VOLUME IV, NO. 9
FEBRUARY 28, 1951

PROGRESS AND DECLINE

WE don't throw people to the lions any more. An ordinary man who has the misfortune to annoy an absolute monarch can no longer be imprisoned and held incommunicado for the rest of his life. Duels to settle private feuds are not permitted. Chattel slavery is only a memory, and married men do not own the property and the persons of their wives. The mentally ill are not shackled and hidden away in dungeons. In countries enjoying the heritage of Anglo-Saxon law, an accused man is innocent until he is proved guilty. As individual citizens, we have the writ of habeas corpus to protect us from illegal detention, and as members of a political community which has declared for freedom of speech and freedom of religion, we have the guarantee of the Bill of Rights.

These achievements, we say with reason, represent Progress. Both law and custom protect us against arbitrary invasion of our personal rights. Although there are many inequalities and injustices in our society, the principle of its organization stands for equality and justice. The justice may be imperfectly administered, the power of wealth may corrupt public servants, the poor man may have less of a chance before the law than a rich man—but we do not admire or accept these circumstances without protest. We believe that they are wrong and we try to correct them.

Thus the claim of progress is reasonable. By and large, this progress seems to have grown out of a general recognition of the importance of impersonal law. The law admits no distinctions of birth or property. The law does not distinguish between superior and inferior men. The law is the instrument of justice, equality, and freedom, and it applies to all. And we, naturally enough, attribute what justice and equality and freedom we possess to the laws we have established—or our forefathers established—to rule over us. We have, we say with pride, a government of laws, and not of men.

This is the place, perhaps, where we ought to consider the intruding threat of war—the kind of war which makes our claims of progress sound shallow and unconvincing. We could do this and very easily come to the conclusion that we are now faced with a much greater "challenge" than any past obstacle we have overcome. We could say that now is the time to extend the principle of government by impersonal law to include the entire world community. This is the argument for world government. It is, however, an argument which has already been presented many times, and by experts on the subject, so that there is no particular advantage in pursuing it, here. Instead, we should like to look more closely at the assumption that progress inevitably grows out of the development of a legal system, and that the progress of the future—if there is to be any progress, or, indeed, any future—will depend upon our ability to establish some sort of constitutional bridge to a better world.

Periodically, we find ourselves drawn to a rereading of Rose Wilder Lane's *Discovery of Freedom*, despite what some would describe as her rock-ribbed Republican tendencies. Mrs. Lane may be indifferent to certain aspects of the social question, but she is very much alive to questions which "socially-minded" people have neglected for nearly half a century. And, strangely enough, there is something of the same kind of fire and conviction in this book as that found in the *Communist Manifesto*. At any rate it is a passionately written and fascinating exploration of the nature and sources of human freedom.

In this book, some forty pages are devoted to the rise of Islamic civilization. Apparently, the Moslems of the first great cycle of Mohammed's religious and cultural reform were free men. It is

soon plain that their freedom had practically nothing to do with charters of civil rights or constitutionally provided securities. Some quotation is necessary to convey the picture:

> The only safeguards of property seem to have been possession of the property, individual honesty, and public opinion.
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> Well, cabins were never locked on the American frontier where there was no law. The real protection of life and property, always and everywhere, is the general recognition of the brotherhood of man. How much of the time is any American within sight of a policeman? Our lives and property are protected by the way nearly everyone feels about another person's life and property.
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> But the Saracens seem to have had no civil law whatever. There were Mohammed's recorded opinions, and those of other wise men, Moslems accept these as rules of conduct. There were the emirs, leaders of groups; like leaders of political parties in this country. There were the Caliphs; the word means Successor (to Mohammed). The Arabian Nights tells how the Caliphs used their influence.
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> There were men everywhere, whom their neighbors depended upon to give judgments, like the judgment of Solomon in the case of the two women who claimed the same child. I knew such a Cadi very well, he was an expert cabinet-maker and earned a good living at his trade....
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> Actually, it is the way in which men always, everywhere keep the peace, when no one of them has a recognized right to use force. Then each one feels his responsibility. This is the way Americans kept the peace on the frontier, and keep it now on fishing and hunting trips and in clubrooms.
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> The Saracens evidently got along very well for nearly a thousand years with no law. They modified, in many ways, the pure anarchy of freedom. From the past, they kept tribal customs. They increased the natural authority of parents over children, and the natural influence of wise able, successful men and women. Workers formed fraternal groups; these still exist, more than a thousand years old. The fraternity of boatmen clusters around every ship that anchors in the Bosphorus, and takes no passengers or freight ashore until the boatmen's chief and the ship's captain have agreed upon terms suited to that day's and that ship's circumstances.
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> All these are methods of using free energy flexibly, in mutual action. They are ways of controlling combined human energies without restricting individual freedom How many such methods there were in the great days of that lost civilization, precisely what they were, how they worked or failed to work—who knows? . . .
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> There was no Authority. There was no State. There was no Church.
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> Men were spending enormous sums in building roads and observatories and universities and hospitals and mosques and fountains and public gardens. Scholars were collecting and exchanging manuscripts and books; architects were creating the world's most beautiful buildings. Traders were managing businesses extending thousands of miles. How did they do it? What methods did they develop, from eight hundred years of experience?

Mrs. Lane has some answers of her own, but to get them it will be necessary to read her book. Here, we are concerned with the impressive fact that the kind of Progress the Saracens achieved and the kind of progress we are ourselves so proud of is quite possible without the elaborate legal structure within which we have constructed what we call our Way of Life. And, by a parity of reasoning, world peace and world freedom, while it *could* come in association with a great world constitutional convention, is just as likely—more likely, perhaps—to come in some entirely different way.

We say "more likely" for the reason that the identification of impersonal legality with Righteousness and Progress can also lead to some terrible delusions. Hitler insisted upon all the forms of legality. The Soviet Constitution is a noble document. Further, the increasingly blind worship of big abstractions like The State can devitalize and even dehumanize the immediate moral realities of life and substitute merely symbolic satisfaction of the ethical urges of human beings, while granting concrete indulgence to all their weaknesses. Look at the way we justify the past and future use of the atom bomb in the name of "national security." The idea of the nation

comes very close to being the "foul fiend" when it will clothe such acts with the robes of sanctity.

An excess of reliance on "law" and on legal authority and "official" justification can also have seriously weakening psychological effects. There is the debilitating tendency to trust to outside forces for protection from harm, instead of one's own resourcefulness and sense of inner integrity. There is the morbid timidity in face-to-face human relationships and the frantic desire to escape into a vast, impersonal legality, the hollow embrace of authoritarian rules. These qualities in human beings, when encouraged, lead finally to allowing the State to do *anything* for our protection, and to regarding as the greatest of all crimes any sort of resistance or even disrespect to the demands of the National Will. Legality and constitutionality can thus become a cloak for weakness and a massive deception of the whole population, leading men to believe that they are children of Light and Progress, when, in fact, they are only the puny descendants of men who once found their particular march of progress in the majestic concepts of law which emerged in the revolutionary epoch of the eighteenth century.

No, we don't throw people to the lions any more. But we may have embraced a subtler and more revolting form of barbarism—the barbarism which wears the cassock of Justice in a war criminals' trial, or erases a city or two—*completely*—in the name of World Security. Perhaps the street-corner justice of a Moslem Cadi would be better. Perhaps the security of day-to-day recognition of human brotherhood, without any other Authority, whether of Church or State, is something we ought to attain to, before mouthing the high-sounding vocabulary of World Order and International Covenants. Perhaps, in fact, we should simply ignore all the "Nations" for a while, at least until they begin to behave more like nations of human beings.

Letter from GERMANY

BERLIN.—Ordinarily, in considering the quality of a university, it is necessary only to inquire into the background and point of view of the professors and the broad administrative outlook. Today, however, higher education in the Eastern Zone of Germany is affected by complex ideological pressures. For example, in the Humboldt University of Berlin, there is a strange sort of rivalry or conflict between two outstanding professors who lecture on the general history of the Middle Ages and modern times.

One of them—Prof. Fritz Roerig, a well-known authority on the Hanseatic League, which operated the great trade line between Novgorod in Russia and Bruges in Flanders from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century—lays much stress on the fact that relations between the Hanse merchants and the Norwegian fishermen of the Lofoden Islands were purely patriarchal. He urges that no "exploitation" took place in the exchange of flour and grain for dried cod, although the fishermen were paid in advance and fitted out by German merchants from maritime Baltic towns. This assertion, however, meets with strong protest from "Free German Youth" (FDJ) students belonging to the Soviet zone, who cite Norwegian complaints during past centuries, according to which the Hanse dominated commercial life in Norway, monopolized her trade, interfered with her political status, and exploited the population.

The background of both assertion and protest is as follows: Prof. Roerig belongs to the category of German scholars who attempt to re-establish "German honor" after the lost war and who go back to past times for supporting arguments. In this way, Prof. Roerig sides—not consciously, perhaps—with former officers in Western Germany who long to restore the respectability of the "German soldier," thinking that this is the price for participation in a new military program of Western defense.

On the other hand, the FDJ students, objecting to all "free enterprise," protest against the interpretation by Prof. Roerig. Their idol is Prof. Alfred Meusel—a German emigré to England during the Hitler years.

Both professors, it may be said, are likable persons, of good character, and capable men. Prof. Roerig, who was born in 1882, reflects an education which trained him to come to *independent, original* results in his thinking, and one of his notable discoveries was his recognition of the important part played by Scriptural language in the extensive commerce and the trade of the Middle Ages. He also saw that European towns during the same period were not simply dependent on their feudal masters (archbishops, princes, etc.), but developed autonomous forces (the middle class of merchants, artisans) which made their real greatness. He argues strongly against regarding the medieval town as a self-sufficient community in economic relations. (Quite possibly, by stressing the role of the middle class and of the traders over great distances, Prof. Roerig tends to idealize this class and thus involves himself in controversy with FDJ students who see in the middle [bourgeois] class their main foe.)

Prof. Meusel, on the other hand, now only 54 years old, lacks the educational background of Prof. Roerig. He is not even a historian, but was trained in Sociology. However, because of his Marxist position, he, as dean of the faculty, refuses Sociology any place at all at Humboldt University. His lectures are in general dry and sterile reproductions of theses formulated years ago by Marx or Engels concerning the great Peasants' War in Germany (1525), the French revolution of 1789, and the civil revolutions of 1848, etc. His range of knowledge is limited, his lectures poor in matter and literature, while his classes are large because of his monopoly of the history of modern times. (The omnipotent FDJ students think him an excellent "political" scientist, and really admire him.)

Both professors are now at a practical standstill in scientific research. It must be admitted, however, that, so far as we know, Prof. Meusel never did any research. Meanwhile, his dogmatism, his fear to touch on certain problems, his ban on Sociology (understandable enough, for a conscientious sociologist would probably want to analyze the social situation in the Eastern zone!), his general lack of historical knowledge—which is partly his own fault, partly his fate as a scholar in totalitarian surroundings—does not in the least prevent him from being *the* Eminent Professor of Humboldt University. Prof. Roerig, on the other hand, finds his field of interest and admiration, the achievements of the progressive middle class, now a virtually forbidden subject. He is harassed by opposition from the FDJ and Prof. Meusel, and restricted in research by the effects of war—destruction of Hanse and other famous German towns under the hail of bombs. All that is left to him—and this is significant—is digging among the ruins of German towns like Magdeburg, where the accidental exposure of the remains of ancient buildings has uncovered clues to the development and influence of various social and national strata (Germans and Slavs, feudal and civil classes).

It is easy to see that neither of these teachers can compromise despite their common actual fate. The rift between the two ideologies is felt in every field and faculty at Eastern universities. Fortunately, there are teachers who stand consciously or unconsciously between the fronts, just as not all students are imbued with FDJ ideology. But it would be an error to assume that free research has hope of actual support in this quarter (lack of courage, of knowledge and education impedes here, too). In consequence, the sway of mediocrity, which has its part at all times in every university, has enlarged considerably and covers now almost the whole field of learning and teaching. Modern Berlin students work only to assure a future livelihood and to get better pay; they seldom think about higher questions. Finally, the Marxist philosophy of life, rigidly and dogmatically presented, will not tolerate genuine scientific research.

It is natural to wonder whether the situation sketched here prevails only in the Eastern zone of Germany. Perhaps other universities in Germany and elsewhere have the same problems, caused by other factors, yet working none the less in the same direction of sterility and standstill.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
"THE OBJECTOR"

TO the best of our knowledge, Jeb Stuart's novel, *The Objector* (Doubleday, 1950), is the first book due for wide circulation which attempts to portray the experiences of an American who refused to bear arms in World War II. It is worth reading for the above reason if for no other. But while more fascinating stories have been told and other war novels exhibit greater literary skill, Stuart has also highlighted a great many considerations of psychological and social import.

Perhaps no one would bother to write a full-length novel about a conscientious objector unless he felt something of respect and something of sympathy for a man who takes that position. Stuart, at any rate, has a great deal of both, even though, apparently far from being a "pacifist" himself, he served in the recent war as a machine gunner and cannoneer on active duty. Doubleday's jacket description does a fair job of summarizing the theme and tone of the book, and gives indication at the outset that this is not a volume calculated to please propagandists charged with the responsibility of adding recruits to the country's armed forces:

> Heath was a young man of maddening logic who, simply and sincerely, believed that war was murder and wanted no part of it. When he was mistakenly sent to an infantry division instead of a medical division he refused to carry arms. Heath was not a hero, nor was he sustained by religious fervor—it was merely that he knew he was right and nothing was going to change his mind. Even the army psychiatrist and Heath's girl, who could have smoothed his path, were prevented by Heath, who regarded a man's integrity as his most precious possession. *The Objector*, a novel of deep emotional impact, is one that portrays most dramatically the problem of a man of strong conviction who has the courage to sustain that conviction in the face of tremendous odds.

Daniel Heath was impelled neither by the conditioning of membership in one of the traditional peace churches nor by physical cowardice. He moved haltingly on a path of decision for which he alone was responsible—haltingly, in the sense that a becoming humility attended his defiance of placement in a combat unit after his request for service with the Medical Corps. He never claimed to be completely sure that he was right, yet, under pressure, he never failed to follow the convictions he did possess. This, it strikes us, is a very good kind of conscientious objector to be. The issues about which such a person tries to make up his mind are so subtle and difficult that they require an attitude of open-mindedness and humility. If Daniel Heath may be taken as a prototype for the I-AO's—those who accept service so long as they are not required to bear arms—we can probably do with a great many more such unpretentiously thoughtful men who risk security to find their own place to stand in relation to war.

It is interesting that Stuart resists the temptation to make Heath a hopelessly out-of-step character, someone who is in no sense "normal." Although Heath would rather clean latrines than drill with a rifle, though he is determined to risk imprisonment or even death with the position he takes, he is portrayed as in other ways very much like his barracks mates. These men, differing from most of his superior officers, like and respect him; he talks and argues and lives with them in real fraternity. Heath even has a girl, and the progress of his relationship with her follows the approved pattern for wartime novels. Moreover, he finds this girl in the midst of the army camp and snatches her from the office of a middle-aged colonel who has taken apoplectic dislike to Heath's effrontery in refusing to bear arms, and who seeks to break him in every possible fashion. Finally sent overseas as a result of this same officer's malice, Heath becomes a reliable first-aid man at the front lines, repeatedly exposed to death in an effort to bring in the wounded under fire, and finally meeting the bullet which kills him during a hazardous mission.

Stuart apparently wishes his readers to learn two things about war through the courtesy of Private Heath. The first is the full extent of the evil which wars and armies generate, and the second, the existence of a reservoir of nobility and cooperative spirit in the men who actually face front-line action. He seems to be saying that the army does as much as anything could to ruin a man's humanity, but that, paradoxically, men are still a bit stronger than the psychological corrosion they have suffered in the army and find something left of humanness when they come to the actual time of fighting and dying. As an example of the first theme we may quote some unmitigated condemnation of the army, as Heath sees it, after his period of "seasoning" at an army training center:

> En route to Lilis, Heath looked out of the window of the bus and thought of the Army, his feelings about it, and he thought the Army essentially was an evil instrument, that it robbed one of his manhood, built walls of fear, dishonesty, and prejudice in and around the soldiers. It pitted man against man, encouraged betrayals, and daily appealed to man's basest emotions. What was more, it forced the intelligent to submit to his inferior and imposed on the men the horrible military caste system. And all this the soldier recognized and wished to escape, but his idea of escape was to enter into the whole insane undertaking more fully.
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> Then Heath wondered if he were actually going to go overseas. Perhaps Thumb was really intending only to frighten him. After all, he wasn't prepared for an assignment to a combat area and the major knew it. But when Heath considered himself in the camp and gave thought to his being overseas, he decided that it would be best for him to be actually shipped out. His position in the detachment command was incongruous. Everyone liked him, but their affection for him was the sort one held for the village idiot who was regarded as gentle and safe. The village supported, tolerated, and fed the idiot and made use of him as a handy man, and so the detachment soldiers and command treated Heath, the conscientious objector, whom they really regarded not far removed from the gentle village idiot. And so thinking as he was, Heath decided that it would be for the good to go across the ocean, and he began to prepare himself within for the transfer.

Later in the book we see a further development of this subtle dual thesis. It is not, say Stuart and Heath, the actual fighting and dying that is the worst of world wars. The worst thing of all is the subhuman nature of the activity required by training and by authoritarian psychology.

> The one single, great thing he discovered was that he was not afraid of the sight of blood, not afraid as he thought he would be afraid. He discovered that one saw not blood alone but a human openly, unashamedly pleading for aid, and one had no alternative but to give help.
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> There were many other things he learned. He found that war was not death only but that it was a number of very profound matters. At the front, in going from one dug-in position to another, talking with the riflemen, aid men, and officers, Heath came upon fellowship, unity, and a kind of love. Amid the dirt, the hard labor, the scarcity of food, the lack of winter clothing, the long periods without news from home, the continual loss of their numbers through death, wounds, and sickness, amid all this and more, the men managed to sustain themselves, not with religion, or the worship of God, but with an inner faith in themselves as humans. They had overwhelming confidence that the war would end in victory for their side and the days to come would be good.
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> The good days ahead they talked of often and long. Heath found more hope, more faith, more good humor in the lines than he had ever found at home, in civilian life, in the army reservations, anywhere. What was more, he saw that the soldier with the gun, who had seen violent death for days almost without end, was a genuine believer in peace. He was a man of peace not out of weakness, a longing for the comforts of the untouched and untroubled America, but out of a simple realization that war was stupid, a base crime against humanity.

It seems to us a thoroughly legitimate and thoroughly defensible hope that more novels dealing with conscientious objectors will be forthcoming, and perhaps some of them should be novels about the lives of those who refused to cooperate with the army machinery even to Heath's extent: the 4E's who landed either in prison or at forced, unpaid labor. Statistics and articles about the fate of the conscientious

objectors are less effective, often, than a novel. If one tentatively accepts the hypothesis we favor—that the conscientious objector represents to some degree a portion of feeling in all of us which has not yet reached maturity—we need to know about the psychological reactions of these men more than we need to know about what they specifically did, how many of them there were, and what attitude the Army and Selective Service adopted towards them. We are unable to share Stuart's apparent faith, however, that the men who have "seen violent death for days almost without end" are necessarily going to be believers in peace, for it apparently takes quite a lot more than this. Heath represents "all of us," in one important sense—not because his is the course all will ultimately follow, but because he attempts to think through the cultural, religious, and philosophical contradictions of our time. There must be occasions when every thoughtful man feels some aspiration which cannot be fulfilled unless one stands apart from majority opinion long enough to evaluate fairly and freely.

This book has only recently been released. It will be a matter of some interest to note its reception. Some libraries, we are sure, will regard it as a definitely subversive book and refuse to order unless it is endorsed by Sufficiently Responsible Authorities. But until a better attempt to do the same job is forthcoming, we welcome Mr. Stuart's story of Daniel Heath as a good item for every home library.

COMMENTARY
WHAT CAN A MAN DO?

WITHOUT it being in any sense planned, a great deal of this issue happens to be devoted to war—the psychological effects of war in Germany, the "morality" of war in Korea, and the reaction to war of a few isolated men called conscientious objectors. This is considerable thinking—and writing and reading—on war, and it is reasonable to ask, What can a man do about it all? If, as Carlyle once remarked, "The end of man is an *action* and not a *thought*, though it were the noblest," thinking and writing and reading ought to be followed by something else.

But is there any individual "act" in relation to war which has a real meaning—a meaning for war, as much as for the individual? A month or so ago, a writer in the Memphis *Press-Scimitar* told of his experience in serving in the late war under a major general who had been a regular army man for twenty-eight years. The time was August, 1945; the occasion, the news that an atom bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. As the *Press-Scimitar* reporter tells it:

> In that first excitement, I gave no thought to the consequences. I just ran into the office of my chief, Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, and blurted out to him the confused story that I had heard. . . .
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> He was sitting at his desk, working on some papers when I entered. He listened to what I had to say and then leaned back in his chair and stared off into space for a few minutes.
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> Then he looked back at me—and very slowly and very softly said:
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> "I hope that report you have heard isn't true."
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> After World War II, Gen. Lerch went off to a new post and a new duty—to Korea, where he was military governor. He died there—before the 38th parallel was crossed. . . .

How many individuals are there who, behind the facade of military resolve, and despite their impotence as individuals, are staring off into space, today, and wishing that the things they know to be true weren't true?

What does that wish really mean? How do you start turning such wishes into acts? In a world where moral responsibility is supposed to count for something, there ought to be a way in which individual feelings can make themselves felt. Lest conscience make us cowards, shall we let war make zombies of us all, and, until the end of our days, stare sadly off into space?

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

ARTICLES on education and bringing up children abound in magazines such as *Western Family, Better Homes and Gardens, Good Housekeeping, Ladies Home Journal* and *Woman's Home Companion.* We seldom refer to these articles, for it is difficult to avoid the opinion, with pieces so full of trite generalities, if not banalities, that most of them obscure rather than illuminate the problems they presumably discuss. There are exceptions, of course, although never, to our knowledge, particularly profound ones. But striving as they do for a certain variety as to topics, such articles may serve as an index to the natural subdivisions in the educational situation—and as reminders of various matters which should receive particular consideration.

The January issue of *Better Homes and Gardens* attempted a summary of the methods used by parents to develop in their children a grasp of the principles of money exchange. The writer, C. Howard Smith, begins by telling about a twelve-year-old daughter who, in normal fashion; was increasing her demands for cash. Her parents, like most parents, "paid little heed to her requests, except to give her what they thought they could afford. But by Thanksgiving they noticed a change in her needs. She was asking for money more frequently—and for larger sums. At the same time, they observed that an impersonal note was creeping into her demands. It was not ingratitude exactly. Still she appeared to be taking their assistance for granted. They began to feel that Judy's view of money was out of focus."

Mr. Smith apparently feels that the best solution is simply to explain the family income to the children very carefully, and point out that it is impossible to dole out at random loose change or dollar bills; instead, the children may be given a regular budgeted allowance, taught to save, and to learn "the value of money." This is the conventional approach to the problem, but we should ourselves rather incline to maintain, however, that Mr. Smith's recommendations will not lead far enough. The sort of education that is really needed provides more than "adjustment," which is never more than second-best.

At the root of a psychological situation in which misunderstandings of this sort occur is the inadvisability of allowing children to take *anything* for granted, beyond the expectation that they will not be allowed to starve if unable to provide for themselves. Parents cannot remind themselves too often that when the home becomes non-productive—as soon as there is nothing for the child to do which is organically related to the subsistence of the family or the advancement of its financial status—all sorts of new problems come into being. Typical of these problems is the adolescent assumption that part of having a parent is looking to him for disbursements of money which will, however, be forthcorning entirely upon adult mood and caprice. Yet no one can truly respect money, or any other gift, if its availability depends upon another's *mood.* On this basis, there is no rational relationship between one's own efforts and the amount of money that is forthcoming. All too often, parents simply give children money, often because they have not been ingenious enough to think of ways to encourage the children to work for it; and, more unfortunately, because parents very often wish to see their children's possessions shown off to advantage in front of the neighbors. If we stop to think about it, it should be clear that we are not actually doing the youngsters any service at all by this policy. Their preparation for a world in which they will have to support themselves will be a poor one if their conditioning is in terms of largesse and the caprice of parental pride. There is only one type of occupation which this sort of psychological training fits one for, and that is the type which includes con men, gigolos and other parasitic misfits.

We have a particular enthusiasm for the idea of stimulating the child's imagination by allowing

him to create his own vision of an ideal society. Let him suppose himself isolated on an island, or in some forgotten, inaccessible region, accompanied only by his contemporaries. He now has opportunity, in theory, to build new habits and a new social world without adult interference. Of value at all times and with all children, this method—which may use some story-book situation, with other features added by ourselves—can also bring adults back to consideration of the meaning of many social relationships. In this particular instance, for example, the society we imagine into existence might be, at least at the beginning, a simple society, built from conceptions of the primal relationships of man to the land, to morality, to civil law, to family custom, to education and to government. The consideration of money in such a context, in turn, recreates the logic of the productive home, and immediately suggests the extent to which our prevailing customs have grown away from their original basis in social necessity.

It is easy enough, in such a context, to see the relationship between a family income and a child's or adolescent's efforts. If you are selling a cash crop, for instance, you establish a basis for compensation for effort, but this basis is obviously lacking in the average American home today.

There are, of course, some necessary qualifications. The frontier home and the farm home and the ranch home were not necessarily happy homes. The mere fact that adolescents usually earned their full share of provender and luxuries was not a guarantee of psychological well-being. Many of these grand old productive homes were ruled over by small-scale tyrants—fathers who believed that they had a moral right to as much work as they could get out of their children, as though children were some sort of domestic animals. We have, indeed, often passed from one extreme to another, moving from a society in which it was typical for children to have less freedom than they needed, to a society where it is typical for them to have almost none of the responsibilities which lead to a normal maturity.

Taking these qualifications into account, then, we can apologize if we have been tiring some readers with our ceaseless praise of yesterday's rural society, and yet justify our sentiments on the ground that *one aspect* of the farm or frontier home was superior to the corresponding aspect of the average home of today. The "productive home" is a tremendous asset in keeping alive a healthy and happy communal psychology. But in this instance, as in all others, we shall finally have to admit that no material conditions are truly prime causes in successful education. We can make up for lack of opportunity for family sharing in production by an enlightened attitude, but we cannot make up for unenlightened attitudes by share-the-work projects. The "enlightened attitude," in turn, is simply the realization that all of life's experiences, both the responsibilities and the joyous excitements, are of value only in terms of the extension of human understanding.

FRONTIERS

Viewpoints on the Korean War

IN its issue for January 17, the *Christian Century* printed a rousing article on the United Nations, urging that, "Through the five years of its existence it has succeeded in many more instances than it has failed." We should not have paid much attention to this editorial, save for the later comment of a Quaker reader of Whittier, California. It is always worth while, in cases of "bitter necessities" such as righteous war, to set aside the ideological issues and considerations of national policy, if only for a moment or two, and to look at the bare human values as they appear to one who cares very little about either victory or defeat. The remarks of the Whittier subscriber of the *CC*, admittedly "rather warm" for a Quaker, are as follows:

> It is quite true that the U.N. has not failed. But in my opinion the editor of *The Christian Century* is failing the United Nations and his Christian readers when he implies that a first-class U.N. citizen is one who sanctions war as a method of the United Nations. The sentence "Every American should be thankful that there was a U.N. to judge our actions as righteous and to point out who the aggressor was," is simply astounding.
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> This sort of thing goes on: "The U.N. has torn down any moral pretense on the part of the aggressor." Tell that to the homeless Koreans! Tell that to the babies scarred for life by American bombs and fire jelly! Tell that to the conscripted teen-agers on both sides of this monstrous aggression for power on one side and profits on the other!
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> My dear sir, are you a Christian editor speaking for *The Christian Century*, or are you trying to do what no Christian should do, namely, to choose the lesser of two evils? Rather, why aren't we led to think that a U.N. citizen, first class, is one who would have the U.N. admit *now* that it has been led astray by the illusion of militarism? Why aren't we told that a planeload of CARE packages parachuted to hungry communist children has more power than capitalistic bombs built to stave off unemployment?
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> Perhaps I am getting rather warm for a Quaker, but don't we really want a Christian Century, rather than either an American or a Russian one?

For some reason or other, the Quakers have been jocularly identified as those "peculiar people." The peculiarly interesting thing, here, is that there is absolutely no meeting ground between the logic of this letter and the theory behind the military action in Korea. While the *CC* editors try to create such an area, by offering to "chip in" on some food packages to be dropped to "hungry communist children," the fact remains that hungry children play no part at all in the equations of military policy. For the purposes of war, hungry children simply do not exist.

It would be difficult indeed for an enthusiastic advocate of police action by the UN to argue with this Quaker reader of the *Christian Century*. Where would they start? The Quaker would say that it is immoral (or unchristian) to cause harm or hunger even to a single innocent child, and he would not move from that position. He would say that the grown-up children—the teen-agers on both sides—are practically as innocent as the little children; and, very likely, the Quaker would be quite right. How do you argue with a person who takes this view? A person who says that you can never get anywhere doing evil in order that a supposed good may come?

About all you can do with such peculiar people is to ignore them, shout them down, or brush them off lightly as the *Christian Century* editor did with his note about chipping in. But if there were twenty million Quakers, instead of only a hundred thousand, or twenty million people, Quakers or not, who shared the same opinion of war, there would be no shouting them down or brushing them off. The rest of the world would have to begin to cope with their logic—begin to take seriously this indictment of the "lesser of two evils" theory of moral behavior. The only reason any one of us tolerates it is because everyone else seems to tolerate it. Who would stay by the "lesser of two evils" logic if it represented a minority position?

But, it will be claimed, just because the great majority accept the "lesser of two evils" logic, the

rest of us intelligent people who personally "hate war" have to accept it, too. And that is really the difference between the rest of us and the Quakers. We can't stand being on the side which can be ignored, shouted down, or brushed off. There may be some other reasons, but this, we think, is about the most important one. After all, hardly a man of us would fire flaming gasoline jelly where it might hit either babies or adolescent boys, or even grown-up men, unless "the majority" had somehow persuaded us that it was all right or a "necessary" thing to do.

We don't plan any attempt to "settle" an argument of this sort because it isn't really an argument. An argument involves reason, and it is fairly obvious that reason can play a very small part in a discussion where the participants do not share the same basic feelings.

It is possible, however, for both "peculiar" and other people to give a fair hearing to what the Koreans themselves are saying about the way to end the war which has devastated and is now re-devastating their country. Ordinarily, this magazine gives little attention to political pronouncements, but when a Korean speaks up on the subject of the settlement of the war in Korea, and is ignored, shouted down, or brushed off, it seems the course of justice to give his proposal as wide an audience as possible. Accordingly, we print below a letter to the January *Eastern World* by Yongjeung Kim, President of the Korean Affairs Institute, Washington, D.C. His opening observations declare that a formula for peace, to be successful, "must have as its paramount consideration the aspirations of the Korean people." And either "facesaving" or "power politics," he adds, in disregard of the legitimate hopes of the Korean people, can only bring further disaster. The body of his proposal, which has dignity of utterance, and seems to have peace and justice as its aim, is as follows.

* * *

Actually, what Koreans want is: (1) an end to hostilities; 2) a unified nation; (3) the right to choose their own government; (4) a respect for their sovereign independence; and (5) world-wide assistance in the reconstruction of their war-torn country.

How under present conditions is it possible to move from the mental climate of hatred and war into the moderate temperature that would make real these rational objectives? First, we must abandon our present negativism, i.e. the idea it is too late, that nothing can be done with Chinese or Russian Communist leaders, or that morality is all on one side, immorality all on the other. Moreover, it would not be conducive to peace for the great powers to continue to heckle each other. It would be well to consider a hard historic fact—namely, that no nation or people holds a monopoly on virtue.

Considering the above, I suggest the following:—

1. An immediate cease-fire, arranged by the U.N., or responsible non-involved individuals.

2. Withdrawal of belligerent troops to a demarcation line arranged by the U.N. or responsible non-involved individuals.

3. Reconstitution of the present U.N. Commission on Korea acceptable to the U.N., the United States, China and the U.S.S.R., to serve as a temporary over-all governing body in Korea.

4. This Commission would supervise the withdrawal of all foreign troops, military missions, etc., by a given date.

5. Appointment of a Korean advisory committee, composed of persons of high calibre and integrity who were not and are not connected with either government in Korea, to assist the over-all Commission.

6. Organisation by the Commission of interim local governments in each village, town and city. These local governments would be empowered to exercise administrative and police functions pending a national election.

7. Holding a free plebiscite without regard to political views or civil status, to choose a government for a united Korea. The poll should be held at the earliest moment in a manner fixed by the Commission. (The present tragedy stems in large

measure from refusal to trust the Koreans to mould their own future.)

8. Upon establishment of a national government through free elections, termination of the authority of the Commission and the admission of Korea to the United Nations.

9. Guarantee of the independence and neutrality of a united Korea by the United Nations and by Communist China if it is not a member of the United Nations.

10. A programme of reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea by the United Nations.

The ten-point solution I have presented touches the hard core of peace in Asia, namely, the Korean problem. I present it as a Korean, thinking primarily of my country. I am mindful of, though not qualified to offer solutions to, other problems that possibly enter into any agreement concerning Korea, such as the admission of Communist China into the U.N., the position of Nationalist China vis-a-vis the United States and the United Nations, and the fate of Formosa. I can therefore only suggest that their solution be considered in the temperate, unemotional climate of reason rather than in one embracing shortsightedness and vindictiveness.

To solve the Korean problem can be the beginning of a new era which could lead conceivably to a general world settlement.