

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

THERE is a sense in which religion and philosophy are identical, but more commonly, and in practice, they are alternate theories of the nature of man. They are theories, moreover, which are at war with one another. A medieval mystic, Adam of St. Victor, carries the claim of sovereignty for the religious view to an almost ridiculous extreme, yet his sincerity cannot be questioned:

Of the Trinity to reason
Leads to licence or to treason
Punishment deserving.
What is birth and what procession
Is not mine to make profession
Save with faith unswerving.
Thus professing, thus believing,
Never insolently leaving
The highway of our faith,
Duty weighing, law obeying
Never shall we wander straying
Where heresy is death.

But human beings *can* reason, which leads to freedom as well as to disaster. It seems reasonable to propose that the intellectual and moral development of Western civilization, while often called a long war between science and religion, is more exactly defined as a war between religion and philosophy.

Western religion, or Christianity, can be identified as a supernaturalist faith spotted with inclusions of unhallowed reason. It is these inclusions which caused its downfall, for when Christians began to *reason* about their faith, they undertook to subject it to an examination by a higher—or at any rate a different—authority. No essentially supernaturalist religion can survive the impartiality of reason. A metaphysically grounded religion can cope with the honest use of reason, but not supernaturalism.

For the fact that Christianity *is* almost entirely

a supernaturalist religion, we have the testimony of a leading scholar, Etienne Gilson. Dr. Gilson, in his *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, is at pains to correct the mistakes of Platonizing Christians who, entranced by the power of Plato's mind, endeavor to show that the God or gods of Plato are the same as the God of Christianity. Dr. Gilson knows better. After discussing briefly the Platonic conception of the Good, and the Artificer of the *Timaeus*, from which he passes to Aristotle's First Unmoved Mover, he says:

Compared with all these laborious gropings, how straightforward is the method of Biblical revelation, and how startling its results!

In order to know what God is, Moses turns to God. He asks his name, and straightway comes the answer: *I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent you unto me.* (Exod. iii, 14.) No hint of metaphysics, but God speaks, *causa finita est*, and Exodus lays down the principle from which henceforth the whole of Christian philosophy will be suspended.

Isaac Husik, author of *Medieval Jewish Philosophy*, says much the same thing:

In the Bible and similarly in the Koran we have a purely personal view of God and the world. God is a person, he creates the world—out of nothing to be sure—but nevertheless he is thought of doing it in a manner in which a person does such things with a will and a purpose in time and place. He puts a soul into man and communicates to him laws and prohibitions. Man must obey these laws because they are the will of God and are good, and he will be rewarded and punished according to his attitude in obedience and disobedience. The character of the entire point of view is personal, human, teleological, ethical. There is no attempt made at impersonal and objective analysis of the common aspects of all existing things, the elements underlying all nature. Nor is there any conscious effort at a critical classification of the various kinds of things existing in nature beyond the ordinary and evident classification in Genesis—heaven and earth; in heaven, sun, moon and stars; on earth, grass, fruit trees, insects, water

animals, birds, quadrupeds, men. Then light and darkness, the seasons of the year, dry land and water.

It was Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Aristotelian thought, Husik points out, which transformed the thinking of Jew and Mohammedan "from religious and ethical discussions into metaphysical systems." The Jews and the Mohammedans, being men, were irresistibly drawn to the use of the mind in respect to their beliefs, and the reorganization of these religions according to a pattern supplied by reason was the result.

Of course, these religions became only relatively, "metaphysical systems." "Theological systems" would probably be the better term, since reason was by no means set free to reach independent conclusions. But reason could give a certain order to religious thinking, and a relative satisfaction, therefore, to the rational nature of human beings.

The same trend was soon established in Christian thought. In the second century, Justin Martyr, who had been a Platonist before he became a Christian, argues with Trypho, the Jew, that the God who appeared in the burning bush and had spoken to Moses, could not have been the Most High. In his *Dialogue with Trypho*, Justin reasons that "he who has but the smallest intelligence will not venture to assert that the Maker and Father of all things, having left all supercelestial matters, was visible on a little portion of the earth." The voice which speaks to Moses, must have been, Justin insists, a "minister to God." It was incredible to Justin's philosophically trained intellect that the "Infinite One" could make a personal appearance! Justin seems to recall the archaic doctrine of Emanations in this debate, for he continues, arguing for what seems a plurality of Gods:

I shall quote again the words narrated by Moses himself, from which we can indisputably learn that [God] conversed with someone who was numerically distinct from Himself, and also a rational Being. These are the words: "And God said, Behold, Adam has become as one of us, to know good and evil." In saying, therefore, "as one of us," [Moses] has declared

that [there is a certain number of] persons associated with one another, and that there are at least two.

Justin is really trying to persuade Trypho of the reality of the Son, or Christ, for he later adverts to the episode of the burning bush, saying, "I have proved to you that it was Jesus who appeared to and conversed with Moses, and Abraham, and all the other patriarchs without exception, ministering to the will of the Father." The "Son," in short, agreeably to the Greek doctrine of the *Logos*, is the manifested deity, who does the work of the "Father" in the world.

The dispute over the Arian heresy arose from a similar determination to *reason* about religion. Arius, who was finally declared a heretic and driven from the Church, held that "there was a time, before the commencement of the ages, when the parent Deity dwelt alone in undeveloped, undivided unity." This "Divine Unity" rested unshaken until the work of creation began, and this marked the emergence, or "birth"—to use an anthropomorphic term—of the Son. Arius composed songs which were sung in the streets of Alexandria, the center of Greek influence on Christian thought. A stanza of one of them went:

Be men, be men, Egyptians!
Or, rather than such lore,
Turn back again to Apis
And Isis as of yore.
They never, in the old times,
That saw King Pharaoh's court,
Bowed down before the folly
That Catholics support.

Gregory of Nyssa, a fourth-century historian, reports:

Every corner, every alley of the city was full of these discussions—the streets, the market-places, the drapers, the money-changers, the victualers. Ask a man, "How many oboli?" he answers by dogmatizing on generated and ungenerated being. Inquire the price of bread, and you are told, "The Son is subordinate to the Father." Ask if the bath is ready, and you are told, "The Son arose out of nothing."

The Arian contention was summed up in a single idea: "There was a time when He, the Son,

was not." The philosophical ancestry of this notion is clear. It represents the antique conviction that the active, creative deity is not the highest—the unknowable, unmanifest One. The Son has a beginning in time, which marks the coming into being of the world. Accordingly, Arius held that the Son is a being with free-will, who might have erred, although he did not.

Arius lost out to Athanasius at the Council of Nicea, and his books were ordered burned. Athanasius "solved" the difficulty by declaring that: "There is one Person of the Father and another Person of the Son," and that Christians are to worship, "neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the substance." Further, the two Persons are one "not by confusion of substance but by unity of Person."

How could Arius, or any reasonable man, reply to a statement like that? Concerning this controversy, a thoughtful writer observed in the *Hibbert Journal* some years ago: "The history of Christianity has been described as the history of a hopeless attempt to resolve a contradiction, but it might be more truly described as the history of an obstinate refusal to accept any solution that eliminates the contradiction."

In the twelfth century, after long centuries of complacent faith—in a darkness broken only by hardy spirits like Johan Scotus Erigena—Peter Abelard gave renewed power to the temptations of reason, and the revolt of which he was the author was continued throughout the Reformation and the Renaissance, finding a final climax in the reign of the Goddess of reason in the streets of Paris, which lasted for two or three years of the French Revolution.

Searchers for heresy have no difficulty in finding victims among the devotees of reason, for reason will never suffer the confinements of dogma. Even people who suppose themselves "good" Christians and devoutly religious, could doubtless be convicted of serious deviations from revealed truth, if anyone would take the trouble to examine their beliefs. An interesting instance of

this is found in a current review of Arnold Toynbee's religious views, in the *Christian Century* for October 10. Mr. Toynbee, as everyone knows, is widely regarded as the man who has saved by devoted and monumental scholarship the Christian interpretation of history. But after some examination of Toynbee's major work, the *Christian Century* reviewer, an acute professor of theology, has this to say:

Toynbee often reveals an authentic Christian spirit. But far more than he realizes, he bases his argument on anti-Christian premises. Religion, he says, aims to apprehend "timeless truths and values," to state "essential counsels and truths." But to make its appeal in temporary and local situations it must acquire accretions, become denatured. We must strip off these historical accretions to get at this eternal essence.

But the Jewish-Christian scriptures do not claim to be a listing of eternal truths. (Of course any scholar has a right to disagree with those scriptures; but if he wants to examine them he must look at them on their own terms.) The Bible claims to tell primarily of God's deeds—his acts of creation, judgment and redemption. It does not say that these recorded events are God's *only* deeds; it says that they are crucial deeds of the only God.

Any Christian can see why sincere people may disagree with this recital. It is harder to see how anyone, in the effort to capture the "essence" of Christianity, can disregard it. It is the more surprising that a famous historian should be indifferent to the peculiarly historical quality of Jewish and Christian faith.

What is the trouble with Toynbee? Apparently, he wants to "universalize" Christianity and thereby remain a Christian while reasoning about religion in general, seeking its "essence." But this would submit Christianity to the depersonalizing process of reason, by which process the essentially revelatory and supernaturalist character of Christianity is lost. Mr. Toynbee, alas, turns out to be a heretic. Yet he is an amiable and well-intentioned one. As the reviewer says: "Nevertheless, a Christian is likely to find his thought enhanced at many points by confronting the fertile and sincere mind of Arnold

Toynbee."

It is pertinent to ask why the usage of reason should be so devastating to religion? Is it sinful to reason? Is reason a tool of the devil? Historically, reason has been acceptable to religious people, so long as it has been *controlled*—not permitted to have any independent authority. But reason on a leash of dogma is reason self-betrayed. The entire virtue of reason lies in its faithfulness to impartiality. It is a curious claim which asserts that reason is reliable only when it is made to corrupt itself!

Here, perhaps, is an explanation of the deeper "guilt-feelings" of Western civilization. The people who demand that reason be restrained really "know better." On the other hand, the people who, resenting this interference, turn reason into a weapon for unbelief are guilty, too—guilty of an excess in the opposite direction. The Christians want to control reason to save the reality of an historical event which was supposed to have occurred 1956 years ago. Their enemies—let us say, the Communists—want to exploit reason to save current history—that is, to make it come out the way they have predicted it must.

Yet all of Western history can be interpreted, we think, as a struggle of reason to be *free!*

Letter from **CENTRAL EUROPE**

INNSBRUCK.—Two criminal cases have recently attracted public attention in Central Europe, although more from a judicial than a criminological point of view.

Dr. Müller, a dentist in Western Germany, was charged with having murdered his wife. Mrs. Müller met her death in a burning motor car. The dentist declared that he was driving, with his wife sitting next to him, that he stopped on the roadside to search for a lost hub-cap, that he unexpectedly heard an explosion and, returning to the car, was unable to save her. He admitted that he had stored some tins of gasoline and other explosive material on the back seat. He said that, by lighting a cigarette, she might have caused the fatal accident. The Müllers had a few minutes before left friends in the best of spirits and a number of witnesses testified under oath that the married couple and their two sons had always lived on good terms. There was no motive for the crime (if it was a crime), except that police investigation brought to light that the dentist had exchanged letters with a former secretary who had left for England seven months before, and with whom he had, while she had worked for him, been in love. The first sensation came when a medical expert declared that Mrs. Müller had been killed before the car exploded; and there was more excitement when Dr. Müller injured himself by trying to commit suicide in his cell. Four weeks later, when Müller was released from the hospital, a new trial was necessary, and another medical expert, called in by another presiding judge, declared that Mrs. Müller could have been alive when the fatal explosion took place!

In the other case, a skilful and well-like surgeon was charged with having murdered a girl medical assistant. Her stripped body had been found in a meadow, outside an Austrian city. The police disclosed that Dr. Hoflehner (the surgeon), who was having a love affair with the victim, had summoned the young lady to that lonely rendezvous, as neither of them (the doctor had a wife and children) wanted to be seen by anybody. Since a medical expert,

commissioned by the judge who conducted the investigation, came to the conclusion that the girl had been killed with a tool found in Dr. Hoflehner's car, and since the public prosecutor assumed that the doctor wanted to get rid of her, because she probably had threatened to tell his wife or others about their intimate relations, there seemed to be no hope for him. Finally, however, some friends who believed in his innocence were able to arrange for further testimony from two experts of international fame. After due investigation, the new experts reported that the tool could not have been the murder weapon and that the killing showed all the signs of a murder for sexual reasons. When, shortly afterward, a second assault took place (another girl was killed, not far away, under similar conditions), it became obvious that Dr. Hoflehner was not the murderer.

The public of Central Europe is alarmed by the fact that both the doctors might have received life sentences: Dr. Müller, if he had not attempted suicide which accidentally caused the appearance of another expert; and Dr. Hoflehner, if his friends had not successfully questioned the report of the first expert.

These cases have aroused serious doubts as to the validity of the juridical regulations which have to be followed by the courts. The cases are apt to serve as starting-points for a reform of both German and Austrian Court institutions. As one important reform, it is expected that the judges will, in the future, become neutral figures (similar to British and American law), and not, as is at present, practically collaborators with the public prosecutor.

Meanwhile, however, there are the usual delays. The German and Austrian authorities have announced that the special commission appointed to prepare the reforms will not finish its work before 1961. Thus for five more years, other Dr. Müllers and Dr. Hoflehners may be punished for first-degree murder on no other evidence than that of an "expert" selected by the prosecution.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

"THE FULLY FUNCTIONING PERSONALITY"

LAST week's notes on two popular novels focussed on the need for transcending cultural hallucinations. The insights expressed were, quite obviously, derived from a gradually maturing psychological philosophy—no longer is "adjustment" to the status quo regarded as a guarantee of happiness. So the psychologists, like the philosophers, now show growing interest in ways of defining "the mature mind."

An article by S. I. Hayakawa, appearing in the Spring *ETC.*—a *Review of General Semantics*, provides a comprehensive survey of literature in this field. Dr. Hayakawa endeavors to isolate the qualities present in the fully "sane" person—the person who is described by Professor A. H. Maslow of Brandeis University as the "self-actualizing personality," and by Carl Rogers, of the University of Chicago, as the "fully functioning person." Dr. Hayakawa unites these insights:

The most impressive fact, as described by both Rogers and Maslow, is that these sane people are not, in the ordinary sense of the term, "well-adjusted." The unreflective layman and many school teachers and administrators, even some psychiatrists, seem to believe that adjustment to a society, in the sense of complete conformity with the goals, internal and external of that society, is the goal of mental health. Such a view of adjustment would mean that in Rome you would not only do as the Romans do but think and feel as the Romans do; that in a money-mad society you too would be money-mad; that in a Nazi society you would be a good Nazi. The "fully functioning personality" is not, in that sense, fully adjusted. His relation to the society around him may be described somewhat as follows: he is *in* and *of* the society of which he is a member, but he is not a prisoner of that society.

On the other hand, the "fully functioning personality" is not an outright rebel against social norms of a society either, given a half-way tolerable society to live in. Maslow writes as follows of his case-studies of "self-actualizing personalities":

"Their behavior is marked by simplicity and naturalness and by lack of artificiality and straining

for effect. This does not necessarily mean consistently unconventional behavior. Actually the 'self-actualizing personality' is not extremely unconventional. His unconventionality is not superficial but essential and internal. It is his impulse, thought, and consciousness that are unconventional, spontaneous and natural. Apparently recognizing that the world of people in which he lives could not understand or accept this, and since he has no wish to hurt people or to fight them over trivialities, he will go through the ordinary trivial conventions with a goodhumored shrug and with the best possible grace. . . . But the fact that this 'conventionality' is a cloak which rests very lightly on his shoulders and is easily cast aside can be seen from the fact that the self-actualizing person practically never allows convention to hamper him or inhibit him from doing anything that he considers very important and basic."

Another characteristic of the person with a "fully functioning personality" is that he is not afraid of rebuff or criticism representing honest feelings and opinions:

The way in which a genuinely psychologically healthy person differs from so-called "normal" people is that he is aware of his own feelings, he does not try to suppress them, he often acts upon them, and, even if he does not act upon them, he is able to admit them to awareness. Let me quote Rogers' description of this characteristic: "The person would be open to his own experience. . . . In a person who is open to his experience. . . every stimulus, whether originating in the organism or in his environment, would be freely relayed through the nervous system without being distorted by defensive mechanisms."

The fully functioning personality is ethical in the deepest sense. Maslow says that his sane people have a sense of right and wrong that is quite clear-cut, but that their evaluations are at deeper levels, rather than at the superficial levels that most people worry about. He says that ordinary "moral" problems fade out of existence for sane people.

Dr. Hayakawa concludes his article:

Sometimes we speak of the goals of mental health as if they meant the hope of the emergence of completely happy people in a completely trouble-free world. If such were our goal, it would indeed be an impossible and unattainable one. Actually, it seems to me that the goals of mental health are much more modest. Sanity does not mean the solution of all

problems (cultural or psychological or economic or whatever) but merely the abolition or avoidance of those problems which we create for ourselves through lack of self-insight.

In philosophical terms, as Hayakawa earlier observed, the "fully functioning personality" is able to regard everything he sees and does as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some socially approved accomplishment. While this may just be another way of repeating the familiar religious counsels which insist that a man learn to make the most of the opportunities "God" has given him, the rephrasing by the psychiatrist seems to us of great value. For one thing, a distinction between conventionally defined goodness and conscious ethical awareness becomes clear as it never has been in religious literature. The joyfully growing person is to be recognized by an absence of rigidity in either ideas or behavior—something Dr. Rogers has called "a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, of a flowing, changing organization of the self and of personality rather than the imposition of structure upon experience."

Dr. Hayakawa, like Rogers and Maslow, arrives at some positive affirmations. "The fully functioning personality" must be "self-actualizing"—which means that no man is fully a man unless he is genuinely creative. However one may tend to become bogged down by such an involved and abstract terminology, the picture which emerges is quite clear. It is not a matter of there being "some people" who are "happiest" when moving and thinking with the crowd, and others who are happier being different. Rather, the man who is never creatively "different" can never be fully happy, because he will be inwardly haunted by the realization that he is living in grooves which only creative action can widen. The philosophical balance of Dr. Hayakawa's discussion helps the reader to realize that being "creative" does not necessarily call for flamboyant nonconformity, but that, at its root, creativity is simply an attitude of mind which enables us to discover when, where and how *we* may actually create. Small things or large, intellectual or artistic—these are incidental.

For the intellectual and teacher, however, some

part of creativity is bound to be expressed in a rejection of the standards imposed by "group thinking." We close with the following, which makes clear the subtle interrelatedness between non-conformity and creativity:

It isn't what teachers think, it isn't what the Ph.D. committee thinks, it isn't what the neighbors think, it's what *I* think that matters. Because the fully functioning person's experiences, past and present, are accessible to awareness, because he sees freshly and without rigid categorizing or labeling of the situation before him, he ultimately is his own judge of what is the needed solution for any given problem. After all, the solutions of others are merely the solutions of people who weren't in *this* situation, confronted with *this* problem, with *these* materials or with *these* people to work with. Therefore, the fully functioning person, even if he may welcome the praise or admiration of others, is not dependent on others.

Perhaps from this we can give an account in general semantics terms of the creative process. Let me put it something like this: if you see in any given situation only what everybody else can see, you can be said to be so much a representative of your culture that you are a victim of it. In other words, you haven't even got the materials to be original with, since you have before you only "just another" sunset, "just another" tree, "just another" batch of left-overs in the icebox—these are the common abstractions. But if you are extensional about the world around you, open to the uniqueness of every object and event, if you are open, too, about your own feelings, namely, the uniqueness of your tensions and needs at this moment, and of those around you, what is before you *is not* "just another" sunset, or "just another" tree, or "just another" batch of left-overs. And the act of bringing together the uniqueness of yourself at that moment with the uniqueness of your materials at the moment and the uniqueness of other people's feelings at that moment into the solution of the problem is the act of creativity.

COMMENTARY NOT A MUMBLIN' WORD

AN Associated Press dispatch from Adelaide, Australia, tells of the effects of atomic bomb explosions set off by the British at the Maralinga testing grounds in South Australia. According to the report, cattle 400 miles away from the testing grounds were "heavily affected by radioactivity." (Los Angeles *Times*, Oct. 8.)

The cattle were slaughtered at Hamilton Downs Station, northeast of Maralinga. A Geiger counter check of the thyroid glands of the animals revealed a radioactivity count of 3000 instead of a normal 30. The cattle had been exposed to a cloud of radioactive particles which hung over the station following the blast. "But scientists," the report concludes, "would not say whether a count of 3000 was dangerously high."

Awkward, isn't it? Awkward for us, awkward for the scientists, and awkward for the cattle.

The wind, apparently, was blowing northeast that day. Then there are those mysterious words, "heavily affected." Doubtless these cows, unlike those in the United States, could not be described as "contented." Anyhow, they slaughtered them. One wonders how many of them.

We used to say, "A miss is as good as a mile." We'll have to revise that to, "A 400-mile miss is as good as a hit." Of course, the way the wind blows may be important. Perhaps we can learn to control the wind, too. It won't really matter if we have to expurgate from the Bible the phrase, "The wind bloweth where it listeth." So many of the things in the Bible have been proved wrong, anyway.

One wonders, also, if the "heavily affected" cows were victims of a "clean" or a "dirty" bomb. It doesn't matter too much, of course, since the cattle would probably have been slaughtered for beef, sooner or later.

Maybe we're making too much of this. After

all, it was just a little story on an inside page. Such things will probably be quite common, soon enough. We may even have personal opportunity to learn what it means to be "heavily affected." And there's still the possibility that a radioactivity count of 3000 is not "dangerously high." The scientists, at any rate, are not alarmed. *They* didn't say the tests ought to be stopped. They don't seem troubled at the prospect of eating radioactive filet mignon. Anyway, they're going to set off two more "atomic devices" at Maralinga pretty soon. Maybe they'll get some "accurate information" from *those* tests. It's probably all right. They'll know some day.

CHILDREN and Ourselves

COMMUNICATIONS

EVERY SO often we receive a friendly inquiry from some reader who wants to know why, since this column is titled, "Children . . . and Ourselves," we don't "say something about children once in a while." Well, "explaining" the child is simply too big a task for us, and one never intended as a central topic for our agenda. When we talk about "learning from children," we mean learning from the psychological contrasts suggested between the world view of the child and the world view of the adult. Until we can determine whether the "child" still within us sees more clearly than its grown-up overlay, or whether "it" is simply immature, we probably know less about either ourselves or children than we might.

The whole problem of education, whether it be elementary, high-school or collegiate, is the problem of fostering expanding mental horizons. Since teachers, parents and professors have just as great a need for this accomplishment as pupils and children, we don't feel we are off the subject when we talk about anything which relates to the general "problem of learning."

* * *

EDITORS: I believe it is commonly granted that if a small child feels free to criticize his parent, this is a generally healthy attitude—that he should not be afraid to express such criticism. However, is there any danger that this "permissiveness" will run away with the child? Supposing the child uses phrases like "I hate you," or "I'll hurt you"? If he is never checked, he may say a little more and a little oftener. Might not the child feel guilty later on from expressing such thoughts about his parents? Is it not better for the parent to curb this sort of talk, even forcefully, at times, for the child's own peace of mind?

This question is a practical one, and one which happily falls into the category suggested by our previously mentioned critic. We have several

times noted that most children require and desire—however well they may conceal it—help in regulating their own extremes of emotional expression. We don't think that the child who is allowed progressively greater verbal abuses of a parent will himself be at all happy with the atmosphere generated, nor does it altogether matter whether the parent absorbs the criticism with self-sacrifice and sweetness. Any child who possesses even a moderate love for a parent trusts and depends upon that parent a great deal, and, because he does, it is comforting for him to believe that his parent is a worthwhile person. Irresponsible criticism and unmodified outpourings damage the clarity of the image.

Since a parent, however, can hardly be successful in asserting his own "goodness," other means must be resorted to; it might be insisted, for example, that criticism be presented only in a rational context. When little children say "I don't like you," or "I am going to hurt you," it may be well enough for them to feel that violent punishment will not result from the outburst of feeling. But a mother or father would do well to let the child know that irrational criticism is not respected. It is no psychological trick, but the most natural thing in the world to say to the child: "I am not going to listen to you when you talk that way, because nothing you say in that mood is worth listening to." The worst mistake of all, probably, is to try to placate the imperiously demanding child whose response to every refusal to gratify his desires is verbal abuse. The parent can be tougher than the child at the game of criticism, but be fair about it.

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Our recent discussions of authority in the schoolroom provoked a paragraph from one of the original participants, who feels that every teacher should be encouraged to philosophize on the need for something besides "democracy" in the teacher-pupil relationship. It is not feasible, certainly, for students, whether they be in elementary school or college, to "elect" their

teachers and determine the content and nature of teaching. A good teacher has the privileges and the responsibilities of aristocracy, and must often rest on the authority of greater knowledge. It is this percipience, also, which may properly allow the various desirable degrees of democracy to play their role. So, fed upon too many recommendations of "permissiveness," this writer remarks that "authority" is still the foundation of every school and system, however tactfully described:

We may say this is undemocratic, but not everything can be. No matter with what psychological trick we try to convince ourselves and children that it is otherwise, the teacher is the authority and maintains discipline primarily on that basis. Regardless of whether authority is used wisely or unwisely children will cooperate only when they know teacher is boss. MANAS wisely states that the teacher should not be forced to adjust to the preference of the pupils and that there is "nothing personal" in this. This is authority, pure and simple. I had a pupil who was a serious behavior problem, even though I had talked with the mother three or four times about it. I finally talked to the father for an hour. He wished me to try to understand that his boy was of unique constitution, that he should go on special errands, that perhaps I would let him sit at a table near my desk, etc. I replied in essence that I could not serve as his psychologist and protector, that there were too many children in the room and that if his boy wanted special favors he would have to earn them with good behavior and good work. The next day saw a complete change in the boy, and he subsequently did become well behaved and improved in his work. My method was not to decide "how permissive" to become or seek the key to his problems or attempt to perform psychological magic which would get the boy to adjust. It was a simple matter of getting the parent to use *his* authority, because otherwise the authority of the teacher is limited.

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Gentlemen: Your provocative article on children, recommending that we read "a blend of philosophical and psychiatric readings" is very interesting, but it stopped too short. What should have followed is a suggested bibliography, which we would be pleased to have.

We suppose that the "blend of philosophical

and psychiatric reading" we had in mind is a compendium of the many recommendations made at various times in MANAS. Karen Horney's *Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, Bruno Bettelheim's *Love is Not Enough*, C. J. Ducasse' *Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion*, Erich Fromm's *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, and S. Radhakrishnan's *Recovery of Faith* come easily to mind. What we meant to suggest was that the building of rewarding interpersonal relationships requires an expanding understanding of the complexity of human aspirations and of the human psyche. The day of the success "formula," religious or otherwise, is over—if it ever had a real existence. We must, we think, complicate our understandings in order to simplify our lives, and to help clarify life for our children.

FRONTIERS

The Way the Wind Blows

WHILE we have opportunity to see the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* regularly, we find it difficult to keep up with the "continued-next-month" horror story the editors are presenting. If we miss a couple of issues, the next one we read seems practically unbelievable. Did you know that there are now "dirty" and "clean" bombs for atomic warfare? A "dirty" bomb has a maximum of fall-out, or poisonous rain of tiny radioactive particles, while the "clean" bomb, which gains its power from a higher proportion of "fusion," instead of "fission," has reduced fallout. The clean H-bomb is now known as the "humanitarian" bomb.

The editors and the contributors of the *Bulletin* take a dim view of a recent announcement by Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. After last summer's tests (*Operation Redwing*) were complete, Adm. Strauss announced that the United States had found a way to control local radioactive fall-out. Commenting editorially in the September *Bulletin*, Eugene Rabinowitch noted that the announcement had been widely misunderstood. One columnist thought it meant that now we are beginning to develop some effective defenses against H-bombs. However, as Mr. Rabinowitch says:

In the first place the announcement referred only to controlling the fall-out from *our own bombs*, not those of the enemy. Whether the latter will choose to restrict fall-out or to use it as an additional means of winning the war, will be up to him. The reason the U.S. has for such self-restriction—the desire not to hurt the friendly or neutral neighbors of the Soviet Union—does not apply, because of our geographic isolation, to an attack on the U.S. It would be unrealistic to hope that a nation at war—and a totalitarian nation in particular—would limit its power to inflict damage on its enemy for purely humanitarian reasons. America's use of atomic bombs to subdue Japan should have thoroughly cured everybody of such delusions!

The announcement that America has the ability to control the fall-out from its own atomic weapons thus means no reduction of the danger we face in the case of a thermonuclear attack. . . .

The point of the editorial is that it is pretty silly to expect that any power ready to use atomic weapons will be restrained from using "dirty" bombs by "humanitarian" considerations. The editor of the *Bulletin* suspects that Adm. Strauss made his announcement as a counter-move against "the world-wide agitation for the cessation to weapon tests," and to reduce the occasion for hysteria on the "home-front." Mr. Rabinowitch takes the view that it is "utterly wrong" to "confuse public thinking in a field so crucial for the whole of mankind."

Two broad psychological considerations bear on this general question. First, the layman is practically incapable of thinking in the terms of the destruction that now seems almost an everyday conversational commonplace to atomic scientists. This talk about atomic explosion is going on over all our heads, and we find it difficult to take seriously. If we took it seriously, we should have to do something about it.

On the other hand, people who decide that we do have to *do* something about it often resolve the problem by taking an emotional short-cut. They blame the Russians bitterly for the entire mess and might easily be swayed into advocating a sudden and final attack on the "enemy" to end the painful uncertainty. A point is reached in any period of protracted strain when *any* "solution" seems desirable—when reason, which was never strong, gives up entirely. Perhaps it is just as well that the reports of the destructiveness of the new bombs and the vulnerability of United States to attack have not yet conveyed their full threat to the public at large. A public frantic with fear would hardly contribute to the hope for peace.

An extract from a hearing held by the Senate subcommittee on the Air Force (of the Senate Committee on Armed Services) gives a clear idea of the kind of destruction our military leaders are

contemplating, these days. In this hearing, held last May, Senator Symington asked Air Force General Gavin about a *Fortune* article in which it was said that 110 bombs dropped on the United States at intervals of ten minutes would kill or maim some seventy million people. The General confirmed the statement. Then Gen. Gavin was asked another question by Senator Duff:

SENATOR DUFF: . . . I would like to ask you, sir, if we got into nuclear war and our strategic air force made an assault in force against Russia with nuclear weapons so that those weapons were exploded in a way where the prevailing winds would carry them southeast over Russia, what would be the effect in the way of death over there under those circumstances, in your opinion?

GENERAL GAVIN: I will give you an answer to this and I will give you a specific one, sir, but I would like to respectfully suggest that the Air Force or a proper study group give you this answer.

Current planning estimates run on the order of several hundred million deaths that would be either way depending upon which way the wind blew.

If the wind blew to the southeast they would be mostly in the USSR, although they would extend down into the Japanese and perhaps down into the Philippine area.

If the wind blew the other way they would extend well back up into Western Europe.

And I use the figure "several hundred million," which contrasts with the estimates that you have quoted in *Fortune* Magazine as being about several times lower.

From this interesting testimony we pass to the words of another military man, Lt. Col. Anthony L. Wermuth, of the Pentagon Army Staff, who also appears in this issue of the *Bulletin*. Lt. Col. Wermuth is concerned with making his readers realize that an atomic war will be "for keeps," without much regard for restraint of any sort. He says:

The truth is that the real advantage of atomic weapons is their power of saturation, of complete devastation of large areas. Otherwise, if atomic weapons can be made so small and precise as to be comparable to conventional explosions why are they needed at all? The targets around which discussion

has centered as being the most remunerative targets for atomic destruction are all adjacent to or in the midst of concentrations of population: industry, communication centers, air bases, stockpiles of critical resources. In attacking such targets with saturation weapons it would be largely impossible, as a practical matter, to avoid "incidental" destruction of other elements inevitably located at such targets: the women, the children, the aged, the sick, the churches, the schools, the libraries, the homes—in a word, civilization. . . .

If any atomic weapons are used, where will atomic warfare end? If they are used without restraint, there cannot be advanced any pretensions that only certain important war-sustaining buildings will be hit. *Our* civilization will be vulnerable, too. Each soldier's family is as likely to be hit as the soldier on the field. . . .

Again, in this issue of the *Bulletin*, Dr. Ralph E. Lapp offers some caustic remarks on the A.E.C. chairman's "Humanitarian" H-bomb. Dr. Lapp is concerned with explaining how "fall-out" can be controlled to produce a "clean" or "humanitarian" bomb. This involves making a "jacketless" bomb, which would be extremely expensive. The bomb with heavy fall-out, with maximum fission, on the other hand, is comparatively cheap. Dr. Lapp writes:

Fission . . . is relatively easy to maximize, thus making for a very dirty bomb. Achievement of high internal temperatures raises the fusion to fission ratio. Since the temperature in the bomb varies as the bomb power, it would be expected that the ratio of fusion to fission could increase with increasing megatonage.

Fractional megaton-class weapons might have a ratio of one to one; i.e., equal yield from fission and fusion. Megaton-yield bomb could, if the designer wished, give the lion's share of the energy to fusion. Multi-megaton weapons could be designed to raise this ratio even higher. Thus the relative dirtiness of the bomb could decrease for high-yield weapons. However, the absolute dirtiness of the bomb would increase since the number of fission products would increase.

In summary, the superbomb can be designed to be either relatively clean or very dirty. The former would be desirable in the test series whereas the latter would seem to fulfill the requirement of a strategic weapon.

The *raison d'etre* for a strategic weapon is to deter. That is the basic policy of our present "peace through mutual terror." To deter, the full terror of the weapon must be maximized. Diluting the potency of the bomb weakens the deterrence.

Even the words used in these prosy accounts of the instruments of "mutual terror" have a maniacal ring. What is a *remunerative* target for an atom bomb? When Mr. Rabinowitch discusses in his editorial the unlikelihood of any nation using "humanitarian" bombs, he speaks of the *bonus* value of more fall-out:

Another consideration, which military planners are not likely to forget, is the "bonus" added to the destructive effect of thermonuclear bombs by the fall-out. If to wipe out metropolitan cities is a "legitimate" means of winning the war, why should one desist from using the same bombs to convert thousands of square miles around those targets into a deadly radioactive desert, thus obviously increasing the effect on the capacity of the enemy to continue the war?

"And damn'd be him that first cries, *Hold, enough!*" shouted Macbeth, five minutes before he was killed. Our skilled writers on the prospects of atomic war sound like a bunch of soured and embittered Macbeths. They know that they will be damned, as Dr. Oppenheimer was damned, if they "cry enough," yet they see that they, along with everyone else, will be damned anyway, unless something is done.

A note of sanity in this issue of the *Bulletin* is provided by Robert S. McCleery, who contributes "A Christian Answer to Atomic War." Mr. McCleery writes as a pacifist:

I believe both the realistic and Christian answers lie in complete and unequivocal rejection of the use of national force of all kinds. I am, of course, aware that this is not the official position of the Christian churches. Yet, as an individual Christian, it seems to me that we can no longer disregard the inconsistency of an avowedly ecumenical and evangelical religion supporting national or regional objectives by condoning atomic warfare, albeit indirectly.

Mr. McCleery faces the worst possible consequences of such a course, and then chooses

it with his eyes open. "I believe that," he concludes "although the American people might reject the proposed course of action, they should have the opportunity to be faced with the choice."

The really interesting thing to be noted is that the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* has published this and similar articles without particular comment or apology. It offers a choice no longer regarded as either ridiculous or "weak."