

THE MEANING OF WORLD REVOLUTION

WORLD REVOLUTION is a sonorous term covering a multitude of sins and horrors. In its semantic definition, it refers to a definite cycle of human progress, involving many regional and local revolutions. But for the latter to gather themselves into a larger cycle of world revolution, a definite and universal direction of human progress is needed, and this, for the purposes of the present discussion, was historically provided by the birth of the political ideology of the individual, shortly after the close of the Middle Ages in Europe.

The new ideology of the individual shaped the first forms of modern democracy, under which a large portion of mankind still lives, in association with the development of the modern industrial era. The present phase of world revolution is marked by the attempt of modern man to progress through and beyond the industrial era—to make the transition from an industrial to what may be called a *cultural* civilization.

In the revival of learning at the close of the Middle Ages—in the passing of feudalism and the emergence of the political or social individual—the World Revolution had its roots. With the advent of the political individual—bringing finally a definite, though limited, freedom of conscience and thought and action—man set his feet upon a road marked by an endless amount of violence and confusion, but with no divergence, no turning back. The cultural values developed since the beginning of the World Revolution have been for the most part social values involving more economic and political freedom than was heretofore possessed. One result of this instinctive urge for social improvement was, of course, democracy, which, in theory, at least, made the individual, instead of the king, legally supreme. The freed individual immediately began to create—as has happened in other historical

periods of emancipation from toil or slavery—but this time, instead of a new culture or art, he created the machine.

Born with democracy, the machine may become the distinctive tool of the World Revolution, of the free individual, and the development and use of the machine are irrevocably bound up with the emergence of the free individual and the future course of the World Revolution. Early in the twentieth century the growth of democracy was disturbed by reactionary influences eventuating in World War I, which continued the abolition of kings and dynasties and introduced large-scale socialistic experiments, as in Russia and Scandinavia. This was the first machine warfare in human history and the forces which were able to use the machine with the most imagination and effectiveness won the war.

By the beginning of World War II, when democracy was threatened by the revival of the authoritarian state, the machine had almost reached its technical perfection, but it remained in the hands of powerful, self-seeking minorities, and controlled by a feudal economy—far from being the servant of the free individual. Even in this state of perversion, it was still charting the course of the World Revolution. Hitler is the supreme example to date of the exploitation of the machine for personal profit. The hardest taught lesson of the World Revolution is that the modern machine will not be contained in a feudal economy.

Dr. Mortimer Adler of the University of Chicago has estimated that it will take 500 more years of intermittent warfare before the individual is established as the significant unit of society, free from subversion by group domination. Le Comte du Noüy believed that only after hundreds of centuries will man be able to function as a purely

human being, without lapsing into habits of animal instinct. But the emergence of the individual may proceed at a rate more rapid than contemporary man can foresee. Conceivably, not all the factors of this progress are readily discernible.

The advance of this great revolution is nevertheless limited, in that its very existence as a world force is not clearly understood. Like all deeper currents of progress, it is attended by confusion and ignorance, by conflict within conflict, held back by the stubbornness and inertia of a civilization which does not recognize the forces that are urging it on toward freedom and enlightenment. It is the old story of the consciousness of the individual pitted against the expedient defense of custom and tradition. But the fact remains that the energy and direction of world-progress are toward the emergence of the free individual—expressed, today, in the terms of economic emancipation.

The old systems and societies that give no security nor promise of emancipation are everywhere in conflict with the beginnings of new systems more responsive to the needs and functions of the individual. These new systems express the urge of the individual toward economic freedom, and are challenging the old systems sustained by accumulated power and wealth—sustained even in the individual by fear of change, by confusion and doubt, by the hard choice between the known and the unknown.

The phase of that emergence called here the World Revolution follows also a pattern of elemental growth and materialization. It is essentially a process of the consciousness of man taking control over and reshaping the old necessities of his form and structure. This consciousness reveals itself in the minds of a few prescient men, whence it spreads slowly into systems, organizations and civilizations.

The spiritual and political aims of man are natural examples of how human ideals take root and transform themselves slowly into the energy and form of human expression. The revolt of the

individual from his limited existence as economic man and his struggle toward a higher plane of culture are but the continuation and acceleration of an evolution of spiritual ideals into human action. While food, shelter, and clothing still seem to be the basic problems and preoccupations of the majority of mankind, one might say that the human form has now about perfected the mechanical means for supplying its own physical needs, so that, conceivably, the spiritual nature of man is ready to possess the earth and to create new civilizations in a higher image than the old anthropological determinism.

In this process, which may be just beginning, a new world might be born in the same way that a new world was born when men took physical possession of the earth. Tools and energy for the birth of that new world already exist and are only waiting to be used. The first of these tools is the modern machine. The nature of the machine is to produce, and the natural result of its free functioning is to provide economic freedom for every individual living upon the earth. This waits upon the establishment of a system of distribution to match the machine's unlimited power to produce—a system involving the eventual abandonment of the old handicraft system of wages and profits.

Another of these tools is democracy, which creates a real master of the machine and forms the social basis for political and economic freedom. Only in terms of the free individual can the machine function freely. And only by the individual, whether he work in groups or alone, can the transition be made from the economic to the cultural civilization, for it is the function of the individual which finally determines the form and shape of all systems and civilizations.

A third of these tools or foundation-stones for the new world is, of course, religion, which determines the direction and final effectiveness of all human progress. The religion capable of creating a new world cannot be confused with the old religion of theology and organizational

authority which has largely lost its power to create and can only concur or dissent. The moral force capable of directing the free individual will not be stated in terms of creed or conformity, but in the exact and mystically understandable terms of human function.

As the free machine and democracy are essential expressions of human function, so will religion be the highest and most intimate expression of human capacity. This functional aspect of the individual and the machine may be the most striking and basic aspect of the new world. The functional machine will supply all man's physical needs, while the applied realization of his own function, embodied in a new science of relationships, will ultimately relate him to his source, to his fellow man, and to all the forms and forces of his environment.

The new civilization, then, will be built on the foundation stone of a new science of relationships—precisely because the whole moral problem of man is reducible to the basic fact of relationship—relationship to his source, to his fellow beings, and to his environment.

The culture of such a knowledge of relationship, we may think, will be the basis of all future societies and civilizations. Charity, or service, which Christ called the virtue of greatest necessity, would become in such a society the common recognition of relationship and the functional basis of human order.

Thus we come by slow and often tortuous stages, through the evolution of the machine, democracy, and the knowledge of relationship, into the final attainment of a functional world. The method of that evolution is the method of cosmic forces, working themselves out upon the tiny stage of human endeavor. Political and economic freedom, equality, abundance, peace and brotherhood are not human inventions—they are spiritual forces, elements of the nature of man and of the universe. The individuals who fight and die for their attainment are merely the more or less conscious agents of their slow emergence. The

spirit breathes, today, not upon inanimate elements, but upon the soul and mind of man; through the heat and torsions of individual effort, it may bring forth a new world of order and truth.

The World Revolution today—the great wind which sweeps the world—is the intensity of this evolution, in which the individual must become intellectually and emotionally aware of his powers and capacities—of the great worlds of function and fulfillment which await his maturity. To this end, culture may be defined as the apprenticeship of consciousness to the sense of order and function within the individual, leading him to explore the pathway of his fulfillment—what Whitman calls "the rare, cosmical, artist mind, lit with the infinite, [which] alone confronts his manifold and oceanic qualities."

Culture, in a word, is the knowledge of reality, the knowledge the individual must have before he can become universal man.

In art, in science, in human relations, philosophy, metaphysics—man explores reality and relates himself to it. By the effort to extend his consciousness he acquires knowledge, which is power, which transmutes him from the victim of environment to its master and creator. Culture is not only a personal sensitivity to the ultimate freedom of life; it is also compulsion of form and consciousness to attain a complete and unlimited expression. The cultural or creative man is thus a sort of demigod of nature—a Pan or Prospero of the natural world—visualizing the evolution and capacity of form, perceiving and understanding something of its relation to the life-force which creates all form, and by his work clarifying and formulating the relation of spirit to mass.

The violence and confusion of the last 200 years result from the compressed evolution to which man has been subject during this sudden ascent, whose proximate cause is the machine. Like a diver shot up from the depths of the sea, he endures the cramps and spasms of sudden adjustment. It is questionable at times whether he will survive the strain of this adjustment—whether

his physiological and psychological systems will be able to adapt to the new environment. Only a deep faith in universal purpose—belief in a divinely creative evolution—can assure us that man will survive and progress, perhaps from cultural to cosmic man, and, beyond that, to worlds which we cannot at present even glimpse.

The World Revolution may be but the beginning, the early dawn, of a new day. In any event, it signifies the release of man's capacity to a new and higher direction, the beginning of a new pilgrimage on the long road to self-realization. Its progress and effectiveness depend today as much upon the understanding and action of the individual as in the days of Jefferson, Rousseau, Cromwell, or Bolivar. Depending on his understanding of the forces that are working on him—or his lack of it—he can become either the co-creator of his destiny, or the victim of his time. Ignorant of the forces that are loose in his world, he must wait for the momentum of progress to uproot and sweep him along helplessly in its tide. He remains part of that general average which is acted upon only by forces from without—an objective mote rolled and roiled by the stream of history. As in all applied knowledge, understanding precedes control. The data of human experience are the stuff of progress—directed by spiritual forces—shaped and formed by individual action.

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ED MACLEAN

Letter from CENTRAL EUROPE

SALZBURG.—In 1943 the Allies promised solemnly to restore to Austria her full sovereignty within the boundaries of 1938. Austrians are still waiting for the redemption of that promise.

During the last months of World War II, Austria's fate was similar to that of Germany. From the east, the Bolshevik Armies forced their way in the direction of Vienna and took possession of it after weeks of bombing and street-fighting, while the American, British and French forces entered Austrian territory from the West, stopping from time to time.

An old socialist leader, Dr. Karl Renner, who decades ago had been President of the Austrian Republic, went to see one of the Bolshevik commanders about facilities for the population in the occupied area. A short time later, Dr. Renner was commissioned by the Russians to form a provisional government.

The path on which this government tries to advance is filled with all kinds of obstacles. The continuing food shortage in some ways resembles a famine. Part of Austrian industry was destroyed during the war, more was demolished or confiscated by the victors. Thousands of prisoners of war are still held by other countries, while many specialists—as a result of the denazification laws—are obliged to make their living as unskilled labourers. In consequence of two devaluations of currency, people have become penniless. Whatever was built or supported by the Germans during their rule in Austria from 1938 to 1945—private homes, official buildings, factories, power stations and railways—is treated by the victors as "German Property" and appropriated. Just when Austrian railway traffic seemed to reach a state of recovery, the Soviets decided (in November, 1948) that 540 locomotives and more than 5,000 cars must be delivered to Russia; of course the Austrian Railroads had to return to the slow traffic programme which existed soon after the war.

Arrests have not yet stopped. But it seems that the majority of the arrested persons are non-Nazis. Even officials of high rank, serving present Austria, are taken away and vanish forever. The Soviets

invariably pretend that such persons have been spying against Russia, but refuse to supply any documentary proof to the Austrian Government or the Austrian jurisdiction. Meanwhile others say that the arrested persons are wholly innocent.

The attitude of the four occupation powers with regard to the Austrian-German problem is interesting. The USA and the British Control Commission show no special interest. The frontier between the two German-speaking countries is still nearly closed, not even relatives being permitted to visit each other, and all letters are censored.

The policy of the Soviets is variable and may change from one day to the next. Vienna and Berlin are treated in quite different ways. But it would probably be a mistake to connect this fact with an intention to separate the Austrians from the Germans by psychological means. Vienna would be subjected to the same policies as those used in Berlin, should this fit the Soviet conception of advantageous world politics.

Only the French seem to follow certain principles. While they continue to be strict in their occupation zone in Germany, they are exceedingly agreeable in Austria. Their desire to build up lasting friendship between themselves and the Austrians is obvious and their inability to quit the country while the Peace Treaty remains to be concluded is sincerely regretted. To show their amicable feelings, they recently replaced the official French Control Commission with a simpler French Authority in Austria.

In Germany, the engines of the Western and the Eastern express-trains seem to confront each other on the same rail. Austria still offers the chance of a shunt.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW UNDERSTANDING ONE'S TIME

IT was Edmund Wilson's *To the Finland Station* that made us buy a strange book by Jules Michelet, the great French historian of the last century. Few books are as illuminating of the forces which moved through the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as *To the Finland Station*, and of all those whom Wilson discusses, from Vico, to Lenin, Michelet stands out most vividly in our memory. Born the son of a printer in 1798, Michelet grew up amid the turmoil left by the French Revolution, and he lived until 1874, through long, tumultuous years. As he lived in history, he wrote it—a history of France in eighteen volumes.

Wilson says that Michelet seems more like the last great man of letters of the Renaissance than a nineteenth-century scholar. It is certain that he is on fire with ideas. Michelet's history is alive with the explosive forces of the human ferment; he has been called a "polemicist," one who made his books into tracts to push his prejudices, but we think he was inhabited by an incalculable intellectual vitality and a passion for human freedom. In reading Michelet, you encounter not a scholar but a man. Wilson is a good introduction to Michelet, the early chapters of *To the Finland Station* seeming to possess themselves of the impact of Michelet's genius. Wilson writes:

The mature Michelet is a strange phenomenon. He is in many ways more comparable to a novelist like Balzac than to the ordinary historian. He had the novelist's social interest and grasp of character, the poet's imagination and passion. All this, by some unique combination of chances, instead of exercising itself on contemporary life, had been turned backward upon history and was united with a scientific appetite for facts which drove him into arduous researches.

Eleven of the eighteen volumes of Michelet's history are translated into English, and various other works. The book we have is *Satanism and Witchcraft*, apparently an overflow from the material gathered for the history of the Middle Ages. In it, Michelet doesn't side with the witches and sorcerers, but it is plain that they have more of his sympathy than their orthodox persecutors.

Michelet fills this small volume with horrors copied out of documents. It is as though all Europe

was a death-camp for three hundred years or more—the centuries in which black-robed inquisitors sought out their screaming victims, terrified them into insanity, tortured them, burned and immured them. Michelet never gets used to these crimes. He is perpetually agast.

He treats the development of witchcraft as the return of alienated human beings to pagan Mother Nature. The hopeless and oppressed peasants of Europe reached a point of desperation where they would seek any master other than the ones approved by the society which enslaved them—even the Devil himself. The early Christians, Michelet relates, held Nature accursed. "They condemn her as a whole and in every part, going so far as to see Evil incarnate, the Demon himself, in a flower." So there was little to separate one who sought natural secrets from the taint of diabolism. When, in 1527, Paracelsus burned the entire pharmacopoeia of his time, he asserted that sorceresses had taught him all he knew.

Writing of the unspeakable cruelty with which those accused of witchcraft were treated, Michelet says:

One is filled with amazement to see all these widely different epochs, all these men of varying cultivation, unable to make one step in advance. But the explanation is simple; they were one and all arrested, let us rather say, blinded, hopelessly intoxicated and made cruel savages of, by the poison their first principle, the doctrine of Original Sin. This is the fundamental dogma of universal injustice: "All lost for one alone, not only punished but deserving punishment, undone even before they were born and desperately wicked, dead to God from the beginning. The babe at its mother's breast is a damned soul already."

Who says so? All do, even Bossuet. A Roman theologian of weight, Spina, Master of the Sacred Palace, formulates the doctrine in precise words: "Why does God permit the death of the innocent? He does so justly. For if they do not die by reason of the sins they have committed, yet they are guilty of death by reason of original sin."

From this monstrous theory two consequences follow, in justice and logic. The judge is always sure of doing justice; anyone brought before him is inevitably guilty, and if he defends himself, doubly guilty. No cause for justice to sweat, and rack its

brains in order to distinguish true and false; in every case the decision is a foregone conclusion.

Michelet sums up:

From when does the Sorceress date? I answer unhesitatingly, "From the ages of despair."

From the profound despair the World owed to the Church. I say again unhesitatingly, "The Sorceress is the Church's crime."

There were of course pagan enchanters, sibyls and seeresses, in ancient times, but Michelet is careful to show that the deadly enmity of the good, such as characterized witchcraft in some of its stages, was present hardly at all in the earlier historical periods to which the rites of witchcraft are traced. Medieval diabolism only reflected the hideousness of medieval dogma.

It is an ugly subject that Michelet treats, yet even this he makes instinct with his warm humanity. Always, he is trying to explain, to incarnate his mind within the mind of the dark age of superstition and to communicate its living emotion in the terms of rational understanding. The essence of his explanation, we think, has to do with the behavior of submerged human beings—men and women alienated from society. There are various forces in the world, some called good, some called bad. When, for a considerable number of people, the forces called good seem worse in their effect on life than the "bad" forces, diabolism, of one sort or another, becomes the religion of those people. In the Middle Ages, they became witches and wizards. In the nineteenth century, they became nihilists, terrorists.

The useful thing to do, now, of course, is to attempt a comparison of the period treated by Michelet with our own. To do this without distorting the facts would be very difficult, even though certain parallels are obvious enough. The present epoch is uneven and full of contradictory forces. There is no one paramount institution like the medieval church. The oppressions are different—much subtler, in some respects. The alienation is less easy to trace from cause to effect. One could say that the more fanatical of the Nazis created an organization to represent their alienation from Western liberal democracy. Some descriptions of contemporary Soviet society convey similar impressions. But from the viewpoint of modern

civilization as a whole, it can be said only that a slowly rising psychological pressure of an indefinable nature is harassing human beings and engendering an uneasy distrust of things as they are. In other words, people have no great hopes about the future. Many men would be willing to settle for less than half of what they would have hoped for, twenty years ago.

In our society, unlike the medieval society, there is really no top dog. There are people occupying positions which are supposed to be top-dog positions, and would be, if the people in them could stop worrying. But they can't. Only philosophers can stop worrying, these days. Philosophers and the insane have found the cure for worry, but the rest of us still have to figure things out.

Usually, in comparisons of the medieval period and modern times, it is said that while the Middle Ages were "static" and unprogressive, the present is eagerly seeking growth. We wonder if this is still true. It was true for several centuries, but the world seems frozen by fear of the unknown, these days. Technical advance will continue, no doubt, but there can be no real progress without a vision of the future in the minds of many men—a vision tangibly connected with some practical grasp of the means of bringing it about. So, in this sense, the modern world has reached a static condition, and, for most people, a condition inherently oppressive to their personal hopes and efforts toward a better life.

COMMENTARY AFFIRMATIVE THINKING

IN this age of criticism and self-consciousness, a special sort of courage is needed in order to do constructive thinking. The intelligence of the time is sharply analytical, often to the extent of dissolving all the subtleties of human conviction, making even its good seem pointless and unnecessary. We hear, endlessly, that the business of the responsible individual is to learn, not "what," but "how," to think, and while the value of this rule cannot be gainsaid, there are times when the content of thought is at least as important as the method of thinking. In any event, the vitality of thought arises from its substance, and not from its form.

This week's lead article, for example, embodies a positive vision of which some minds habitually devoted to "critical" thinking would be incapable. The article contains assumptions about the nature of things—assumptions which are intuitive propositions of the author. There is the idea that the aspirations of mankind are *natural forces*, working their way, through obstacles, to a higher civilization. The article also suggests a great periodicity in human affairs—that there are plateaus of attainment for man, followed by steep ascents, and that these both are part of the natural order of evolution.

The machine, in this article, is conceived as a natural accessory to man's social development—a cultural mutation, one might say, bringing new problems of adaptation and requiring conscious evolutionary ingenuity.

This author sets the human problem in specific terms, by means of an ardent affirmation, and we should like to suggest that without such affirmations to work with, criticism is a vain and sterile thing. Affirmations are evocative of the creative energies of man. Movements are born, cultures are originated, civilizations are evolved, by men who think positive thoughts, men who affirm. Then, after a cycle of growth and of

maturity, the rigidities of age overtake the institutional structures which men of vision once inspired. The affirmations of youth become the spiritless commonplaces of men who remember, but who fear to dream.

It is then that new affirmation is needed, that the values of criticism need to be incorporated with, but subordinated to, another vision of human possibility. And there should be hospitality for the thinking of men who are trying to see the future—for the men who, in an age of extreme criticism, are trying to affirm.

CHILDREN . . . and Ourselves

ONE of the latest developments in "progressive" elementary school teaching focusses in the phrase, "reading readiness," meaning the child's capacity for converting words, phrases, and sentences into *ideas*. It is the worthy intention of teachers who try to take "reading readiness" into account to prevent children from reading or saying things from a purely imitative impulsion. In the past, teachers have often discovered that some of their "best readers" could rush accurately through a passage without having any notion of its meaning. And so those who talk about "reading readiness" want to be sure that verbal symbols do not become ends in themselves, and that reading in class which *sounds* capable will not be confused with reading which *is* capable.

From the standpoint of the teacher in school, so far so good. But where does reading readiness come from? First of all, there is abundant indication that a child's capacity for learning does not come entirely from environment. Each child has a different cycle of maturation in respect to mental facility—which might conceivably be related to home environment—and each child has individual moral and mental capacities which cannot be altogether explained in terms of home environment. (See "The Case that Rocked New Jersey," this Department, MANAS, Dec. 29.) Although we cannot expect environment to determine a child's character or intellect, we do know that it is exceedingly important to recognize that there are different kinds of environment. For instance, over and beyond the income-bracket of the family, the formal education received by the parents, and the parents' personal morality or immorality, there is the qualitative field of mental environment. What is the characteristic level of thought conveyed by the everyday verbal expressions in the home? What sort of mental stimulation provides the circumstances out of which conversation is made—what types of books are read, what radio programs and motion

pictures are habitually chosen? Here, in this area of mental environment, are the materials out of which each individual child may develop or fail to develop the greatest reading readiness possible in his particular case. The part played by the parents in creating this environment is often overlooked.

The parents who display a genuine interest in the reading of books which they feel to be educative cannot fail to provide a beneficial mental atmosphere for their growing children. Even in the reading of fiction, parents may feel that some authors have a worthwhile intention, and have felt some sort of educative responsibility in the construction of their plot. Writers who are simply technicians, who are sensualists or who are merely negative and cynical in their attitudes do not undertake to supply their reading audience with useful insights on the human drama. Almost without exception, the writers of murder mysteries fall into this dubious category. But if the parents select very carefully what they read with an eye to its ultimate value, something in their attitude may be transmitted to the children. A parent may discover in the child's own terms what it is that interests him about what he has read. Without making any effort to "get" the child to read, a curiosity may be fostered that the child will attempt to satisfy by looking at the words on the pages or by opening the book when he is unable to think of anything else to do. It is entirely possible for this sort of introduction to literature to lead to the beginning of a valuable self-education, the kind which is furthered by an avidity for knowledge and understanding, assisted by the simple expedient of a dictionary. The learning of new words, once its fascination has been introduced by the parents, may become part of the natural growth of the child, carried on with the eagerness of an unfolding mind.

It seems to us that one dimension may have been overlooked by the enthusiasts of the "reading readiness" theory—the idea that the increase of each child's understanding flows from imagination. Imagination may always proceed a little ahead of

complete intellectual control. We think it is justifiable to speculate that Lincoln, in his lonely and untutored vigils with many different books, read a great many things he did not completely understand, but in which he *sensed* the general meaning. Perhaps, at times, Lincoln, as most of us have, aided himself even when he completely misconceived the intention of an author. As children, we may have found on the printed page some focus for our present thoughts, and, in the final analysis, only what comes from our own thought-stimulation is of value. A reading habit that is simply an automatic attention to detail is a habit which may paralyze the imagination, no matter how accurately the words of the author may be repeated at a later date. So it seems probable that parents should not be afraid to let their children *read to themselves as* much and as often as they will, and without worrying about the child's developing a false sense of understanding. Ultimately, the child must find his own way in his world, just as the parents must practice self-reliance in theirs.

It is natural that teachers should be particularly concerned about reading without a sense of meaning, for in the classroom a formal stimulation rather than a natural one is employed. Class readers are often working for an admired performance in public; the solitary reader, at least the young solitary reader, has no ulterior motive. If he likes to read, and if he reads a page which means a lot to him, this does not signify that his "reading readiness" is being sabotaged just because he does not thoroughly understand it. As a matter of fact, quite an argument could be advanced for no one reading anything he can understand completely. The tendency to have everything defined in specific terms is in accord with the over-emphasis on the technical aspects of modern civilization, but it does not contribute to the awakening of the latent imaginative and intuitive faculties of children. Words, as we said, are a focus for thought, and even new words are always a fine thing to have around.

FRONTIERS

"Separateness, Exclusion, Isolation"

THE SHAME OF THE STATES, by Albert Deutsch (Harcourt, Brace, \$3.00) is a book that should be read by everyone who has a conscientious interest in the typical problems of modern democracy. It is a concise description of the conditions in the state-operated mental hospitals of the United States. While wondering what to say about these conditions, further than that they are unspeakably bad, we came across a paragraph by Dr. Kenneth E. Appel, of the Pennsylvania Hospital Medical School, which seems to sum up the idea we were looking for:

Many people have been crushed by our materialistic, schizophrenic civilization—schizophrenic, because it has emphasized separateness, exclusion, isolation, instead of relatedness, wholeness, balance, and cooperation. Education has been chiefly in specialties, with little training for citizenship, grounding in the values of life, the relationships of people, communities or nations. There is insufficient instruction on the sources of conflict and dissatisfaction in oneself and others, with inadequate cultivation of responsibility to others and to social "causes." (*Science*, Nov. 26, 1948.)

Mr. Deutsch writes about the people who have been "crushed" by our civilization, but he does not tell us much about why we have such a civilization. For this reason, the solution he offers at the end seems rhetorical and weak. But this is not a serious criticism of *The Shame of the States*, whose merit is more in the drama of its indictment than in any proposed cure. It is good specialized reporting and pretends to little else.

Mr. Deutsch visited the mental hospitals of a number of states, often with a photographer. He was usually welcomed by the directors of these institutions as a man who might help to arouse public opinion on behalf of their miserable charges. In many respects, public administrators can act only with effective public support.

Dr. Karl Menninger, who contributes the Introduction to *The Shame of the States*, says on behalf of the psychiatric profession:

It is only perplexing to us that thousands upon thousands of people do not spontaneously rise up and put a stop to this blot on our civilization. The facts have been put before the public time after time, but as yet the movement to eradicate the evil has scarcely more than begun.

What evil? In one of his chapters, Mr. Deutsch reassures us that we are not like the Nazis who put to death at least 275,000 "lunatics" and "cripples" as "useless eaters." That is not our idea of public welfare. We put them away in hospitals and forget about them. As Deutsch says:

We do not kill off "insane" people coldly as a matter of official state policy. We do not kill them deliberately. We do it by neglect.

The author takes his readers on a personally conducted tour through several of the larger and better known state institutions. There is Byberry, not far from Philadelphia, with 6,100 patients. The normal capacity of this state hospital for mental diseases is 3,400. While minimum standards of the American Psychiatric Association call for thirty-four physicians in an institution of this size, Mr. Deutsch found only fourteen actually on the staff. Instead of the 200 nurses recommended by the APA, forty-one were on duty. There were 180 attendants on the Byberry payroll, instead of the needed 1,100. At Byberry Deutsch saw "hundreds of patients living under leaky roofs, surrounded by moldy decaying walls, and sprawling on rotting floors for want of seats or benches." Children in their early teens mingled with adults in all stages of mental deterioration. Some of these children had no serious mental disorder, but were sent to Byberry because Pennsylvania had no proper facilities for their care. In the incontinent ward, 300 male patients dully stand, squat or sprawl, all day long in a bare room. They are always naked, winter and summer. Deutsch found the place "like a scene from Dante's Inferno," and asks: "Could a truly

civilized community permit humans to be reduced to such animal-like level?" These conditions prevailed at a time when the State of Pennsylvania was building up a wartime treasury surplus of \$200,000,000, and was offering state hospital attendants \$69 a month plus maintenance.

Next stop on the tour is the Cleveland (Ohio) State Hospital for mental patients. In 1944 a Grand jury investigation brought charges that Cleveland patients had died after violent attacks by attendants or other patients. Assaults on patients were frequent, the weapons being strap buckles, metal plated shoes, and wet towels used for "choking." It was said that the hospital was run like a penal institution where the mentally ill were regarded as criminals and subhumans undeserving of any human rights or careful medical care. After this exposé, Deutsch found the Cleveland Hospital "halfway between a house of horrors and a decent asylum." The superintendent told him: "We have all we can do right now to turn this into a decent custodial institution. We haven't even started to give these patients adequate medical care." Three of the nine buildings used by the hospital for patients' living quarters were years ago condemned by a state authority as unfit for human habitation. When Deutsch was there, there was a total of 2,750 patients. The uncondemned buildings have an actual bed capacity of 1,800. The hospital has a long waiting list of applicants for admission. Pay for attendants at Cleveland was \$70 a month, and turnover in attendant employment averaged 100 per cent every ten months. "Ohio" says Mr. Deutsch, "with a \$125,000,000 surplus in its treasury, was spending less than ten cents a meal for its mental hospital patients."

The story of New York's institutions is just as grim, or grimmer, if you consider the volume and "pace" of affairs in the Empire State. In New York, one third of the state's total operating budget is earmarked for use by psychiatric institutions. (The mental hospitals of other states have costs in similar proportion.) Mr. Deutsch

visited Manhattan State Hospital on Ward's Island in the East River. Some sixty per cent of the patients there are over sixty years old. One in six dies every year. Crotchety old folk, in senile deterioration, swell the hospital's total to 4,000 patients. They are old, feeble, eccentric, unable to care for themselves, rather than "insane." These people are poured into the state's mental hospitals by poor families living in cramped city apartments. Now they live in an institution of which some buildings date back to Civil War days. It was condemned in 1933, ordered to be totally abandoned in 1943 by the State Legislature, but the war and lack of facilities elsewhere in the state postponed the abandonment plan until 1948. Now it is to be rebuilt gradually, on a smaller scale.

Conditions in this institution are probably typical of many others. One doctor at Manhattan State, says Mr. Deutsch, was supposed to care for more than 800 patients, spread over three different buildings, with many of them in suicidal and homicidal wards. He continues:

The average doctor at Manhattan State Hospital, I was told, spends about half his time in paper work—checking patients in and out, making up requisition orders in triplicate and quadruplicate, counting clothes, bed sheets, towels, writing up case reports, accident reports, death certificates, etc. On Sundays only one physician was left in charge of a total of 2,500 patients spread over 32 wards. Besides the impossible task of making rounds on all these wards, the Sunday physician had to see visitors and attend to necessary paper work.

According to regulations in New York, each patient is supposed to be interviewed at least twice a year. Doctors told Mr. Deutsch of patients who had not been interviewed for as long as five years. Many able-bodied patients work for the institution eight hours a day. They are given no pay, but get extra tobacco and candy. In some state hospitals, this sort of thing is called "industrial therapy."

Mr. Deutsch arrived at the Napa State Hospital in California during a Grand Jury

investigation of four attendants accused of beating to death a disturbed Navy veteran of World War II. The veteran died of internal hemorrhages on the night of his arrival at the hospital, and an autopsy showed thirty bruises on his body. Faced with a choice between Chino, model state prison, and Napa, Deutsch would choose Chino for a place to stay.

Mr. Deutsch visited other hospitals—one in Detroit, one in Georgia, and he has much good to say about the Brooklyn State Hospital, where he found enough doctors and a superintendent with a strong aversion to "restraint." Dr. Bellinger of Brooklyn State requires a personal explanation for every patient placed in some restraining device, and when he suspects brutality he calls the district attorney. He visits every ward himself at least once a week. Mr. Deutsch seems to be of the view that if you are going to lose your mind, the best place to do it is in Brooklyn—where the mental patient "gets a break."

Mr. Deutsch has written an important book on a subject he knows thoroughly—his *Mentally Ill in America: Their Care and Treatment* (1937) is a standard work in American psychiatry. He writes about what is wrong with our mental hospitals without exaggeration—none is needed!—and finds the "system" of state care responsible for prevailing conditions rather than any class of individuals or group. He describes the shortcomings of the state system and makes his recommendations for reform. But of course, such changes will take place only at the demand of the public, and no one knows when that demand will be forthcoming.

The real question is twofold: *Why* are so many people in the United States mentally ill—one out of every seventeen is destined to spend a part or all his life in a state mental hospital—and *why* are so few Americans informed or concerned about the conditions under which mental patients wither, suffer and often die?

Dr. Appel gave the answer in general terms: our civilization is itself afflicted by a kind of

insanity—we split ourselves off from everything but our personal interests; we emphasize "separateness, exclusion, isolation, instead of relatedness, wholeness, balance, and cooperation." But why, again, do we behave in this way? Where, how, when, does this schooling in cruelty begin? We need books, many of them, that will provide the answers to such questions.