

HISTORY AND SCIENCE

LAST month's *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* inaugurated a symposium on the subject, "Science and the Affairs of Men," which will continue throughout the volume of this periodical—the tenth anniversary year of its publication. If the work of the contributors to the first issue of the symposium is a measure of the quality to be expected throughout the series, everyone interested in the question of the "responsibility of scientists" should find a subscription to the *Bulletin* a worth-while investment. (Subscriptions are \$5 a year and are accepted by the University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.)

A peculiar virtue of this magazine is its obvious humanitarian purpose, unqualified by a commercial motive. Further, the magazine is still too young to have acquired a noticeable institutional bias, while the intellectual caliber of its contributors is of the best.

The symposium on Science and the Affairs of Men is introduced in the April issue by the editor, Eugene Rabinowitch, who proposes that the present is "a tragic age"—an age haunted by the conflict between two truths:

In speaking of two truths, I have in mind, not the forces of political and economic freedom on one side, and those of political totalitarianism and economic statism on the other; nor the struggle between white man's "colonialism," on the one hand, and national aspirations of previously dependent (or still dependent) nations, on the other. The uniquely tragic aspect of our time is the conflict between the forces of history (of which the two above-mentioned rivalries are current examples), and the forces of science, which call for an end to power contests between any ideologically or nationally circumscribed sections of humanity and for international cooperation for the fulfillment of the common needs of all mankind.

This is a disinterested and to some degree searching formulation of the problem. It is disinterested because it might have been offered by

any thoughtful human being, regardless of nationality or race. It is searching in that it locates the difficulty in the psychology of human behavior, implying that the fundamental issues are not "technical," but call for intelligence and a better understanding of the springs of human action. The Editor continues:

The great problem before mankind in our time is one of coexistence—coexistence of the historical world of changing but undying ideals of group devotion, religious and ideological partisanship, with the new world of scientific facts, which cannot be undone or suppressed, and which give man enormous capability to create and destroy. Despite the efforts to push military technology back to its "pre-atomic" state, there is a growing realization that this is not possible. Mankind will have to live in atomic jeopardy in all its future, and if it wants to survive in this world and reap its promises, it will have to adjust history to science and not put science in the service of history. Does man realize his new situation? What are the chances that the dilemma will be resolved without a catastrophe? These are questions which we hope our symposium will help to illuminate.

A first question to be considered is: Is this a *new* problem, or an old one which has grown so great that it now has a qualitatively different reality?

A scientist might argue that the problem in its present form is really new because our very survival depends upon its solution. This may be true. If the wiping out of almost the entire population of the earth would constitute the end of the human adventure on this planet, then the advent of atomic power does indeed constitute a unique emergency in human history. In this view, ultimate values depend in the last analysis on physical existence.

It may of course seem a bit ridiculous to suggest as an alternative that moral and human values can continue without a human population to cherish them; but if, for one man, such values have been conceived to be far more important than human life, and if that man was right, this conclusion would hold for the rest of mankind. If survival had been more

important to Socrates than his integrity as a man and Athenian citizen, he would have behaved quite differently, both during his trial and after.

If we concede the possibility that Socrates cherished not an illusion but a reality more precious than life, then we are free to suppose that the crisis of moral decision described by Rabinowitch is not *really* new, or perhaps that it is not truly a crisis at all. We may suppose, moreover, that the equation of "tragedy" as he formulates it is the ever-present human environment, its uniqueness for the present being only in our having become aware of it.

These suppositions may be important, not in order to minimize today's sense of emergent decision, but as possibly throwing the only kind of light on the problem that can help us to solve it. For these may be considerations indispensable to the understanding of the nature of man.

The simplest way to characterize the several articles on Science and the Affairs of Men is that they all, in one way or another, call for a moral rebirth of mankind.

The first contributor, Raymond Aron, a French journalist, makes this appeal in a back-handed way, since the only immediate security he can find for the world is founded on fear—fear on the part of all nations of the consequences of a war in which "ten-megaton" bombs (having the explosive power of ten million tons of TNT) will be used. M. Aron admits that such security is "precarious" at best, but argues that time will be needed to establish attitudes conducive to genuine peace:

Many physicists have had the idea that since Hiroshima we have entered a new and radically different period, in which statesmen would have to revise entirely the conduct of diplomacy. I do not think they are wrong, only that their reasoning is not immediately valid. . . . To think and prepare radical solutions for a later time, requires that men see clearly the dangers and tasks of the present. If the half-century before us will truly be one of limited wars, our children will have the chance to make the coming century one of peace.

David F. Cavers, associate dean of the Harvard Law School, offers a somewhat discouraging review of the past ten years of attempts to control

armaments through the agency of the United Nations—subtitled "A Decade of Disagreement." And even if one sort of control could be established, there is the danger that technological advance in weapons will suddenly change the area to be "controlled," and thus render all past efforts in this direction futile. Prof. Cavers' most significant conclusion is casually expressed: "Neither we nor the Soviets will be induced to enter arms agreements by fear alone."

Jules Moch, French engineer and statesman, writing on "Technology and the Future," finds optimism in the emotional certainty that people *must* wake up:

If the present folly of mankind were to endure, the scientists would continue to devote a portion of their time and of nuclear resources to the destruction of civilization. The entire world would then be drawn into an accelerated race for thermonuclear and biological armaments, toward redoubled political tensions, and the threat of annihilation of the species.

But one can no longer doubt that reason will prevail, thanks to the influence of scientists and other intellectuals upon the people and their representatives, thanks to the awakening of people to the peril which faces them, thanks to the patient labors of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee, as well as of the General Assembly of the U.N.

Scientists, M. Moch believes, have done their part in opposing "peacetime research leading to ever more monstrous weapons":

They [the scientists] have at all times fulfilled their mission, which is to increase the sum of our knowledge and permit progress toward a better world. The decision how to apply the sum of knowledge so acquired, is the responsibility of all men, not of scientists alone. The masses, more than the elite, are responsible for the present disorder. . . .

No choice is more dramatic than that between a peaceful atomic era and thermonuclear destruction. In spite of all appearances, let us have confidence in the collective wisdom of thinking human beings!

This praise of the behavior of scientists will probably seem ingenuous to the atomic scientists, many of whom are far from being so well satisfied with themselves, and a little more evidence to

support "confidence in the collective wisdom of thinking human beings" would be to the point, in connection with M. Moch's final exhortation. But even if the French technologist appears to expect a miracle, this expectation amounts, in practical terms, to a demand for moral rebirth.

Llewellyn Woodward, an eminent English historian, writes on "Science and the Relations between States." He asks whether modern nations have any longer the right to "do justice, even if the world should perish." This fine phrase must now be taken literally:

However sure we may be of our own conception of justice, can we assume responsibility for destroying the human race if this conception is flouted? Even if we were sure of our moral right, should we in fact exercise it? In other words, should we begin a defensive war, knowing that if we ourselves refrain from using our deadliest weapons, the enemy might well use such weapons as a last mad act of defiance, and therefore compel us to reply in kind. We were once proud of another slogan: "a war to end war," but what if we have to say "a war to end mankind"?

In conclusion, Prof. Woodward says, "We must accustom ourselves to total insecurity." To sustain a life of this sort, we must "view the situation as a whole," and "Such a view requires a discipline of the mind and the emotions, in short, an education in which modern communities are still lacking." Follows the usual demand of the scholar and the historian for education in the humanities, especially for the young scientist, for whom "humane" knowledge is surely as important "as it may be for him to spend a similar time in military service." Prof. Woodward concludes:

For a young man trained in the sciences the study of the humanities requires a good deal of "unlearning" as well as learning. Young scientists will not accept this diversion from their specialist work and from the path of their professional ambitions unless the collective weight of opinion among leading scientists impresses them that the sacrifice (as it must appear from their angle) is desirable and necessary. It is indeed not for me to dictate to the masters of the sciences. (Moreover I realize, as do most teachers of the "humanities," that the present levels even of post-graduate attainment outside the sciences do not allow "nonscientists" to

assume airs of superiority.) Many of them are deeply wise in the kind of knowledge which transcends exact measurement, but at least I can say that if they do not exercise their great and almost hieratic authority to secure something of this "other" knowledge for their disciples, then increasingly the demand for more scientific and technological education will mean a starving of the community, and the more problems in world politics which scientists and technologists set to their societies, the less competent will they or their societies be to answer them.

The strong sense of emergency felt by these contributors to the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* needs no emphasis here, although their sense of what is required to meet the emergency seems hardly adequate. The point is, that although they ask for, or imply the need of, a genuine moral rebirth for all the world—or at least, for a beginning, in the persons of the most intelligent of the race—they seem seriously lacking in an appreciation of what moral rebirth means and how it takes place. We doubt if the *Bulletin* editors will find a place in the series for a discussion of these questions, despite their manifest importance. After all, the *Bulletin* is a magazine published by atomic scientists, and not a journal of the philosophy of religion, or a periodical devoted to the processes of social and moral regeneration.

So, if there are readers with non-sectarian suggestions, perhaps others can help with beginnings to the answers that are needed. And if the suggestions can be made to relate to Rabinowitch's way of setting the problem—as a "conflict between the forces of history and the forces of science,"—with resulting illumination of the nature of these forces, and their bearing on both the individual and society, then so much the better, for we suspect that "history" and "science" are terms which cloak more universal meanings.

REVIEW

AFRICAN LENS

THE DARK EYE IN AFRICA by Laurens van der Post (Morrow, 1955) is a book of which, if we had the money, we would buy enough copies to send to all our friends. Colonel van der Post has written a book about Africa which is really a book for and about the world. It is made up of an introduction, 53 pages titled "The Basis for Discussion," and 134 pages of answers to questions from the members of the Psychological Club of Zurich.

We know of no work which so successfully restores the sense of drama and adventure to the human enterprise. While there are some "facts" in the book, it is largely a work of the imagination, and perhaps its chief value is that it is likely to compel the reader to respect and take seriously a work of the imagination, not as a "literary" achievement, but as an intensely practical study of the problems of Africa and the modern world. The psychological insights provided are doubtless Jungian in background, but they are by no means mere echoes of the great Swiss psychologist. Colonel van der Post is manifestly an original thinker himself, with a capital of ideas won from experience and reflection.

Initially and throughout, the author supplies a sense of form to the usually intangible subject of the psychic life and aspirations of human beings, considered in terms of individual cultures. This enables both writer and reader to see in the mind's eye a definite content for discussion. As to whether the "form" suggested by Colonel van der Post is the "correct" one, we can only say that if the subtle ethical perceptions which emerge during elaboration of his ideas can vindicate the author's theory, then we, at least, are satisfied.

The difficult question of the Mau-Mau activities is a good test of any writer, so that the following passage should be generally revealing:

The white man has first discredited the African way of living and dealing with the forces of nature about and within, and then obliged him increasingly to live in a way which rejects the institutions, customs, initiation rites and rituals by which, for centuries, he has struck a balance with those

overwhelming aspects of nature which are incomprehensible to reason and quite beyond conscious control and rational articulation. I do not want to imply that it was necessarily bad that this African way of living was discarded. It was inevitable in the nature of things that sooner or later it would either have to die of itself or else be rejected by the Africans themselves before they could move on to something more complete. But what is deplorable is that having discredited this ancient way of living we have not put an honourable alternative in its place. No human being or society, however self-sufficient and rational it may appear, can live without institutions that deal with those aspects of life which cannot be explained rationally. No community can be left indefinitely outside in the night of the human spirit, in the beast-infested jungle which lies beyond the conscious fortifications which civilized culture raises for *us* in life. If a community cannot get within the protection of those fortifications by fair means, then it will do so by foul. If civilized reason and conscious strength will not aid it, then animal cunning and brute force will. Having then destroyed the cultural defences of the Kikuyu people, it was imperative that we should give them the protection of our way of life and free access to our own institutions. It was all the more imperative in the case of the Kikuyu because they are one of the most intelligent African peoples. But having destroyed their natural defences, we then denied them our own. Having taken away their way of life, we then made it impossible for them to acquire any other. Having supplanted their law by ours, we then gave them no right to live as our law demanded, but rather forced them to drift suspended in dark acceptance of a state of non-being. That is something no human race can do and survive. What most terrifies the primitive man is not physical danger but the fear that he may lose his soul. I believe Mau-Mau is a desperate attempt on the part of the Kikuyu to prevent such a loss of national soul. What is going on out there at the moment is, in a deep primitive sense, a war of religion. It may be a struggle for a form of religion so crude and base that it must revolt all civilized senses and one which the European is forced to reject with all his power. But it is a war of religion for all that. It is a fight of the Kikuyu for their old Kikuyu gods. It is a battle, as the Romans would have said, for the "ashes of their fathers and the temples of their gods."

Colonel van der Post's book is a plea for understanding, yet this expression has lately become quite pale from overuse. Understanding must

include the capacity to feel with oppressed peoples the agony of their expropriated psychic lives, and to comprehend their sense of having been dishonoured. The author tells how, during the war, as a prisoner of the Japanese, he and the other prisoners, American and British, were made to feel like outcasts of the human race:

We had no rights, privileges, and no security. Even the fact that we were alive was held to be a shameful argument against us, proof of our guilt and culpability as well as proof of the unprecedented magnanimity of our captors. What we stood for was condemned in advance not because of anything we had done but because of *what we were imagined to be*. None of us stood out as an individual and we were merely a collective reality for our rulers.

In the eyes of his fellow prisoners van der Post saw a strangely familiar look as they suffered the indignities imposed upon them by Japanese sentries and guards. Then he realized where he had seen that look before—"I had been familiar with that expression all my life and had seen it countless times on the faces of black Africans as they were being belaboured and upbraided by a white employer, or else stood in the dock for trial under a law which was not theirs and in a language they did not know."

The heart of *The Dark Eye in Africa* lies in the author's idea of human development—"a journey of *becoming*." He finds in the great cultural myths the key to human aspiration. The cultural dream of self-realization is embodied in the myth, and this myth—whether it be the search for a Promised Land, a quest for the Holy Grail, or an Odyssey which will end in reunion in Ithaca—provides the transcendent element in human life. Sometimes the interpretation of the myth turns sour with frustration and defeat. Writing of his countrymen, Colonel van der Post suggests that the heroic phase of the South African adventure was fulfilled by the Great Trek. This was the physical achievement, worthy of epic celebration. But the Afrikaners have rejected the New Testament rebirth of their dream:

They, too, cling to the literal truth of the word and power of the law in utter incomprehension of the alchemy of forgiveness and quicksilver transcendence of power in love, just as the *Jews* once clung to their ancient concepts of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a

tooth, and of a superior race favoured by God and of lesser breeds destined to be but hewers of wood and drawers of water. In consequence, the tide of my countrymen's myth has begun to ebb in them and threatens to leave them stranded on the bleak island shore of their histories, . . .

. . . there is nothing wrong with the basic myth of my people. If instead of believing that they are the *only* chosen people they could believe that we are all chosen people charged in our unique and several ways to bring the journey to its contracted end, our differences honourable, equal in dignity and adding to the variety and wonder of life, then all would be well.

It is the role of the Quixotes of our own and other times to restore the vision of the dream. The author relates the action of the son of a former Governor-General of South Africa who defied a police order forbidding him to demonstrate in an African area in Johannesburg. He appeared in the area, was tried, and sentenced to prison. Quietly, as an act of the moral imagination, he attempted to show that there was a conflict between white and white, on the issue of African destiny. "He tried, as it were, to change the gear of the living myth from reverse into first gear and check its recession. And to check the recession of our myths is, I believe, one of the most urgent tasks of contemporary man, not to do away with them, but to lend them the light of our reason and intellect, for we all need our myths constantly and forever."

The passage on *Don Quixote* adds luminously to the memory of the great classic:

Does not Cervantes' *Don Quixote* most movingly symbolize this truth? The knight of La Mancha and his peasant follower ride on in all of us from our first classic rose-pink dawn to our last romantic twilight. For the knight and the peasant are not two separate people, but one, the knight riding in search of a fit cause for his dedicated and heroic spirit is symbol of the aboriginal myth in us seeking flesh and blood to make it living reality; the peasant following grumbling behind is our physical worldly self which clings to the myth, for without its spirit his life has no meaning. They are two aspects of one continuing ambivalent truth: without nations and communities the myth cannot live, but without myth the life of a people lacks direction and meaning.

Tragedy comes when one or other of these inseparable aspects is made to usurp the validity of the other and to masquerade as the totality, as, for instance, when the knight rejects the evidence of the peasant's vision in a worldly issue and attacks shepherds and sheep as robbers. Yet there is no disaster so great as when the spirit is denied its journey—when the knight loses his horse, spear and cause—for when that happens a terrible meaninglessness invades life. We have only to look round us to see how high a tide of meaninglessness has already arisen in the being of man, and how denied is his legitimate meaning in the society to which he belongs. He has been driven more and more to rediscover it illegitimately through social upheaval and war. I believe this growing desperation is largely because the institutions and societies of our day will not give their constituent members causes worthy of their heroic capacities and love. Society treats men as children that must not be exposed to risk and insecurity, or to revert to my basic image, it refuses the knight his armour, his horse, his cause and separates him from his peasant.

Colonel van der Post draws attention to the fact that many of the reports in the press and the magazines and in books do little more than inspire hate of the Afrikaners, as though they had somehow become "depraved human monsters." What is most to be feared is the depersonalization of such problems, which leads to inhuman condemnations. Many of the Afrikaners, the author points out, *feel* that they cannot do other than what they are doing. This must be recognized, however much we disagree with what they do:

If there is a form of theft lower than thieving itself, it is to rob the thief of such little honour as he possesses, for by doing so you deny him the opportunity of discovering the real meaning of his actions and deprive him of the one thing through which he can be redeemed from thieving. . . . The European in Africa cannot be punished or hated into being a better person.

To an unsympathetic critic who declared that the Afrikaner churches are stronger than ever, today, and who disputed van der Post's claim that South African religion had broken down, the author replied that the dream of the original Afrikaners has been turned into a politico-racial myth, without inner depth. "That explains," he said, "the ease with which

Afrikaner priests go from the pulpit to politics; there is at heart no longer any serious difference between the two: both serve the same master." To this reply, he added: "Even if you do not, I consider what is happening to be a most serious break-down in the religious machinery of my country. I go further, I call the process a betrayal of the religious urge which originally brought us to Africa."

This book is peculiarly valuable in showing how a man who thinks as the author does meets what might be termed the "old" liberal approach in political and social criticism, giving a fresh perspective on the problems of human conflict. In conclusion, we quote from the answer to a question relating to the "economic factor" in the exploitation of colonial peoples:

I shall never forget a sad, embittered moment after the war when the Dutch leaders in Java realized for the first time that the desire of the Indonesians to see them leave those lovely emerald islands of the East was no passing emotion and that their empire, the third largest in the world, was tumbling down about them. I remember the governor-general turning to me and saying, "I cannot understand it. Look what we have done for them. Look at the schools and the hospitals we have given them. A hundred years ago the population was only a few millions, today it is nearly sixty millions. We have done away with malaria, plague and dysentery and given them a prosperous, balanced economy. Everyone has enough to eat. We have given them an honest and efficient administration and abolished civil war and piracy. Look at the roads, the railways, the industries—and yet they want us to go. Can you tell me why they want us to go?" And I felt compelled to say, "Yes, I think I can: I'm afraid it is because you have never had the right look in the eye when you spoke to them."

It may sound inadequate, but just think, for one moment, of the light that is in the eye of a human being when he looks at another human being he loves and respects as an equal. Then remember the look in the eye of the average European when he is in contact with "a lesser breed without the law," and you will understand what I mean. The difference between the two, I believe, is the explosive that has blown Europeans out of one country after another during our time.

COMMENTARY

BUDDHA JAYANTI

TOMORROW (May 24) will be the occasion for world-wide celebration of the 2500th Buddha Jayanti—anniversary of the birth, enlightenment, and entry into paranirvana of Gotama Buddha, the great reformer of Indian religion. Most readers are aware that a revival of Buddhist thought and philosophy is now taking place throughout the East. A two-year conference of Theravada Buddhism is proceeding in Rangoon, Burma, with the interest and encouragement of Prime Minister U Nu, a devout Buddhist. In the United States, Buddhist groups including students of both Japanese and Caucasian descent will make observance of this anniversary. West Coast Americans are well aware of the cultural contributions of Japanese people who have settled in this country, and not the least of these has been to add to the American "congress of religions" their appreciation of and devotion to the ethical and psychological teachings of Gotama Buddha. There are now 63,000 Buddhists in the United States—as many, we learn with surprise, as there are in India, the land of Buddha's birth.

Indian neglect of Buddha is, however, likely to be remedied by wise Indians who recognize, as did Gandhi, India's great debt to the Sakya Prince who became a lover of all his fellows. Mr. Nehru caused his cabinet to set aside a large appropriation for a proper celebration of Buddha's Day, and Indian leaders are reminding their countrymen that one who was perhaps India's greatest philosophical teacher, Shankaracharya, "acknowledged and declared Gotama Buddha as an avatar of the Hindus," despite the fact that Shankaracharya worked for a revival of Vedantism and Brahmanism. A writer in the January *Maha Bodhi Journal*, devoted to the revival of Buddhism in India, appealed to Indians to "make amends for the wrong done by their ancestors in expelling Lord Buddha from their country on account of ignorance, jealousy and

envy, by reinstalling him in every city, town, and village of India."

Western readers may take some pleasure in the fact that Eastern Buddhist periodicals are now found to be quoting the works of Western scholars of Buddhism almost as frequently as their Eastern counterparts. An editorial in the *Maha Bodhi Journal* rejoices that the first edition of E. A. Burtt's *The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha* (Mentor) was exhausted in two weeks and that hundreds of thousands of copies of this work have been distributed. An ancient Buddhist prophecy is to the effect that 2500 years after Buddha's death, his teaching, "like a great banyan tree that has been decaying for centuries, will put forth fresh green shoots and flourish more vigorously than ever," and Buddhists see in the new life of Buddhist thought, both East and West, the promise of a great fulfillment.

MANAS has little interest in the spread of any sort of sectarianism, and cares no more for the "church-and-priest" side of Buddhism than for the religiosity of any other historic religion. Buddha, however, was no sectarian, and his philosophical teachings have brought immeasurable enrichment to mankind. Study of the life and work of Buddha need not make us "Buddhists," but it can make us better men.

CHILDREN and Ourselves

THE following communication from a subscriber provides opportunity for continuing last week's discussion of the meaning of "principle" in relation to education:

Editor, "Children . . . and Ourselves": Recently in a graduate university class entitled, "Philosophical Backgrounds of Educational Thought," we studied the book, *Philosophies of Education*, the 41st Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. The book contains five expositions of educational philosophies by five men who differ greatly in their philosophies.

After the class members had read the book, and were quite familiar with the varying philosophies (after much discussion), we tried to summarize and synthesize. Six were called upon to form a panel. One member was moderator, and each of the other five was to take the part of one of the philosophers. Two days were allowed for preparation. The professor assigned the "parts," and did so without concern for the person's own philosophy. As a result, some members of the panel found themselves playing the role of a philosopher with whom they really did not agree, or with whom they had no sympathy. The professor then presented to the panel specific classroom situations, and asked that members explain and uphold certain procedures on the basis of their philosophies in the *roles they were playing*—not their own. The result was quite surprising, even to the panel members themselves. For they found that they became quite wrought up when the philosophy they represented was attacked. It was indeed a strange sight, to see a man become very annoyed when his temporary, "role-playing," philosophy was under fire, and afterwards to see him become quite embarrassed when the instructor pointed out to him he had violently upheld in debate a philosophy with which he did not profess, at other times, to agree.

Perhaps you would like to comment on this peculiar mental-emotional experience and help with some comments as to its educational implications.

This recalls a previous discussion—of the value of taking up controversial issues in the classroom, so that pupils acquire a judicial quality of mind. The highest manifestation of judiciousness, from a philosophical standpoint,

takes the form of active sympathy for views other than one's own. When we talk of our concern for "principles," and wish our children to know what "living by principle" means, we should not confuse principle with doctrine. A parent's beliefs cannot, simply by transference, become a youth's "principles." The man of principle is the man who can understand the *role* of principles in human thinking and conduct. He is not merely concerned with his own criteria, but with developing sympathetic understanding for the criteria of others.

But here is a paradox: Since a "principled man" is thought of as firm, unyielding to suasion as he "follows his standard," and since we have just described the "man of principle" as one who possesses a high degree of sympathy for principles other than his own, we seem to be talking in circles. The point, however, is that the *function* of principle in human life is most important; the understanding of this function, in turn, involves an attitude which adds stature and dignity to the human being—the attitude of *respect for philosophy itself*.

All this seems to have taken us far away from the seminar, where we started. But both the seminars for teachers and the classrooms where they will later teach are primarily devoted to respect for the thinking capacity of man—as a "*principle*" in itself. This is the democratic approach to teaching and learning, inextricably bound up with the faith that, in the midst of open argument, men will find their own way to the truths they need to know. Totalitarian assumptions are different, and so are the assumptions of conventional religion. In both authoritarian government and in the traditional church, the first assumption is that the citizenry must be conditioned into proper beliefs. The point, here, is that every factionally minded person believes in the efficacy—and necessity—of coercion. It matters little whether the coercion is by demanding argument or by the force of arms, for the philosophy and psychology are essentially

the same. The factionalist is a man of little faith in the capacity of his fellows to distinguish and discern principles. So, while he may talk much about them, and wave them overhead, he has not yet come to terms with principles. He is trying to *win* with them, rather than plumb the full depths of their meaning.

There is a kind of argument, however, which is not demanding of others. Those who participate in philosophic discourse are interested in the value of the ideas discussed, and not at all interested in *who* maintains them, or even for what reason. So it is a wonderful thing for teachers, if only for a time, to dissociate the personality or the associations of an annoying critic from his essential ideas.

Often, here, we have walked a difficult tightrope between the contentions of professional educators and their "traditionalist" critics. So much vituperation exists on both sides that almost any evaluative point suggested is immediately taken as indication of alignment. What each factionalist needs, we suspect, is a close personal friend who takes the "opposite" position, but the factional lines are grooved so deeply by now that this becomes a most unlikely occurrence. However the sort of discussion attempted in the seminar described by our correspondent, supplies many of the same ingredients: when one is caught off guard, and takes to himself, in temporary alliance, a contrasting *idea*, he is on the road to discovering a wider perspective.

As we have intimated, what is good for teachers in seminars is also good for children in the classroom. While something like this happens occasionally when the young reach the university, during the important intervening years they may easily fall into a common habit of their parents—to choose a side and fight all comers, on a purely personal, factional basis. Children need to learn the spirit and the practice of rational discussion of opposing ideas just as much as they need to know the alphabet.

We all have beliefs and alignments—temporary ones, at least. In this respect we are all "religionists" in the traditional sense of the word. But our personal beliefs can always stand tempering with evaluative philosophy, and few are those, however factional by nature, who do not in some measure respond to this challenge of *impersonality*. Some of the teachers who participated in the seminar, perhaps, encountered a valuable experience of this nature for the first time.

FRONTIERS

Religion and the Psyche

BETWEEN traditional religion and the contemporary philosophies of psychotherapy there are, today, a number of uneasy alliances—constantly shifting, but heading in one predictable direction. Since the psychological philosophies constantly seek reinterpretation and reintegration, they are drawing a larger circle around the definition of man, while the religionist, usually unwilling to attempt total reevaluation, is reduced to compromise. For this reason an increasing number of critics believe that the "religion" of the future will end by being more universal in scope and at the same time much more individualistic.

Among the works of psychologist pioneers who are attempting new evaluations of the religious field is Dr. Viktor E. Frankl's *The Doctor and the Soul*, translated from the German and published in America by Alfred A. Knopf in 1955. Dr. Frankl is neither a partisan of therapy nor a religious apologist. On the one hand he feels that psychotherapy, unable to view those broad vistas of human potentiality which are properly conceived in philosophical terms, "has given too little attention to the spiritual reality of man." The aim of the psychotherapist, really, should not be simply to discover the hidden secrets of disordered psyches, but to "bring out the ultimate possibilities of the patient—realize his latent values." So far as we can see, according to Dr. Frankl's treatment, this means learning to discuss philosophy with each patient somewhere during the process of rehabilitation. Dr. Frankl writes:

Psychotherapy has insufficient resources to deal with the totality of psychic reality. On top of this insufficiency there is its incompetence to deal with intellectual reality as a thing in its own right. Not only is it exceeding its authority in dealing with the individual's world-view as a "neurotic" phenomenon; it is going too far altogether when it constructs theories of the pathological origin of all world-views. Theories of this sort are simply unsound. An intellectual creation cannot be reduced to psychological terms because the mind and the psyche

are incommensurable. A philosophical structure is not just the product of the diseased psyche of its creator. We have no right to conclude from the psychic illness of a person who has produced a particular world-view that his philosophy is therefore of no value as an intellectual structure.

Here, as in works of Erich Fromm, we encounter a penetrating interpretation of the philosophical differences between Freud and Jung. As Frankl puts it, though Jung was prepared to grant interesting symbolic meaning to religious beliefs, he nevertheless reduced them to "psychologisms," divorced from "actual reality." It is in *this* context that Jung is tolerant of the concept of a Personal God and of the rigidities of Catholic dogma, while Freud was an implacable foe of both:

Freud once said: "Man is not only often much more immoral than he believes, but also often much more moral than he thinks." I should like to add that he is often much more religious than he suspects.

We must not make the alternative mistake of looking upon religion as something emerging from the realm of the id, thus tracing it back again to instinctual drives. Even the followers of Jung have not avoided this error. They reduce religion to the collective unconscious or to archetypes. I was once asked after a lecture whether I did not admit that there were such things as religious archetypes. Was it not remarkable that all primitive peoples ultimately reached an identical concept of God—which would seem to point to a God-archetype? I asked my questioner whether there was such a thing as a Four-archetype. He did not understand immediately, and so I said: "Look here, all people discover independently that two and two make four. Perhaps we do not need an archetype for an explanation; perhaps two and two really do make four. And perhaps we do not need a divine archetype to explain human religion either."

The issue between Freud and Jung, in these terms, is the extent to which each feels that psychological reality is discoverable by individual man. If one "needs" a God symbol, or the reassuring structure of a formal creed, this is equivalent to saying that his resources are insufficient either to discover or to face the truth of his own being. Jung's religions are fascinating

curiosities—never, in their symbolism, passing beyond half truth; for Freud, religious assertion is either true or false, and, by his bold declarations, he showed an implicit faith in man's ultimate capacity to escape a mere relativism of values. While Dr. Frankl shows a little more tolerance for the God symbol than Freud, and though he criticizes a number of Freud's preoccupations, he clearly shares the spirit of the father of psychoanalysis. Rather than wishing to revise Freud's basic premises, he proposes that a supplemental field be admitted and developed. This field he calls "*Logotherapy—Psychotherapy in terms of the mind.*" The psychiatrist who uses the equivalent of Frankl's "Logotherapy" equips himself to deal with philosophical questions, and, in effect, means to offer an expanding horizon for the distressed mind as well as relief for a twisted emotional nature.

Since so much of psychologism tends toward "debunking," it is often found to be, Frankl says, "the favorite recourse of those with a tendency toward devaluation." He continues: "Its user reveals himself as having no interest in intellectual justice or the acquisition of more knowledge. But to our mind psychologism is a partial aspect of a more comprehensive phenomenon. It is this: the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century completely distorted the picture of man by stressing all the numerous restraints placed upon him in the grip of which he is supposedly helpless. Man has been presented as constrained by biological, by psychological, by sociological factors. Inherent human freedom, which obtains in spite of all these constraints, the freedom of the mind in spite of nature, has been overlooked. Yet it is this freedom that truly constitutes 'the essence of man'."

To complement these provocative quotations, we offer statements from the closing sections of Joseph Campbell's *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*. (This volume, enthusiastically reviewed in MANAS, is now fortunately available in a Meridian paperback edition.) As his excellent title

indicates, Campbell begins with the premise that the dream of mankind, from the remotest ages past, is the fulfillment of a transcendent destiny. The hero is a hero *because* he transcends, and the dream of the hero never dies because man's spiritual intuitions are the very substratum of his individuality. The completion of individuality requires one to "go out from the group," in order to discover a deeper reality than that conceived or experienced in conventional terms. The hero must be daring, must think as if he were the first man who ever thought. But the assault upon the bastions of conventionality requires a good deal more than brashness, and this is why the hero, at each level of heroism, has always had a difficult time in reaching his symbolic goal. The basic character of our being is discoverable only after the most difficult odyssey of all—the search for true individuality within and apart from its personal accouterments. This quest is ageless, and cuts through all of the paraphernalia of religious tradition:

From the standpoint of the way of duty, anyone in exile from the community is a nothing. From the other point of view, however, this exile is the first step of the quest. Each carries within himself the all; therefore it may be sought and discovered within. The differentiations of sex, age, and occupation are not essential to our character, but mere costumes which we wear for a time on the stage of the world. The image of man within is not to be confounded with the garments. We think of ourselves as Americans, children of the twentieth century, Occidentals, civilized Christians. We are virtuous or sinful. Yet such designations do not tell what it is to be man, they denote only the accidents of geography, birth-date, and income. What is the core of us? What is the basic character of our being?

The asceticism of the medieval saints and of the yogis of India, the Hellenistic mystery initiations, the ancient philosophies of the East and of the West, are techniques for the shifting of the emphasis of individual consciousness away from the garments. The preliminary meditations of the aspirant detach his mind and sentiments from the accidents of life and drive him to the core. "I am not that, not that," he meditates: "not my mother or son who has just died; my body, which is ill or aging; my arm, my eye, my head; not the summation of all these things. I am

not my feeling; not my mind; not my power of intuition." By such meditations he is driven to his own profundity and breaks through, at last, to unfathomable realizations. No man can return from such exercises and take very seriously himself as Mr. So-an-so of Such-and-such a township.

This is the stage of Narcissus looking into the pool, of the Buddha sitting contemplative under the tree, but it is not the ultimate goal; it is a sitting contemplative under the tree, but it is not the ultimate goal; it is a requisite step, but not the end. The aim is not to *see*, but to realize that one is, that essence; then one is free to wander as that essence in the world. Furthermore: the world too is of that essence. The essence of oneself and the essence of the world: these two are one. Hence separateness, withdrawal, is no longer necessary. Wherever the hero may wander, whatever he may do, he is ever in the presence of his own essence—for he has the perfected eye to see. There is no separateness. Thus, just as the way of social participation may lead in the end to a realization of the All in the individual, so that of exile brings the hero to the Self in all.

Centered in this hub-point, the question of selfishness or altruism disappears. The individual has lost himself in the law and been reborn in identity with the whole meaning of the universe.

It is in the light of this interpretation, as Campbell intimates, that we are able to brush aside the superficial distinctions between the teachings of Christ and of Buddha, of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Koran*, the *Upanishads* and the *Tao Te King*. Traditional religion, because it is factional, subverts the cause of universalism. Great world religions, as at present understood, cannot meet the requirement:

For they have become associated with the causes of the factions, as instruments of propaganda and self-congratulation. (Even Buddhism has lately suffered this degradation, in reaction to the lessons of the West.) The universal triumph of the secular state has thrown all religious organizations into such a definitely secondary, and finally ineffectual, position that religious pantomime is hardly more today than a sanctimonious exercise for Sunday morning, whereas business ethics and patriotism stand for the remainder of the week. Such a monkey-holiness is not what the functioning world requires; rather, a transmutation of the whole social order is necessary, so that through every detail and act of secular life the vitalizing

image of the universal god-man who is actually immanent and effective in all of us may be somehow made known to consciousness.

And this is not a work that consciousness itself can achieve. Consciousness can no more invent, or even predict, an effective symbol than foretell or control tonight's dream. The whole thing is being worked out on another level, through what is bound to be a long and very frightening process, not only in the depths of every living psyche in the modern world but also on those titanic battlefields into which the whole planet has lately been converted. We are watching the terrible clash of the Symplegades, through which the soul must pass—identified with neither side.

But there is one thing we may know, namely, that as the new symbols become visible, they will not be identical in the various parts of the globe; the circumstances of local life, race, and tradition must all be compounded in the effective forms. Therefore, it is necessary for men to understand, and be able to see, that through various symbols the same redemption is revealed. "Truth is one," we read in the Vedas; "the sages call it by many names." A single song is being inflected through all the colorations of the human choir. General propaganda for one or another of the local solutions, therefore, is superfluous—or much rather, a menace. The way to become human is to learn to recognize the lineaments of God in all of the wonderful modulations of the face of man.

With this we come to the final hint of what the specific orientation of the modern hero-task must be, and discover the real cause for the disintegration of all of our inherited religious formulae. The center of gravity, of the realm of mystery and danger has definitely shifted.

From such powerful projections of philosophical hope as those of Frankl and Campbell, one derives a great enthusiasm for the future. Our "long inherited universe of symbols" has collapsed. Its essence, like the Phoenix, has yet to be reborn, and the accomplishment of rebirth, in each individual, will be the hero-deed of today. Campbell ends *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* thus:

Not the animal world, not the plant world, not the miracle of the spheres, but man himself is now the crucial mystery. Man is that alien presence with

whom the forces of egoism must come to terms, through whom the ego is to be crucified and resurrected, and in whose image society is to be reformed. Man, understood however not as "I" but as "Thou": for the ideals and temporal institutions of no tribe, race, continent, social class, or century, can be the measure of the inexhaustible and multifariously wonderful divine existence that is the life in all of us.

The modern hero, the modern individual who dares to heed the call and seek the mansion of that presence with whom it is our whole destiny to be attuned, cannot, indeed must not, wait for his community to cast off its slough of pride, fear, rationalized avarice, and sanctified misunderstanding. "Live," Nietzsche says, "as though the day were here." It is not society that is to guide and save the creative hero, but precisely the reverse. And so every one of us shares the supreme ordeal—carries the cross of the redeemer—not in the bright moments of his tribe's great victories, but in the silences of his personal despair.