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AUTHORITY'S VANISHING POINT

WITHIN the past year, two men eminent in their respective fields, public health and radiology found occasion to speak out against the submissive attitude of the public with respect to measures alleged to be of value in the prevention and treatment of disease. Dr. J. C. Geiger, public health director of San Francisco, commenting on the increasing use of immunization "shots" and antibiotics, scored prevailing medical practice by saying: "The caduceus has been replaced by the syringe, the needle has become more important than the stethoscope." He illustrated the danger from excessive and irresponsibly administered injections by calling attention to the present custom of injecting tetanus toxoid into children. It began, he said, as a result of wartime practice, in which tetanus toxoid was given to large numbers of service men because of the dangers to which their activities exposed them. Now, however, "habit and ritual have put tetanus toxoid into thousands of infants," despite the fact that there is no conclusive evidence of the efficiency of the toxoid itself.

Last December, Dr. James F. Brailsford, founder of the British Radiological Association, told a group of California physicians that the much-advocated periodic X-ray examinations are wasteful and may even produce bad effects. "If you feel fit and well," he advised, "stay away from all doctors." He particularly condemned mass examinations, in which people are hurried before X-ray cameras in droves, on the ground that they cannot be accurate—the negatives are too small, and even the best radiologists may make mistakes in twenty out of every hundred examinations. Meanwhile, people become upset by fears of illness and their plans for life are disturbed without reason. Some twenty per cent of the population, Dr. Brailsford informed his listeners, contract tuberculosis and recover without knowing or worrying about it. Finally, superficial examinations will give people a false security and cause them to ignore actual symptoms when they occur. Dr. Brailsford's advice is categorical:

> Even in the case of cancer, nature will notify educated persons when to seek medical advice. . . . Mass X-ray examinations for tuberculosis and cancer do more harm than good. . . . We should stop wasting money on mass X-ray examinations and concentrate upon educating people in hygiene.

There may be an argument there, but it doesn't seem worth developing. Instead, we propose to investigate the problem behind the problem—the question of why, in principle, we seem to need periodic and emphatic warnings against believing in and taking everything that is said to be good for us by the "authorities.' It is one of the lessons of history that the authorities—in particular specialized authorities, such as doctors—are as much the creatures of their times as the rest of us, and just as prone to make mistakes. The fact that they are authorities only means that they have the power or the prestige to impose their mistakes on other people. It may also be learned from history that the societies in which the exercise of authority of any sort was at a minimum have produced the most exceptional if not the healthiest individuals, so that the entire psychology of authority is something that should be thoroughly explored.

To keep assumptions of value out in the open, we might start out with the premise that authority is a fine thing when it comes to the question of how to make porcelain glazes, or of deciding when you can make a left turn off the highway, or of what to do if the ship starts sinking. The second premise is that when it comes to picking a religion or deciding what is worth living or dying for, authority is the worst thing in the world. This is like saying that it is better to be Lucifer and get expelled from heaven for figuring things out for yourself than it is to be

a happy angel who is merged with the sweet side of life because he knows no worse—or no better. Or, to put the matter less sensationally, all legitimate authority (here, institutional or specialists' authority is meant) must be limited authority—qualified by an appropriate scope of decision.

If we are right about this, then the more "spiritual" knowledge a man or any conceivable "being" has, the less he will tell other people what to do. He will know that the only real failure for human beings is the failure to live their own lives, to find the truth for themselves; and while he may discuss with others the problems that arise in the search for truth, he will not try to "give" it to them. He knows that if he does, they will be sure to form an organization around it and set up "authorities" to interpret it to the common herd. And that, he also knows, is why the common herd usually stays a common herd.

Ideally, every man should make his own decisions about everything. Simply because it is possible to riddle this proposal with practical objections is no excuse for failing to work for the next-best objective—a society in which everyone makes as many of his own decisions as he possibly can. In institutional terms, this means a society which consciously safeguards the spirit of individual decision and which makes its educational system serve this principle.

In the matter of health, for example, an emphasis on individual decision runs strongly counter to the presumably "liberal" movement for socialized medicine and to the legal enforcement on a mass scale of certain public health measures. State medicine means not only political medicine, but tax-supported *orthodox* medicine. There are those who disagree partly or completely with prevailing medical theory regarding infectious disease, and who think that the statement of W. H. Manwaring, Stanford bacteriologist, that "No immunological hypothesis of the past half-century has had a clinical verification probability of more than 5 per cent" *(Science,* July 5, 1929), entitles them to be choosey about public health programs involving injections. Such people, of course, are very much in the minority, but they have the distinctive virtue of wanting to be their own authorities—and there is always the possibility that they are right.

A discussion of this sort is likely to be annoying to the reader for the reason that it proposes that every man should involve himself in apparently endless relativities of judgment. Each time he is confronted by the necessity of an important choice, he would have to ask himself: How much weight shall I give the opinions of the experts in making this decision? Even the suggestion that the experts are often wrong is a threat to the psychological security of those who have the habit of turning to the authorities when they are the least bit uncomfortable or confused. Trusting to the authorities eliminates a lot of painful thinking and fear of being "wrong." There are people who make no distinction between the rules: Don't move the patient until the doctor comes; Don't say anything until you talk to a lawyer; Don't ally yourself with that cause without consulting a priest. These rules represent essentially different levels of personal or moral responsibility and they are supported by essentially different justifications. The experts involved—doctor, lawyer, priest—derive their authority from training in specialized fields. The doctor is supposed to know about the mechanisms of the body. The lawyer has familiarity with the personal, social and economic relationships as defined by law, while the priest is reputed to have special knowledge concerning what is right and what is wrong.

It is quite conceivable that a thoughtful man will consult a lawyer only under extreme practical necessity— choosing the sort of career that does not fatten on processes of litigation; that he will obey the doctor only in matters which do not affect his basic estimate of human nature, and reject entirely the admonitions of priests. Such a man uses experts as they should be used, as

technologists of more or less mechanical processes, reserving all moral decisions for his own judgment. And when technical and moral matters are inextricably allied, he does the best he can, deciding for himself where to draw the line.

In an illustration such as this one, we are trying to approximate the mood or attitude of mind that will help to establish a sense of competence in human life, as opposed to the feeling of impotence that is fostered by habitual resort to experts. Is this expert *really* necessary? is always a good question to ask.

Two world wars have greatly augmented the dependence of twentieth-century human beings upon the decisions of authorities. Modern war requires extensive suppression of individual choice—for efficient manipulation of both the civilian and the military population, and for the over-all purposes of what is called "morale." The authority of the war-maker is increasingly an absolute authority, reinforced by fear of destruction and by the administrative demand for "national unity." War, therefore, apart from its other effects, creates a submissive state of mind toward the decisions of authority. As fewer decisions remain to individuals, those that are left often being trivial by comparison to those which are lost, an attitude of basic incapacity becomes typical of the mass populations of war-making states.

What are the processes through which men gradually lose their self-respect—their love of living their own lives—and substitute for it an undifferentiated emotionalism of conformity and obedience? Basically, these processes seem to begin with the theoretical subdivision of man into various departments, each one ruled over by experts who are believed to know more about a *part* of man than any ordinary person can hope to know. The logic is persuasive. *Of course* the doctor knows more than you do, *and* the lawyer, *and* the priest, *and* the statesman, *and* the general. They went to the university or the seminary or they have years of experience. Just ask them—they'll set you right. The point is that, although they may be able to embarrass us into silence or convince us that we don't know what we are talking about, the decisions of all these experts, taken together, are converting the world into a physical and moral shambles.

There are many approaches to this problem. Take for example magazines like the *Sarvey Graphic* and *United Nations World.* These periodicals represent the active thinkers of our time who are trying to affect the course of human events with individual thought and decision. Add the "liberal" magazines, which have the same objective from a somewhat different point of view. These papers represent an intellectual half-way house between apathy and self-government. Most of their readers realize that the actual avenues of decision open to them are very few: there is the ballot, the letter column in the newspaper, the congressman to write, various organizations which may be joined, and causes to support. All these activities represent the exertion of influence through expression of opinion. None of them gives direct participation in better modes of living. And these expressions of opinion nearly all relate to issues so "big," in the sense of being complicated and connected with countless intangibles, that a man's sense of having decided what he "thinks" about them is seldom satisfactory. He goes to the big game, he sits in the right section, he yells himself hoarse, and goes home. He may feel good, but what if he spent the afternoon in the wrong arena? This disturbing thought will probably make him yell a little louder, next week. Or maybe he'll just stay home and play with his television set.

The vast majority who never see *Survey* or *UN World*, who if they did find them very dull, are equally subject to the psychological subdivision of their lives. For them, the portals to conventional decision are so distant that they have lost almost all reality. For them, the experts have *really* taken over. People are constantly being told what to do, urged on by suavely insistent printed and spoken

words which are flanked by the symbols of unquestioned authority—the scientist, the elder statesman, the military hero, the famous actress. No one ever says to the public, "I don't really know what is right to do about this: do you?" and then walks off the stage. The answers are all worked out by somebody else. We have only to accept them.

It is this denial of the right of the common man to think for himself, to choose for himself, which brands our civilization as anti-educational. We may have the biggest libraries the world has known, more schools than any other period of history and more children going to them, but so long as our major social institutions pursue activities which, deliberately or not, discourage independent thinking, it will be a civilization fixed in opposition to genuine human growth.

How, then, shall we locate the heart of this problem? Where begin to change the polarity of our lives with respect to intelligent choosing for ourselves? First of all, it will be necessary to establish some categorical vanishing-point of outside authority, so far as we are concerned. There are some decisions which can be delegated to others only at the cost of our manhood and inner self-respect. There may even be decisions which are tarnished simply by consultation with others about them. What are the things that we ought to know about and do for ourselves, without asking advice?

Then there are other problems in which advice is really needed. Here, we need to be sure that we are seeking knowledge, and not relief from responsibility. The only sort of advice worth taking is the advice which, if it seems to go wrong, will not make us *want* to blame the person who gave it to us. We need, in other words, to learn to take full responsibility for whatever we do, whether under the guidance of experts or not. The one thing that no expert can ever do is absolve us from moral responsibility. To shift one's moral responsibility to someone else is an act of dehumanization.

Most of all, we shall have to overcome our horror of making mistakes, even if it kills us, and it probably won't. All that the experts and authorities can do is seem to prevent our little mistakes while saving them up for the one vast and all-destroying Great Mistake like the atom bomb. The atom bomb may be taken as a symbol for what seems an insoluble dilemma. It is the massive reproach by human nature *to* human beings for refusing to make up their minds. The inhumanity of man to man is made up of an infinite number of little decisions passed on unmade to "the authorities" by every one of us, until we no longer realize that we are not making any important decisions at all. Then, when we look around for something to do about the mess we are in, there is simply nothing to do. All the tools of decision are in the hands of high authorities. There is no arena, no visible battlefield; so we fold our hands, turn to one another, and say, hopefully, "Maybe there is a God, after all."

Maybe there is. But the God that has been denied is not somebody up in the sky; it is the more reasonable god in man—the being with the glory and the power of choosing for himself, if he wants to.

Letter from

ALASKA

PALMER.—If statehood comes to Alaska it will be in spite of a mystifying opposition which has been able for several years to thwart the will of Alaskans and the majority of Congressmen. In a 1946 referendum, Alaskans voted three-to-two for statehood. Before, and since then, various groups of federal legislators have toured the Territory, repeating similar tours of equally observant or unobservant committees, duplicating information already on file in Washington. Canvassing of individual Congressmen this year indicates an easy majority in favor of statehood, but the bills fail to reach a final vote.

With no justifiable basis for opposing statehood, opponents have been reduced to the classic "time-has-not-come" argument, pointing to local political fiascos to prove that Alaskans are not ready to manage their own affairs. A more tangible point made by objectors is their concern over paying for state government with a population of a hundred thousand, a portion of whom are tribal natives. They assert that the Territory cannot support its own government until it develops industrially. Statehood supporters counter that colonial status perpetuates political conditions which prevent industrial development.

Sophistry has not been all on one side. Advocates have used their share of forced arguments, claiming, for instance, that statehood for Alaska is vital to national defense. It is of course fashionable these days to use national defense as a good reason for promoting anything from nationalized medicine to the open shop.

Governor Ernest Gruening, appointed by the President, comes closest to the essence of the issue when he protests against the injustice of taxation without representation and the inconveniences of being continually subjected to the vagaries of federal bureaucracies. Governor Gruening is sincere in his campaign for statehood. Genuine democratic sentiment of an ardency not often seen in public officials any more, causes him to believe that full federal citizenship is a right and a responsibility due to be undertaken even if it should bring no benefits. At the same time Dr. Gruening is politically astute enough to recognize the predominant interests of people, and has addressed a share of his appeals to Alaskan sentiment in practical directions, such as the advantage of receiving a larger share of federal grants now automatically received by states. He has also used the national defense argument. Without the Governor's persistent stand for statehood since his appointment in 1939, there is reason to doubt that Alaskans would have voted for it in 1946.

It cannot be denied that the people's desire for statehood is genuine, that from an objective viewpoint it is justified, and that it is probably more overwhelming now that it was two and a half years ago. But it must not be supposed that the demand expresses the yearnings of a people for freedom from oppression. There is no revolution brewing here. It is impossible to conceive, for instance, of the refusal of any number of Alaskan young men to register for military training, as in Puerto Rico, on the grounds that Alaska had no representation in the legislature which imposed the draft. Passage of the conscription law was taken for granted in Alaska and excited no particular reaction one way or another.

If Alaska does gain statehood, unless there is some vital change in public sentiment and the constitution of its population, no important divergence from the general pattern of government in existing states is to be expected. Although the current Alaska legislature, elected by a large majority, is comparatively progressive and liberal in contrast to its opposition, it is not a radical or proletarian type of liberalism that prevails, but rather an individualistic, bourgeois (though unintellectualized) liberalism that is vaguely sensed and expressed by vocal elements.

It might indeed be characterized as a *laissez faire* attitude which would encourage anything that was an incentive to "business."

Alaska's white population is as yet too unstable, too freshly recruited from all the states of the union, to form a true community of sentiment. The native population is practically without native leadership, therefore entirely subordinated to the whites. The desire to get ahead, to make money, may be regarded, according to sociological definition, as a like interest, but not a common interest except in a secondary way. It is the like desire of its citizens to make money, to promote more business, that lies behind the popular sentiment for statehood, rather than a sense of spiritual community.

ALASKAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

ALARM AND PLEASANTRY

ONE seldom expects to find an inspiring idea in a motion picture. While some of the "literary" periodicals attempt serious criticism of the uses to which the "medium" of the screen is put, it seems clear that, for the novice at least, there is little of reward from such painstaking analysis.

But going to the movies can be the cause of a not unprofitable train of reflections. Though even more confusing for basic evaluation than fiction, a motion picture —or rather a brace of them, since exhibitors seem to have lost all hope of competing with quality, and are resigned to the "double-bill"—does provide material for studying the psychology of the times. Take *Black Magic* and *In the Good Old Summertime,* for instance, mysteriously tabbed for co-exhibition on the West Coast. There probably was a reason for this queer alliance in entertainment, come to think of it—an aim at program "balance," in which *Black Magic* was to provide the macabre and Van Johnson was to charm the patrons back to appreciation of the commonplaces of simple Americanism.

Black Magic is macabre, all right, even beyond the call of duty. Supposedly based on the life of Cagliostro, a fabulous historical personage, it could be suspected from the outset that this picture was destined to be another smorgasbord serving, like nearly every other effort at "historical" cinema. Anyone who has read Trowbridge's *Cagliostro*—a carefully objective analysis of the legends attached to a notorious name—will be thrown into fits of teeth-grinding by the Orson Welles production. For example, Cagliostro is represented as receiving advice and instruction in hypnotism from Anton Mesmer, when, as a matter of fact, Mesmer was not a hypnotist, but a healer who depended on other means than hypnotism for his cures.

Most amazing of all is the twist of sexual immorality given to Cagliostro's life. The Johnson office, as everyone knows, is supposed to set very definite limitations on how much of this sort of thing can be shown. Lurid lives are continually being pared down to conform to the Johnson idea of "decency." But preserving history from distortion and biography from defamation does not, apparently, come under the heading of decency, in the catalog of don'ts which film producers must follow. When no grounds whatsoever exist for suspecting infidelity and amorous intrigue, the producers, it seems, reason that it is simply good business to invent a way of using up the allotment of vice the Johnson office allows.

In *Black Magic*, Cagliostro enjoys the favors of a mistress, and he subsequently woos and weds a reluctant heroine with the help of hypnosis. Cagliostro, whatever else may be said of him, was never charged with having a mistress, and he married his wife, who remained staunchly by his side throughout his stormy career, when both were very young. But Bad Men are so fascinating. Surely this tame domestic equation can be improved!

The central issues of screen falsification of history, such as occurs in *Black Magic*, revolve around the unquestioning acceptance of any calumny which promises to add "excitement" to a story. While Trowbridge, Cagliostro's biographer, finds nothing to prove that he was Giuseppe Balsamo, a Sicilian adventurer and forger, and produces much evidence to show that Cagliostro refused to derive any personal gain from his apparently "occult" powers, *Black Magic* assumes the identity of Balsamo and Cagliostro and pictures the latter as a greedy, unscrupulous egomaniac who traffics in alchemy and seances as means to fleece the impressionable. Egomaniac is the right word, too, for here, as in other instances, Hollywood decides that the easiest way to present any character whose motives are enigmatic and whose effect on others is inexplicably potent is to occasionally focus the camera on the staring eyes of a madman. Of course, there is the human

touch, too, showing moviedom's compassion for human kind, no matter how great their perfidy: Cagliostro, we are to understand, as Balsamo was conditioned to hate and to lust for vengeful power because his mother and father were unjustly hung by a sadistic nobleman who, in a later reel, becomes the film's equivalent of the Cardinal de Rohan and who appropriately commits suicide under the spell of Cagliostro's evil eye. (Here, we register a plaintive sidenote, expressing the wish that The Screen would sometimes vary the monotony of sudden death, administered during the closing minutes of the picture, for all those who have seriously offended against orthodox morality. Just as you can't ever have had a mistress and hope subsequently to live to a normal old age, so, also, it is impossible for anyone who has unjustly hanged someone else to hope to breathe God's air past the end of the picture. Welles, by the way, that great creative genius, succumbs so utterly to Hollywood tradition that he adopts one of the most venerable of exits for Cagliostro, who obligingly topples from a steeple to the pavement below, with the added touch of a sword thrust through his heart to ease the path of True Love.)

Let us now by all means turn to *In the Good Old Summertime*, a bicycle-built-for-two drama in color, excellently done. For once not required to over-act, S. Z. Sakall gives us a character in which are blended some of the most typical quixotries of human nature. We see ourselves as we sometimes wish we were, and sometimes as we wish we were not—and, after all, which of the functions of "art" is more legitimate than this?

In the Good Old Summertime also raises some speculation as to why "period" movies, especially those dealing with the not-too-distant past of the late nineteenth century, are so often engaging. The Gay Nineties seem invariably to embody a pleasant humor; the commonplaces of the time allow us to be both tolerant and amused at the extent to which Those People were the innocent victims of quaint customs. It seems much more difficult to be "tolerant" of the people with whom we share modern life—perhaps because of the difficulty in gaining the sort of perspective which would allow us to be amused, at times, by ourselves.

There may be still another legitimate appeal in a picture concerned with the lives and occupations of oldtimers in the United States. MANAS has frequently pressed the importance of a less turbulent, less speeded-up way of living, pointing to times and places where cities were smaller and individuality had more of a chance. Whether the plot of a motion picture deals with the days when the West was in process of settlement, or with the very different city life of the nineteenth century, it is possible that people respond to this nostalgic appeal for the same reason that they might buy thousands of copies of Ralph Borsodi's *Flight from the City*, if it were reprinted in a pocket edition and displayed on every newsstand.

NEHRU'S CHICAGO ADDRESS

WE wonder how many Americans were struck by the simple honesty and depth of Pandit Nehru's talk, broadcast from Chicago about three weeks ago. To us, it seems no exaggeration to say that it made comparisons of the Indian Prime Minister's mode of thinking with that of any other major political contemporary utterly impossible.

Introducing the speaker, the Govemor of Illinois spoke with sympathy of Nehru's years in prison on behalf of a cause identical in spirit with the cause of the American Revolution. Nehru began his extemporary remarks by replying that the Governor's sympathy was "rather wasted," for does not the highest human happiness lie in the sort of fulfillment one gains from supporting without reservation the cause closest to his heart?

Nehru referred to the extravagant compliments paid him by distinguished Americans. He protested this praise, although with complete graciousness, saying that such exaltation could not be good for anyone. He implied that to be the object of excessive flattery makes a man a poor psychiatric risk.

On the question of his mission in the United States, he acknowledged that most people have supposed he had come to make some sort of a deal for India with the American Government. His real reason for coming, he said, was because there were various things he wished to learn from America, and not because he sought some political or economic end. Speaking personally, he said he did not want the United States to "do things for India." It would not help the Indian people, he said, to have the tremendous task of economic and political integration performed for them by some outside power. The true explanation for India's relative success, thus far, he suggested, is that she has earned every bit of it herself. What people do for themselves they are better able to understand and preserve.

Nehru gave evidence of being proud that he had never sought a political career, suggesting that an absence of political ambition makes a man independent of the pressures and compromises which beset the officeseeker. Point for reflection: Is there any doubt that men who keep political objectives secondary in their lives are the very ones who preserve the objectivity and humanity most needed in the sphere of political action?

Again with pride, Nehru spoke of the uniqueness of the Gandhian revolution, saying that the achievement of Indian independence was not as important as the method by which it was gained. The ending of physical conflict, as all historians should know, amounts to little if the psychological antagonism remains to burst forth at a later time. He called India's non-violent revolution one of the most significant experiments ever undertaken—concluded successfully by the establishment of good will on both sides.

Can any reader recall a similar speech under similar auspices by the head of a modern State? Nehru's sentiments and reasoning are not new, of course, to the American tradition. The tone of his address will be familiar to readers of Jefferson, Washington, Madison, Paine, and Lincoln. But these men lived a long time ago. Perhaps India, with all her poverty, is not so unfortunate; perhaps she will some day be grateful for her freedom from excessive wealth and the materialistic spirit which wealth usually engenders.

C H I L D R E N

. . . and Ourselves

WE know of one family problem so omnipresent that discussion of it is never finished. Early or late, nearly all parents find themselves hurt or disappointed by the fact that their adolescent children are not interested in spending much time at home. It is typical for the parent to desire the child's company in the evenings and on holidays, and for the child to wish to be with other friends. The most common result of this psychological disharmony is for the parent to try to cajole the young one into "spending more time with the family" and for the adolescent to devise innumerable, ingenious ways of escaping the net.

It might be logical to suppose that in adult relationships, those possessed of superior qualities will be besieged by acquaintances who want more of the companionship of the "superior person" than is voluntarily offered. We cannot assume, however, that the children of a typical family are the moral and mental superiors of their parents. One reason for the fact that parents are more interested in the adolescent's companionship than the adolescent is interested in that of the parents is because children at this stage have a greater amount of vitality, associated with their adventurous attitude towards life's experiences. We say "adventurous" because, whether consciously or no, they are marshalling their creative energies to build something out of the raw material of their being. Youth is always interesting because youth is by nature creative. Patterns of activity have not yet been established, prejudices are not yet deep-rooted, while most parents have long been drifting along a course of behavior determined years before. It is commonly understood that most parents wish to live their lives over again in the lives of their children, hoping to compensate for past mistakes and weaknesses of their own, but the strongest *emotional* attraction to the companionship of one's growing children is probably that of the child's creative vitality. We might even describe this situation as one of the inevitable psychological difficulties of family life, except for those rare instances where the parents are more adventurous and creative than their children, and consequently filled with an even greater vitality. But the most serious difficulty in many homes is not because such a problem exists, but rather because disharmony is intensified by a parent's poorly conceived efforts to persuade the child that he or she "should" be in constant family attendance.

The child who *spontaneously wishes* to share many hours and many thoughts with his mother and father is usually the child who has been enabled to feel perfectly free about where he chooses to spend his time, aside from whatever work may be legitimately considered the child's contribution to the maintenance of the family economy. Of course, it is easy to understand why parents are afraid to relax the psychological pressure which makes their children feel obligated to spend time at home, because to remove this insistence would, in many instances, result in the child being away from home almost all the time. But for courageous parents, this is still the most satisfactory method, if it is practiced by one who also realizes that he must be a sufficiently interesting human being to *attract* the child's companionship.

Probably few parents feel that they are in any way guilty of exerting psychological pressure upon their children, but it is equally true that very few parents are free from this guilt. We must remember that it does not matter how carefully we word our arguments to the child or how many reasons we can devise for requesting the child's presence in the home. The boy or girl may actually *want* to be dutiful and kind to his mother and father, and he may not rebel in any overt way, but he will yet be influenced both by the "pressure" and by his own desire to escape possessiveness. He is, after all, a human being, and every human being is like this.

We have more than once suggested the value

of a "contract theory of education" as applying to family relationships. If the child can feel that he thoroughly understands what the parent considers his definite obligations to the maintenance of the home, and if he feels that he is performing these obligations adequately, he is no longer lost in that sea of intangibles wherein possessiveness and psychological coercion often flow as dominant currents. He is free to think and *feel* as he likes, after he has lived up to his part of the bargain. And *if* he becomes free in this fashion, the first step has been taken toward making possible a spontaneous wish for more intimate association with his parents.

The desire for "freedom" in human relationships is not purely selfish. It must be based upon an intuitive recognition that spontaneous gifts of friendship and of assistance of all sorts are the most worth giving, and that they cannot be given if "expected." Even in our mass-production schools, the best "education" is often achieved after school hours, with the few *who seek their teachers* because of independent inclination. This becomes particularly noticeable at the collegiate level, and corresponds to the adolescent relationship in the home.

Most parents are never satisfied with the work around home contributed by their children, nor with the time spent in the bosom of the family—because their primary desire is to have the child absolutely interested in the parents. A definite agreement mutually reached by the parent and adolescent as to what will constitute the young one's legitimate obligations to the home accomplishes something else which is also very important for the child. It enables him to feel "on top" of at least one segment of his increasingly complicated life. He knows what he is giving and what he is receiving, and the relationship between the two, and can, with normal effort, feel that he is doing a satisfactory job. But if something is wrong in his relationship to his family— if he feels that his parents always want more than he feels he can give them—he will carry a small emotional disturbance around with him wherever he goes. All of us need our psychological energies intact, so that we can throw the full force of our concentration upon the new areas of experience constantly opening up in our lives. But the child who feels that his parents want emotional reactions from him which he cannot spontaneously supply will resemble the adult who suffers from an unhappy marriage relationship.

Children are not "better" than their parents. The parents have the same moral capacity, and the same capacity to be interesting to others as does the child. Yet the child must have the freedom to discover this, must seek out the parent because his desire moves him more strongly in this direction than in any other, if an equality of appreciative feeling can ever be expected to appear. Of course, as already indicated, this is not just a parent-child problem. It is a problem which has to do with many employers, with many brothers and sisters, with many wives and husbands. Every form of psychological pressure based upon the premise that we can cajole others into agreeing with our conception of how they "should" feel about us is a mistake, and deepens whatever rifts have already prohibited full love or companionship. We have to stop deciding how others should feel about us, and concentrate upon the constructiveness and fairness of our own feelings toward them.

FRONTIERS

Man—Forerunner of the Apes

LAST January, in a discussion of the problems of human evolution, we named the late Dr. Henry Fairfield Osborn as being "the only distinguished opponent of the ape-human theory of the origin of man." (MANAS, Jan. 19, 1949.) We have now to report that this statement was in error, and that Dr. Frederic Wood Jones, professor of human and comparative anatomy in the Royal College of Surgeons in England, has held and expressed views similar to those of Dr. Osborn for the past thirty years.

It may seem presumptuous for anyone without a special background in anthropology to recommend Dr. Jones's latest book, *Hallmarks of Mankind,* as marking a revolutionary advance in that branch of science. We dare to do so for the reason that this volume makes no revelation of new facts that have been unearthed, but deals, rather, with facts most of which have long been known, its value being in the explanation of why and how the meaning of these facts has been suppressed for so many years. Illustrious names of nineteenth-century science appear as frequently in this book as those of present-day investigators. It is notably devoid of polemical flourish, although its occasional irony will please the reader who has always felt a little oppressed by the great show of certainty on the part of some scientists regarding the descent of man from apish ancestors.

Hallmarks of Mankind belongs in the library of everyone who is seriously concerned with the nature and origin of the human species. It will also interest those who recognize the part played by prejudice and controversy in the shaping of supposedly scientific theory. For both these reasons, the book should have a place beside Dr. Osborn's article in *Science* for May 20, 1927, "Recent Discoveries Relating to the Origin and Antiquity of Man," and Franz Weidenreich's slender volume, *Apes, Giants and Man,* published by the University of Chicago Press in 1946. The American publisher of *Hallmarks of Mankind is* Williams & Wilkins, of Baltimore, Md., from whom it may be obtained at $2.50.

Dr. Jones presents two lectures devoted to the two main contentions of his scientific career:

> The first is that, considered solely from the point of view of structure, Man is an extremely primitive type, and the second that, though more primitive in basal structure than the living monkeys and apes, Man has his own remarkable structural specialisations that distinguish him from all other Mammals and appear to be very ancient hallmarks.

In his first lecture, Dr. Jones formulates eight "propositions" in which he generalizes all the major claims leading to the view that man is descended from the anthropoid apes, or is at least their close relative. Then, step by step, he presents anatomical evidence to show that the propositions are insupportable. While the book is well within the comprehension of the intelligent reader, it is almost impossible to summarize, so far as the evidence against these propositions is concerned. The importance of this evidence, however, is indicated by the propositions themselves, of which number five, for example, maintains that the Anthropoid Apes evolved from the Catarrhine or Old World Monkeys. Dr. Jones shows the diiliculty in maintaining this claim by pointing out that the existing Old World monkeys are possessed of specialized anatomical characteristics which are either absent or relatively undeveloped in the Anthro*poidea.* If the *Anthropoidea* descended from the Catarrhine monkeys, they would certainly exhibit the traits which are peculiar to their ancestors. As Dr. Jones says:

> If we apply, without prejudice, the criteria that are employed generally in the classification of living things, we can only conclude that the *Anthropomorpha* do not represent the summit of the catarrhine radiation but are survivors of more conservative stocks that arose nearer to its base.

Proposition six asserts that the human stock in turn arose from "a catarrhine radiation" to

which the anthropoid apes also have kinship. Here, the evidence provided by anatomy again suggests the contrary, for man has even less traits in common with the catarrhine monkeys than the anthropoids. "If," writes Dr. Jones, "we are to judge Man as a Catarrhine, we are compelled to admit that, just as the Anthropoid Apes are less completely developed Catarrhines than are the monkeys and cynomorph apes, so is Man a less completely developed Catarrhine than are any of the existing Anthropoid Apes." The conclusion, therefore, is the same—that the original ancestors of man differentiated from the hypothetical common stem before the anthropoid apes acquired such few Catarrhine specializations as they possess.

In other words, if man is an ape or any sort of monkey at all, he is the most primitive monkey of the lot, for they all have specialized anatomical developments which he lacks. Or, to phrase the conclusion less cynically, man had his own line of organic evolution, independent of others, "before the ancestral stocks of the existing Anthropoid Apes had been developed."

Dr. Jones is not at all persuaded by the rhetoric of Thomas Huxley on behalf of the Darwinian version of the origin of man. He is a careful student of the history of evolutionary theory and his pages are dotted with dry notations of the distortions of anatomical fact by Darwin's supporters. Several forceful pages are given to disproving the claim that man gradually arose from the stooping posture of the ape to his present uprightness. Dr. Jones writes:

> There is no halfway stage in posture. It would be better to discard all the drawings that depict the early progenitors of Man as slouching brutes carrying themselves in postures incompatible with the dictates of gravity, and to relegate to oblivion all the speculations and theories concerning the gradual rise of Man from a quadrupedal pronograde to a bipedal orthograde posture.

Dr. Jones has no moralistic animus against the apeorigin theory. His sympathies are entirely with the facts of anatomy and Dollo's Law of Irreversability. He doesn't see how men and apes can be genetically related when many aspects of the development of human and simian feet are carried out in opposed directions. The human foot, he says, "is distinguished by the retention of certain primitive mammalian muscles, lost in whole or in part by all monkeys, and Anthropoid Apes." Dollo's dictum is that evolution is never reversed, that lost organs are never regained, so that it is difficult to see how man can be derived from the apes without dispensing with Dollo's law.

Dr. Jones is similarly impressed by the anatomical evidence that ape evolution seems to have been away from rather than toward the primeval human type, and he warns against supposing that the extremely early fossil apes discovered in South Africa were on the way to becoming men, simply because they had not yet fully become apes. The evidence, he says, is rather that they were merely apes who had not yet attained "all the specialisations of their modern representatives."

What Dr. Jones himself thinks about the evolution of man is not very extensively set forth, but of one thing he is sure: the forms of the ancestors of man, if they are ever discovered, "will be utterly unlike the slouching, hairy ape men of which some have dreamed and of which they have made casts and pictures during their waking hours; and they will be found in geological strata antedating the heyday of the great apes."