the dawn of civilization. But is it not remarkable that authors who were supposed to be wise could be so pessimistic—after all, in spite of their prophecies, the world and our life still continues.

Perhaps we need not be so fearful of annihilation, after all. Many parts of the globe are still "uncivilized," and annihilation, it seems, can only be complete when "civilization" is complete.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
THE SOCIALIST DILEMMA

PRESENT-DAY socialists—those who speak of "democratic socialism," as distinguished from the totalitarian partisans of Communism—are faced with the problem of how to achieve power without taking it, how to use it without monopolizing it. Leon Blum, the French Socialist who was Premier during the fall of France, devoted to this difficulty the final chapters of *For All Mankind*, a book written in a prison of the Vichy Government. "The problem of civilization," he said, "as it has been seen ever since humanity became conscious of itself, is precisely that of replacing animal energies by disciplined, harmonized, and spiritualized forces, of transforming savage idolatries and bigotries into reasoned certainties, or into convictions based on the demands of the individual conscience."

But can a political party attain to power by suppressing the "animal energies"? Turning from Leon Blum to another "school" of socialism—one that did gain power—we find Max Eastman saying of Leon Trotsky: "He was a man with an extreme social ideal and enough mechanical instinct to know that the only force capable of achieving such an ideal is the organized self-interest of the oppressed classes." Blum, however, sees the downfall of the social movement in the unleashing of self-interest. He speaks continually of self-sacrifice, of the need for the socialist party to be "better, nobler, and worthier than all others in public activities, in its political doctrines and in the ethical motives" behind them. He refers to Jaures, the great French socialist and pacifist who was assassinated at the outbreak of the first World War, as having transformed the Marxian logic into humanitarian idealism:

> It was Juares who added to Marx the demonstration that the social revolution is not merely the inexorable consequence of economic evolution, but would satisfy also the eternal demands of man's reason and conscience. So, in his view, Socialism was to become the realization and the justification of the glorious watchwords of the French Revolution, "the Rights of Man and the Citizen," and "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," and through Socialism the heroism of the fighters for democracy, whose struggles have filled Europe and the world for a century, would find its highest expression and triumph. Thus Jaures infused into the materialist conception of history all the idealism of the creeds of democracy and human brotherhood.

Then, Blum asks:

> Do we make enough of this idealist teaching in our day-to-day propaganda? Were we emphatic enough in refusing in all circumstances to have recourse to the cruder instincts of the human animal, to brutality, envy, and malice? Did we remember always to appeal only to the nobler sentiments of the human mind, to its inborn need of justice, affection and fraternity? It is often argued that it is useless to change social institutions until the mentality of the individual has changed, and the argument has too often been a convenient justification for the indefinite postponement of necessary changes. But have we, in fact, done what lay in our power to change the individual human unit, while we tried to change society? Did we carry on the two tasks together as we should have done, so that they intermingled and supported each other?

It should be remembered that Blum wrote these words in the shadow of the Nazi occupation of his native land, and under the severe conditions of prison life. He had seen and had experienced, firsthand, the sort of energies which were evoked by the angry partisanship of Nazi propaganda. The National Socialists had produced "results," just as, twenty years earlier, "organized self-interest" had served the purposes of the Russian Bolshevik, but Blum admired neither. The events of the fall of France and the opportunism of the collaborationists may have helped him to recognize the incalculable moral disaster that overtakes a political movement which allows a moral abyss to separate its ends and means. For this reason, perhaps, he says, near the close of For All Mankind:

> The task of the Socialist movement is now only one of preaching and conversion. Like the Church in those periods of history when its temporal interests dangerously obscured the real purpose for which it existed, it must now discover the purity of its original inspiration.
>
> Does that mean that religious propaganda is one of the tasks of Socialism? In a sense it does. Spinoza said, "If we have a concept of God, every action that falls within our control must be based on our

> religion." If for what Spinoza calls "the concept of God," we substitute the concept of Humanity, of all mankind, of the universe seen as a whole, the statement remains true. . . .

Here, M. Blum sounds a note reminiscent of the early humanitarian socialists and of others who based their program on moral principles. In America, Edward Bellamy was such a reformer, and in England, Robert Owen. As early as 1848, when the proletarian Chartist movement gave evidence of proto-Marxian animosities which were later to become characteristic of the "Class Struggle," Charles Kingsley, who supported the political demands of "the People's Charter," wrote in criticism of the methods of the Chartists:

> . . . many of you are trying to do God's work with the devil's tools. What is the use of brilliant language about peace, and the majesty of order, and universal love, though it may all be printed in letters a foot long, when it runs in the same train with ferocity, railing, mad, one-eyed excitement, talking itself into a passion like a street woman? Do you fancy that after a whole column spent in stirring men up to fury, a few twaddling copybook headings about "the sacred duty of order" will lay the storm again? What spirit is there but the devil's spirit in bloodthirsty threats of revenge?
>
> . . . I denounce the weapons which you have been deluded into employing to gain you your rights, and the indecency and profligacy which you are letting be mixed with them. Will you strengthen and justify your enemies? Will you disgust and cripple your friends? . . .

Kingsley was a clergyman of the Church of England, but a man of broad interests and catholic spirit who defended the discoveries of Charles Darwin as deepening rather than harming the religious interpretation of Nature. After the failure of the great Chartist demonstration of April, 1848, with F. Dennison Maurice, he founded the Christian Socialist movement, working practically to revive the cooperative movement and attempting, although unsuccessfully, to establish small, self-governing workshops. (Kingsley is probably better known as the author of *Alton Locke*, a story involving England's social problems, *Hypatia*, a remarkable historical novel of fifth-century Alexandria, and the classic of literature for children, *The Water Babies*.)

The dilemma with which Kingsley attempted to deal, as quoted above, and the questioning of Leon Blum, a century later, form the central problem of socialist ethics. Marxists who accept the theory of the Class Struggle have followed Lenin and Trotsky, asserting that a revolutionary movement is under no obligation to conform to any moral standards. Lenin, as Trotsky pointed out in his pamphlet, *Their Morals and Ours*, advocated a "resort to all sorts of devices, manoeuvres, and illegal methods, . . . evasion and subterfuge, in order to penetrate into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on communist work in them at all costs." This is a solution which denies morality itself. Defending Lenin's position, Trotsky claimed these were the "only methods of valid self-defense against the perfidious reformist bureaucracy."

The Communists, therefore, admit no moral problem at all with respect to the methods they employ. While Blum praises Jaures as restoring the ideal of human brotherhood to the socialist movement, the ideological followers of Lenin and Trotsky insist that "the attempt of the moralists to 'improve' Marxism by adding a morality binding on all classes, was in reality, a step by them into the camp of the capitalist class." It goes without saying that the strictures of Kingsley and the questionings of Blum have direct application to the methods of modern communism, which illustrate the practical results, at the level of bureaucratic organization, of political action in disregard of a "morality binding on all classes."

Blum's mistake, of course, is supposing, with Jaures, that it is possible to infuse "into the materialist conception of history all the idealism of the creeds of democracy and human brotherhood." All that is possible from such a combination is either a half-hearted materialism or a compromised brotherhood. Harold Weinstein's *Jean Jaures: A Study of Patriotism in the French Socialist Movement*, shows how the French socialists failed in an attempt to unite these irreconcilable viewpoints; and how, also, the class-struggle idea made the "pure" Marxists unable, on principle, to cooperate with the Third Republic, while the patriotic fervor of the reformist leaders fostered the delusion that

French nationalism and democratic idealism were the same thing. Along with other well-intentioned men, Jaures was susceptible to nationalist propaganda because of his conviction that France was the European stronghold of revolutionary principles, which must be preserved at any cost.

Socialist history, over the century now complete, is fundamentally the history of the struggle of human beings with this dilemma. The ideals of democracy and brotherhood had their development from a metaphysical conception of the human being, and they cannot be engrafted upon revolutionary theory founded on historical materialism. Sooner or later, all human beings involved in the great social movement which began in the eighteenth century have to choose between whole-hearted materialism, which issues, finally, in some form of totalitarianism, and whole-hearted idealism, which is founded on a spiritual conception of man, and issues in a free society. Sometimes that choice comes too late, as in the case of the old Bolshevik in Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, who finally realizing the meaning of the moral conflict within himself, admitted his "counter-revolutionary" humanitarian sympathies and accepted his execution with a clear conscience. Sometimes it comes to minds full of intellectual bewilderment, and then we read of men who renounce the materialism of Communism for the subtler materialism of authoritarian religion.

The last ten years have seen extensive discussion of this problem in the organs of non-party socialist thought. Probably the most searching analysis to date is Dwight Macdonald's *The Root Is Man*, which appeared in two issues of *Politics*, for April and July, 1946. Discussions of similar significance were published in *Enquiry*, a small but provocative journal of independent radical thought that came out irregularly in Chicago from 1942 to 1945. The following passage by Philip Selznick will illustrate the direction in which *Enquiry* contributors were moving:

> The gradualist emphasis is relevant primarily to *institutional* change; it deprecates the uprooting of established forms where subtle transformations are practicable, ever conscious of the limited capacity of men and structures for the absorption of the thoroughgoing and all-pervasive. The bolsheviks do not escape these strictures, for in expunging the presently traditional they are far from casting men into new molds. The most they can achieve is a return to older forms, still founded on the enduring character of the human materials with which they must deal. The gradualist cannot make his peace with the bolshevik revolution for that cuts at the moral groundwork of his society. But he will realize the necessity for a more limited revolt, profound in its ultimate consequences but concentrated against only a relatively small sector of society as we know it. He will, in the course of his action, be ready to defend those gains, received and won, which fashion a restrained, reflective and moral culture. To be sure, the inherent tension between revolution and reformism cannot be erased by the fiat of our own desires; not is it unlikely that the former will, at some stages, spill over whatever dams we may construct. But a prior limitation of goals, founded on a clear conception of alternative consequences, together with the steeping of our movement in a spiritual atmosphere in which only democracy can live, can assure the preservation of its institutionally gradualist character.

Despite the academic language, Mr. Selznick's meaning is clear. He is talking about the dynamics of social change which Gandhi consciously put into practice in India. He has become aware that "the moral groundwork of society" is something that cannot be decreed or voted into being, but must be slowly evolved, step by step, through the deliberate effort of human intelligence. This is a method of resolving the dilemma opposite to that chosen by the communists. It leads to the *rejection* of power over the people, and, in its highest development, would rely entirely upon the voluntary response of individuals to shape their lives in patterns contributing to the common good. And of course, the features of socialism which are so much feared by those who have never taken the trouble to understand this great humanitarian movement, are themselves transformed, by this resolution, into something quite different. Instead of being material threats, they are now ethical goals, to be attained without malice and without compulsion.

COMMENTARY
CHINESE STUDENTS

READERS will recall the single-minded devotion to their country of Chinese students, as briefly described in a review of Robert Payne's *Forever China* (MANAS, May 26). It now appears that the students in Chinese universities are China's sole remaining hope for peace.

Accordingly to the Manchester Guardian for June 17, for more than a year, the students of the universities, supported by some of China's most famous scholars, have been conducting a "war within a war"—a militant protest, that is, against the totalitarianism of the Nationalist Government. In May, 1947, the protest began with student demonstrations demanding an armistice and charging that military, political and commercial selfishness were responsible for continuing the civil war. The demonstrations occurred simultaneously in every one of the twenty large universities in Nationalist territory, involving about forty thousand students. These students, the *Guardian* correspondent says, "represent nine-tenths of the future leadership, military, political, commercial, of a country which is still more than 98% illiterate."

It soon became evident that the Government was determined to oppose the student activity with terrorism. The universities were encircled with barbed wire. Leaders were kidnapped and tortured and starved. One student was arrested last February and released 20 days later "so changed in face and body he was almost unrecognizable." Such excesses, the reports make clear, are the not uncommon punishment for demands that the war be stopped. But despite the ruthlessness of the Government, the whole country, it is said, "has responded with deep sympathy" to the student revolt.

These tragic events recall the period, some twenty years ago, when the Chinese Revolution, so bravely begun by Sun Yatsen, fell prey to the delusion that military power was the paramount need of the revolutionary success—when the triumphant march of Chiang Kaishek became, in 1927, merely a military victory, delivering authority into the hands of the military oligarchy which, "under the banner of revolution, restored the very order of society which the great innovator Sun Yatsen had gone out to subvert."

Sun Yatsen started his labors for China's freedom with a small band of students, and officials of the old regime. Now, China must begin its revolution all over again, and it is, again the students, and their teachers, who support the revolutionary ideal.

CHILDREN
. . . AND OURSELVES

ANOTHER letter:

> Observation has shown that some parents spend three-fourths of their time with their children trying to nag them into a certain pattern of behavior which they think is good. A child should pick up his clothes, use better table manners, show more respect for others with expressions in common usage, show thrift in money matters, take care of all his possessions, and so forth. Now, if a child will do these things only under pressure or not at all, but on the other hand, shows a sense of justice and fair play in relation to other children—has a sense of humor, is kind and has a sense of moral fitness, or any other such "abstract virtues"—one wonders whether specific disciplines of behavior are so important. If a child persistently follows his way of doing things, are parents right to try and deflect his course in favor of their way? Is it necessarily true that if we are slipshod in these physical habits, we will be slipshod when it comes to moral decisions? Many seem to think so.

It is well know that many of our greatest figures in literature, science and statesmanship wandered unconcerned from triumph to triumph with baggy pants and scuffed shoes. Conversely, it is doubtless very important for a child, as for anyone else, to learn to be meticulous about things which directly affect his relationships with other humans. But a child cannot be expected to show the same regard for every single one of his possessions, and we cannot judge a child as being careless and indifferent to property unless there is no single item which he is truly interested in caring for. If a child devotes great effort and concentration to the proper upkeep of a bicycle and seems indifferent to clothes and books and dishes, it may be because that bicycle is a symbol of an urge to travel and adventure—a very important and constructive urge, if properly developed in later life—and, as it happens, the dominant creative urge of the moment. Further, evident parental appreciation of the child's meticulous care given to any single object may be the best way of encouraging a greater care of articles of property.

The usual difficulty is that parents and children think in almost opposite fashion in deciding which things merit the most care. The parent is much less interested in a bicycle, even though he has purchased it for the child, than in a waxed hardwood floor. But the child is not using the hardwood floor for anything that is important to him, and he *is* using the bicycle. Somewhere, a gradual transference of values needs to take place, inspired by an attitude of tolerance, so that the particular "things" important to parent or child may be appreciated by the other to some degree.

On the matter of "showing respect for others," the same psychology may apply, for the fact that a child will not show respect in the verbal terms to which we are accustomed does not mean that he is unwilling to evidence and express respect in other ways. And it is the respect, and not a particular mode of expression of it, that is important.

The child who habitually leaves clothes lying in disorderly heaps on the floor, even after continued suggestion that they will look much better afterward if hung in the closet, might conceivably learn "neatness" more rapidly if he were allowed to wear the mussed-up clothes for as long a period as they would have been worn if properly cared for. Nagging the children about these small details often exaggerates the importance of a simple conflict. Most parents realize this, but under the pressure of home circumstances seldom find the leisure to devise ingenious alternatives—such as refusing to press the child's clothes or wash them—the parent must remember also that the educative value of any conflict situation largely devolves upon the devotion to simple principles of logic shown by the participants. If the child says, "I don't care whether my clothes are washed or pressed—and I have to wear them so why should you care?" the parent would probably often do better to give up the argument until such time as the contrast

between the child's own utter dishevelment and the comparative neatness of some other children drives him to seek some measure of improvement. This sort of unconcern is, of course, difficult, for we have to forget what the neighbors will say about the appearance of our child during such an experimental period. But the neighbors do not have to live with our child: we do. And we shall live with him in much greater mutual satisfaction if we give him his own time to come to terms with certain principles of orderliness and cleanliness. Of course, a parent can always console oneself with the knowledge that a period of retribution is in the offing. The first date will bring a fantastic desire for sartorical elegance, and if the parent is then begged to press pants and take grease spots off coats and ties, a sort of principled victory will have been won.

It is true in a very general sense that no "slipshod" characteristics are desirable, but we need not worry about those forms of physical carelessness that are often a deliberate refusal to swallow whole the parents' particular scale of values. What appears to be slipshod may be the result of a child's desire to assert independence.

Naturally, there are instances when the uncleanliness of a child or his penchant for leaving unappetizing clothes on the floor disturbs the parents' actual world—not just their imaginary world. But here the parent does have logical recourse, after all attempts at constructive adjustment have been exhausted. He can say, "Go ahead and stay dirty, if you are sure that this is the way you want to be; but, since you disturb grandmother's appetite at the table, you will have to eat on the front lawn. This house is inhabited by people who cooperate in being clean so as not to spoil each other's digestion, and if you are so smelly and sloppy and dirty as to offend, you will have to take your food somewhere else." If the child is convinced that he is being unjustly humiliated and announces that he will promptly leave home, by all means let him. If it is a good home, he will return to it shortly, a wiser person. And if it is a bad home, he will also return a wiser person, though not in so short a time.

FRONTIERS

MAX PLANCK: 1858-1947

THE life of Max Planck, the great theoretical physicist who died last October, near his ninetieth birthday, spanned the entire development of what is called the "new" physics, and he was himself an important contributor to its revolutionary conceptions. In the words of a contemporary:

> The work of Planck has led to a reformation of the principles of physics so drastic that we can compare it only with the adoption of the Copernican view of astronomy or with the replacement of the kinetics of Newton by that of Einstein. As the Copernican system gave the key to the heavens, so the quantum theory of Planck has supplied the key to the sub-microscopic world and to the understanding of the structure of matter.

Planck's studies in thermal radiation, undertaken in 1894, began the series of researches that were to "culminate in the overthrow of classical physics." His basic discovery, "that light was emitted and absorbed in energy units—quanta—whose size was proportional to the fundamental constant, *h*, and to the frequency of light," was first announced in December, 1900. It may be noted that those six years were a time of extraordinary eventfulness for modern physics, not only on Planck's account, but because of several other discoveries of the utmost importance. In 1895, Roentgen discovered the X-ray. In 1896, Madame Curie proved the case for the radioactivity of matter, and in 1897 Lorentz and Thomson discovered the electron. The addition of the Theory of Relativity, a few years later, and after that, the formulation of the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy, enabled Robert A. Millikan to say, in 1932: "Result, dogmatic materialism in physics is dead! If we had been as wise as Galileo and Newton it would never had been born, for dogmatism in any form violates the essence of scientific method. . ."

The practical issue of Planck's discovery, taken together with other developments of the new physics, has been the dissipation of the "indivisible" atom into an electromagnetic mist. "Particles," jibed Karl Compton, "behave like waves and waves behave like particles; here's to the electron; long may she wave." Physics deals no more with "real" matter, but with theoretical constructions that make no special pretense of revealing the "ultimate" nature of physical reality. As a recent commentator has put it:

> Atoms, electrons, and electromagnetic waves are concepts (not to say fictions) invented for describing the results of experiments and correlating them with each other. . . . the "elementary constituents of the universe" are merely auxiliary concepts devised for the purpose of properly describing the behavior of instruments in interaction with their surroundings. If we assert that this stone which we see is composed of atoms, electrons, etc., we mean merely that if placed into certain specified interactions with certain instruments, these latter will behave in a predictable way . . . But we should no longer talk of understanding the secrets of the universe and learning the ultimate structure of matter. (A.K. Bushkovitch, *Philosophy of Science*, January, 1940.)

An appreciation of Max Planck appears in Science for May 21, giving the highlights of his long career of usefulness in both scientific research and scientific education. he was among the first to recognize the extraordinary merit in the ideas of Albert Einstein, and was responsible for the coming of Einstein to Berlin to take a position at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute. It is of interest that Planck was shocked and horrified by the Nazi rule. Hoping to influence the German dictator, he asked and obtained and interview with Hitler. "He was," the writer in *Science* tells us, "courageous enough to say. . . . what he felt he had to say," but accomplished nothing. His last years were clouded by the Nazi infamy, and shame at Germany's course prevented him from traveling after 1953. His second son, Erwin Planck, was Secretary of State under Schleicher, and an active foe of the Hitler regime. This son was executed by the Nazis in 1945 for participating in the unsuccessful plot against Hitler's life.

Like his more fortunate contemporary and colleague, Einstein, Planck regarded the laws of nature with a feeling akin to religious reverence. He chose the field of theoretical physics for his lifework on this account. According to *Science*, "Such laws as the principle of the conservation of energy affected young Planck with the force of a revelation.

It is understandable that he should have devoted his whole life to studies of the basic laws of nature."

This spirit is nowhere more manifest than in a volume of his essays, published by Norton in 1932, entitled *Where Is Science Going?* Here, Planck perpetuates the great tradition of "natural philosophy," a term once used to describe physical science, but discarded with the advent of the modern, anti-metaphysical bias in scientific thought. We can do no better than reproduce a passage from Planck's discussion of causality and free will, as illustrating the depth of his philosophic approach to scientific questions. He wrote:

> The fact is that there is a point, one single point in the immeasurable world of mind and matter, where science and therefore every causal method of research is inapplicable. This point is the individual ego. It is a small point in the universal realm of being; but in itself it is a whole world, embracing in our emotional life, our will and our thought. This realm of the ego is at once the source of our deepest suffering and at the same time of our highest happiness. Over this realm no outer power can ever have sway, and we lay aside our own control and responsibility over ourselves only with the laying aside of life itself . . . .
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> The law of causation is the guiding rule of science; but the Categorical Imperative—that is to say, the dictate of duty—is the guiding rule of life. Here intelligence has to give place to character, and scientific knowledge to religious belief. . . . Indeed it was not by accident that the greatest thinkers of all ages were deeply religious souls, even though they made no public show of their religious feelings. It is from the cooperation of the understanding with the will that the finest fruit of philosophy has arisen, namely, the ethical fruit. Science enhances the moral values of life, because it furthers a love of truth and reverence—love of truth displaying itself in the constant endeavor to arrive at a more exact knowledge of the world of mind and matter around us, and reverence, because every advance brings us face to face with the mystery of our own being.

It was characteristic of Planck that in the midst of an abstruse consideration of the principle of causality, he suggested to his readers that every individual should examine his own life in the light of the causes behind his behavior—seek them out, study them and pursue each act to its root in motive. This, he said, "is the only soundly scientific way of dealing with our own lives," the means of becoming truly intelligent human beings.

READING AND WRITING

As a non-political footnote to the war in Palestine, there is the following extract from a recent new Statesman and Nation, written by a mother with three children under seven, all having to walk to different schools in different parts of the Jewish section of Jerusalem, during the shooting—if somewhat sporadic—war between the Arabs and the Haganah:

> It is possible, of course, that an existence spent chiefly in wishing that you were old enough for the Haganah is not good for any child, although in times of war it is difficult to know what one can do. Perhaps encourage the young to play a nice game of United Nations, sit down for a pleasant round-table conference with Moderate Arabs? No, it is far more enjoyable to spend one's leisure hours alternately demanding the identity cards of all comers, and, with ear-splitting accuracy, imitating the sounds of various kinds of weapons of assault. The Moslem lady who. . . . recently named her offspring Bren and Sten, was only following a trend which has become increasingly noticeable in Palestine, although among Jews it is possibly more confined to the younger set.

A month after the shooting began, this mother's six-year-old son came to her and said:

> "Mummy, I did dream that two Arabs did come to me as I came from school, and with knives they did try to kill me."
>
> Three or four months ago this would have meant a stern lecture on generalizations, good Arabs, bad Arabs, but it's too late now. I said.
>
> "What did you do?"
>
> "I did take my pocket knife and I did kill both. Mummy, it if was real, would you smack me?"
>
> There, if one comes down to it, is an appreciation of the realities of existence.