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THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SPELL

TO return to the eighteenth-century philosophers and to renew acquaintance with their belief in the power of reason and their enthusiasm for the future of mankind under its guidance is like going on an excursion to the original spring of humanitarian rationalism. It was just a matter of time, they seemed to think, until the spread of enlightenment through reason would be able to establish justice, righteousness and prosperity for all men. Even in the seventeenth century, John Locke discoursed concerning the rational principles of civil government with a confidence so transparent as to suggest that he thought the Millennium of Reason was just around the corner, needing only books like the ones he was writing to convert the entire world.

Freedom was the goal, constitutional self-government the means, and education the method for fitting men for both freedom and self-government. But now, after two hundred years of struggle, crowned by fabulous power in the hands of the constitutional governments of the world, dark, subterranean forces which seem beyond our control make the eighteenth-century hopes for rationalism appear almost as unwarranted as the medieval reliance on prayers, exorcisms, charms and amulets.

It is in the twentieth century, and not in the dark eighth or ninth century, that a leading spokesman of our scientific civilization has described a radio-active "sand" that invisibly poisons every living thing and kills in a month or so. According to Dr. Louis N. Ridenour, University of Illinois physicist, this "lightest and most transportable of all weapons of mass destruction" could be sprayed on an area and the inhabitants would not know that they had been in any danger for two weeks or a month. A few days later, they would die. The poison sand, says this expert, could be made by dipping tiny sand particles of metal powder in a water solution of radio-active salts, and the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission's plutonium production plant at Hanford, Washington, could, he adds, produce enough of this dust every month to contaminate 144 square miles. The press report of Dr. Ridenour's announcement blandly remarks that this "slow-acting poison . . . could be the most insidious—or most humane—type of atomic weapon known."

In the eighteenth century, the great representatives of rationalism were the scientists and the thinkers influenced by science. Their forerunner, John Locke, had been not only a political thinker, but was, also, the founder of introspective psychology. Locke maintained that the human mind—the mind of the child, that is—is like a "white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas." The furnishings of the mind come entirely from experience, and all that we know from experience is developed through the use of reason by the thinking being. Locke's was a simple doctrine of individual progress through the use of reason, and of social progress through its use to form the best possible social contract.

But obviously, there are compulsions of experience which Locke and his rationalist successors did not anticipate. The "practical" political philosophers and utilitarian thinkers had no theory of evil, beyond the evil which arises from the failure of man to use his reason to best advantage, and very little of the aspiring quality which draws upon the higher emotions of human beings. Mr. Locke's essay on civil government, while a masterpiece of rational analysis, has no higher end for the association of men in community than "the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety," and as government, therefore, is devoted to the protection of property, a government which fails to provide material security is a failure. But if men conceive the enjoyment of property to be their highest good, *can* any sort of lasting security be provided? This is a question which is almost never asked, as it challenges the major assumptions of our time.

It happens that the breakdown of Rationalism—and here we mean Rationalism in association with

shopkeepers' utilitarian ethics, Locke's "enjoyment of property" as the end of human association—in modern times has been illustrated in many more ways than the failure of liberal political economy. The researches into the devious ways of the human psyche, conducted by Freud and others, have been a great discouragement to modern rationalists. The psychoanalysts, who show very little admiration for "reason," are about the only students of human behavior who have been able to offer some measure of explanation for the hideous excesses of modern totalitarianism. The rationalists can't understand them at all, while the new school of theologians presents books about the mysterious "demonic" forces in history.

The irony of the success of "rationalism" in the United States—for the current of thought begun by John Locke found its most complete fulfillment in America—lies in the fact that here it is associated with supremacy in the capacity to destroy. It was the power of scientific reason that developed and made the atom bomb; it was the theory of security of property that made us drop it on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and it is out of "rational" consideration for our future security that we talk of bacteriological warfare, H-bombs, and radioactive death-sand as matter-of-factly as our ancestors spoke of driving out and exterminating the red Indians to make way for a "higher" or more "rational" civilization.

It is dangerous, of course, to show contempt for the rational side of human nature. Only a short step from contempt for rational man is the idolization of irrational man, leading to thinking with one's blood instead of one's mind, and to dark cults of religious and political fanaticism. But unless we can find out what is wrong with the kind of rationalism we have believed in—unless we make a strenuous effort to explain its impotence to ourselves—our faith in reason may simply fade away without any sort of a struggle being put up in its behalf. Faith in reason has already been killed off in many parts of the world. Wherever the Party Line is supreme, there is no faith in Reason, which has become, instead, a Respectful Prostitute in the service of the State. Free and independent thought, the power of reason at work, flickers and goes out under totalitarian rule. In Russia, for example, Vavilov, the geneticist who dared to oppose the Party Line in biology, simply disappeared. And a year or so ago, in New York, Shostakovich stuttered through a speech that was obviously prepared by someone else, uttering praises of his homeland which few were able to believe were supported by his heart.

Thus reason has been silenced in Soviet Russia, and where reason is silent, faith in it is only with great difficulty located. But what of reason in the United States? Last December, at the annual meeting of the American Astronomical Society at Tucson, Arizona, retiring President Otto Struve had this to say concerning what had happened during his three-year term of office:

> As physical scientists we are affected by the soul-searching doubts of the atomic scientists, and as the representatives of the most international among the sciences we are disturbed by the growth of narrow nationalism in science. Political considerations unknown to our founders and abhorred by our immediate predecessors have been thrust upon us by those who wish to make of science a tool for advancing their own ideologies. Some of the developments represent real dangers, . . .
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> The first danger comes from without. Recently, attacks made upon us by astronomers of the Soviet Union combined with boastful assurances of their own pre-eminence have filled many of our members with deep concern. We are portrayed as ruthless stooges of a capitalistic conspiracy to enslave the world, who deal out incorrect scientific information in order "to prove the futility of life on earth and to disarm the will of the people to change the existing order." We are accused of medieval faith and an "idealistic" outlook by those who profess to serve the dictates of pure materialism.
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> The second danger comes from within. It is disheartening that a famous foreign astronomer who was invited to work at an American observatory was refused a visa by our State Department without any explanation of its action to the institution that invited him. By acts of this nature, the interests of science are defeated, American prestige is lowered, a potential friend of our democracy may very well have been turned into an enemy, and a suspicion is created that political attempts to control scientific thought are not all confined to countries on the other side of the Atlantic.

> The third danger lies within ourselves. It is all too easy, step by step, to relinquish our freedom of scientific inquiry and to surrender to political powers our right to control our thought. Fear of political persecution and of social ostracism are cropping up in unexpected places. . . . we must not allow our differences to blind us to the dangers I have referred to. We should reaffirm our belief in the freedom of science. (*Science,* June 30, 1950.)

The power of reason, doubtless, can exert little if any immediate effect upon the people of a land where reason has been at a discount for almost a generation. But what about the effectiveness of reason here in the United States? How much have we discounted reason? Are the loyalty oaths a discount of reason? How much of our foreign policy is founded upon the proposition that human beings are capable of coming to wise and just decisions whenever they can obtain all the facts and reason freely about them? If it be said that the people of other lands are not free to reason for themselves, and that there is no good in pretending that they are, the answer can be made that if we, who deem ourselves still free, refuse to set the example of relying on reason and freedom of thought, what hope at all is there for a free and reasonable world ?

These questions, of course, are in some measure rhetorical. But that they seem and are in fact rhetorical is a fact in evidence of our failure to expect much of the power of reason. We can sigh, we can regret, we can publish little magazines of protest, but "They" will go right on doing what they are doing, betraying reason with almost every appeal to reason, while we can think of nothing to do about it. The fact that we can think of nothing to do implies that the channels of action based upon free reason have just about disappeared.

Science for July 7 has a long "Open Letter to the United Nations" by Niels Bohr, one of the most eminent of living physicists. It is an appeal for free exchange of information among the scientists of the world. This idea has been with Prof. Bohr, apparently, ever since the fall of 1943 when he escaped from occupied Denmark and was invited to participate in the then secret project of the atom bomb. In August, 1944, Prof. Bohr submitted a long confidential memorandum to President Roosevelt, setting forth the idea that atomic weapons would create problems far outlasting the expected "victory." "Unless, indeed," he wrote, "some agreement about the control of the use of the new active materials can be obtained in due time, any temporary advantage, however great, may be outweighed by a perpetual menace to human security." This is Prof. Bohr's theme; his solution is the end of secrecy. The alternative to open communications among the scientists of the world is a continuation of the "distortion of facts and motives, resulting in increasing distrust and suspicion between nations and even between groups within many nations." This influence has reached many phases of our life: "Even medical science, which holds out such bright promise for the health of people all over the world, has created means of extinguishing life on a terrifying scale which imply grave menaces to civilization, unless universal confidence and responsibility can be firmly established."

Prof. Bohr speaks with the voice of the eighteenth century. He still believes, and we, many of us, would like to believe with him, that the appeal to reason will arouse some secret moral resource in the leaders of the world's affairs. But while the eighteenth-century rationalists spoke as prophets, Prof. Bohr, himself a grand fulfillment of the scientific expectations of the *philosophes,* speaks as a Jeremiah crying in the wilderness. He must speak out, but where is his audience to be moved to action? Why is reason without sense of direction or strength of purpose?

What must the spokesmen of reason do to encourage us to believe that truth is mighty and that it will prevail? What must we do to give those spokesmen greater courage to speak out? Surely, a new kind of rationalism is needed, if belief in reason is to survive at all.

Letter from ENGLAND

LONDON.—"Face to face with the implications of the hydrogen bomb, our bipartisan politics assume the aspect of back-chat between the March Hare and the Mad Hatter." This comment was made by the professor of medical statistics at Birmingham University (Lancelot Hogben). He and eleven other professors at the same University issued a manifesto during the Parliamentary Election earlier this year. They appealed to the electors to put party politics aside and to vote for those candidates who would give unqualified support to world government. The manifesto declared:

> . . . civilized mankind has an all too brief breathing space in which to undertake the supreme moral and intellectual task of creating a new social institution, capable of controlling the limitless powers of destruction now at our disposal. If we fail to make this effort we may well follow the dinosaur and dodo to extinction.

As if to reinforce the fears so expressed, a lecture on "Present Science and Future Strategy," given during the same month in London by the Scientific Advisor to the Army Council, was notable for its references to the bacteriological possibilities of modern warfare. Dr. Wansbrough-Jones confirmed that some seven ounces of a certain material would suffice to kill every man, woman and child alive today; but he consoled us with the thought that it was hardly likely that people would submit themselves to the deliberate injection of the precise amount of the material required. He made no suggestion that someone might be smart enough to invent a method of administering the unnamed material by methods other than injection. On the other hand, he admitted that there was a possibility of attack, with all manner of microorganisms or their products as weapons, on men, animals and plants. But, here again, knowing precisely the possible horrors, he tried to reassure his audience with the thought that new means of treatment were almost certain!

These and cognate matters continue to raise in an **a**cute form the question of whether international understanding is possible, if only to prevent the arms race from spreading. Is international understanding definable, let alone possible? Some commentators do not think so. Amongst them is Dr. J. C. Beaglehole, Senior Research Fellow, Victoria University College, New Zealand, who, in a broadcast over the English network, put the point pithily:

> Even to ask the majority of Englishmen to appreciate the feelings of the French about cooking or the plays of Racine (assuming that the majority of Frenchmen have strong and identical feelings about those things) is really going too far. To ask them to understand the American point of view about iced water, let alone the American way of life in general, is also going too far. It is probably possible for certain individual specialists to understand or know all about another people. I suppose that J. E. C. Bodley understood the French in his time; I suppose that Professor Brogan does in ours. I suppose that Halévy came pretty near understanding the English. I suppose that Professor Laski understands the Americans. But where does that get us, the non-specialists?

He thereupon advanced the paradox that while international understanding is extremely desirable, it is really impossible! Dr. Beaglehole brought forward a few historical instances to support his contention that the amount of understanding between peoples which is humanly possible is of little account for the mutual relations of those peoples, and, indeed, is in a way irrelevant:

> Take the European Middle Ages. Then, if ever, there was in the western world a common culture, common institutions, a common educated language, a great non-national inclusive structure in the Church, a way of life in fact, that everybody could understand because everybody was in it. Yet, in spite of all exhortation, the Middle Ages were studded with wars. Take the eighteenth century when intellectual converse between France and England was so free and so fruitful. What sort of peace was the Seven Years' War? Let us even take the history not of

> relations between different peoples but of single peoples: if general understanding is so effective, then why was there a civil war in England in the seventeenth century, and another in America in the nineteenth century? . . . Or take the vast efforts at comprehension by diplomatists and Foreign Offices, the official interpreters of national feelings: where have they landed us—or, if you like, failed to land us?

We are thus driven to examine the alternative bases for understanding, apart from intellectual approaches, or, to use Dr. Beaglehole's phrase, "cross-fertilization in culture." It is, after all, conceivable that the historical illustrations adduced by him may have other meanings. On this point, we may quote *The Rise of Modern Indus*try, by J. L. and Barbara Hammond:

> If, in one aspect, history records a struggle between the strong and the weak, in another it records a struggle between the robber and the artist in man: between qualities and forces that do not follow any dividing line of class or nation or religion or circumstances, since every man and every society is both robber and artist, divided between possessive and generous instincts, between the delight in power for the sake of power, and the desire for sympathy for the sake of a deeper satisfaction. The same age may produce the divine grace of the Parthenon and the gross crimes of the Peloponnesian War, the delicate visions of Blake and the savage cruelties of the Slave Trade; for in every society and every age man trembles between the light that touches his imagination, when he sees the world in the wide mystery of fellowship, and the shadows that close about it, when he sees the world in the hard and narrow circle of ambition or avarice or fear.

R. H. Tawney, also, in the Annual Lecture to the National Book League in London last year, when he spoke on "Social History and Literature," referred to the importance of literature in enhancing the appreciation of the historian, and said: "Sympathy is a form of knowledge. It cannot be taught. It can only be absorbed by association with those, the depth of whose nature has caused them most profoundly to feel and most adequately to express it." It is here, in the appraisal of the essential place of sympathy and compassion in the nature of being, and of the steps necessary for its wise development in the life of nations and individuals, that we may hope to find the elements of a sound basis for international understanding.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
SUBTERRANEAN SELF AND SOCIETY

A BANTAM GIANT edition of Ira Wolfert's longest novel (*Tucker's People*) has recently been released to the public under the title *The Underworld*, providing the drugstore literati with an opportunity to do some thoughtful reading. For, despite the lurid cover of *The Underworld*, this is not a thrill novel.

The significance of this edition lies in the present receptivity to Wolfert's definition of modern man's relation to competitive capitalist society. As before suggested on this page, a penetrating critique of "business" compulsions can serve effectively as propaganda for those Soviets anxious to demonstrate the infinite corruption of America, but Wolfert also makes a contribution to the understanding of racketeering psychology, suggesting our blood brotherhood with the Capones and Cohens. And brotherhood with anyone, we think, is a good thing to feel. This broadens the base a bit for the Russians, too, for the black markets of Soviet territory stand as witness to the fact that "underworld" ethics cannot be erased by new forms of state control.

Wolfert's definition of man's tragedy might be paraphrased in this way: Though all love the sense of clean freedom of the ethical man, most find this love turning to fear and hate because it is so easy to be trapped by the terms of the success also sought:

> This story has no beginning and, as you will discover if you read to the last page, no real ending either.
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> It is a story of our own modern world, and of what the world does to its people and of how a question has been laid upon both the world and its people, for each to answer as it can:
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> Which shall be the user and which shall be used? Is the world a cloth that may be cut to fit its people? Or, are people cloth that must be cut to fit the world?
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> So this story is of people cutting the world to measure where they can and cutting themselves to measure where they have to, and of the two, world and people, rolling through the universe embraced in battle and altered by battle.
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> What was the beginning of this? Where is the end, since altered people alter their children, and altered children must likewise subdue themselves to this way of life? They must join the battle and cut the world and be cut by it. Then the children are further altered by the battle and must alter further, in their turn, their own children.

We like Wolfert for two things he says—two things which are related: Individual man is never fully and finally caught in the pattern of cruel battle, even though the continuing carnage is still the relentless story of history. Then, even with those who are closest to being "fully and finally" caught—the criminals of a lifetime's education—there are moments of clear thought and clear compassion when they momentarily become more than they seem. This is the promise, not for now—not, perhaps, for the lives of those whose habits have carried them too far; yet who can tell when one man, or which one man, will live up to what he should like to be? We are all, to Wolfert, not just what we think of ourselves and what others think us to be, but also what we *could* be. If Wolfert helps us to see how close are even the socially damned to redemption, we can look at those less damned—perhaps ourselves—with less hopelessness.

Frederick Bauer is *The Underworld's* irremediable tragedy. He was a man who sought nothing so hard as avoidance of trouble, yet who became enmeshed in the violent pressures of a realm of rackets he did not even want to be a part of. He was like millions of soldiers who wish only to stay home, who are not trying to control history, but who will be controlled by it and march to Someone's fighting. As Wolfert puts it:

> The weight of history that a man carries on his shoulders as he goes about his daily life is not a small weight, although Bauer was among the great majority in never being aware of it. He never thought of himself and of each other man on earth as living all day in the stream of history. To him, history was not

what was happening to all people but something in school books.

The little man had a heritage of insecurity that had begun from the day of his birth to make him into a certain kind of infant. He was born in a world given over to business played as a game with profit as the goal and man staking his life on reaching it. There was no security in that for him. Whatever insecurity he was born into must be aggravated by such a way of life.

Insecurity had made him into a certain kind of infant and had aggravated him into a certain kind of man. That man could see no way out of insecurity except death. The will to self-destruction was strong in him, but it needed fear to do its work, a paroxysm of ultimate fear. This alone would be adequate to compel its victim to destroy first, whatever love was in him for the things in his life and for life, and then destroy life itself. So, the little man began to invent enemies in order to inflame fear and stirred hate in himself in order to inflame fear and worked on fear, nursed it, fed it, sheltered it. Towards the end fear was becoming strong enough to make everything that happened its food. A doorbell ringing, forgiveness by his friend and boss, the promise of a new chance to resume the old life, his wife, his children, his father, the society in which he existed, they all fed fear and became fearful.

Bauer needed only a little help to remain alive. His central fear had become the insecurity attached to working in the bank. He needed only someone or something to take him out of that fear, either by helping him argue himself out of it, shaming him, coaxing him or loving him out of it. Was there no one? Was there nothing in his life to shame or coax him from the fear enthralling him? A feeling of loneliness plucked at the flesh of his brain, as if with lips. His grave opened its mouth and breathed on him. His eyes went wide and he stared horrified into the darkness of his coat collar.

Here Wolfert turns to a psychiatric sort of investigation, and when he connects the life of Bauer, an insignificant illegal worker in a New York "policy bank," with the rise of Nazism, he does something worth trying, whether or not the analogy is perfect:

Now, you may ask, what have these rather shabby confusions in a little man's inconsequential life to do with so great a thing as history?

Well, the time was 1934. Already a nation of Germans, ripened by history, as the little man had been, and then flung into economic crisis, as the little man had been, had invented enemies, as he had, and stirred hatreds and nursed and fueled and fanned fear. He knew how to delude himself into gratifying the will to death. The leader meant Germany's death, but he promised Germany a better life. Then the life of Germany as a fruitful, dignified nation, or force on earth, and the life of Germans as members of the human race was bound in slavery, and fruitfulness, dignity and humanity were destroyed in the flames of fear.

This thing called the Nazi idea, this promise of wholesale death, crept across the earth. It was a climax to the modern world and its business game. Wherever it found climax men, strong only in the will to self-destruction, it found victims. All of Tucker's people, and, of course, Tucker himself, were climax men of the modern world. Some were riper than others, but each was ripening. In each was the sum of the history of the modern world to date. Whatever history lay after 1934 would be, in large part, their doing. What they accepted or rejected, acted upon or failed to act upon would be the story of what came next on earth. That was the weight of history upon Bauer's shoulders. He was the ripest of all the climax men and he swam drowning in the stream of history.

The value of a novel such as Wolfert's may finally lie in its contribution to social psychology. The latter vague field will never crystallize into a genuine human aid until the subtleties of the Subterranean Self and our Subterranean Society are related, by laying bare their deepest correlations. The "social scientists," by a preference sometimes appearing craven, deal only with the easily observable correlations, while the most important ones can only be determined by someone willing to attempt a full-scale attack on all the crimes that men are encouraged to perpetrate by the sanction of "respectable" social procedure. And as Macneile Dixon had it in *Civilization and the Arts,* the writer, the poet, and the artist may bring us closer to what we need to know than the "disciplined" sciences, and the logarithms of psychiatry. A corollary of such attempts as Wolfert's is the slow but promising move towards abandonment of capital punishment, humanizing of convicts' surroundings,

and the extension of probations and paroles. Those who read San Quentin Warden Clinton Duffy's *My Home is San Quentin* had an opportunity to see a forward march of enlightenment about crime through the eyes of a man who determined to be a friend to his fellows, whether or not their clothes and shoes were prison-made. The example of Warden Lawes at Sing Sing, also, has been a hope or a promise that we may finally stop destroying ourselves by belief in the value of destruction.

Crime novels of the Irving Schulman variety (*The Amboy Dukes* and *Cry Tough*) are popular today. These contain a pathos in their harshness—something carried over, however poorly, into such motion pictures as *The Asphalt Jungle*. Perhaps the extremities of "crime" fascinate us because we are coming to a cleaner knowledge of our complicity in all crime whether social or international. The pathos we like may be the pathos we feel about ourselves, in a world where it is so much easier to become trapped by fear, hate and suspicion than to become free.

COMMENTARY
RULE OR REASON?

PAUL WIENPAHL'S second essay on the loyalty-oath question (Frontiers) provides a background for isolating the crucial issues in a complex problem: Do we believe in the self-determination of universities? Do we feel that teachers should act as administrators—are capable of being administrators ?

Whether or not Communists should be allowed to teach, and whether or not professors can rightly be required to declare their political convictions, the central question, after all, is really: *Who should decide about these matters?*

If we argue that regents, trustees, or any other sort of non-teaching administrators are the people to make the decision, we are declaring that our society, *in toto,* must be governed by "experts" in policy-making, instead of by the free pursuit of truth. For if we are unable to believe that the "free pursuit of truth," to which we are verbally dedicated, can, in our universities, produce enough wisdom to enable the professors to govern themselves, we obviously give "free pursuit" a low rating. We imply that the universities are no more than decorative appendages to our culture. And this also means that we of little faith no longer *have* a culture.

Acceptance of dictators is possible only when the people have given up hope of getting much out of the free pursuit of truth. From this failure of faith stems the doctrine that political expediency is the only practical rule of government, and that we must be led by the men who are the most skillful in practicing political expediency—dictators, in short.

Sidney Hook, cited by Paul Wienpahl, is reported to believe that Communists should not be allowed to teach in universities. CP members are certainly untrustworthy teachers if they follow the propaganda directives they are supposed to follow. If such a conclusion were reached by the *faculty,* in order to *preserve* the free pursuit of truth, it would be a decision in full consonance with academic freedom. And if trustees and regents, but few teachers, hold Hook's point of view, the former may argue with the faculty in an effort to persuade, as Mr. Hook, for example, has been doing.

But if non-teaching administrators rule instead of debate—if they attempt through coercive direction what they cannot accomplish through reason—they are doing precisely what they claim the Communists must be stopped from doing to the world.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WE have at hand a communication which may stimulate further thought on "The Child in a Problem World":

> The problem child: Embattled from the very start, the perceptive youngling self-protectively adjusts itself to prevailing . and progressive sources of bewilderment such as are found on every hand, all in some measure based upon conflicts due to the general hypocrisy typical of "civilized living." It is only partly true that "Heaven lies about us in our infancy," as Wordsworth said. For, even though the infant, the child, the adolescent, innocently contrives so far at it may, its own "world," it still is a mite, lost in a great land overshadowed by veritable giants whose *size* is psychologically inimical to children's desire for equity. Hence size is the first confusion that confronts the child once it has gotten away from its mother's breast and has learned to toddle about. The second confusion, I'd say, is that which is imposed by coercive methods adopted by parents: The *forcing* of food, "rest" periods, and "good habits," upon the now mobile youngster. Naturally, when the child realizes it has the power to move away from impositions (as the child sees them), the impositions become even less bearable, since they may possibly, thinks the child, be escaped. Hence, the more inflexible the parent becomes, the more the flight-inclined child resents the domination. The third confusion could perhaps be that which the child falls heir to when it pits its straining, freedom-seeking ego against the equally parental-repressed egos of other children. Then, of course, the reacting refugee can't figure out why it should have so much trouble with these creatures of its own size. The fourth confusion visits the child when adults seek to convince it that a complicated (i.e., several-phased, especially when manual) act must necessarily be performed in *one mechanical way* decided entirely by the adult mentors. The child, if alert at all, may impulsively find other, maybe easier, possibly *better* ways of accomplishing the required action.

The new popular wave being currently ridden by proponents of "Dianetics" at least spreads an atmosphere in which parents may become aware of how much they unknowingly cause to happen to the psychic nature of their child. An important phase of "dianetic auditing," as of psychoanalysis, consists of encouragement to the patient to re-live the feelings and events of early years—the theory being that all our irrational behavior flows from the shocks we have absorbed from our first confusing environments.

Some of the typically unnecessary interferences with children are described above, but more attention may be given to another sort of circumstance which contributes to maladjustment of the young, particularly since there has been no lack in authors who suggest how to worry about the adverse conditioning of the unpleasant *events* which occur during infancy. Our correspondent touches upon one of the subtlest and yet one of the most important loci of difficulty when he equates a child's "embattlement" with "conflicts due to the general hypocrisy typical of 'civilized' living," and when he later emphasizes the logical desire of the child to escape the "inflexible parent." While we have written much along this line, the need for continued probings is evident on every hand.

For instance, *The Manchester Guardian Weekly* for June 1 contains a singularly informative review on a Carnegie Trust publication by D. H. Stott, entitled *Delinquency and Human Nature.* We do not have the book at hand, but the reviewer summarizes something of signal importance in commenting upon Mr. Stott's thesis:

> A delinquent act, he says, is not a fortuitous episode, but the outcome of many emotional cross-currents. Delinquent breakdown is an escape from an emotional situation which for a particular boy with a specific background becomes, at least temporarily, intolerable. None of the 102 boys under discussion had simply yielded to casual temptation; very few of them had stolen because they coveted the object of their theft; few, if any, of the offences were due to a lack of moral training. In fifty-three cases these boys had turned to crime largely in order to keep at bay some anxiety at home too poignant to be faced.
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> One may ask why some breakdowns are delinquent while others are not. Mr. Stott did not set out to answer this question, but he emphatically denies that the boy who steals cannot distinguish

> right and wrong or disbelieves in the sanctity of private property. The trouble is rooted in a failure of affectionate relations between parent and child. This has nothing to do with "spoiling" on the one hand or excessive sternness on the other. It concerns the quality of family life in each separate household.

From this provocative statement and that of our contributing subscriber, we might proceed to reason that children may often become "bad" for no other reason than that they dislike the associations they have had with what is commonly called "good." The parent who is a verbal paragon of virtue, but a concealed tyrant and hypocrite, must certainly cause the child to actively dislike everything associated with conventionally "good" morality. Perhaps we can easily accept the truth and the logic of this, and yet be not sufficiently aware of the extent to which we are *all* tyrants and hypocrites in degree. Do we ever profess more than we can practice? An interesting conclusion legitimately drawn from Stott's book might be that no man can afford to profess a morality in excess of his own self-knowledge and self-control, since any lack of full respect from the child, or any dislike for a parent's attitudes or habits will probably become fastened, by negative association, to what is propounded as the "good life."

It warms us to see that the *Manchester Guardian* reviewer, who summarized Stott's book, subsequently found it exceedingly difficult to be courteous to another author, currently in publication on the subject of delinquency, who feels that one of the major causes of delinquency is abandonment of the conventional "practice of religion." It might be more correct to surmise that the delinquency of the present is in large part a working to the surface of *negative associations with conventional morality*—such as have been engendered by peculiarities of the practice of *conventional* religion in the past.

No matter how we sum matters up we are drawn to the conclusion that the greatest enemy of the child is indeed the hypocrisy and moral presumption of its elders. Delinquency is not the condition of "psychopathic personalities," whose numbers are very few, but a "normal" condition of our society—which we ignorantly perpetuate.

FRONTIERS

Free Universities and Faculty Responsibility

JUSTIFIABLE concern over communism and CP members has obscured a vital portion of the loyalty oath problem in universities. This is the question of the role of faculty members in important decisions which affect the institutions in which they are employed. The world-situation for the past five years and the demonstrable threat which the CP constitutes for our way of life have prevented both the public and many professors from either analyzing or appreciating this aspect of the *imposition* of loyalty oaths by regents and trustees on university faculties. We have failed to see that it threatens the autonomy of the faculty and we have not understood why this is important.

All of us are aware of the increasingly important part which institutions of higher learning are playing in our society. A college degree is becoming a necessary requirement for entry into many businesses as well as all professions. Universities are furnishing most of our essential research. Assuming that our society is more or less democratic, we can expect that these centers of higher learning should themselves be democratic institutions. This, for two reasons: First, it may be reasonably argued that one of the most important functions of a university, the quest for knowledge, will not be fulfilled if the university is not democratic in character. Secondly, and more importantly for present purposes, we cannot legitimately expect our universities to do their part in producing men and women who will feel at home and be useful in our society if the universities are not democratic. Even if we assume that they have some democratic qualities, every effort should be made to democratize them further.

What is a democratic university? The answer may be given by recalling what a democracy is. According to John Dewey, Sidney Hook and others, it is a society in which the major decisions are made with the freely given consent of the majority of the adults affected by those decisions. Without going into details, it may be seen that "freely given consent" presupposes active participation in the making of decisions, for without participation, interest in and concern for whatever is going on are not possible. People who are not interested in and concerned for social processes of which they are a part may be said to be irresponsible. Thus, any "consent" which they might give to decisions affecting them could not be regarded as freely given.

It is, then, a characteristic of a democratic society that its members participate in decisions affecting it. Similarly, a university will be democratic when its members, the faculty, participate in fundamental decisions affecting them.

Democratic universities are necessary in our society for two reasons, both related to the characteristic mentioned above. In the first place, as we have noted, when people do not participate in decisions affecting their activities they lose interest in the organizations of which they are a part. It is notorious that non-policymaking positions are dull. Individuals who occupy them have little or no interest in their work and soon become drudges. This applies in educational institutions as well as elsewhere. Furthermore, individuals who do not have anything to say in social processes which affect them soon lose concern for those processes. Their activity becomes routine. In the case of educators, this means routine teaching, lack of enthusiasm, instruction by rote which can be absorbed by students only in memory work. Thus one may argue that a university, or any school, which does not have this democratic characteristic of participation by its instructors in decisions affecting it will fail in one of its primary functions, teaching.

In the second place, are not educators poor examples for their students if they do not exhibit interest in and concern for their institutions and work, traits which can come only from active

participation in the government and conduct of those institutions? And how can students respect teachers who do not have the qualities of independence and interest?

It might be urged that professors need be interested only in their teaching and research, and that most of them do not wish to take active part in the government and general conduct of their universities. Experience has shown otherwise. The history of American education on the college and university level is in part a history of the struggle by faculties to obtain autonomy in all matters directly affecting their research and teaching. (See: "Academic Freedom and Tenure," Robert Ludlum, *Antioch Review*, Spring, 1950.) And even the professor who is absorbed in his strictly professional function would be highly incensed if he could not help to make decisions concerning his work whenever he thought it was necessary to do so.

If we grant what has been said, it is important to ask what are the matters in which the faculty must participate if a university is to be democratic. Faculty members must participate in—that is, be responsible for—all academic matters such as planning curricula, organization of courses, setting of standards and the employment and estimation of the worth of their colleagues. They should, in a word, participate in all matters which are related to the primary functions of a university, the seeking-and propagation of knowledge.

In large part because of this, faculties such as that of the University of California have resisted the imposition of loyalty oaths on the faculty by boards of regents or trustees. Independently of questions of communism, the faculties have seen in such procedures a threat to the self-government of the faculty. A matter vitally affecting them, who shall be a member of their teaching and research staff, was and is being taken out of their hands. Some professors were able to regard their opposition as a part of a long fight for a principle which is essential to the very nature of a university: the principle of faculty participation in all matters of fundamental policy. They would have waged a struggle regardless of the particular issue involved. It is unfortunate for the universities that the issue in this case was related to communism because this made it difficult to keep one's head and see clearly what was required.

However, the importance of faculty responsibility for major decisions as a factor in the recent controversies can no longer be overlooked. Its realization is an essential condition for the future success of our universities. If the faculties do not exert an increasingly strong influence in all aspects of their own government and leadership, the universities will cease to exist in the form which is necessary for our democratic society.

To achieve this influence they need the help of an enlightened public opinion and of a public which understands the crucial import of faculty autonomy. It is an heartening sign that a recent editorial in the *Saturday Evening Post* commented favorably on a suggestion put forward by Sidney Hook in the May 6 issue of the *New Leader*. Hook proposed that "it is time for educators to re-examine the mechanisms of university control, and to seek more direct and extensive participation in the governing boards of their institutions."

Such re-examination, perhaps with a view to obtaining faculty representation on governing boards (regents and trustees), will be understood by faculties. Its success will, however, depend in good part on public support. This requires that the public be informed and inform itself about the universities, the ways in which they operate and the purposes they serve.

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