

## GREAT QUESTIONS: IV

A FEW years ago, at the outset at one of those expensive projects in scientific research—this one had a budget of more than a quarter of a million dollars for five years—the director of the program made a somewhat remarkable statement. The research involved study of the relative effects of heredity and environment on human beings, and the scientist in charge, Dr. C. C. Little of the Jackson Memorial Laboratory at Bar Harbor, Maine, allowed himself the luxury of a "broad view" of the problem:

Human life [he said] as it can be measured and recorded consists of a partnership between the two forces of heredity and environment. There is plenty of room in our definition to include non-material or spiritual forces.

At that time, dogs, sheep, goats, and other animals were to be subjects in a course of experiments which, it was hoped, might throw light on the genetic basis of "personality traits" in animals, with particular reference to variations in intelligence and emotional expression. Although the plan was to develop "knowledge" that would be applicable to human problems, human beings were excluded as subjects for the reason that they grow too slowly and, in the words of a newspaper account of the project, "cannot be subjected to the rigorous conditions of control that it will be necessary to impose to study the effects of single factors."

What interests us, of course, is the question of "nonmaterial or spiritual forces," and how they are to be "fitted in" among the conclusions drawn from the behavior of dogs, sheep, goats, and "other animals." It is too much, perhaps, to expect a scientist to say anything definite on the subject of "spiritual forces." For at least two generations of scientific inquiry it has been one of the main purposes of biology, and later, of psychology, to replace "spiritual forces" with "material" ones in scientific theory. That Dr. Little even mentions non-material and spiritual forces is itself a rather remarkable concession to the mysteries of human nature, although the plan of research at Bar Harbor makes it fairly clear that the role of such

forces will be restricted to vague, interstitial functions—they may be permitted to "explain," without any serious attempt at explanation, activities for which neither heredity nor environment can give an accounting.

It goes without saying that any scientist could easily turn the tables on criticism of this sort. He could say, "All right, *you* tell *me* what the 'non-material' or 'spiritual' forces are like, and then we'll see whether they have any logical place in a scientific hypothesis." There would be some justice in this retort, for it would be difficult indeed to offer a scientist an answer that would be scientifically acceptable in terms of present conceptions of the natural world—and to propose *supernatural* factors would be a practical invitation for him to destroy the foundations of all science.

But if we allow the argument thus far, why should a scientist himself even mention "non-material or spiritual forces"? Well, he *might* mention them for either one of two reasons. He could do it because of an honest doubt of the adequacy of the forces of heredity and environment to produce the complex reality of human beings as we know them—a doubt felt strongly enough to cause the question of non-material forces to be raised, but not strongly enough to make him insist upon a rational theory of spiritual causation. He could also do it as a result of "larger" considerations, such as an unsettling suspicion that "science" is not the magical Aladdin's Lamp that its eighteenth- and nineteenth-century champions and pioneers thought it would become, and the fear, not without justification, that the general public, looking at the imminent chaos which threatens our scientific civilization, is likely to demand at least a "symbolic" respect to Higher Forces in the universe. In the latter case, mention of "spiritual forces" assumes a resemblance to pious genuflection—an outward gesture of respect which need have no relation at all to the practical pursuits of scientific discovery.

There are still more compelling reasons, however, for proposing the need of a serious theory of non-material factors in human life. To identify these reasons clearly, it is necessary to review in brief the course of scientific theorizing about the forces which shape human character. With the abandonment—or the soft-peddling—of the doctrine of divine creation, the doctrine of heredity, always in the background, took a more important position. Opinions about heredity became "scientific" with the verification of Gregor Mendel's formulation of the laws of transmission of traits, based originally on his breeding experiments with plants. The idea of heredity as the major determinant of character gained popular authority through such supposedly scientific studies as the one devoted to the famous "Kallikaks"—a name coined by Dr. Henry H. Goddard from Greek words meaning "good" and "bad" and given to two markedly dissimilar family groups living near Vineland, New Jersey. The "Kallikaks" were reputed to have a common ancestor, but one group for generations produced a high proportion of mental defectives and degenerates, while the other was comprised of entirely worthy and normal persons. The "bad" Kallikak line was believed to be descended from a feeble-minded girl, and thus the history of the family was considered to be proof that character is transmitted from generation to generation. It was also claimed as an argument for sterilization of the socially unfit. The influence of this version of the power of heredity is summed up in the familiar statement by Justice Holmes, in deciding a Supreme Court case in favor of sterilization, "Three generations of imbeciles are enough!"

Then, with the birth of modern psychology, the factor of environment began to receive closer consideration. Specialists in the field of "conditioning" began to whittle away at the Goddard research. Finally, in 1944, in the *Journal of Heredity*, Dr. Amram Scheinfeld reviewed the facts and the reasoning in the Kallikak case, concluding that Goddard's method of classifying the mental types and characters of the Kallikaks is extremely dubious. As a New York *Times* summary put it:

All through Goddard's reports run assumptions or conclusions that immorality, drunkenness, pauperism, epilepsy, criminality and mental defects are related to genetic weakness. Scheinfeld finds it hard to understand why the bad traits of Martin Kallikak Jr. (the son of the feeble-minded girl) did not pass on to any of the . . . "good" Kallikaks. "Surely the laws of chance must have awarded some of the seven good Kallikaks the shady half of their father's 'demonstrably' mixed heredity." . . .

Scheinfeld concedes that some feeble-mindedness can well be ascribed to heredity factors, but "there is wide disagreement as to what the percentage is or what genetic mechanisms are involved." The question of environment cannot be ignored in dealing with drunkenness, crime, poverty and degeneracy, and no good evidence can be offered that heredity alone accounts for them.

Research now began to be aimed in the opposite direction. "Environment" came to be regarded as virtually the sole factor of importance in the shaping of character. Probably the most notable investigation with results suggesting this view was that undertaken by Dr. George D. Stoddard, director of the Child Welfare Research Station of the University of Iowa. The purpose of his program, which extended over a number of years, was to determine the effects of environment on the unfolding intelligence of growing children. It involved a comparison of children cared for in State institutions with children placed in foster homes. The histories of hundreds of children were examined, leading to the discovery that children born in the least fortunate levels of society, when removed to better environment and associations developed intelligence ratings equal to and sometimes surpassing the general averages assigned to the children of college professors. One of the psychologist-workers on this project exclaimed, "*We are still looking for our first feeble-minded child whose environment was good from infancy onward!*" Some of the children whose IQ average was equal to children of college teachers had mothers who, *as adults*, "were definitely feeble-minded." Dr. Stoddard generalizes:

The only extraordinary thing about these results is the shock to our expectations. We have been led to believe that dull parents must of *necessity* have dull children. The mothers of these children are certainly

dull, and we are reasonably sure that the fathers are little brighter. Moreover, as we look into the life histories of the mothers and fathers, they present a picture of economic and social inadequacy, of delinquent and criminal records, and of frequent institutional care. The life histories are thoroughly consistent with the low mental ratings. Nevertheless, their children have turned out to be even above average in brightness when taken from their parents at a very early age and placed in good homes.

Finally, to complete the confusion on the subject, we have still more recent case histories of the sort presented in "Children . . . and Ourselves" (MANAS, Sept. 19). There, from an Antioch psychologist, are given several accounts of the lives of people who, according to the environment theory, should have turned out complete failures—but instead, they became unusual and distinguished individuals.

Only one conclusion is possible. Everywhere, and all the time, there are individuals who are triumphing over the prejudicial factors of *both* heredity and environment. And these are the people we need more of, to help overcome the effects of a world-environment that is becoming increasingly bad. Surely, no one need be shy in proposing the reality of non-material or spiritual factors in human beings, when such facts are contemplated.: Why not consider as a *human* hypothesis—a hypothesis neither scientific nor religious, in the conventional sense—that there is a unitary soul-intelligence in every human being, stronger in some than in others, more vulnerable in some than in others to the bad influences of heredity and environment?

This theory, however rudimentary, would at least meet the initial requirements of the facts as observed. And if it has "metaphysical implications," what of it? Observant students of human thought tell us that mankind is incurably metaphysical, anyhow. The issue is not metaphysics or no metaphysics, but *sensible* metaphysics. And the idea that man is, essentially, an immortal soul, has been embraced, defended, and taught, by numerous sensible men of every age.

## *Letter from* ENGLAND

LONDON.—In nothing, perhaps, is man's spiritual homelessness more clearly demonstrated in this modern age than in his passive acceptance of most of the economic doctrines that are held to determine his physical survival. This is as true of the revolutionary as it is of the hardened reactionary. The principles and structure of our commercial and industrial civilization are cases in point. Efforts to increase international trade whilst keeping tariff barriers intact, and to increase productivity in agriculture and industry without regard to standards of distribution or the effect upon diminishing natural resources, are illustrative of contemporary muddle and of the coarsening influence of economic or collectivist ideologies. As for the individual, it is only necessary to observe generally his attitude to property, which all are thought entitled to gain at the expense of society, and his role as an "economic unit," intent only upon the satisfaction of instinctive needs, in order to realize by what false values the vast majority of people measure their conduct. The machine age has led nations and men to be content with a mechanical and mercenary discharge of irksome duties, and to believe that terminable contract, and not inner obligation, is the cohesive force in the social order.

These things premised, it is matter of historical interest to see how, for instance, the single problem of wages is debated in a welfare State like England. With regional variations in application, the essential features of the wage structure in industry are the same the world over. We may believe with Stalin that it is "the equal right of all toilers to receive according to their requirements" (Webb, *Soviet Russia*, 1936, II, 702), or with the academic economists, who, following Ricardo (1772-1823), define what is called "the natural law of wages" as "that which will maintain the labourer." Whichever theory is adopted, the important question which remains is who or what is to decide the "requirements" and what is the source of the assumed "natural law" and who is to decide the degree of maintenance? Either way, the judgment

rests with an authoritative State or the possessor of capital, or else it is the result of hard bargaining between hirer and hired, with an element of violence, actual or potential, in both cases.

Discussion goes on here about "the wage structure," meaning by this the wages and salaries paid to millions of different people by all sorts of bodies. Nothing in all this has been deliberately planned. No attempt has been made to divide the total national income between profits, salaries, wages, and capital investment, nor have rates of pay for different occupations been planned intentionally. High remuneration is paid to those best organized or in accordance with scarcity of skilled workers most in demand at any particular time, or with the level of profits of specialized industries. Even national needs are not decisive. There are too few workers in some industries (coal mining, for instance), and too many in others (e.g. the retail trades and the Civil Service). Over the past ten years, wages have risen sharply in relation to total national income, profits have fallen, and salaries of professional and similar workers have remained fairly steady. Taxation is very high, and it is doubtful if anyone in the country, whatever his capital assets, is able to enjoy an annual spending *income* of more than £5,000. However we look at the country's economy, there is no sign of logic or priority in the division of the national income, and, in the special question of wages and salaries, neither "requirements" nor "maintenance" is considered from any other standpoint than that of physical existence and the imperious desires created by "civilized" habits.

At this point we may ask why even our familiar structure of industry and commerce, and modes of remuneration implicit in its present operations, should be viewed as necessarily a permanent feature of our social life, as something so sacrosanct that any discussion of their basic assumptions is thought to be impiety of the worst type. If such an eminent authority in this field as John A. Hobson, in *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (1926), which is still a standard work, can say, "There is, then, no reason to suppose that wages, either nominal or real, bear any exact, or even approximate, relation to the output of efficient work, quantity and quality being

both taken into consideration," may it not be that, in the realm of political economy, as in so many other sciences, we are bewitched by the doctrines of a logical positivism whose inferences change, like a weathercock, according to the relevance of observed facts? Change the facts, or widen the range of their significance, and the apparently solid core of truths built upon a fashionable empiricism vanishes into thin air.

The real problem of "a fair day's wage for a fair day's work" assumes an unreal and distorted magnitude because we are all obsessed by an economic system, privately or State controlled, which is but the resultant of pressure by different classes in the community, with their unending hidden or open organized conflicts. With the gradual removal of the artificial material valuations which are forced upon so many by the actual structure of present-day Society, it should become possible to see the outlines of a true relationship between man and man, and between man and his total environment. Production must be pursued by way of voluntary association of individuals in the spirit of a common devotion to the ideal of community service.

If it be said that this offers but a pious generalization in face of the application in modern life of an "iron law of necessity," the critic may be referred to the guild systems of medieval Europe and to the functional theories of the "guild socialism" which had such a vogue in England during the 1920's. If we both ignore spiritual truths and refuse to learn the lessons of history, we are left to tuition by the catastrophes that follow inevitably the denial, in social forces, of human worth.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

## *REVIEW*

### REVIEW OF REVIEW

IT seems only fair to share with MANAS readers—if not to "share," at least to communicate—the feelings of two or three subscribers who, to put it mildly, have "found fault" with the review of James Jones' *From Here to Eternity* which appeared in the Sept. 5 issue. The comments offered characterize the Jones book as unrelievedly bad, it being variously represented, from simply "a mess" to "a bucket of filth." Moreover, the MANAS editors and reviewers seem to be regarded as even more worthy targets for verbal castigation and abuse than Mr. Jones, although their offense is simply that the book gained what may be called "favorable mention" in these pages. It may be said that our critics seem well acquainted with one another's views—or view—which perhaps may account for the high degree of concert in these communications.

Having passed along this "warning" to other readers, it seems appropriate for us to say that this Department makes no apology for the review in question, which was, we think, a good one, and served a purpose. The only reason for mentioning these rather acid objections is that they raise the entire question of "morality" and "obscenity" in literature, in connection with the frequently described MANAS review policy of giving space to comment on books which are being very widely read. This question is always worth discussing: it represents the interplay of the factors of custom and convention with the factors of direct human perception of right and wrong. It is a question, naturally, which can never be finally "decided," for the reason that true morality hides in the mystery of motive, but any approach which assists in the probing of motives is a useful exercise, even if publicly inconclusive.

The suggestion that MANAS review *From Here to Eternity* came to the editors from a friend and respected subscriber who has done much to

widen the circle of MANAS readers. The book also happens to be a Book of the Month Club selection, placing it among volumes which we periodically make an effort to note and discuss. These books do, as we have said, "serve in some fashion as literary common denominators," and receive attention for this reason.

It is true that *From Here to Eternity* represents the graceless and excessively profane and excessively unrestrained scene and circumstances of regular army life. It reveals the inevitable ugliness and vulgarity of the all-male society of military barracks—the kind of society which our wars and our fear of wars create. It is also true that Mr. Jones employs as few euphemisms as possible in conveying his idea of a faithful picture of that life. We have no interest in defending his method—it is his, not ours; and so far as we are concerned, it does not make "pleasant" reading. But to condemn his book simply for its vocabulary, and because of the "sort of people" the author chose to deal with sympathetically is to miss entirely, we think, the point of our review and to ignore the basic meaning of "criticism."

Mr. Jones is concerned, we think, with the wickedness of armies, and not the wickedness of the men caught in them. There is a difference. The debauchery of drunken soldiers, their tiresome biological epithets, their opportunism and their irresponsibility are not examined in *From Here to Eternity* in order to feed the voracious repressions of readers interested in vicarious "sin," but appear as the circumstantial background of two or three rather unusual human beings. "Filth," we propose, is sometimes where you find it, and we would say rather that this book is a portrayal of the *debris* which our society creates through the mechanism of "national defense"—*debris* of men, and the more fragmentary *debris* of particular degrading human actions, habits, and emotional attitudes.

But is not this, one may ask, the doctrine of "conditioning"? It is indeed. We *are* our brothers'

keepers, in more ways than one, and the abandonment to follies of weaker and less respectable persons than ourselves is not unrelated to the self-righteous morality of the churches, the gossipy hypocrisy of polite society and the shielded and hidden weaknesses of the moneyed and comfortable classes. Men struggle to maintain their integrity in *From Here to Eternity*. Such struggles have no place in a salacious book. A moral impulse is fatal to the mood of pornography in the same way that the studied "philosophy" of sensuality corrupts the work of literary lions.

It sometimes seems as though a man's choice of words incurs more condemnation than the betrayers of their fellows through the lies of religious imperialism. What is "filth" and "dirt," anyway? To us, it seems that there are far worse immoralities than those of men who degrade their own speech through lack of imagination, who sink to the level of animals through lack of self-restraint—and lack of knowing any good *reason* for self-restraint. These are in a sense "crimes," it is true—but they are "natural" crimes, at least, representing the tendency to human weakness in all men. But what of those who exploit the weaknesses of their fellows, while never letting themselves be caught in a "compromising position," who guard their speech as closely as their self-esteem? When shall we learn to measure *these* offenses with our outraged revulsion, as being not crimes of weakness, but crimes of betrayal? It is to be noted that none of the critics of our review had a word to say respecting the *causes* of the "filth" and ugliness they find so offensively described.

Mr. Jones does not "celebrate" the cause of debauchery. He holds up a mirror to a segment of our *common* life—a part we disdain to look upon, perhaps—a part, moreover, we may with safety look at only briefly, so long as we understand and *accept* it, in the sense of recognizing that it forms a part of the society in which we play a part, which we help to create and perpetuate, insofar as

we accept without protest the social forces which put men in barracks and keep them there, in and out of the "duration."

Morality is not a matter of words—unless they be bitter and venomous words; nor a matter of acts—unless they be acts which play upon the prejudices and vulnerable spots in the human nature of others. Morality is a matter of motive, of what, deep in the heart and mind, causes men to do what they do. It is this, after the outer coverings of behavior are stripped away, that needs be examined; and the novel, the story, the drama, is the instrument of the revelation of motive—first, in the characters of the story; and then, if the writer be a good one, in ourselves, if we take the opportunity he affords.

Something of these values we found in *From Here to Eternity*. Often we have found nothing of them in the Books of the Month, and have said as much. We took occasion to say in passing that this volume contained an over-abundant supply of "barracks-room language," and this, we think, should be enough for those who feel no inclination for the kind of exploration Mr. Jones conducts. We understand the inclination, respect it, and in a measure share it. However, as we read *From Here to Eternity*, a kind of fidelity to the author's larger purpose, as he seems to have envisioned it, somehow qualified and reduced the obvious unpleasantness of the words he felt obliged to employ. The book is a serious work, and we have tried to judge it accordingly.

## *COMMENTARY*

### THE COURTS—PROTECTORS OF LIBERTY

WHILE the power of "institutions" is often deplored in these pages, certain public institutions are entrusted with preserving and applying the principles of freedom, and this seems a good time to acknowledge the fact. We speak of the courts.

A U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the conviction of William W. Remington on a charge of perjury. Remington had denied he was a Communist, and was convicted of perjury as a result. The Circuit Court, in rendering its decision, declared in effect that both the judge in the lower court and the prosecuting attorney rode their way to conviction on the wave of hysteria. The Circuit Court did not attempt to determine whether or not Remington was guilty of perjury, but simply called attention to errors of procedure—errors which were prejudicial to Remington's interests as the defendant. Accordingly, the case was remanded for new trial.

Commenting on the decision, the New York *Times* appropriately remarked:

We . . . believe . . . that the court's scrupulousness for the precise rights of a person charged with a sinister affiliation is particularly valuable at the moment. We have been hearing a great deal about persons damned by hearsay and denounced by irresponsible testimony. It is good to know that the venerable principles of common law are still respected and still protect the individual, no matter what the offense of which he is accused.

In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals noted that the prosecuting attorney's reference to the Attorney General's list of "subversive organizations" was among the various errors committed. The Court declared:

This was error, for the list is a purely hearsay declaration by the Attorney General, and could have no probative value in the trial of this defendant. It has no competency to prove the subversive character of the listed associations and, failing that, it could have no conceivable tendency to prove the defendant's alleged perjury even if it were shown that he belonged to some or all of the organizations listed.

The courts, as institutions, are preservers of freedom because they are, and ought always to be, defenders of *impartial justice*. Logically, the haters of the Communist tyranny should themselves be the first to see this. Usually, however, it appears that they do not hate tyranny, but only *Communist* tyranny, whereas, so far as we can see, there is nothing to choose between various brands of tyranny. They are all equally bad.

## CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

THERE are times when, despite a desire to show great respect for the intuitive and reasoning faculties of children, one is tempted to believe that, after all, they are not much better than adults. (We have been reading some essays by high school students.)

There is a difference, of course, between young children and adolescents, the latter already having had opportunity to acquire attitudes of the adult world. When you manage to get a young child to consider whether or not killing someone is a good idea—and hold him to thinking about it long enough—the odds are great that he will be deeply shocked and hurt at the very thought of killing. But in high school, what with patriotic parents, a dash of the hidden brutality which accompanies intense competition in school sports and first money-earning, and the rationalizations of nationalist propaganda, the odds are not so great any more. It is difficult to encourage serious thought among high school students on issues of war and peace, non-violence versus violence, brotherhood versus the struggle for survival—even though most diplomas are ending up in induction centers.

If adults were more frankly outspoken on their views of war and peace, and if there were less moral confusion and more candor on the subject, the young would at least find it easier to remember that these issues exist. The truth, as everyone who reads the newspapers knows, is that everyone claims to be a peace-monger, but a peace-monger who believes war-mongering sometimes necessary and inevitable. This doubletalk must be bewildering to youthful minds, and when minds are confused, whether youthful or not, the tendency is to accept certain articles of faith which blanket the confusion. So the eighteen-year-olds are fairly well conditioned to accept the war-is-the-best-way-to-peace version of how to build brotherhood. In illustration, we

should like to quote from some answers given to a high school questionnaire concerning the dropping of the Hiroshima atom bomb. Students were supposed to indicate whether they thought that terrible trip was really necessary. The effect of propaganda is noticeable in what they say, the *factual* background provided the adolescents being obviously negligible. Here are some typical questions and answers.

"Do you feel it was wrong to drop the Atomic bomb on Japan?"

"Yes, it killed a lot of innocent people."

Comes the next question: "Do you feel it should be used again?" The answer, "On Russia, yes. They *all* seem to want war." Another student answered as follows: "I do not feel it was wrong to use the atomic bomb. We warned the Japanese about it, and evidently they doubted our word."

This last information will probably be news to the survivors of Hiroshima, and to the former titular heads of the Japanese war government. The ignorance displayed in these answers becomes even more abysmal at times. One youngster assumes from the question that someone has *recently* dropped an atomic bomb on Japan. He didn't learn this directly of course, but assumed that such things might easily happen:

I think it was quite wrong for the Americans to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. We are not at war with Japan. If the Americans were just making a test I think they should have taken it to a deserted place where it would have done no harm to human beings. I think it was unfair also. The Japanese people weren't fighting us and the dropping of the bomb was unfair and cruel. The Japanese weren't given any warning so they could at least try to save themselves. I do not think the bomb should be used again.

Occasionally a student had clear-cut opinions, without inconsistencies. Some were in favor of dropping A-bombs on all possible enemies, arguing that this world is one where the toughest survive, so we might as well be smart and stop

pussyfooting around, etc. Sometimes there was clarity on the other side of the fence:

I think it was wrong to drop the "A" bomb in Hiroshima because it did nothing but kill thousands of people who didn't give a darn about the war. At least they could have evacuated the city of all civilians, anyway.

This questionnaire was circulated in a Los Angeles high school, by the staff of a small mimeographed paper called *The Unesco Review*. The students active in the "survey" of high school opinion must have been moved by unusually commendable motives, since they received no course credits for their efforts. The young editors solicited the cooperation of teachers of history classes by using the unanswerable argument that even to *raise* such questions would benefit all students, starting thought in directions where none had perhaps been encouraged before. Such aspiring young educators—for that is what they are—obviously should be encouraged. The more their own awareness of the principles and values involved in international difficulties increases, the more useful members of a high school community will they be, and if it were not for the fact that a certain proportion of such socially aware adolescents exists in all high schools, we might as well despair of anything save the success of totalitarianism. Working on such a venture as the Unesco paper, by the way, apparently provides the staff with a few stiff jolts in respect to the unwisdom of their government, and we think they should learn to think critically about modern governments as soon as possible. The issue of the paper at hand, for instance, contained an article strongly advocating immediate and generous aid to India. Belatedly, an editor's note was added which, despite the sound of it, we doubt to have been Communist Party propaganda:

—When the article "Give to the Needy" was written it seemed like a sure thing that our Congress would send the needed wheat. As of yet they have done nothing but talk. Russia sent the needed wheat,—Ed.

An article on "Aid to India" expresses the necessity for haste, to relieve famine suffering, and the hope that Congressional debate on such an

obvious subject might cease. One of the paragraphs also shows the type of insight and idealism which can bring the youngest of thinking people to appreciate other cultures and nations. It is based in part, as all broad perspectives must be, on intelligent self-criticism:

When India asked us for wheat to help her starving people, that was when our policy changed. Thousands of Indian people were dying while Congress was trying to decide if it would be a good investment. The cost of wheat is not so high that Congress had to wait months to reach a conclusion. We waited so long because India does not exactly follow our policy. She is neutral and is neither behind us or the Communists. Her aim is to bring the countries of the world together. No other country has striven so hard for world peace. When her delegate to the U.N., Sir Benegal Rau, spoke to the Chinese delegate and to ours, it gave me new hope. It made me feel that there is still one country that is trying to bring the countries of the world together. This is the country that we almost decided not to help.

When one finishes the perusal of a page of impromptu writing by high school students, an easy conclusion to reach is that all the stupidities, errors, and prejudices of the adult world, and its idealisms, too, of course, are present in high school populations. Fortunately, neither the idealism nor the destructive attitudes are hidden behind sophisticated doubletalk, making such papers good reading material for adults, many of whom have become so enamored of special rationalizations and convenient persuasions that they need very badly to see their thoughts reflected at an elementary level.

Youngsters have had few facts to go on, and a great many forms of propaganda. All in all, then, we have to reaffirm our faith in the native intelligence of the human being and paraphrase Rousseau by insisting that man is born intellectually free, and becomes enslaved mostly by the prejudices acquired from his surroundings of time and place.

## *FRONTIERS*

### The Uses of the Researcher

RECENTLY we tried our hand at showing how the Quakers, who have kept on talking and talking about a world peace they don't seem to be able to create, are nonetheless very valuable citizens, and that lack of interest in them on the grounds of their being boring is rather unintelligent. Patient people are really necessary, for they are often the only ones who remember things the rest of us really mean to remember, but forget.

Alongside the group of bores to which the Quakers belong—the perpetual dispensers of noble sentiments—we might place another variety: the historical researchers. The historian bores us because he involves himself in so many details, while the preachers of world peace bore us because they are so repetitious and "impractical." So, these two groups are, when we come to think of it, extraordinarily unlike save in two attributes; they share an inexhaustible supply of patience, and they are badly needed at this historical juncture.

There is no researcher more willing to squeeze the last drop from facts, perhaps, than the historian who either is or has been a practicing lawyer. Frederic Sanborn, eminent legal authority, demonstrated this propensity recently when his *Design For War* was issued by DevinAdair. The book is a 600-page recital of the events and documents related to the causes of Japan's recent war with the United States. And from the original sources so carefully reviewed and quoted by Mr. Sanborn, we learn a great many things—among them that the Japanese nation, cabinet, and Emperor, desired peace far more than did those who controlled U.S. policy. More and more, as the course of a European war in which the U.S. was more than casually interested seemed to become crucial to those who feared the fall of England, President Roosevelt and the men he consulted felt that some pretext must be found for this country to become an actual belligerent.

A reviewer's word need not be taken for any of these statements, nor even Mr. Sanborn's word. Serving more as compiler than as author, Mr. Sanborn assembles his points from the written records of diplomatic correspondence, state papers, etc., arranging them so as to indicate the special significance of many things which might otherwise pass unnoticed. Mr. Sanborn tells us things we need to know—not matters of opinion, but matters of fact which prove conclusively that the Japanese war of December 7, 1941, was made in America.

Now, lest the admirers of Mr. Roosevelt, whose names are legion, become extremely indignant at such a suggestion, we should add that neither we *nor* Mr. Sanborn feel able to make the fact of a secret, war-making policy prove that this policy was "against national interests." That is quite another argument, and one, moreover, upon which no "facts" can be conclusive. As Sanborn puts it:

The author has studiously refrained from any attempt to pass any judgment upon the great question of whether it was wise or mistaken for Mr. Roosevelt to involve the Nation in what he once called the "international quarrels and squabbles [and] the wars of the rest of the world." Let each reader form his own opinion for himself upon that problem.

It may be the ultimate verdict of history that Mr. Roosevelt was wiser than the people of the United States, and that he knew better than they did where the best interests of the Nation lay. Or the ultimate verdict of history may be otherwise. That question is neither asked nor answered in this book.

But without regard to whatever ultimate answer history may give to that question, there will still remain the question which this history raises, the question of ways and means and methods and devices and secrecy. Ought one American to be permitted—no matter how wise he may be, no matter how sincere or conscientious or altruistic—to conduct our foreign affairs sometimes personally and single-handed, often with little or no counsel or advice, and frequently in deep secrecy?

We may observe, in this book, however, an undercurrent of disapproval of the Roosevelt foreign policy. The critical tone is so strong that

some ground exists for arguing that an anti-Roosevelt sentiment inspired the writer. Possibly so. But even if Mr. Sanborn, besides being a well-known professor of law, is also a zealous Republican, his book seems of great value. He shows that this is an age in which even the most eminent of "liberal" political leaders may feel so pressed by the pace and complexity of international relations as to consider that actual deception of the public will serve the long-range interests of the nation. This condition may not have been Mr. Roosevelt's fault, as his supporters will claim—perhaps people today *are* too irresponsible and wilfully provincial to be allowed confusing debate on issues they will apparently not take the trouble to understand. Or it may be very much Mr. Roosevelt's fault, as his detractors claim. But the *fact*, as Mr. Sanborn proves, is undeniable. On the issue of War or Peace, our democracy simply did not work.

The failure of democracy in respect to foreign relations has many consequences, only one of which we would like to highlight here. Do we realize that distorted facts, concealed facts, and misrepresented facts all contributed to American hostility toward the Japanese—all Japanese, everywhere? The irresponsible American people may have needed to have decisions made for them, but the Japanese people did not need to have so many Americans hating them. Hating and being hated are about the worst things that can happen to people, and we now know that millions of peace-loving Japanese even the Emperor, Prince Konoye, Ambassador Nomura, and many, many other Japanese officials—did not deserve to be hated. Far from being responsible for Pearl Harbor, they strove with great zeal to avert the failure of peacemaking diplomacy and the inevitable subsequent ascendancy of a war-cabinet.

Who says so? Well, for one thing, our own Ambassador in Tokyo, Joseph Grew. Also, the dispatches from Admirals Ingersoll and Stark to Admiral Kimmel are tacit admission that the

Konoye cabinet had finally lost its fight for a *peaceful* settlement, to secure which they had even considered stopping the invasion of China.

Mr. Sanborn attempts to demonstrate the existence of an American policy, on the other hand, deliberately calculated to force Japan into war:

The American embargo had shut Japan off from about twenty-three million barrels (of oil) and Japan, with an annual consumption of thirty to thirty-five million barrels, now had no certain source of supply except her own production of seven million barrels. There was but little oil for the Japanese fishing boats, and already fish was unobtainable in some sections of Tokyo.

October 1941 had been a fateful month. When it began, it was still possible to avoid war in the Pacific: when October ended, war in the Pacific, if not yet absolutely certain, appeared probable. In the Atlantic an undeclared naval war had become a reality and was in full swing.

Of all the citations in Mr. Sanborn's book, we are the most impressed by an informal communication sent by the Japanese Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nomura, after the latter had tried long and futilely to secure some clear statement as to just what the American Government would require of Japan to preserve the peace. Here is one of the Bad people talking, but he doesn't sound so bad to us, nor does anything else issuing from the Japanese leaders of that time:

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference and now we are at length able to bring forth a counterproposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military high command. This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th [November].

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuation of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the selfsame propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this—to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a onesided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes, we will defend them without recking the cost.

At the very least, we can say that the attitude expressed by such Japanese representatives was no more belligerent than the feelings and contentions of U.S. officialdom. Is it possible that the Russians may have some "peace-loving people" around, too? Rather unlikely, we suppose. They represent no more than one-sixth of the world's population.