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AMERICAN CULTURE

THE Founding Fathers of the United States were not modern "sociologists" and they seldom if ever used the word "culture" in its present-day scientific meaning. It is even possible that they would not have liked very much the feeling of this word, as it is used by modern sociologists, for the reason that, like most of the words in the scientific vocabulary, it suggests that the one who uses it is somehow "set apart" from the hopes and intensities of human life. Scientists are, or try to be, "objective." And to be objective is commonly taken to mean—even though it need not—that the investigator is indifferent toward the values involved in the thing that is studied.

There are sociologists, of course, who feel a certain distaste for this sort of objectivity in connection with the lives of human beings. The sympathies of such scientists frequently break through the colorless, analytical language of their specialty, making it seem as though they are sometimes talking about human beings like ourselves —people who are trying to fulfill some purpose in their lives—and sometimes not. Eventually, perhaps, sociologists of this sort will evolve a way of writing and thinking which will have less contradictions in it—in which the terms representing *causation* in human affairs will always leave psychological room for moral freedom. Today, all the numerous ways we have of saying that a man is "conditioned" by his environment or his heredity imply that *he is* made of some kind of plastic material that is molded by external forces. We need words with less of a totalitarian impact in relation to the problems of human behavior—words that will mean that a man is *affected* by these influences, and that they present him with various decisions. If we fail to develop a sociological vocabulary of this sort, our scientists will continue to be helpless in the face of the massive conditioning forces of our time. They will submit, and they will advise us to submit, even though, in some "unconditioned" aspect of their being, they will not like at all what they advise us to submit to. They will not be able, as scientists, to tell us anything else because they have no concepts, no vocabulary, no grammar, of the spirit of human freedom.

The Founding Fathers, however, were "pre-scientific" with respect to the social sciences. When they thought of the future of the United States, it was not as the development of a society of human guinea pigs, animated by certain "drives," beset by particular climatic and geographic conditions. They were patriots, and more than patriots—men who saw in their mind's eye a vision of illimitable possibilities for the human race. One difference—perhaps the major difference—between the outlook of the Founding Fathers on the future and the so-called "scientific" way of looking at man is in the fact that they regarded human ideals as the shaping cause of human history. They had faith in men who are animated by high purposes, and being themselves men animated by high purposes, they had no reason to doubt their faith.

It is a standing reproach to our own time that, in these days, almost no one looks up the Founding Fathers except for the purpose of finding some quotation to bolster a partisan cause. The fact is that we don't really know what the Founding Fathers would do in or about our world. Maybe Alexander Hamilton would join the Republican Party, and maybe he wouldn't. Maybe Thomas Paine would find himself a place among the respectable liberals of our time, but it seems as likely that he would line up with Garry Davis. Paine was a heretic in the eighteenth century, and he might turn out to be one in the twentieth century. He did say, "The world is my country," and that is what Garry Davis is saying, today.

Unlike modern scholars, the Founding Fathers aimed to be makers of culture rather than mere students of its traits. With hardly an exception, they wrote of the need of American culture to have an independent evolution. Franklin set the keynote of this hoped-for growth:

All things have their season, and with young countries as with young men, you must curb their fancy to strengthen their judgment.... To America, one schoolmaster is worth a dozen poets, and the invention of a machine or the improvement of an implement is of more importance than a masterpiece of Raphael. . . . Nothing is good or beautiful but in the measure that it is useful: yet all things have a utility under particular circumstances. Thus poetry, painting, music (and the stage as their embodiment) are all necessary and proper gratifications of a refined state of society but objectionable at an earlier period, since their cultivation would make a taste for their enjoyment precede its means.

Washington took a similar view, remarking that "only arts of a practical nature would for a time be esteemed" in the United States. A lover of the drama, he hoped for its progress simply as "a chief refiner" of the people. It would, he said, "advance the interests of private and political virtue . . . and have a tendency to polish the manners and habits of society." Nor did Jefferson look forward to an intellectual elite. "We have," he wrote in 1813, "no distinct class of *literati* in this country," and at the end of his life he observed of American literature: "Now and then a strong mind arises, and at its intervals of leisure from business emits a flash of light. But the first object of young societies is bread and covering." Jefferson's view of letters was practical. The Declaration of Independence, he said, was "to place before mankind the common sense of the subject in terms so plain as to command their assent." John Adams spoke of a taste for the fine arts as an "agreeable accomplishment," but he argued that most artists sought reputation—that the arts had sprung from luxury, had been prostituted by despotism, and were of no use to a young nation. "The age of painting," he said, "has not yet arrived in this country, and I hope it will not arrive very soon."

This alienation from the European tradition was much more than an enmity toward the English oppressor. America, said her earliest thinkers, must make her own models for culture. As Philip Freneau declaimed against Europe in his *Literary Importations* (1786):

> Can we never be thought to have learning or grace
> Unless it be brought from that horrible place
> Where tyranny reigns with her impudent face?

And as Noah Webster wrote:

> . . . this country must, at some future time, be as distinguished by the superiority of her literary improvements as she is already by the liberality of her civil and ecclesiastical institutions. Europe is grown old in folly, corruption, and tyrannyin that country laws are perverted, manners are licentious, literature is declining, and human nature is debased. For America in her infancy to adopt the present maxims of the old world would be to stamp the wrinkle of decrepit age upon the bloom of youth, and to plant the seed of decay in a vigorous constitution.

The planners of a national system of American education quoted in Allen Hansen's *Liberalism and American Education in the Eighteenth Century* have all the same perspective and grasp of the needs of the young country. Always there is the contrast with Europe, the determination to preserve the new beginning of the United States through self-reliance and through independent education. The seeds of what later was to be called "pragmatism," and the learn-by-doing theory of education are plainly evident in these early plans. There is recognition, also, of the heavy hands which social institutions lay upon the growth of the human community, and speculation concerning the possibility of devising institutions that will be self-correcting—which will not harden into rigid restraints upon the future.

A reading of the Hansen book, of Charles A. Beard's *Rise of American Civilization,* of Vernon

Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought*, of Merle Curti's *Growth of American Thought*, and, best of all, of Constance Rourke's *Roots of American Culture*, gives breadth and substance to the idea of the American Dream—and even a measure of justification to a kind of folk mysticism concerning the birth of the American Republic. Constance Rourke, it seems, was one of the few students of American culture who have felt that a distinctive surge of originality and of potential greatness found release in that event. Speaking of the ideas of the Founders, she writes:

> The concern of Franklin, Washington, Jefferson and Adams with the arts as common utility provides a broad chart for an approach to American culture which by no means excludes the fine arts or the derivative forms of expression but which keeps the center of gravity within that social complex out of which the arts must spring. . . . In segmented views of a culture the great human themes are sometimes forgotten: life, death, love, nature. What did our young nation do with them? In what sphere were its hopes, fears and aspirations most articulate? If beauty was achieved, in what did its quality mainly consist? Esthetic questions may also be human questions.

It is something of a shock and a shame to the modern reader to learn of the early American artists—to recognize their full participation in American life as well as their acceptance by the common people. There was William Billings, the tanner of hides who became America's first composer, and there was Junius Brutus Booth, extraordinary actor, and student of Rosicrucian lore, who played from frontier to frontier those "dark romantic dramas that Americans had adopted as their own." In those days, the artists belonged to the people, and their art was a part of the common fabric of life. A boisterous, energetic and endlessly fertile culture was in the making in the early years of the Republic.

After a review of American folklore, which is contrasted with the richer and more mature traditions of other countries, Miss Rourke has this to say:

> Probably we are still a folk—an imperfectly formed folk—rather than a schooled and civilized people. This fate is strange enough in the modern world, but from the beginning we have also had another destiny. We are also acutely conscious and self-conscious, critical and purposive. Our literature and public speech are strewn with the evidences of this from the days of the founding fathers onward. Conflicting forces have thus been set up, but we shall hardly be able to select another course at this late date, and it would seem possible at times to use one strain on behalf of the other.

It is certainly true that what unity of culture the United States possesses today is still at the "folk" level, and exists, for the most part, in the more rural areas where something like the conditions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries still prevail. (Jesse Stuart, in *The Thread that Runs so True*, has captured this quality of American-life has, indeed, added to it, by his own efforts at being an educator to the pioneer breed of the Kentucky mountains.) We can hardly call the pattern of living which the industrial system has imposed upon the urban regions of the United States a "culture," except in a technical sense. For there, as Miss Rourke suggests, the themes of "life, death, love, nature," have been disparted from the common life and are explored only by specialists, and unhappy and alienated specialists, at that.

Perhaps we should say to ourselves that American culture—American culture as the fulfillment of the vision of the Founding Fathers—is still a dream of the future; that we have suffered too many intrusions of the vices of the Old World, and invented so many new ones of our own, that genuine culture in the United States is either still a very primitive thing or does not exist at all. Perhaps, too, this very shapelessness which characterizes the life of the average American may be taken as evidence that we are the merest beginners in the art of civilization-building, and that we may have another chance. If Miss Rourke is right, and our destiny is "self-conscious, critical and purposive, it may be that the culture to be fashioned with conscious awareness requires a far

longer gestation-period than the older, "intuitive" cultures of other continents and countries.

How shall we go about the task? The Founding Fathers, to return to their example, were moved by a sense of mission. They believed that men make their own lives, their own culture, by combining the plan of their purposes with the raw materials of existence. It is this conviction, it seems, which we lack most of all, and which would naturally be the most important ingredient of a *self-conscious* culture.

There is one further consideration. Quite possibly, the familiar comparisons between the unintegrated and amorphous communities of the United States and the more "whole" and picturesque societies of Europe's past have very little pertinence in a criticism of American culture. Perhaps we cannot, and ought not to try, to achieve the excellences of European civilization, but should strive for another sort of synthesis at another level—the level foreseen in principle by the Founding Fathers, but hardly guessed at, since, save by a Whitman, a Thoreau, or an Emerson.

Letter from ENGLAND

LONDON.—Following the Boer rising in South Africa in 1880 (largely provoked, it is now recognized, by Mr. Gladstone's government in England at the time), and the Peace Convention which ensued, the Boers hastened to invade the territories of their native neighbours. Among these was Bechuanaland, and the inhabitants appealed to Britain for protection. As a result, a British Protectorate was proclaimed over all Bechuanaland, while a smaller southern portion of it was declared a Crown Colony. "I look upon this Bechuanaland territory," Cecil Rhodes said to the Cape Parliament, "as the Suez Canal of the trade of this country (South Africa), the key of its road to the interior." South Africa today has an independent Union Government, and has often pressed for the transfer to itself of the reluctant Protectorates—Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland. Every British Government has steadfastly refused the request. It is this Bechuanaland territory of some 325,000 square miles which has come into public discussion over the problems associated with the rulership of Seretse Khama.

In September, 1948, Seretse Khama married an Englishwoman. The tribal assembly disapproved of the marriage in November, 1948, and, again, though less decisively, in December of the same year; but in June, 1949, the assembly declared their acceptance of Seretse as chief, notwithstanding his marriage. This was followed by the withdrawal into voluntary exile from the reserve of the regent Tshekedi Khama and a number of leading men of the tribe. In the Bechuanaland Protectorate succession to the office of chief is subject to recognition by the High Commissioner and confirmation by the Secretary of State in this country. In the event of doubt arising, provision exists enabling the High Commissioner to appoint a judicial enquiry of an advisory character to investigate and report to him. Such an enquiry was duly set up and its report received in December, 1949. The Government there discussed the matter with Seretse in London in February last. He was accompanied by his legal advisers. The official report goes on to say that the Government "viewed with grave concern the danger which recognition would cause to the unity and well-being of the tribe and the administration of the Protectorate." After Seretse had refused voluntarily to relinquish his claim to the succession, the High Commissioner was instructed to withhold recognition of Seretse as chief for not less than five years—to be then reviewed. He was required to reside outside the Protectorate, and an allowance was provided for himself and his wife.

Thus ended what Mr. Churchill has called "a very disreputable transaction." Obviously, questions of race and colour bar have taken a prominent place in public debate, irrespective of the merits of the Seretse dispute. Seretse himself was once at Oxford University, and 136 former fellow students of his old college (Balliol) recorded, in a letter to the London *Times*, their distress at the treatment he had received from the Government. "We fear," they wrote, "that the trust placed by the colonial peoples in the impartiality of British rule has been greatly undermined; but this is secondary to our feeling that a question of principle has been decided on grounds of expediency." What does Seretse Kharna himself say? In another letter to the *Times* he lists the three reasons given by the Government for exiling him: (1) to prevent disruption of the tribe; (2) because of doubts about the possibility of his discharging the responsibility of chieftainship; and (3) because of doubts whether he could retain adequate tribal support. He then argues that he has failed to discover one single charge against him where he has done wrong. "The tribe," he writes, "have decided at their *kgotla* to have me with my English wife as their chief. If the Bamangwato do not object to a white consort, it would seem right for the Imperial Government not to over-rule the decision of the

people in their internal affairs." He asks to be given a chance to take up his duty, if only for a probationary period.

The principle of racial equality is accepted by the British Commonwealth of Nations. But the method of its application, as regards the colour bar in its many forms, varies considerably. In this sense (and realizing also that colour bar or colour prejudice is not by any means a white man's monopoly), it may be said, for example, that the refusal of some hotels and lodging houses in this country to admit non-white British subjects, is equally as disreputable as the action of the Government in the case of Seretse Khama has been called. The truth is that the fount of racial injustice of any kind is in the human heart and mind. These are not matters fundamentally for legislation or governmental decrees—though wise laws may help. They are related to our conceptions of nature and of man. Until these ideas are clarified, and emancipation sought from the deadweight of bigotry and superstition, we cannot hope for a lasting resolution of racial enmity.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
A BEAUTIFUL FRIENDSHIP

THE latest BOM selection—Giovanni Guareschi's *The Little World of Don Camillo*—isn't very long and isn't very complicated. It's just the fanciful story of Don Camillo, the heart-of-gold-rough-exterior-huge-shoulders-wonderful-left-hook priest, and Peppone, the Communist Mayor of a small Italian town in the Po Valley. Peppone is quite like Don Camillo in the heart-of-gold-rough-exterior-huge-shoulders-wonderful-left-hook department, but not quite his match. These two think they hate each other, but actually don't. How can they, sharing those Fundamental Qualities, h-o-g-r-e-h-s-w-l-h? So, in the end, they draw closer and closer, and we are left surmising that one more chapter and Peppone would have taken the Cassock. For Guareschi clearly honors the Church in the controversy. One interesting feature of *Don Camillo is* the fact that the figure of Christ above D.C.'s altar is able to talk, and manages to advise Don Camillo successfully on all manner of things. (This Christ, says Guareschi, is the voice of his own conscience, so it can't be helped what he says.)

Don Camillo is not, in any sense, a *Yogi and the Commissar* sort of discourse. It isn't supposed to be serious or challenging. Some of the readers who like it, if asked, might say it reminds them of Steinbeck's *Tortilla Flats,* though Don Camillo lacks, we feel, the subtlety of Pilon. But, to illustrate the fact that Guareschi is engagingly entertaining, and, on the subject of Communism, even baneficially temperate, we quote a section from his preface:

> I want you to understand that, in the Little World between the river and the mountains, many things can happen that cannot happen anywhere else. Here, the deep, eternal breathing of the river freshens the air, for both the living and the dead, and even the dogs, have souls. If you keep this in mind, you will easily come to know the village priest, Don Camillo, and his adversary Peppone, the Communist Mayor. You will not be surprised that Christ watches the goings-on from a big cross in the village church and not infrequently talks, and that one man beats the other over the head, but fairly—that is, without hatred—and that in the end the two enemies find they agree about essentials.

So far, much to the good. The tangled oppositions of politics and religions should always be viewed against the background of an "eternal breathing of the river." And when an author talks about a place where "many things can happen that cannot happen anywhere else," he does us another service, for it is well to keep alive the thought of any kind of place where experience is different and the impossible is impossible no longer. All of us are in need of a broader view, where the expected is less logarithmic and more mystical. (This may be, incidentally, the basic *raion d'être* of the arts.)

Don Camillo is both a Good book and a Bad book, which doesn't make it neutral at all, but rather an interesting subject for study. The symbology of the story *looks* good. Here we have political opponents discovering grounds for friendship in common human qualities which make political distinctions seem ephemeral. This, certainly, might be regarded as a breath of hope, when there seems so little hope. And then, should we not heartily bless anyone who suggests that those people called Communists are human, and may be weaned from exaggeratedly destructive modes of behavior? What is wrong, then, if anything? Certainly not the re-presentation of the dream that All Men can be Brothers.

Don Camillo suggests one other thing to readers, however. It suggests that things like Communism and Catholicism are really very simple. And this is not a good thing to say to readers, since it fails to be true. It is not true because both Communism and Catholicism have grown out of the dominant psychological traits of human beings, and these are complicated indeed. The destructiveness of the Inquisition and the destructiveness of Stalin's purges we need to understand, in order to better understand ourselves. Both were based upon the philosophy of Authoritarianism. Stalin said he was fighting against the economic enslavement of the masses,

and in the name of this war—as is apt to be the case with wars—he justified any measures taken to defeat the "enemy." The custodians of Papal authority said they were fighting against the slavery of eternal perdition, sure to overtake all those who did not learn the proper formulas for protection and appeal to the proper sources for mediation. And in the name of this Holy War against Evil, they, too, were able to justify whatever measures might serve in the saving of souls.

Now, really, you don't get two rival authoritarians together by friendly converse, unless one or the other drops his allegiance,—or both drop their allegiances, which is much better. But neither Don Camillo nor Peppone gave up their respective faiths. They were supposed to have conveniently reached around them, to clasp powerful hands. What makes a Communist, or a Catholic, however, is *devotion* to his particular authoritarianism—not a propensity for conveniently forgetting about it. And it is because of this single simple fact that Camillo and Peppone tell us nothing at all about Catholics and Communists.

We have a feeling that the psychology upon which *Don Camillo* is based is an essential part of a hopeless historical circle. The root of authoritarian religion, psychologically speaking, is oversimplification. Men like to Believe in order to avoid the responsibility of personal investigation and decision. Belief in authority allows them to shrug off the greatest amount of responsibility, and hence belief in authority has always been the most popular of all blind beliefs. (The alternative to belief in authority is, of course, to struggle through all manner of contortions in the hope of becoming one's own counselor. This is a hard fight, not often undertaken, and when undertaken, seldom completely won, as most of us know.)

To continue with the analysis, we move from a desire for oversimplification to its attainment in some form of authoritarianism. The authoritarianism, however, whichever we happen to pick, is but one of many opposing rivals, which clash either culturally, religiously, or politically. Faced with wars which seriously threaten our existence, we look for another kind of oversimplification —we want to believe that men's feelings of divisiveness are nothing but a sort of passing phase of immaturity.

The immaturity is there, all right. But we shall never understand and eliminate it unless we tear down the structure of our authoritarianisms brick by brick, mercilessly. We can be as easy as we wish on people, but, because we have so long lived in the illusion of the authoritarian dream, we must never be easy or even tolerant on "systems."

Mr. Guareschi, of course, only appears to be fully tolerant. He rates the Church much higher than the Kremlin, as we have noted. But even if he set these systems, Catholicism and Communism, off against each other as equals, he would do us no service by implying that all we need is a few staunch men with hearts of gold to reach beyond the "systems." For systems such as these—the ones with authoritarian bases—reach right down inside even the staunch men with hearts of gold, and though these stalwarts may not be destroyed by the tendrils, they are at the very least sufficiently enmeshed to be confused. There is no way out of Systems except back the way men got into them. On that so necessary return journey, we must consciously unravel the tangles, the delusions, biasses, prejudices.

But *Don Camillo* tells us that this painful process is not really necessary. It is for this reason that we have to call a work like Guareschi's a perpetuation of the Delusion of Oversimplification.

COMMENTARY
REWARD FOR INTEGRITY

THE Board of Regents of the University of California on August 25 voted, 12 to 10, for the discharge of thirty-two faculty members who refused to sign loyalty oaths. Of the original forty non-signers, four have signed, and four more have resigned, leaving the thirty-two, among whom, the Los Angeles *Times* reports, "are prominent professors of many years standing with the university." These teachers, according to the *Times*, have said as a group that they "abhor Communism," but "believe their academic freedom is encroached upon by demands for special loyalty oaths other than the standard pledge of allegiance all public officials now take."

The regents voted for dismissal, despite the fact that Governor Warren ruled that the Board had no authority to reconsider its earlier (July) decision to accept the recommendations of a faculty committee with respect to the employment of the non-signing professors. Nine of the regents, including Governor Warren and University President Sproul, called it a "breach of faith" to dismiss teachers who had been cleared as non-communists by the faculty committee.

These are facts. Their implications have already been discussed in MANAS, but this is not a subject that should be dropped or forgotten. The issues involved go far beyond a local educational controversy, raising the broad problem of the sort of political intelligence and integrity on which a self-governing community depends for survival.

It seems fair to say that the action of the Board resembles in several ways a determination on the part of some of its members to "get" the "stubborn" professors who would not conform to the Board's definition of "loyalty." The fact that the non-signing professors acted on principle has made no difference. The fact that a jury of the colleagues of the non-signers has cleared them made no difference. And the fact, fairly well established, that the non-signers are the sort of men who would never become communists, because of their vigorous defense of free thought, has made no difference.

What is wanted, apparently, of the professors of the University of California is submissiveness, not personal and academic integrity This, therefore, is the final fact to be faced: The U of C Board of Regents has placed an economic premium on intellectual compromise and has penalized the kind of men who reject the "Party-Line" sort of obedience.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

> If parents "set the example" of being cooperative and understanding concerning the needs of the family as a whole, and if the child grows up in an atmosphere of generosity and unselfishness, then one would expect the child to regard things given him as a natural expression of that cooperation and wish to give in return. What a shock it is for a parent to be confronted by an adolescent who takes the attitude that the generosity of the parent may be but a snare, bribery designed to exert moral suasion, or to delay the freedom of the child from his parents. Presents, the youngster may say, are often strings which bind unfairly and are going to be held in suspicion. I would like some discussion on this point as it seems to be an area of great subtlety which needs clarification on the part of both parent and child.

WE have written a considerable number of words in this column on the educational importance of the "work-relationship" in the home—the cooperative performance of useful tasks. But it occurs to us that a matter of almost equal importance is involved in the manner in which we give "presents" to our children. (Incidentally, the subjects are really related, for a child can hardly feel qualms about a "present" he has helped to work for.)

Every home is literally surrounded by special occasions involving presents. Other presents arrive intermittently, presumably the natural and expected marks of affection. But the psychology of "giving" is always of great importance, and greatest during the most formative years. Now presents are assumed to be "good" because they make children happy, but a poorly concerned giving, or lack of thought about the appropriateness of the gift may lead to something quite different from a happy ending.

The unfortunate fact is that the majority of parents do tie strings to their presents. These strings are of many sorts. The one most frequently used is the string which, in a subconscious, emotional manner, insists the child recognize and acclaim his parent's generosity. Another sort of string is considerably more serious in its implications, for it involves interference with the freedom of the mind of the child. This is "moral suasion," and moral suasion is decidedly immoral; it proceeds from the faulty logic that the person who has received a valuable present should, in gratitude, adopt the attitudes and behavior we think they should adopt. But this leads to pretence on the part of the child. No one can bribe another into any state of mind that is other than neurotic.

Sometimes we think brochures should be distributed, through the medium of the public schools, advising all children to reject any presents they suspect may later be used as suasion. Such propaganda might read: "Do not be a fool today just because you were yesterday. If They (He or She) have attempted generosity-suasion in the past, take a long vacation from asking for things. If you later decide to have a try at it again send for our two-cent questionnaire on "Questions to Ask Before You Accept." (It almost seems that one has to become a little ridiculous in order to call attention to the very subtle, Trojan-horse aspects of so much parental giving. Unlike the Quality of Mercy, this kind of giving "blesseth" neither "him who gives" nor "him who takes." It does, however, have a great deal to do with the "throned monarch," to continue with Shakespeare, for the State as well as ecclesiastical and family authority has employed the same method for centuries. Most bribery and blackmail exist outside of the underworld).

It is, admittedly, a difficult job for a parent to decide whether or not he is giving too many presents, or giving the ones he does give with inadequately educative attitudes. A few criteria might be suggested: first, does a parent really believe the present to be useful in a social or a family sense, or is it something he gives principally because there has been a great clamour for it on the part of the child, or because he suspects a certain gift will enable him to enjoy a great deal of gratitude? Secondly, is the time for giving the gift

selected by the recipient or the giver, since for the present to be given in the freest manner it needs to be given at the time when the most desire and reason exists for the giving. Third, has the recipient shown any indication to work for such a gift himself? If he has, one is helping in something *already begun,* offering assistance rather than largesse.

The most significant gifts of all are presented in this way—as efforts on the part of one person to help another in something with which he has shown himself to be seriously and persistently concerned. If we could only realize it, there are so many occasions when we might give assistance to those engaged in a difficult enterprise, which would be prized much more deeply, in a psychological sense, than any of our charity, our wedding, anniversary, or Christmas gifts and packages. These things have to be said, at the risk of falling into the lexicon of platitudes, because it is impossible to determine the things people need from us unless we talk about "attitudes of mind" instead of conventional habits of giving.

We should now return to the important matter of developing an active sense of participation in as many of the child's interests as possible. We can't tell what the child most needs, or when he needs it, unless we have found ways to live in his own psychological world, ways that enable us to think *with* him. Failure to bridge the age-gap in respect to thought and feeling, we submit, is the most common stumbling block for the parent who tries to "set an example," yet fails to produce an anticipated effect upon the child. Aside from the fact that setting an example is something that we must not say that we are doing, even to ourselves, the "examples" most meaningful to the child will be those which are organically a part of a cooperative relationship with him. It is not just a matter of benignly undertaking to "help" the child. The important thing is to *share* with him, in terms of work, or play, or study. Only that which is shareable carries the real power of example.

Children, as most educators know, are often especially sensitive to the question of motivation, even if often only unconsciously. The child is most "responsive" when he feels a sense of rapport with the motive behind any phase of parental contact. The parent who, with clumsy enthusiasm, worsens the damage to a child's toy in trying to see if he can fix it, will be more endearing to the child —despite the damage— than another parent who simply pulls currency from his pockets For a New One.

Of course, we have to recognize that some children will become suspicious of their parents during adolescence simply because they have friends who loudly and rightly complain about *their* family's efforts to control them by reference to the gratitude supposed to be shown for "all the things we have done for you." At times we have to suffer suspicions originating from a common condition of society rather than the condition of our own home. But if a parent evidences enough discrimination to let the child work for what he needs—and then helps around the edges a bit, whenever he can—the example of cooperation has been truly set. Whether or not it becomes fashionable in the child's crowd to suspect parents of ulterior motives in their generosity, such a youth will eventually come to see how illogical it is to suspect his own family of undue suasion just because undue suasion is attempted in many other homes.

FRONTIERS

The Koreans Themselves

THE psychological frame of reference of the Korean war is so confusing—unless, of course, one adopts a *real-politik* view of international affairs, and a surgical view of the function of military power—that comment, useful comment, seems exceedingly difficult. Most Americans know little or nothing about Korea, except for impressions gained, through the years, from miscellaneous reading. One odd bit of information that may stick in the memory, for example, is that the Koreans represent a very ancient culture, being the first in the world, according to the histories of the graphic arts, to do printing from movable type.

Then there is the libertarian heritage of the Koreans. Readers of the old *Asia* (now become *UN World)* will recall affecting articles which appeared in that magazine op the long and heroic struggle of the Koreans to free themselves from alien domination. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Korea was still a vassal state of the old Chinese empire, but virtually independent. Growth of Japanese influence in the country led to a war between China and Japan, concluded in 1895 after a humiliating defeat of the Chinese. This brought Korea within the sphere of Japanese control and in 1910 the emperor of Korea ceded all rights of sovereignty to Japan. In 1919, on the occasion of the funeral of the emperor, some 200,000 Koreans staged a non-violent revolt in which thirty-three leaders—including Christians, Chuntoists, and Buddhists—drew up a declaration of independence and presented it to the Japanese Government and the Paris Conference. The leaders and hundreds of their followers were immediately imprisoned. The unarmed Koreans were easily taken by the Japanese, who attacked every gathering place. Within two weeks thousands of Koreans were arrested and put to torture, to make them name the leaders of the movement. According to the *Encyclopedia Britannica,* more than 11,000 Koreans were flogged by the Japanese over a period of five months.

Strong measures were taken by the Japanese Government to suppress the incipient Korean revolution and to eradicate the revolutionary spirit. During the great earthquake of 1923, many Japanese thought that the Korean anarchists would revolt, with the result that a movement was started to kill all Koreans in Japan. In Tokyo and its vicinity alone, more than 9,000 Korean people were massacred. These events led to a cultural and spiritual rebirth of the Korean people. Korean writers began to educate the masses in the classics of Korean antiquity. Korean women became feminists, claiming the right to direct their own destiny. There has also been a strong pacifist movement in Korea, its leaders believing that the future of Korean freedom depends upon the ability of the people to control all forces of violence.

A good summary of present-day Korea was provided by an editorial in the *New Statesmen and Nation* (July 29, 1950):

> Korea is not two countries divided by the 38th Parallel, but one country about the size of Britain. It contains about 30 million people, some of whom live in modern brick-built towns and most of whom are peasants mainly concerned with getting rid of landlords. Almost all of them have a strong sense of national unity. In a long and bloodthirsty past of conquest and resistance, Koreans have developed, even more than most people, a distaste for foreign occupation. We must grasp the central fact that the Parallel was a temporary occupation device; that Koreans are primarily interested, like the Chinese, in national unity and social change; and that this involves throwing out foreigners and the old ruling class the foreigners support and substituting a government of their own people.

The history of the current political situation in Korea began at Cairo, in 1943, when Great Britain, the United States, and China declared their intention to restore Korea's independence. Soviet Russia joined in this pledge at Potsdam. With the surrender of Japan in 1945, Russian and American troops occupied Korea, dividing the country at the 38th Parallel. Mr. Lewis Hoskins, executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, described in a recent broadcast the American part in the political fission of Korea:

> Just before the surrender of Japan, in the summer of 1945, several one-star generals hurried into an office in the Pentagon with a statement: "We have got to divide Korea. Where can we divide it?"

> The colonel with Far Eastern experience protested: "But you can't separate Korea. Korea is an economic and social unit. There is no place to divide it." The Generals insisted, "We have got to divide Korea and it has to be done by 4 o'clock." So by 4 o'clock, the division was made at the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. (New York *Times*, July 3I.)

While the 1945 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers decided that the independence of Korea was the ultimate object, this was to be preceded by the trusteeship of the U.S., Britain, Russia, and China. In November, 1947, the UN General Assembly voted for free Korean elections to establish an independent government. The occupying Soviets in the North, however, refused to cooperate, with the result that separate elections were held in the North and the South.

The perpetuation of the division of Korea has had drastic consequences for the Korean economy. North Korea has a third of the population—ten million—and all the mineral wealth, timber, and chemical and hydroelectric resources of the country. South Korea is agricultural, and its twenty million people have been cut off from the natural market for their produce and from their normal sources of fuel and water-power. During the first nine months of 1949, South Korean imports were ten times the exports for the same period. Extensive American aid, therefore, has been necessary. Meanwhile, the Syngman Rhee regime of South Korea, instead of being a model young democracy, seems patterned after the regime of Chiang-Kai-shek. All observers agree, at any rate, on its inefficiency and corruption.

The *New Statesman and Nation* article gives this description of the results of the division of Korea and its occupation by two opposing powers:

> The 38th Parallel has never been a genuine frontier. Neither North nor South Korea ever acknowledged the right of the other to exist, nor was the South ever recognised by the Communist world or Northern Korea by the Western Powers. In the South, a period of American military government slowly gave way to an administration representing the landlords, directed by American advisers and upheld by E.C.A. funds which totalled 400 million dollars. The E.C.A. advisers have struggled to introduce land reform but the Government was largely successful in frustrating it. In the North, on the other hand, the Russian armies, whilst maintaining a large military mission, at the very outset of their occupation gave power to People's Committees run by Korean Communists already prominent in the Resistance Movement against Japan. Landlords were expropriated, and the land distributed to the farmers. By the beginning of 1946, political opposition had already been broken, and a People's Republic along familiar Communist lines been created by the Red Army co-operating with Korean Communists. In 1947, an American expert reported that, in the North, "a regimented and orderly political regime was being established upon the ruins of Japanese administration, whereas in South Korea a chaotic but free political system was slowly taking shape under trying circumstances."

On the question of who is responsible for the present struggle, all but obviously communist partisans readily admit that the invasion of South Korea was a clear act of aggression, involving the use of some 400 Soviet-built tanks. What is not so generally known is that, according to official United Nations Reports, some 18,000 people have been killed in guerilla warfare along the border between North and South Korea during the past two years.

What is most notable about the war in Korea, however, and about the war of words which resounds above the actual combat, is the focus of nearly all comment upon the issue of which side is "right," with almost no mention of the disaster which has overtaken the Korean people. This is the tragic reality which cannot be "localized" in Korea, however successful the attempt of the Powers to limit armed conflict to the Asian peninsula. The fine words about "freedom" and "way of life" seem particularly empty when the scene in the Pentagon building described by Mr. Hoskins is recalled. The five generals and their Russian collaborators in another part of the world were not partitioning a cake—they were amputating a human community, exposing thirty million people to the hazards of civil war. Was it military necessity? The exigencies of last-minute diplomacy? No doubt these compulsions existed. But what is the use of talking about the "freedom" and a "way of life" which are dependent upon such compulsions as these? Very little use, as we see it; so, here, we have talked about the Koreans themselves, and what has happened to them.