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TOMORROW'S ORTHODOXIES

NO special qualifications for prophecy are needed to say that these are days in which men are getting ready to find themselves a new religion—or religions. The signs are all about. In the existing religions of the West—we cannot speak for the East, but suspect that a similar condition is on the way—the matter of "doctrines" is becoming less and less important. Theology, therefore, except for the professors of theology, interests almost no one. Religion is for the most part a vague benevolence, although, in the case of Christianity, an undeniable vitality persists through the hero-image of Jesus Christ, who will doubtless always be an inspiring figure.

Whether or not theology is really *needed* in religion, or metaphysics in philosophy, is of course arguable. The view adopted here is that, without theology, religion soon lapses into institutionalized sentiment or agnostic humanism. The contention is that the human mind cannot for long do without actual or promised explanation on the great questions with which theology deals; that most people, if denied theology by their traditional religion, will sooner or later get themselves a new religion or invent a theology to go with the one they have.

Theology or metaphysics provides the mind with an ascertainable relation of the individual to the world. For some two hundred years, the men who shaped the mind of the West assumed that its ascertainable relation could be supplied, or would be supplied, by the progress of scientific inquiry. Much of the philosophizing done from the scientific point of view has been in this direction. Today, however, it has become pretty clear that science—science as we know it, and not any imaginable form of science—is not prepared to recognize any significant reality in the individual. A human being, according to the sciences which deal with man, is a result, not a cause. Now a result is something that happens at the end of a mechanistic process. It follows that scientific definitions which relate to human beings as *individuals* must also do something else—they must state what *man* causes to be. Individuals, in short, are causal agents. They participate, therefore, in a value known as freedom.

For this reason, effective definitions of man are trans-scientific. And for this reason, naturalistic or scientific accounts of man's relation with the world are not adequate substitutes for theology or metaphysics.

No man, unless he has psychopathic delusions which lead him to seek refuge in total withdrawal, can be content to think of himself as a "nothing." And he is a nothing if he is not a causal agent. The delusion that man is a nothing is one of the results of the abandonment of theology and metaphysics by the modern world. When we look at this delusion as persons, we may suppose that no one could be so foolish as to accept it. Made into a general theory, however, the delusion seems less offensive, probably because then each individual can take secret personal exception to it, while being willing to believe that it applies to everybody else. As a political theory, the individual-man-as-nothing view is balanced by the general-man-is-everything view, in which the State stands for general man and absorbs all the values which once belonged to the individual Totalitarianism is the *cultural* delusion that individual man is nothing, but totalitarian states by no means have a monopoly on this delusion. It is found in democratic societies, also, wherever minorities are treated, not as a number of individuals, but as a depersonalized mass of "brown," "black," or "yellow" people without individual characteristics.

In fact, the man-as-nothing theory is probably a major cause of the anxiety and insecurity of modern man, who feels the emasculating effect of this delusion without realizing what it is that bothers him. It is our contention that an emotional situation of this sort is bound to make people hunger for a new religion—a religion, moreover, which will have either specific dignity, or specific comfort, to offer on the subject of man's relation as an individual to the world about him.

We now arrive at the subject announced by our title—"Tomorrow's Orthodoxies." Picking a new religion is something like picking a wife. The two relationships have many parallels and in both cases it is a good idea to look into the future. What will the prospective faith or the prospective mate be like, twenty years hence? Will orthodoxy overtake one, and conventionality overtake the other?

In the case of religion, at least, we have past experience for a guide. Some religions have a greater tendency to formalism and orthodoxy than others. Religions heavily laden with personification and anthropomorphisms seem to acquire the grooves of orthodoxy very rapidly. In these religions, there is little hospitality for innovation, or what some people refer to as the "prophetic" spirit. Add vigor and private inspiration to orthodox religion and you get rapidly multiplying sects, each with a separate version of the "true faith."

Is there a single characteristic of religion which marks the tendency to orthodoxy and all that goes with it? As we look at the past, the one indication of what will happen to a religious faith in the passage of years or centuries is the role of the priest. If the priest is important as an interpreter of religion, orthodoxy arid a multitude of sects are almost certain to result.

In pantheistic religion, for example, there can be, strictly speaking, no priests, no sacerdotal caste. For the man who believes that God is in all, including himself, the acquirement of spiritual knowledge—blessedness, salvation, or whatever is the ultimate religious value—is fundamentally a private transaction. And since individuals differ widely, it will not be possible to codify the One True Path. So long as each man remains the essential agent of his own salvation, so long will it be impossible to contain the secret of the Higher Life within the formula of a creed. Least affected among Christian groups by the eroding effects of sectarianism are the Quakers, who, from the days of George Fox, have believed there is that of God in man, and in a resulting "Inner Light." While the Quakers do not claim to be pantheists, there is certainly a pantheist tendency in the religion of the Society of Friends.

It is natural, also, and for the same reason, that the Quakers are more mystically inclined than any other of Christian believers, and more willing to accept the validity of symbolic forms of faith. Among followers of the traditional religion of the West, no other group could have accepted from Gandhi the challenge to form an international organization dedicated to the idea of "equal reverence for all religions." The Quakers did form such an organization, which is known as Fellowship of the Friends of Truth, with headquarters in India.

(Perhaps we should say, as a further tribute to the Society of Friends, that the Quakers are far from complacent or satisfied with their performance, and that always in the journals of the Quaker societies a process of self-examination and self-criticism is going on.)

However, it would be a mistake to suggest that Quakerism offers what might be called a theology or a metaphysic for the modern world. The unhappy side of this general problem lies in the fact that an elaborate theology or metaphysic seems to lead to rigid sectarianism, so that, for many, there is a question whether theology is not a high road to narrowness and exclusiveness in religion. The least equivocal of the theologies known to the West is the Roman Catholic theology, which has a simple, if unbelievable,

doctrine of man's relation to God (instead of the world). In the East, also, the parallel holds. Buddhism began as a reform of Hinduism, and metaphysics is far from being the primary feature of the Buddhist faith. Southern Buddhism, sometimes called Ceylonese or Theravada Buddhism, is far less metaphysical or doctrinal than Northern or Mahayana Buddhism, and seems, therefore, to the Westerner's eye, far less guilty of tropical extravagance and theological embellishment. Ethics is the principal appeal of Theravada or exoteric Buddhism, while ceremony and ritual seem to have an enormous importance in the religion of Tibet. On the other hand, Mahayana Buddhism attempts answers and deals with problems left untouched by Theravada Buddhism. Doubtless, in the original teachings of the Buddha there were no such divisions and schisms. If we could know what Buddha himself taught, and could understand it, we should have only the problem of controlling the sectarian tendencies in ourselves, instead of having to deduce what explanation we can from religious history.

In any event, the source of orthodoxy and sectarianism in religion seems to lie in a reliance upon some person or group or cult as necessary to our salvation. Religion, then, which involves an intermediary as the means to truth is religion which will lapse into orthodoxy in years to come. This is the sort of religion we don't want.

What are the prospective sources of the religion or religions of tomorrow?

As we look at the contemporary scene, there are several possibilities. Among scientists such as Einstein and Eddington, a neo-Pythagorean sort of pantheism has had considerable expression. Probably great scientists have always had such feelings, producing in them the sense of a community of being with the world and the mysteries which lie behind. The difficulty here is that great men may feel such things and even give them poetic expression, while the rest of mankind reverence the words of the great men, instead of seeking the feeling for themselves. But we all may have inklings.

Then there is the largely "unemployed" altruism and humanitarian sympathy of the many who find themselves alienated from revolutionary movement. Actually, former communists have been showing an interest in Spinoza, as a philosopher whose inspiration can be acknowledged without a return to any sort of sectarianism. The anti-war movement, also, is continually producing its annual quota of "seekers," and nonconformists in politics are likely to be nonconformists in religion, too.

The most active area of thinking, however, so far as we can see, lies in the field covered by the term Psychotherapy. If there is anything that two or three generations of doctors of the mind have learned from practical experience in hospital, clinic, and private practice, it is that human beings, in order to have health of mind and emotions, must learn to rely upon themselves and institute their own disciplines in living. And they have learned, too, that a man who relies on himself must be a man who respects himself. What, then, are the sources of self-respect, or even self reverence?

It is here that the psychotherapist encounters the hard rock of the old Socratic problem. To honor himself, a man must have a philosophy in which he plays a role of dignity and honor. So, in recent years, psychotherapists have been in pursuit of the self, in order that they may become better healers.

The self, however, while simple from one point of view is complex from another. The study of man, introspectively, tends to become either romantic or sterile, without some form of metaphysical orientation. *Structure*, in other words, sooner or later plays a part in the reflections of men who approach the human psyche directly, and not merely in the verbal terms of ancient theologies. Freud worked out an empirical structure of the psyche, using the terms *id*, *ego*, and *superego* to account for what seemed

to him distinctive functions within the man. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Platonic philosophy affords similar categories, and that Eastern metaphysics, again, subdivides the human being into a number of *upadhis,* or "vehicles," assigning to each one specific qualities, relationships, and functions.

But as previously suggested, metaphysics of this sort is no guarantee against orthodoxy and sectarianism; on the contrary, the more thorough-going the metaphysics, the greater the danger of an "orthodox" line developing. This probably results from the fact that metaphysics introduces an intellectual factor. To explain metaphysical subtleties, insofar as they can be explained at all, requires intellectual ability. The capacity to explain thus makes possible the element of status, and this produces hierarchy, and, finally authority and orthodoxy.

The founders of past philosophical traditions made strenuous efforts to avoid these consequences. Buddha, for example, or the Buddhists who set down the early scriptures of Buddhism, would first affirm elaborate metaphysical teachings, and then forthrightly deny them, labelling them illusions—hoping, apparently, that this would work against the crystallization of metaphysical ideas into "tenets" and eventually religious dogmas. Plato, too, qualified his metaphysical proposals by making them in the form of "myths." The myths of Plato were obviously works of the imagination, not to be taken literally, and this device was so successful with modern scholars that most of them imagine that Plato meant nothing serious by the myths, which are taken by them as mere fancies or insubstantial allegories.

The other alternative—that of omitting metaphysics altogether—might satisfy the devotional or emotional needs of people, but would leave their hunger for rational explanation without nourishment. In modern terms, this would mean little more than the naturalistic ethics of the scientific philosophers—which give little promise of affecting the lives of the great majority.

The thing that must be avoided, therefore, in any contemplated religion, is theology which gives spiritual authority to anyone besides the individual, each man for himself. It is at this point that religious inspiration always sells out to orthodoxy and sectarianism. The creation of "specialists" in religion is the worst specialization of all, and the cause of the corruptions and presences which have made the history of religion the unholiest of subjects.

The most encouraging thing about the new spirit of quest in religion is the general feeling that religion is not a means of getting something or somewhere, but of knowing and being something. The wornout religions of the past all involve external transactions between the individual and a god or between the individual and a priest or an institution which represents a god. If we want to avoid orthodoxy and sectarianism in the religions of tomorrow, we will carefully shun all faiths which propose external transactions or relationships between the individual and something outside himself. True religion is entirely inward and the highest form of religious instructions is a dialogue between the individual and another part of himself—Ain Soph talking with Ain Soph, as the ancient Kabalists said.

REVIEW
LIFE FROM THE DEAD SEA

DURING the year since initial notice in MANAS of the "Dead Sea Scrolls" controversy, an enormous amount of commentary has been published on the subject, and a supplementary discovery made. Apart from the professional Christian historians and their non-Christian adversaries, nearly every well-read person now begins to suspect that, at the very least, we here encounter a fascinating study in psychology. Unaffiliated scholars, after studying these records of the rites and beliefs of the Essenes, have probably become much more interested in Christianity than they ever have been before—now viewing the texts of the New Testament as the outgrowth of a natural process in religious formulation. But the orthodox, be they Fundamentalists, Protestants, or doctrinaire Catholics, show signs of marked alarm, as they respond with claims to the effect that the Dead Sea Scrolls actually add to the evidence of the "uniqueness" of Christ's life and philosophy.

It is of course no surprise to discover that Jewish publications, alone among representatives of the Judaic tradition, maintain impartiality. After all, one of the essential differences between Judaism and Christianity is that those of the former faith refuse to see anything entirely unique in either Christ or his teachings, and thus have always made a kind of "comparative religion" approach to the origin of Christianity. The April issue of *Congress Record*, published by the American Jewish Congress, presents a brief article on recent developments concerning the Scrolls, entitled "Qumran and Christianity." The writer, Leo Pfeffer, begins:

> As each new article or book in a rapidly growing literature on the Dead Sea Scrolls is published, the overshadowing question of the relationship of the Qumran sect to the origins of Christianity comes into sharper focus. It is vain for conservative scholars to attempt to discourage speculation by warning against premature conclusions and urging patience until all or most of the scrolls and fragments are deciphered and published. The fact that this may take more than half a century is not conducive to patience even if the question were not of so burning a nature.
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> That many religiously committed Christians are disturbed by the trend of events is evidenced by the frequent sermons and statements by clergymen and scholars assuring the faithful that they have nothing to fear and that the reported affinity between the Qumran community and the origins of Christianity, if not entirely baseless, is certainly greatly exaggerated. It is not without significance that a Roman Catholic writer of a scholarly article uses the word "atheistic" to characterize some of the speculation.

The original Dead Sea discovery has now been supplemented by other cave findings. One recent work compiled by scholars working in the Palestine Archaeological Museum in Jordan deals with such interesting items as a description of a ritual banquet "at which a Messiah is present and at which bread and wine are blessed and eaten." Edmund Wilson, who prepared an extensive summary of the original discovery for the *New Yorker* for May 14, 1955, has pointed out the obvious connection "between the sacred banquets of the Essenes and the Gospel account of the Last Supper, with the rite of the Communion based on it." Mr. Pfeffer tabulates other similarities:

> The resemblance between Qumran and Christianity, pointed out by Dupont-Sommer and expanded and substantiated by Allegro, is striking. In both, a divinely appointed leader, whose coming was foretold by the prophets, is persecuted by his arch-enemy, the High Priest, and is caused by the latter to be crucified by Gentiles. His followers await his resurrection on Judgment Day when the wicked will be punished and the elect, i.e., those who believe in him, will be saved. Both established an ascetic, communist, democratically governed community whose sacraments were chiefly ritual immersion or baptism, ritual communal meals, study (more pronounced in Qumran) and prayer. Both called themselves a community of the "New Covenant" or "New Testament," renewing the covenant with the Lord that had been broken by the perfidy of Israel. Both used many distinctive terms such as "those of the Way," "the Many," "the poor ones," "the Elect of God," "Children of Light," etc. Both were subject to an inescapable sense of urgency, believing the end of the present wicked world order was almost at hand. Just as the Christian church believes that the crucifixion of Jesus atoned for the sins of man, so the Qumran community saw in the agonies of the Teacher of Righteousness and his followers an atonement for the iniquity of the world. Vicarious

> suffering and vicarious atonement seem to be as deeply rooted in the beliefs of the Sect as in the dogma of Christianity.

In *Encounter* for May, Edmund Wilson discusses the controversy currently raging between Dr. John Allegro of Manchester University, who has made a series of BBC broadcasts on the Scrolls, and a number of busy Catholic priests. The London *Times* gives ample space to the debate, as "defenders of the faith" resist any suggestion that the Scrolls prefigure Christian doctrine and the role of Jesus. Both Dr. Allegro and the biblical scholar, A. Dupont-Sommer, are, interestingly, ex-Catholic—and apparently well able to politely reject official interpretations by the Roman Church. As Mr. Wilson points out, the further this whole thing goes, the more evident it becomes that Christianity has been intensively factional since the beginning; and it is likely that omission of mention of the Essenes in the New Testament was a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the existence of a rival group. So one wonders if the orthodox would not fare much better if they let sleeping dogs lie, and not attempt to force arguments which are apt to backfire.

In any case, Scrolls or no Scrolls, a frantically partisan Christianity seems already to have outlived its natural span of years. The undeniable revelation of the Scrolls might have been a cruel trick to play upon the devout a century or two ago, but if the patient is never going to rise again, anyway, the demise might just as well come soon as late. In a few centuries, perhaps, we shall have some genuine wisdom about religion, and then sectarianism—at the level of partisan metaphysics and doctrine—will be a thing of the past.

A Los Angeles *Times* (June 20) book review by Robert Kirsch provides thoughtful comment on A. Powell Davies, book, *The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Signet). An English Biblical scholar who now lives in America, Dr. Davies suggests that the Scrolls "constitute the greatest challenge to Christian dogma since Darwin's theory of evolution shook the theological world in the 19th century." Dr. Davies also feels that the Dead Sea discovery is a most fortunate one, since it demands revaluation of Christianity from the standpoint of comparative religious study. Mr. Kirsch summarizes as follows:

> What bothers Dr. Davies is that some scholars are fearful that historical information of the type found in the scrolls and in the research at the ruins of the Qumran Commuriity is bound to undermine Christian theology. He contends that they have known "for a long time that the traditional view of Christian origins is not supported by history so much as theology." Thus he imputes to them a double standard or hypocrisy which seems unfair.
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> But to the layman, unconstrained by dogma, the historical truths cannot destroy the ethical and moral truths which, in a sense, transcend history. Thus, it is the teachings of Jesus that are important rather than the physical life of Jesus.

In this light, we can only agree with Dr. Davies and Mr. Kirsch, that the present age, which bids fair eventually to become one of philosophical search and discovery, requires the relinquishment of literalism in religion. The *philosophy* of Jesus of Nazareth, separated from the extravagant claims of official theology, supplies a much-needed bridge between the viewpoints of East and West. And the present swing towards increased respect for the Eastern scriptures stems, we think, from the realization that "comparative religion" and synthesizing philosophy come naturally to the scholars of the Orient. Neither the Buddhist nor the Hindu scholar feels compelled to deny Christ as a personage who may have belonged to a great fraternity of teachers, nor are they at all interested in arguing the comparative stature of Krishna, Buddha, and Jesus.

As Mr. Kirsch points out in his concluding paragraph, the articulate Christian world has been prepared for the present challenge by the development of archaeological and anthropological science. To regard Christ as an entirely unique being is actually to devaluate the rest of humanity, whereas a Christ who has lineage in an old tradition of ethical thought is a "Saviour" able to deepen the respect which one may feel for all his forebears in the ancient world.

COMMENTARY
UNPOPULAR PROPHET

REFLECTING on the argument in India (see Frontiers) between the socialists and the advocates of capitalism, it occurred to us that the intelligent man of the present generation is more likely to have read Lenin and Marx than Herbert Spencer. Yet Spencer was as good a prophet as Marx, if not better in some respects. Following is a quotation from a collection of Spencer's essays, entitled *The Man Versus the State*, reprinted by Caxton in 1945:

> When asserting the sacredness of property against private transgressors, we do not ask whether the benefit to a hungry man who takes bread from a baker's shop is or is not greater than the injury inflicted on the baker: we consider, not the special effects, but the general effects which arise if property is insecure. But when the State exacts further amounts from citizens, or further restrains their liberties, we consider only the direct and proximate effects. We do not see that by accumulated small infractions of them, the vital conditions to life, individual and social, come to be so imperfectly fulfilled that the life decays.
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> Yet the decay thus caused becomes manifest where the policy is pushed to an extreme. Any one who studies, in the writings of M. M. Taine and de Tocqueville, the state of things which preceded the French Revolution, will see that that tremendous catastrophe came about from so excessive a regulation of men's actions in all their details, and such an enormous drafting away of the products of their actions to maintain the regulating organization, that life was fast becoming impracticable. The empirical utilitarianism of that day, like the empirical utilitarianism of our day, differed from rational utilitarianism in this, that in each successive case it contemplated only the effects of particular interferences on the actions of particular classes of men, and ignored the effects produced by a multiplicity of such interferences on the lives of men at large. And if we ask what then made, and what now makes, this error possible, we find it to be the political superstition that governmental power is subject to no restraints.
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> When that "divinity" which "cloth hedge a king" and which has left a glamour around the body inheriting his power, has died away—when it begins to be seen clearly that, in a popularly governed nation, the government is simply a committee of management; it will also be seen that this committee of management has no intrinsic authority. The inevitable conclusion will be that its authority is given by those appointing it; and has just such bounds as they choose to impose. Along with this will go the further conclusion that the laws it passes are not themselves sacred; but that whatever sacredness they have, it is entirely due to the ethical sanction—an ethical sanction which, as we find, is derivable from the laws of human life as carried on under social conditions. And there will come the corollary that when they have not this ethical sanction they have no sacredness, and may rightly be challenged.
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> The function of Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the powers of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the powers of Parliaments.

The real difficulty, of course, is in deciding upon "the laws of human life as carried on under social conditions," and in formulating what Spencer calls the "ethical sanction." Even so, the force of his argument may be felt to greater advantage, today, than a century and more ago, when it was written.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

Editors: This is a very old and a very generalized question—one, moreover, which seems to involve almost every issue of psychology and philosophy as well: How much attention does a busy adult owe to the wishes and demands of a child if simultaneously attempting to build towards new forms of fulfillment in his or her own life? Lest this way of putting it sound as though the parent may begrudge much of the time and energy which child-care involves, suppose that the parent is equally concerned with the child and with her own development of capacity in some worthwhile held.

This sort of problem is almost inevitable for the many divorced mothers who must work to help support a child or children, for, when something of a "new life" is being built, such a parent is rather apt to develop new interests along with the enforced regimen of gainful employment.

ALL parents know that a young child's appetite for attention is pretty close to insatiable, and that to meet every demand or whim would actually reduce the parent to a personal nonentity. On the other hand, all child-psychologists discover that the failure of parents to give a sufficient intensity to the "attention" they do proffer may seriously inhibit the child's capacity for self-confidence. But there is a good deal more to be said on this topic beyond the obvious "not too much, nor too little."

We think it no exaggeration to say that each child must *discover* that he is a human being, and that until the discovery is made possible, he is something less than that. Deserted or lost children who have somehow survived in a wilderness do not make this discovery, for it is only in the atmosphere created by the presence of adult minds that the latent mind-capacities of the child come alive. The discovery that one is a member of the human family seems to come in two natural stages. First, unlike the young of the animal tribe, a child develops imagination, and, with imagination, the capacity to "want" any number of things and conditions. This innocent selfishness focusses on the parent, particularly the maternal parent, as the first known source of fulfillment for desires, and the child begins to develop a measure of self-confidence as he learns that the mother will take his desires into consideration, and at least wishes to fulfill them. Every normal home is, during the first months and years, "child-centered," in recognition of the inevitability of this. But doting parents, attempting to lose themselves in their children—or fulfill themselves vicariously—easily submit to tyranny, and the tyrannical child soon becomes a menace to himself. His happiness becomes based upon desire-fulfillment alone, and since it is plainly impossible for anyone to find every whim immediately fulfilled, the tyrannical child becomes just as frustrated as the neglected child. In later life, moreover, he will become a trial to any marital partner.

The second stage of "discovery" involves the realization that the parent has a life of his own just as important, and often more so, than the untutored life of the child. What is to be striven for is the closest approximation to equality of consideration that can be attained in the early years, and while the child may not understand a parent's interests or activities, it is the most natural thing in the world for him to adjust to them. We have often heard it said that "the children must come first," but, in reality, the parents *did* come first. Theirs is the responsibility for seeing that helpless creatures develop the capacity to help themselves, and eventually to become, *on this basis*, creative members of a family. No satisfactory adjustment is ever one-sided.

The growth and self-reliance of a mother is just as important as the growth and self-reliance of the child. During the critical years of a child's adolescence an increased breadth of understanding and catholicity of interest developed by a mother will make the difference between an attitude of custodial care and the flowering of a genuine friendship. Nor is there any reason why the "new interests" mentioned by the questioner need to mean simply a threat to the quality or quantity of attention being given the child. Communication and a sense of participation are here, as in all things, the most precious attainments. The enthusiasm of a parent who begins to develop latent capacities along artistic or professional lines *is* communicable, and patience in building this sort of feeling for sharing is

extremely rewarding. After all, in the final analysis, children flourish best when they are able to feel neither dependent nor independent, but cooperators in a mutual scheme of living.

The psychological problem for the parent is simply the psychological problem of all human beings—the tendency toward preoccupation. One loses perspective if the only concern is the supposed "happiness" of the child, and, conversely, if one's own "fulfillment" becomes completely absorbing. The presence of a child can give depth and direction to any sort of adult striving, and this striving can also give depth and direction to the child himself. Of course, since the many combinations of adult activities are above the mental comprehension of the very young, some bewilderment is to be expected. Confusion can, however, be considerably lessened by the parents' continuity of effort, consistency in attitude, and preservation of a general flavor of optimistic enthusiasm. Parents who throw themselves into "new careers" and new interests only to become depressed and discouraged would do far better to exist on a pittance and give their energies almost entirely to the patient education of their children, since an equitable return for time taken away from the child is a sharing of that sense of growth and fulfillment a parent presumably seeks.

As sociological statistics have revealed, a child is often in much better case when given a fair proportion of time by a single divorced parent than if supplied with a sort of token "doting" by parents who continually quarrel, and who therefore fail to reveal anything of consistent discipline and purposefulness in their own lives. The young not only want what they want at the moment—they also want to become a part of something in which they have faith, and this sort of faith can become firm only when constancy of effort and enthusiasm are apparent in the parent.

Growth of mind and the growth of self-reliance in the child depend a good deal upon the atmosphere and attitudes which the child encounters. The parent who does not tolerate constant interruptions in his own reading or studying is not necessarily a poor parent, for it is often demonstrated that the mood of concentration and contemplation is contagious. There are times, in other words, when the child must learn to leave the parent alone and to find resources of his own, for unless he does so, he is apt to generate a few guilt feelings; and to think himself insufficiently loved. Most of the trouble, we think, between young parents and young children comes at the level of leisure time amusements. If the parent is doing something the child can understand, his inclusion in such activities should be taken for granted, in whatever degree feasible. In short, whatever can be done to insure that neither parent nor child will feel that they live in entirely separate worlds, with opposing interests, is beneficial, while at the same time, each parent needs to "grow" just as much as the child does. The happiest children, in our opinion, are the children whose parents *are* living creative lives of their own. From the sense of fulfillment which accompanies growth and accomplishment in the adult world, the parent comes to the child with something more of himself to offer.

Well, all one can do is "talk around" a subject of this sort. Our main point is that independent lines of fulfillment for the parent need not be considered as neglect of a child simply because there is less time for absorption in the child's activities. The attitude and the spirit of the parent are the basic sources from which happiness and a sense of security will come to the child. Nothing is more tragic than the situation wherein a parent stops growing during a child's earliest years, and therefore has nothing new to bring to later companionship. The child is learning and growing all the time, and to be of his true company, we should do likewise.

FRONTIERS

Debate on Political Economy

[The old political argument about private versus public ownership, perennial in the West for more than a century, is now acquiring an Indian version. India, as we know, is committed to socialization, and has now a pluralistic economy including both private and public enterprise. Having experience of both types of organization, Indians are finding arguments based upon facts for both sides of the controversy. Upon first reading C.V.G.'s recapitulation of the current debate in India, we thought, "Nothing new here." Then we reflected: "But the discussion has a freshness and is therefore interesting." The freshness, we think, comes from the fact that C.V.G. does not write as a partisan. No pressure of party allegiance dictates what he says, and simply the atmosphere of freedom in thought—thought oblivious to the oceans of propaganda which have been produced to affect human judgment on this subject—has a manifest value. One gets the impression that India may eventually adopt a system which proves itself in experience, regardless of claims and counter-claims. This, if it happens, will be a great advance over the incredible self-righteousness which pervades political argument in the West.—Editors, MANAS]

MR. C. D. DESHMUKH, India's Finance Minister, defending the exclusion of the accounts of the nationalised life insurance companies from the audit jurisdiction of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, said recently: "I was convinced that if the Auditor-General were to be placed in charge of the audit, those who were in charge of it (insurance) would always be trembling, so to speak, for their financial responsibility would not show that dash and enterprise, which is so badly called for, if any expansion of this somewhat peculiar business were to take place." The Finance Minister's anxiety for the free operation of "dash" and "enterprise" will not impress many; for, private enterprise which offers free scope for these qualities, has, in India, in recent years to reckon with increasing regulation and control by a government committed to the Welfare State. Private enterprise, in India, as elsewhere, owes much of its prosperity to a determined and daring exercise of "dash" and "enterprise," and so can offer some justification for appropriating to itself the huge returns it has reaped in the shape of profits.

The position of profit as stated by Alfred Marshall is that it is the return to a fourth factor of production (land, labour and capital being the classical three), organisation or management, made up of such qualities as dash, enterprise, initiative, imagination, etc. While Marshall's theory appears plausible, the huge disparity between the returns to labour and to management which characterises modern capitalism, militates against its acceptance; the Marxian verdict on capitalism as erratic and exploitative and on profit as predatory sounds more reasonable. Governments have found it necessary to regulate and control private enterprise, the unfettered operation of which has often promoted, not social good, but only self and sectional interests. India, whose prime minister has been considerably influenced by socialism, has decided on active State participation in economics.

Captains of industry may not deny that private enterprise is sometimes erratic; but they will argue that this should not be objected to. Industrial activity is characterised by a large number of unknowns, unknowables and variables and predictability of results is often difficult; method in action not always possible and therefore an element of the haphazard should be permissible. The industrialists' claim that the responsibility for such venturesomeness being their own, the resulting rewards should be their own, too; it is pointed out that while profits may appear inflated, they should be assessed in proportion to the magnitude of the risks private enterprise has to face and take, and there is always the possibility of its reaping not profits alone, but colossal losses.

Socialist economists have had no difficulty in repudiating this claim; they point out that while responsibility for erratic actions is that of the management, consequences of miscalculations affect not merely the management but also others,

and more severely. A wrong decision means acute unemployment for a large labour force. For example, the *Times* of India recently embarked on expansion and started simultaneous publication from three cities. When the unwisdom of this step was realised a few months later, one of its offices was closed and many journalists and other employees lost their jobs. Socialists claim that such disturbing events, far from being accidental aberrations, are indicative of the piratical tendencies of capitalism. Socialist theories of trade fluctuations assert that cyclical movements result from the depredations of capitalism; it stands to gain more from alternating periods of prosperity and depression than from stable economic activity; and so will not welcome the very necessary state action to end such de. liberate and organised exploitation.

Representatives of industry protest that charges of exploitation spring from either malice or misunderstanding and argue that this should be evident from the not wholly desirable results of State legislation in India. The Factory Act of 1922 was perhaps the first step taken by the State to regulate industry and since then labour laws have grown in extent and importance. The Labour Departments of the governments at the centre and the states are armed with powers to check private enterprise when it does not behave itself. Arbitrary dismissal, retrenchment or termination of services by management is no longer possible and labour enjoys more security of tenure than even a few years ago.

Industrialists, however, have been quick to point out that this is not an unmixed blessing. The effect of protective legislation in India has been to assure the same security of service to industrial employees as is enjoyed by government servants. Industrialists complain that so much security saps efficiency and encourages irresponsibility. They illustrate this by pointing to the working of government departments in India. Statutory rules for Government servants are very elaborate and benevolent and dismissal or removal from service is resorted to only in extreme cases of misconduct. Consequently, government service in India is unhappily characterised by inefficiency, slackness and irresponsibility. When, for instance, a government servant retires, certain roundabout but unavoidable procedures have to be gone through before his pension is sanctioned; and the pensioner suffers terribly owing to the scandalous delays incurred by the accounts offices in the disposal of his papers and the authorisation of pension payment.

Industrialists accuse the government of having contributed to such deterioration in industrial and commercial service by indiscriminately benevolent legislation. Some time ago, an industrial establishment in Delhi dismissed some of its employees and the Labour Officer, finding the action of the management illegal, ordered their reinstatement. The employees, realising the powerlessness of the management and their own immunity, spent most of their working hours in an anteroom in the office, playing cards; and the correspondent of an Indian daily, reporting the event, concluded with a dig at the Welfare State.

The industrialists' contention that employees deliver their best in an atmosphere of pressure and insecurity is not unsound; but the undesirability of fear as an incentive, notwithstanding its practical suitability, from humanitarian consideration, is patent. The Government of India, have therefore, striven for its abandonment in industry. But when the State proceeds to humanise and democratise industrial relations in countries where the general level of education is very low and civic consciousness undeveloped, this effort creates a situation in which the workers become conscious only of their rights and not of their responsibilities; and this attitude spreads tension in a society torn by glaring inequalities not easily and immediately remediable.

India has emerged as a democracy, but successful democracy needs an educated and a socially responsible people. In India, where these

requisites will take time to realise, the limitations of democracy are often seen to be crippling and the State is tempted to make inroads into the rights and liberties assured to its citizens by India's Constitution when it feels that they are being unwisely exercised. For example, the Second Five-Year Plan is going to make a determined bid to reduce the staggering dimensions of India's unemployment. Unemployment in India is aggravated more by preferences for jobs among the unemployed, which a poor country can ill afford, than by an absolute scarcity of jobs. There is the tendency among the educated and the literate to scoff at manual jobs, though a manual labourer often earns more than a white-collared clerk. An unemployed man often prefers penury in his own town to moving to another a few hundred miles away where employment can be had. Recently a State Government decided to set up single-teacher schools in villages to promote literacy; distressingly enough, despite the huge volume of educated unemployment, teachers were not forthcoming in enough numbers: the jobs were not good enough!

India will find it more difficult to resist the temptation to abridge democracy when it retards economic advance, the more spectacular the advance made by her neighbour, Communist China. China's economic progress has impressed Mr. Nehru, whose impatience with India's own inspired the resoluteness of the Second Five-Year Plan. But China does not owe allegiance to democracy. India does; and China's ruthless land reforms and mobilisation of rural savings will not be possible in a democratic India. India will find it difficult to escape the conclusion that the State will have to be more draconian and less democratic if it is impatient for economic progress. But once an agonising decision toward restraining democracy is taken, it will be difficult to know when to stop. Experience in Russia and even in China has demonstrated the vitiating and self-perpetuating influence of power which, starting as a means, soon becomes the end. Socialist, democratic India, which set out to check capitalism, is then likely to become just as predatory and acquisitive.

Gandhi was wise to see that the conflict and tension in modern society resulted from the hugeness and complexity of its organisation. He was against large-scale industrialisation which destroys personal relationships and centralised government which becomes a Leviathan. He pleaded for small-scale industries the size of which preserve amity between master and craftsman and manageably small village governments. But India, which cannot be an island in a furiously industrialized and fiercely competitive world run by highly centralised governments, was obliged to reject his utopianism. The chances of success in her efforts to achieve economic democracy within the framework of the political depend on whether the sword of Damocles over her head is real or imaginary; viz., the widely expressed fear that if democracy does not deliver the goods, Commumism will take over. The abject poverty of the Indian people, who are vulnerable to propaganda, lends substance to this fear. But there need be no finality to this prediction; and prophets of doom have not always been proved right.

C. V. C.